S/PV.115 Security Council

Before we begin our work, I have a duty to perform which is also a pleasure to me. On behalf of my colleagues, as well as in my own name, I want to render a tribute to Ambassador van Langenhove for the most efficient manner in which he presided over the Council. In the month of February, under his presidency, much useful work was accomplished owing in great part to his ability as a guide and co-ordinator. Several important resolutions were adopted, including that on disarmament, and many others were submitted for consideration. His was a fruitful term of office, during which the Council made positive progress and met the world's expectations with its labours. CENT·QUINZIEME SEANCE Tenue aLake Success, New-York, le mercredi 5 mars 1947, a15 heures. President: M. O. AUNHA (Bresil). Presents: Les representants des pays suivants: Australie, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, Etats-Unis d'Amerique, France, Pologne, Royaume-Uni, Syrie, Union des Rcpubliques socialistes sovietiques. 83. Ordre du jour provisoire (document S1290) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. Lettre, en date du 31 decembre 1946, adressee par le President de la Commission de l'energie atomique au President du Conseil de securite, transmettant le "Premier Rapport de la Commission de l'energie atomique au Conseil de securite" (document S/239)1. 84. Allocution du nouveau President Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Avant que nous ne commencions nos travaux, j'ai a remplir un devoir qui m'dt particulierement agreable. Au nom de mes collegues et en man nom personnel, je desire rendre hommage aSon Excellence M. van Langenhove pour la tres grande competence avec laquelle il a preside le Conseil. Au cours du mois de fCvrier, nous avons accompli, sous sa presidence, bien des travaux utiles; nous le devons, pour beaucoup, a ses talents de guide et d'organisateur. Plusieurs resolutions importantes ant ete adoptees, notamment ceIle sur le desarmement, et beaucoup d'autres ont ete soumises a notre examen. La periode de son mandat a ete fCconde; cUe a permis au Conseil d'a~comp1ir des progres sensibles et de repondre, par la tache qu'il a realisee, al'attente du monde entier. 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite> Deuxieme Annee, Supplement No 5, Annexe 14. Less than twenty years later, Brazil, as a member of the Security Council of the United Nations, has assumed the same task, with the honour of presiding today over the efforts of those who have refused to surrender their faith. Error can be turned to good use at times, when we understand it and through it acquire knowledge; that is the wisdom of contrasts. We cannot, therefore, follow again the road that led to a second war in which, more than in the first, civilization was on the verge of foundcring and perishing. This example and many others from the past can guide us in collaborating with greater assurance in the creation of a world situation less uncertain and less unhappy than that which marked the life of the League of Nations. Inspired by this experience, and the concilia- 'ory traditions of my people, I assume the presi- :cncy of the Council, confident mainly of your ~)crsonal collaboration because I am certain that Brazil counts upon it from your Governments and your peoples. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated f1'om French): Mr. President, I greatly appreciate the kind things you said to me on behalf of the members of the Security Council. I have been greatly assisted in carrying out my duties . as President by the cordial co-operation that all my colleagues have been good enough to give J'ai l'honneur de representer ici une tradition d'attachement seculaire aux regles du droit, aux principes de conciliation et de paix. Telle est la raisoIl de ma presence au Conseil: l'adhesion indefectible du Bresil ala cause du bien-etre des peuples de l'Amerique et du monde entier. Au moment ou j'entre en fonction, je ne veux pas terminer cette breve allocution sans rappeIer un episode de l'histoire de mon pays, que ceux dont depend le succes de cette Organisation devraient garder present al'csprit. En 1926, dans sa hate d'admettre l'Allemague en qualite de membre permanent du Conseil, la Societe des Nations a viole, le Pacte, ce qui a contraint le Bresil ase separer de ce Conseil. Ce n'est pas le fait que la preference ait ete accordee a une nation plutot qu'a une autre) mais le fait que des engagements juridiques aient ete rejetes pour des raisons ephemeres d'opportunite et de force qui nous a contraints de nous retirer de la Societe des Nations, non sans que le monde ait ete averti, par la voix de notre representant, Meno Franco, des risques et des dangers que presentent des combinaisons contraires aux principes de justice et de morale qui sont a la base de l'union des peuples. Malheureusement, il est arrive ce que nous aviol1S prevu, ce contre quoi nous avions mis le monde en garde. Moins de vingt ans plus tard, le Bresil a repris la mcme tache, en qualite de membre du Conseil de securite des Nations Unies, et a aujourd'hui l'honneur de presider aux efforts de ceux qui ont refuse de renoncer a leurs convictions. On peut parfois tirer parti d 'une erreur, quand on sait la comprendre et en degager des le~ons. La sagesse nait de l'experience. Nous ne pouvons done reprendre la route qui nous a conduits a une seeonde guerre, dans laquelle, plus encore que dans la premiere, la civilisation a failli sombrer et peril'. Cet exemple et beaucoup d'autres exemples du passe peuvent nous apprendre a cooperer, avec une assurance plus grande encore, en vue de Creel' dans le monde des conditions moins incertaines et moins malheureuses que celles qui ont marque la vie de la Societe des Nations. M'illspirant de cette experience et des traditions de conciliation de mOll peuple, j'assume la presidence du Conseil, ayant confiance dans votre collaboration personnelle, car le Bresil a la certitude de pouvoir compteI' sur celle de vas Gouvernements et de vos pe.uples. M. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgique): Monsieur le President, je suis extremement sensible al1X aimables paroles que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser au nom des membres du Conseil de sccurite. L'aecomplissement de mes fonctions presidentielles m'a ete ~ingulierement facilite par la bienveillante cooperation que tous mes eol- 85. Adoption de I'ordre du jour 85. Adoption of the agenda 36. Suite de la discussion du Premier Rapport de la Commission de I"!ner~ gie ctomique 86. Continuation of the discussion on the First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission Le general M eNaughton, representant du Canada, f}rend place ri la table du Conseil 1 •

Before calling upon any representative who may wish to speak on this point, I will try to summarize the situation so that we may proceed with our business in the most orderly manner. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Avant de donner la parole aux reprcsentants qui desirent cxprimer leurs vues, je vais essayer de resumer la situation afin que nous puissions travail· ler aussi methodiquement que possible. Vons vous souviendrez qu'apres un certain nombre de seances, au cours dcsquelles les representants •des differents pays ont disc.ntc le fond du rapport de la Commission de l'energie atomique, on a souleve la question de la procedure . a adopter dans l'examen de ce rapport. Apres You may recall that after several representatives had commented upon the substance of the report of the Atomic Energy Commission, the question armtc as to the proper procedure to be adopted in dealing ,vith the report. After several opinions had been exprel'sed on this procedural aspect of the matter, the United States representative, at our last meeting devoted to this subject, presented a proposal which we all have que plusieurs opinions eurent ete exprimees sur cette question de procedure, le representant des Etats-Unis a presente, au cours de la derniere seance consacree a cette discussion, une proposition que nous avons tous sow; les yeux, et dont l'objet essentiel est de renvoyer le rapport a la Commission de l'energie atomique avec nos observations et les amendements que nous proposons, afin de permettre a la Commission, a la lumiere de ce qui s'est passe au Comeil, de pour- Sllivre 8es travaux et c1'essayer de resolldre les beforc us, the ultimate end of which is to refer t?C report back to the Atomic Energy Commis- SIOn together with our comments and suggested amendments, so that the Commission mav, in the light of what has happened in this C01~ncil, proceed with its work and try to solve the funda.. mental issues involved in the question of control of atomic energy.2 problcmes fondamcntaux qu'irnnlique la question du contr61e de l'energie atomique2. Vous vous souviendrez aussi que le representant de l'Union sovictique, le rern~~;entant de la France et moi-meme, it titre de renre,sentant dll BresiL avons farmulc ccrtaines observations sur la pr~position des Etats-Unis Sur la dcmande du representant de l'Union sovietique, la discussion de' la proposition des Etats-Unis a ete remise a line date ulterieure. Nous avons note neanmoins que la proposition de renvoyer le rapport a la Commission de l'energie atomique n'a pas souleve d'opposition. .Te propose donc de consacrer no~re se~n,ce d'auionrd'hui, dans la mesure du posslb!e, a 1examen de la proposition des Etats-Unis. Nous paurrons cnsuitc entendre l'opinion des membres du Conseil, et les representants des differents pays .auront l'occasion, s'ils le desirent, de presenter leurs observations all de proposer des amende.. mcnts ou des modifications. You may also recall that some comments have becn made on the United States proposal by the representatives of the Soviet Union and France and by myself as representative of Brazil. Following a request by the Soviet Union representative, discussion on the United States proposal was deferred to a later date. We have noted, however, that no objection has been raised to the suggestion that we should re~er the report back to the Atomic Energy CommIssion. Therefore, I would suggest that today's meeting be devoted, as far as possible, to the consideration of the United States proposal. Then we shall be able to hear the opinion of the Council, and each representative will have the opportunity, if he so desires, to comment upon it or suggest amendments or modifications. J M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques sodalifites sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Je voudraifi rappeler qu'au cours de la dernicre seance comacree a cette question, i'ai annonce que j'avais l'intention de"traiter a'la seance suivante Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, I should like to recall that, at the last meeting devoted to this auestion, I stated that I intended at the next •meeting to deal with a number of important questions of substance in connexion with the results of the discussion of ~l'importantes questions de fond qui se rapportent au resultat de la discussion du Premier 'Conformcment a la decision prise lors de la lOSe seance. Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, DCl1xicme Annce, No 13. • Ibid., Deuxieme Annee, No 19. 1 In accordance with decision taken at the 105th meeting. See Official RCC01"ds of the Security Council, Second Year, No. 13. , , Ibid., Second Year, No. 19. ' In speakinf!, about these important questions and proposals, I hnve in mind, first of all, the question of thc conclusion of a convention for the prohibition of atomic and other major weapons of mass destruction, and the Soviet proposal on this subject. The General Assembly of the United Nations, by its resolution of 14 December 1946/ set before all Member States of 'I,.e United Nations serious tasks in the field of e control of atomic energy and of the prohibicion of its use for military purposes. By this resolution the Security Council has been charged with a special responsibility, since a system of international control of atomic energy should be created precisely within the framework of this organ, which should work out and ensure the implementation of measures to exclude the possibility of using atomic energy for military purposes. Among the amendments and additions submitted by the Soviet delegation at the meeting of the Security Council on 18 February 1947,2 there is an addition to the recommendations of the Atomic Energy Commission which reads as follows: "With a view to the earliest possible implementation of the findings and recommendations stated above, and also of the General Assembly's resolution of 14 December 1946, on 'Principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments', the Security Council recognizes the urgency of consideringdraft conventions on the prohibition of atomic and other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction." 1 See Resolutions adopted by the General AssemrJly during the second part of its first session, page 65 "Prin· ciples ,governing the general regulation and reduction of armnmen ts". (Traduit de l'anglais) La discussion du Pre~ mier Rapport de la Commission de l'energic atomique au Conseil de securite a ete utile du fait qu'elle a permis d'apprecier plus clairement l'attitude de tel ou tel Etat tant a l'egard des questions qui ne donnent pas lieu a des divergences de vues qu'a l'egard de celles sur lesquelles l'accord ne s'est pas encore fait. En memc temps, il est necessaire de souligner qu'aucun progres sensible n'a ete accompli jusqu'ici vel'S la realisation d'un accord sur un certain nombrc de questions importantes relatives au controlc de l'energie atomique. Les propositions soumiscs par la delegation sovietique au sujet de ces questions n'ont pas, jusqu'ici, ete l'objet de l'examen qu'elles meritent. En soulignant ce fait, je ne veux pas dire qu'il soit necessaire que meme ceux qui n'ont rien a dire sur le fond de ces questions et de ees propositions definissent leur attitude a cet egard. Quand je parle de ces questions et propositions importantes, je pense tout d'abord ala conclusion d'une convention pour l'interdiction des armes atomiques et autres principales armes de destruction massive, et a la proposition sovietique ace sujet. Par sa resolution dl! 14 decembre 1946\ l'Assemblee generale dcs Natiolls Unies a donne a tous les Etats Membres des Nations Unies des taches importantes dans le domaine du controle de l'energie atomique et de . l'interdiction de son utilisation a des fins militaires. Cette resolution a donne au Conseil de securite des fonctions d'une importance particuliere, puisqu'un organe de controle international de l'energie atomique devra ~tre cree precisement dans le cadre de cet organisme, qui sera appele aelaborer des mesures destinees a exclurc toute possibilite d'utiliser l'energie atomique a des fins militaires et a assurer la· mise en ccuvrc de ces mesures. Parmi les amendements et propositions complementaires soumis par la delegation sovietiquc au cours de la seance du Conseil de securite tenue le 18 fevrier 19472, on trouve un addenda aux recommandations de la Commission de l'energic atomiquc qui ~st redige comme suit: "Afin de realiser au plus vite la mise en ccuvre des conclusions et recommandations ddessus, ainsi que de la resolution que l'AsscmbUe generale a adoptee le 14 decembre 194G. au sujet des "Principes regissant la reglemcntation et la reduction generales des armements", le Conseil de securite declare qu'it convient d'etudier sans delai les projets de conventions tendant a interdire l'arme atomique et toutes autres principales armes pOllvant etre utilisees en vue d'une de~,.':uction massive." 1 Voir les Resolutions adoptles par I'Assemblle gblcmic pendant la seconde partie de sa premiere session. page 65 "Principes l'cgissant la r6g1ementation et In re.rl11ctioIl generales des armaments". We are still being told that atomic weapons cannot be prohibited until the Soviet Union accepts the United States proposals on the question of the control of atomic energy. Such a statement of the question, at the basis of which lies a desire to dictate to other Member States of the United Nations the terms which one country is trying to impose with the purpose of strengthening its monopoly position in the field of atomic energy, cannot conform with the interests of an urgent and successful solution of the problems of the establishment of atomic energy. control. It is necessary to pay tribute to the frankness of the authors and advocates of such a plan, who do not conceal that they identify the interests of the United Nations in this field with the interests of one country, by subordinating the interests of other countries to the narrowly understood national interests of this one country. The statements of the United States representatives in the Atomic Energy Commission and later in the Security Council-and, in particular, the statements of Mr. Austin, whom I greatly respect-on their readiness and willingness to establish an international control of atomic energy for the purpose of ensuring its use only for peaceful purposes, and the United States proposals themselves, lead us away from the solution of the most important and urgent problems connected with the working out of the questions of control. . The United States representatives decisively object to the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons, though it is not difficult to understand that the immediate conclusion of this very convention is imperatively dictated by the whole situation. It is dictated by the nature of the atomic weapon itself as a weapon of aggression. It is dictated by the fact th~t at the present time atomic energy is still bemg used only for military purposes. It is dictated by the fact that there are no objectively existing obstacles, especially in the light of the available historical examples of the prohibition ~f ~oisonous and suffocating gases, analogous lIqUIds and bacteriological' means of warfare. The only obstacle to the conclusion of such a eDllvention is the desire of one country to impose its will in questions of atomic energy on other countries, regardless of their legitimate interests. Is it possible to consider that the way outlined in the United States proposals will lead us to a The necessity of an immediate solution of the problem of the prohibition of atomic weapons, .which are weapons of aggression and constitute a threat, first of all, to the civilian population, is also dictated by the ancient traditions of mankind, proving to us that even at early stages of the development of civilization, certain moral norms had already been established according to which it was considered a crime to exterminate a peaceful population in war. For centuries the following saying: "May the blood of women, children and old men not stain your Victory" was popular among many peoples. Not a few instructive examples can be found in the history of the Middle Ages. Let us hope that our Organization of the United Nations, created in the twentieth century, will successfully compete in this respect with the morals of the ancients and· of the Middle Ages. I considered it necessary to emphasize once more the importance of the question of the prohibition of atomic and other weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and the importance of the proposals submitted on this question, in the hope that after all we shall still be able to come to an agreement on this question and discuss without delay drafts of an appropriate convention. In my statement of 14 February of this year I already drew the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons would not mean that the working out of other questions, including that of inspection, should not be continued.! However, the consideration of all the questions related to the establishment of atomk energy control will inevitably require some time, and in view of this, the postponement of the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons cannot be justified. The conclusion of such a convention, besidcr.; the fact that it should represent a concrete and practical step towards the fulfilment of the General Assembly's resolution of 14 December 1946, would create more favourable conditions for the solution of other problems arising out of the General Assembly's rep-olution, to say nothing of the fact that the conclusion of such a convenfondamentaux de tous les peuples pacifiques. La necessite de trouver abref delai la solution du probleme de l'interdiction des armes atomiques, qui sont des armes d'agression et qui constituent une menace en premier lieu pour les populations civiles, est egalement dictee par les traditions anciennes de l'humanite, qui nous indiquent que, meme aux premiers stades du developpement de la civilisation, il existait deja certaines regles morales seIon lesquelles l'extermination, au CoUl'S d'une guerre, d'une population pacifique ctait considcree comme un crime. Pendant des siecles, la maxime: "Prenez garde que le sang des femmes, des enfants et des vieillards ne souille votre victoire" a ete populaire chez de nombreux peuples. On peut en trouver plus d'un exemple edifiant dans l'histoire du moyen age. Esperons que la regIe morale de notre Organisation des Nations Unies, creee au xxe siecle, pourra avantageusement se compareI' acet egard avec celle de l'antiquite et du moyen age, J'ai estime necessaire de souligner une fois de plus l'importance de la, question de l'interdiction des armes atomiques et autres annes permettant des destructions massives, ainsi que l'importance des propositions soumises en la matiere, dans l'espoir qu'apres tout nous pourrons quand meme aboutir a un accord sur cette question et discuter sans retard des projets de convention. Dans ma declaration du 14 £Cvrier de cctte annee, j'ai deja attire l'attention du Conseil de securite sur le fait que la conclusion d'une convention pour l'interdiction des armes atomiques ne signifierait pas qu'il ne faudrait plus chercher a resoudre les autrcs questions, notamment celle de l'inspectiont. I1 est neaomoins inevitable que l'examen de toutes les questions relatives a l'etablissemcnt du contrOle de l'energie atomiqueexige un certain temps et, dans ces conditions, l'ajournement de la conclusion d'une convention pour l'interdiction des armes atomiques serait injustifiable. La conclusion de cette convention ne constituerait pas seulement une etape concrete et pratique vel'S la mise en ceuvre complete de la resolution de l'Assemblee generale du 14 decembre 1946; eUe creerait aussi des conditions plus favorabIes a la solution des autres problcmes decoulant de cette resolution, sans parler du fait qu'elle contribuerait aaccroltre la confiance mu- I Voir 1es Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de secl/- rite, Deuxieme Annee, No 14. The Soviet delegation deems it necessary to recall that the position of the Soviet Government on the question of the international control of atomic energy was clearly expressed by Generalissimo Stalin. On 23 October 1946, answering a question by Mr. Hugh Baillic, president of the American agency, United Press, Generalissimo Stalin stated that "a strict international control is necessary". Thus the position of the Soviet Union on this question, as well as that of the Soviet representatives on the Security Council and on the Atomic Energy Commission, is clear. The Soviet Union has stood and is standing for strict and effective international control of atomic energy. At the last session of the General Assembly the Soviet delegation, in the person of its Head, Mr. V. M. Molotov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and later the Soviet representative on the Atomic Energy Commission and on the Security Council, also clarified the position of the USSR on questions of inspection, without which, as is clear, no strict, effective and real international control is conceivable. Effective inspection is a necessary component part of the system of international control. I have considered it necessary to make this additional explanation, since the position of the Soviet Union on this question is often presented in a wrong light, and sometimes even distorted outright. Sometimes one may hear statements implying that the Soviet Union is against strong international control and against effective inspection. Such statements have absolutely no basis and are evidently tique sur cette question est souvent presentee sous un faux jour qui la denature parfois completement. On entend quelquefois des declarations qui pourraient faire croire que l'Union sovietique s'oppose al'etablissemcnt d'un contr01e One may ask: what is the difference between the position of the Soviet Union and the proposals submitted SOl)1e time ago to the Atomic Energy Commission by the representative of the Unitcd States and laid down as a basis of the report of the Atomic Energy Commission, which is under our consideration? I have already pointed out one of the' most important differences while speaking about the necessity of an immediate conclusion of a convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons, which is not provided for by the United States proposals. However, there is a difference in some other respects, and it is an essential difference. The position of the Soviet Union on the questions of the control of atomic energy and inspection is clear. Strict international control and inspection of atomic energy should be established. At the same time this strict international control and strict inspection should not develop into interference with those branches of industry which are not connected with the production of atomic energy. The internationfll control of atomic energy should not deal with questions which are not connected with atomic energy. Logic tells us that any idea may be reduced to an absurdity. This applies even to good thoughts and ideas. The transformation of atomic energy control into an unlimited control would mean to reduce to an absurdity the,very idea of control of atomic energy in order to prevent its use for nilitary purposes. Unlimited control would mean m unlimited interference of the control and con- .rolling organ-or organs-in the economic life of the countries on whose territories this control would be carried out, and interference in their internal affairs. This is not required of us for the fulfilment of the tasks set forth by the United Nations in the field of atomic energy control and prohibition of atomic weapons. This is not the task of the United Nations in connexion with the establishment of the einternational control of atomic energy. Such a conception of international control as is presented to us in the United States proposals, and which lies at the basis of the corresponding sections of the report of the Atomic Energy Commission, may only complicate the entire matter of organizing control and inspection, since, as I have already pointed out, it would mean crude interference by the control organ in the internal affairs and economic life of States, which cannot be compatible with the basic principles of the United Nations. Such interference in the internal affairs of States is not required by the interests of effcctive control and does not flow from the demands which are made on the control etre institues. Toutefois, cc controle international rigoureux et cette stricte inspection ne devront pas aboutir a une ingerence dans les secteurs industriels qui n'ont aucun rapport avec la production de l'energie atomique. Le controle international de l'energie atomique ne devra pas s'exercer dans des domaines qui n'ont pas de rapport avec l'energie atomique. La logique nous enseigne que toute idee peut etre poussee al'absurde. Ceci s'applique meme a des idees ou pensees qui sont bonnes en soi. Si l'on transformait le controle de l'energie atomique en un controle sans limites, on pousserait a l'absurde l'idee meme du controle de l'energie atomique destine a empecher l'emploi de cette energie a des fins militaires. Un controle sans limites equivaudrait a une ingerence illimitee de l'organe-ou des organes-de controle dans la vie economique des pays dont le territoire serait soumis a ce controle, et a une ingerence dans les affaires intericures de ces pays. L'accomplissement des taches definies par les Nations Unies dans le domaine du controle de l'energie atomique et de l'interdiction des armes atomiques n'exige pas que nous nous livrions 11. cette ingerence. Les Nations Unies ne sont pas chargees d'une telIe tache dans la mesure Oll eUes ant a etablir un controle international de l'energie ato- • mique. La conception du controle international te11e qu'elle nous est presentee dans les propositions des Etats-Unis, et sur laquclle se fondent certaines sections du rapport de la Commission de l'energie atomique, ne peut que compliquer tout le probleme de l'institution du controle et de l'inspection, puisque, comme je l'ai deja souligne, elle aboutirait a une ingerence pure et simple de l'organe de controle dans les affaires interieures des Etats et dans leur vie economique, ce qui ne peut pas etre compatible avec les principes fondamentaux des Nations Unies. 11 n'est pas necessaire d'intervenir de la sorte dans les affaires interieures des Etats pOUf assurer un I draw your attention to the fact that many atomic scientists fully realize the defects of the proposals to grant control organs the right of interference in the internal life and internal af~ fairs of nations. In this connexion the statement by the Council of the British Atomic Scientists' Association, published on 20 January 1947, deserves serious attention. In this statement a n umber of the provisions of the so-called Baruch plan were subjected to criticism. In particular, the British scientists have revealed the defects in the proposal concerning inspection. The scientists find, quite rightly, a serious defect in the United States proposal concerning inspection in the fact that it provides for unlimited rights of inspection for the control organ. They express their wish CCthat the right of inspection should be circumscribed as far as possible and should not be a means of excessive prying into legitimate industrial or other activities. This is a question which can only be settled by extensive discussion. One may contemplate a procedure similar to a search vvarrant which would give the right of entry upon certification by the Atomic Development Authority that there exist reasonable grounds for. suspicion." As you see, the atomic scientists consider that the proposal concerning inspection, "Vhich provides the control organs with excessively broad powers in the field of inspection, is one of the serious faults in the plan of the United States. The United States proposals on control proceed from the erroneous premise that the interests of other States should be relegated to the background during the exercise by the control organ of it~: functions of control and inspection. Only by proceeding from such fundamentally vicious premises was it possible to come to the conclusion, contained in the proposals submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission by the United States representative, on the necessity of transferring atomic enterprises to the possession and ownership of the international organ which is to be responsible for the realization of control. A proposal of this sort shows that the authors of the so-called Baruch plan completely ignore the national interests of other countries and proceed from the necessity of subordinating the interests of these countries to the interests actually of one country-that is, the United States of America. It is easy to understand that the granting of such rights to control organs would mean a complete arbitrariness of these organs and, first of all, of those who wopld be in a position to command a majority in these organs, The granting of 8\1('h rights to control organs would give an easy opportunity for interference in the activities of the enterprises on the territory of one or another country, without any grounds for such interference. ..du possible, et nedevrait pas constituer un mayen de s'ingerer indument dans les activites legitimes, qu'elles soient industrielles ou autres. C'est la une question qu'on ne peut reg1er que par une discussion etendue. On peut envisager une procedure analogue au mandat de perquisition qui confererait le droit d'acccs lorsque l'Autorite pour les rechcrches et travaux atomiques aurait certifie qu'il existe des motifs raisonnables dc suspicion." Comme vous le voyez, les savants qui s'occupent de l'energie atomique estiment que la proposition relative a l'inspection, qui donne aux organes de controle des pouvoirs excessivement etendus dans le domaine de l'inspection, constitue l'une des graves imperfections· du plan des Etats-Unis. Les propositions des Etats-Unis relatives all controle partent de l'idee erronee que les intercts des autres Etats devraient passer au second plan tandis que l'organe de controle exercerait ses fonctions de controle et d'inspection. Ce n'est qu'en partant d'idees aussi essentiellement erronees qu'il a ete possible d'aboutir a la conclusion qui figure dans les propositions soumises a la Commission de l'energie atomique par le representant des Etats-Unis, selon laquelle i1 est necessaire de transferer la propriete des cntreprises produisant de l'energie atomique al'organe international auquel incombera la responsabiIite d'exercer le controle. Une proposition de cette nature prouve que les auteurs du plan dit plan Baruch ne tiennent aucun compte des interets nationaux des autres pays et ont pour principe qu'il faut subordonner les interets de ces pays a ce qui est en fait l'interet d'un seul pays, asavoir les Etats-Unis d'Amerique. On comprendra facilement qu'en accordant de tels droits aux organes de controle, on confcrerait des pOl_lVoirs absolument arbitraires aces organes et, au premier chef, a ceux qui seraient a meme de s'y assurer une majorite. Le fait d'accorder de tcls droits aux organes de contro1c offrirait facilement l'occasion de s'ingerer dans l'activite des entreprises situees sur le tcrritoirc de tel ou td pays, sans qu'une telle ingerence soit motivee. "The Authority should set up a thorough plan for control of the field of atomic energy, through various forms of ownership, dominion, licences, operation, inspection, research and management by competent personnel." Surely the authors of these proposals are not going to deny that their plan contemplates the interference of the control organs in the most varied fields of the life of a State. In the same statement of the United States representative, obviously for softening purposes, it is stated that after an international control organ has solved the problems enumerated above in the field of ownership, dominion, licences, etc., "there should be as little interference as may be with the economic plans and the present private, corporate and State relationships in the several countries involved".2 Thus, interference of the control organ in the internal life of the country is definitely provided for. The reservation that in the future there should be some limitation to this interference does not alter the situation, since that is not the main point. The tasks of the control organ, which is entrusted with ownership, licensing and with a number of other functions, are, as it were, identified with the tasks of international syndicates and trusts, of which the role and influence upon international relations and upon the cconomic life of individual countries are well known. It was not for the creation of international syndicates and trusts, which would possess establishments located on the territory of individual countries, that the Atomic Energy Commission was established. It was not for this that the General Assembly decided, on 14 December 194·6, on the necessity of establishing atomic energy control and on prohibiting atomic weapons. It is time to understand that one cannot approach the solution of such questions guided only by the interests of one country; it is necessary to take into consideration the legitimate interests of other countries as well. One cannot imagine a situation in which a control organ would possess establishments in different countries, decide whether or not to allow the creation of such establishments on the territories of these or other countries, and have the exclusive right to carry on scientific research in the field of the production and use of atomic energy. It is impossible to imagine such a situation. Only people. who have lost the sense of reality can seriously believe in the possibility of creating such arrangements. The above-mentioned provision contained in the United States proposals is repeated several times in a modified form. In the same statement "L'Autorite devrait etablir un plan complet de direction et d'administration dans le domaine de l'energie atomique en utilisant les divers modes suivants: propriete, regie, licences, exploitation, inspection, recherches et direction par un personnel competent." Les auteurs de ces propo.sitions ne vont certainement pas nier que leur plan envisage l'ingerence des organes de contrale dans les domaines les plus varies de la vie d'un Etat. Dans cctte meme declaration, le representant des Etats-Unis precise, evidemment pour adoucir ce qui precede, que quand un organe de controle international aura accompli les taches enumerees cidessus en ce qui concerne la propriete, la regie, les licences, etc., "il ne devrait y avoir que le minimum d'ingerence dans les plans econo· miques et les relations actuelles entre les personnes privees, les societes ou l'Etat, dans les divers pays en cause 2". Ainsi, l'ingerence de l'organe de controle dans la vie interieure du pays est nettement prevue. La reserve qu's. l'avenil' cette ingerence devrait etre sujctte acertaines limitations ne change rien a la situation, car ce n'est pas la le point essentiel. Les fonctions de l'organe de controle qui est investi du droit de propriete, du droit de delivrer des licences et d'un certain nombre d'autres attributions, sont, pour ainsi dire, identiques aux fonctions des consortiums et des trusts internationaux dont on cOl1nalt suffisamment le rOle et l'influence dans les relations internationales et les regimes economiqucs de tel ou tel pays. La Commission de l'energie atomique n'a pas ete etablie pour permettre la creation de consortiums et de trusts internationaux qui possederaient des etablissements situes sur le territoire de tel ou tel pays. Ce n'est pas pour cela que l'AssemblCe generaie a decide, le 14 decembre 1946, qu'il fallait instituer un controle de l'energie atomique et interdire l'emploi des armes atomiques. 11 est temps de comprendre qu'on ne saurait aborder la solution de ces problemes en s'inspirant exclusivement des interets d'un seul pays; il faut egaIement tenir compte des interets 1egitimes d'autres pays. I1 est impossible de concevoir un etat de choses dans lequel un organe de controle possederait des etablissements dans difIerents pays~ decidcrait s'il doit autoriser ou interdire la creation de ces etablissements sur le territoire de tel ou tel pays et aurait le droit exclusif de poursuivre des recherches scientifiques dans le domaine de la production et de l'utilisation de l'energie atomique. Cette situation est inconcevable. Il faut avoir perdu le sens des realites pour croire serieusement qu'il soit possible de prendre des dispositions pareilles. La disposition mentionnee ci-dessus, contenue dans les propositions formuIees par les Etats- Unis, se retrouve a plusieurs reprises sous des 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels de la Commission de I'c1'Iergie atomique, No 1, page IQ. In this provision the idea of the necessity of turning the control organ into a peculiar international trust is brought almost to its logical conclusion. It appears that the control organ would also control and direct the work of all the plants and own the product of these plants. It remains only to add to such a proposal the further suggestion that the international control organ should share profits of establishments under its management in accordance with the quantity of shares belonging to one or another country. Then the picture will be complete. The statement of the British scientists referred to above justly exposes the unacceptability of the idea of handing over the establishments to the possession of the international control organ. The scientists point out that the granting of such powers to the control organ would call forth difficulties, since it would mean that only such an organ would decide whether this or that country might or might not construct power plants. Such an organ would also have the right to prevent the use of power produced at those plants and to determine conditions for the supply of this power. Referring to the prOVISIOn contained in the United States proposals on the exclusive right of an international organ to carry on scientific research, the atomic scientists justly point out that "the danger does not come from research as such, but from the application of the results. The object of a control scheme is to ensure that the result of such research would never be used for destructive purposes." The idea of granting to the international control organ the right to possess establishments, to permit or not to permit this or that country to construct establishments, the right to possess the product of establishments, the exclusive right for scientific research, etc., contained in the proposals of the United States, also finds its reflection in the report of the Atomic Energy Commission, though in a somewhat veiled form. In particular, such an idea was expressed in part 5, chapter 1, paragraph 4- of the report. In this definition of the concept "management" there is formulated in essence the principle of handing over the establishments for the production of atomic energy to the possession of the control organ; that is, the principle which is stated in the most exact form in the above-mentioned statement of the representative of the United States on the Atomic Energy Commission. This paragraph reads as follows: 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels de la Commission de l'Energie atomique, No I, page 1L I draw attention especially to the fact that the Commission considers that "management" is the direct power and authority to take day-by-day decisions governing operations as well as responsibility for planning. These are plainly elements of the right of ownership. I draw the attention of the Security Council also to the fact that, according to the findings contained in the report, "management" is normally a prerogative of ownership. It is true that in the same part of the report it is stated that management "need not imply ownership". However, these reservations which apparently have been inserted to soften the main thesis, do not change the meaning of this paragraph and of the idea expressed in it, which is thoroughly vicious and unacceptable. The thesis formulated in the above-mentioned statement by the United States representative at :he first meeting of the Atomic Energy Commis- :ion is reproduced in essence in the report of the Atomic Energy Commission. I have already pointed out that the proposal to grant to an international control organ the right to possess establishments for the production of atomic energy, and unlimited power to carry out other important functions connected with the ownership and management of the establishments and with the disposition of their production, would lead to interference by the control organ in the internal affairs and internal life of States and eventually would lead to arbitrary action by the control organ in the solution of such problems as fall completely within the domestic jurisdiction of a State. I deem it necessary to emphasize that the granting of broad rights and powers of such a kind to the control organ is incompatible with State sovereignty. Therefore, such proposals are unacceptable and must be rejected as unjustifiable. Not only do they not facilitate the solution of the problem o! establishing strict and effective international control, but, on the contrary, they complicate the solution of this problem. The thesis regarding the right of ownership or the right of dominion has nothing to do with the problems of establishing effective and real international control of atomic energy. This would seem to be obvious. Nevertheless, the above- J'attire votre attention tout specialement sur le fait que, de l'avis de la Commission, la "direction" comporte aussi bien une responsabilite et une autorite directes portant sur les decisions quotidiennes qui reglent les operations, qu'une responsabilite dans l'elaboration des plans. Ce sont la, manifestement, des facteurs inherents au droit de propriete. J'attire egalement l'attention du Conseil de securite sur le fait que, d'apres les conclusions du rapport, la "direction" est, 'hormalement, une prerogative du proprietaire. I1 est vrai que, dans la memepartie du rapport, on declare que la direction "n'implique pas necessairement que celui qui dirige soit proprietaire". Toutefois, ces reserves, qui n'ont ete apparemment introduites que pour adoucir la these principale, ne changent pas le sens de ce paragraphe et de l'idee qu'il exprime, laquelle est tout a fait erronee et inacceptable. La these formulCe dans la declaration mentionnee ci-dessus, que le representant des Etats- Unis a faite au cours de la premiere seance de la Commission de l'energie atomique, est reproduite en substance dans le rapport de cctte Commission. J'ai deja fait remarquer que la proposition tendant a accorder a l'onrane de controle international le droit de poss~~ler des etablissements de production d'energie atomique et un pouvoir illimite pour remplir d'autres fonctions importantes ayant trait a la propriete et a la direction des etablissements et a l'ecoulement de leur production, amenerait l'organe de contrOle international a s'ingerer dans les affaires et la vie interieures des Etats et meme a prendre des mesures arbitraires pour resoudre des problemes qui relcvent exclusivement de la iuridiction interne d'un Etat. J'estime necessaire d'insister sur le fait que l'octroi de droits et de pouvoirs aussi etendus a l'organe de controle est incompatible avec la souverainete des Etats. Ces propositions sont donc inacceptables et doivent ctre rejetees comme injustifiees. Loin de faciliter la solution du probleme de la creation d'un controle international rigoureux et efficace, elles ne font, au contraire, que la compliquer. La these relative au droit de propriete ou au droit de regie n'a rien a voir avec les problemes que souleve l'etablissement d'un contr61e international efficace et reel de l'energie atomique. 11 semble que ce soit la une verite evidente. Nean- 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux of/iciels de la Commission de l'c71ergie atomique, Supplement special, "Premier Rapport de la Commission de I'energie atomique au Conseil de securite, en date du 31 decembre 1946, page 45. In speeches by representatives of some States in the Atomic Energy Commission and the Security Council, as well as in speeches by numerous "experts", who have appeared recently in great numbers, on the problems of the international control of atomic energy, the question has been asked very often: How does the Soviet Union conceive the carrying out by the control organ of practical day-by-day activities, and how shall this organ take decisions relating to such day-by-day activities? The position of the Soviet Union on this question has already been stated more than once. If it is necessary, I am prepared to repeat that such an organ must have the right to take decisions by majority vote in appropriate cases. Does this mean, however, that it is possible, by invoking the principle of international control, to agree in reality to grant the right of interference in the economic life of a country even through the decision of the majority in the control organ? The Soviet Union does not wish to and cannot allow such a situation. The Soviet Union is aware that there will be a majority in the control organ which may take one-sided decisions, a majority on whose benevolent attitude toward the Soviet Union the Soviet people cannot count. Therefore, the Soviet Union, and probably not only the Soviet Union, cannot allow that the fate of its national economy be handed over to this organ. The correctness of such a conclusion is confirmed by historical experience, including the brief but very instructive experience of the activities of the United Nations organs. The Soviet delegation does not doubt that all those who objectively appraise the situation will correctly understand the position of the Soviet Union on this question. , Hence it follows that, while creating an international organ of atomic energy and organizing inspection, it is also necessary to have a strict regulation of the rights and duties of the control organ, excluding arbitrariness and unlimited rights. Such regulation cannot be an obstacle to the establishment of a strict and effective control, for carrying out strict and effective inspection. On the contrary, a strict definition of the rights and functions of a control organ will allow it to exercise its control and inspection functions more precisely and regularly. In such a situation there tional n'est possible que si 1'0n accorde des droits et des pouvoirs etendus al'organe de contrOle. Une etude approfondie de ces propositions montre que cette these, en invoquant le controle, ne fait que dissimuler un effort pour obtenir le droit d'ingerence dans la vie economique d'un p~ys afin de servir les intef(~ts de la majorite meme des membres de l'organe de controle. Dans les discours sur les problemes du controle international de l'energie atomique, prononces par les representants de certains Etats ala Commission de l'energie atomique et au Conseil de securite, ainsi que dans les nombreux discours prononces recemment par de nombreux "experts", une question revient tres frequemment: comment l'Union sovietique con~oit-elle que l'organe de controle doive remplir ses fonctions et poursuivre son activite quotidienne, et comment eet organe prendra-t-il des decisions ayant trait acette activite quotidienne? L'attitude de l'Union sovietique en cette matiere a ete definie plus d'une fois. S'ille faut, je suis pret a repeter qu'un organe de ce genre doit avoir le droit de prendre, dans les cas appropries, des decisions ala majorite des voix. Cela signifie-t-il qu'il soit possible, en invoquant le principe du controle international, de decider, en realite, d'accorder le droit d'ingerence dans la vie economique d'un pays, meme si ce droit resulte d'une decision de la majorite des membres de l'organe de controle? L'Union sovietique ne desire et ne peut admettre une telle situation. L'Union sovietique se rend compte qu'il y aura, au sein de l'organe de controle, une majorite qui pourra prendre des decisions unilaterales, une majorite dont le peuple sovietique n'a pas lieu d'attendre qu'elle soit bien disposee a l'egard de l'Union sovietique. L'Union sovietique, et eUe n'est probablement pas la seule dans cc cas, ne peut done pas permettre que le sort de son economie nationale dcpende de cet organe. Le bien-fonde de cette conclusion est confirme par l'histoire, et notamment par les enseignements trcs clairs qui se dcgagent des activites des organismes des Nations Vnies, bien qu'ils soient de creation trcs recente. La delegation de l'Union sovietique ne doute pas que tous ceux qui portent sur la situati?~ un jl~gement objectif comprcnnent la posltlOn pnse par l'Union sovietique acet egard. 11 s'ensuit donc que, en cn~ant un organe international de controle de l'energie atomique et en etablissant un systeme d'inspection, i1 faut aussi definir avec rigueur les droits et les devoirs de l'organe de con!role, d7 ~~ni~r; a exclure l'arbitraire et l'octrOl de drOlts l1hmltes. Vne telle reglementation ne saurait constituer un obstacle a l'etablissement d'un contrOle rigoureux et effi· cace permettant de proceder a des ins~ections egalement rigoure~ses et effica~es. BlCn au contraire des pouvOlrs et des fonctlOns nettcment d6finis p~rmettront al'organe de controle d'exer- Strict regulation of the powers and duties of a control organ should exclude the unlimited access for inspection purposes to all equipment and operations, access which is now provided for in the report of the Atomic Energy Commission, and should also exclude granting to the inspecting organ the right to shut down plants, to interfere with normal mining and milling operations and to give so-called licences, that is, the permission to conduct definite activities on definite conditions, etc. Regulation of the activities of the control organs will exclude similar actions, which are described in such detail in the so-called first report on safeguards, contained in the report of the Atomic Energy Commission. Incidentally, this report on safeguards is the least thoroughly thought-out part of the Commission's report. This can probably be explained partly by the fact that the proposals on safeguards have never been subjected by anyone to serious discussion in the Atomic Energy Commission. What is not included in this report on safeguards? What is not provided for in it, in connexion with the definition of the Fights and powers of the control organ? One can find in the report the explanation of the necessity for travelling without restraint and for flights in and over territories of other countries at the inspectors' will; there can be found a description of the possibilities of a seizure by a group of people of the establishments for the produCtion of atomic energy. This is almost like a detective story. In spite of the evident fact that the proposals to grant unlimited rights to the control organ are unfounded, there are people who still continue persistently to defend proposals of this kind, pretending that such proposals are in conformity with the tasks of setting up a strict and effective international control. I do not know whether the authors and advocates of such proposals believe themselves that they are genuine. Nevertheless, they are trying to prove that these very proposals should constitute a basis for the establishment of a system of international atomic energy control. In reality, to grant to the control organ unlimited rights and possession and management of the atomic establishments cannot be looked upon as anything but an attempt by the United States to secure for itself world monopoly in the field of atomic energy. This tendency has found its expression in the proposals submitted by the representative of the United States on the Atomic Energy Commission and later laid down as the basis of the report of the Atomic Energy Commission. Une regl~ment~tion rigoureuse des pouvoirs et des fonctIOns d un organe de contrOle devrait exclure le droit actuellement prevu dans le rapport de la Commission de l'energie atomique d'acceder sans restriction atoutcs les installations et operations, aux fins d'inspection. Elle devrait egalement exclure du systeme d'inspection le droit d'ordonner la fermeture des usines et d'intervenir dans les operations d'extraction et de broyage, ainsi que le droit d'accorder des licences, c'est-a-dire la permission de poursuivre une activite bien definie dans des conditions egalement bien definies, etc. I,a reglementation de l'activite des organes de controle exclura l'activite du meme genre qui est decrite en grand detail dans le premier rapport sur les mesures de precaution qui a ete incorpore au rapport de la Commission de l'energie atomique. Soit dit en passant, ce rapport sur les mesures de precaution constituc, de tautes les parties du rapport de la Commission, celle qui a ete le moins murement pensee. Cela tient sans doute en partie a ce que les propositions relatives aux mesures de precaution n'ont jamais fait l'objet d'une discussion approfondie a la Commission de l'energie atomique. Que manque-t-il dans ce rapport sur les mesures de precaution? Que n'a-t-on pas prevu lorsqu'il s'est agi de definir les droits et les devoirs de l'organe de contrale? Le rapport explique les raisons justifiant le droit de se deplacer sans entraves, le survol des territoires d'autres pays au gre des inspecteurs; on peut egalement y trouver une description des possibilites de saisie, par un groupe de personnes, des etablissements destines a la production de l'energie atomique. On croirait presque lire un roman polider. Bien qu'il soit evident que les propositions tendant aaccorder des droits illimites a l'organe de contrale ne soient pas fondees, il se trollve encore des personnes qui persistent Et. defendre des propositions de cet ordre, en pretendant que leur adoption permettra de resoudre les problemes que pose l'institution cl'un contrOle international rigoureux et efficace. J'ignore si les auteurs et les partisans de ces propositions y croient eux-mcmes. Quoi qu'il en soit, ils s'cfforcent de prouver que cc sont ces propositions- Ht qui devraient servir de base al'etablissement d'un systeme de contrOle international de l'energie atomique. En realite, le fait d'accorder a l'organe de controle des droits illimites ainsi que le droit ~e posscder et de diriger des installations d'energlc atomique ne saurait etre consiclere comme autre chose qu'un effort de la part des Etats- Unis pour s'assurer un monopole mondial dans le domaine de l'energie atomique. Cette ten~~nce a trouve son expression dans les propo~It~ons soumises par le representant des Etats-1!ms a}~ Commission de l'cnergie atomique, qUI ont ete prises plus tard comme base du rapport de la Commission de I'energie atomique. The scientists preferred to choose a somewhat restrained language for criticizing these proposals. But still, in essence, they succeeded in noting a tendency to secure a monopoly position for one country by such proposals. The adoption of such proposals, as well as the plan for atomic energy control as a whole, submitted some time ago by the representative of the United States, is in contradiction with the basic economic and national interests of other States, for this plan is directed against their economic independence. It is directed against the independence of other States. The situation is not altered by the fact that such a proposal actually finds support. I have already had an opportunity to state the point of view of the Soviet delegation on the question of the principle of unar~imity of the five Powers, permanent members of the Security Council, in connexion with the discussion of the question of the control of atomic energy. The ~oviet delegation considers that it will be impos- SIble to reach an agreement on this question so long as the unacceptable proposal on the question of the so-called veto is defended, since such a proposal is in contradiction with the principles of the United Nations. I have already pointed out that there seems to be no difference of opinion among us on the question of the necessity of ~unishing violators. All agree that certain sanct10ns should be applied against violators, if their guilt is proved. There is a divergence of opinion as to how, and by whom, decisions on sanctions should be taken. Should such decisions be taken in accordance with the basic principles of the United Nations, or in violation of those principles? The Soviet delegation considers that such decisions should be taken in strict conformity with the basic principles of our Organization and should be taken by the organ which is charged with the primary responsIbility for the maintenance of peace, that is, by the Security Council. The principle of unanimity of the five Powers, as such, is not an obstacle to the effective It is sometimes said that the proposals on the veto question contained in the United States plan did not affect the principle of unanimity of the five Powers as such. Attempts are being made to prove this by the argument that the States themselves, according to the convention, should give up this right. Besides, it is pointed out that, after an appropriate convention is concluded, nobody should have the right of veto, which might hinder the putting into effect of this convention. But the very point is: What should be provided for in the convention? Should departure from the principle of unanimity be provided for, or should the convention not touch the principle of unanimity of the five Powers in the Security Council? Thus, the question remains whether decisions on sanctions, after the conclusion of an appropriate convention, are to be taken by the Security Council, in which the principle of unanimity operates, or by the control organ, in which nobody will have the right of veto. That is why the United States proposals in fact affect the general question of the principle of unanimity in the Security Council. Since this is so, and since some people-and first of all the representatives of the United States-are trying to represent the situation in such a way that it appears as if the Soviet Union alone of the five Powers is interested in preserving the right of veto, the Soviet delegation considers it necessary to touch on this question once again. The veto was established not on the initiative of the Soviet Union, but on the initiative of the United States of America, in particular of the late President Roosevelt, and also of the former Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Churchill. Thus, the initiators of the veto werc the United States and Great Britain. The Soviet Union supported the proposal of President Roosevelt because it considered that the principle of the unanimity of the great Powers corresponded to the interest of the maintenance of peace. At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, where, for the first time, the principal questions of the creation of the United Nations were subjected to thorough discussion, the principle of unanimity of the five Powers was supported by aU the participants. At the Conference, not only was there no difference of opinion· on this question, but in general not one of its participants even dared to think that there might be some other solution of the question. This Conference failed to reach a decision only on the question of the application of the principle of unanimity in cases when the Security Council takes decisions on matters in conncxion with peaceful settlement in which one or more of the great Powers are involved. At the Dumbarton Oaks Conf~rence, 11 s'agit donc toujours de savoir si, apres la signature d'une convention appropriee, les decisions en matiere de sanctions doivent etre prises par le Conseil de securite au sein duquel joue le principe de l'unanimite, ou par l'organe de controle dans lequel personne n'aura le droit de veto. Voila pourquoi les· propositions des Etats- Unis touchent en realite a la question generale du principe de l'unanimite au Conseil de securite. Puisqu'il en est ainsi et puisque certaines personnes, et en premier lieu les representants des Etats-Unis, s'efforcent de presenter la situation de telle sorte que l'Union sovietique apparaisse comme la scule des cinq Puissances it s'interesser au maintien du droit de veto, la delegation de l'Union sovietique estime necessaire de revenir sur cette question. Le droit de veto n'a pas ete etabli sur l'initiative de l'Union sovietique, mais bien sur celle des Etats-Unis d'Amerique et notamment de fen le President Roosevelt, ainsi que sur ce]]e de l'ancien Premier Ministre de Grande-Bretagne, M. Churchill. Les Etats-Unis et la Granc1e- Bretagne ant done ete les promoteurs du principe de l'unanimite. L'Union sovietique a appuye la proposition du President Roosevelt, parce qu'elle estimait que le principe de l'unanimite des grandes Puissances etait dans l'interet de la paix. A la Conference de Dumbarton Oaks, an cours de laquelle les principales questions relatives ala creation des Nations Unies ant etc, pour la premiere fois, discutees afond, le principe de l'unanimite des cinq Puissances a rec;:u l'appui de tous les participants. Non seulement i1 ne s'est pas manifeste, acette Conference, de divergences de vues en la matiere, mais, d'une fac;on gene- 1 'A' , ra e, personne n a meme ose penser qu on pourrait resoudre la question differemment, Le seul point sur lequel cette Conference n'ait pas ~bouti a une decision a ete l'application du princlpe de l'unanimite dans les cas ou le Cbnseil de securitc est appele a prendre des decisions sur d~s questions liees au rcglement pacifique d'un dlfferend auquel une ou plusieurs des cinq grandes Puis- Proposing a formula for voting in the Security Council, the United States delegation made a statement containing both the text of the formula and its justification. Here is the text of this statement, read on that" occasion by Mr. Stettinius, former Secretary of State of the United States. I quote: "STATEMENT ON THE UNITED STATES AT- TITUDE ON THE QUESTION OF VOTING'IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. 1. Review of the situation on this question. "It was agreed at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference that certain question~ would be left for further consideration and solution in the future. Among them the principal one is what procedure of voting should be used in the Security Council. "The thrJ:e delegations examined carefully the whole question at Dumbarton Oaks. Since that time this question has been subjected to a continuous and intensive study on the part of each of the three Governments. "On 15 December 1944 the President forwarded the proposal to Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill that this question be solved by wording section C, chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks prop9sals in general as follows: 'C. Voting: '1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote. '2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be taken by the majority of seven members. '3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be taken by the majority of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members, with a party to a dispute abstaining from voting while decisions are being taken under section A-Peaceful Settlementchapter VIII, and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of section C, chapter· VIII.' " "EXPOSE DE L'ATTITUDE DES ETATS-UNIS SUR LA QUESTION DU VOTE AU CONSEIL DE SECURITE.· "1. Recapitulation de la situation en la matiere. "Il a efe convenu, it la Conference de Dumbarton Oaks, que l'etude et la solution de certaines questions seralcnt remises a plus tard. La principale de ces questions est celle de la procedure de vote qui devrait etre suivie au Conseil de securite. "Les trois delegations ont etudie avec. attention l'ensemble de la question it Dumbarton Oaks. Depuis lors, eHe a fait constamment l'objet d'une etude approfondie de la part de chacun des trois Gouvernements. "Le 15 decembre 1944-, le President a envoye au marechal Staline et au Premier Ministre Churchill une proposition d'apres laquelle, pour resoudre cette question, on redigerait la section C du chapitre VI des propositions de Dumbarton Oaks dans les termes suivants: "C. Vote: "1. Chaque membre du Conseil de securite devrait disposer d'une voix. "2. Les decisions du Conseil de securite sur des questions de procedure devraient ~tre prises par un vote affirmatif de sept membres. "3. Les decisions du Conseil de securite sur toutes autres questions devraient etre prises par un vote affirmatif de sept de ses membres, clans lequel seraient comprises les voix de tous les membres permanents, etant entendu que dans les decisions prises aux termes du chapitrc VIII, section A - Reglement pacifique - et de la seconde phrase du paragraphe 1 de la section C du chapitre VIII, une partie aun differend s'abstiendrait de voter." " (a) The proposal is in full accordance with the special responsibility of the great Powers for the maintenance of international peace. In this respect our proposal requires absolute unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council on all the most im- portant decisions relating to the maintenance of peace including all economic and military enforcement measures. " (b) At the same time our proposal recog- nizes the desirability of the frank statement of the permanent members that the peaceful settlement of any dispute which may arise is a matter of international concern, a matter in which sovereign non-permanent Member States have a right to state their points of view without an arbitrary prohibition. "We believe that if such freedom of discus- sion in the Council is not allowed then the creation of an international Organization, which we all desire, may be seriously ham- pered, if not made altogether impossible. With- out full and free discussion in the Council, even though it could be created the Organiza- tion would be a quite different one from what we are planning. "The document which we have submitted to the other two delegations contains the text of the provisions which I have read and a special list of those decisions of the Security Council which according to our proposal will require absolute unanimity and, separately, the list of those questions in the field of dis- putes and peaceful settlement on which any party to a dispute should abstain from voting. "3. Justification of the United States posi- tion. "From the point of view of the United States Government there are two important elements in the question of the voting pro- cedure. The first element is that for the main- tenance of international peace, which I have mentioned above, unanimity is necessary among the permanent members. "The second element is that it is extremely important for the people of the United States that justice should be provided for all the Members of the Organization. "Our task is to reconcile these two major elements. We believe that the proposals sub- mitted to Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill by the President on 5 December 1944 do provide reasonable and just solution and combine satisfactorily these two major considerations." "::::. Analyse de la proposition des Etats· Unis. « a) Cette proposition tient pleinement compte du fait que les grandes Puissances ont une responsabilite primordiale dans le main- tien de la paix internationale. Sous ce rapport, notre proposition exige l'unanimite absolue des membres permancnts du Conseil de securite pour toutes les decisions les plus importantes relatives au maintien de la paix, y compris toutes les mesures de coercition d'ordre econo- mique et militaire. «b) Par ailleurs, notre proposition admet qu'il est souhaitable que les membres perma- nents reconnaissent franchement que la solu- tion pacifique de tout differend qui peut sUl'gir est une affaire d'interet international et sur laquelle les membres non pcrmanents du Conseil de securite ont le droit de faire conn'fltre leur point de vue sans en etre em- pcches d'une manicre arbitraire. "Nous estimons que si 1'on ne permet pas une telle liberte de discussion au sein dll Conseil, on risque de compromettre grave- ment, ou meme de rendre tout a fait 'ropos- sible la creation de l'Organisation internatio- nale que nous desirons tous. Si, au sein dll Conseil, on ne peut proceder anne discmsion libre, pleine et cntiere, 1'Organisation, bien qu'eUe puisse etre creee, serait tout a fait dif- ferente de ceUe que nous projetons. "Le document que nous avons presente allX deux autres delegations contient le texte des dispositions dont je viens de donner lecture et une liste des decisions qui, d'apres nous, exige- raient l'unanimite au Conseil de securite; cc document contient, dans une partie distincte, la liste des questions relatives aux differends et au reglement pacifique sur lesquelles unc partie au differend devrait s'abstenir de voter. "Le Gouvemement cles Etats-Unis estime qu'en matiere de· procedure de vote, il y a deux points importants a considerer. Le pre- mier, c'est que le maintien de la paix interna- tionale dont je viens de parler exige l'unani- mite des membres permanents. "Le second, c'est qu'il est extrcmement im- portant aux yeux du peuple des Etats-Unis d'agir selon la justice a l'egard de tOllS les membres de l'Organisation. "Notre tache consiste a concilier ces deux idees fondamentales. Nous estimons que la proposition presentee au marechal Staline ~t au Premier Ministre Churchill par le PresI- dent, le 5 dccembre 1944, donne a ce pro- bleme une solution raisonnable et equitable et concilie d'une fat;on satisfaisante ces deux idees fondamentales." Paragraph 2(a), in the section Analysis of the United States proposal, which states that this proposal is in full conformity with the special responsibility of the great Powers for the main- tenance of peace; therefore it requires absolute unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council on all the most important deci- s!ons, including all economic and military sanc- tIOns, C'B., Section 3, Justification of the United States position, which points out two important ele- ments: the necessity of unanimity among perma~ ~ent members and the necessity of providing jus- bee for all Members of the Organization; and also to the conclusion stating that the United States proposals give "reasonable and just solu- tion" and combine successfully both of these important considerations. . At the <?rimea Conference, during the discus- SIOn of thIS question, and in particular of the a?ove-stated United States proposal, the prin- CIple of the veto as well as the United States propos~l were fully supported by Mr. Churchill. Accordmg to the record-I have in mind the record not of the Secretariat, but of the Soviet delegation, a record to which Mr. Churchill did not give his approbation-Mr. Churchill stated that he "was not completely satisfied with the original proposals worked out at Dumbarton Oaks" as he was not sure that the real situation and position of the three great Powers were fully taken. into account in these proposals. After studymg the President's new proposals, that is, the proposals on the veto, Mr. Churchill's doubts di~a'ppeared-in any case, he said, as far as the BntIsh Commonwealth and the British Empire were concerned. This also applies to the inde~ pendent Dominions of the British Crown. Mr. C~urchill ~dmits that the question whether peace wIll b~ bUIlt. on firm foundations depends upon the fnendship and co-operation of the three great Powers. However, we would be placing ?urselves in a false position and would not be Just towards our intentions if we did not provide small nations with an opportunity for the free expression of their claims. Without this it would look as if the three great Powers c1aim~d to rule the world. Meanwhile, in reality they want to serve the world and to save it from the disasters which overtook the majority of the peoples in the recent war. That is why the three great Powers must display a certain readiness to com- ply with the interests of the common cause. Naturally, Mr. Churchill thinks in the first place how the new situation will affect the fate of the British Commonwealth. He would like to cite as a concrete example, one which is diffictllt for the British force, namely, Hong Kong. If the proposal of the President is adopted and China asks for the return of Hong Kong, then Great Britain will have the right to express its Au paragraphe 2 a) de la section intituIee Analyse de la proposition des Etats-Unis, il est dit que cette proposition tient pleinement compte du fait que les grandes Puissances ont une responsabilite primordiale dans le maintien de la paix; c'cst pour cette raison qu'elle exige l'unanimite des membres permanents du Conseil de securite pour toutes les decisions les plus im- portantes, y compris les sanctions economiques et militaires. A la section 3 intituIee Justification de la posi- tion des Etats-Unis, on souligne deux idees importantes: la necessite de l'unanimite des membres permanents et la necessite d'agir selon la justice a l'egard de tous les membres de l'Organisation; je souligne egalement la conclu- sion affirmant que les propositions des Etats- Unis donnent "une solution raisonnable et equi- table" et concilient heureusement ces deux idees importantes. Lorsqu'on a discute cette question, et notam- ment la proposition des Etats-Unis precitee, ala Conference de Crimee, M. Churchill a donne tout son appui au principe du droit de veto, ainsi qu'a la proposition des Etats-Unis. SeIon le proces-verbal-je veux parler, non du proe<'~s~ verbal du Secretariat, mais de celui de la dele- gation sovietiquc auqueI M. Churchill n'a pas donne son approbation-M. Churchill a declare qu'il "n'etait pas completement satisfait des pro- positions elaborees a Dumbarton Oaks", car il n'etait pas sur que ces propositions eussent pleine- ment tenu compte de la situation et de l'attitude veritables des trois grandes Puissances. L'etude des nouveIles propositions du President, c'est-a- dire des propositions sur le droit de veto, a dis- sipe le doute de M. Churchill, du moins, a-t-il declare, pour ce qui est du .CommonwraJth et de l'Empire britanniques. Cela s'appliquait egale- ment aux Dominions independants relevant de la Couronne. M. Churchill a reconnu que l'eta- blissement d'une paix sur des bases solides de- pendait de la bonne entente et de la collabora- tion des trois grandes Puissances. Cependant, nous nous mettrions dans une position fausse et nous ne serions pas fideIes a nos intentions si nous ne donnions pas aux petites nations l'occa- sion d'exprimer librement leurs revendications. Si cette possibilite ne leur etait pas rcconnue, l~s trois grandes Puissances sembleraient voulOlr regir le monde entier, alors qu'en realite elles veulent se mettre a son service et le sauver des desastres qui se sont abattus sur la plupart des peuples au cours de la recente guerre. V?ila pourquoi les trois grandes Puissances de~raIent faire preuve d'une certaine bonne volonte pour servir l'interet de la cause commune. Naturellement, M. Churchill pensait avant tout aux repercussions de la situa~ion ~ouvelle sur l'avenir du Commonwealth bntanmque. 11 a choisi un cxemple COllcret qui pose un problcme difliciJe pour les Britanniques, asavoir le cas de Hong-Kong-. Si la p!'oposition duo Pre~dent ~tait adoptee et si la. Chme demandaIt qu on IUl r~­ mft Hong-Kong, la Grande-Bretagne aurmt In such a case, a victory would be secured for the British Government, as each permanent member has, in certain cases, the right to veto the actions of the Security Council; on the other hand, it would be unjust if China had no possi- bility of expressing its opinion on the subject of the dispute. The same applies to Egypt. In case Egypt should raise against Britain a question concerning the Suez Canal, then Mr. Churchill would have allowed the discussion of this ques- tion without any fear, since British interests are ensured by the provision of the American state- ment, which provides for the right of veto. I hope that at the present time nobody can have any doubts as to who is the initiator of the proposals on the veto and how the matter stood in the discussion of the original proposals on this question. These explanations may be useful, at least for those who want to know what the actual state of affairs was when this question was being discussed before it found appropriate ex- pression in the United Nations Charter. Generalissimo Stalin, the head of the Soviet delegation at the Crimea Conference, on behalf of the Soviet Union, agreed with the proposals of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, since the principle of unanimity of the great Powers cor- responds to the interests of co-operation among them and to the interests of the maintenance of international peace. One may say, "That was in time of war, and the significance of co-operation and of co-ordi- nated actions among the great Powers was ob- vious, but at the present time the value of the principle of unanimity among the great Powers is not so obvious." But, if the two years which have elapsed since the Crimea Conference and the year and a half since the San Francisco Con- ference and since the end of the war have brought for some people doubts on the soundness of this principle, then what is the use of speak- ing about the prospects of co-operation among the great Powers and about the maintenance of The delegation of the Soviet Union deemed it necessary to make additional clarifications of its position on this question so that when returning the report of the Atomic Energy Commission we would at least realize clearly and distinctly where we are. An understanding of the actual position may perhaps help us to cope with those serious tasks facing the United Nations Organization in the field of the establishment of international control of atomic energy in order to prohibit its use for military purposes, and to ensure its appli- cation only for the benefit of humanity, for rais- ing the standard of living of peoples, and for widening their scientific and cultural horizons.

It is getting late and we clearly cannot reach a decision on this question today. I still have some speakers on my list. On the other hand, it seems that the representatives would like to have some time to consider this speech by the representative of the Soviet Union. I think that the best course for us is to adjourn our proceedings now. We already have a meeting scheduled for Friday afternoon at three o'clock to deal with the question of trusteeship in strategic areas. I therefore suggest that the Council should meet again on Monday, 10 March, at 3 o'clock, to proceed with the consideration of the First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission. The meeting rose at 6 p.m. la place du veto? Ne veulent-ils pas nous ramener aux ruines de la Societe des Nations? On peut ne pas repondre aces questions, mais on ne , peut pas les eludeI'. La delegation de l'Union sovietique a juge necessaire de preciseI' davantage son attitude sur cette question afin qu'en renvoyant le rapport de la Commission de l'energie atomique, nous sachions exactement et clairement aquoi nous en tenir. Si nous apprecions objeetivement la situation, nous serons peut-etre mieux en mesure d'accomplir les taches importantes qui incombent aux Nations Unies dans le domaine du contrOle international de l'energie atomique, en vue d'en interdire l'utilisation a des fins militaires et d'en assurer l'application au seul benefice de l'humanite, de reIever le niveau de vie des peuples et d'elargir leur horizon scientifique et culturel. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Il se fait tard et il est manifeste que nous ne pourrons pas aboutir, aujour,d'hui, a une decision sur cette question. 'Un certain nombre d'orateurs sont encore inserits sur ma liste. 11 semble, d'autre part, que les representants voudraient avoir le temps .d'etudier l'importante declaration du representant de l'Union sovietique. J'estime donc qu'il vaut mieux ajoumer nos debats. Une seance est deja prevue pour vendredi a15 heures, pour traiter de la question du regime de tutelle dans les zones strategiques. Je propose done que le Conseil se reunisse de nouveau lundi 10 mars a 15 heures pour continueI' l'examen du Premier Rapport de la Commission de l'energie atomique. La seance est levee a18 heures.