S/PV.1141 Security Council

It is my sad duty to inform the members of the Security Council that the President of the Council of State of the Polish People’s Republic, Aleksander Zawadzki, passed away today. President Zawadzki, who was born in 1899, devoted his life to serving his people and his country. lVIay 1 request the Acting Permanent Representative of Poland to convey to the Polish Government, the Polish people and the family of the late President the deep-felt condolences of the Security Council. 1. triste de d’Etat Aleksander dent Zawadzki, au service le repr.&entant de bien vouloir nais, disparu de sécurité, 2. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republits) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation was profoundly grieved to hear of the untimely death of the President of the Council of State of the Polish People’s Republic, Aleksander Zawadzki. 2. M. MOROZOV soviétiques) profonde nouvelle du Conseil Pologne, Aleksander 3. On this sad occasion the Soviet delegation offers its sincere condolences to the Polish delegation and the Polish mission to the United Nations, The Soviet people share with the Polish people the full burden of this 10s~. 3. ses condol8ances et à la mission des Nations deuil que cette perte 4. We, the Soviet people, held in special esteem the activity of Aleksander Zawadzki, who did SO much to strengthen and develop brotherly relations between the peoples of Poland and the Soviet Union. The name of Aleksander Zawadzki was well known outside his own country. During the years when he was Head of State the Polish Peoplefs Republic did much to promote the Principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different political systems, to achieve progress in the disarmament negotiations, to develop friendly relations among peoples, and to strengthen peace and SeCurity, in which a11 peoples on earth are vitally interested. 4. l’activit6 renforcer entre Son nom est bien pays, a bté le chef de l’Etat, Pologne a beaucoup cipes des syst&mes des négociations loppement pour

It is with deep emotion that our delegation has heard the sad news of the death of Aleksander Zawadzki, the President of the Council of State of the Polish People’s Republic. In this moment of sadneSS ous delegation, like the Government and people of the Czechoslovak Socialist Flepublic, feels itself even more closely linked to the brother people of Poland. 7. Through his constructive efforts in many ffelds of Poland’s development and in the struggle for peace and peaceful coexistence between the peoples, the late President played an outstanding role. Heplayedno less a part in the life of the Polish people and in the community of socialist countries. He made a very great contribution to the development of fraternal relations between the peoples of the neighbour countries of Poland and Czechoslovakia, closely linked by ethnie and cultural ties and by a common effort to build socialism and contribute to the victory of peace. 8. Throughout his life Aleksander Zawadzki personified the most noble efforts made by the Polish people in this cause, May I ask my dear friend Mr. Wyzner, the Aoting Permanent Representative of the Polish People’s Republic, to accept my delegation’s condolence and expression of sympathy and to transmit them to his Government and people.

On behalf of my Government, I wish to add our expression of sympathy and of sorrow on the occasion of the death of Aleksander Zawadzki, President of the Counoil of State of Poland. His long service to the people and to the Government of Poland is known and respected far beyond the borders of bis country. 1 remember personally the good fortune of meeting him and the courtesy that he paid my Government on the occasion of the death of President Kennedy by his presence at the funeral ceremonies in Washington, President of the Council of State for twelve years, he markedly influenced the policy and the progress of his great country. 10. My Government shares theuniversal sympathyfor Poland, for its Government and for the family of the late President.

It is with great sadness that the French delegation has learnt of the death of the President of the Council of State of the Polish Republic, a country with which France has many ties of long standing. 12. My delegation unreservedly associates itself with the fcelings of grief and sympathy expressed by several of my colleagues, and asks the Acting Permanent R.epresentative of the Polish People’s Republic 14. My delegation wishes to convey its condolence to the Polish delegation at this moment of sorrowfor the people of Poland, with whom we in Britain have had ties of friendship maintained through many vicissitudes. 14. a la del8gation pour la Grande-Bretagne s’est les vicissitudes.

His Majesty the King of Morocco has alreaciy sent a telegram of condolence to the Polish Government on behalf of the Government and people of Morocco. In addition, 1 would like to express here in the Security Council the sadness which the Moroccan delegation has felt on hearing the news of the death of Aleksander Zawadzki. We extend our sincere condolente to the Polish delegation. Under Aleksander Zawadzki’s leadership, Poland played an important part in international affairs. exerting every effort on behalf of peace and, more specifically, of world-wide disarmament and denuclearization. 15. Maroc condol&ances gouvernement gramme, sein du Conseil ve la dalegation d’aleksander condoléances du r8le que la Pologne, Zawadzki, ployant souviendra Pologne, a joue dans la question de la d&uclearisation 16. My country maintains excellent relations with Poland; in particular, 1 would refer to the great industrial and agricultural successes achieved by the Polish Government, whose outstanding experts are now working to promote prosperity and progress in Morocco. 16. tions les importantes du Gouvernement perts des œuvres 17. LVe join the previous speakers in expressing our condolence and the profound sadness felt by our people. 1 am sure that the many Poles living in my country will have witnessed this feeling on the part of the people of Morocco. 1’7. Nous de se faire ment de profonde certain dans tristesse 18. grande la nouvelle dent de Pologne, longtemps, entremise, de la Pologne la m*ssion blique dert Aleksander

It is with great grief that the Brazilian delegation has learnt of the death of Aleksander Zawadzki, President of the Council of State of the Polish People’s Republic, a country with which Brazil has long maintained ties of deep friendship. Through you, Mr. President, I ask the Polish mission to convey the condolence of the Brazilian mission to the Government of the Polish People’s Republic and to the family of President Aleksander Zawadzki..

Bolivia, like other Latin American countries, maintains diplomatie relations with the Polish People’s Republic. Through these friendly relations, my Government and the Bolivian people developed agreat admirationfor Aleksander Zawadzki, who rendered important services to his country, 1 accordingly wish to ask the Polish delegation to the United Nations to transmit, on our behalf, the same heartfelt condolence as that already expressed by the representatives who have preceded me. 19. de l’espagnol]: d’Amérique matiques ces a mon pour services demander l’organisation egalement prime 21. My country, like a11 the other countries represented here, feels sincere grief on this sad occasion Of the desth of the Polish Head of State. Through you, Mr. President, 1 wouldexpress to the Polishdelegation the sorrow and condolence of the delegation of the Evory Caast. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. Letter dated 4 August 1964 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5849)

It will be recalled that at the last meeting of the Council it was agreed that the Prosident should hold informa1 consultations with members of the Counoil on the basis of the proposa1 of the representative of France and in the light of the comments offered thereon by the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States and to report to the Council on the outcorne of those consultations, The result of the consultations is the following general understanding among the members of the Council: “The Security Council, for its further consideration of the complaint against the DemocraticRepublit of Viet-Nam referred to in the letter dated 4 August 1964 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the President of the Security Council, would welcome such information relating to this complaint as the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam would desire ta make available to the Council, either through taking part in the discussion of the complaint in the Council, or in the form which it might prefer. Furthermore, the Security Council would receive in the same mariner such information relating to the complaint as the Republic of Viet-Nam would desire to make available to the Council.” 23. This aspect of the matter before us having been settled, 1 shall arrange for the Secretariat to oommunicate without delay the contents of this general unclerstanding to the Democratic Republic of Viet- Nam, as well as to the Republic of Viet-Nam.

The Security COUncil has to deal with a grave case of aggression and threat to peace. On 5 August 1964, a large number of United States Air Force aircraft shot at and bombed a serfes of localities on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam in the region of vinh Benthuy, at the estuary of the river Gianh, and in the proximity of the town of I-Ion Gai, causing casualties among the population. The United States Government, on whose orders this wilful and premeditated aggxession, this violation of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and this deliberate killing of the Viet-Namese people took place, attempted to justify its action by asking immediately fox anurgent meeting of the Seourity Council, 25. The Czechoslovak delegation, at the beginning of this debate, pointed to the one-sided character of the expected United States information, as well as to the fact that the United States authorities were reporting on the alleged Viet-Namese attack only after they had perpetrated an action which far exceeded the place and size of the alleged attack. 25. tchecoslovaque des renseignements mettaient rites la prBtendue commis pleur de la P&endue 26. New, certain information has reached our Government confirming our doubts concerning the United States allegations made here in the Security Council, although the full facts about the crime of the aggression may be obtained directly, as a matter of course, only from the victim itself of that attack, namely the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. 26. Aujourd’hui, au Gouvernement que nous Etats-Unis naturellement, attaque même, tique directement 2’7. Let me state briefly that the aggression against the territory and people of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam was perpetrated by the United States armed forces thousands of miles away from the national boundaries of the United States of America. In order to justify that aggression, the United States Government alleged that an attack had been made on United States vessels on the highseas by Viet-Namese boats patrolling in the Gulf of Tonkin. By admitting, however, the presence of their war vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin, which is adjacent only to the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and to that of the People’s Republic of China, the United States Governmento by implication, proved just one thing, and one thing only, that is, the provocative character of the mission those vessels had to accomplish within that area. 27. Je me contenterai l’agression Etats-Unis la RBpublique roul6e nationales fier a P&endu dans le golfe du Tonkin des Etats-Unis leurs du Tonkin, de la République la Republique des Etats-Unis et une seule, le caractgre dont avaient 6% charges 28. According to our information, in fact, on 30 July 1964 those vessels actually violated the territorial waters of the Demooratic Republic of Viet-Nam and even shot at the islands of Hon Ngu and Hon Me, In the course of 1 and 2 August 1964, an American des- 28. De fait, disposons, 30 juin 1964, les eaux territoriales démocratique sur et 2 aoQt 1964, un destroyer nouveau violé les eaux territoriales la côte de la province ce meme navire patrouilleurs Nam, leur pays. troyer again violated the territorial waters near the shores of the province of Cuang Binh. On 2 August, that same United States vesse1 had an encounter with patrol boats of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, which chased it from the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. 29. As far as the alleged incident of 4 August 1964 is concerned, the United States version itself seems rather doubtful, thus a statement by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam is a11 the more indispensable for the Security Council. 29. 1964, la version assez indispensable d’un expose des faits du Viet-Nam. 30. It was, however, just that alleged attack, which, according to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, is & sheer fabrication of the United States Command, that was chosen as a pretext for a large-scale aggression against the toast of the Democratic Republic of Viet- Nam. It really gives great grounds for suspicion 30. attaque, blique démocratique ment choisie grande envergure 31. Even in the light of that version, the attack by the United Statea against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam could net be considered as an act of legitimate self-defence. At the most, it could be qualifie& as previous debates in the Security Council in other cases have quite clearly shows, as an act of reprisal; and as we a11 know and remember, this Seourity Council, by its resolution of 9 April 1964, “condemns reprisals as incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations”. I/ And may 1 be allowed to remind you, Mr. President and a11 my colleagues, in the debate preceding the adoption of that resolution, the Permanent Representative of the United States, Mr. Stevenson, stated on 6 April 1964: “My Government has repeatedly expressed its emphatic disapproval of provocative acts and of retaliatory raids, wherever they occur and by whomever they are committed.” [1108th meeting, para. 67.1 32. But the United States action against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam was actually muchworse than the reprisals condemned by the Security Council and, as we saw, by the United States Government. It was an act of naked and brutal aggression. What reason was there, may 1 ask, immediately after the alleged attack occurred and was repelled-according to the United States version-to attackplaces hundreds of miles distant from the place where the alleged incident was said to have occurred? Were the Vietnamese fishermen and their wives and children, may 1 perhaps ask, such a terrible danger to the powerful Seventh Fleet of the United States, or to the very existence of the United States itself, that the United States was obliged to act immediately, without delay, in self-defence and send out aircraft to kil1 them? g Offlcial Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1964. document S/SUSO. 34. And what opportunity to be free are they providing, and for whom? We cari read here in the United States reports of what kind of opportunity for freedom is being provided and upheld. Prom thousands of such reports, let me yote from one of the most recent American descriptions of this “freedom” in South Viet-Nam. It is in an article publishedin a well-known New York weekly, The Reporter, in its issue of 13 August 1964, an article which in principle seems to accept the United States policies in South Viet-Nam: “The Vietnamese administration”-and this, of course, refers to South Viet-Nam-“during the past year has virtually disintegrated, and most provinces have had no less that four different chiefs. The probity of the national police is at its lowest point. In a land pleading for social reform, the only positive plan advanced by the Social Welfare Ministry is for the legalization of prostitution, Corruption appears even more rampant than before.” Je me permets gnage am&ricain. May 1 be permitted to repeat that this is an American testimonial. 35. Against whom are the Americans defendingthose friends and those splendidfreedoms? They speak about foreign infiltration and imported terror; but they are tration 36. The truth about the United States mission in South Viet-Nam is that, by spending billions of dollars, by keeping thousands af American boys in the role of hated foreign mercenaries, and by sacrificing hundreds of their lives-which everybody Will deplore, as we deplore the sacrifice of every human life in a futile, wasteful, dirty war-be committing theirprestige they are supporting and maintainlng, against the Will of the people of South Viet-Nam, the power of a handful of brutal and corrupt individuals whom the people would ohase away if it were not for United States military support, and whom the people will eventually chase away, in spite of that support, because the same thing happened, as we know, in many other countries before. 37. This truc role of the United States presence in South-East Asia, which has just been adopted as one of the reasons to justify the recent aggression on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has, once more, been clearly manifested by that same aggressive action. It was an act contrary to the principles of the Charter, to the decisions bythe organs of the United Nations, to the obligations of Member States, and, above all, of the permanent members of the Security Council, as well as to the Agseements adopted at the Geneva Conference,z/ the obligations of which are binding upon the United States, as was recogniaed by them. It is an act unworthy of a permanent member of the Security Council, and an act unworthy, may 1 be allowed to say, of the American people. It is, moreover, an act of criminal irresponsibility, inciting and aggravating tension, and threatening world peace. 38. The Government and the people of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic condemn most emphatically the aggression perpetrated by the United Statesforces against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. In these moments, more than ever, the fullest sympathies and fraternal solidarity of the Government and peopla of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic are with the people and Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet- Nam; they are deeply sorry at the loss of lives and are ffrmly opposed to the repeated United States and Saigon provocations at the borders of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. 39. By acting with restraint, by appealing to the Geneva Conference, the Government and people of -/ Geneva Conference on the problem of restoring peace in Indo- China, held from 8 May to 21 July 1954. 40. The time hss come to reject this attitude which is obsolete in our present period and contrary to the obligation of a State Member of the United Nations. It is up to a11 Member States and the United Nations itself, to make clear to the United States Government that the days of the colonial gunboat nndbig stick-and 1 do not know what else they might be called-policies are gone; that they are condemned and rejected not only by the principles of the Charter, but also by the peoples and public opinion of the world, and that any attempt to revive those policies constitutes a crime-suc11 as the recent aggression of the United States forces against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam-the responsibility for which falls fully upon that Government which may undertake it. 40. tement Membre n’est les de faire Etats-Unis coloniale noms est principes et l’opinion pour la contre un crime sur le gouvernement

1 had not expected to addross the Council this afternoon, but in view of what bas been said by the representative of Czechoslovakin, 1 feel obliged to address the Council briefly on two points. 41. de l’anglais]: la parole qui vient d’être slovaquie 42, Pirst, 1 want to state that there is absolutely no foundation in fact for the whollyfalse impression which the representative of Czechoslovakia has sought to create, namely that the wilful, the deliberate and the planned attack by North Viet-Nam torpedo-boats against United States ships on the high seas on 2 August-which lias been ndmitted by North Viet-Namwas nothing more than a natural reply to alleged provocative acts by the United States against North Viet- Nam in the days preceding. He has echoed the efforts of Peking and of Hanoi to avoid responsibility by calling the United States to court charging it with this responsibility. He has alleged, evidently using statements from Hanoi and Peking as source material for bis charges, that on the evening of 30-31 July American warships intruded into the territorial waters of North Viet-Nam and shelled the islands of Hon Me and Hon Ngu. 42. absolument fausse cherche délibbrée torpilles contre attaque que la reaction cations dans fait l’écho pour faisant de toute et de PBkin pour tendu navires ment Nord de Hon Ngu. 43. This allegation is false. No United States ships intruded into the territorial waters as alleged, nor did United States ships shell the islands referred to or any other North Viet-Namese islands on 30-31 J~ly or any other time before or since. On those days the closest American ship was at the 17th Parallel off shore and 120 miles from the site of the alleged action on 30-31 July. 43. guerre ritoriales Etats-Unis mention, 30 et 31 juillet, avant le plus proche 1iXe et 2 120 milles prétendu 45. These attacks were very real indeed. The facts concerning them have been publicly desoribed by President Johnson, by the Secretary of Defense, and by me in my remarks at the last meeting of this Council, During the night of 4August the two American vessels were on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin in international waters, sixty-five miles from the shore, more than twice as far out in the high seas as on the occasion of the 2 August attack when radar picked UP highspeed craft moving rapidly toward the destroyers, Prior to that the destroyers had ascertained thatfor a number of hours they had been tracked by radar of a. type that is carried on torpedo-boats used by the North Viet-Namese Navy. At firing range, typicaltorpedo launching manœuvres were cletected. Sonar immediately picked up torpedo tracks and subsequent torpedoes were actunlly seen passing the destroyers by personnel on the vessels under attack as they were making evasive manoeuvres. 46. Searchlights and g-un flashes from the attacking boats were also seen at close quarters by personnel on the vessels under attack andby supporting aircrdt, and torpedo-boats themselves were seen in illumination provided by flares dropped by aircraft. Counter fire from the destroyers was continued until contact was lest in the darkness. 47. This attaok was very real to those WhOSe 1iVeS were in danger. The attack was also extremely serious in the view of my Government, coming as it did less than two days after the previous attack on the Maddox, coming as it did without warning or without provocation, coming as it did on the high seas, 48. These was only one conclusion to be drawn: the attack constituted a planned, a calculated, a deliberate act of military aggression against United States vessels on the high seas, fully as deliberate and more serious in its implications than the daylight attack of 2 August, which the North-Viet-Namese have aclmitted. 49. In the circumstances, the United States Government had no choice but to reply. Reply we did. Our reply was limited and relevant to theprovocation. The representative of Czechoslovakia has averredthat our response to the “non-existent” attack of 4 August should have been limited to, 1 suppose, also a nonexistent defensive fire, 1 would cal1 his attention to the fact that on 2 August, the United States did limit its response to counter-attack on the torpedo-boats. In order to avert further diffioulties, the United States the next day despatched a warning note to North Viet- Nam asking the International Commission for Supervision and Contra1 to transmit it, and releasing it to the Press SO that there was no doubt that North Viet- Nam would know about it. 52. This was a limited, this was a relevant response of self-defence, directed only against the boats andthe supporting bases in response to a deliberate assault on our armed forces. 1 trust that the Government of Czechoslovakia Will use a11 of its influence to persuade its North Viet-Namese friends to cesse their dangerous provocations. 53. We did not on 5 August, nor do we now, seek to extend the conflict in South-East Asia, 1 said that here at the last meeting; I repeat it again. We sought only to destroy those weapons of war and supportfacilities which had been used in armed aggression against us. We sought at the same time to demonstrate again to those who seem determined to remain oblivious to the lessons of history that armed aggression, whether in the Gulf of Tonkin or anywhere else, Will not be tolerated and Will not go unanswered. 54. 1 had not wanted to comment on the political attack of the representative of Czechoslovakia on the Flepublic of Viet-Nam, which has been struggling for years to protect itself from aggression from its northern neighbours. It is with some exercise of patience that 1 confine myself to pointing out that we have listened to the representative of Czechoslovakia make a typical communist attack on a free people trying to defend themselves from communist attack. Let me remind the representative of Czechoslovakia that the Charter to which he refers with suoh reverence does not condemn the efforts of people to preserve their independence from aggressive neighbours. Its purpose, and the reason for the existence of this Council, is to protect independence and freedom. It is not a cloak; it is a shield.

The French delegation listened with the greatest attention to the statement made at the last meeting by the representative of the United States concerning the incidents which have occurred during the last few days in the Gulf of Tonkin. My delegation has noted Mr. Stevenson’s statement that, while the Government of the United States found itself obliged to take positive measures in this instance, these measures would remain limited. My delegation has supported the suggestion, unanimously approved by our colleagues, that a hearing should be given to any observations and explanations which the representatives of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and of the Republic of Viet-Nam might deem it necessary to make. 56, This being said, my delegation believes that it should today set forth the general considerations guiding it in the examination of this serious matter. 57. While public opinion is deeply disturbed and self-questioning with regard to these events, what it fears above a11 is their possible consequences. The main problem, in fact, is that of the future, A series 58. Our aim is to return to strict respect for the 1954 Agreements and finally to achieve the true pacification of the States which formerly constituted Indo- China. 59. We are convinced that, in the circumstances, the only possible solution is a politioal one: negotiations, and therefore a conference, must be held between the Powers concerned, if that part of the world is to be preserved from a recurrence of events of this kind, which would have incalculable consequences. As the President of the French Republic stated last July, in referring specifically to the possibility of the complications which have just supervened: “Since war cari settle nothing, it is necessary to make peace.”

1 wish to apologize for taking the time of my colleagues tomake a second intervention at this meeting, but 1 would like to make two points in answer to what has been said by the United States representative, Mr. Stevenson, to whose speech 1 and my delegation listened with the utmost interest, as we always do to a11 his speeches and to the speeches of a11 our colleagues. 61. The purpose of the intervention of the delegation of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia was to set the facts straight andtopoint to certain inconsistencies in what has been presented by the United States delegation to justify its armed action against the shores of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. 62. Pirst of ail, since the beginning, when the first reports from officia1 sources appeared, my delegation was puzzled by certain inconsistencies and certain oonflicting elements in those reports, especially concerning the circumstances under which the alleged attack on the night of 4 August tookplace. Knowing the high intelligence of my colleagues, 1 am sure that these inconsistencies did net escape them, and 1 would net like to waste their time because they certainly bave become more apparent. However, if it were SO wished, 1 could read some of them from the statements which were published immediately after the attack. However, 1 am sure that my colleagues are aware of them and that they have noticed them. 63. It was in view of these conflicting reports that were received from United States officia1 sources on 5 August that my delegation was compelled to doubt the exactitude of what has been said in order to justify the attack on the Democratic Republic of Viet- Nam. 64. Moreover, another point which 1 made inmyfirst statement here and later repeated, and which 1 wish again to recall, was the haste with which these actions, 65. Moreover, what 1 was questioning in my first statement-and 1 did not receive any answer on thiswas the haste with which that retaliatory action was undertaken, without notifying the public or the Security Council in advance. 1 was questioning whether there was any extreme danger to the United States which would have justified such action, if there was any justification. That was the point, and I think the answer of our United States colleague was not exactly pertinent. 65. Enfin, la question que j’avais pos8e dans ma premiére étB donnee - avait trait à la hâte avec laquelle ces mesures de repr8sailles ont Bt6 ex&utées, sans que notification ou au Conseil de s&urit& tait un danger extrame pour les Etats-Unis qui justifie C’est la le point qu’il fallait Bclaicir et, B mon avis, la repense de notre collègue des Etats-Unis n’&ait pas exactement pertinente, 66. As far as concerns his second point, itrelated to the attempt to justify this attackby a certain reference to the American mission in South-East Asia, in connexion with which 1 simply confronted those words with facts as they are reflected in American sources, which are non-communist. Therefore, 1 would say that it was a little too superficial to reply that this was communist propaganda, or something of the kind. The facts were not disproved. The facts are contained in American reports, and 1 am sure that Mr. Stevenson knows much more about those facts because he knows much more about classified reports on them than the public or any one of us cari know. 66. Pour ce qui est du deuxibme point qu’il a soulev8, il s’agissait de la tentative faite par les Etats- Unis pour justifier mission dans l’Asie du Sud-Est et, & ce propos, je me suis content8 de confronter faits, americaines qui ne sont pas communistes. Je dirai donc qu’il est un peu trop superficiel de répondre que c’est 1% de la propagande communiste, ou quelque chose d’approchant. Les faits n’ont pas été &uti%., Ces faits sont contenus dans des rapports et je plus sur ces faits parce qu’il en sait beaucoup plus sur les rapports secrets que le public ou l’un quelconque d’entre nous. 6’7. 1 apologize for having taken up the time of the Council in order just to explain what were the reasons which compelled us to make the points we did make in our previous statement, and how we understood the answer which the United States representative was kind enought to give. 67. simplement pour expliquer quelles Btaient les raisons qui nous avaient force & soulever ces points dans notre intervention nous comprenions la repense que le représentant des Etats-Unis a eu l’amabilite de donner. 68, Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America): 1 also apologize for detaining the Council further, but 1 must express my appreciation to the representative of Czechoslovakia for his explanatory remarks. He said, however, that Czechoslovakia had had no answer to its question why the United States acted with such haste. The answer is the haste with which our ships were twice attacked. How long do we have to wait? Until one of our ships is sunk and we are a11 on the precipice of war with a11 its incalculable consequences? 68. M. STEVENSON (Etats-Unis d’Am&ique) duit de l’anglais]: Je m’excuse moi aussi de retenir encore l’attention primer Tchécoslovaquie pour ses remarques explicatives, Neanmoins, il a dit que la Tchécoslovaquie n’avait pas obtenu de réponse lorsqu’elle avait demande pourquoi les Etats-Unis avaient agi avec une telle hBte. La repense est la h%te avec laquelle nos navires ont BtB attaques a deux reprises. Combien de temps Faut-il que nous attendions? Que l’un de nos navires soit coulé ou que nous nous trouvions tous au bord le la guerre, avec toutes ses conséquences incalculables? 69. J’ai aussi pris note de la remarque du repr& sentant de la France qui a dit, et tr&s justement a mon avis, que le problhme principal est l’avenir et qu’il avait pris note, en s’en félicitant, ration que j’avais faite & la derni&re seance, dans laquelle j’avais indique que si les Etats-Unis Btaient Yans l’obligation de prendre des iemeureraient i-t-il 69. 1 also took note of the remark bythe representative of France, who said-and 1 think properly-that the main problem is the future, and that he had noted with aPprova1 my statement at the last meeting that if the Untted States was forced to take measures they would be limited. That is true. He said, further, that the eountries of that troubled area should return to peace and independence assured by scrupulous respect for the 1954 Agreements. 1 just want to add, before this 70. Mr. MORO’ZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republits) (translated from Russian) : Some of the remarks made by the United States representative at today’s meeting of the Cou&l cal1 for a reaction from me. 71. Whenever, instead of a business-like analysis of arguments adduced here in the Council, attempts are made to reject them, as a typical communist attack, in the words of Mr, Stevenson, our immediate reaction is that our opponents’ arguments are running out or exhaustecl. We have long been used to this situation. 72, tVhen there is nothing more to say on the substance, we are presented with this version. We are proud to represent here the countries which were the first in the history of mankind to inscribe on their bas-mers the device of freedom, happiness and true independence for a11 mankind and equal rights for nations large and small. 73, We are therefore proud to be reminded of the cause which we are defending in the interests of a11 freedom-loving mankind. We are not going to adopt the same tactics, and we are not going to attach to the arguments of the United States representative the labels which we could with much greater andwith real justification apply to the entire platform he is trying to defend here-labelling it imperialist argumentation in defence of imperialist policy, thepolicy of oppressing, enslaving and plundering peoples. 74. We axe not going to distract the Councilfrom the bssic issues and tasks with whichit isnow dealing. The issue here is not a clash of ideologies but the fact that under the United Nations Charter and in observance of these principles, and in accordance with the international obligations which the United States assumed under the Geneva Agreements, we are entitled to demand-as we did in the Council at its last meeting-that the United States Government immediately cesse military operations against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. 75. With regard to the stubborn attempts which the United States representative is still making to foist upon the Security Council what we have already described as bis one-sided version, we say again that on the evidence we already have it is impossible not to condemn the actions of the United States, which bas sent its navy to the Gulf of Tonkin. 76. As we said, the Soviet Government most strongly condemns the bombing by United States armed forces 78. Even sufficiently authoritative United States sources-and 1 think the United States representative considers authoritative a statement made at a press conference by the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara-do not deny the account wbich 1 gave at the beginning of my statement and whioh the Czeehoslovak delegation also gave at this ‘meeting. This source does not deny that the actions taken by the United States were taken in retaliation. ‘78. Aux autorisges Etats-Unis declaration le M. ici a la présente Ce porte-parole qui ont étB entreprises en guise de repr&ailles. 79. These are the very words spoken by Mr. McNamara, as transcribed at the press conference: “In retaliation for this unprovoked attack on the high seas, our forces have struok the bases used by the North Viet-Namese patrol craft”. -/ 79. d’apr&s “A titre tifiee bases Viet-Nam 80. We shall postpone for the time being a detailed analysis of a11 that took place on 1 and 4 August. We have already said here-and this has beenemphasized by the representative of Czechoslovakia and then by the representative of France at this meeting-that we need information to give us a complete picture of a11 that happened on these dates, and then we shall revert to the numerous details, some of which, as we already have noted in our statement at the last meeting of the Council, are odd, to say the least. 80. Je n’analyserai ce qui s’est dit, de la France qu’il qui nous permettent de tout nous reviendrons quelques-uns, sgance du Conseil, 81. However, as I said, this is the evaluation given by Mr. McNamara in his statement. 81. viens de le noter, dans ladt5claration 82. The difference between the right of self-defence and the right of retaliation is quite obvious to any first-year student at any law school or any institution of legal studies. 82. tr8s défense et le droit 83. In fact, contemporary international law categorically denies and rejects a right of retaliation. The recognition of the right of self-defence in Article 51 of the United Nations-Charter ipso jure precludes the right of retaliation. which-how cari one disbelieve the Ulyited States Secr&ary of Defense?-was the basis for these actions, about which the Secretary of Defense should be better informed than anyone else, 83. nie et rejette sailles: fense il nie par duquel - a la clefense les actions informé 84. Zt is consequently out of the question that the actions which culminated in the bombing of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam could have been done in self-defence or covered by that concept. 84. Par les de la Republique Bte dictees qu’elles 85. As has rightly been noted here, and as we have already said earlier, we strongly condemn these actions and cal1 them acts of aggression against a sovereign State-the Democratic Republic of Viet- Nam. 85, comme nons fermement d’actes RBpublique 36. This is why the arguments we have had to listen to here from the United States representative for the 86. avons dej& entendus A/ Passage quoced in English hy the speaker. 2/ Passage 8’7. These are the comments which 1 have again been obligecl to make on the latest statement by the United States representative.

This meeting Will now be adjourned, and the President Will cal1 the next meeting after fixing a date and time, in consultation with the members of the Council. The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m, / : HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications may distributors throughout the world. Write to: United Nations, Sales COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS Les publications des Nations Unies sont agences dépositaires du monde entier. ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, Section COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de las Naciones casas distribuidoras en todas partes dirijase a: Naciones Unidas, Section Litho in U.N. Price: $U.S. 0.35 (or equivalent in other currencies)