S/PV.1149 Security Council

In accordance with the decisions taken at the 1144th and 1145th meetings 1 propose, with the agreement of the Council, to invite the representatives of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines to take part in the discussion. 1. Le PRESIDENT aux décisions je propose, ter les representants et des question. A t the invitation of the Presiden t, Data’ Ismail bin Data’ Abdul Rahman (Malaysia), Mr. Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro (Indonesia) and Mr. Jacinto Castel Borja (Philippines) took places at the Council table. Sur l’invitation Abdul Rahman negoro (fidon&ie) pines) prennent

The Security Council Will now continue its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Eirst speaker is the representative of Indonesia, to whom 1 give the floor. 2. Le PRESIDENT poursuivre du jour. sentant de l’Indonésie, 3. M. SUDJARWO Comme sécurité, crite à. l’ordre sentant demandb - débat B ce stade, ce qui pourrait sentant suggestions en devoir faits prkis sentant Etats-Unis, m&me temps, vernement la Malaisie,

As we are now approaching the time for the Security Council to consider a decision on the question on the agenda as requested by the representative of Malaysia- Indonesia has not requested anything-1 think that on intervening in the debate at this stage, I should give some thoughts about what could be done, espe- Cially since the representative of the United States haS already made some suggestions in this respect. But before doing SO, 1 feel obliged to make my observations on some specific and relevant points in reply to the representative of Malaysia, as well as to the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and others. I Will at the same time sum UP the position of my Government on this question of Malaysia. 5. We looked forward to the day when they loo-our brothers in kinship-would equallyattain their freedom and independence in andfor their own countries, ridding themselves of British colonialism, contributing their rightful share to the freedom and independence of the whole family insouth-East Asia. We have no territorial claims outside the boundary of our owncountry, which comprises the former Netherlands East Indies. Indonesia is vast enough. We therefore welcomed with joy and gratefulness the birth of a free and independent Malaya in 1957, whose independence was achieved-and 1 stress this as did the representative of Malaysia-by peaceful negotiations with the British. 6. The matter of true independence is a matter primarily for the people of the oountry concerned detexmine and to achieve, although we a11 know peoples everywhere, especially those who have suff ered SO long from colonial domination and exploitation, only want to have the truest form of independence their respective countries. This we shouldnever forget. It applies to the people in Indonesia, but equally, 1 believe, to the people in Malaya, or the present Malaysia, and indeed a11 the world over. Armed revolution is no guarantee of the attainment of genuine independence; neither, however, are negotiations. Indonesia achleved its independence by botharmedrevolt andnegotiations. In fact, what is generally termed “independence” here, for the newly independent country, is merely recognition of its independenoe, in the international andformal sense, according to international law, be’coming a Member of the United Nations with an equal vote like other older, sovereign, independent States. It is only an international label for so-called sovereignty independence. irrespective of whether there is true independence or net. This true independence we have to achieve and develop by further struggle. 7. Indonesia is no exception in this matter. Freedom and independence is a continuous concarn. Because newly independent countries in Asia and Africa, after the attainment of their formally reoognized independence, are still confronted, withoutexception, Ibelieve, with remaining colonial interests and designs of the 8. We a11 know that a newly-born independent nation, not excluding Indonesia, needs some time to overcome its diffioulties, to carry out the further struggle and development which we must a11 undergo. When we rejoiced over the birth of a sovereign, independent Malaya in 1957, we had the greatest understanding for our brothers in Malaya, also in regardto the time needed for that further struggle. 8. NOUS pendante - et l’Indonésie ne fait pas exception - met un certain temps a surmonter ses difficultes, 8. pousser plus loin la lutte et le développement qui sont notre lot a tous, Lorsqu’en 1957 nous avons acclamé la naissance d’une Malaisie indépendante et souveraine, nous étions pleins de compréhension pour nos fibres de Malaisie, sachant en particulier que cette poursuite de lalutte leur prendrait du temps. 9. But we soon discovered that things went wrong. As I stated in my previous interventions, the rebellious, secessionist movement in Sumatra-near Malaya and Singapore-joined later by that in North Celebes, near the then British colonial territory of Sabah, against the unity, freedom and independence of Indonesia, obtained support, shelter and encouragement from Singapore and Malaya, and also from the British colonial territories in northern Borneo, Sarawak and Sabah, using the seaport of Tawau very near the Indonesian border. This support was not onlypolitical and eoonomic, but also included the supplying of weapons to the rebels. It was only too obvious that this was oonnectedwithBritishcolonialist-imperialist policy in our part of the world. Some data in this regard might prove illuminating. 9. NOUS les choses s’engageaient mal. Comme je l’ai dit dans mes interventions precédentes, le mouvement secessionniste Malaisie du nord, pr&s du territoire nial, du Sabah, mouvement dirigé contre l’unité, la liberté appuyé, protégé et encourage à Singapour, sie, dans les territoires Sarawak et du Sabah, au Bornéo septentrional, et il se servait frontibre ment d’une aide politique et 6conomique, mais aussi de fournitures que trop évident avec la politique colonialiste imperialiste notre partie du monde. Certains faits pourraient Btre édifiants a cet Egard. 10. In December 1957, due to the sharpening of the Dutch-Indonesian conflictoverWestIrian, theeasternmost part of Indonesia, we started to take drastic actions against Dutch colonial economic interests in Indonesia, and soon nationalized a11 Dutchenterprises in the country. A blow was given to colonial economic interests in Indonesia. Then in 1958, the secessionist rebellion broke out in Sumatra with the support of British and other colonial interes ta. For your information, British colonial economic interests in Indonesia were largely centred with their oil fields in Sumatra. Singapore, very near to Sumatra, was and still is a bulwark of British economic, military and strategic interests in our region, and the British also still had eonsiderable economic interests in Malaya after its independence. Singapore, geographically and strategically, is like the point of a dagger deep in the side of Indonesia. 10. En décembre 1957, comme le conflit entre les Pays-Bas et l?ndonésie a propos de l’Iranoccidenta1, pointe orientale nous avons commencé &Prendre des mesures radicales contre landais en Indonesie et nous avons rapidement nationalise toutes les entreprises hollandaises dans le pays. Un coup a été port6 aux intér&ts économiques coloniaux sécessionniste a éclaté à Sumatra, avec l’appui des intérêts britanniques et d’autres intérêts coloniaux. Il est bon de savoir qu’en Indonésie les int&r&s 6conomiques des colonialistes britanniques etaient surtout axés sur leurs champs de pétrole desumatra. Singapour, tout pres de Sumatra, Btait et reste encore un bastion des int&êts Economique, militaire gion, et les Britanniques avaient aussi gard6 des intér&s economiques considérables en Malaisie apres son accession a l’indépendance. Du point de vue geographique et stratégique, Singapour est semblable a la pointe d’une épée s’enfonçant dans le flanc de l’Indonésie. 11. Ainsi, avertis que cette rebellion sécessionniste, qui menaçait gravement la liberté, la puissance et l’unit8 les intér&ts Malaisie et dans d’autres territoires tanniques, au Bornéo septentrional, et que nos rebelles trouvaient pretendu indépendant de Malaisie, nous nous trouvions 11. Thus, when we knew that this secessionist rebellion, seriously threatening Indonesia’s freedom., strength and unity, obtained active Support from British colonial interests in Singapore, Malaya and other British colonial territories in northern Borneo, and that our rebels indeed enjoyed some shelter in the so-called independent State of Malaya, we were faoed wtth a rather embarrassing and indeed difficult situa- 12. Indonesia exerted the utmost toleranoe andunderstanding toward Malaya during this time of difficulty for us, and probably also for them. But our tolerance and our brotherly consideration did not pay. British colonialist aggressive polioy against Indonesia clidnot stop with the end of the unsuccessful rebellion which we were able to crush only in 1960, Their subversive aggressive policy againstIndonesia-tbis is, of course, against theIndonesianrevolution, not against thepeople or the country as such-went on, at which we were not surprised, trying, of course, to find other means, other ways, other strongholds. The role of Malaya and Singapore continued to be the same as that of the colonial territories in northern Borneo: to provide a stronghold, and even a spring-board, for British colonialist designs in South-East Asia and against Indonesia. 13. The British “confrontation” policy would not let us alone. Indeed, the oontrary was true. They conceived the idea of Malaysia. That project had to be implemented with the co-operation of Kuala Lumpur, of course, which would become the capital of the Federation of Malaysia, com,prisingMalaya, Singapore and the colonial territories of northern Borneo. Malaya would give up its own sovereignty and independence, but Kuala Lumpur would become capital and leader of so-called sovereign, independent Malaysia, a greater Federation. 14. Tunku Abdui Rahman, the then Prime Minister of Malaya, was happy. He was slated to become the Prime Minister of the projectedMalaysia. He collaborated enthusiastically with the British to realize the project. Because did not this British project carry the banner of “decolonization”? And it looked SO timely in oonnexion with the pressure for decolonixation from the United Nations, Tunku Abdul Rahman rejoioed. Freedom and independence would soon be spread, extended to a greater area, tofellow Malayans in the British colonial territories in northernBorne0. Singapore’s attitude, however, from the beginning, was definitely not too enthusiastio for some complex reasons and interests. About 85per cent of Singapore’s population is Chinese, and there was a strong socialist movement in Singapore. 15. Tbis is the story-the political, not the juridical or constitutional story-of the idea of Malaysia as it is connected with the aggressive and subversive-not constitutional-policy of British oolonialism and imperiaIism in South-East Asia. This is the story as it is 16. Our policy is not against an independentMalaysia, free from colonialism in any form, established in accordance with the genuine wishes of its people, if that were really the intent in creating the Federation. But this British neo-colonialist project, smart though it was to cloak it with the United Nations banner of decolonization, was olearly andunmistakablylinked with the British colonial “ganyang” or confrontation polioy towards Indonesia, ‘with the general confrontation policy of colonialist/imperialist Powers against progressive revolutions. While it was not difficult for us to determine our position and attitude vis-g-vis this British neo-colonialist design, nevertheless it was not easy to determine our position towards Kuala Lumpur, which wittingly or unwittingly oollaborated SO enthusiastically in this project. Malaya is a brother nation with whom for the common good, we should still have the best of relations. Despite the collaboration of Kuala Lumpur with the British confrontation policy against Indonesia, which had indeed already strained our relations somewhat, we did net want to make them altogether worse. Things might have taken a turn for the better; Malaysia had net yet corne into being at that time. And it was truc as the representative of Malaysia reminded me at the 1145th meeting, that Mr, Subandrio, our Foreign Minister, said in the United Nations General Assembly on 20 November 1961 that Indonesia would have no objections to the planned Federation of Malaysia, to the merger of Singapore and the British colonial territories in northern Borneo with independent Malaya into a greater Federation. But, signifioantly, Data’ Ismail omitted the remainder of Mr. Subandrio’s statement, that is, provided the Federation was “based upon the Will for freedom of the peoples concerned”.u 1s the representative of Malaysia, after a11 the recent happenings, not quite certain whether Malaysia is really supported by the will for freedom of its peoples? 16. Notre indépendante, 6tablie lation, pondait habilement entreprise colonialiste festement du ganyang lYIndon&ie des puissances des r&olutions eu de peine à arr&er a l%gard il n’a pas 6% facile de Kuala Lumpur, avec un si vif enthousiasme est une entretenir de tous. avec l’égard dans une certaine lions situation pas encore le représentant M. Subandrio, avait effectivement rale 1’IndonBsie Malaisie des territoires septentrional fédération ficatif par M. ;2 savoir volonté Est-ce la recente faitement par la volonté 17. Le représentant titre, combattants contre joindre eux étaient britanniques font maintenant Mais Azahari, Brunei, mouvement 17. The representative of Malaysia is rightly proud of the brave sons of the present Malaysia, the freedom fighters who went to Indonesia during our revolution against the Dutch to join the fight for freedom. Many came from the British colonial territories in northern Borneo, now included in the Federation of Malaysia. But it was exactly these brave sons, like Axahari-the leader of the revolt in Brunei in northern Borneo in December 1962-who led the freedom movement against British colonial power in northern Borneo to prevent also the imposition of the projeot of British Malaysiaandto establish u Officia1 Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, vol. II, 1058th meeting, para. 194. g Documents Séances 18. The representative of Malaysia assured us that his people Will fight in defence of their freedom and independence till the last drop of their blood. No one Will contest this statem.ent of high principle. On the contrary, it is an admirable principle. But then it should be regretted that the blood of many native sons of the present Malaysia has been spilled in joint actions with British colonial soldiers in the area. For what cause? History has shown us that nowhere have colonial troops ever defended the cause of freedom. Indeed, the contrary is true. 19. The representative of Malaysia referred to “gunboat” diplomacy. 1 would only remark that if he had studied the history to date of colonialist/imperialist Powers in our very own area in Asia-indeed, in the world at large-he would have known whichpowers are used to conducting that diplomaoy on a big scale. And his tirade on that subject, might have embarrassed his own friends and defenders here in this very Council. He would also have known that the British military base in Singapore-in independent and sovereign Malaysia-is but the very centre and stronghold of this diplomacy in South-East Asia, this diplomacy aimed against the search for freedom in Asia. 1s proof necessarf? It might prove illuminating for you, Mr. President, to learn that near the time when Kuala Lumpur was planning to “complain” to the Security Council, but before the alleged incident of 2 September 1964 happened, several large warships of the British and their military allies, combat ready, entered Indonesia’s national waters, in three convoys, on 27 and 31 August, and on 2 September. These warships entered the waters between Sumatra and Java, approaching very olosely the islands of Banka and Billitin, and steaming provocatively through the narrow strait of Sunda, between Sumatra and Java. This almost provoked action from our navy and air force. We believe that, in the tense situation at that time, they wanted to provoke another “Tonkin” affair. Meanwhile, military subversion and provocations from British Singapore-though on a small scale-have been continuing for a long time. Indonesia has never been left in peace. 20. 1 have no objection to the representative of Malaysia referring to “gunboat” diplomacy as “ganyang” diplomacy, since the aim of both is to crush or to destroy, but neither Will suoceed. 20. Je n’ai sentant ganyang l’une est d’ecraser sont vouees & l%chec. 21. The representative of Malaysia has, in bis difficulty over trying to defend the case of Malaysia, sought refuge-as the Governm.ent of Kuala Lumpur has always done, supported by London-in the United Nations findings on the assessment of the wishes of the people in Sabah and Sarawak, an assessment which had been requested by the Manila Accord3 SO as to facilitate the welcoming of Malaysia by Indonesia and the Philippines. That request, however, was not just a formality and certainly possessed more than just a constitutional or juridical meaning. There had been a revolt in 1962 against the imposition of the planned Malaysia. The Manila Accord was an attempt-a brotherly attempt-to solve this problem inco-operation with Kuala Lumpur. Indonesia had supported that revolt against British colonialism in northern Borneo and the Philippines possessed a claim to Sabah, The assessment we jointly requested the Secretary-General to undertake had the agreed and clear purpose to assess the genuine political wishes of the people, including the many who were detained by British colonial authorities in Sabah and Sarawak because of their anti-Malaysian sentiments, 21. Le représentant ficultés plaider - comme Lumpur, sultats les voeux enqu8te qui avait et6 rsclamée de Manille y et qui devait faciliter de la Malaisie Cette demande d’enquête, lit&, avait plus qu’une simple portée constitutionnelle ou juridique. la crgation représentait ce probl&me L’IndonOsie nialisme Philippines L’enquête taire reconnu la population, detenues Sabah et au Sarawak la Malaisie. 22. Mais la réalite, munes. qui ont organisé des Nations ont arrêté qui ont pretes gardes armés 22. But what happened actually made a mockery of the whole intent of our common, joint request. It was the British colonial authorities who arranged the meetings for the hearings by the United Nations team in Sabah and Sarawak; who arranged the schedule, the time, the place; who provided officiais as the interpreters and who provided the guards at the meetings-colonial soldiers with bayonets fixed. 23. The hearings were conducted publicly, in the open, at gatherings convened by the colonial authorities, guarded by colonial soldiers. With regard to the political detainees, no adequate opportunity was provided to the United Nations team to hear from them ail. 1 believe that only about 4 per cent of the total number of detainees were heard by the team. One need not himself have had any experience with colonial systems to surmise that the use of such methods, under suoh circumstances, to ascertain the wishes of the people could not possibly oonstitute their ascer tainment in the free and democratic manner requested by the Manila Accord. Indonesia and the Philippines had observers present during the assessment, though their attendance at the hearings was only made possible during the last few days. The Philippine 23. Les de reunions et se déroulant coloniale. on n’a pas vraiment Nations que seuls entendus rience prendre circonstances des voeux démocratique L’Indonésie observateurs, aux audiences a Le Président pines et le réunis à Manille l’Accord 3 ao0t et publié 2/ The Presldent of the Republic of Indonesia, the President of the Philippines and the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya met at Manila from 30 July to 5 August 1963. They approved and accepted the Manila Accord on 31 July. signed the Manila Ceclaration on 3 Augusr and fssued a Joint Statement on 5 August. 24. If the representative of Malaysia would tare, in a11 sincerity, to make an evaluation of that British Qo-operation” with regard to the asccrtainment the wishes of the people in Sabah and Sarawak the United Nations team, he oould not escape the conclusion that British Vo-operation” meant in faot a sabotage of the real intent of the Manila Accord which Kuala Lumpur signed with regard to this question, Then he would understand that Indonesia and the Philippines could not but refuse to accept such an asoertainment of the wishes of the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak as free and adequate, He would not have complained that the unexpected happened with regard to the attitude of Indonesia and the Philippines, On the contrary, the unexpected happened in the first instance from Kuala Lumpur. On 29 August 1963, while the United Nations assessment was still being cgnducted in Sabah and Sarawak, Kuala Lumpurobviously under heavy pressure from the United Kingdom-announced that the Federation of Malaysia would be proclaimedon 16September 1963, inoomplete disregard of the United Nations assessment in Sabah and Sarawak, in complete disregard of the Manila Accord on this point. It is true that Kuala Lumpur sent an envoy to Djakarta on 27 August not, however, to consult with us but only to inform Djakarta of this fait accompli, Manila was not consulted either. far as the United Nations was conoerned, this shameful announcement, in violation of a11 agreements understanding, was oalled by one who was deeply involved in the assessment itself “a slap in the face of the United Nations, indeed of the Secretary-General. It made the work of the United Nations team meaning- 188s”. There is no sense indeed for Kuala Lumpur, nor for London, to oomplain that Indonesia and the Philippines have not accepted the findings of the United Nations team; we have our very serious reasons. But Kuala Lumpur and London ignored entirely the work of the United Nations team when they decided, irrespective of the United Nations findings, to proolaim their Malaysia, Therefore, the absurdityis asfollows: whereas Malaysia did not consider itself bound by the outoome or by the assessment of the United Nations, it insists that both the Philippines and Indonesia consider themselves bound by the outcome of the same assessment. We have no quarrel withthesecretary-General; neither does he have any quarrel with us. 25. SO, the Malaysia created and established such an arbitrary way by London and Kuala Lumpur, in complete disregard and violation of the letter spirit of the Manila Accord, is not the Malaysia we-Indonesia and the Philippines-were supposed to 26. On this point, relating to the Philippines claim to Sabah-wbich has been ignored by Kuala Lumpur- The Sunday Times of Manila%i its issue of 6 September 1964 stated in an editorial on Sabah, Sarawak and Kuala Lumpur as follows: 26. 6 septembre Philippines Kuala ment dans un éditorial, et de Kuala Lumpur: With Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo) still under British administration despite the supposed independent status of Malaysia, the Philippine claim to North Borneo cannot but meet with roadblocks at every turn.” Le m&me journal And the same paper also stated that: “From a11 indications, settlement of the North Borneo question, if any, Will have to await a more propitious time. It should be obvious by now that even were Kuala Lumpur actually desirous of settling this question, it is not wholly free to do SO, since North Borneo is only under its nominal control. n Telle qui n’est malaisien. fond8e. This is the opinion of an important paper in Manila which is not basically anti-British nor even anti- Malaysia. That situation is indeed the sad truth. 27. le Sunday 1964, J. V. Cruz 2’7. In an article on the same subject appearing in The Sunday Times of Manila of 13 September 1964- only yesterday-J. V. Cruz wrote: “No significant nation of this region [South-East Asia] has spoken up in support of Malaysia% ‘case’ against Indonesia. This is due to the simple fact that the leaders and peoples of Asia and Africa know that the Federation of Malaysia is acolonialist creation whose raison d’être and inspiration are not merely to preserve but even to extend British COlonialist power and influence in South-East Asia . . . . Since Malaysia remains under the military control of the British, it follows that the British must neoessarily be ‘consulted’ also onpoliticaldecisions. These are the inexorable dynamics of puppetry,” C lest 1% probablement ce pays tionnee This is probably the dynamic revolution in this COUntry to which the representative of Malaysia referred this morning. 29. TO pretend ignorance on this is, 1 think, very unfortunate, The British military base in Singapore is used as a spring-board for subversive aggression against our country, as was proved during the rebellion in Sumatra and Celebes. The denialmade by the United Kingdom representative was not convincing to us. On the contrary, it was in contradiction with the facts of history. Perhaps a reading of the recentlypublished book Birds’ Nests in Their Beards2 might be helpful and illuminating for the representative of Malaysia, as well as for the representative of the United Kingdom. 30, The difference in evaluation or acknowledgement, if 1 may say SO, between the representative of Malaysia and me, 1 believe, lies in the fact that we evaluate colonialism-in this case, British colonialism in Asia-rather differently. He emphasizes that the people of Malaysia equally want to eradicate colonialism from their lands. We are happy to hear this assurance. We wish them well, but that is probably why there is no fighting in the present Malaysian territory. 31. With regard to the Tokyo summit meeting and the negotiations between us in June 1964, it is true that in principle we agreed to the withdrawal of our volunteers. 1 stress the “volunteers”, because that is what they are. But the principle of withdrawal was in the context that a political solution of the dispute would be sought. In fact, Indonesia started the initial withdrawal in order to facilitate the start of the summit meeting. This goodwill by Indonesia unfortunatelywas met by illwill and obstruction from the Government of Kuala Lumpur in the effort to reach a peaceful 2 Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Co-operation, adopted at rhe Asian-African Conference held at Eandung, Indonesia, from 18 to 24 April 1955. 4/ William Stevenson, Birds’ Nescs in Their Beards (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964). 32. As for the statement of the representative of the United States at the 1145th meeting of the Council, much of it has already been answeredby the statement 1 made immediately thereafter. Nevertheless, 1 would like to add some basic observations. 32. Quant 2 la dgclaration qu’a faite le représentant des Etats-Unis du Conseil, j’y ai déjh, en gros, répondu par l’exposé que j’ai présenté immédiatement après. J’aimerais cependant ajouter quelques remarques importantes. 33. It is rather ironie that the accusation of the use of force directed at my country should corne from the representative of the United States, whose powerful country shows an impressive record of the use of force, justified or unjustified, disguised or undisguised, authorized or unauthorized, in its policies towards other countries, Members or non-Members of the United Nations, He contended: Il . . * The Government of Indonesia, a Member of the United Nations, has sanctioned the use of force in the pursuit of its quarrel with the sovereign State of Malaysia, which is also a Member of the United Nations.” [ 1145th meeting, para, 15.1 33. Il est assez ironique que ce soit le représentant des Etats-Unis d’Am6rique qui nous accuse d’employer la force, sant pays avec d’autres Etats, Membres ou non des Nations Unies, compte un nombre impressionnant de recours à la force, justifiés ou non, déguises ou non, autorisés ou non. Il a declar6: “Le Gouvernement de l’Indonésie, Etat Membre de l’Organisation le recours a la force dans sa querelle avec 1’Etat souverain de Malaisie, qui est également Membre de 1’ONU.” [1145eme séance, par. 15.1 34. Of course, he just ignores the fact that SO far as Indonesia is concerned, a sovereign Malaysia does not exist. The sovereign, independent Malaysia which was to be formed and welcomed by the agreement of Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines, was sabotaged and manipulated by British power which created and imposed British neo-colonialist Malaysia in its stead. 34, Naturellement, qu’aux yeux de l’Indonésie, il n’existe pas de Malaisie souveraine. La Malaisie indépendante et souveraine, qui devait entre la Fédération de la Malaisie, l’Indonésie et les Philippines, la puissance britannique qui a crée et imposé à sa place la Malaisie néo-colonialiste britannique, 35. But even assuming that we should respect the soveseignty and independence of Malaysia such an accusation is rather strange when it cornes from the representative of the United States. Has he forgotten occurrences, to mention only recent events, such as the “Bay of Pigs” and “Tonkin” affair? How would he like it if 1 simply changed the word “Indonesia” intc the Wnited States” and “Malaysia” into “Cuba” in that statement of his? Then it would read: 35. Mais ?I supposer meme que nous devions respecter la souverainete et l’independance de la Malaisie, une telle accusation sonne assez mal dans la bouche du representant des Etats-Unis d’Amérique. A-t-il, cents, oublié les affaires de la “baie des Cochonstf et du “Tonkin”? Aimerait-il ment le mot “Indonésie” par “Etats-Unis” “Malaisie” faite? On y lirait alors: “Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, Etat Membre de l’Organisation le recours à la force dans sa querelle avec 1’Etat souverain de 1’ONU.” 36. Bien entendu, ce n’est pas seulement le recours éventuel B la force, qui est en canse, mais sa justification, sentant des Etats-Unis d’Amérique voudrait le faire croire. a demandé au Conseil de securit8 d’agir contre l’Indonésie afin d’empêcher, comme il dit, que l’attaque ne se renouvelle, eux, avec leur puissance internationale, ont àmaintes occasions su détourner le Conseil de sécurite de pareilles la force, bien le qualificatif pouvait tres difficilement se justifier. “The Government of the United States, a Member of the United Nations, has sanotioned the use of force in the pursuit of its quarrelwith the sovereign State of Cuba, which is also a Member of the United Nations. n 36. It is not, of course, just the use of force, if any, which is at issue, but its justification. It is not as simple as the representative of the UnitedStates would suggest. The representative of the UnitedStates asked for Security Council action against Indonesia to prevent, as he said, a recurrence of the attack, while the United States has chosen, because of its international power, to prevent on many occasions suah Security Council actions in cases of attack or use of force, even when the attack could easily be termed unprovoked and uncalled aggression, and even where its justification has been very dubious indeed. 37. En mettant en cause l’Indonésie, le TePréSentant. des Etats-Unis des faits et considérations qui ont précéde et entoure l’événement sur lequel se fonde la plainte malaisienne. Le représentant 37. In this case against Indonesia, the representative Of the United States has kept his eyes and his,ears closed to many facts and considerations which preceded and surrounded the event which fosmed the substance of Malaysia’s complaint. The representative 38. The air raid bombing which 1 mentioned in my statement at the 1144th meeting was in fact carried out by an American pilot, flying an American airoraft, hired and paid by an agent of the United States Government. We shot down the aircraft, captured the pilot and put him, on triai. You cari read the story of this event, if you wish, in the recently published book T& Invisible Government, by David Wise and Thomas B. ROSS.~ Another book nublishedrecently-which1 mentioned before-in which the involvemen”t of Britain and the United States in the revolt against the Indonesian Government is described is Birds’ Nests in Their Beards, by William Stevenson, a well-known Canadian journalist. What would my colleagues from the United Kingdom and the United States think if Indonesia were to accuse them of aggression, or at least of the use of force-subversive as it may be, but yet detectablein their relations with Indonesia, indeed of both subversion and aggression, of whichwe have ampleproof? 39. It is also typical that the representative of the United States is quick to see a t’paternityt’ case with others. This may represent a state of mindwith which his Government and its allies are used to handling the world. We, on our part, thinkin terms of obtaining a solution, of remedying and solving the conflict-not of paternities. It is the “Maphilindo” idea, the “Maphilindot concept, agreed upon in Manila by the Governments of the Federation of Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines. What paternity does one see in that idea, that concept? Paternity of an idea, of an ideal? In that case, 1 cari sayprobably, ttyesn. But no paternity derived from military power. That is why Indonesia and the Philippines have always been willing to seek a peaceful solution to the confliot, as I have explained before, based on ideas, on concepts, of solutions. is a concept of a self-respecting Asia, of a selfrespecting Asia and Africa. 40. With regard to the statements of the representative of the United Kingdom, my comments are the following. The representative of the United Kingdom has seen fit to deny the fact, which 1 mentioned in my statement at the 1144th m.eeting, of there being evidences of British colonialist policies and designs towards my country. He has done SO in a way that was not too oonvincing to me, because we know the records in my country and in South-East Asia. The w David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government (New York, Random Blouse Inc., 1964). 41. The investigations that were conducted on the events of 2 July, 19 and 21 August, which 1 just mentioned, brought to light the fact that a11 these hostile activities were part of aBritish-Malaysian subversive plan in the indonesian Riau Archipelago. The leader of the subversive plan was Chawin ben Kassim, a Malaysian national, who was assisted by two excaptains of the abortive secessionist rebellion. It was further established that the subversive activity in the Riau Archipelngo region consisted of smuggling of persons and firearms into Indonesian territory and also of activities aimed at destroying the military system of the Indonesian Government. The persons used in these subversive activities were mostly recruited from the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (P.R.R.I.) , secessionist rebellion, who were trained and armed by and in Malaysia. Those are some proofs of what 1 said before. 41. du mentionner, activites britannico-malaisien de Riau. ben deux niste subversive consistait et essayer vernement ces parmi Revolusioner entraînés malaisien. ce que j’ai avancé antérieurement. 42. ni certainement plaider britannique, subversifs ainsi et qui existe du monde. qu’a formulées ai solution mais apparah toutefois, de cette guerre que les Britanniques ne peuvent pas gagner, le Spectator, hebdomadaire britannique, publié recemment, le 28 aofit 1964, un 42. It is not surprising to my delegation or possibly t0 others that the United Kingdom is SO zealously defending the case of British Malaysia, defending subversive and aggressive designs in South-East Asia, defending a state of war of its own creation which has been going on for some time in our part of the world. Its accusations, SO consonant with those of the representative of Malaysia, have already been refuted inmyprevious statements. The UnitedKingdom cannot offer the concept of a solution to the conflict. It wants only to stop our struggle, not its own war of subversion, military as it also appears-a war which it Will, however, not win. As for that war that cannot be won by the British, by the way, the British weekly, xhe Spectator, as recently as 28 August 1964, publiehed an interesting article by a British Member of Parliament, Julian Critchley. He complained in that article that : article d’un membre du Parlement britannique, Julian Critchley. “‘This is a war that may well last for ten years.’ Such is the view of the senoir British officer in Borneo. If his forecast is only half right, then the consequences for British policies in South-East Asia Will be immense as well as unforeseen. ‘Confrontation’ in Borneo is a euphemismfor a bitter 43. This war has been going on for some time, and indeed we cannot see the victory-or any victory-in sight SO long as the British will not co-operate the search for the peaceful solution which the Asian countries ooncerned have themselves been seeking. Instead, while we are discussing this problem in the Council-and 1 believe members of this Council are eager to restore peace and seek peaoeful solutionswe have read a report from London, published The New York Timës last Saturday, 12 September, which once again SO tynioally demonstrated the bin gunboat diplo&y, the &acy policy of Britain’s power towards Asia. 44, The British Government reportedly has decided, under the cloak of their so-called retaliation theory, to launch an open bombing attack on Indonesia to stop Indonesian confrontation actions against Malaysia. We are familiar with the so-called retaliation theory of the British imperialists which, on the question of Yemen was recently condemned by the Security Counoil in April of this year. But even if there were no Secusity Council resolution, we could identify this adventurous British gunboat policy by ourselves and without difficulty, and Indonesia Will oppose and conclemn it. Let me say here and now: if Britain chooses to lsunch an open attack on any part of the territory of Indonesia, Indonesia Will immediately retaliate with a counterblow. 45. The situation is indeedfraught with many dangers, The confrontation policy on both sides has not lessened; on the contrary, it is heightening. Guerrilla fighting continues on both sides. Violations of Indonesials air-space and territorial waters have not ceased. Incursions, violations and subversion against our territory are the order of the day. Consequently, if the Council should now attempt to produce a resolution, 1 would like to remind the Council to take the entire situation into consideration. There are at least two parties to the conflict before this Council, and no one-sidecl orunbalancedresolution Will prove workable or useful. Hostile actions by both sides cannot even be easily halted without the achievement-or at least the positive prospect of the achievement-of apolitical solution. The underlying source of these hostilities must be acknowledged. 46. As 1 saidin my firstintervention[ 1144thmeeting], the situation needs a solution, not merely a resolution. My delegation has not corne here to ask for a resolution, but my delegation is prepared to oo-operate in finding a solution, apeaceful solution, of the oonflict. My Government, as 1 stated clearly before, has never closed the door to a peaceful solution of the conflict, because our confrontation policy against British 47. But one should thus see clearly that this confrontation by Indonesia is not a source but a manifestation of the conflict which exists in South-East Asia. Non-recognition of the present Malaysia is not a source either, but a manifestation of the conflict, the specific conflict over the formation of the Federatien of Malaysia. Recognition cannot, therefore, be demanded first, before that underlying conflict is solved. 47. de la part une Est asiatique, actuelle conséquenoe la formation On ne peut donc exiger la reconnaissance lieu, 48. Do we still see a possibility for a peaceful solu- 48. tion? As far as Indonesia is concerned, the answer solution is yes. 1 have told you about the Manila agreements, la réponse the basic agreements between the Federation of Made Manille, laya, Indonesia and the Philippines. Although there la FBdération de Malaisie, l’Indonésie et les Philipare differences over the provisions of one of the pines. Bien qu’il subsiste un différend Manila agreements regarding the formation of Maclauses de l’un des accords de Manille relatives laysia, the whole of the agreement, 1 believe, still la formation de la Malaisie, l’ensemble de ces accords stands. There are agreements regarding the freedom reste, and independence of the peoples in South-East Asia, liberté regarding their peace and security, and regarding asiatique, B leur paix et B leur their progress and development, agreements signed progr&s et à leur d&eloppement, solemnly by the leaders of the three Governments trois gouvernements int8ressés y ont solennellement concerned. apposé leur signature, 49. It is true that on the specific question of the formation of Malaysia, thus far no agreement for the solution of the differences has been reached. Two separate talks at Bangkok failed. But in Tokyo when the deadlock could not be broken, a new device was found, which was to submit the dispute to a four-nation, African-Asian conciliation comm.ission, as proposed by President Macapagal of the Philippines. The three parties agreed to this proposal, at least in principle, while President Sukarno not only accepted the establishment of the commission but went even further by stating that he was prepared to abide by its recommendations. Thus the dispute could be solved quickly and finally. 49. Il est vrai Pr&ise n’a Bté conclu jusqu’ici qui résolve Les entretiens organisés & deux reprises à Bangkok ont échoué. Mais LL Tokyo, devant l’impossibilit8 dgnouer le conflit, sentant les Philippines, celle de soumettre le différend à une commission de conciliation nations, sur cette proposition, le prgsident Sukarno a accepté non seulement la cr&tion se di%larer dispos8 à en appliquer les recommandations. Ainsi le différend pourrait $tre r&solu de façon rapide et définitive. 50. This device for African-Asian conciliation is not only an act of faith in our African-Asian family and its solidarity; it is also an expression of the principle of “Maphilindo “, that Asian problems should be solved by Asians in an Asian way-the system of “mushawarahW. It should apply to the African-Asian family as it is now practised within the African fam.ily of nations, 50. Ce procgdé de conciliation afro-asiatique pas seulement un acte de foi en notre famille afroasiatique et en sa solidaritg; c’est aussi une expression du principe du “Mapfiilindol’, probl8mes asiatiques doivent être &!SOI~S par des Asiatiques t&me de la ttmushawarah”. Il faudrait la famille pratiqué dans le cadre de la famille africaines. 51. Permettez-moi pertinents du com.muniqué de Tokyo du 20 juin 1964: 51. Permit me to refer to the relevant paragraphs of the Tokyo communiqué of 20 June 1964: Paragraph 1 concerns the meeting itself-whereit was held, and SO forth. Le premier paragraphe porte sur la réunion ellemême - son lieu, et ainsi de suite, Paragraph 3: President Sukarno expressed agreement to this proposa1 and gave assurance that he would abide by the recommendations the commis sion, Paragraph 4: Prime Ministes Tunku Abdul Rabman agreed in psinciple to this proposal, with the proviso that a11 acts of hostility againstlllalaysiamustcease forthwith. Paragraph 5-which is very important: The three Heads of Government agreed to instruot their Foreign Ministers to continue the study of tbis proposal, bearing in mind the views expressed their respective Heads of Government, SO that the latter could meet again at an appropriate time. Tbe convening of this ministerial conference been discussed but has been met withsomereluctance from Kuala Lumpur, However, 1 think that this communiqu8 also still stands for Kuala Lumpur. 52. Thus, if the Security Council would like to take advantage of this open door, it cari do SO. In my view , it is the only way remaining for finding solution-if one really wants a solution, a peaceful solution, to the problem. It should not, in my opinion, be disrupted by devices which Will not be consonant with the principle underlying the Macapagal proposal. The growing responsibility of Asia and Africa solving their own problems in their own regions should be honoured. We believe deeply in that responsibility, not only toward our own people, but also toward peace and justice of the wosld.

oall on the next speaker on my list, the representative of the Philippines.

TO us who are anxious to see the differences between hvo mutual friends settled peacefully the progress we are making in this discussion is indeed gratifying. We see behind contentions of both parties the basic desire willingness of both to reach an amicable agreement. Once more the advantage of consultation and peaceful talks between parties truly dedicated to peace and interested in the peaoeful settlement of disputes vitally being demonstrated before this Council today. 55. In our intervention at the 1145th meeting, emphasized the desire of my Government to bath our friends, the contending parties in this dispute, to sllow US to help settle their differences through the implementation of the proposa1 of the President of the Philippines, better known as the MaCaPagal proposai, by way of the creation of an African-Asian 56, The specific question before the Security Council is that of aggression as presented by one of the contending parties. The exis tente or the non-existence of aggression, therefore, is a fact to be determined by the Couneil. 56. de sécurité celle de déterminer 57. In the meantime, and for the purpose of further clarification, the Philippine delegation would like to sum up its position. Like any other Member of the United Nations loyal to the Charter and itsprinciples, my Government is opposed to aggression oommitted anywhere in the world andby anyone. This we reiterate’ without in any way wanting to anticipate the findings of the Security Council on the question of aggression which is before it. We trust, however, that the Council in its wisdom and without much more delay Will soon reach an agreement on a course of action designed to head off more serious incidents or developements in that area. 57. aimerait mieux l’organisation Charte 2 toute l’auteur. maniére sécurité il est saisi. parviendra, s’accorder des incidents cette r$ion. 58. l’Accord la Malaisie pacifique des conciliation des proposition rit6 Voila, Philippines, 59. glais]: des representants des Philippines, ont trait également par cette question. 60. notre alléguée s’agit nationale encore le fond les exam.en attentif question 58. My Government, in line with the spirit of the Manila Accord, hopes that the Malaysian-Indonesian dispute could be settled peacefully and, if possible, through the Philippine proposa1 of an African-Asian conciliation commission, but the Philippine Government is prepared to support any other proposa1 which the Security Council may adopt for a peaceful solution of this dispute. This in brief is the position of the Philippine Government.

We have studied carefully the statements made by the representatives of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as other available material concerning the question on our agenda. Equally, we listened attentively to the views expressed on this question by some members of the Seourity Council. 60. The problem under consideration, in our opinion, is not an isolated incident alleged by one side and not admitted by the other. It is the conflict between the forces of national liberation in Asia and the power positions which in these areas are still being held by colonialism. This is the substance of the problem which, whatever attempts may be undertaken to conceal it, emerges from any careful examination or discussion of the present question. 61. A series of armed actions has been taking place in certain territories near the borders between the Republic of Indonesia and the newly created Federation of Malaysia. As we were reminded by the representative of Indonesia, these incidents had started long before the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia. They resulted from the local resistance against the British colonial power and from the hostile attitude which this colonial Power from the beginning took towards the Indonesian revolution. Generally speaking, they have been a phenomenon accompanying and inherent to the crisis and breakdown of colonial domination. We have witnessed it in different regions of south-eastern Asia, as well as in other parts of the world. 61. certains la République Malaisie pelé avaient ration la résistance nique coloniale lution un phénom8ne de la domination moins ainsi que dans d’autres 63. Here we are witnessing another phenomenon-not a new one, but one rather familiar to the different organs of the United Nations dealing with similar situations: a colonial Power, faced with a breakdown of its empire, declares a certain area independent by imposing on it obligations such as the continuation of certain economic privileges of colonial monopolies, military bases, economic and political influence. 8 State formation may of course antagonize not only its neighbours, who consider a further presence the colonial Power as dangerous for themselves for the whole area, but also the population of former colonial areaa which have been incorporated into such formation and find themselves faced with the same economic overlords, the same colonial administration, the same colonial troops, and the same colonialwars. 64. The people in North Kalimantan, as we kuow, net aocept the solution of the Malaysian Federation, and considered that it w as dictated not by the interests of the peoples whose territories had been incorporated into that Federation, but rather by the interests colonial Power, of foreign tin, rubber and other monopolies, which has been admitted in numerous British and American statements, and, by implication, as being contrary to the freedom and self-assertion of Asian peoples. 65. The struggle apparently extends ta other territories of Malaysia. The resistance movement in North Kalimantan commands the sympathy and support of the Indonesian people. Indonesia has proved by its heroic fight to be a champion of the anti-colonialist struggle in South-East Asia and in the world in general, is considered tobe an example and inspiration for those who fight the remnants of colonialism elsewhere. Rnd this, 1 suhmit, is quite natural. It is also understandablo that Indonesia gives moral support to the national liberation struggle of those people who are closely linked to the Indonesian people by geography, race, language and culture, and who are incorporated into another political formation, which, by the way, has never been recognized by Indonesia as a sovereign State, and which has been considered rather as an expression of neo-colonialism. 66. In this connexion, may 1 remind the Council that the result of the United Nations investigation 1963 cari hardly by invoked without objection infavour of the establishment of Malaysia, since, as Indonesia has repeatedly pointed out, Malaysia itself, contrary to the Manila summit meeting, declared that Malaysia would be proolaimed no matter what the outcome of 67. The moral support of Indonesia finds expression in a number of Indonesian volunteers who join that struggle. But this fact cannot constitute anyfoundation for accusing Indonesia of being an aggressor or for blaming her for the difficulties in which Malaysia may find herself, difficulties which are the result of Malaysia’s close association with the interests and positions of a foreign colonial Power in the area. In the opinion of our delegation, if we accepted such an accusation, it would be contrary to historical reality, common sense and the aims of our Organization, especially as they are expressed in the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. 67. l’arrivée nésiens ne saurait d’une agression sable la Malaisie, association sance gation serait et aux objectifs ceux qui sont exposés de l’indépendance 68. It is of course deplorable that in the areas con-. cerned, as well as in other territories in South-East Asia, men of the same country, the same race ancl the same nationality are fighting each other and are suffering and dying in battles which are increasing tension and threatening peace in the area. The responsibility for this, however, lies with the colonialist and neo-colonialist Powers, which attempt to maintain and defend their interests and positions by making Asians fight Asians, as elsewhere they make Africans fight Africains. 68. régions Sud-Est d’une les dans tension ce secteur. tion colonialistes leurs Asiatiques elles contre 69. And this is also the substance of the problem we are facing. It is not our task in the Security Council to examine the inclividual cases or incidents without taking account of their historical ancl political context. By its Charter by a series of decisions ancl resolutions of its organs, and especially by the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, the United Nations recognized the importance of the revolutionaryprocess of decolonization not only as a powerful historical phenomenon, as a factor shaping the world of today, but also as a task for contemporary humanity, the accomplishment of which is a pre-condition for establishing a world of 69. est posé, d’examiner sans Par et de résolutions la Déclaration pays Nations révolutionnaire seulement donne mais temps, veut dans le monde - C’est la prgsente Cette nialisme, troupes créer la région blèmes sommes maturité aux Nations intervention rageant ment moyen de négociations peace, freedom and justice, which is the aim of the United Nations. In accordance with this recognition we should also examine the present question and strive for its solution, Such a solution consists in ensuring the complete departure of colonialism, of its economic and political power, of its troops and military bases, and in creating conditions for the peoples of the region concerned to settle their problems in a way which would correspond to their interests and desires. We are quite sure that these peoples are sufficiently mature and experienced to achieve such a settlement by themselves. It is for the United Nations to assist them by removing a11 outside interventions and pressures and by encouraging the parties concerned to seek a positive settlement through understanding, negotiations and agreement. 70. Our delegation is gratified to find also that in the question which is under discussion there are positive elements which allow for some hope. The peoples involved are close to each other in many 70. dans il existe espoir. 71. The Indonesian representative gave an encouraging manifestation of the goodwill and willingness of his Government ta take such a way. Such a solution is indicated, as he stressed, by the Manila Accord of 1963, as well as by the talks which took place afterwards. He also reminded us of the principles proclaimed by his oountry jointly with the Philippines, namely mutual consultation and the seeking of agreement through consensus. And this was repeatedly stressed by many speakers as well as by the representative of the Philippines. c’est pose a suivre rappelé par’ les Philippines, voie reprises 72. May we say that in some of the words of the representative of Malaysia we find a certain hope that Malaysia may not close the door to such a way and to such a solution. In our opinion, the deliberations of the Security Council should be aimed at encouraging and facilitating such a solution of the problem. du représentant une telle voie et à une telle solution. possibilité

We are dealing with an incident which is perhaps limited in scope, but none the less serious fait since it is one of a series of events whose roots go very deep and which are taking place in an area that is already seething, SO that the slightest spark cari set off an explosion, 74. The dropping of about thirty armed men by parachute may not be a tragedy, but in the midst of SO much misunderstancling and suspicion, and in the light of the motives we have heard, we have every right to be concerned by such an operation, since it is interpreted as a point of departure for extending this unhappy, bloody and fratricidal conflict, which up to now has been a limited one. 75. It is a matter of regret that this peaceful region, which cari lay claim to such eminent philosophers as Buddha, Confucius and Gandhi, a11 of whom preached non-violence and tolerance, is coming to the point where weapons of war and mass destruction are brandished at the slightest ideological confrontation. 76. The history of the fight against colonialism takes on different forms depending on the men, the coutries and the period involved, each form being equally nationalistic, equally wise and equally effective. The Government of the Ivory Coast cari scarcely fail to recognize that a11 Asian, Latin American, African and European countries that, in one way or another, have freed their people from the yoke of colonialism, have the same rights, should enjoy the same privileges and cari claim the same merits. 77. Motivated, as it ie, by the sacred principle of tolerance, my Government cari likewise scarcely fail to accept that any State Member of the United Nations should be described as “neo-colonizedV1. This epithet is such a subjective one that it could contain a high percentage of errors prejudicial to good relations and the peaceful coexistence of peoples and States which are essential to the maintenance of peace. 79. Sovereignty and territorial integrity are not only a privilege but also a right to which a11 are entitled, and my Government deeply regrets the extension of this conflict into a non-contested part of the territory of a sovereign State Member of the United Nations.. 80. The Ivory Coast considers itself a friend of both Malaysia and Indonesia. Are they not a11 three linked by the indissoluble bond of African-Asian solidarity? However, the Ivory Coast feels that it must in a11 modesty shoulder its share of responsibility for maintaining peace. 81. Just as, in the recent past, my country, together with the other members of the Council, deprecated the shooting in Panama and the bombings in Yemen; just as, the day before yesterday, it deplorecl the events in the Indo-Chinese peninsula; and just as we and the other members of the Council called for a cesse-fire in the Mediterranean and ordered the bombings and overflights of a sovereign State to be stopped, SO again today it is my country’s sincere and objective belief that the parachuting of armed forces into a sovereign State is illegal and contrary to the principles and spirit of the Charter. 82. We therefore consider that the Security Council, using its customary language and taking tare not to fan tbe flames of passion, should regret and deplore the incidents of 2 September 1964, which are the subject of the complaint of 3 September 1964 [S/593O]u. 83. In that way, the Council Will avoid issuing a oondemnation which, in the present oircumstances, would only add to the difficulties, as long as the statements we have heard demonstrate a sincerewish on the part of those concerned to settle their differences by negotiation. 84. However, the Council should make sure that such unfortunate incidents do not recur, and should appeal to both parties to take steps to that end. 85. But, if the principle 1 have just mentioned, which derives from sovereignty, is a major factor in my Government’s foreign policy, there is yet another one, no less important in the eyes of my Government: a neighbour’s right to live, and hence the practice of a good neighbour policy. 86. In point of fact, Indonesia has stated in the course of the debate that it was not opposed, a priori, to the idea of a Greater Malaysia but preferred an Asian Malaysia to one conceived by the British, and that it feared that this combination might be used against its own dearly won independence and revolution. 9 Sec Officia1 Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year. Supplement for July, August and September 1964. 88, Even though the theory of “one il1 to cure another” has occasionally been accepted in medicine although it would seem to smack of charlatanism, indiplomacy on the other hand, this point of view has slowly but surely led the world into war, Withthis spectre looming over us, the parties concerned Will agree with us that the best plan is to revert to the Charter which places on a11 of us the obligation for settling our differences by peaceful means. 89. The Council should therefore exhort the parties ‘co refrain from any hostile measures or acts and to resume their conversations, if necessary having recourse to the good offices of friendly countries. In view of the explosive situation in this area, the Council should be able to follow the course of events in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter. 90, We warmly support the hopes expressed by bath parties that this Asian problem will be solved within the Asian family of nations, In recommencling that if necessary, the parties concerned should have recourse to the good offices of friendly nations, we have in mind the joint communiqu0 issued by the Heads of State of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines after the meeting at Tokyo on 20 June 1964. 91. In conclusion, the Government of the Republic of the Ivory Coast, true to the spirit of African-Asian solidarity and fully aware of its international responsibilities, is ready to support a resolution, expressed in moderate terms and avoiding any premature condemnation, that Eollows the main lines of the recommendation we have put before the Council.

The complaint lodged by Malaysia, which is the subject of the present debate, places the Council in a very difficult position, Of course, while it goes without saying that it is this organ’s duty to maintain international peace and to do SO in the specific case before the Council, it is no less true that, from a more general standpoint and owing to its very complexity, the dispute which has been going on for some time now between the Malaysian and Indonesian rulers poses a real moral problem for many countries including my own. 93. The statements made here in the Council by the Malaysian Minister of the Interior, the Deputy Fore@ Minister of Indonesia and the Ambassador of the Philippines prove beyond doubt that within this great Asian family there is a feeling of uneasiness at times, amounting in some ways to anxiety. But the most regrettable fact of a11 is that suddenly, in certain parts of Malaysian territory, this anxiety has erupted into bloody conflict, a situation which my delegation cari only strongly deplore. 94. That tragic development has left my delegation deeply concerned and apprehensive, since, in the view of my country, which maintains friendly relations with both countries as an integral part of the African- 95. In the absence of a policy of mutual unclerstanding and co-operation, SO very important for the two peoples concerned, these two countries, no matter how seriously their dispute, must at the very least allow their action to be guided by the principle of mutual respect and peaceful coexistence, and choose the path of negotiation, mediation and arbitration as their means of solution, This is the only wayfor them to overcome their present difficulties and finally to aohieve full independence and sovereignty in those areas where this is necessary. 96. At this critical stage in their relations we hope that the norms of international law, set forth in the relevant provisions of the Charter governingrelations between States, Will not be ignored. As everyone knows, the peace and stability of that part of the world are at stake. Even though independent Malaysia apparently still has to make some improvements in its economic and military organization-and most small States in the initial stages of their national independence find themselves in the same situation-.we believe, looking at the matter with a11 due objectivity, that, a11 other considerations apart, Malaysia has a politioal system of its own choosing and its right therefore as a sovereign State must be recognized and a peaceful and even fraternal attitude must be maintained towards it. This cari very well be done, without prejudice to the fact that the independent States and peoples of that region should combinetheir efforts in order to eliminate a11 forms of colonial rule and exploitation, In other words, relations between these two States must be founded on the permanent principles of justice, solidarity and good neighbour- 96. Dans relations, international, nentes Etats, de l’intérêt partie doive lioration - fait des petits indépendance en toute a ce pays politique et d’observer fique, le cas, les Etats guer de domination ment dit, il faut que les relations soient justice, ordre int&êt la sagesse des alliances l’est convoitent, fois de sa position potentielles, cette Kuala Lumpur, ments devenue conclusions sur la mise mination lineSS. In line with this idea, it is interesting to note that the former Federation of Malaya had the wisdom and the prudence to stay aloof from the military alliances surrounding it to the north and east which were soliciting R-1 would even say covetingit-owing to the importance both of its geographical position and its potential resources. TO my delegation’s knowledge, the prudence shown from the start by Kuala Lumpur does not seem to have undergone any changes from the time that Federation assumed its present form, that is to say since the Secretary- General of the United Nations reached conclusions on the implementation of the principle of selfdetermination and finally since the creation of Malaysia. 98. 1 do not wish to dwell on the merits of that principle and how it applies to Malaysia, but it should be borne in mind that the decolonization process has offered and Will oertainly oontinue to offer a series of examples in which the calculations of a colonial Power are quite often thwarted by the dynamic, unexpeoted and extremely rapid pace of the phenomenon of liberation which the colonized peoples of Africa and Asia are experiencing today. The fact is that many peoples have become fully conscious of their sovereign right to join together and liberate themselves and that, owing ta the extraordinary drive towards emancipation, a number of situations have been completely altered thereby to the advantage of the formerly colonized peoples. 98. Sans principe sie, il y a lieu de considérer cessus nement où les calculs très dynamique, phénom8ne de libération les - il faut le dire - grâce d’émancipation nettement s’unir situations Zï l’avantage 99. Rien ne nous dit qu’il un proche que de voir séquelle de sujétion de ses anciens colonisateurs. fois tifie ne peut suscite sence, base stratégique que celle cœur liste sentiment cet autre maillon de la chaîne des bases stratêgiques et asiatique, impérialiste et par cons6quent tions des peuples, 99, There is nothing to indicate that the situation Will not be otherwise in the case of Malaysia in the near future or that the anti-colonialist movement Will not enable this brother country in its turn to free itself from the last vestiges of the economic and military subjugation of its former colonizers. But we cannot ignore the fact that this prospect, even if it justifies our hopes for Malaysia’s future, is not enough to allay the fears of oux Indonesian friends and brothers at the presence in theimmediate proximity of their oountry, of a strategic base as large and formidable as Singapore. That pistol aimed at the heart of that great progressive and anticolonialist country of Asia is certainly not going to foster a feeling of security within the region. Together with Aden, that other link in the chain of strategio and operational bases girding the African-Asian world, Singapore perpetuates the presence of an imperial force with a11 its traditions and customs, whioh is destined therefore to oppose popular aspirations. 100. In the light of the observations whioh Ihave just made, my delegation hopes that Malaysia, in evaluating the situation in that part of the world-and especially in normal times-Will take its great neighbourls apprehension into account by adopting a rational polioy towards that foreign base in accordance with its mission as a non-aligned and peaoeful nation, 100. de faire, haiter la situation en appréhensions a l’égard rationnelle, alignii et pacifique. 101. Having made these points, I should now like 101. to turn to the complaint lodged by Malaysia. More me permets than anything else, my delegation most sincerely dépos6e hopes that Malaysians and Indonesians will cesse délégation killing each other in the jungles of Malaysia. We et Indonésiens have some reason to believe that, as things are at malaisienne. present, even when undertaken on a vast scale, que, dans guerrilla action Will not solve pending problems. guBrilleros, On the contrary, they will only create another problem, ne résoudront 102. fraternité, l’Indonésie de cet esprit. la satisfaction afro-asiatique ville la pensée révolutionnaire ples colonisés. 102. Morocco has always been and certainly still is inspired by feelings of brotherhood, friendship and admiration towards Indonesia. Hence it is most gratifying for my delegation to state that for the great African-Asian family which came into being in 1955, in the famous city of Bandung, that country was and remains the centre of revolutionary and anti-colonialist thought for the colonized peoples. 103, As a great African-Asian Powsr which played an exceptionally important role in the fight for liberty and justice, Indonesia, and my delegation is convinced of this, is well aware of its responsibilities in the matter of international peace and remains in any event willing to fulfil in good faith the obligations which it assumed under the United Nations Charter. 103. et ayant pour - ma délégation consciente le domaine cause, qu’elle Nations 104. My delegation is no less convinced that that country Will be able to emerge from this unfortunate crisis and still have kept intact the great prestige which it enjoys in the world and, more particularly, among the smaller countries of Africa and Asia; 104. ce pays conservant et plus particulièrement et d’Afrique. 105. Le Conseil de la Malaisie qu’elle tistes La délégation déclarations

The Council is seized with the complaint of the Government of Malaysia against the Government of Indonesia for havinglanded a group of armed paratroopers in southern Malaysia on 2 September 1964. The Norwegian clelegation has listened attentively to the statements by the representatives of the two countries. 106. Malaisie a eu lieu le 2 septembre à 100 milles sentant formulées 106. In the Malaysian statement cletails were given about the parachute dropping on 2 September near the Town of Labis, some 100 miles north of Singapore. The Indonesian representative has not denied the Malaysian charges. The Council therefore does not this time seem to be faced with a case where the facts of the matter are in serious dispute. It is a case of one Member State embarking upon military intervention against the territory of another and, consequently, a very serious case. pour cas oit les faits Un Etat taire c’est 107. actes, 107. My Government deeply deplores and regrets such acts as dangerous and irresponsible. 108. de vue de son gouvernement tions selon 108. The representative of Indonesia gave an account of his Government’s views on a set of underlying issues and why in its view the present situation represents a logical consequence thereof. Now this 110. In principle, the Norwegian delegation holds that peaceful solution should be within reach neighbourhood problems of this nature, This applies particularly to a dispute between neighbours of the same ethnie and cultural background, As such close neighbours they Will surely recognize the simple tenet that it is not the prerogative of your neighbour to choose your friends and determine your affairs you. On the other hand, it is your evident duty to ensure that your own or yourfriend’s conduct does not upset the tranquillity of your neighbour. 111. The applicable provisions of the United Nations Charter prescribe, without reservations or limitations, that a11 Members should settle their international putes by peaceful means and refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity political independence of other States. The Council shoulcl therefore encleavour to render assistance the parties on that basis and with due regard to the more specific provisions of the Charter aimed at helping Member States to reach paeific settlement of their disputes. The Council might do SO by calling for a stop to armed attacks or infiltrations OP any kind against Malaysia. 112. In areas of tension it is generally the case that peaceful conditions must be restored before efforts towards a lasting solution Will be approved. The parties have repeatedly stated their desire a settlement by peaceful means and their regret the negotiations they entered into have been interrupted. It would be in conformity with the spirit the aims of the Charter of the United Nations, particularly with Article 33, if the Security Council appealed to the parties tomake renewed efforts toward a negotiated settlement of their differences as soon as peaceful conditions have been re-established. 113. In this connexion, the Council might take into aooount the specific proposa1 for outside mediation assistance made by the President of the Philippines. No doubt the United Nations woujld endeavour react positively to any requests the parties might agree to make for assistance from the United Nations in this respect. 114, With your permission, Mr. President, on the usual understanding 1 am ready to waive the consecutive interpretation. 117. Data’ ISMAIL (Malaysia): Mr. President, 1 thank you and the members of the Council for your courtesy in calling upon me once again. 117. Je remercie de bien vouloir 118. The Council has had to endure yet once more the same stale arguments repeated ad nauseam by the representative of Indonesia. This afternoon even the Secretary-General of the United Nations did not escape his censure-not directly, of course, but the Secretary-General is now made to appear as either a puppet of the imperialists or a victim of their duplicity. The representative must really Bay what he means and not throw up veiled insults in order to becloud the simple fact that hiB Government has not fulfilled its solemn undertaking to welcome Malaysia, provided that the support of the people of the territories was ascertained by the Secretary-General and that, in bis opinion-I repeat, in his opinion-complete compliance with the principle of self-determination within the requirements of General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV), principle IX of the annex, waB ensured, 118. mêmes l’Indonésie Sec&taire pas BchappB & sa censure tement qu’il impérialistes, cité. nésie lancer simple l’engagement l’avènement consentement ress8s et que, de l’avis de celui-ci l’autodétermination aux résolution 119. Need 1 once again inform the representative of Indonesia of what the conclusion of the Secretary- General was? That he said, “that on both these counts there is no doubt about the wishes of a sizable majority of the peoples of these territories to join in the Federation of Malaysia”? Need 1 remind him yet once more that his Government’s solemn undertaking was to accept the Secretary-General’s judgement? 119. ce que fut la conclusion déclaré doute ,qu’une de ces territoires Faut-il n&ie, solennellement Secrétaire 120. 1 apologize for a11 this repetition, for indeed 1 have already given replies to each and every one of these charges, and 1 have no wish to detain the CounciI any longer on them. 1 have given those replies not because they affect directly the specific charge of Indonesian aggression which is before the Council, not merely because the record should bekept correct, but to demonstrate yet once again that Malaysia seeks to understand Indonesia’s difficulties, that we seek peace, the ways of peace, theways ofpeaceful negotiation to compose our differences. We have indeed been to meetings in Bangkok and Tokyo to Beek a peaceful solution, even though one of the parties has had the impertinence to tel1 us that we are not completely free, 120. déjà repondu et je ne voudrais tention r6ponses, touchent nous avons portée est choses de plus, des difficult8s les moyens ses pour sommes l’une nous n%tions 121. de l’Indonésie, remarques semaine de l’Indonésie sienne contre assisté néo-imp&rialiste a expose nesiennes sion une 121. 1 have listened with the utmost oare to the representative of Indonesia, but 1 cannot detect from his remarks what the issues are for negotiations. Last week we heard the representative of Indonesia boast about Indonesian aggression in Malaysia, This afternoon we have had another variation .of this arrogant and neo-imperialist attitude of his country, giving us the terms of the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from Malaysia in relation to the findings of the proposed conciliation commission, which is an insult not only to the sovereignty of Malaysia but to the members of the commission. 123. We do seek the ways of peace; but let no one doubt that any attack on our freedom, any aggression on our soi1 shall be fully met with, and that the aggressors Will fully pay the price of their folly and irresponsibility. 124. 1 reserve the right to make a more complete reply, if necessary, upon further study of the statement of the representative of Indonesia.

1 give the floor to the representative of Indonesia. 126, Mr. SUDJARWO (Indonesia): 1 believe that the statement just made by the representative of Malaysia does not contain anything which 1 have not already refuted in my previous statements. 1 have explained clearly and explicitly our position with regard to the assessment made by the United Nations team inSabah and Sarawak, If he had listened carefully to my statement, he would not have contended that my Government has no regard for the Secretary-General. Infact, what 1 said after explaining the facts on the matter of ascertaining the wishes of the people of Sabah and Sarawak, was that there was an absurdity in that Malaysia, which did not consider itself bouncl by the outcome of the United Nations assessment, insists that both the Philippines and Indonesia should consider themselves bound by the outcome of the sameassessment. 127. 1 also reserve my right to speakat a later stage of the debate to answer further the accusations with regard to my Government.

There are no more speakers on my list for this meeting. 1 must inform the members of the Council that it was impossible at the consultations heldduring the meeting, to reach agreement on the time of the next meeting. The President of the Council first proposed to cal1 the next meeting after consultation with members, At that time not a single speaker wished to speak tomorrow. During the discussion of this proposa1 by the Chairman, which was made because consultations are now going on which may result in the submission of draft resolutions,-during the consultations on this proposa1 by the Chairman another compromise suggestion was advanced, again when there was net a single speaker on the list: that we should meet on Wednesday morning. However, it likewise proved impossible to adopt that proposal, which suited a number of the delegations engaged in the negotiations 1 have mentioned. At that point the representative of the United Kingdom stated that he wished to speak tomorrow morning; later he said that he did not mind whether he spoke at a morning or an afternoon meeting, but that it must be tomorrow. 130. The Chairman is in the hands of the Council and leaves this question to the Council to decide. 130. du Conseil 131. In order not to prolong our meeting, 1 Will forego the consecutive interpretation into the two languages, if there is no objection to this by members of tbe Council. 131. nonce B la traduction gues, s’il du Conseil,

Of course, my delegation is in the hands of my oolleagues round this table. As you quite correctly stated, Mr. President, 1 have a statement which 1 would very much like to give to the Council tomorrow. As far as 1 am concerned, 1 am happy to give it either in the morning or in the afternoon. There may, of course, be other speakers-either members of the Council or invited members-who Will like to address the Council tomorrow . 132. 1 ‘anglais] : Il va sans a la disposition le une déclaration prononcer concerne, ou l’aprBs-midi; orateurs désireux 133. In the view of my delegation it is desirable to hold at least one meeting tomorrow to try to see whether we cari bring this item to a conclusion as soon as possible. On the other hand, 1 do see that there may be advantage in having ashort interval before we actually meet round the table tomorrow. 133. tienne de voir de cette je ménager sions 134. 1 would therefore propose, if my colleagues would agree that it would be convenient and if members of the Council would be ready, that wemeet tomorrow afternoon when 1 could make my statement; and anybody else who has a statement to make could then do SO. 134. 18gues y sont disposés, aprbs-midi; à cette la parole

Speaking as the representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS andnot as President, 1 want to say that, notwithstanding the respect and interest with which 1 look forward to the statement by the United Kingdom representative on this question, I should be prepared to wait until Wednesday morning, since 1 am very much afraid we are going to have to cal1 a meeting just to hear one statement. 135. en qualit& BLIQUES que Président l’int&êt ration question, matin. soit convoqué que pour entendre une seule intervention. 136. je voudrais pour des membres du Royaume-Uni disposés tique? 136. Speaking again as PRESIDENT, 1 should like ‘to hear the views of members SO that we may afterwards settle this question: is there anyonewhowishes t0 support the United Kingdom representative, or is there any member of the Council prepared to support the representative of the Soviet Union? 137. Monsieur membres à déclarer

Mr. President, inasmuch as you have solicited the views of the members of the Council, 1 should like to say that as far as the Norwegian delegation is concerned we are also taking 138. Therefore, basing myself on that point, rather than being for the representative of the United Kingdom and against the representative of the Soviet Union, I would tend to believe that we would be well served by having a meeting tomorrow afternoon; and also taking into account the possibility that perhaps consultations had then proceeded $0 far that the situation with regard ta a possible draft resolution would be clarifiecl. 139. Mr, YOST (United States of America): I should like to endors8 the view that the representative of Norway has just putforward.Wehavebeen considering this serious complaint by Malaysia for some days now. On Wednesday it will have been a full week. We do have this very complex and difficult matter whioh we shall be commencing to discuss on Wednesday also. 1 would think that it would be advantageous if a11 of us could make an effort to bring this subject to a close and take the neoessary action before we begin with the Cyprus question. 140. Therefore, it would seem useful to have atleast one meeting tomorrow . 141. Mr, HAJEK (Czechoslovakia) (translated from French): As the discussion on the item now before us seems to have been exhausted, and as we are coming to a conclusion and certain decisions requiring consultations with our capitals, I think we Will need more than twenty-four hours to make these consultations, especially in view of the distances involved. That is why, with a11 due respect to the representative of the United Kingdom, my delegation would prefer that the Council should not meet tomorrow but be ready to hold a meeting Wednesday morning; in my opinion, a meeting held tomorrow could only prolong the discussion without bringing us any nearer to the necessary conclusions and decisions. On the other hand, any statements which might be made beforethis decision could also very well be heard and answered bofore tomorrow morning,

Mr. President, you have confronted us with a difficult choice, since the representative of the Soviet Union, who has expressed his opinion to us, also happens t0 be the President of the Security Counoil; naturally, we must take this fact into account. 143. But for the time being I should merely like to say tbat excellent arguments have been put forward by certain members in favour of a Council meeting tomorrow afternoon; I hardly need to repeat thsse arguments, each of which has its own merit, and each of which 1 myself am ready to endorse. But it seems to me-and I apologize for not being COmpletelY in agreement with the President and the representative of Czechoslovakia-that it is not just a matter of facilitnting meetings between two or three memhers of the co~ncil with a view to reaching agreement; as I see it, it is useful for a11 th’e members of the CounCil to t,ake part in the public conversations and Private talks, which serve a useful purpose and are ail the 144, The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): If no one else wishes to take part in this interesting discussion, 1 shall venture to draw certainconclusions. 144. ne desire ressante, conclusions. 145. First, speaking as the representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, 1 want to thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for supporting my proposal. 145. de l’UNION TIQUES, la 146. Secondly, speaking as PRESIDENT of the Council, 1 note that, of the six members of the Counoil who took part in this discussion, four spoke in favour of a meeting tomorrow afternoon and two in favour of a meeting on Wednesday morning. 146. du Conseil, bres quatre demain apres-midi, matin. 147. 1 cari hardly comment on the position of the remaining members of the Council. However, unless anyone still wishes to speak on this question, 1 shall take it that the next meeting of the council Will be at 3 o’clock tomorrow afternoon. 147. position personne je considérerai aura lieu demain, à 15 heures. Xt was SO decided. Il en est ainsi décide. The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m. HOW TO OBTAIN United Nations publications distributors throughout Write to: United Nations, COMMENT SE PROCURER Les publications des Nations agences dépositaires du monde ou adressez-vous à: Nations COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de las casas distribuidoras en todas dirfjase a: Naciones Unidas, Litho in U.N. Price: $U.S. 0.50 (or equivalent in other currencies)