S/PV.1144 Security Council

Igive the floor to the Secretary-General of our Organization, U Thant, for a special statement. 1. Le PRESIDENT parole U Thant, qui désire

1 am sure that a11 members of the Security Council Will learn with deep sorrow that Mr. Sakari Tuomiôja, the United Nations Mediator in Cyprus, has passed away today inHelsinki. He had served with distinction not only his country, Finland, but the United Nations also as the Executive Secretary of the Economie Commission for Europe for a number of years and most recently, as 1 have just stated, as the United Nations Mediator in Cyprus. Bis passing Will be mourned not only by his wife and the other members of his family, butalsoby his many friends both in the United Nations and outside. 2. Le SECRETAIRE Je suis profondément Tuomioja, est avec distinction mais des Nations de la Commission récemment, mediateur sera les ses nombreux 3. 1 just want to transmit this information to you, Mr. President, and through you to the members of the Council. 3. Je voulais au Président du Conseil.

We have just heard with great sadness, the Secretary- General’s announcement of the death of the United Nations Mediator in Cyprus, the former Prime Minister of Finland, Mr. Sakari Tuomi6ja. In the confidence that I am expressing the feelings of a11 Members of the Council, 1 venture to convey to the Government of Finland and the family of the deceased the Council’s deep sorrow at the untimely death of Mr. Tuomibja. 4. une profonde l’annonce, de M. Sakari a Chypre Je suis en présentant, sincères du disparu, M. Tuomioja. On the proposa1 of the President, the members of the Council observed a minute of silence in tribute to fhe memory of Mr. Sakari Tuomibja. Sur la proposition Conseil observent de M, Sakari Expression of thanks to the retiring President 5; Le PRESIDENT der l’examen

Before we consider the agenda for today’s meeting of the 6, Mr. NIELSEN (Norway): Mr. President, may 1 thank you from the bottom of my heart for the very kind words you uttered to me. May 1 also take this opportunity of expressing to you my best wishes the period in which you Will hold t,his very important office of President of the Security Council. May 1 lastly express my gratitude to my colleagues on the Council for the patience they showed to me last month. Tribute to Mr. Benhima, former representative Morocco

should also like to note that this is the first time that we do not see Ambassador Benhima at the Security Council table in the seat of the Moroccan delegation. We a11 know him well, esteem him highly, and have had occasion to profit from his experience and advice. Mr. Benhima’s absence from the Council table is a matter for sorrow. We a11 know, however, that Mr. Benhima has been appointed to the high post of Minister for Foreign Affairs of the country which he SO well represented in the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations. 1 think that 1 am expressing the feelings of a11 members of the Security Council when 1 ask the representative of Morocco on the Council to convey to Mr. Benhima our most sincere congratulations on his appointment to this high office,

Mr. President, the Moroccan delegation to the United Nations is extremely touched by the very kind words you were good enough to say about its former head, Mr. Benhima. On behalf of the delegation and myself, I should like to convey our deepest gratitude for those remarks. 1 am sure’that Mr. Benhima, now Minister for Foreign Affairs of Morocco, Will be deeply moved when he hears of your words, should like to assure you that 1 shall personally the necessary steps to se8 that they reach him as quickly as possible. 1 cari tel1 you here and now that for him your words Will constitute anofficial recognitien of the valuable part he alwaysplayedin the United Nations, and particularly in the Security Council, in the search for peace, friendship and understanding among the States that are members of this assembly. Adoption of the agenda Xhe agenda was adopted. Letter dated 3 September 1964 from the Permanent Representative of Malaysia addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5930)

In his 10, The President has also received a letter dated 7 September [S/5936]11 from the representative of Indonesia concerning the participation of an Indonesian representative in the consideration of the question before the Council. The letter stated that the Government of Indonesia had designated for this purpose the Deputy to the Fore@ Minister of Indonesia and the Permanent Representative to the United Nations. 10. de l’Indonésie [S/59361/], sentant le Conseil nement indonésien adjoint permanent Unies, 11, If there are no objections, 1 propose to invite these representatives to participate, without vote, in the Council’s discussion. 11. les représentants ciper It was SO decided. ll en est ainsi décidé. Sur I’invitation Abdul negoro At the invitation of the President, Data’ Ismail bin Dafo’ Abdul Rahman (Malaysia) and Mr. Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro (Indonesia) took places at the Council fable.

The first speaker on my list is the representative of Malaysia, on whom 1 now call. 12. orateur la Malaisie, 13. Datol ISMAIL (Malaysia): At the outset, may 1, on behalf of the Malaysian Government, offer our grateful thanks to the President for having called this meeting, and to the members of the Councilfor having taken time off SO soon after thenationalholiday weekend to assemble here. 1 am sure this must have meant 13. Je voudrais malaisien, cette voulu se réunis de fête nationale. cation vous, prie-t-il toutefois, qui, sans réfléchir, alerte. permission, une troubles avec patience, des dirigeants contre t0 most, if not all, a certain amount of inconvenience, for which 1 tender my Governmentls apologies, 1 cari assure them, however, that my Government has not Iight-heartedly cried wolf at the slightest stir; and the story that, with their indulgence, 1 shall unfold has, as they Will find, heavy shades of darkness and tragedy, flot merely in the sense of the troubles and tribulations chat we, as a State, have patiently borne, but also in the sens8 of the persona1 attitudes of the leadership that has unleashed its malignant power against an inoffensive neighbour. 14. 1 do not desire to occupy your time in recounting ancient history, but 1 should like to place before you some introductory material. 14. remontant peler quelques faits 15. My country, under the name of the Federation of Malaya, achieved independence in August 1957 andwas admitted to membership of the United Nations in the same year. We proclaimed a policy of friendship and co-operation with a11 States and of non-involvement in multilateral military pacts of any kind. We are a small country and, high as our per capita income isthe highest in Asia, excluding Japan’s-our gross national product is very mode& beoause of OUP small population, We thus had need for every cent in our dollar for our rural and industrial development, to give the good things of life to our people, to fil1 the forms of political independence with economic wellbeing, as otherwise independence would remain an empty, high-sounding Word. 15. est devenu indépendant la même année, XX l’Organisation Nous de coop8ration l’bcaxt nature et, si plus du Japon - modeste, avons ciéres industriel, bienfaits dance u Sec Officia1 Records of rhe kcurity Council, Nineteenth Year, SuPPlement for July, August and September 1964. u année, 17. Very close ties had been maintained with Indonesia since even before the Second World War, and there always existed a free flow of visitors between the two countries. When the Indonesian people fought for their independence from the Netherlands, not only did the inhabitants of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak give them material and moral support, but they went over by the hundreds to Indonesia to join their brethren and to fight side by side with them. Some of them laid down their lives for them, and many more settled down in Indonesia, becoming Indonesian citieens. In those days and thereafter, Indonesian leadership was a source of inspiration and guidance to us. 18, Our relations were SO close that even before independence our Prime Minister as Chief Minister of the Federation in 1955 paid an officia1 visit to Indonosia to foster friendliness and goodwill. 19. Early in 1957, even before independence, Malaya took the significant step of opening a Mission in Djakarta, which was a historic departure from the normal Commonwealth cliplomatic practice. On Independence Day, 31 August 1957, it was raised to the status of a full Embassy; and this was fully reciprocated ky Djakarta opening their Embassy in our capital City. 20. About a year later, in November 1958, the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister led a goodwill mission to Indonesia and was warmly received by the President, the Government and people of Indonesia. It was on this occasion that a Minister of the Indonesian Government. declared that Indonesia and Malaya were inseparable friends inspired by the same ideals of freedom and justice, 21. The most weloome and happy finale of this visit was the declaration in a joint communiqu8 presaging the conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship between the two countries. This Treaty, the first of its kind for independent Malaya, was quickly brought into being, SO that during the return visit to Malaya by Mr. Djuanda, the then Prime Minister of Indonesia, opportunity was taken to finalize and sign the Treaty in Kuala Lumpur on 17 April 1959. TO this day this Treaty of Friendship has remained the only treaty of its kind ever entered into by independent Malaya or Malaysia. Implementation of the Treaty did not lag behind and visits of civic leaders and cultural groups were exchanged in 1959 and in 1960, and even in 1961 and 1962. Thereafter these exchanges ceased. 22. In October 1960 General Nasution, Chief of Staff of the Indonesian National Army, with his wife and a group of officiais, made an officia1 visit to the Federation and in addition to the usual courtesies, was invited to and did visit a11 our various military establishments. 25. These were some of the more important steps by which we on our part actively and sincerely pursued our policy of promoting the traditional friendship between Indonesia and ourselves and felt happy in SO doing. Nothing gave us a greater sense of satisfaction than being in the midst of friends, particularly Indonesia withwhomwe had developed a close co-operation, understanding and Concord, and for our part we would not allow even a single cloud to darken that bright horizon. 25. sures appliqu8 siasme 1’Indonesie. que d’Indonésie, tement, et bien ne pas troubler 26. After nearly six years of this situation of external peace and interna1 prosperity for our people, it was understandable that our brothers and sisters in the Borneo States and Singapore, coming out of colonial bonds, felt drawn to us and made no secret of their wanting to corne together into closer political association with us. We welcomed them with open arms, because they too are people of our own race with whom we had close religious, economic and social affinities. Furthermore, by accident of history as a result of the colonial rule we have a similar system of administration, law and justice. This and nothing else was the sole source and motiviation behind the enlarged federation under the new name of Malaysia that we became, almost exactly a year ago. But let me say this, Whatever might have been the similarities and close affinities between the peoples of Malaya and those of Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak, there would have been no Malaysia if the people themselves had not willed it on the basis of their true expression. Where the people did not wish it there was no compulsion, as in the case of Brunei. 26. et était tout naturel de Bornéo coloniales, aient manifesté ment accueillis eux aussi, d’étroites ciales. un meme même la seule ration exactement [en anglais: pu être le peuple pour, de Malaisie exprim6 oh la population ration, 1 ‘a obligée B y adherer. 27. des llautod&ermination lorsqu’il lations riser nos dent pour sation les vœux de la population fait procéder sur décision 2’7. Indonesia, joined by the Philippines, raised doubts about the principle of self-determination having had its full play in the ascertainment of the wishes of the peoplss of the Borneo Territories. In a desirefurther to promote and cernent our existing friendship and convey conviction to our friends, we took the unusual step, -unusual for any sovereim .State, of joining with them in reauestinc the Secretarv-General of the United Nations to ie-ascertain the wishes of thepeoplein the two Territories. After the situation had been closely examined on the spot, the Secretary-General gave his decision as follows: “Bearing in mind the fundamental agreement of the three participating Governments in the Manila meetings, and the statement by the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines that they would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided that the support of the people of the territories was ascertained by me and that, in my opinion, complete compliance with the principle “In reaching my conclusions, 1 have taken account of the concern expressed with regard to the political factors resulting from the constitutional status the territories and about influences from outside the area on the promotion of the proposed Federation. Giving these considerations their due weight, in relation to responsibilities and obligations &tablished in Article 73 and General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) in respect of the territories, 1 am satisfied that the conclusions set forth above take cognizance of, and are in accordancc with, requirements set forth in the request addressed me on 5 August 1963 by the Foreign Ministers the Republic of Indonesia, the Federation of Malaya and the Republic of the Philippines.” 28. Immediately this decision was given, the unexpected happened. Neither the Philippines nor Indonesia was willing to accept a decisionwhichpresumablywas not to their liking. They refusecl to recognize Malaysia -and rupture of cliplomatic relations followed immediately. This was their sovereign privilege. Malaysia oontinued to carry on with the even tenor of its life, undeterred by this unexpected attitude from the two States whose friendship, more than that of any other, it had been concerned to cultivate. 29. Indonesia announced a military and economic “confrontationtt policy against Malaysia, and Indonesian army infiltrators, both regulars and irregulars, started flooding into the Borneo States from across thousand miles of jungle-infested border and began a continuous series of hit-and-run tactics from the safe sanctuary of their own part of Borneo-and they are continuing to do SO to this day. This has involved us in no small losses by way of men and material. Our Permanent Representative to the United Nations wrote about this to the President of the Security Council on 11 August 1964, and 1 do not propose to go over that ground as that is not the gravamen of our charge against Indonesia on this occasion, With your leave, Mr. President, may 1 be permitted to read two paragraphs from that letter. We said: “The Government of Malaysia in a sincere desire to avoid, as far as it lay in its power, any furthel build-up of tension in this otherwise alreadytroubled region has for a11 these months scrupulously desisted from crossing the border into Indonesia in pursuit of these intruders, which however, is clearly permitted to any State in the exercise of its right of self-defence, a right preserved and guaranteed by the Charter. The active introduction and establishment of these intruclers in different parts withinour territory in North Borneo is not only openlyflaunted by the Indonesian Government in the name of ‘confrontation’ but, it also makes no secret of its intention to reinforce them and keep them there with a view to further adventures.” 30. 1 am only anxious to emphasize that in spite of 30. this obvious and continuous provocation, freely adcontinues, mitted by Indonesia, we have not only exhibited the l’Indon&ie, utmost patience and forbearance in the face of conpatience tinually mounting losses in men and material, but perdions also allowed ourselves to be persuaded by friendly Nous Powers, within that area and without, to attend at des puissances conference tables for talks with Indonesia again and dehors, yet again, in an effort to find a peaceful solution to l’Indon&ie problems which to this day remain a mystery to us à des probl&mes unless, of course, explained in terms of a policy that pour Malaysia must be crushed. par l’intention 31. We have taken part in at least ten such meetings without making any progress with Indonesia. Far from it, we have always found Indonesia’s appetite for concessions growing with every meeting, keeping pace with Indonesian attitudes hardening at every step. The last of these efforts, painst~akingly promoted by President Macapagal of the Philippines, ended in failure only last July in Tokyo. The President, fully conscious of the risks towards chaos that thewholeregion would drift into, has again proposed further talks; and we, too, for ever conscious that the compulsions of geography, if not of history, permit no escapefrom seeki11g avenues of peaceful coexistence, if not of actual friendship, with our closest neighbour, have agreed to these talks provided that our territorial integrity and sovereignty are fully respected. TO ensure that, we suggested that the talks be begun and properly prepared for by appropriate contacts at officia1 levels. Indonesia, too, has signified its willingness to attend, 31. genre, de l’Indon&ie. semblait à durcir conciliation, Macapagal de Tokyo, conscient de sombrer entretiens, imperatifs nous contraignent tence voisin tiens, notre Pour propos8 contacts resses. de négocier 32. It is in this context that the storm broke on the morning of 17 August, when a large part of sea-borne IndOnesian infiltrators heavily armed, landed on the beaches of the southern districts of the Malaysian Peninsula. The fishermen and villagers gave prompt alarm and with their help ancl co-operations nearly two-thirds of the infiltrators have been captured or otherwise put out of combat. In the long series of probing and infiltration that have gone on for over a year, this was the first invasion-like landing in strength on the peninsular part of Malaysia. 32. la d’indonésiens, sur sule aussit6t des ou mis de coups premier invasion 33. dent, des membres incident, 33. Mr. President, we had this matter immediately communicated to you, again, only for the information of the memhers of Ihe Security Council. It is only fair that before leaving this episode 1 should state 34. As you Will appreciate even in bringing it to the notice of the Security Council we were most anxious in view of our desire and readiness to meet again as proposed by the President of the Philippines, that nothing should be done, as fax as we could prevent it, to exacerbate feelings further, and spread alarm around the world. 35. As 1 have endeavoured to show, we took every step with the utmost consideration and tare. Had this incident of the sea-borne landings remained an isolated episode, unco-ordinated with the recent Indonesian activity of “confrontation” to crush Malaysia, incident which merely manifested someone’s excessive military zeal that outran political discretion, spite of the harm it had done and the wounds it did inflict, we might have in time forgiven it, even if we should never have forgotten it. But another incident :losely followed and the pattern became clearer, 111 to see. 36. Having failed to liquidate Malaysia either in its spirit or by recourse to military arms, by the hit and run methods adopted on the Borneo bordera with comparative safety to itself, Indonesianaturally felt somethlng more clramatic and damaging had to be done abroad to sustain its revolutionary image in the eyes of its own people. In one reckless gamble, therefore, which at once enlarged the area of conflict and intensified the methods used, Indonesia has now moved forward to blatant aggression by dropping three platoons of heavily-armed paratroopers in a remote area of southern Malaya. This is an incident without parallel in peace time relations and without precedent history between two neighbouring sovereign States not at war, however ill-disposed to each other they may be. 37. During the midnight hours of l-2 September 1964, as a result of prior information through intelligence sources, members of the local Vigilante Corps had been alerted to keep a watch over a large area which included the village of Kampong Tenang in central Johore, the southernmost state of the Malaysian Peninsula. In a clearing close to the village, there is a land development scheme run by the Federal Government; the Vigilante Corps belonged to the scheme personnel. The location is about ten miles 38. The security forces waited for day-break and searched the area indicated by the Vigilante Corps personnel. They recovered four parachutes within a small area. TO each of them was attached a large crate and the crate in turn contained a number of boxes, large and small. These were later examined and found to contain arms, ammunition, medicine and rations. We have photographs of these, which 1 shall produce in due course, 38. Les fouiller Vigilante quatre une grande grandes a mont&. munitions, pagne. que je vous montrerai 39, Detachments of military and security personnel were deployed, and by the early hours of the morning contact was made with a group of enemy personnel and, in the engagement that followed, one Indonesian was killed and another captured. Later in the day, in further contacts, a second Indonesian was killed and four more captured. 40, Initial interrogation of the captured personnel revealed that about forty Indonesian infiltrators were air-dropped from the aircraft, which was a troopcarrying transport plane. It was identified as a Hercules transport aircraft belonging to the “Angkatan Udara Republik Indonesia” (AURI), or Indonesian Air Force. The aircraft had left the military airfield Halim Perdana Kesuma of Djakarta, at about 4.30p.m. on the previous evening, that is 1 September, and arrived at Medan (Sumatra) at about 11 p,m, After a refuelling stop which extended for over an hour, the aircraft took off again and arrived at the spot over the Labis area in South Malaya about 1.30 a.m. 39. Des ont heures au cours et un autre fait prisonnier. d’autres a étB tue et quatre 40. rbv616 largues pes, du type Hercules, Republik abriennes l’a&rodrome Djakarta, ler vers 23 heures. Après un arrêt de plus d’une heure pour faire le plein d’essence, l’appareil était reparti et il Btait arrive la region malaise. 41. Les parachutistes Gerak Tjepat (PGT), c’est+&-dire au corps de parachutistes de l’arm&e de l’air indonésienne; ils avaient tous reçu un entraîhement de parachutiste commando, ainsi qu’une formation speciale au sabotage, Le groupe comprenait environ 40 personnes, dont 10 Malaisiens vement clandestin étranger qui se propose de renverser par la force le Gouvernement malaisien, issu d’blections démocratiques, au nombre étaient charg& chutistes largués en trois groupes. Cette opération aeroportée était commandge par le lieutenant Sukitno de l’AURI, parachutistes A la date du 8 septembre, on comptait cinq parachutistes tués et douze faits prisonniers. 42. Les opérations se poursuivent h l’heure actuelle. Nous avons trouve de grandes quantités de materie - armes, munitions, tant sur les lieux du parachutage que sur la personne des morts ou des prisonniers. 43. Dans les 48 heures qui ont suivi le parachutage, on a ramassé dans la seule région de Labis les 41. The paratroopers belonged to the “Pasokan Gerak Tjepat” (PGT), or paratroop battalions of the Indonesian Air Force, and a11 of them had gone through paratroop and commando training, which included special sabotage training. The whole party consisted of about forty Persons, which included about ten Chinese Malaysians belonging to an underground satellite alien movement committed to the violent overthrow of the democratically elected Government of Malaysia. The Chinese Malaysians, inoluding two women, were to serve as local guides to the paratroopers who were dropped in three separate groups. The whole of the air-lift was under the command of Lt. Sukitno of the AURI, who had been in charge of the training and who travelled in the aircraft. Up to 8 September, the number of paratroopers killed was five and the number captured twelve. 42. The operations are still proceeding. Large quantities of material-arms, ammunition, persona1 effects, supplies-have been recovered at the place of the paratroop landing as well as upon the persons killed or captured. 43. Within forty-eight hours of the air-drop, in the Labis area alone, the following quantities of arms, 44. In view of the flat denial of the whole incident by Indonesia, 1 may be permitted to give a short list, representative of such captured arms and equipment, which Will demonstrate chat Indonesian organization and participation in this incident is incapable of denial or refutation. The list is as follows: “1. One 51 mm. Madsen mortar of Danish manufacture (19 57). It shows its range table in Indonesian. Neither Malaysian nor British nor other Commonwealth troops use this weapon. 112. One 7.62 mm, automatic rifle, type G.3, known as of German manufacture and bearingname : ‘Rheinmetalwerke, Düsseldorf’. Neither Malaysian nor British nor other Commonwealth troops use this weapon, ll3, One web equipment belt comprising: (a) one water-bottle, with Indonesian markings AD-61; (& one medical pack containing drugs and other surgical material bearing name, description and instructions for use, in Indonesian. “4. One silkparachute withpersonnellandingharness bearing Indonesian Air Force No. AURI-2323. “5. One parachute smock and trousers bearing Indonesian markings with place name ‘Bandung’ . “6. One military helmet. Neither Malaysian nor British nor other Commonwealth troops use this type of helmet. “7. Other miscellaneous items: 2 badges of rank, 1 paratrooper badae. 1 parachute record book entitied Bd& Paj&g. Udara of Bataljon Angkutan Udara D.A.A.D. bearing serial No. 3906 with instructions in Indonesian. 45. 1 shall now have these exhibits placed on the Security Council table. 46, The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): In a private conversation yesterday, the representative of Malaysia asked me whether he could bring into the Security Council Chamber a weapon which, he said, was material evidence of the events he is now describing to the Council. 1 replied that he oould do SO if the Security Council allowed him to produce the exhibits whioh he said would be numerous. 47. In this connexion, 1 should like to say that-if 1 am not mistaken and if my memory serves me wellthis is the first time in the Organization’s many years of existence that a weapon, loaded or not, has been aimed directly at the table where the members of the Security Council are seated., 1 may say that, since it is not aimed at me personally, 1 am not worried and 49. 1 therefore insist that the weapon which is now on the table be removed or at least not aimed at this threatening angle, 1 would ask the representative of Malaysia to comply with this ruling of the President, and then to continue his statement. 49. vent pour tion conformer vous pourrez 50. Je suis dent, bien que je ne puisse, les que ces armes ne sont pas chargées. 50, Data’ ISMAIL (Malaysia): 1 am naturally bound by your ruling, Mr. President, although of course 1 cannot speak for the other members of the Security Council. 1 cari assure you that these weapons are unloaded, The exhibits were removed from the Council table. Les objets exposés sont enlev&

The representative of Malaysia may now continue his statement. 52. Datol ISMAIL (Malaysia): In order not to occupy your valuable time in recounting further details, my delegation has caused to be handed to the Secretariat for circulation to a11 members of the Council the following: a statement 2/ of Toby Aban, one of the captured personnel, to which is attacher1 a list of code words with which he had been supplied, and four sets of photographs, each of them bearing a description of the picture on the back. 51. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Le repré- sentant de la Malaisie peut poursuivre sa déclaration, 52. Data’ ISMAIL Pour ne pas vous faire perdre un temps prkieux par un r6cit plus détaillé, ma délégation a fait remettre bres du Conseil, les pièces suivantes: ladéclarationv de l’un des parachutistes faits prisonniers, Aban, à. laquelle est jointe la liste de mots en code qui lui avait étB remise et quatre séries de photographies, avec légende au verso. 53. Dans une déclaration attxibuée ‘a Ganis Harsono, porte-parole &rang&xes, montét’, de mbme que les débarquements précédents avaient 6% pr&sentés par ce ministère comme une pure invention, Une d6olaration ultérieure, du 4 septembre, attribuée à la meme source officielle, contenait l’affirmation C-130 indonésien survolait son territoire, bien un C-130 au voisinage de la Malaisie, mais il 70 jolies danseuses khmères qui Btaient venues en Indonésie pour les cérémonies du 117 aotit, fête de l’ind&pendance.” 54. Je puis certifier du Conseil de sécurit6 que l’on a regardé de tr8s près le corps des personnes qui ont été tubes faites prisonnikres, et que l’on n’a pas trouvé parmi elles de femmes du genre de celles qu’aurait transportées l’avion. délicate note feminine pr&ence, chinoises, très bien armées; l’une d’elles a été tuée, le 3 septembre à 11 heures, au cours d’un bref engagement avec un groupe de cinq parachutistes. Elle etait armée de pied en cap. C’est de cette manière bouffonne que le Gouvernement indonésien présente une affaire qui est de la plus haute gravite et qui met en jeu des vies humaines et la sécurité d’une nation. 53. In a statement attributed to Ganis Harsono, a spokesman of the Indonesian Fore@ Ministry, this whole incident was described as a “fake”, even as the previous sea-borne landings were desoribed by that Ministry as a fabrication. Indeed, a later statement on 4 September attributed to the same officia1 source claimed: “At the time when Malaysia alleged that an Indonesisn C-130 was flying over Malaysian territory, a C-130 was, in fact, in the vicinity of Malaysia on its way to Pnom Penh, Cambodia, with a cargo of seventy beautiful Cambodian dancers who had been in Indonesia fox the 17 August Independenoe Day celebrations.~~ 54. 1 cari assure you, Mr. President, and members of the Security Council, that a very oareful examination has been made of the bodies of those killed and of the persons captured, and this did not reveal any women corresponding to the type alleged to have been carried by the aircraft. The only element that gave a delicate feminine touch to the whole party was the presence of two well-armed Chinese Malaysian women included in the party of guides; and one of them was killed at 11 a-m. on 3 September during a brief engagement with a group of five paratroopers. She was fully armed. This is an example of the facetious way the indonesian Government has chosen to explain amatter of utmost gravity involving human lives and security of nations. 2/ Subsequently circulated as document S/5956, sec Officia1 Records Of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year, Supplement for July. August and September i964. 3 Ultérieurement officiels juillet, 56. This, in brief, is as detailed a description am able to give at the moment of the events of the midnight hours of l-2 September. It is, 1 VentUre think, unnecessary for me to labour this further. view of Indonesia’s complete denial that the whole incident ever occurred, it is for the members Council to eay if this is reallya”fake” or fabrication, if we have, in fact, invented this whole brutal storyin a11 its ramifications and with a11 its details. 57. It would be a grave error to suppose that the various examples of Indonesian acts of aggression, culminating in the parachute landings of members of the Indonesian armed forces which 1 have recounted to you, were merely isolated aots reflecting a temporary aberration in Indonesian policy towards Malaysia. 1 would put it to you that such acts are a consistent, calculated and carefully organized gramme which follows logically the policy Malaysia must be destroyed. 58. Can the Indonesian Government deny the speech made by its President on the so-called National Resurrection Day on 20 May 1964 in the course of which he said: “But before 1 January 1965, Malaysia would be completely crushed by Indonesia”? 59. Did not President Sukarno on the Indonesian National Day on 17 August 1964, in his “Year of dangerous living” speech, say that Malaysia must be crushed and that “our children are risking their lives to fight at the front to crush Malaysia*? 1s it not a fact that one of the two major targets of the present Dwikora Cabinet is to crush Malaysia? Did not Mr. Subandrio as recently as 6 September 1964 say that Indonesia is taking an “offensive attitude” in the context of the crush Malaysia campa@. 60. There cari be no doubt that a11 those acts of aggression against Malaysia are aimed at only one objective, namely, to destroy Malaysia. Indonesia has therefore arrogated to herself the right to take the law into her own hands by the use of force, in complete contradiction to the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations and the Bandung Declaration!/ of which Indonesia herself claims to be the champion. 61. If, as 1 feel confident, you feel-as you mustthat you cannot dismiss a11 the evidence presented to you and shrug off the whole incident, then, in my Government’s humble submission, there is only one conclusion to which you are compelled, I have demostrated with the utmost partioularity and detail that this is an occurrence which is incapable of being described in any other w ay than as unprovoked aggression-“blatant and inexcusable”, as we have called it. There is no other phrase of which 1 am aware that 3/ Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Co-operation, adepted at the Asian-Afrlcan Conference held at Bandung, Indonesla, from 18 to 24 April 1955, 62. C’est pourquoi je demande - par déférence, je ne dis pas: llj ‘exige”, comme j’en aurais le droit - que vous déclariez l’Indon&ie d’agression le plus grave, Je vous demande de condamner ce genre de brigandage international. A mon humble avis, vous ne pouvez le tolérer, car ce serait ébranler les fondements memes de l’Organisation des Nations Unies et de sa Charte. Je demande d’enjoindre activiths; 1 ‘assurance qu’elle ne répétera pas ce genre d’actions et qu’elle mettra fin B l’agression dejZt commise. Je vous demande de rappeler a l?ndon&ie qualité de Membre de l’organisation Unies n’est pas un manteau ?i l’abri duquel elle peut agir comme il lui plaft au-del% de ses frontii?res, pas plus qu’elle ne peut cacher ses activités derribre des slogans ronflants destin&3 à jeter de la poudre aux yeux d’un monde perplexe mais vigilant. Je vous demande de rappeler à l?ndon&ie ne saurait se libérer de toutes les obligations morales et juridiques qu’elle a solennellement souscrites en signant la Charte. Je vous demande de lui rappeler aussi qu’une agression entreprise d’un cœur lbger, minuscule que soit la zone visée, ne peut manquer de s%tendre si elle n’est pas écrasée dans l’œuf. Enfin, ie n’ai pas besoin de rappeler aux membres du Conseil qu’un incendie, si petit soit-il, n%teint pas et qu’on ne combat pas conduira in& vitablement a un sinistre grave, que vous avez le pouvoir - en m8me temps que le droit et le devoir - d’empêcher en agissant, et en agissant sur-le-champ, selon la lettre et selon l’esprit de la Charte. 63. I thank you for your patience and for the indulgence you have shown me in listening to me for SO long. 64. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): 1 now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, who is the next speaker on my list. 63. Je vous remercie de votre patience et del’indulgence dont vous avez fait preuve en m%ooutant si longtemps. 64. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Je donne la parole B l’orateur l’Indonésie. 65. M. SUDJARWO (IndonBsie) [traduit de l’anglais]: Monsieur le Président, - et, par votre Conseil - d’avoir permis a ma délégation, qui represente un pays non membre, de participer a la réunion du Conseil, convoquée aujourd’hui à la demande du gouvernement de Kuala Lumpur. Comme vous le savez, Monsieur le President, membres du Conseil, mon gouvernement ne reconnaît: pas la Malaisie comme un pays souverain et indé- pendant - pour des raisons que j’exposerai plus tard. Néanmoins, mon gouvernement a décidé de participer au présent débat pour la simple raison que le gouvernement et le peu)?le indonésiens seront clirectement visés dans la discussion portant sur le point de l’ordre du jour dont le Conseil est saisi.

Mr. President, 1 would like to thank you-and, through you, the members of the Council-for the opportunity you have given to my delegation, representing a non-member country, to participate in the meeting of this Council, convened today at the request of the Government ofKuala Lumpur, As you, Mr. President, and the members of this Council are aware, my Government does not recognize Malaysia as a sovereign and independent country-for reasons 1 Will explain later. Nevertheless, my Government has decided to partioipate in the debate for the simple reason that my Government and mypeoplewill be directly involved in the debate on the agenda item now before this Council. 66. vient de faire le représentant de la Malaisie. Bien entendu, si je dis Malaisie, c’est sans préjudice de notre non-reconnaissance et c’est simplement par courtoisie adversaire. Sa déclaration contient des allégations 66. 1 have listened carefully to the statement just made by the representative of Malaysia. Naturally, 1 mention Malaysia here without prejudice to the fact of our non-recognition, but as a matter of courtesy to the person of my distinguished opponent. His statement contains allegations and accusations which, un- 67. It was cclonialism and imperialism which separated cur peoples, artificially dividing our great family into differing units-thereby oausing, Ifnot opposition, then almost ccmplete estrangement. This is the tragedy, or one of the tragedies, inflicted upcn our pecples in South-East Asia and indeed upcn many peoples in Asia and Africa, the playground of colonialism and impesialism in the past. Even with the emergence newly independent countries in Asia and Africa, the wcunds inflicted upon us have in fact not yet been entirely healed. And, wcrse, although cur enlightened peoples have been trying to restore brctherly relations and harmony, the remnants of cclcnialism which still prevail quite strongly or adamantly in semé ccuntries have been a firm obstacle tc these efforts, In reality, the deep -ccnflict between\ the new emerging revolutionary forces of freedcm and national self-assertion in the new emerging countries-especially in Asia and Africa, and probably alsc in Latin America-and the cld dominating forces still exists. IC even takes an acute form in many parts of the wcrlcl, and certainly does so-as my President, Mr. Sukarno, recently stated-in South-East Asia, where pcwerful new emerging revoluticnary forces meet strong opposition from the old established forces of the world, which want to maintain their old domination, pclitically, econcmically and militarily or strategically, for as long as possible, This is the tragic situation in the world today, and certainly in Scuth-East Asia where our pecple live and where this conflict, this struggle, has to be fought out in many ways and in many forms. 68. This item under discussion by the Ccuncil tcday regarding the complaint of Malaysia in the framewcrk of the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia shculd be considered in the context of this deeper and broader conflict in OU~ region of South-East Asia. Indeed, it is not an isclated case, ncr cari it be singled cut for ccnsideration without reference to its deeper backgrcund and the history of the situation. 69. When Indonesia started its pecple’s revolution, its revolution for freedom and independence, its revclution against colcnialism and imperialism which culminated in its proclamation of independence on 17 August 1945, it met only with the strongest oppcsition frcm the forces of colonialism and imperialism, primarily from the Netherlands. Fighting and war brcke cut. Pecple on bcth sides died. Suffering, tears and bloodshed beclouded the lives of our people. This was the heavy price we had tc pay for our independence. We did not shrink from paying it. In the process we learned something, something dear: that to attain genuine independence, genuine Preedcm, genuiae dignity and self-respect for one’s people in this hard wcrld, cne has tc struggle, to suffer, to fight, even to die if necessary. And as cur Revolutionary Leader, President Sukarno, has taught us, in his political mani- 71. SO then, ever since our independence, ever since the growth of our national Revolution, we have had to face this evil confrontation, these difficult challenges from strong world Powers. Of course we have our own friends in the world, our comrades-in-arms, SO to speak, because the Indonesian Revolution is only part of the great human revolution of this Century. But most important of all, we have faith in ourselves, faith in the cause of ohr Revolution, faith in the just cause of our struggle. As the great Asian philosopher Confucius said, there is no nation which cari stand erect without faith in itself. That is indeed true. 71. le d&veloppement avons provocation,s sances dans le monde, car de la grande Et, foi juste grand philosophe ne peut rester Il en est bien ainsi. 72. nous pour politique et pour force sance était et l’impérialisme, noble, 72. Having learned from these bitter experiences, we then decided to do our utmost to strengthen the unity of our people politically as well as psychologically, and to build up our national defence, including our military strength, even at the cost of our economic growth. We have learned a hard lesson indeed. In the fight against colonialism and imperialism, it is not enough to possess high ideals, you have to be strong in spirit and, in most cases, inevitably, militarily also. For the feelings of superiority, the arrogance 73. As 1 have said, the specific item under debate is nOt an isolated case nor an isolated incident. It bas a background, it has a history, ancl, on our part, it certainly has an explanation. That is what 1 should now like to put before this honourable Council. 74. Since our independence, my country and my people have suffered much from colonialism and imperialism. The neighbouring areas, which are now called Malaysia, inhabited by our brother peoples, have been used by British colonialism as a base from which to challenge, to fight and to subvert our Republic, our Revolution, politically, economioally and militarily. Yet, WhenMalayawasgrantedindependence in 1957, we welcomed the new State with the joy and good wishes of a brother nation. We soon sought cooperation and friendship with the Government and people of Malaya, people SO close to us, but SO long separated by the imposition of colonialism. Soon we even concluded a Treaty of Friendship, just mentioned moreovep by the representative of Malaysia, Yes, a Treaty of Friendship. But alas, soon it appeared that the ohains of British colonialism in Malaya, supported by the presence of Britain’s powerful military bases in Singapore and elsewhere, had not been weakened much, let alone ùroken. Singapore and Malaya continued to be used as bases os even instruments to subvert and crush our Revolution, our Republic, and indeed our national independence and the peaceful growth we desire. 75. From Singapore, we suffered and continue to suffer economic subversion and manipulation, bath Singapore and Malaya-the “friendlytl Malaya with whom we had a friendship treaty-have provided net only a shelter but an active base for seoessionist rebels against the Republic since 1958. Nevertheless, we adopted a tolerant attitude towards this hostile trentment from our neighbour. Rather, we sought to discover the British policy behind this all, a policy with which Kuala Lumpur seemed to have difficulties. We wanted ta allow the leaders in Kuala Lumpur time to develop their independence, to develop their national freedom and to overcome their difficulties with the remnants of British colonialism and domination in the area. The idea of establishing the so-called Federation of Malaysia arose, 1 believe, at the end of 1961 or beginning of 1962, under the slogan offurther *ldecolonization” of British colonies in the area; chat is to say, the British colonial territories in the northern part of Borneo or Kalimantan, the Indonesian name for the island, were tobeincluded. Theidea originated in London, and was to be implemented with the cooperation of Kuala Lumpur. At that time, wewondered whether the British policy of confrontation toward Indonesia would actually change. As for Malaya, we lmew that Malaya-or rather the Government of Tunku Abdul Rahman in Kuala Lumpur-among other things, wanted to solve, through the institution of the projected Federation of Malaysia, a Chinese problem they were faced with. And we, on our side, were cerbinly prepared to oo-operate with them in solving i&at problem in the interest of the welfare and the 76. The Philippines, which was also interested in the projected Malaysia because of its claim to Sabah (North Borneo), also shared this idea of co-operating in the efforts to form a free and independent Malaysia. 76. au nouveau revendications partageaient sement 77. Thus Indonesia was not a priori opposed to the idea of Malaysia. But we asked ourselves, would it not be bette; that Malaysia be formed not primarily as a British-Malayan project, but rather as a South- East Asian project; that is to say, founded on the cooperative Will for freedom of the peoples inSouth-East Asia rather than on the power or protection of Britain. Our bitter experience with British so-called decolonization in Malaya-despite our initial goodwill toward that oountry-British Singapore’s economic and military designs against independent Indonesia, and the British vested interest and colonial stronghold in adjacent northern Borneo (Kalimantan), gave us ample reason to view the British project of Malaysia with suspicion. Some opposition had already arisen among the people in Malaya itself, in Singapore, and in the British colonial territories in northern Borneo, This opposition, even though suppressed, became stronger and stronger. Hundreds, and even more, were arrested and gaoled. But, on 8 December 1962-months before the projected Federation cf Malaysia came into beinga revolt led from Brunei broke out in northern Borneo against British colonial rule and against theprojected British Malaysia. The freedom and independence of the Rate of northern Borneo, comprising,allthreeBritish colonial territories, was proclaimed and a government-in-exile was established. TO my mind, it would only be fair ancl just if the leaders of this rebel government-in-exile could address this Counoil. They would be able to provide its members with illuminating details of the conditions existing in the British territories at that time. 77. à l’idee s’il crbation tiellement fondee de l’Asie protection nous nique en Malaisie initiales miques llindon&ie colonialistes du Borneo raisons Malaisie. festee de niques cette de personnes Cependant, avant envisagée, dans le Bornéo niale de Malaisie. Nord, tanniques, exil a Bté établi. que les soient a ses qui niques. 78, This people’s revolt was an expression of the struggle against British colonialism in northern Borneo and against the British project of Malaysia. My people and my Gcvernment could not but support this anti-colonial freedom struggle, since we have always supported as strongly as possible the struggle against colonialism a11 over the world, particularly in Asia and Africa. The revolutionary youth in my country began to prepare-voluntarily-to join their brothers as guerrilla fighters in northern Borneo itself; that was before the Malaysian Government was 78. le colonialisme et peuple d’appuyer car la lutte contre et La jeunesse à frères 80. A preparatory ministerial meeting in Manila of the three countries was held in June 1963, and was followed by the Summit Conference of the threeHeads of Government of Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines from 30 July to 5 August 1963. The Conference produced the Manila Accord, the Joint Statement and the solemn Manila Declaration, in which the principles for llMaphilindoU were set forth. It was in this spirit that the procedure for the formation of the projected Federation of Malaysia was somewhat modified. The agreed intention was to express the idea that the projected Federation of Malaysia shouldpossess an Asian label, if not spirit. This would be in Malaysia’s own best interest as well as being consistent with the spirit of “Maphilindo”. For the t~Maphilindo~~ concept embodies the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist spirit of our three peoples and our common desire for a new and better life through mutual co-operation. “Maphilindott represents the strengthening of a free South-East Asia, the development of a self-reliance in its people SO as to be responsible for ensuring their own freedom and independence, and, equally important, responsible for the maintenance of stability and security in their own region. 79. It was President Macapagal of the Philippines who then suggested that the three Heads of Government of Malaya-it was before Malaysia-Indonesia and the Philippines meet together, as Asiaq brothers within the same family, to solve the acute problem of the projected Federation of Malaysia and the independence movement in northern Borneo (Kalimantan), and to find ways for close co-operation for the COmmon welfare and common development of our people’ s desire for freedom ancl independence in South-East Asia. Thus the problem of Malaysia would then be resolved within the framework of the concept of “Maphilindo”, a loose association between Malajraeventually Malaysia-the Philippines and Indonesia. We were happy that Kuala Lumpur’s response WaS not entirely discouraging. 81. The Manila Declaration was an historic declaration with an historic significance. The full texts of the three documents produced by the Summit Conference are available from my delegation, and I now understand that they have been distributed to the members of this Council. 82. These documents were of course also signed by Tunku Abdul Rahman in a solemn and historic ceremony. 83. The spirit of the Manila Declaration was indeed quite different from the policy practised by the British in our region of South-East Asia. It represents a break-through for genuine deoolonization in the struggle against British domination and colonial practice. As far as the question of Malaysia was concerned, the Manila agreements provided that the 84. Poser Sienne, “Maphilindo sans COU~S de la Conférence a Bté confirmee P&&endaient sabotage? de Manille nisation des populations geance, des autorit& les attitude jour de l’enquête 1963, avec 1 ‘accord du Gouvernement que la Fédération 16 faire, Nations de la lettre Qui pis est, les colonialistes ainsi, leur politique libération indonésienne. défier Et, en effet, de M. Duncan Sandys, ministre res coloniales, l%tablissement attendre 84. From the outset, however, the British were opposed to this new concept of a Malaysian federation, particularly since it was linked with the concept of tVMaphilindo’t. This British opposition and obstruction, disguised though it may have been, was very much felt during the Manila Conference. And this attitude was later confirmed by their so-oalled co-operation -which in rcality meant sabotage-in the implementation of that part of the Manila agreements providing for a United Nations reassessment of the wishes of the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak. The intransigence, arrogance and undermining policy of the colonial authorities in those territories made a mockery of the actual intent of the Manila agreements. This attitude was again demonstrated and explicitly expressed when the British, without awaiting theresults of the United Nations reassessment, with the cooperation of the Government inKuala Lumpur, declared on 29 August 1963, that the Federation of Malaysia would be proclaimed on 16 September 1963. This was thus to be done regardless of the outcome of the United Nations reassessment. This was a flagrant violation of the letter as well as the spirit of the Manila agreements. But even more serious, it was an arrogant demonstration of British colonialist determination to pursue a policy of confrontation against the freedomloving peoples of South-East Asia and against the Indonesian Revolution. Our suspicions of the actual intent of British policy in South-East Asia had been borne out. Indeed, the decision to proclaim the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia before and regardless of the outcome of the United Nations reassessment was taken during the visit of the British Minister for Colonial Affairs, Mr. Duncan Sandys, to Kuala Lumpur, 85. ~OS& par les Britanniques, qu’il It coopérer ne pouvait création gements “Maphilindo britannique, non seulement mais du Sud-Est”. la région elle du colonialisme dence, lance dont l’objet par les trois “la responsabilit8 lité ainsi, ” Maphilindo “. qu’il mon peuple 85. From that time on, it was obvious tomy Government that it was completely impossible to co-operate further in the establishment of Malaysia-a fait accompli enforced by the British. There could be no compromis& with a British Malaysia, a project of neo-colonialism. If we examine the defence arrangements for this British Malaysia, clrafted long before the t’Maphilindoll agreement, we find that the British intendecl not only allegedly to assist in the defence of Malaysia but even more “to preserve peace in South- East Asia”. 1 repeat, in South-East Asia, the very region in which Indonesia lives, and wants to live in freedom, genuinely independent from colonialism and imperialism. It was clear that this colonial policy was a flagrant challenge to the principle and spirit of the llMaphilindol’ concept which provided that the three independent countries of South-East Asia should jointly liave the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of the stability and security of the area”. The existing British concept constituted a direct challenge to the ltMaphilindo” concept. We tookup this challenge, despite the burdens it would entail. My Government and people decided to launch a policy of what we cal1 “confrontation” in order to defend the concept of “Maphilindo” , our national independence, and our -. 19 87. Indeed, the strugglefor freedom and independence is a political, not a legal or technical problem. The same is true for the problem of maintaining peace and security. The conflict in this realm is a political conflict which must be solved in conformity with political considerations, And that is precisely why this Security Council, entrusted with the task of maintaining peace and security, is a political, not ,a legal body . 88. Let us now examine exactly what the “preservation of peace in South-East Asialf-as the British cal1 it-mentioned in the British defence arrangements with Malaysia has meant to my country, which desires to remain free and independent. 1 have already told you about the political assistance and weapons supplied from Singapore and Malaya to the rebels in my country during 1958 and 1959 and even Iater. In the face of the projected formation of Malaysia the British have built up their sa-called defences and stepped up their activities for the l’preservation of peace in South-East Asia”. What proof do we have that this in effect has meant a stepped-up policy of subversion in Indonesia? 89. We have ample evidence of their subversive activities against the Republic, of their incursions into our territory, of their smuggling and dropping of weapons to strengthen or foster rebellion against our Government. Let me cite from our records some revealing facts which 1 believe have never been fully publishod by the Western Press. 90. Records of incursions against Indonesian territory, by British and later British-Malaysian seaand airoraft, in the region of Long Bawsn and Long Nawan in East Kalimantan (East Borneo) alone, which is just a very small area of the island, already show the following numerous violations: unauthorized flights by British aircraft were detected on 19 and 20 Decem- 91. In addition to these violations of Indonesian air spaoe, the following even more serious incursions were recorded: on 26 October 1963, six British soldiers parachuted into the East Kalimantan border area of Long Nawan. They told the local population that they were searching for members of the National Army of North Kalimantan. On 14 November 1963, at 2230 hours, a British patrol accompanied by border scouts crossed the border into the open oultivated fields in the Indonesian territory of the Long Nawan area in East Kalimantan. On 15 December 1963, a British patrol of six men in an outboard motor-boat entered Indonesian territorial waters near Nunukan, an Indonesian island east of Kalimantan. After being fired at by Indonesian forces, the patrol fled in the direction of Tawau (Sabah). 91. sien, plus britanniques Long Nawan, Ils membres Le britannique frontière la région oriental. tannique a moteur ritoriales nésienne feu des forces en direction 92. These incursions continued to take place in the year 1964. TO list but a few: on 5 March, a British aircraft was seen flying over Pak Rupai. On 9 May, at 2135 hours, a British jet fighter entered the air space over Basiok; twenty minutes later, the plane circled over Pak Bawan and then disappeared in the direction of Sarawak, On 11 May, at 1230 hours, a British plane violated Indonesian air space in the Basiok area. On 12 May, at 1146 hours, a British bomber was seen flying over Basiok in the direction of Baklaran, East Kalimantan. On 15 May, at 1552 hours, a British Piper Cub was seen flying from the direction of Basiok toward Baklaran. On 4 July, at 1030 hours, a British bomber violated Indonesian air space over Basiok. 92. Je n’en mentionnerai un avion britannique Rupai. britannique dans le meme disparu un appareil nesien un bombardier volait Kalimantan Cub britannique Baklaran. britannique dessus 98, Among the even more serious incursions recorded during the same period of 1964 are the following: on 3 May, at 0900 hours, a British bomber machinegunned for a period of five minutes the village of Basiok, fortunately without causing any casualties. On 1 June, a group of British rangers attacked Pak Pane; they were driven off without any casualties to the Indonesian forces, On the same day, another group of twenty-five British rangers, stationed in Sarawak and accompanied by two border scouts, crossed the border and attacked an Indonesian military post of four men in Buduk Batu, East Kalimantan; three of the four Indonesian soldiers were killed in the battle, 93. au cours les suivantes: britannique de Le a attaqué forces groupe Sarawak la frontiere de quatre oriental. 95. Our records of the smuggling of weapons into Indonesia for use in an open revolt againstthe Republic include the following activities in East Kalimantan: at the beginning of March 1964, the Indonesian Government became aware of the stepped-up subversive activities in the are-a of Bulongan, East Kalimantan. It was later discovered, as recorded on 26 June 1964, that approximately fifty people from Bulongan in Indonesia had been trained in Tawau (Sabah) in handling weapons, in psychological warfare and in inciting the people to revoit against the Indonesian Government. It was also discovered, as recorded on 26 June, that arms had been smuggled from Tawau to the Bulongan area. These arms consisted of: 5 Bren guns, 50 Owen guns, 10 automatic pistols, 10 cases of Bren g-un ammunition, 10 cases of automatio pistol ammunition, 5 hand grenades. These arms were smuggled from Tawau (Sabah), to Sungai Sadjau and to Buah Bakung Sungai Tuan, both villages within the Bulongan area. Boats with outboard motors were used ta transport these weapons. The boats left Tawau (Sabah), at 8 p.m. for Bulongan and had returned to Tawau at 8 a.m. the next morning. 96. It was reported that the conspirators would strike at the end of June 1964. But before they could carry out their plans, they were a11 captured by Indonesian army units. The whole story became clear from their confessions. They a11 confessed that they had been driven to this scheme by some individuals who were former British agents provocateurs in Sabah and who are now members of the Malaysian intelligence service. AU the conspirators are still in custody. 98, In Central Sulawesi, or Central Celebes, near the village of Pasangkaju, at the end of August 1964, the local authorities uncovered arms which were to be supplied to Andi Selle, a former Indonesian army officer who rebelled against the Republic of Indonesia. The arms included: 573 Lee Enfield rifles, 13 submachine-guns, 6 mortars, 5 Bren guns, 30 tons of assorted ammunition, 2 radio sets. Photographs of these weapons are available to members of the Council if they should wish to see them. 1 cannot show these weapons here because they are still in the island of Sulawesi, and we had not planned to corne before the Security Council. The arms were dropped in shallow waters in the rebel area near Pasangkaju. Markers had been set up to make it easier to locate the drop site. The local authorities noticed the markers and then notified the nearest army post. 99. Only a month prior to this, a former Indonesian Army captain, who had fought in the rebel army of the “Permestatt , was apprehended by the Army after it became apparent that he was playing an important role in the subversive activities which were then and still are being organized in Tawau (Sabah), He confessed to this and explained that an organization had been set up in Tawau (Sabah) by British Intelligence with the purpose of infiltrating the machinery of Indonesia’s economy in order to promote smuggling and to supply rebel groups with arms and money. The captain is still in the custody of the Indonesian Army. 99. capitaine battu dans l’armée avait qu’il versives ni&es aveux gnements une contrebande fonds Le 1 ‘armee 100. 1 think 1 should stop now. 1 must tel1 you that these and other data we have are only the facts which we could detect or discover with our simple and inadequate instruments of detection and recording. Many other acts of subversion, of violation of our territory, and smuggling of deadly weapons-in order to crutih our Government-might have occurred and have escaped the attention of our police or village guards in remote jungle areas of our vast country. But we have recorded what we could, for our own knowledge. Our guards, our police in those jungle areas have no cameras, and any cameras they might happen to have, would not be very good ones. They have no tape recorders, they bave no adequate means eVen of communication. We are technically not as developed as the colonial Powers. But we donot com- Plain. Indeed, we recorded these events primarily for ourselves in order to detect the hostile and aggressiQe activities of British Malaysia, and not for eVidence to be used before any international body such as the Security Council. We never had any intention of bringing these various cases to the Security Council. 100. que les données que je viens de pr&senter, qui sont en notre faits mbmes, d’enregistrement. de violation d’armes ont pu &tre commis de notre police jungle nous cela nos d’appareils en ont il ne peut taires. même pas de moyens Notre celui en plaignons c’est 101. Today you have heard several stories about alleged hostile acts of Indonesia, even to the extent that they were called “aggression” again Malaysia. If you wish to be fair, however, please consider these allegations and accusations against Indonesia within the context and against the background of therealities which 1 have just related. Youmust considerwhat they have done to us, to our people, in order to crush our Revolution, to destroy our free Republic; you must consider the suffering they have inflicted on our people,’ the number of deaths they have caused. 102. My people and my Government were compelled to counteract that ruthless confrontation. Our situation today is different from our situation several years ago. At that time, our response to that confrontation w’as due to our weakness, limited to defending ourselves only inside of our own territory. But today we possess sufficient strength to respond, acting in OUF own defence byretaliating, if necessary, on the enemy’s own territory. When the British forced the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia as a fait accompli which embodied also their confrontation against Indonesia and against the anti-colonial concept of ‘lMaphilindo”, we were compelled not only not to recognize the existence of an independent and sovereign Malaysia, but also to return their confrontation, Cur people rose to action. They volunteesed asguerrillas, ready and willing even to enter the enemy’s territory to assist their brothers in the fight for freedom. 1 am proud that my people, especially our revolutionary youth, are prepared to sacrifice SO much, to risk their lives for the cause of freedom, in the fight against colonialism or neo-oolonialism. 103. 1 would not deny tbat our volunteers, our guerrillas, together with the militant youth of Sarawak and Sabah, some of whom had been trained in our territory, have entered so-called Malaysian territory in Sarawak and Sabah. They have been fighting there for some time. This is no secret. And, in the absence of a peaceful solution to the problem of Malaysia, to the conflict belween Malaysia and Indonesia, particularly after the inconclusive end of the summit conference at Tokyo last June, the fighting and activities on bath sides could only beoome aggravated or even escalate. And now this fighting has spread to other areas in Malaysia such as Malaya. Why is Malaysia SO greatly concerned now that it requests a meeting of the Security Council? Why was it not equally concerned much earlier when the fighting broke out in Sarawak and Sabah, whioh is also a part of this Malaysia7 As a matter of fact, the fighting now in Malaya is on a very small scale compared to the magnitude of the fighting in Sarawak and Sabah. An officia1 of the Kuala Lumpur Government even stated, if 1 remember correctly the relevant prees report, that these so-called inoursions on Malaya were ill-planned, ill-timed and doomed to failure. 104. Therefore, let no one talk high-handedly of ++aggressionl’ on Indonesia’s part, This matter of hostilities between Indonesia and Malaysia, involving incursions into each other’s territory, has been going on for some time. And for many years prior to the oreation of Malaysia, Indonesia suffered incursions and subversions from the British colonial territories in the present Malaysia. 104. à la l&g&re d’une “agression” de lapart de l’Indonésie. Ces hostilités entre l’Indonésie et la Malaisie, ces incursions de l’une dans le territoire poursuivent avant la création en butte aux incursions et aux actes subversifs organises B partir de l’actuelle Malaisie. 105. And what do we mean by “aggression”? Even the United Nations has not been successful in finding an agreed definition for it. Indonesia’s acts, pursued by volunteers for the cause of freedom against neocolonialism,, cari certainly not be termed +‘aggression+’ On the contrary, the many hostile acts of British colonialism and of Malaysians committed against us, against our territory, against our independence over a period of several years, deserve more justly to be called aggression. 105. &u+entendons-nous par “agression’? Même les Nations Unies n’ont pas réussi & se mettre d’accord sur la définition de ce terme. Les actes de l’Indonésie, entrepris par des volontaires pour la cause de la liberté, ne peuvent certainement pas &tre qualifiiés d’ “agres- Sion”. du colonialisme britannique et des Malaisiens, commis pendant plusieurs années contre nous, contre notre territoire, justement le nom d+agression. 106. Let me stress that Indonesia has never sought war with a free and independent Malaysia. The conclusion of the Manila agreements proves this. The Malaysian people are in fact our brothers. They should form a part of “Maphilindo l+, Unfortunately, their close co-operation with us has now been prevented by the adamant colonial polioy which the British have pursued in these areas. Nevertheless, Indonesia, together with the Philippines, has continuously tried to solve the problem, the dispute and the difference witi Malaysia as far as possible by peaceful means. Although we had no diplomatie relations with Malaysia, we met twice in Bangkok to facilitate a peaceful solution, However, the Bangkok meetings produced no result because of the reluctance of Kuala Lumpur to discuss a settlement of the problem as a whole. 11 refused to discuss the crux of the whole matter-the Political aspect of the conflict. Our confrontation Policy, including the presence and activities of OU~ guerrillas in Malaysia, is a result of this failure to 106. J’insiste sur le fait que l’Indon8sie n’a jamais cherché la guerre avec une Malaisie libre et ind& pendante. La conclûsion des Accords de Manille le prouve. Ils devraient faire partie du “Maphilindo”. Malheureusement, la politique coloniale inflexible que le Royaume-Uni poursuit dans nos régions les em@- chent actuellement cle collaborer nous, Néanmoins, l+Indonesie, de concert avec les Philippines, problbme et le différend avec la Malaisie et cela, autant que possible, par des moyens pacifiques. Bien que nous n’ayons pas de relations diplomatiques avec la Malaisie, nous avons conferé deux fois avec elle a Bangkok en vue de faciliter Mais les entretiens de Bangkok n’ontpas abouti, Parce que Kuala Lumpur n’a pas voulu discuter d’un règlement du probl&me d’ensemble. Kuala Lumpur a refus8 de traiter du conflit. Notre politique de confrontation, y ComPris 108. President Sukarno readily accepted the Philippine proposal, and even went SO far as to suggest that we should abide by the commission’s recommendations. The dispute would then finally be solved, peace would be restored and co-operation for the common good would be established between the three countries. President Sukarno’s attitude was also an act of faith in our African-Asian family and its solidarity. 109. Indonesia has accepted the proposa1 to establish this African-Asian commission because it conforms to the doctrine espoused by President Macapagal President Sukarno that Asian problems should solved by Asians in an Asian manner. The underlying principle of this cloctrine is mutual consultation, the concept of “mushawarah” amongbrothers or members of the family. In an Asian way it means the way of wmushawarah”, that is, to seek agreement through oonsensus. Extending this doctrine to the African- Asian family, African-Asian problems should then be solved by Africans and Asians. 110. Tunku Abdul Rahman, on the other hand, would accept the Philippine proposa1 for an African-Asian conciliation commission only in principle and under the following conditions: before the commission could be established, Indonesia must stop its policy of confrontation andwithdraw a11 the guerrillas from Sarawak and Sabah. But in that event, what would be the task of the commission? The Tunku seemed to forget that the confrontation policy, together with the guerrilla activity, are only the consequenoe, not the cause of the Malaysian conflict. Its cause is the existingpolitical dispute. Of course, the confrontation policy and the guerrilla activity Will cesse as soon as the political dispute is resolved and friendship is restored between the parties. 111. This is the situation to date, The inconclusive result of the Tokyo summit meeting has aggravated this situation, Nevertheless, the door has not been 112. Approximately one month after the Tokyo summit meeting, the Philippine Government proposedthat the three Foreign Ministers meet again, in acoordanoe with the Tokyo communiqu& Indonesia was prepared to attend such a meeting, Once again, it was the Government of Kuala Lumpur which displayed unwillingness to co-operate in seeking a solution. It proposed that a preparatory meeting at the sub-ministerial level be convened first. The Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Mr. Subandrio, declared that Indonesia was ready to meet on whatever level and at any time. But we wanted the meeting to have an agenda, and this is quite natural because our experience at the Bangkok meetings taught us that if there were no agenda, the meeting would be doomed to failure. The Government of Kuala Lumpur, however, refused to have an agenda for the proposed meeting. 112, le trois sent Tokyo, r8union gouvernement dispos6 Il a propose toire, affaires a déclare tciut moment voulions exp&ience appris vouée Kuala du jour pour la réunion propo&e. 113. Thus, one really cannot say that Indonesia is unwilling to seek a peaceful solution to its dispute with Malaysia. On the contrary, Indonesia has gone very far in its attempt to facilitate the search for a peaceful solution. It is now up to Malaysia to decide whether it watts peace or war with Indonesia. 113. refuse differend n8’sie Tt faciliter maintenant si 114. In conclusion, 1 would appreciate it if the members of this Council would a11 reflect thoroughly on the actual propensity of this problem before considering as to what steps the Council may deem it necessary to take. It is not a sesolution that counts, but a solution, a peaceful solution, 114. membres sement d’examiner prendre. lution,

The representative of Malaysia has asked for permission to speak once again at this meeting of the Council. If the members of the Council have no objection, 1 shall give him the floor. 1 callupon the representative of Malaysia, 116. Data’ ISMAIL (Malaysia): May 1 intervene again to give a very brief reply to the statement by the representative of Indonesia. 1 reserve my right to make a fuller reply later. 115. sentant d’intervenir S’il du Conseil, au representant 116. Je voudrais ration vant 117. TO the members of this Council this narration of our political delinquencies of omission and commission is probably new. TO Malaysia it is an old and oft-repeated story. Many of these criticisms have been voiced before, and there is nothing startlingly new to which 1 have listened. There is detectable, though, a redistribution of the emphasis to suit the present occasion. Should it become necessary 1 shall, of course, answer, every point made. In fact, even though such answers may be new to the Council, they Will not be new to Indonesia because Indonesia knows precisely what our answers are. 117. paohés peut-6tre histoire ont m’ait que pour les besoins du debat. Si cela se revele je pourrai, Et Conseil, qui sait trés 118. It was because 1 did not want this debate to degenerate into general polemics, into revolutionary socialism and neo-colonialism., that in my statement earlier 1 took very great case to define for the Council as precisely as the circumstances permit the limits of our present complaint to the Security Coun- 118. degi%ere revolutionnaire grand avec notre sion Cil. Was there aggression by Indonesia on Malaysia 119. 1 humbly request that, in the expression opinion that Will follow from your lips, you too, members of the Security Council, Will not allOWyOU?3dVeS to stray away from the main task, which is as simple and as clear as 1 cari make it. 1 repeat, however, to avoid any suggestion of discourtesy, that 1 have taken careful note of what has been said and that, should it become necessary, my Government Will give answers to a11 the allegations at a later stage, Again, 1 profoundly hope that it Will not become necessary.

The Council has been in session for some time, and it is certainly not my wish to detain members for very long, but I feel bound to intervene briefly in view of the statement we heard a few minutes ago from the representative of Indonesia. 121. In that statement the representative of Indonesia made a number of accusations against my Government. 1 shall, of course, have to give proper study to what he has said and no doubt reply later to any of his charges which may seem pertinent to the matter which we are discussing today. This afternoon 1 shall limit myself to a very few preliminary comments. 122. In the first place, 1 note with interest that the Indonesian representative no longer maintains, as his Government was maintaining as lately as five days ago, that the parachute landings near Labis were an invention or a fake. NOW, on the explicit admission of the representative of Indonesia, the story seems to be that the infiltration of the so-called volunteers from Indonesia into Malaysia has been going on for quite a long time, and that this not only is no secret but is pesfectly justified and natural conduct on Indonesia’s part. 123. In the light of what the representative of Indonesia said this afternoon, 1 imagine that the Council Will assume that the Indonesian Government has now explicitly admitted that it has been attacking its neighbour, both in other areas of Malaysia and now in the Malayan Peninsula itself, for a considerable time, and that it is indeed responsible for the sea-borne landing at Pontian and the paratroop Ianding at Labis. The Council Will not, I suppose, be likely to believe that in the case of this latest incident near Labis the Indonesians would have entrusted one of their military aircraft to a volunteer. The evitlence, both material and written, which has been produced today by the Malaysian delegation, shows conclusively that this was not the case, 1 am confident, inshort, that the Council, having now heard the two opening statements, Will be able without much difficulty to determine where the truth lies. 124. The representative of Indonesia also made great play with his assertions about alleged British and British-Malaysian activities against Indonesia. I should like to make it perfectly plain to the Council that my Government has never at any time been actuated by hostility towards Indonesia. On the contrary, as Ministers of my Government have said on SeVeral occasions, some of them inside this building, we should be only too happy to resume the friendliest 125. As regards the detailed allegations made by the Indonesian representative 1 shall, as 1 have just said, study them carefully in due course. However, 1 should like at once, and by way of example, to comment on just one of the allegations he has made. He referred to the finding of British arms in Celebes, and he has alleged that these have been supplied to the rebels in that island by the British. This allegation is yuite unfounded, although 1 have no doubt that the rebels in Celebes, and indeed the participants in earlier rebellions elsewhere in the Indonesian archipelago, do have British arms. Not only are there plenty of these in the area left over from the Second World War, but also, until very recently, they were the principal weapons of the Indonesian Army, alarge body of which defected to the Celebes rebels earlier this year. But of course the general effect, and no doubt the intended effect, of the statement by my Indonesian colleague was to diverl the attention of the Council from the specific question whicb is now on our agenda. What we have to consicler is the complaint of Malaysia that its territorial integrity has been flagrantly violated by this most recent paratroop landing near Labis against a background of nurnerous Indonesian infiltrations and subversive actions in various parts of Malaysia, spread over many months. 125. Pour ce qui est des allegations détaill&es faites par le representant de l’Indon&ie, je compte, comme je viens de le dire, les examiner de pr&s, le moment venu. Je voudrais toutefois en relever une d&s maintenant, 5 titre d’exemple. Parlant d’armes britanniques trouv8es avaient étB fournies aux rebelles de 1YIe par les Britanniques. fondement, bien que je ne doute pas que les rebelles de CélBbes, de même que ceux qui ont participé a des rebellions anterieures dans d’autres rQions de l’archipel niques. Non seulement il en est resté de grandes quantites dans la rBgion depuis la seconde guerre mondiale, mais encore, jusqu’& une date toute ré- cente, ces armes constituaient le gros del%quipement de l’arm6e indonesienne, dont une unit6 importante est pas&e l’année, Bien entendu, l’objet g&&ral, et sans aucun doute voulu, de la deolaration de mon coll&ue indonesien Btait de detourner l’attention du Conseil de la question précise qui est inscrite & notre ordre du jour. Or, ce que nous devons examiner aujourd’hui, c’est la plainte de la Malaisie selon laquelle son integrit8 par le dernier largage de parachutistes effectue pr8s de Labis, et cela après toute une s8rie d’actes d’infiltration Indonésiens dans diverses parties de la Malaisie et repartis sur de nombreux mois, 126. As 1 have said, the Council has heard the evidence. 1 am conficlent that it Will share my own view that the Malaysinn case is proved. If it cloes, it Will wish to express a view in due course about these latest Indonesian actions, and Will want, 1 take it, to act as best it cari in order to deter any future actions of the same character. 126. Je le répete, le Conseil est maintenant au courant des faits. Je suis certain qu’il partagera mon opinion quant au bien-fondé de la plainte de la Malaisie. Dans ce cas, il desirera exprimer, en temps opportun, une opinion au sujet des derni??res actions indonésiennes et il voudra, je suppose, faire de mieux pour empecher la répétition d’actions analogues dans l’avenir. 127. Ma d818gation estime que le Conseil de sécurit8 se trouve devant un exemple trbs clair du genre de situation une attaque non provoquée, une “agression flagrante et inexcusable “, comme on l’a dit, commise par un pays contre un autre, et, je voudrais simplement rappeler l’attaque d’habitants contre d’habitants. 127. TO my delegation it appears that the Council has before it a singularly clear example of the kind of situation which it was set up to remedy, namely, an unprovokecl attack-a “blatant and inexcusable aggression”, as it has been described, by one country upon another, ancl, I would just remind memùers of the Counoil, that it is an attack by a country of a hundred million on a country of some ten million inhabitants. 128. My delegation believes that the Security Council 128. Ma dé18gstion estime que le Conseil de &ourit& should, in these circumstances, deal with the situation doit, dans ces circonstances, faire face h la situation it bas been called upon to consider and strongly conqu’il a BtB appelé 2 examiner, qu’il doit condamner demn such attacks, and should cal1 for an unequivocal catégoriquement assurance that they Will not occur again. l’assurance formelle qu’elles ne se reproduiront pas.

The United Kingdom representative hss said that he Will dispense with the consecutive interpretation of his statement into French. Since 1 hear no objection, this interpretation Will not be given. 129. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Le repr& sentant du Royaume-Uni renonce a I’interpretation consécutive, en français, de son intervention. Puisque je n’entends pas d’objection, il en sera fait ainsi. 130. There are no more speakers on my list for today. It appears, from consultations with the members of the Council, that the majority of them are in faveur of holding the Council% next meeting on this 130. La liste des orateurs est BpuisBe. AprBs avoir consulté les membres du Conseil, il me semble que la majorit8 cr6e à cette question se tienne demain, h 15 heures. Price: $U.S. 0.35 (or equivalent Litho in U.N.