S/PV.1140 Security Council

1 should like first of a11 to express my deep appreciation, as well as that of my colleagues, to Mr. Benhima of Morocco, who was President of the Seourity Council for the month of July, 1. Le d’abord et celle de mes coll&ues du Maroc, Conseil 2, In addition to his courtesy and charm, Mr. Benhima has always displayed a spirit of understanding and accommodation of differing points of view. May 1, therefore, be permitted, personally and on behalf of a11 memhers of the Security Council, to express our gratitude to Mr. Benhima for the contribution he has made to the Counoil’s work. 2. sonnel, préhension Je me permets nom d’offrir pour son apport à notre œuvre 3. sincsrement, paroles l’occasion a Bt$ trbs prksider écoulé, ProblBmes vous fonction, qualités vertus dont Conseil

1 thank you most sincesely, Mr. President, for your kind words regarding my presidency which, fortunately was very oalm, since 1 was not called upon to preside over a Council meeting during the month which has just elapsed. While the beginning of your own presidency is being attended by particularly anxious problems, 1 should like to wish you complete success during your term-success which Will certainly be ensured by your outstanding diplomatie talents and by the virtues of understanding, tact and diplomacy that you have always displayed, both in the Security Council and elsewhere. 4. blème vœu savoir-faire, fois avec le même succès avez su le guider a travers et aussi importants. 4, At a time when debate on an extremely delicate matter is about to begin, 1 would reiterate my hope that thanks to your intelligence and “savoir faire” the Council Will once more be able to accomplish its task in the same harmony and with the same success as in August 1963, when you guided it through equally delicate and important deliberations. 7. We explained that our request was based upon the elementary neoessity-apparent to anyone who repres ents a Government in the Seourity Counoil-of obtaining the necessary instructions. Unfortunately, this request of ours was only partly successful: instead of a morning meeting, and then instead of a meeting beginning at noon, it was agreed to postpone the meeting to 3 p.m, 8. 1 have to say that at 3 p.m., or rather, at this very moment, the Soviet delegation in the Security Council finds itself in the same position as when it requested the President and the other members of the Council to shift the beginning of the meeting to the morning of 6 August. 9. Accordingly, 1 repeat once more the Soviet delegation’s request to postpone the Counoills meeting to the morning of 6 August for the reasons1 have stated. 10. 1 should like to say in conclusion that we trust that those members of the Security Council who are interested in the Council’s examining more than the information which may be submitted by one side and which therefore cannot serve as a basis for the Council’s consideration of the question, Will support the Soviet delegation’s appeal-which is reasonable and is normal in such circumstances as these-that the Security Counoil should, from the very start, have an opportunity to study the question before us from a11 sides-let me repeat: from a11 sides.

Having asked for this urgent meeting [S/5849],1/ 1 take the liberty of replying to the request of the representative of the Soviet Union for apostponement. 1 asked for an urgent meeting in the light of armed attacks on the high seas. There have been two such armed attacks in the past two days. Despite these aggressive actions, my Government has sought to dampen the explosive potentialities, the implications of which we must a11 be aware, and to reduce the likelihood of expanding the conflict. 12. We have already agreed, at the request of the Soviet Union, to a delay until this aftern?on. Any further delay would seem to me improper beoause the Council shouid be fully and promptly informed about the ciroumstances. 1 am sure a11 of the members know that the Council has acted and canact with great rapidity when the need arises. Indeed, there have been several recent examples of the speed with which this body cari respond. One such example was on the even- 13, More recently, during the afternoon of 13 March, the representative of Cyprus again sought an urgent meeting of the Council and, without undue delay, the Council convened at 6 o’clock that evening. 14, Members will note that in both instances the Couacil was convened at the request of a Member State which feared that hostile action against it was imminent, In the present instance a series of deliberate hostile actions have already taken place. But even more important-and 1 had not thought it necessary to remind any member of the Seourity Council-the Charter of the United Nations provides not for deliberate consideration, but explicitly calls for immediate reporting to the Council, of measures taken by Members in the exercise of their right of self-defence. 15. Under these circumstances, while I should like very much to accommodate the representative of the Soviet Union, 1 am unable to agree with the idea that we should now delay the deliberations of the Counoil. If the Council wishes to adjourn alter hearing our statement, we would certainly have no objection, in order to give time to other delegations as well to receive their instructions. But that we shouldproceed now, consistent with the language of the Charter requiring of a11 Members, imposing as aduty upon them, the immediate reporting of such circumstances, Ifeel is self-evident.

Mr . President , during your consultations this morning you were good enough to ask the Czeohoslovak delegation for its opinion, We replied that we dicl not wish to participate in a Security Council debate on the question proposed for inclusion in the agenda of the present meeting, tions, vous avez bien voulu demander l’avis de la figurer a l’ordre du jour de la P&ente 1’7, This reply was motivated by the necessity for the Seourity Council, when discussing a matter as serious as this, to be in possession of very complete documentation and a full knowledge of the facts, and to be informed of the views of the parties concerned. 17. Les raisons qui ont motivé notre réponse Btaient fondées sur la nécessité, pour le Conseil de strcuritk, en déliberant sur une question aussi s&ieuse,d’avoir une documentation très complète concernant les faits et une pleine connaissance de ceux-ci, aussibien que des divers points de vue des parties int&essées. 18. Etant donné qu’actuellement nous ne possédons qu’une version des &vi%ements qui se sont d&oulés, je ne crois pas qu’il serait utile, qu’il serait juste, ni même fructueux, dans une délibération qui ne porterait que sur cette seule version, 18. Since at the present time we possess only one version of the events which have taken place, 1 do not think it would be useful, just or even productive for the Security Council to start a debate based on this version alone. 19. Le représentant des Etats-Unis a voulu nous impressionner en insistant sur l’urgence de la réunion du Conseil de sécurit8. Malheureusement, il faut dire que ma délégation n’a pas été convaincue par ce qu’il vient de déclarer. Quelle urgence y a-t-il Conseil de sécuritB a entendre seulement la version américaine des évknements? Les Etats-Unis sont-ils menacés? Les intérêts vitaux des Etats-Unis courentils un danger? Je comprendrais bien l’usgence si les Etats-Unis avaient demandé la convocation du Conseil 19. The representative of the United States has tried to impress us by stressing the urgencyof the Security Council meeting. Unfortunately, it must be said that my delegation has not been oonvinced by the statement he has just made, What urgency is there for the Se- Gurity Council to hear only the American version of the events? 1s the United States threatened? Are the vital interests of the United States in danger? 1 could well understand the urgenoy if the United States had requested a meeting of the Security Council before 20. For this reason my delegation-as 1 am sure you Will recall, Mr. President, that 1 told you this morning-persists in its request that the Security Council’s meeting should not be held today but should be postponed until tomorrow.

Mr. President, before taking the floor I should like to hear the views of my oolleagues and then have the question 1 raised finally settled.

It seems to my delegation to be an esseatial part of our duties in this Council to be ready to meet, if called on to do SO, in circumstances of urgency. On this occasion, Mr. President, we have answered your cal1 to a meeting, and a11 members of the Council are present and we are in a position to conduct our business. 23. Purthermore, the representative of the United States bas made clear that he is seeking to discharge the responsibility of making an immediate report on the matters referred to in his letter asking for a meeting in accordance with the Charter. 24. In these circumstances, the requestfor ameeting seems to my delegation entirely proper, and it is our view that we should proceed to hear the report which the United States delegation wishes to make. Whether we go further this afternoon is, as Mr. Stevenson suggested, for later consideration. But having regard to what was stated by the representative of the Soviet Union, it would seem to me that some members of the Council, at any rate, if in needof further instructions, might firld it helpful to hear the statement of the United Stateu representative, 25. Mr, MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) : As apparently no other member of the Counoil intends at this time to speak on the question 1 have raised, andin view of the insistence with which the United States representative is asking the Council to discuss the proposed item this very day, 1 am prepared, if the United States representative continues to insist-1 repeat-1 am preparecl to take part today in the discussion of this item and 1 ask that the name of the Soviet delegation should be put down on the list of speakers to speak after the representative of the United States makes his statement in the Council. Perhaps a similar request Will be made by other representativeswho seem 27, Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): 1 have already stated that the Soviet delegation is not opposed in prinoiple to the holding of a meeting of the Seourity Council. With regard to the wording of item 2 of the provisional agenda, “Letter dated 4 August 1964 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council”, we shall not abject to the adoption of the agenda with the understanding that it means the Security Counoil Will be considering a United States complaint concerning alleged attacks by torpedo-boats of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam against destroyers of the United States of America and that our position in no way signifies that we accept the correctness of the terminology contained in the United States representative’s letter , which uses the words “Hanoi rggime “. It is well known that there is no “Hanoi r8gime” but there is a Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, a sovereign State which has gained wide international reoognition. 28. Having made these remarks, we shall not abject to the adoption of the agenda.

Mr. Presidem, since it seems that you wish to overlook the objections originally raised by the delegation of the Czechoslovak Sooialist Republic, 1 must repeat that the delegation of Czechoslovakia maintains those objections. 30. The wording of the letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the President of the Security Council cari only confirm the soundness of our objections, for to judge by the text of this letter it would seemthat the powerful fleet of the Democratic Republio of Viet-Nam is threatening the existence of the tiny fleet of the United States. 31, 1 would not wish to stress the ludicrous impression that may be created by the wording of the letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States; but 1 would ask you, Mr. President, to note that the delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic adheres to its objections and Will participate in this meeting only because a11 the other members of the Security Council have agreed that a meeting should take place. Despite tbis circumstance, my delegation maintains its objections and its doubts as to the advisability of holding a meeting today.

The President has recorded the maintenance of the objection by the representative of Czechoslovakia to the holding of a meeting today. There being no further comments in regard to the provisional agenda, the agenda is adopted. The agenda was adopted. 34. Naval vessels of my Government on routine operations in international waters in the Gulfof Tonkin have been subjected to deliberate and repeated armed attacks. We therefore have found it neoessary to take defensive measures. 35. The major faots about these incidents were announced last night by the President of theunited States and communlcated to other Governments. At the same time 1 was instructed to request this meeting. 1 shall reoount these facts for the members in chronological order. 3 6, At 8.8 a.m. GMT on 2 August of this gear, the United States destroyer Maddox was on routine patrol in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin.moceeding in a south-easterly direction away fro& the ooast about thirty miles at sea from the mainland of North Viet-Nam. 37. The Maddox was approaohed by three high-speed North Viet-Namese torpedo-boats inattackformation. When it was evident that these to%pedo-boats intended to take offensive action, the Maddox, in accordance with naval practioe, fired thremng shots across the bows of the approaching vessels. At approximately the same time, the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga,which was also in international waters and had been alerted to the impending attack, sent out four aircraft to provide air caver for the Maddox. The pilots were under orders not to fire unless they or the Maddox were fired upon first. 38. Two of the attacking craft fired torpedoes which the Maddox evaded by changing course. Al1 three attackingessels directed machine-gun-fire at the Maddox, One of the attacking vessels approached for close attack and was struck by fire from the Maddox. After the attack was broken off the Maddox continued on a southerly course in international waters. 39. New, clearly this was a deliberate armed attack against a naval unit of the United States Government on patrol on the high seas, almost thirty miles off the mainland. 40. Nevertheless, my Government did its utmost to minimize the explosive potential of this flagrant attaok in the hopes that this might be an isolated or uncalculated action. There was local defensive fire. The United States was not drawn into hasty response. 41. Then, on 3 August, the United States took steps to convey to the Hanoi r0gime a note calling attention to this aggression stating that United ‘States ships would continue to operate freely on the high seas in accordance with the rights guaranteed by international law, and warning the authorities in Hanoi of the “grave conseyuences whieh would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against 43. Il né pouvait s’agissait prémgditee droits On ne pouvait d’autorit& pour parvenir oonskquences. 43. There no longer oould be any shadow of doubt that this was a planned deliberate military aggression against vessels lawfully present in international waters, One oould only conclude that this was the work of authorities dedicated to the use of force to achieve their objectives regardless of the oonsequenoes. 44. My Government therefore determined to take positive but limited and relevant measures to secure its naval units against further aggression, Last night aerial strikes were thus carried out against North Viet-Namese torpedo-boats and their support facilities. This action was limited in scale-its only targets being the weapons and facilities against which we had been forced to defend ourselves. Our fervent hope is that the point has now been made that acts of armed aggression are not to be tolerated in the Gulf of Tonkin any more than they are to be toleratedanywhere else. 44. Mon des mesures ses navires C lest ainsi la nuit nord-vietnamiennes action n’avait étaient lesquels Nous esperons clairement sion arm8e qulailleurs. 45, 1 want to emphasize that the action wehave taken is‘ a limited and measured response fitted precisely to the attack that produced it, and that the deployments of additional United States forces to South-East Asia are designed solely to deter further aggression. This is a single action designed to make unmistakably clear that the United States oannot be diverted by military attack from its obligations to help its friends establish and protect their independence. Our naval units are continuing their routine patrolling on the high seas with orders to protect themselves with a11 appropriate means against any further aggression. As President Johnson said last night, “We still seek no wider war ‘1. 45. Je tiens avons prise exactement que les deploiements mentaires qu’il dgoourager d’une mesure puisse laisseront de l’obligation prot8ger poursuivent mer avec appropri& sident Johnson chercher 46. Let me repeat that the United States vessels were in international waters when they were attacked. Let me repeat that freedom of the seas is guaranteed under long-accepted international law applying to a11 nations alike. Let me repeat that these vessels took no belligerent actions of any kind until they were subjected to armed attaok. And let me sayonce more that the action they took in self-defence is the right of a11 nations and is fully within the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 46, Je réphterai, navires internationales que la libert8 de droit qui sont Je rép&terai acte de belligerance oil ils ont été l’objet une fois prises l’ont défense pleinement des Nations 2/G eneva Conference on the problem of restoring peace in Indo- China, held from 8 May to 21 July 1954. 21 Conférence paix en Indochine, 48. Al1 these wanton acts of violence and of destruction fit into the larger pattern of what has been going on in South-East Asia for the past decade and a half. SO does the army of terrorist gangs in South Viet-Nam by the régimes of Hanoi and Peking. SO does the infiltration of armed personnel to make war against the legitimate Government of that nation. SO does the fighting hi Laos, and a11 of the acts of subversion, and a11 of the propaganda, and the sabotage of the international machinery established to keep the peace by the Geneva Agreements, and the deliberate and systematic and flagrant violations of those Agreements by two régimes which signed them and which, by a11 tenets of decenoy, law and civilized praotice, are bound by their provisions. 49. The attempt to sink United States destroyers in international waters is much more spectaoular than the attempt to murder the mayor of a village in his bed at night; but they are both part of the pattern, and the pattern is designed to subjugate the people of South-East Asia to an empire ruledbymeans of force, of rule by terror, of expansion by violence. It is only in this larger view that we cari discuss intelligently the matter that we have brought to this Council. 50. In bis statement last night President Johnson concluded by emphasizing that the mission of the United States is peace. Under the explicit directions of President Johnson, 1 want to repeat that assurance in the Security Council this afternoon: our mission in South-East Asia is peace. 51. We hoped that the peace settlement of 1954would lead to peace in Viet-Nam. We hoped that that settlement and the 1962 supplementary Agreements signed at the Geneva Confexence?! would lead to peace in Laos. Communist governments have tried aggression before and have failed. Each time the lesson has had to be learned anew. We are dealing here with a régime that has not yet learned the lesson that aggression does not pay, cannot be sustained, and will be thrown back by people who believe, as we do, that people want freedom and they want independence, and not subjugation and the role of satellites in a modern empire. 52. In South-East Asia we want nothing more, and nothing less, than the assured and guaranteed independenoe of the peoples of that area, We are in South- East Asia to help our friends preserve their own opportunity to be free of imported terror, of alien bWL3SinatiOn, managed by the North Viet-Nam Com- -- 3/ International COnference on the Sertlement of the Laotian Question, held in Geneva from 12 May 1961 to 23 July 1962. l’ordre très que du se retirent région simple mette l’indépendance au franchissement ti8res lution de violer pour “The people of Laos want to be left alone. The people of Viet-Nam want to be left alone. The people of Cambodia want to be left alone. When their neighbours deoide to leave them alone , , . there Will be no fighting in South-East Asia and no need for American advisers to leave their homes to help these people resist aggression. Any time that decision cari be put in enforoeable terms, my Government Will be only too happy to put down the burden that we bave been sharing with those determined to preserve their independence. Until such assurances are forthcoming, we shall stand for the independence of free peoples in South-East Asia as we have elsewhere.” [ 1119th meeting, paras. 61-62.1 Le peuple paix, en paix. laisser du Sud-Est conseillers aider que pareille termes mon gouvernement le fardeau résolus que nous n’aurons drons du [lllgème That is what I said to the Council in May; that is what I repeat to this Council in August. Voila je rép&e 54. When the political settlements freely negotiated at the conference tables in Geneva are enforced, the independence of South Viet-Nam and of South-East hsia Will be guaranteed. When the peace agreements reaohed long ago are made effective, peace will 54. gociés respectes, garantie. longtemps paix militaires P3tUrn to South-East Asia ‘and military power cari be withdrawn. 55. Mr, MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) : First of all,I must inform the Council that I am now-since this meeting started-in a position to present to the Council some considerations and practical suggestions from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the item before us. 55. soviétiques) vous je et propositions soviétique oocupons. 56. The Soviet delegation in the Seourity Council deems it necessary to emphasize, first of all, that as at this moment, after hearing the statement of the 56. ligner la déclaration rique, ments kté démocratique pilleurs ~W'eSelitatiVe of the United States of America, the Council still has only one-sided information about the alleged attacks by torpedo-boats of the Democratic nepublic of Viet-Nam against United States destroyers. 57. It is natural, then, that it should occur to every fair-minded participant in this meeting and to world 57. présente 58. The need for obtaining that information from the other party is diotated by the great importance of the oircumstances involved which must be clarified if the Security Counoil is to be able to discuss the present item with a real knowledge of the situation, a real knowledge of a11 the fa&% 59. Such information is further called for by the fact that the public statements quoted here regarding the alleged attack by torpedo-boats against the United States destroyer Maddox had been made by the United States spokesmen on the day following a protest from the Government of the Democratic Republio of Viet- Nam pointing out that the United States andits lackeys in South Viet-Nam had sent warships to bombard the islands of Hon Me and Hon Ngu, situated in the territorial waters of the Democratic Republio of Viet-Nam, after a raid by United States bombers on a Viet- Namese frontier post and a Viet-Namese village in the Ke Son district, twenty kilometres from the Viet- Namese-Laotian frontier. 60. I should also like to draw the Council’s attention to the fact that the United Nations Charter, in Article 32, contains the following very important instruotion, directly applicable to the matter we are discussing. Article 32 of the Charter states: “Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute, , o ,N 61. In this connexion 1 should think it necessary to observe that if the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam wishes to take part in the meetings of the Security Council, it will be the obligation-1 repeat: the obligation-of the Security Council, in accordance with the Article 1 have just quoted, to invite forthwith representatives of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam at once to take part in the Council’s work. 62. Permit me now to turn to certain circumstances which have remained and still remain unexplained and may remain unexplained in the future if we make use only of the one-sided information which has been made available to the Council. 63. As is known, on 4 August of this year the United States Department of Defense announoed that torpedoboats of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam had allegedly oarried out a new attack against United States vessels and that as a result the United States destroyers Maddox and C. Turner Joy sank two communist torpedo-boats and damaged two others. 64. In the case of this incident as Weil, one must not ignore the circumstance that the Security Council has r eceived no officia1 information from the other party- 66. 1 have to declare that the Soviet Government most emphatically condemns the bombardment of coastal installations of the Demooratic Republic of Viet-Nam by United States armed forces. In our view, such acts cari only be oharacterized as aggressive. 66. condamne formellement forces armkes les oôtes de la République Nous estimons que des actes de cette nature ne peuvent &tre qualifi& 67. In the view of the Soviet Government, the United States plans to expand its military operations inSouth Viet-Nam are fraught with great danger to the maintenance of peace in a11 of South-East Asia. 67. De l’avis du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis opérations menacent gravement le maintien l’Asie 68. Unis arrêteront taires Dans la négative, les Etats-Unis lourde responsabilité 69. Cela dit, comme mente tout juste B aborder l’examen qu’il bmanant non pas seulement bien des deux parties, propositions raient à l%tude juste et conforme aux buts, aux principes de la Charte de notre organisation. 68. The Soviet Government expects the United States to cal1 an immediate halt to its military operations against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, If it does net, the United States Will bear a heavy responsibility for the consequenoes of those operations. 69. Having said that and while bearing in mind that the Seourity Council is only beginning its examination of this item and that its examination of this requires the presentation not only of informationfromoneparty but also of the information in the possession of the other party, I intend shortly to put forward some practical proposals which, in our view, may facilitate an objective examination by the Seourity Council of the problem before it and thereby lead to a correct decision in keeping with the purposes, principles and spirit of the Charter. 70. Before taking the liberty of submitting these practical proposals for the Council’s consideration, I should like to reserve my right at an appropriate stage of this discussion to comment on the exposé just given us by the United States representative of the purposes of his countryls policy in the South-East Asia region, and in particular in respect of the Democratic Republio of Viet-Nam, in which he portrayed his oountry and his Government as fighters for the freedom and independence of the peoples of South-East Asia and thus triecl to represent matters as being entirely different from what they really are. 71. We shall corne back to this; 1 onlywish to record the fact that at this junoture, when we are just beginning OUI consideration of this item, I am not overlooking these assertions by the United States representative, and we cannot, of course, agree in the slightest with those assertions in the last part of his statement. 70. Avant de soumettre je me r&serve stade ult&ieur tique des Etats-Unis a l’égard buts dont vient de parler Unis, et l’indépendance qui a tenté ainsi de présenter bien différent de la réalité. 71. Nous en reparlerons: remarquer, de la question, des Etats-Unis et que nous ne saurions souscrire aux assertions sa d&laration, 72. du Conseil liminaires ment sovi&ique, 79. In Conclusion, 1 should like to submit for the COUnCil’S consideration the preliminary practical PrOPOSalS whîch, from my point of view and the point of VieW of the Soviet Government, represent the steps “The Security Council, “In view of the complaint by the Government of the United States of America alleging that an attaok has been carried out by PT boats of the Democratio Republic of Viet-Nam on United States destroyers, “1. Requests the President of the Security Counoil to ask the Government of the Democratic Republio of Viet-Nam to supply the Council urgently with the necessary information relating to the United States complaint; “2. Invites representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to take part without delay in the meetings of the Security Council.” 74. I submit that those members of the Counoil who are interested in an objective consideration of the question, who are interested in eliminating the serious threat to peace and security that has arisen,will want to support this proposa1 of the Soviet Government as a first step towards creating the necessaryconditions for the adoption of appropriate and correct decisions by the Security Council, ‘75. I Will hand the text of this draft resolution over to the Secretariat, SO that it may be oirculated without delay-perhaps, in view of its brevity, even before the end of the consecutive interpretation of this statement of mine required by the Council’s provisional rules of procedure-and SO that the members of the Council may have before them as quickly as possible these practical and concrete first proposals of the Soviet Government on the item under discussion, ‘76. Mr. JACKLING (United Kingdom) : In view of the statement that we have just heard from the representative of the Soviet Union, my delegation deems it necessary to make clear its position on the matter before us this afternoon. 77. The representative of the United States has, on behalf of his Government, reported to the Council on the measures taken by the United States resulting from a series of attacks onUnitedStates naval vessels on the high seas. 78. Mr. Stevenson has explained to the Council that these measures have been taken in exercise of the right of self-defence. The latest attacks on the United States ships took place, according to the information we have been given, some sixty-five miles from land. It seems to my delegation in these ciroumstanoes that, having regard to the repeated nature of these attaoks and their mounting scale, the United States Government has a right, in accordance with the principle of self-defence as interpreted in international kW, to take action directed to prevent the recurrence of such attacks on its ships. Preventive action in aooordance with that aim is an essential right which is embraced by any definition of that principle of self-defence. It therefore seems to my delegation that the action taken by the United States Government is fully consistent with Article 51 of the Charter. 80. membres ment, un long passe principe par de guerre devons certainement non provoqu&es cesser. tels prendre en vertu qui nous occupe, attaque isolee contre des navires dans les eaux internationales; eu des attaques qu’elles 80. Mr. President, you and the other members of the Council Will appreciate that my Government, representing as it does a nation with a long maritime history and dedicated to the principle of the freedom of the seas, must view with abhorrence unprovoked attacks upon warships proceeding on their lawfui occasions on the high seas. We must surely a11 agxee that such unprovoked attacks and acts of violence _ must be stopped. It is the right of every nation whose ships are subjected to such acts of aggression on the high seas to take immediate measures to that end in accordance with the right of self-defence. In the present case, there has not been merely one isolated attack on United States warships in international waters; we have been told that there have been repeated attacks, the nature of which is such as to indicate that they were deliberately mounted. 81. devoir Charte pour empêcher Tout chercher avons droit Charte. sentant des Etats-Unis apr&s-midi, que son gouvernement dans l’exercice sont pleinement h ce que prevoit 81. We in this Council are duty bound to support action taken in accordance with the Charter to prevent their repetition. There is an obligation on every lVIember of this Organization to seek to preserve international peaoe. Equally, we have an obligation to uphold the right of self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter, It is right and proper that the United States representative should have reported to the Council this afternoon, as he has SO clearly and ably done, the measures which his Government has felt compelled to take in exercise of this right-measures which, 1 repeat, are in the view of my delegation fully consistent with Article 51 of the Charter. 82. Mr. President, the representative of the Soviet Union has introduced a draft resolution for the Council% consideration and 1 reserve the right with your permission, Mr. President, to comment on the proposals of the Soviet delegation at a later stage of our discussion. 82. soviétique lution, je me &Serve de faire proposition

At this stage of our discussion, let me content myself with saying that, in the view of my delegation, the action taken by the United States iS entirely justified under the established rules of international law and under the provisions of the United Nations Charter. 83. de notre de ma délGgation, Unis reconnues de la Charte 84. If you, Mr. President, think itis inorder, 1 would like to address myself very briefly to the proposa1 to invite representatives of the Hanoi regime to participate in the deliberations of the Council. 84. je puisse ment de la proposition sentants rations 65. It was by a stroke of the pen ten years ago in Geneva that Viet-Nam was trunoated at the 17th Parallel. Since that time the communists in the northern part of Viet-Nam have embarked on a course of subversion and ag&ession against the countries of South-East Asia. They bave, through the years, trained and armed Pathet-Lao and Viet-Cong guerrilla units and have increasingly and overtly supported and directed offensive actions in Laos and South Viet-Nam. These acts of lawlessness have now culminated in armed acts of violence on the high seas. 85. Geneve, le Viet-Nam parallble. du Viet-Nam version l’Asie entrafi et du Vietcong tement, ils ont appuy8 et dirig8 au Laos et au Viet-Nam mepris minant avec des actes de violence 36, b'Wdt the Viet-Nain communists have to say has been said in unmistakable terms by their deeds. TO 86. avoir

May 1 draw the attention of the members of the Council to the draft resolution which was introduced by the representative of the Soviet Union a little while ago. The draft resolution in writing is now being distributed by the Secretariat [5/5851].

My delega.tion has listened attentively to the sta.tements made during this afternoon’s meeting. At this stage of the discussion we wish to speak merely on the point of order raised by the representative of the Soviet Union. .89. My delegation regards it as self-evident and in line with the Charter and the Councills tradition that the parties to the dispute should be enabled to state their case, We therefore consider itright that a represcntative of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam should be invited, as a matter of urgency, to participate in our debate without vote. 90. On the other hand, it would seem tous preferable -on the basis of numerous precedents-to entrust our President once more with the task of ta&ing action on any wishes that the Counoil might express, without voting on a resolution whose terms might give rise to controversy and whioh might thus prolong this debate to no purpose. 91. The French delegation therefore expresses the hope that the representative of the Soviet Union will agree that in this case the substance is more important than the form, and that he Will not insist on the draft resolution he has read being put tc the vote, if the Counoil-as the French delegation hopes-proves favourable to the participation in our debate of a representative of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam,

1 have little comment on Mr. Morozov’s extensive remarks, except to observe that, for a representative who, at 3.30 p.m., protested that he couldnot possibly get instructions until tomorrow, he had quite a bit to say at 4,30 p.m., submitting even a draft resolution, 93. His suggestion that the Council should condemn the United States for defending itself and its ships against unprovoked attack in international waters is certainly a novel concept-that the NorthViet-Namese oan attack United States ships outside of their territorial waters, but that the United States ships may not defend themselves. 94. I repeat again that the objective of the United States is peace, and not war; we want no wider war in Viet-Nam or anywhere else. But if others attaok us, let there be no doubt that’we Will defend ourselves, as 1 trust the incidents in Viet-Nam in the past few days have made clear. 95. I must comment for a moment on the draft resolution that has been presented. The United States, 96. The attack on our destroyers was an extension of Hanoi’s aggression against the Republic of Viet- Nam, and the representative of the Soviet Union has also made accusations in his remarks against the Republic of Viet-Nam. Perhaps the best way, then, to handle this matter might be to provide an opportunity for informa1 consultations among Council members SO that appropriate invitations could go forward.

1 am taking the floor at this time only becausc 1 see that for the moment the President has no other speakers on his list from among those of my colleagues who have as yet not expressed any views or participated in thepresent discussion. 98. If the Soviet delegation were to set itself the task of pleasing the representative of the United States in this Council, we would certainly find ourselves in a very difficult position-I say, if we were to set ourselves that task. When 1 stated that 1 needed a certain delay , on entirely legitimate and reasonable grounds, in beginning the consideration of this item, that did not please the representative of the United States. He felt that the item must be considered. When the circumstances 1 spoke of changed, that too seemed to displease him, and he attached such great importance to this that he began his second statement with a reference to it. In otler words, we are always wrong, whatever we do, 99, However , in explaining the position of principle and the policy of the Soviet State, we have never considered it our task to be guided by anybody’s likes and dislikes. That is why in my statement 1 cited the considerations-the considerations of principle-on which the Soviet Government Will base its assessment of the question undei discussion, and that is why 1 continue to believe that the representative of the United States is the only one here who is displeased by the fact that this happened today, right after his statement, and net later, at subsequent meetings of the Council. 100. In contrast to what has just been said here by the United States representative, we also proposed practical steps which, in our view, Will help the Council to arrive at correct decisions. 101, In response to these practical steps and proposals, the United States representative has hastened tc suggest that a representative of South Viet-Nam should be invited; he cited as a reason the fact that reference was made to sepresentatives of South Viet- Nam in the statement of the Soviet delegation. We did indeed refer to them in our statement-as lackeys Of the United States. We say that again now. But we believe that in the consideration of the complaint brought before the Council, concerning an alleged attack by torpedo-boats of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam against United States destroyers, the United 103. The second observation 1 wish to make-in connexion with the statements of other representativesis that 1 am grateful to those who have already indicated their support, both in the corridors of the Security Council and here, publicly, at the meeting of the Security Council, for the two practical proposais which we put before the Council at the end of our statement, namely-1 Will repeat them since the draft resolution is now before the members of the Council-to request the President of the Security Council to ask the Government of the Democratio Republic of Viet-Nam to supply the Council urgently with the necessary information relating to the United States complaint and, secondly, to invite representatives of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam ta take part without delay in the meetings of the Security Council. 104. If a decision of the kind mentioned by the Frenoh representative is adopted in the way he described, that is to say, if it expresses a unanimous view of the Council, and the President takes the steps required of him under the above proposals-both in operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of the draft resolution-obviously, that would have the practical effect of achieving what the Soviet delegation, the Soviet Government, was seeking in submitting its proposals for the Counoil’s consideration. 105, The PRESIDENT: 1 bave no further speakers on the list for this afternoon’s meeting. 106. 1 should like to draw attention first to a suggestion made by the representative of Francewithregard to the prooedure which he considered to be the most flexible and the most useful in the prevailing circumstances-and the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States have made certain comments in that regard which clarified their positions. Naturally, the President is in the hands of the Council. If it is the desire of the members of the Counoil that the President consult with them informally on the basis of the proposa1 made by the representative of France, and in the light of the comments thereon offered by the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States , naturally the President will attempt to undertake suoh informa1 consultations. 107. May 1 add that if the Council would wish to follow such a procedure with regard to the next meeting of the Council, it would not be my intention to cal1 any meeting tomorrow since that, for important reasons, would seriously inconvenience some of the members present at the Council table. Naturally, that statement refers to a meeting in which I would report on the outcome of such consultations, if the Council wanted me to undertake them. If there were any unforeseen and unexpected developments in regard to the substance of the question which is now before the Council, of course it would be natural for the Council to be reconvened at short notice, Il en est ainsi décid& It was so decfded. 110. sident procédure prochaine 110, The PRESIDENT will consult with the members of the Counoil with regard to the procedure to be followed as well as with regard to the date and time of the next meeting. The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications may distributors throughout the Write to: United Nations, Sales COMMENT SE PROCURER LES tes publications des Nations Unies agences dépositaires du monde entier. ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de las Naciones casas distribuidoras en todas partes dirijase a: Naciones Unidas, Seccion Litho in U.N. Price: $LJ.S 0.35 (or equivalent in other currencies)