S/PV.1151 Security Council

1 have received communications [S/5970, S/5971 and S/5975]1/ from the representatives of Turkey, Cyprus and Greece requesting that they be invited to partioipate, without the right to vote, in the discussion of the question now before the Security Council. If there are no objections 1 intend, in accordance with the practice followed by the Council in this matter in the pas t, ti invite the representatives of these three countries to take their seats at the Council table. 1. Le PRESIDENT sentants de la Turquie, de Chypre et de la Grèce, ‘m’ont adressé des communications [S/5970, S/5971 et S/5975U] demandent ‘a participer, de la question soumise au Conseil de shurit6. propose, s’il n’y représentants de ces trois pays a prendre place à la table du Conseil, conformément a la pratique suivie au cours des pr&&dentes seances. Sur l’invitation (Turquie), M. Spyros Kyprianou (Chypre) et M. Dimitri S. Bit&os (Grèce) prennent place à la table du Conseil. At the invitation of the President Mr. Orhan Eralp (Turkey), Mr. Spyros Kyprianou (Cyprus) and Mr. &??itri S. Bitsios (Greeoe) Cook places at the Counoil table.

The Seourity Council Will now proceed to examine the report of the Secretary-General on the UnitedNations operation in Cyprus, which was distributed as dooument 5/5950, Corr.1 and Add.l,l/ and the letter of the representative of Cyprus [S/5488]2/ mentioned in the Council’s agenda, 2. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): ConformBment à ce qui est incliquh dans l’ordre du jour, le Conseil de shurité Secretaire géneral sur l’oppération des Nations Unies a Chypre, qui figure dans les documents S/5950 et Corr.1 et Add.lY, de Chypre [S/54882/]. I! Voir année, I! .%?e Officia1 Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year, SuPplement for July. Auguat and September 1964. 2/ Ibid., 2/ Ibid., Eighteenth Year, Supplement for Occober, November and r)ecember 1963. décembre

1 reportedwithdeep regret to the Security Council the deathof the Mediator on C@rus, Mr. Sakari Tuomioja, on 9 September 1964, and informed the Council [S/5950] that 1 was taking the necessary steps towards the designation of a new Mediator with the shortest possible delay. 6. 1 am happy now to be able to inform the Council that the four Governments concerned have agreed to the appointment as Mediator of Mr. Galo Plaza, who Will be assuming his functions shortly. Mr. Galo Plaza needs no introduction from me, and the members of the Council Will be aware that he has already given most distinguished service to the United Nations in Cyprus as my Speoial Representative there. 1 hope to be able to report to the Council shortly the exact date on which Mr. Galo Plaza Will take up his new functions.

1 thank the Secretary-General for his statement, and give the floor to the next speaker on my list, the representative of Cyprus.

1 wish, in the first place, to thank you, Mr. President, for inviting my delegation to participate in the present meeting of the Security Council, as well as for giving me the opportunity to open the debate. 9. First of ail, 1 wish once more on behalf of my Government and the people of Cyprus to pay tribute to the memory of the late Mr, S&ari Tuomioja, the Mediator in Cyprus, whose sudden death deprived the United Nations of a noble soldier. 1 wish to add that we on our part wholeheartedly welcome the appointment of Mr. Galo Plazaas thenew Mediator to replace Mr. Tuomioja. Mr. Galo Plaza’s objeotivity, sense of duty and integrity is well known in Cyprus, and therefore it was with particular pleasure that we aooepted the proposa1 of the Secretary-General, 10. We have before us quite a lengthy report from the Secretary-General covering the period between 8 June and 8 September 1964. 1 have very oarefully read this report, and 1 must quite frankly say that there are many points in it in connexion with which my Government holds a different view. This is perhaps due to differences of approach or differences in the assessment of the situation relating to certain facts and considerations. It is understandable that, to a certain extent, some UnitedNationsofficials.inCyprus in their zeal and eagerness to achieve progress in certain respects often see things in a different perspective and sometimes unintentionally-1 must stress the word Qnintentionally “-tend to overlook and not always to take into full consideration the great responsibilities and the heavy duties that confront the Government of Cyprus in the present critical times. 3/ Ibid., Nineteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September l&5‘& . 11. This is not, as a11 the members of the Security Council must by now be well aware, unoonnected with the hexternal threat of intervention. By saying this, 1 do not, of course, for a moment wish to doubt the sincerity and the good intentions of a11 the United Nations officiais in Cyprus, and in this connexion 1 want once more to pay tribute to the Secretary-General and a11 his collaborators in the Secretariat for their untiring efforts to sec peace restored in that sensitive area of the world. 12. It is in this spirit, alone, that 1 wish to reserve my Government’s position with regard to certain points raised in the report and upon which 1 might find it necessary to make comments and observations later in the debate, or submit them, in due course, in written form, which 1 might request you, Mr. President, to circulate as a Security Council document. 12. réserver de certains lesquels certains senter en demandant texte en tant que document du Conseil 13. In the course of my statement today 1 shall deal only with certain aspects of the report which, in my judgement, are the most important ones. The most important of a11 is that part of the report which deals with the events of early August, when my country experienced the most tragic days in its reoenthistory and when the world witnessed barbarism and ferocity at its worst. 1 shall deal with this question towards the end of my statement. 13. parlerai mon avis, importante nements que mon pays vivait son histoire pires cette question 14, My ‘Government has already indicated to the Secretary-General that we are prepared to accept the extension of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) mandate for an additional three months’ period on the basis of the tesms of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 4 March 1964 [S/5575],4/ We accept the continued presence of the United Nations force in Cyprus as a symbol of peaoe, and 1 take this opportunity to reassure the Council of my Government’s sincere intention to oo-operate fully with the United Nations force in aohieving the common goals laid down by the resolution to which 1 have just referred. 14. taire du mandat nouvelle de la resolution 1964 [S/55754/]. des paix, et je tiens a cette occasionaassurer le Conseil de coopérer Unies a la realisation dans la r6solution 15: In this connexion, 1 feel obliged to make certain observations regarding the functions and the mission of the United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus. While we do not expect it to act as an arm of the Government, the functions of UNFICYP, as we have a11 along understood them under the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964, would be exercised in such a way as to respect at a11 times the sovereign rights and the authority of the Cyprus Government. It is indeed gratifying thatrthis basic premise is reiterated by the Secretary-General in paragraph 220 of his 15. vations Force paix qu’elle pensons toujours lution exerdes rains Nous de base r.?%téré par le Secrstaire paragraphe Nations souverainete l’autorité report, whioh states that UNFICYP: “respects at a11 times the sovereignty and the independence of Cyprus and the authority of the Governmentll. -/ 1964. A/ Ibid., Nineteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1964. 17. It should always be borne in mind that the Government of Cyprus has the right, the responsibility and the imperative duty to strengthen its defence in accordance with the inherent and universally-acoepted right of self-defence-recognized, inter alia, in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter-which every sovereign State possesses for the protection and defence of its territorial integrity, This right has been emphasized by the Secretary-General in bis reports of 15 June [S/5’764 and Add.1]5/ and 10 September. This duty has become even more imperative in view of the fact that in early August the recurrent and continuous threats of aggression on the part of Turkey took a very concrete form. The observations of the Secretary-General in paragraph 232 of his report of 10 September must therefore be considered in the light of those principles. 18. With regard to the question of unrestribted freedom of movement of UNFICYP, raised by the Secretary-General in sub-paragraph (5) of paragraph 232 and elsewhere in his report, my Government has done its utmost to solve thisproblemin the desire to assist the United Nations Force in its task and in a spirit of goodwill, oonfidenoe and trust towards the United Nations, in spite of the fact that most serious issues of seourity and defence are involved. Sinoe the publication of the report ths issue bas been settled between UNFICYP and the Government. 19: Regarding the question of the right of the Force to remove positions and fortified installations, referred to in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 232 of the report, this is a most constructive proposition in our view, provided that theUNFPCYP always acts in agreement with the Government, Any other approach to this matter would be interpreted as inconsistent with the prinçiple stated in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 7 of the report, which states: “In connexion with the performance of its function and responsibilities, UNFICYP shall maintain close contact with the appropriate officiala in theGovernment of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order and which has been asked by the Security Council in its resolution of 4 March 1964 to take a11 additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in C yprus . n 20. In this connexion, however, 1 wish to state before the Council that my Government, in its earnestdesire to see peace and normal conditions restored in the island, is ready to order the removal of a11 armed posts throughout the country,provided that the Turkish rebels do, or are made to do, thesame. This decision was offioially commynicated yesterday to the Secretary-General in a message by the President of the 21 Ibid., Nineteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1964. 21. It must, of course, be made quite clear that the proposals for the removal of positions and fortified installations, contained in paragraph 232 of the report, or the removal of armed posts referred to in the President’s message to the Secretary-General, do not concern, include, affect or relate to any military installations, fortifications or other defensive measures connected with the security and defence of the country agains t external threats. 21. propositions et des installations paragraphe démantèlement dans le message genBra1, ou ne visent ou autre d6fense 22. As regards the third assumptioninparagraph232 namely, that Il., . it may be demanded by the Commander that the opposing armed forces be separated t0 reasonable dis tances in order to create buffer zones in which armed forces would be prohibited”, 1 have to state that, while this may seem practical, it may in effect prove most dangerous. Whatever action the Commander may intend to take in this respect, it must always be with the agreement of the Cypruo Govesnment. The oreation of dividing lines-and we have had some experience with those-or buffer zones would not contribute to the restoration of normal conditions or therefore of pesmanent peace. On the contrary. they might create a situation fraught with danger and als0 prejudicial to the political future of the country. Furthermore, 1 must say that if the proposition contained in sub-paragraph (@ of paragraph 232 of the report is implemented-and I have already stated my Government’s readiness to contribute positively and effectively to a successful implementation thereof -it would seem that the proposition in sub-paragraph (Q), in connexion with the buffer zones, besides the dangers it entails, would be completely unnecessary even to consider. 22. au paragraphe Commandant armees situaes afin de créer forces cette mesure, fait d’&tre envisagee égard, avec le Gouvernement de séparation en la matiere pas a assurer consbquent risque et pouvant je dois dire du paragraphe d.$ja dit que mon gouvernement tribuer mise d’envisager sujet des zones neutres, qu’elle 23. In his message yesterday to the Secretary- General, the President of Cyprus, further stated that the Government of Cyprus ‘lis willing to accept any suggestion of the United Nations in respect of certain practical security measures contributing to the pacification of the island provided that such measures do not affect the political solution of the problem’“. This is in complete accord with the statement of the SecretarJr-General in hls memorandum of 11 April 1964 [S/5653]$/ to the effect that the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in C@rus, “In carrying out its function, , , , shall avoid any action designed to influence the political situation . . , n , 23. le PrBsident Gouvernement toute Nations de &curite l’Île, solution tement dans selon lequel, des Nations a influencer 24. My Government is more than anxious to seepeace and normal conditions restored. This is the meaning 24. le r&s.blissement 25. In my short intervention on 11 September[1147th meeting], during the debate on the Greek Government’s complaint against Turkey in connexion with the viatimization and the mass extermination of the Greek minority in Constantinople, 1 dealt briefly with the question of the so-called economic blookade of tbe Turks in Cyprus. My intervention at that time was necessitated by the ultimatumpresentedby the Turkish Government in a memorandum circulated on the pre- V~OUS day by the representative of Turkey as well as by the statement made on that same day by the Prime Minis ter of Turkey , Mr, Inllnff. 26. The Turkish Government, in presenting the ultimatum, alleged that the Government of Cyprus had on purpose blocked its supply of foodstuffs and other assentials to the Kokkina area, in its .design to suppress the Turks living in that village. 1 stated on that, day that according to our information, which coincides witb the information furnished by the Secretary-General, there was no question of starvation in that area or indeed, if 1 may add, in any other area. We had proposed a further investigation in the Kokkina area and we had invited the Turkish representative in Cyprus to go alongwith theunited Nations team. Following that, General Thimayya, the United Nations Commander in Cyprus, accompanied by the Turkish Chargk d’affaires and other United Nations and Red Cross officiais, visited the village of Kokkina on 12 September 1964 for this purpose. Although tbe investigation could not have been regarded as thorough, and although we are quite well aware of the preparations made by the Turkish rebels in that area in the expeotation of the visit of this team, General Thimayya, in his officia1 statement, said: “The whole situation appeared satisfaotory and no cases of starvationwere seen, II 27. What were the preparations made by the Turks in that area? On instructions received from their leaders in Niçosia, they were ordered to try to present to the visiting team apictureof misery and starvation. In a message which went to Kokkina before the visit, the Turks in that area were told to wear tattered clothes and old shoes and to hide as much as possible of the stocks of supplies which they had. In the document whioh the Seoretary-General circulated on 11 September 1964 [S/5961],7/ that is to say one day before the visit of the team, he enumerated the consignments of goods which were brought into that area between 9 Aygust and 8 September. The Secretarp General gave further information of additional Supplies y Ibid., Ninereenth Year, Supplement for July. Augusr and September 1964 A 28. Some further information on this matter may also be enlightening. On 11 September, the eve of the visit of the team, it was ascertained that the Turkish inhabitants of the Kokkina area had not bothered to ask, sinoe 8 September, for certain additional supplies which they were entitled to receive. Thereupon, General Thimayya was requested to inform them that if they SO wished they could be supplied wiîh additional provisions as of that very evening. The Turks in that area .had every opportunity, therefore, to eliminate or to minimize any hardship they falsely alleged they were suffering, by simply asking for additional supplies which would readily have been made available to them. 28. Quelques renseignements peuvent Veille les pas. pris la peine de demander, certaines avaient droit. leur sions même. Les Turcs toutes possibilit& pr&endues quIil leur plémentaires, diatement. 29. Some additional information may shed further light in connexion witb this issue, On 14 September, in the course of discussions held in Niçosia with the Turkish leaders, UNFICYP proposed to transport and eSCOrt without delay any supplies that the Turkish leaders wished to make available for their oompatriots in Kokkina. But aooording to a statement by the UNFICYP, the Turkish Cypriot leadership did not agree to make available the supplies which the Turks nOw have in Niçosia and Famagusta-whioh, by the way, amount to substantial stocks-for the Kokkina area, on the ground that Kokkina had alreadyreceived its due share from the Red Cresoent supplies available. Either the Turks in Kokkina were in no need of food, or the refusa1 of the Turkish leadership to aSsi& them was a further indication of their intention t0 defame the Government and to provoke incidents, 29. Voici encore’ d’autres cette affaire. qui ont eu lieu a Nicosia la Force transporter nement compatriotes ration dirigeants d’envoyer reçoivent Famagouste tuent des stocks Kokkina venant Kokkina des dirigeants tation nement et de provoquer 30, There is a dispute, as 1 said, between the Turkish 30. Il y a désaccord, Government and my Government with regard to the entre figure of the persons living in that area of Kokkina. quant au nombre In a statement whioh General Thimayya issued alter de Kokkina. his visit to the village on 12 September, he said that, s’être aooording to the local inhabitants, the total figure is g&$ral 1,400, which, General Thimayya added, is a figure 1 400 personnes, more or less accepted by the United Nations Force. que la Force Whereas the Government puts the population figure aocept& at 850, in accordance with the 1960 census,but allowde 850 habitants, ing for an increase in population since then and the de la population aocumulation of refugees from surrounding villages, refugiés we do not doubt that there are 1,400 persons living doutons pas qu’il y ait bien 1 400 personnes in that area. zone. 31. representant difference nement de Chypre ne tenait naturellement du nombre clandestinement j’en 31. 1 pointed outto thwlyudcish’rep~eeentative at the 1146th meeting why there is this differenceinfigures. I told him that the Cyprus Government did not, naturally, take into aocount the number of Turkish offioers and men who have been smuggled into the axea from TurkeY, of whioh 1 am sure the representative of Turkey is well aware, just as we are. This is a faot whioh can further be confirmed by the United Nations and by the report of the Secretary-General. Of course, the Prime Minister of Turkey assured the aussi leurs rai de l’organisation -, 7 32. As 1 see it, itwasexpectedof the Cyprus Government to make arrangements for the supply of goods to foreign enemy soldiers who have been smuggled into the oountry to overthrow the Government and destroy the, State, This is why the Turkish representative was SO much interested in the oaloric value of the supplies that have been entering Kokkina. 1 stated my Government’s position and, if 1 maysay SO, it was with deep disappointment that Ididnot hear any word of appreoiation from some quarters, My Government’s position was that wewereprepared tofacilitate the supply of reasonable quantities of foodstuffs and other essentials for Kokkina village and that we were prepared to accept what the Secretary-General himself would consider reasonable. This, 1 submit, could not be considered as an indication of a government’s intention to condemn people to starvation. 33. Sinoe 14 September my Government has gone even a step,further. The President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, while the false and baseless Turkish propaganda that the Government was using inhuman measures against the Turks in Kokkina ran riot, informed General Thimayya that the ,Government was prepared to transport to Kokkina any additional supplies that he might suggest, andfurthermore, that the Government of Cyprus was even prepared to pay for these additional supplies if the Turkish Cypriots were unable to buy the supplies themselves. 34.. 1 challenge anyone to quote a similar example of humanitarian attitudes by a Government towards persons who have taken up arms against the State in the service of foreign interests and in pursuance of a policy aimed at destroying the State. It is true that among the Turks in the Kokkina area there are innocent people, perhaps totally unconnected with the activities and plans of the terrorists who are in contrO1 of the village-terrorists either from Turkey, whom we did not include in the population figure of the area, or terrorists from Cyprus. 35. Before leaving this specifio case of Kokkina, I wish to inform the Council of some further developments on this question-some of the repreyentatives may have read them in The New York Times of 16 September. In accordance with the arrangement which was reaohed between UNFICYP and theGovernment, certain supplies were arranged to be transported to Kokkina, and indeed they were transported by UNFICYP. May 1 quote from The New York Times: “Meanwbile, as the first truckloads of food set out for the besieged Kokkina region, United Nations Offioiahs reported a scuffle. They said Turkish CJW’iOtS had tried to prevent the food from being unloaded at the roadside.tl 36. I wish to inform the Council that only two hours ago, according to information which 1 have received from Cyprus, the Turks in Kokkina still refuse to accept the food which was unloaded by United Nations trucks yesterday on the edge of their village. Some Turks have said, “We cannot accept food from the Greeks,‘! I submit that if these people are indeed hungw , they would have accepted food from the government of Cyprus which, after all, was conveyed to them by the United Nations. 36. Chypre Conseil les vivres Unies dit: voyé avaient vraiment que le Gouvernement et qui, aprés des Nations 37. Kaving dealt’with the specific case of Kokkina, 1 should like to say one or two words about the question of the so-called economic blockade in general. There has never-I repeat never-been an economic bloekade. This was simply a new invention of Turkish propaganda in its efforts to defame the Cyprus Government. I regret to have to repeat what 1 said in the Council, that there seem to be many victims of this propaganda-some willing and some unwilling. 37. de Kokkina, question répete, s’agit gande Chypre. dit devant le Conseil propagande taires 38. The real situation was as follows-1 say nwasll because it has been changed by a new decision of the Cyprus Governmeqt. In certain areas where the Turkish population has been isolated by the Turkish terrorists leaders, in pursuance of their political and militasy aims, there have, as it was natural, been difficuities in the supply of essential goods to these areas. Apart from the huge quantities of supplies, which they managed to pile up in those areas, the Turkish terrorists have been trying to increase their stocks, not for the benefit of the civilian population to whom, perhaps, most goods are being denied by their so-called leaders, but for the purpose of having ample supplies in the expectation of a conflict as a result of the plan of invasion of the country by Turkey. It’ was, therefore, natural on the part of the Government to restriot the new supplies of certain items to reasonable quantities. 38. dis tt6tait’1, c’est nement Dans trouvee turcs tiques, nbcessit6 Ayant rables ristes réserves, a laquelle, refusent plutôt prevision sag6e gouvernement tains produits 39. 1 need not stress here that the Government could not, of course, under anycircumstances allow supplies 39. nement dans preparatifs dont j’ai parlé lation le gouvernement représentants nationale la livraison site dans les zones qui se sont, pourtant, ment nement Unies devaient de produits frais, vgtements dises nables. t0 these areas of material related to militarypreparations. The Government, in order to meet the difficulties to which 1 have referred and in its desire to relieve the innocent Turkish civilian population livingin those areas, has been having long discussions with United Nations and Red Cross officia19 in Cyprus in connexion with the preparation of a detailed plan for the unhindered supply of essential goods to ‘these selfrsStriCted areas. According to the plan, which was Prepared by the Government in consultation with UNFICYP and the International Red Cross, a number of items of essential foodstuffs were to be sent into the areas in unrestricted quantities, such as fresh food, fruit, medical supplies, alcoholic beverages, women’s and childrenls clothing. Other types of goods wonld go in those areas in reasonable quantities. And in connexion with those reasonable quantities, 1 offered, at the 1146th meeting, that it should be left “On its part, UNFICYP has been observing in the last few days the movement of food supplies in the island and has noted that the Government’s decisions are being carried out and that in most cases the restricted areas are receiving the amounts of supplies allooated to them. As stated before, these amounts were established by the Government and the International Committee of the Red Cross has considered their calorie value as reasonable.lt 40. 1 submit that the point is proved, quite clearly, that the Cyprus Government, while faced with innumerable ‘problems, with the threat of outside aggression and subversion from within, has been seriously occupied with working out a detailed plan; in co-operation with the United Nations and the International Red Cross, in order to make the supply of essentials to the self-restricted areas possible’, on humanitarian grounds, and bearing in mind that the majority of the Turkish population in those areas are innocent civilians, living in isolation, intimidated and terrorized by their oompatriots and the agents of.Ankara in pursuance of political and military aims. 41. In the light if this situation, it isreally too difficuit to understand that some people have endorsed, willingly or unwillingly, this new theme of Turkish propaganda, namely, the so-calledeconomic blockade. 1 have dealt with this question at some length in my desire to put the record straight and, at the same time, to enlighten the members of the Counoil who, 1 am sure, have for some time now been hearing of the so-called economic blockade, of the false accusations against my Government and of the outrageous charge that we have condemned the Turks to starvation. 42. 1 felt it necessary to explain what the position was until yesterday. Certain restrictions in some of those areas were fully justified, in my submission, in the light of the prevailing situation and in view of the aggressive and subversive Turkish plans. Now, in spite of the attitude andplans of the Turkish terrorists and those of the Turkish Government, in spite of continued provocation and subversion, and in spite of the continued threat of aggression, my Government had decided once more to take the lead and point the way to peace and normality. 43. The Government of Cyprus has decided, as from yesterday, 15 September, to remove a11 economic restrictions and to allow the entry of any quantity of 44.. lt has never been our desire to suppress the minority..It is not our policy to do.so. It is notour inten? tion to divlde the people; it is our intention to unite them, because it is not our aim to divide the oountry. Our aim is to preserve and safeguard its unity. In our desire to assist the majority of the Turkish Cypriot population which is Buffering due to the intimidation and sinister plans of its leaders and those of their mastors in Ankara, we are prepared to offer to protectithose Turks who would wlsh to return to theirvillages under the rule of law and the rule of Government, and we know that there is a very great number of Turkish Cypriots who would like to return to their normal and peaceful life. We wish to help them to do SO and to protect them, and we most solemnly cal1 upon the United Nations Force to assist the Government in this effort, 44. Nous n’avons jamais désir8 supprimer la minorité. Telle n’est pas notre politique. Nous ntavonspas l’intention de diviser la population; nous voulons son uni%, parce que nous ne cherchons pas a diviser le pays. Nous cherchons a maintenir et a protéger son unit& Nous d&irons aider la majorité de la population chypriote dation et des sombres machinations de ses dirigeants ou de leurs mai’tres d’Ankara, et nous sommes disposés B offrir rentrer dans leur village et vivre dans le respect des lois, sous.l’autorite de trés nombreux Chypriotes turcs voudraient bien retrouver lons les y aider et les protgger, pt nous lançons à la Force des Nations Unies chargde du maintien de la, paix un appel solennel pour qu’elle aide notre gouvernement dans cet effort. 45. In this connexion 1 wish to inform the Council that my Government has decided to grant financial assistance ta those Turkish Cypriots who have been oompelled by their leaders to abandon their homes and are’desirous of being resettled in their vill.ages. 45. A cet égard, je tiens à informer le Conseil que mon gouvernement a dt5cid6 d’offrir Ci&re aux Chypriotes turcs que leurs dirigeants ont obligé à quitter leurs foyers et qui desirent rentrer dans leurs villages. 46. My Government is further prepared to grant an amnesty ,).o those of the Turks who would be willing t0 lay down their arms which they have taken up against the State, and we would be seady toprotect them if they wished to return to their normal and peaoeful life. 46. En outre, mon gouvernement est disposi3 & accorder une amnistie aux Turcs révoltés contre l%tat qui voudraient deposer les armes, et il serait prêt a les proteger s’ils voulaient rentrer chez eux et reprendre en paix leur existence quotidienne, 47. How to achieve these goals, which we are fully oonvinced would prove to be of great importance and a contribution towards the restoration of peace and normal life-that is the problem,with which the Government of Cyprus and the United Nations Force Will be confronted. But we feel we must go along together towards the implementation of these plans. We, on our part, s,hall do our utmost in ‘that direction. 1 am quite confident that theunited Nations’wilido the same. 47. Comment pourrons-nous rgaliser ces objectifs qui, nous en sommes convaincus, ont une haute importance et contribueraient beaucoup au retour a la paix et a la vie normale? C’est la le probleme qui se pose au Gouvernement de Chypre et à la Forcedes Nations Unies. Nous estimons que nous devonsunir nos efforts pour atteindre oes buts, Pour notre part, nous ferons tout notre possible à cet Egard. Je suis convaincu que les Nations Unies agiront de même. 48. TO sum up my Government’s intentions andpolicy, aimed at assisting the Turkish minority in CypruS and furthering the cause of peace and normality, I cari do no better than to read out the ‘text of’the message addressed on 16 September, by the President of the Republio of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, EO tbe Secretary-General [S/595O/Add.2, Annex]. The message of President Makarios reads: 48. Pour résumer les intentions de mon gouvernement et les mesures qu’il compte prendre afin d’aider la minorite turque de Chypre et favoriser la paix et le retour a une situationnormale, mieux faire que de donner lecture dumessage adresse hier, 15 septembre, au SecrBtaire g8néralpar le Pr&+ dent de la RBpublique de Chypre, Mgr [S/5950/Add.2, les termes suivants: ,*lt is’ clear, in my opinion, that the Turkish Government instigates the Turkish Cypriots ta oreate incidents undermining the efforts of UNFICYP ’ for the restoration of peace and the return to nbrmality. Moreover, the Turkish Government exploits certain conditions created by the Turkish Cypriots for the purpose of falsely representing the Government of the Republic of Cyprus as oppressing the Turkish minority, and also in order to have excuses for arbitrary actions, Inmyearnest “Il est selon moi Evident que le Gouvernement turc incite les Chypriotes turcs & cr8er des incidents qui compromettent des Nations Unies a Chypre pour rétablir la paix et ramener Gouvernement creees par les Chypriotes turcs en vue de cr8er l’impression RBpublique de Chypre oppresse la minorité turque et de trouver “(a) Has deoided to remove any econcmic restrictions and to allow any quantity of fooclstuffs supplied to or purchased by the Turkish Cypriots. Any supplies from Turkey shall be permitted, provided that they shall be sent through the normal channels and on a permit grantecl by the Cyprus Government. ‘l(b) My Gcvernment is ready tc order the removal of aïl the--asmed posts throughcut Cyprus, provided that the Turkish leadership will do the same. “(c) My Government is ready to assist financially the Turkish Cypriots who have been compelled by the leadership to abandon their homes and are desirous of being resettled, and to afforci them any protection. “(cl) My Government is disposed to grant ageneral amnesty SC that any Turkish rebel who may be under criminal charges of cffences in connexion with the rebellion may be relieved from any fear of arrest and punishment. ‘l(e) My Government is willing tc acoept any suggestion of the United Nations in respect of certain practical security measures contributing to the pacification of the island, provided that such measures do not affect the political solution of the problem. “On this occasion 1 wish to express to ycu, Mr. Seoretary-General, my highest consideration and my gratitude for ycur valuable efforts for the pacification of Cyprus.” This is the message of peace. This is our policy and these are our intentions, We are indeed anxiously awaiting to see whethex others would be prepared tc follow the same path. 49. As for the Turkish Gcvernment, 1 have this to say. If the Turkish Government is sinoerely interested in the well-being of the TurkishCypriots-andIregret to say that events and facts point to the contrary-if the Turkish Gcvernment is interested in peace, let it order its agents in Cyprus to openup the concentration camps in which itfcrciblydetainsapartof the Turkish population in pursuance of its political aim of partition, If the Turkish Government, as has been declared SO often in this Counoil, is not really interestedin territorial expansion, and if it has no territorial ambitions, let it give orders tc its agents in Cyprus ‘to Iift the real blcckade which they have for scme time now impcsed upon the innocent Turkish minority in Cyprus. 50. Let the Turkish G&er%ment order its agents in Cyprus to give up ‘their arms and return to their peaceful life-and we shall protect those who do SO. We shall fully apply the principles of human rights 52. If Turkey does not really have territorial ambitions on Cyprus, the problem of Cyprus is the easiest of problems to aolve:. Equal rights for a11 citizens, protection of minorities, with the future of thecountry to be decided by the majority. These are the principles upon which a solution cari easily andquickly he founded, either around this table or perhaps, more appropriately, at the nineteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. In this connexion,1 wish to warn against any diversionary taotios aor forin,-of: obs tructionism, designed t&‘prevent’the General Asi sembly from dealing with the question of C,yprus if mediation efforts prove fruitless until that time. 52: S’il est vrai que la Turquie n’apas de visees territoriales plus simples: ment garantie minorites, major&% aisement se faire manière ,de ItAssemblee Egard, je tiens & Bleverune mise engarde contre toute tactique sous quelque empêcher sa prochaine Chypre si les efforts de médiation fructueux d’ici la. 53. This is our approach to the problem. What, on the other hand, is the attitude of the Turkish Government? It has been frustrating the efforts of the Secretary-General to consolidate peace by rejecting a11 bis proposala with regard to the problem of the Turkishcontingent on Cyprus. It has been instigatîng and ao tively assisting the Turkish terrorists in Cyprus m try, step. by step, to extend the area under their control, while the Turkish Government declares that it has no territorial ambitions, It encourages and actively supports subversion against the State, ft constantly threatens Cyprus with invasion and attaok. The culmination of a11 this has besn the barbarie bombfngs of mearly August. .4,., -< _ 53. bleme. nement turc? Il a jusqu’ici pris par le Secrétaire Btant donné qu’il a rejet8 toutes lespropoaitionsde dernier Chypre, turcs de Chypre dans leurs efforts pour #Rendre petit B petit n’avoir soutient 1’Etat; il menace constamment Chypre; et tout’ cela a abouti aux bombardements bares du d&ut du mois dtaoht. 54, 1 have very oarefully read the acoount contained in the report of the Seorstary-General in connexion With the fighting in the areaof Tylliriain early August [S/6950, paras, 64 to 871. One point that 1 must say ha& struck me was that, although the report had been a rather detailed one, the most important point was not inoluded. It is not mentioned in the report chat before the security forces had undertaken that purely milttary operation, the Turkish rebels had launohed an attack in which four national guardsmen were killed. This is in fact how the fighting started. 1 seek your Indulgence, Mr. President, and that of the members of the Council to state very brieflythefaots oonhected 54. J’ai figure des combats au debut du mois ~hosë iu?il important moment opération belles laquelle VoilZl en réalite Je demande votre indulgence, ainsi que celle des membres très brihvement With this operation. 56. On 28 June 1964, UNFICYP confirmed thecalling of ships fxom Turkey and the unloading of Tuxkish military personnel and war materials in this area. Six Turkish terrorists, arrested by the securityfoxces on 14 July 1964, admitted that theyhadentered Cyprus through the Mansoura area. The ixregulars, smuggled in fxom Turkey, were in gxoups of ten and were dispatched to vaxious strategic heights; I;hey set upposts and built up strong fortifications. As the influxof men and equipment from Tuxkey incxeased, the Tuxks methodically .and systematically expanded the axea under ‘their control, with the xesult that on 10 July they occupied new and important positions, 57. The Mansoura-Kokkina area was also used by the Turkish Government for the concentration of wax matexial to be dispatchecl to other areas as well. The members of the Counoil may still remember the Marley affaix, which had revealed that the Turkish Cypriots in the area paid some British soldiers to transport military equipment in their cars to othex areas in Cyprus. On 10 July 1964, the Turkish terrorists advanced their positions further and installed fortifications on a new height called the Lorovonos height which dominates the whole area and whioh was not occupied by anyone until that time. This advance jeopardized the security of the only remaining road whioh was used bypeople travelling to Polis on aocount of the fact that the main road thxough Mansoura and Kokkina was already closed to the people by the Turkish terrorists. 58. On 10 July 1964, the Commander of the National Guard addressed a letter to General Thimayya, Commander of the United Nations Force, informing him of the fact that the Turkish terrorists hadoccupiedthose new heights, the main one being Lorovonos. 59. It was requested that the United Nations Force should intervene SO that the Turks might abandon that height and demolish the fortifications which they had established. As there was no reply from General Thimayya, the Ministex of Interior and Defence addxessed a new letter to him on 22 July 1964, in which “The Turkish Cypriot bridgehead around Kokkina and ManSOura was considered dangerous bY the CyPriOt Government. The Government claimed,with some justification, that the Turkish Cypriots had been smuggling arms and men into the bridgehead in order to strengthen their positions. Indeed, hlgh Government authorities on more than one occasion had warned UNFICYP to stop this activity in this area or to stand aside andlet theGoVernment do it.1’ 60. On 24 July 1964, General Thimayya informed the Minister of the Interior and Defence that he did not intend to take any action. On 1 August, a battalion of the National Guard was sent to the area where it took up positions in order to prevent further advanoing by the Turks. West of the Lorovonos lies another height called Akoni. The United Nations Force had in the meantime established a post on that height, andon the evening of 5 August the United Nations Force abandoned the Akoni height and the National Guard had no alternative but to occupy that height in order to prevent further advancing by the Turks. 61. The United Nations Force, in my humble subm,ission, should not have withdrawn from that height, but when they wlthdrew the Government forces had no alternative but to occupy it themselves. 62. In the early hours of 6 August, the Turks started to attack with machine-guns and mortars. Four National Guardsm.en were killed. There was a heavy exchange of fire, and the commanding officer of the National Guard requested the Swedish major of the contingent of UNFICYP in the area to intervene for a cesse-fire, The Swedish major refused and withdrew his forces. At 1400 hours the same day the Turks began, with mortar and machine-gun fire,anew attack in the move to occupy the Akoni height. The Government forces succeeded in retaining their position and held off the Turkish advance. ô3. The following day the Turkish terrorists unleashed a new attaok against the national forces whioh Oocupied the Akoni locality. This is how the fighting started in that area. These facts, of course, were explained earlier by the representative of CyprUS in the Security Council in early August [ 1142nd meeting1. 64. Following these Turkish attacks, the SeeuritY forces had no alternative but to launoh a counterattack, and the fighting continued in the whole area on 7 and 8 August. In the course of the fighting, strict orders, which were fully observed, were given to the National Guard not to do any harm to the TurkiSh civilian population. Therefore, the Tylliria incident was a purely military operation undertaken by the taks such an operation, since it had the main responsibility, in accordanoe with the Seourity Counoil resolution of 4 March 1964, to restore law and order, and since it had the sovereignrightand the imperative duty t0 secure and topreserve the unity of the oountry. 66. The Turkish Government attempted to present the Tylliria incident as an excuse for the barbario bombings Of Cyprus on 8 and 9 August by Turkish military aircraft. The Turkish representative before the Security Council on 8 August 1964[ibid.] described these brutal aots as ao ts committed in wtimate selfdefence. TO allege this is the rule of the jungle, TO bomb with rackets and napalm bombs indiscriminately, villages, hospitals and ambulances, causing the death and maiming of many innocent civilians, including women and children, is not a matter that cari be glossed over lightly in our oentury. 67. These brutal acts constitute flagrant violations of the UnitedNationsCharter,partioularlyofArticle2, paragraph 4 and flagrant violations of the resolutions of the Seourity Council as well as of the laws of warfare and every sense of decency and humanity. 68. TO try to present as a pretext the local fighting in Tylliria, which was started by the Turkish terrorists themselves, in order to justify the unprecedented cruelty perpetrated by Turkey on Cyprus, is a stigma that history Will not only hold against the aggressor but a11 those who have shown apathy and indlfference in this respect. 69. On 20 July 1964 there was no fighting at Tylliria and there was no fighting in Cyprus andyet the President of Turkey himself, General GUrsel, stated on chat day , and 1 quote him: “-The Cyprus question would be solved by bombs.” SO even this excuse of the Tylliria fighting unacceptable by a11 standards whioh the Turkish Government and the Turkish representative in the United Nations tried to present as a reason for the bombing of CyPrus by Turkish aircraft is contradicted by the President of Turkey himself, who some days before the Tylliria fighting broke out, had stated, and I repeat, in case some repreSentatiVeS did not hear it: “The Cyprus question would be solved by bomba.” 70. The Turkish Government may perhaps bave tried to oreate a situation which, it nafvely thought, might justify in the eyes of some people the Prearranged plan ~0 bomb the country. The Turkish Government forgot, however, chat the incidents in the Tylliria area were ta,.king place in Cyprus, and not in Turkey, and that therefore the pretext .of self-defence Could net in any oase have been used. The bombings and attaoks by airoraft-with machine-guns, rookets and incen- 71. When, in the course of the Security Council discussion last June [1137th meeting], 1 requested that the representative of Turkey assure tbe Council that Turkey did not intend to attack Cyprus , he did his bes t t0 avoid giving a direct answer. Nowwe a11 understand quite well why he adopted that attitude, 71. S&urit6 de la Turquie son pays [1137eme pondre tous parfaitement 72, While my country was going through those dark days early in August, the people of Cyprus were following with extreme attention the deliberations in tbis Council, and 1 feel that 1 would not be performing my duty properly if 1 did not convey to you the disappointment that they felt at the roleplayed by certain members of the Counoil, and the bitterness that the mothers and fathers who had lost their children felt when they realized-and it would serve no purpose net to be frank enough to state the true facts-that certain members of.the Council had; by their attitude, attempted to place the aggressor and the victim on the same level. 72. mois extrême ferais de la dAception ensemble membres et les p&res v6e lorsqutils de vouloir du Conseil, l’agresseur 73. It is also with great and sinoere regret that 1 have to say that not only did certain countries fail to oondemn these acts of brutality during the time of the bombings but that they have not even condemned them up to this moment. And, apart from the fact that Turkey, like, any other Member of the United Nations, is bound under the Charter to refrain from the use of foroe in its international relations, and that this is a principle that cannot be departed from in any way, the extent and intensity of the air StrikeS of 8 and 9 August, together with President GUrSel’S statement, which 1 have already twioe cited, make it abundantly Clear that these air attacks, far from being npolice actionsIf, as Mr. Eralp portrayed them to the Security Council, constituted aggression of the nature, unprecedented in the reoent history of mankind. ‘As such, it deserved condemnation by ail, and it was oondemned by the conscience of the world, or at least that part of the world which has not been affeated by the Turkish propaganda maohinery, SO well oiled with foreign money. 73. Je dire condam& bombardements mais damn&. Etat Membre tenue aux termes rir qu’il aucune attaques ration fois, aériennes, Conseil agression toire attaques et elles moins touché par l’argent Very n0xt day, 10 August, 75. On 11 August, the Security Counoil again oonsidered the situation and, by a consensus, called upon a11 to stop the flights over the territory of Cyprus in Violation Of its sovereignty. Even this consensus has been violated by Turkey more than once, Only as recently as 12 September, two Turkish military air- Craft again violated the airspace of Cyprus, and this fact cari be confirmed by the United Nations, The territorial waters of Cyprus were again violated feW days ago-during the night of 13 September-by Turkish naval units,.constituting yet another provocation and yet another violation of the sovereignty of cypsus I 76. At the 1143rd meeting of the Council, Mr. Eralp was very anxious to point out that, once a resolutpon has been adopted by the Security Council, it is the duty of a11 countries to obey it. Itwould be well indeed for Mr. Eralp to be less. didactic to others and to address this advice to his own Government. 77. The threats of new attacks oontinue. There is no end to them. The Prime Minister of Turkey, in two statements recently in the Turkish National Assembly, uttered new threats in a bellicose manner. The Turkish Prime Minister, addressing the Turkish Parliament on 3 September, stated: ” *II in view of the continuous ineffeotiveness of the United Nations Force to protect the Turkish Cypriots. Turkish military intervention might becorne necessary”. Ile went on: “We are working to solve the question by legal waya. If this does not solve the question, we bave the possibility of applying military intervention.” 78. These are but a few examples of the continuous threats to which Cyprus has been subjeoted. 1 request the Security Counoil to take cognizance of them in view of their grave nature. 79. The Turkish Prime Minister should be reminded net only of the provisions of the Charter in Artiole paagraph 4, whioh forbids the use of force-an Article referred to speoifically in the SeCUrity COUnOil reSOlutlons of 4 Maroh and subsequent dates-but, inadditlon, of the appeal contained in operative paragraph of the Seourity Council resolution of 9 August 1964, whioh speoifioally calls upon Turkey to Cease the use of military force of any Mnd against Cyprus. 81. Before 1 buch upon the concluding part of my statement, with your permission 1 would like to say a few words in connexion with the presence of the Turkish contingent in Cyprus . 81. Avant de conclure, mission, du contingent 82. Regarding the Turkish contingent, originally statloned in Cyprus under the provisions of the sooalled Treaty of Alliance of 1960, 1 had occasion in the past, and in particular at the 1136th meeting of the Council, on 18 June 1964, to explain fully the circumstanoes which necessitated the abrogation by my Government of this Treaty as regards Turkey,inoonsequence of the latter’s fundamental and continued breach of its provisions, I wish to reiterate my Government’s position that the Turkish contingent should leave Cyprus and that its continuedpresence in Cyprus constitutes a threat to peace and a continuous act of aggression in itself. 82. Au sujet de ce contingent, primitivement à Chypre conform&ment d’alliance notamment 1964, d’exposer quelles ce traite fondamentalement les dispositions, de mon gouvernement, Chypre, nace contre la paix et un acte d’agression 8.3. The Secretary-General, realizing the seriousness 83. Le Sec&taire of the situation and in his sinoere effort to oontribute, de la situation as always, oonstructively and effeotively towards the toujours, restoration of peace in Cyprus by removing the causes efficace of possible cordU&, proposed some months a@ thal Eliminant both the Greek and the Turkish contingents snould voici quelques corne under the command of the Commander of the indistinctement, UNFICYP, without those two contingents’formingpart Commandant of the United Nations force, The Secretary-General fois faire partie stated in his report of 15 June 1964: a d8clar8 ce qui suit dans sonrapportdu “The Greek Army contingent would readily place itself under United Nations command, remain in its barraoks and possibly withdraw from the island if a similar arrangement oould be made with the Turkish Army contingent. , , . The continueddeployment of Turkish troops cannot greatly add ta the seourity of the Turkish Cypriots over and above the seourity that UNFICYP oould afford them . . .” He also stated: Il a Bgalement Il . \. 1 oonsider it reasonable to urge that the Turkish Army oontingent should now either retire to its barracks voluntarily and remain there, or aocept my long-standing offer to take itunder United Nations command, although not as a contingent in UNFICYP. This, of course, would certainly mean the return of the Turkish troops to their barraoks. However, the condition advanced up to now by Turkish officiais for agreeing to place the Turkish contingent under United Nations command is unacceptable, sinoe it would SO limit UNFICYP authority over the contingent as to render the United Nations command meaningless.1t[S/5764,para. 116.1 86. Furthermore, and besides the hostile deploymenf of the Turkish contingent in Violation of the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Cyprus, the merefaot of the recentruthless aggression against Cyprus m.skes nonsense of any concept of alliance between Cyprus and Turkey. We fail to oonoeive how there could still be talk ,of a treaty of alliance between Turkey and Cyprus when one of the so-called allies attaoks the other with rackets and napalm bombs, and kills and destroys. If Turkey oould still be regarded as an ally of Cyprus, I oannot, in a11 seriousness, conceive what an enemy would be like. 87. Mr. President and members of the Council, yOU must have n@ticed from the documents and photographs whioh have just been distributed to you the ngreatfl aohievementsof the heroic Turkish Air Force, the Air Force which has been oreated, supported and strengthened by other countries represented around this table, for the purpose, as 1 understood it, of being part of a l’defensivet’ arrangement. The aircrsft and the bombs which hit Cyprus are not of Turkish make. They are aircraft, rackets and bombs which have been given to Turkey, mainly by the United States. As we understood it, these aircraft, rookets and bombs have been given to Turkey as a member of the NATO Alliance and for the purposes of the NATO Alliance, 88. 1 feel that a great service would be rendered not only to my country. but to the peace of the world, if certain pertinent points were made olear beyond any doubt beforq this Council. 89. The representative of the United States, speaking in this ohamber, on 10 September, in connexion with another item, said: n a.. our attitude on’ the oomplaint ‘before ua grows directly from the obligation of each Member of this Organization under our Charter, This Counoil cannot oondone the use of foroe in international relations outside the framework of the Charter, ” [ 1146th meeting, paaa. 22.1 1 should be most happy, and 1 am confident that the PeoPle of Cyprus ‘would share my’ happiness, if the representatlve of the United States would corne out With the same statement in connexion with the aggres- Sion of Turkey against Cyprus. 90. 1 wonder whether my understanding is correct, that under United States law, and in particular under the Foreign Assistance Aot of 1961 as amended, and (20 91. 1 do not wish tc appear presumptuous, but it is my submission that this is not entirely a matter of bilateral relations between the United States and Turkey. 92. The victims of the air attacks in Cyprus are aiMOus tc learn the answers to these questions, I would ask the representative of the United States to have a careful look at the pictures which bave just been distributed: pictures of maimed people, innocent people. We are entitled tc know whether Turkey, which has received those aircraft in hundreds from the United States and those rackets and bcmbs in thousands, for other purposes, cari be permitted to use them as they have been used? The pecple of Gyprus are anxious to know whether American-made aircraft and weapons, rcckets and bombs, would be allowed to be used again by Turkey against our small island. 93. We are alsc under the impression-and 1 stand to be correcte+that NATO, as such, bas a say in the matter. We wcnder what has been the reaction of NATO in regard to the statement which was made by General Sounai, the Turkish Chief of Staff, on bis return from paris, where he had consultations with NATO officiais, to the effect that he obtained the full consent of NATO Headquarters for the air attacks on Cyprus. It is not, after all, 1 believe, fair to allow the impression tc be created that Turkey acted with the tolerance of some of its allies in NATO, if this was not in fact the case. 94. The representative of the United Kingdom, in his statement before this Council on 9 September 1964 said: n . . . 1 would just remind members of the Council that it is an attack by a countryof a hundred million on a country of some ten million inhabitants.” [ 1144th m.eeting, para, 127.1 He went on: YvIy delegation believes that the Security CoUnCil should, in these circumstances,“-1 hope that ihe representative of the United Kingdom would not exclude Cyprus from these circumstances-“deal with the situation it has been called upon to consider and strongly condemn suoh attacks, and shculd cal1 for an unequivocal assurance that they Will net occur again.” [w., para. 128.1 Would the representative of the United Kingdom corne cut with the same statement in connexion with the Turkish attack on Cyprus? 95. In the course of the same debate, Sir Patrick Dean said: “These obligations under the Char ter, partiCUlarly those Stated in Article 2, cannot be disowned , . .” [1148th meeting, paras. 57, 58 and 591. 96. The representative of NOrWay, in the Same context, said: “The applicable provisions of the United Nations Charter prescribe, without reservations or limitations, that a11 Members shoulcl settle their international disputes by peaceful means and refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or politioal independence of other States.” [1149th m.eeting, para. 111.1 97. It was nut my intention to be. awkward, but the people of Cyprus, in their simplicity, are anxious to find out about their fate. 1 am sure that the other people in that area of the world are also anxious to find out whether peace would be preservecl-and it is not Turkey which cari give this reply alone. We are not under the impression that Turkey is, or should be allowed to be, in the position to dictate the fate of the peoples in that area or to jeopardize international peace. 98. It is not 1, or my country alone, but it is the world that demands a clear and positive stand on this issue on the part of the United Nations, and especially of the great Powers in whose hands thefuture security and peace of the world mainly lies. 99. My Government wants peace and it is through peaceful means that we are encleavouring to solve our political problem, in accordance with the prinoiples of the United Nations Charter, 100. Being a small, peace-loving and militarily weak country, we threaten no nation. We are, however ,faced with a series of incessant and mJltifarious threats from a powerful neighbouring country, which only a few weeks ago went SO far, in complete disregard of what the United Nations represents, as to commit aggression against Cyprus-aggression of the moË;t barbarous and brutal nature, This is why,inour view, the responslbility of the Seourity Counoil is now far greater than it ever was before, In this connexion, 1 Should like to make it clear beyond any doubt that Cyprus will never yield to any threats, and if the need arises, Will defend itself with a11 the means at its disposal, whether alone or with others. 101. Bearing in mind that the Security Council has, under the Charter, the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. 1 oonsider it my duty to state most categorically that we are absolutely and irrevocably determined, though small and weak, to fight until the end, if the need arises, rather fhan surrender to external force aiming at imposing upon Cyprus solutions unacceptable to its people and contrary to the democratic principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter. 103. The Council has met to consider the possibility and the advisability of the prolongation of the mandate of the UNFICYP, on the basis of the report of the Secretary-General [S/5950 and Add.1 and 21 which we have before us. 104. As the Secretary-General states in paragraph 229 of his report, my Government, while indicating its desire tc have the mandate of the UNFICYP prolonged, has put forward certain observations concerning the efficacy of the Force. 1 believeit would be useful for m.e to repeat those observations to the Council. 1 quote from the written text which I handed to the Secretary-General on 8 September: “The experience of the last six months has shown that the UNFICYP, with the limited authority and powers which it now wields, is not in a position effectively to carry out the mandate which it holds from the Security Council, Not only is there no sign .of the restorationof law andorder or of any progress towards the return to normal conditions, but, on the oontrary, the Greek Cypriots, having effeoted a large buildup in manpower and armaments, have found it possible to embark unchecked on a major aggressive onslaught like the one in Tylliria on 5 August. “‘In addition, the so-called economic blockade , whioh the unconstitutionalGovernment has arrogated to itself the right to impose, continues unabated in spite of a few illusory signa of attenuation. On the other hand it has become ,quite clear that the insurgent Greek elements in Cyprus have, in spite of the presence of UNFICYP, consolidated their position in the island and, relyingupon their material superiority, have brazenly embarked on a policy of subjugation by breaking the will and power of the Turkish Cypriots to resist. “This state of facts has not only condemned the Turks of Cyprus to living conditions incompatible with human dignity, but has also given rise in the minds of the Greek Cypriots to the delusion that time is wcrking in their favour and that they will attain their goal sooner or later, “The situation now prevailing in the island has encourageds the Greek Cypriots to adopt an attitude Of intransigence with regard to the efferts made by the United Nations Mediator in order to find an agreed solution and a peaceful settlement, In oonsequence, the inability of the UNFICYP to function effectively has not only oonstituted an impediment to the restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions in Cyprus but is also becoming a hindrance to the attainment of a lasting, peaceful Solution, “The resolution of 4 March lays down that the UNFICYP shall use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting. Its marked inability to pre- “There is no need to dwell on the many oomplications and dangers created by such a dire alternative to which the Turkish Government has been compelled to resort, “Finally, a serious and explosive situation has been created, and continues to exist, in Cyprus as the result of the unhindered, large-scale buildup and importationof armaments andequipmenteffected by the Greek Cypriots, in spite of the presenoe of UNFICYP. “In the meantime, again under the eyes of UNFICYP, Greece has proceeded to invade the island of Cyprus with a military contingent of about 10,000 men. “None of this is remotively compatible with the presence of a United Nations peace-keeping force in the island. It would seem obvious that UNFICYP Will be in no position to prevent a recurrence of fighting SO long as the Greek Cypriots continue te arm themselves to the teeth and to hold on to the lethal weapons which they have imported in enorm.ous quantities. In aocordance with the letter and spirit of the 4 March resolution, speedy action should be taken to implement the m.easures for the oontrol of the import of arms and the gradua1 reduction of armaments outlined by my delegation before the Security Council at its meeting of 8 August 1964. “Any indications whioh thesecretary-Generalmay deem it useful to include in his projeoted report to the Security Council concerning the advisability of conferring greater authority and clearer directives of action to the UNFICYP would be of inestimable value for the amelioration of the situation inCyprus and for the attainment of a peaceful solution.” 105. It is a source of satisfaction to my delegation that, as oan be seen from the Secretary-General’s report, both the Secretary-General and this delegation, starting from different points of view and even from different interpretations of the relevant Counoilresolutions, arrive at the same conclusion, namely, that there should be some clarification ooncerning actions that the Force may take in the discharge of its mandate. 106. The present report of the Secretary-General is a highly oommendable document. Of a11 the reports of the Secretary-General on this subject SO far it is the fullest, frankest and fairest, and the most revealing. It reflects, as do a11 the others, the integrity, ability and devotion to duty of the Secretary-General and a11 his collaborators. And yet it is a sad document inasmuch as it also reflects the frustrations and tribulations of a United Nations Foroe hampered bya lack of precision in its mandate and a whole setof oonflicting interpretations. inStanCe, in the case of the arms build-up, to which 1 shall refer later, the Secretary-General woulddeem it natural for the Government of Cyprus to impcrt armaments ‘for what it calls its self-defence; on the other hand, any importation of armamants by the Turkish Cypriots for genuine purposes of self-defence is classified as smuggling and against the law of the land. 109. Secondly, in paragraph 7 (b) of the report, it i6 stated, and very rightly SO, that;‘the Force must acl with restraint and with oomplete impartiality towards the members of the Greek and Turkish . . , communities”. No one cari accuse the Force of ever having acted with pastiality. Yet, again, inpractice the results have been anomalous. For instance, in the case of the shameful economic blookade, with’ which 1 shall deal later, the UNFICYP has, out of humanconsiderations, been plaoed in the unenviable position of having IX supervise the slow starvation of the members of one community by the other. Against its Will, and under protest, the UNFICYP has .had to observe, again with humanitarian motives, the exercise of the most inhuman discrimination against a minority of different race and religion, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter. The Secretary-General says, in paragraph 222 of his report, that We conclusion seems warranted chat the economio restrictions being imposed against the Turkish communities in Cyprus, which in some instances have been SO severe as to amount to a Qeritable siege, indicate that the GoQernment of Cyprus seeks to force a potential solution by economic pressure as a substitute for military action”,, The c&lusion of the Secretary-General iS inescapable. NeQertheless, it has been the sad lot Of the ‘UNFICYP tc try to case these cruel measures Its failure to put an end to them purely and simply has in effect influenced the ultimate political solution against the best intentions of the Secretary-General. que *la Force peut accuser lit& d’une l’odieux plus humanitaires, & monter accule peu B peu 1 t autre & la famine, Contre et malgr8 Unies inhumaine en violation Au paragraphe ral restrictions turques rigoureuses que le Gouvernement solution et place d’une action SecrBtaire des d’adoucir pas fait les excellentes 110. Another contradiction is apparent in the case of the police force in Cyprus. Paragraph 133 of the report refers to “the anomalous position of the Turkish Cypriot police personnel”, which in paragraph 12’7 is said to remain a serious obstacle to a smooth wcrking of the arrangements with regard to the administration of justice. Yet, in paragraph 139, the report relates the reprehensible practice of the so-called Cypriot Police, the Greek Cypriot Police that is, in rearresting on trumped-up charges persons acquitted’ or released on bail, ostensibly for the simple reason that they are Turks. 110. de la force de police de Chypre, Auparagraphe son rapport, anoimale qui, d’apr&s obstacle ce qui concerne tant, au paragraphe réprehensibles autrement en Btat d’arrestation, des personnes provisoire, de Turcs. 113. My delegation does not believe that there is a misunderstanding. The proof cari be found in a subsequent paragraph of the report, paragraph 221, where the Secretary-General clearly states that the United Nations mission is “in the midst Of abitter civil war” and that it is “dangerously interposed between the two sides of that law”. That is theprimary consideration. The UNFICYP has been dispatched to Cyprus in order to oontribute to the maintenance and the restoration of law and order and in order to prevent the reourrence of fighting. It cannot carry out that mandate with the fairness and impartiality which the United Nations requires and which the Secretary- General is determined to observe if it recognizes to one side in the civil war the unhindered exercise of the prerogatives of a sovereign Government at the expense of the other. Even granting that it is not up to the Secretary-General to determine whether the Government is legitimate or not, the nature of the mandate makes it imperative te observe two things: (8) The so-called Government of Cyprus cari only exercise jurisdiction over those Cypriots which owe allegiance to it, since the Turks of Cyprus cannot owe allegiance to a purely GreekCypriotGovernment, having been driven by it into a civil war which the United Nations is trying to contain. Itwouldbe illogical for the UNFICYP to help to extend the sway of the Greek Cypriots over the Turks under the guise of government. Otherwise, the UNFICYP would be doing jUSt what the Secretary-General asserts that it should not do, namely, in the words of paragraph 220 of the report, act “as an arm of the Governmentof Cyprus”. (Q The UNFICYP may ‘admit as acts of Government only those acts which are compatible with the mandate and presence of the United Nations Force in Cyprus. Thus, the importation of arms with the clear intention of defeating the purposes of the UNFICYP, namely, resorting to a recurrence of fighting, cannot be logioally respecteà by the UNFICYP as an act of Government. The Secretary-General himself raises the question in paragraph 38 of the report where he says: “My view, as expressed in my report of 15 June 1964, continues to be that while there is no doubt that a sovereign government normally is entitled The Secretary-General puts it in the form of a question. 1 censider it merely a rhetoricalquestion. In our view, there is no doubt whatsoever as to the answer. Such importation is not consistent with the letter and spirit of the reSOlUtiOn, nor is there any doubt that this view is shared by a large number of countries, especially those which have sent their sons to fight for peace in the contingent of the UNFICYP. 114. One further observation in this conne. ion. The Secretary-General rightly states that a sovereign Government nosmally-1 repeat the word normallyis entitled tq import arms. Yet even the concept of sovereignty is not incompatible with a limitation being placed on the level of armaments of a country. The Government of Cyprus has formally undertaken an international obligation under the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, on which its Constitutionis based, to maintain its armed forces at a certain level. There are many instances of sovereign States which have undertaken SO to limit their armed forces, 115. After these general observations as to the mandate of the UNFICYP, 1 should like to mention some of the specific issues relating to the problem of Cyprus which we still bave to face. First, there is the question of the eoonomic blockade. We have just been given to understand that the blockade would be lifted throughout the island. I shall comment on that and other cheering news presently. But now 1 must say that even if and when this shocking, this oriminal, blockade is lifted, the shame and the ignominy which it carries will remain with its pespetrators forever. For six weeks now the civilized world has been witnessing the horrible sight of a Government using hunger and thirst as an instrument of its policy of imposing a solution by force against a ClaSS of itS citizens, The incomplet9 reports that were coming in from the island were not suffioient to put the limelight on these horrors, especially in the Kokkina area. 116. It took a determined move on the part of the Turkish Government to bring aid to the starving and the energetic intervention of that unimpeachable soldier, General Thimayya, Commander ofUNFICYP, to reveal the true situation. Only the other day at the 1146th meeting .the Foreign Minister, Mr. Kyprianou was reading out with greafrelish and pride, item by item, the miserable supply of foodstuffs that thsGreek Cypriot régime had, out of the kindness of its heart, ‘Condescended to allow to triokle into Kokkina. When the truth was unearthed by the Thimayya mission on 12 September, it was truly a shock to the world. The people in that one area alone were in need of at least three tons of supplies a day and they had only received something like four and one-half tons, one and a half day’s supplies, in nearly six weeks. The shock of world 117. 1 maintain that neither the UNFICYP nor any other force needed any speoific mandate to step in and stop this inhuman strangulation, No oommunity in our time, whether or net it is a Government, cari arrogate to itself the right to subject another oommunity to hunger, thirst, epidemics and misery. 1 also mainbin that, as the Secretary-General SO rightly observed in bis report, hungry people oan beoome desperate and may want to fight, and the mandate of the UNFICYP is to prevent a recurrence of fighting. MyGovernment . hopes, therefore, that this unspeakable, measure Will be totally removed and Will only remain as a blot on the Greek Cypriot escutcheon. And 1 cannot refrain from adding that the same stigma is attached to the Government of Greeoe which is directly and principally responsible for the turn of events in Cyprus that have brought things to this point and which has condoned these inhuman measures. 118. The seoond immediate danger to the already explosive situation in Cyprus is the arms build-up. The import of arms by the Greek Cypriot Government, particularly from Greeoe, is still in full swing, in spite of the appeal made by the Secretary-General on 16 July [S/5828, sect. A],91 SO that Greece has now in effect,invaded the island of Cyprus with a force of more than 10,000. 119. A moment ago 1 referred to the inoompatibility of this arms build-up on the part of the Greek Cypriot Government with the Security Counoil resolution. This incompatibility is clearly illustrated by a phrase in the report of the Secretary-General, My delegation has maintained a11 along that if UNFICYP is to prevent a recurrence of fighting, its first duty should have been to prevent the warring factions from obtaining the weapons with which to fight. In paragraph 228 of the Secretary-General’s report, it is said: “In my report to the Counoil on 15 June 1964, 1 reported . . . on the build-up of arms and ammunition in Cyprus on both sides, but particularly on the Government side. That build-up continued and contributed to the heightening of tension and led ultimately to the serious fighting that ocourred inearly August.” Since there is this distinct cause and effeot relationship between the arms build-up and the reourrence of 9/ Ibid 2 120. 1 also referred to the inequity of condoning the Greek Cypriot build-up as an act of Government, while terming the meagre Turkish defensive preparations as smuggling, and 1 shall not swell furthes on that. But the duplioity of the Greek Cypriot régime as exposed in the report of the Secretary-General cannot pass unnoticed. You will have observed inparagraph 39 that the President of Cyprus gave assurances that the heavy weapons imported would be used only for the defence of the country against foreign invasionandnot in interna1 conflicts. You Will also have noticed that in the Greek Cypriot attack on the villages in Tylliria a11 these weapons, including 25-pounders, Oerlikon 20 mm, guns, mortars and armoured cars were used agains t the villagers, 121. The Royal Hellenic Government, which has supplied these weapons in large part, shares directly the guilt of the Greek Cypriots in this genocidal crime perpetrated against the villagers of the Tyllisia region. 122. From the operations of the UNFICYP there is a lesson to be learned for a11 future peace-keeping operations of the United Nations: namely, that when a United Nations force goes into an area in order to restore and m.aintain the peace, it shouldsee to it that it remains either the only armedforce or the strongest armed force in the area. Otherwise it cari find itself in embarrassing situations as in the caseof the Greek Cypriot attack on Kokkina. The United Nations force must do this in the first place by preventing an arms build-up by the warring factions in the area. 123. As the danger created by the continuing arms build-up in Cyprus is ever present, 1 would like to revert to the proposals that 1 made to the Council on 8 August 1964 [1142nd meeting], They are proposals that envisage an effective control of the import of armaments and procedure for agradualdisarmament. The Secretary-General, in paragraph 94, refers t0 the possibility that the superior arms build-up of the Greek Cypriots mayoreateafeelingof over-confidence which may cause them to overlook the important ‘deterrent faotors that SO far haveprevented themfrom taking rash action since the cesse-fire. This is a very pointed observation and 1 do hope that the Greek Cypriot authorities have taken good note of it. But in the view of my delegation it would be much more realis tic to put our proposals into effect than to rely on the restraint of the Greek Cypriot leadership. 124. In paragraph 20 of the report, the Secretary- General unequivocally asserts that among the forces aCting under the Makarios régime there are also Greek nationals, including officers, instructors and technicians from the Greek Army. This is areference in diplomatie language to the presence of a Greek army of occupation in Cyprus. It would be desirable 125. Another question which has explosive possibilities is the withdrawal and replacement of aportion of the Turkish contingent stationed in Cyprus under the Treaty of Alliance of 1960. As you Will XeCall, and as it is reported by the Secretary-General, this normal prooess of rotation was to have been effected by my Government on 30 August 1964. The Greek Cypriot Government, relying on thewell-knownuntenable arguments, which, incidentally, have just been repeated here, have raised objections. We have deferred the operation for a brief period in order to comply with the request of the Seoretary-General and relying on the expectation that the Makarios Government would desis t from this new provocation and would be prevailed upon net to interfere with this peaceful procedure. The rotation of a military unit is a humanitarian necessity. There is no doubt that the Greek army of occupation of 10,000 in ‘Cyprus is being rotated in the usual way. The charges of the Makarios Government and our replies have been repeatedly aired in this Council, SO that it is useless to go into them again. The rotation must take place, and it Will take place. Along with the Council we cari only hope that the Greek Cypriot régime Will not seizeupon this opportunity to endanger the peace of the area once again. 126. 1 feel 1 must mention briefly the references in the Secretary-General’s report concerning theposition of the Turkish contingent in Cyprus, My Government has always been prepared to place its contingentunder the over-a11 authority of the UNFICYP Commander. On the other hand, we have explained the cogent reasons as to why the contingent could not go back to its former barracks. It is difficult for us to see the connexion between accepting the command authority of the United Nations and of the contingent returning to its former barracks. The Makarios Government has insisted on this question of return to barracks purely on political and prestige grounds. It would like to establish the point that it, as a Government, has the right to dispose the emplacement of foreign troops on Cypriot territory. The fact is, however, that the Turkish contingent has every right to remain where it is under the Treaty, which the Greek Cypriot Government has purported ta denounce but whioh, in fact, cannot be denounced unilaterally. Under these circumstanoes, it could serve no useful purpose for the -UNFICYP to insist on the oontingent’s returning to its barracks other than to appease the political ambitions of the Greek Cypriot Government. TO what extent that would be compatible with the avowed intention of the UNFICYP to refrain from influencing the political situation is a question whioh remains to be answered. 128. AS for the oonolusion of the report of the Seoretary-General [S/5950, para, 2321, my Governmentcan only rejoice that the need for ths clarification of the mandate of the Force has been stressed. We have insisted a11 along that such clear and wide-ranging authority should be bestowed upon the Force. We, therefore, readily associate ourselves with the assumptions (aJ and (cJ of the Secretary-General. Under assumption (8) the complete freedom of movement in Cyprus , which is rightly demanded for the UNFICYP shouldbe fully used in order to control the dangerous arms build-up and aggressive preparations of the Greek Cypriots. Under (cJ , in separating the opposingarmed forces to reasonable distances, the UNFICYP would do well to assure that such arrangements do not work to the detriment of the security of the Turkish Cypriots, who are in tenuously defensive positions on a11 such fronts, 128. En ce qui concerne la conclusion du rapport du Secrétaire g&&ral [S/5950, par. 2321, mon gouvernement ne peut que se f6liciter de voir qu’elle souligne la n6cessité de pr6ciser Nous n’avons ces& d’insister pour qu’on accorde ala Force des pouvoirs étendus et bien d6finis et nous adoptons donc volontiers Secretaire g6n6ral. A propos de l’hypothese 8, l’entiare liberte de mouvement qui est demandée a juste titre pour la Force devrait servir uniquement à contr6ler la dangereuse accumulation d’armes et les pré- paratifs d’agression des Chypriotes grecs. A propos de l’hypothese c, en exigeant que les forces armees en présence se replient sur des positions situees a une distance raisonnable l’une de l’autre, il faudrait que la Force s’assure que ces dispositions ne seront pas prises au détriment de la S&urit6 des Chypriotesturcs qui occupent des positions difficiles a d6fendre sur tous ces fronts. 129. Cependant, nous 6prouvons des doutes assez graves en ce qui concerne l’hypothese Q. A notre avis, c’est surtout dans les secteurs d’oh une agression pourrait tions fortifiees devraient &tre di?mante%es. Lespositions défensives devraient être maintenues jusqu’g ce que la Force soit absolument certaine de pouvoir prot6ger les Chypriotes turcs d’une attaque par des forces superieures. A ce propos, je devrais peut-être mentionner brievement le paragraphe 15 de ce rapport, oh il est dit qu’en un secteur, celui des docks de Limassol, l’attitude des forces de S&urit6 chypriotes était si agressive que la Force adudecider de retirer provisoirement éviter tout incident. Il faut espérer que les fortifications de défense ne seront pas démantelees tant que la Force ne sera pas sure den’avoirplus a se retirer devant l’attitude outre, a moins que cette mesure ne soit assortie d’autres dispositions préliminaires, elle aura Tour effet de laisser les Chypriotes turcs à la merci d’une majorité Avant de d&molir oompletement les fOrtifiCatiOn% il conviendrait de prendre une série de mesures, Par exemple réaliser un cessez-le-feu veritable en obtsnant que les Chypriotes grecs rsvisnnent sur leurs positions d’armes et de personnel militaire grâce a un COntrôle efficace, Chypriotes grecs de façon qu’elles ne depassent Pas 129, We do have, however , certain serious misgivings as to assumption (b), Inour view,positions and fortified installations should be removed primarilyfrompoints which are liable to lend themselves to aggressive action, Defensive positions should be maintained until such time as the UNFICYP is absolutely certain of guaranteeing the safety of the Turkish Cypriots from overwhelming attack,, In this connexion, perhaps, 1 should mention briefly paragraph 15 of the report, where it is related that at one point, at the Limassol docks, the attitude of the Greek Cypriot security forces was SO aggressive that UNFICYP decided temporarily to withdraw its patrols from the areas in order to avoid incidents, It is to be hoped and expected that defensive fortifications will not be torndownuntil suoh time as the UNFICYP Will never have to withdraw before aggressive attitudes of the Greek Cypriots. Furthermore, unless this measure is accompanied by other preliminary measures, it Will have the effect of leaving the Turkish Cypriots at the mercy of a hostile majority more powerful in numbers and weapons. Before the tearing down of fortifications cari be achieved, a series of measures would have to be taken, such as bringing about an effective cesse-fire by securing the return of the Greek Cypriots to thsir previous positions, preventing the imparts of arms and military personnel through effective control, reducing the illegitimate Greek Cypriot armed forces to the levels provided for in the Constitution, and bringing about the evacuation of the Island by foreign 130. Finally, 1 feel 1 must make a feW OOmmentS on the telegram of Archbishop Makarios [S/5950/Add.Z, Annex] to the Secretary-General, with regard to certain intended measures. 131. In the first place 1 reject most energetically the arrogant and baseless allegations contained in the first paragraph of the telegram with regard to the activities and intentions of my Government incyprus. These must be intended to serve as a shock-absorber against the blow contained in the revelations of the Secretary-General’s report as to the machinations and atrocities of the Makarios Government. 132. The purpose of these ostensibly oonciliatory moves will not escape the attention of the Council. They are obviously intended to placate the United Nations when the world-wide reputation of the Greek Cypriot régime has reached a new low as a result of the economic blockade. The Council Will doubtless recollect that suoh moves always coincide with meetings of the Council, and that they axe always followed by even sterner oppression or aggression against the Turkish community. After the Council meetings in March came the attack on Paphos, and after the meetings in June came the tragic events of Temblos, the assault in Tylliria and the unspeakable blockade. Can the Turkish community be expected to find salace in the promised bounties of Archbishop Makarios? Can any community, deprived of its constitutional rights, be expected to live for long at the will and mercy of a despot, at times subjected to oppression and at limes deluded through bounties? 133. As for the lifting of the blockade, it would be an important step in the direction of restoring peace to the troubled island. But in view of the past record 1 cannot help but have misgivings as to the implementation of this measure. 1 have alreadycited an example of the deceptive moves of the Greek Cypriot Government in the case of the use of heavy weapons against the Turkish Cypriots. The report of the Secretary- General is full of others. There is, for instance, in paragraph 69, the assurance given by Archbishop Makarios that the Government had no intention of attaoking the Turkish Cypriot positions, an assurance which was followed by the notorious attackin Tylliria. There are also the numerous breaches of the agreement with regard to the blockade, as related in the report. After ail, the unforgettable words uttered by the Poreign Minister, Mr. Kyprianou at a previous meeting of the Council on 19 June 1964, from the very Seat which he now occupies, 1 believe have becorne a classic in the annals of the United Nations, I-le said that constitutions were not to be served but to serve. The same mentality has obviously been applied to agreements, treaties and SO forth. We must, 135, Item (c) contains the well-exposed falsehood as to the reasons why the Turkish Cypriots abandoned their homes. The report of the Secretary-General gives certain indications on that score. As for the protection of the M%arias Government, the Turks of Cyprus do not need the protection that it SO generously offers; they need protection against it. As for the financial assistance offered, instead of making such grandiose but empty gestures, the Greek Cypriot Government would do well to pay the old-age and widows’ pensions which UNFICYP has been trying unsuocessfully to obtain for a long time, as reported in paragraphs 119 and 120 of the report. 135. sons donné leurs ral donne certaines la protection tant de gbn&osité, besoin: les proteger. ciere grec, fication, et de veuves s’efforce nous rapport. 136. The offer of an amnesty was made once before for the same propaganda purposes and to give the world the impression that the Makarios Government rules over the Turkish community. How cari a Government grant an amnesty to persons who arenot subject to its jurisdiction? 136. autre occasion donner Makarios un gouvernement des personnes rite? 137. In conclusion, if the Makarios Government is really sincere in its intention of restoring law and order in Cyprus, a11 it would have to do would be to accept gracefully the offer that was made to it by Vice-President KUçUk on 3 June 1964, calling upon it ta co-operate within the framework of the existing Constitution in order to bring peace to the troubled island. I am sure the United Nations Force would be 13’7. desire l’ordre ter president coopGrer, pour ramener certain maintien pliquer retour principes only too glad to arrange such a conciliation and return to normal conditions on a basis of human dignity. 138. du Conseil présent8 [S/5950 mer, appr8ciation membres commandement paix. M. Galo cultes tourmentee 1mpartialitB. 138. Mr. BIT%OS (Greece) (translatedfromFrench): In taking part in this debate of the Security Counoil, called to consider the report submitted on 10 September 1964 by the Secretary-General [S/5950 and Add.1 and 21, 1 wish first of a11 to express the sincere appreciation of the Greek Government of the patient and untiring efforts of the members of the UNFICYP and its commander for the re-establishment of order and peace in Cyprus. The valuable contribution of Mr. Galo Plaza in helping to settle the oountless difficulties whioh constantly arise in that tormentedisland gives proof of his courage and impartiality. 139. notre ainsi ment notre 139. TO the Secretary-General we wish to address our sincere thanks. At a time when other crises and serious problems of direct concern to our Organizatien claimed a11 his attention, he has not spared him- 141. We have given close attention to economic measures to whioh the minority has been subjected in the course of this last week. There cari be no shadow of doubt that the very idea of starvation arouses quite understandable reactions on humanitarian grounds. We would be the first to share these reactions if it were shown that apartof the population of Cyprus, however small that part might be, had been subjected to starvation. Fortunately, however, this has not been the case. The various reports received from the Secretariat and the information just n6w given to us by the Foreign Minister of Cyprus amply demonstrate that there have in faot been restrictions, quite severe in some isolated cases, but that even in these cases there was no question of starvation. 142. It has also been shown that the Turkish side, by its refusa1 to accept the quantities offoodstuffsplaced at its disposal, with a view to provoking the shipment of supplies direct from Turkey, has exploited the claim of starvation in order to create a new major crisis and justify fresh military intervention. 143. Having made this clear, my delegation is very glad to note that the difficulties which bad arisen from time to time regarding the means of supplying the localities where a section of the minority has taken refuge, together with the members of the TMT (Turkish defence organization], have now been overcorne. A statement of Mr. Kyprianou, made in the course of the 1147th meeting and amplified by a further statement today. provides us with the assurance that the question no longer arises, since his Government has authorized from now on, the unrestrictecl supply of foodstuffs. 144. In speaking of a few isolated localities, there is a tendency to negleot the wider aspect of the situation in Cyprus. One tends to forget that, of the 100,000 Turks living in the island, the majorityattend peacefuliy to their daily task, cultivating their fields and gathering their harvests; that in the fortified positions that the Turkish leaders have set up here and there, there are a large number of involuntary refugees who for their part would like nothing better than to acoept the offerof the Cyprus Government to allow them to return to their homes and even to take advantage of the material assistance provided by the State, but who undergo certain pressures to remain as refugees. 145. 1 have said “material assistancefrom the State”, and not from the Greek Cypriot Government, as the representative of Turkey insists on calling it. He is 147. This danger is reinforced from within a Turkish extremist faction, armed to the teeth since thé start of the troubles in December, provided with supplies of every kind and possessing a military and administrative organisation designed for action of long duratien. The picture of the Cyprus situation is in fact completely falsified if one’s attention is concentrated on isolated events and if one refuses to look at the situation as a whole or to consider the political and military conditions which give rise to them. 147. faction le début des troubles de toute nature nistrative de la situation fauss6e et qu’on refuse politiques 148. After the acute crisis at the beginning ofAugust and in the explosive situation brought about by the bombings by the Turkish air force, we were entitled to expect that Turkey would help to oalm matters. But the Turkish Government at once raised a new critical question, namely that of the rotation of its contingent, by presenting a short-term ultimatum to the Government of Cyprus. 148. d’aofit et dans l’atmosphere les en droit llapaisement. mediatement celle de la rotation un Chypre. 149, In SO doing, Turkey was well aware that, irrespective of the good-will of the Cypriot Government, it was impossible for that Government, in an atmosphere of exasperation, to agree to the relief of the Turkish contingent, the more SO since in the opinion of the Government of Cyprus the presence of this contingent on its territory became illegal, when in violation of the Treaty of Alliance of 1960, it took up strategio positions in defiance of every notion of, the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. We thus have the spectacle of Turkey invoking a Treaty which it has itself violated. 149. la bonne 6tait consentir qu’aux de ce contingent gale depuis qu’en violation il s’est prisant de Chypre. trait6 150. une discussion Chypre on ne peut quie, qui a dénonce une s&rie dé trait& avec la Gréce, quand il s’agit la championne se prevaut-elle contient n’ôte representant qui dit que, même s’il a bombard6 fait des victimes continuer vous bombardera 160. This is neither the time nor theplaceto embark on a discussion regarding the attitudes of Turkey and Cyprus with regard to the validity of the Treaty of Alliance. Yet one oannot refrainfromdrawingattention to the fact that Turkey, which has denounced a whole series of treaties and agreements with Greeoe, thus aggravating the crisis, sets itself up, when it is a question of those which concern Cyprus, as the champion of the sanctity of treaties. No doubt it is taking advantage of the fact that the Treaty of Alliance contains no denunciation clause. However, this does notdetract from the irony, which has only escaped the representative of Turkey, of the situation of one who states that, even if he has bombarded your territory and caused casualties among your population, you must continue to regard him as your ally, otherwise he Will bombard you again. 151. It seems to me opportune to recall here the 151. Paragraphs of the report regarding the position of the graphes Greek contingent, a position which reflects the desire contingent of Greece to co-operate in every way with the United Gr&ce 152. In any event, the Greek Government has joined with a11 those who, like the Secretary-General, immediately intervened in the question of the rotation of the Turkish contingent, in an effort to find ways of avoiding a fresh crisis. It was obvious that it was neoessary for sufficient time to elapse. A compromise formula had to be worked out which would respect the differing points of view of Turkey and Cyprus on the legal aspect of the question and allow Turkey to prooeed with the rotation, and thus enable Cyprus to ensure that the Turkish contingent would cesse to block a vital artery and return to its barracks. We sincerely regret that such an arrangement has not yet been concluded. 153. During the period under review, we have seen a new series of Turkish actions constituting aggressions or threats of aggressive action against Cyprus: first, the air attacks of 8, 9 and 11 August 1964 which caused deaths and injuries amqng the civilian population. These attacks, which are morally reprehensible, were in law violations of Article 2,paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Unitéd Nations Charter, and also violations of the resolutions passed by the Council on 4 March and subsequently. From the political angle, as stated in the report which we have before us, these attacks have rendered the solution of the Cyprus problemvery much more difficult. Seoondly, we then had, in the middle of August, the threat of military actionin connexion with the rotation of the Turkish contingent, Finally, on 10 September we find the threat of military action accompanying the ultimatum on the question of economio measures. 154. In a11 the cases 1 have just mentioned, the Turkish Government failed to request the opinion beforehand, and s till less the approval, of theseourity Council. It was only after the attacks by the Turkish air force that Turkey saw fit to notify the Council of the aggressive action it had already undertaken, upon which the Council called upon Turkey to cesse immediately such attacks and to take no further military action of any description, 155, It is fitting to draw the attention of the Counoil at this point to the fact that, in spite of the clear attitude it has adopted, the Turkish Government recently again advised the Greek Government that in case of a further Turkish attack against Cyprus, any defensive action taken by Greece would be oonsidered by Ankara as an act of aggression. 156. Of course, Turkish reprisals against theGreeks in Turkey have been passed over in silence, and Greece, far from having the right to take any action, is not, in the eyes of the Turkish governing circles, even legally entitled to protest. 157. Turkey xeserves the sole right to make of any question which may arise a matter of war or peace. “Turkish army, navy and air force units were reported placed on a new alert today following a meeting of Cevdet Sunay, the Chief of Staff, with the Cabinet, The reason for the reported alert was not immediately clear. There seemed to have been a reduction of tension this week-end in the Cyprus arisis “W . turques auraient été, selon les rapports, placses d’&at-major Btat d’alerte ne sont pas claires. Il semblaity avoir eu au cours de ce week-end une &duction de la tension dans la crise chypriote ro/,‘l 158. This is the contribution of Turkey to the work of pacification, to which the UnitedNations as a whole, and certain Member States in particular, have devoted their unsparing efforts, This is an attitude of attaok, an attitude based on the prinoiple of military intervention, Faithful to that attitude, the representative of Turkey did not hesitate to tel1 us a short time ago -this was to justify a demand for the reduction of the defence forces in Cyprus-that several States should be subjected to restrictions with regard to the level 158. Telle est la contribution de la Turquie B llceuvre de pacification a laquelle les Nations Unies dans ensemble, et certains Membres plus particulierement, sacrifient sans les ménager leurs efforts, C’est une attitude d’attaque, une attitude fondée sur le principe de l’intervention le représentant de la Turquie n’a pas h&ité a nous dire tout à l’heure - c’&ait pour justifier une demande de .t%duction des forces defensives de Chypre - que plusieurs Etats doivent être soumis a des restrictions pour ce qui est du niveau de leurs forces armees. Il a oublie d’ajouter qu’aucun Etat n’est prbt & rgduire ses forces tant qu’il fait face à la menace. Le repr& sentant de la Turquie a encore prétendu que Chypre Btait envahie par des forces grecques, Je lui dois une repense et je dirai que ce représentant a, & mon avis, perdu le droit moral de parler d’invasion de Chypre apres les tristes BvBnements qui s’y sont d&oul& et dont les documents distribués tout a l’heure au Conseil temoignent abondamment. of their armed forces. IIe omitted to add that no State is prepared to reduce its forces SO long as it is oonfronted by threats. Even more he claimed thatcyprus was invaded by Greek forces, This demands a reply, and 1 must state that he has, in my opinion, lost the moral right to speak of an invasion of Cyprus after the sad events which have taken place there and to which the documents distributed a short time ago to the Counoil abundantly attest. 159.’ The representative of Turkey no doubt hoped that others would oontribute to an invasion of Cyprus hy Turkish armed forces SO that it would simply be a waikover, in which, as his Government advised us through Mr. Ball, Under-Secretary of State at the State Department of the United States, the Turks would ha’ve been able tomassacre about 30,000 Greeks, Of course, if Mr. Eralp believes that this would be the attitude of the friends of Cyprus, if he believes that they would do anything to facilitate such an invasion, then he can only be described as surprisingly naitre , 159. Le repr&sentant d’autres contribueraient forces armées turques à Chypre ne soit qu’une promenade, au cours de laquelle, comme son gouvernement nous l’a fait dire par M. Bali, sous-secrétaire d’Eta.t au Departement d’Etat auraient pu massacrer une trentaine de milliers de Grecs, Bien entendu, si M. Eralp pense que telle serait l’attitude ceux-ci faciliteraient sa nai’vet8 de vraiment surprenante. 160. The Greek Government is aware of the fact that the withdrawal of the United Nations force could, at this time, lead to a grave disaster in the island. It is therefore in agreement that its mandate should be extended beyond 26 Sep tember . 160. Le Gouvernement hell6nique est conscient du fait que le retrait pourrait, en ce moment, conduire à un granddésastre dans l’fle. Il est par consequent d’accord pour que son mandat soit prolonge au-del& du 26 septembre. 161. The statement whioh the Foreign Minister of Cyprus has just made on behalf of his Government will, moreover, greatly hearten the members of the UNFICYP in the accomplishment of their mission. The message of President Makarios represents the most constructive and generous contribution which has beea made since the Cyprus question has been debated here. The Cypriot Government has repealed a11 restrictions on the supply of foodstuffs to the isolated Turkish communities. It offers an amnesty even to those who have been guilty of crimes or offences committed during the period of repression. It offers materia.1 assistance to 4hose who wish to 161. Les déclarations que vient de faire au nom de son gouvernement le Ministre des affaires etrangeres de Chypre apI:srtent d’ailleurs Force le message le plus encourageant pour l’accomplissement de leur mission, Le message du président Makarios represente l’apport le plus constructif et le plus genéreux qui ait 6% fait depuis que la question de Chypre est debattue ici. Le Gouvernement chypriote revoque toutes les restrictions lement des communautés turques isolees. Il offre l’amnistie jusqu’a ceux qui se sont rendu coupables le crimes et de delits commis pendant la répression, Il offre une assistance materielle o/ Qubted in English by the speaker. lo/ 162. We note the information contained in the supplementary report of 15 September [S/5950/Add.Z], acoording to which the Seoretary-General has given instructions to his persona1 representative incyprus, and also to the commander of the Force, to contact the Cypriot Government regarding the application the proposals of President Makarios. We are expeoting that Mr. Galo Plaza and General Thimayya Will also obtain a clear indication of the intentions of the minority and we would request the Secretary- General to keep the delegations most concerned advised of the progress achieved in the task he has entrusted to his persona1 representative and to the Commander of the Force. 163. In order that the initiative of President Makarios may achieve its objective, which is identical with that of the United Nations, namely pacification, itis essential that the minority should respond to it on positive lines; it must accept the offers which are placed before it; it must show evidence of a sincere desire to live in peace with the rest of the population. Above ail, it is essential that there should be no further incidents of the type reported in the press today, according to which the United Nations convoy sent to supply Kokkina with food was repelled by Turkish extremists with expressions the like of which Iprefer not to repeat. I must emphasize that such incidents must stop if we are not to suspect that the Turkish leaders do not in fact want a return to normal conditions and the pacification of the island. 164. As soon as peace is on theway to being restored, the political situation should not present insurmountable difficulties. We should like to hope that Turkey Will be willing to co-operate with the other parties order to solve, within the scope of the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus, the issue that the events of the last few months have only served to obscure, namely that of the working-out of reasonable but reliable guarantees of the rights of the Turkish community on the island. The Government of Cyprus taking positive measures and making precise proposais. It is now the turn of the Turkish side. If it wishes to turn aside from a regrettable past and look only to the future, if it is determined to face the situation without second thoughts and without preconceived ideas, here is the chance to do SO. 165. My delegation is convinced that the time is ripe for the resumption of mediation, SO tragioally interrupted by the cruel fate whioh struck Mr. Sakari Tuomioja. The nomination of Mr. Galo Plaza, just announced by the Secretary-General, has been seoeived by my delegation with great satisfaction, and Greece promises him its full support in bis task.

no member of the Council intends to speak at this meeting of the Council, 1 give the floor to the last speaker on my list, the representative of Cyprus. 268. Yet he was kind enough to propose to the Secretary-General that UNFICYP should not take any measures which would prejudice the political solution of the problem. He spoke of the Tylliria fighting. He spoke of the blockade-the so-called economic blockade. TO these points he cari find the answers in my original speech, But one point that 1 feel 1 must raise tonight, and one that 1 cannot pass over unnoticed, although 1 reserve my right to make further observations on his statement in the course of the debate later, is the way in which he attempted to justify the bombings of Cyprus when he said that Turkey felt compelled to take these extreme measures inaccordance with her duty and her right under the Treaty of Guarantee. We dealt with this subject in the Council in February and March, ancl 1 do not think that any member of the Council agreed in any way that the Treaty of Guarantee gave the right to Turkey to use force against Cyprus. Furthermore, it was generally aecepted that, even if it did, any treaty is superseded by the United Nations Charter under Article 103.And, as many representatives stated then, and as has often bcen stated in the course of the debates in this Council in connexion with other items as well as in connexion with Cyprus, the use of force in international relations is completely prohibited by the Charter. 168, voulu des Nations tible de nuire à la solution par18 des combats du prétendu BtB expliques moins, peux laisser de faire de la façon dont M. Eralp bardement avait conform8ment en vertu du Traité de cette question mars puisse Turquie En outre, s’il la Charte ticle nombreux on l’a souvent à propos à la force dans les relations rement 169. What the Treaty of Guarantee provided was that Turkey, together with two other countries, was to PrOteCt anci safeguard the territorial integrity and the independence of Cyprus. The territorial integrity and the independence of Cyprus-those are the two very vital principles and concepts that the TurkishGovernment bas a11 along been trying to undermine and to kill, by trying to use a so-called right, according to its own interpretation, contained in a treaty the purposes of which were exactly the contrary of those pursued by Turkey. 169. c’est doit protéger et l’indépendance et l’indépendance principes constamment s’efforçant usage dans un trait8 de celui que poursuit 170. Since the representative of Turkey tried again tu Use this argum.ent of the Treaty of Guarantee, 1 cari only tel1 him tonight that Turkey, by its policy and by lts actions, which culminated in the recent barbarie bombardment of Cyprus, the result of which the Council has before it in this quite clear evidence I submitted earlier, has succeeded in doing only one thing, namely, in killing for ever the Treaty of Guarantee. 170. d’invoquer je puis lui dire que la Turquie, agissements ment les $, l’appui, ment le Traite 1’72. The representative of Turkey went evenfurther. He even tried to draw conclusions concerningpossible operations of the United Nations in other cases in the future. Really, it is too much-to try to misinterpret the terms of reference, to dictate to the United Nations what to do, to Bell the United Nations that it must act in accordance with the wishes and the policy of the Turkish Government, to distort the whole picture before the Council and then to comeforward with conclusions and say that this is the light in whioh we must draw a lesson about howfuture operations of the United Nations must be undertaken in other possible cases. 173. The Turkish representative emphasized over and over again that the Cyprus Government-and it is the Cyprus Government, whether he likes it or notshould stop arming the country, should stop strengthening its defences. At least one might have expected that since the representative of Turkey insisted much upon this unacceptable point he might also have offered a certain suggestion. One might have expected him to say: “Since the argument of the Cyprus Government in strengthening its defences is the threat Turkish attack, we, the Turkish Government, tel1 you that there is no threat of attack.” But, naturally, cannot say that after what happened in early August. 174. Then the representative of Turkey tried indicate to the members of the Council that there might be cases where there were limitations with regard to the strengthening of defences, limitations ooncerning the armies of certain countries. A small country suCh as Cyprus cannot afford to have a big army and to buy major armaments. And, even if it were to afford them, what would be the purpose? Because of our size we cannot threaten anyone. do take these steps in the light of what has happened. We took steps in the past beoause of the threats, and we are taking steps now because of the fact that a11 those threats of the past took a very definite and concrete shape early in August, And the Turkish representative asks the Cyprus Government to stop strengthening the defences of Cyprus, and indeed indicates to the United Nations that it should try to stop it. Yet the Turkish threats continue, and the Turkish Government goes on increasing its own armed foroes, as if the hundreds of airoraft which it already possesses are not enough for Cyprus. 175. It is the inherent right and the duty of the Government of Cyprus to strengthen its defenoes and it 177. 1 have dealt at length with the accusationsof the Turks with regard to the so-callecl economic blockade. 1 feel that the intervention of the Turkish representative has not added much to the accusations which we already had in mind and to which 1 replied. Perhaps h’e has only added a few further words and a few adjectives. 177. la Turquie Je pense Turquie j’ai mots et quelques adjectifs 178. The Turkish representative tried to make the point that the Turks in Cyprus do net owe allegiance ta the Government. And yet he wants a return to normality. He further went on to say that the Turks in Cyprus do not need the protection of the Cyprus Goeernment, that they do not want it, that they want to be protected from the Greeks. 1 cari assure him. that we know the situation in Cyprus much better and in much more detail than he does and that there are a large number of Turks who would speak, if they had the chance to do SO. 1 am not going to quote the few names which the representative of Turkey perhaps already has in mind and whom he tried, in an earlier debate, to’ describe as traitors. Traitors to what? Traitors to the cause of partition. Apart: from those, there are quite a large number of Turks who want to speak out. The United Nations is in Cyprus. We offerod to protect these people and we offered to proteet them in co-operation with the United Nations SO that they cari be freed and cari be liberated from the intimidation and the terrorism of the Turkish Cypriot leaders in Cyprus, SO they cari express their feelings, to become human beings again and not the tools of a dipltimacy which aims at destroying peace and oo-operation in Cyprus between the Greeks and the Turks. 178. demontrer obéir au gouvernement. & une situation de gouvernement, être protégés nous connaissons situation parleraient pas repr&+entant et qu’il présenter qui? Traîtres sonnes, parler, offert Nations sures chypriotes sentiments d’&re détruire les Turcs 179. sentant devrait Chypre, Nations d’enquête y voir c’est Grecs la Turquie, guerre Grèce. se rendre A Chypre, sentant Force, Quelle trouver? 179. As regards the mission to which the Turkish representative thought fit to make roference again, a faot-finding mission to be sent to Cyprus, we do have quite an important mission in Cyprus already; we have the United Nations in Cyprus. The fact-finding mission should go to Turkey, should go to Alexandretta to see what they are preparing there for Cyprus. It should go to Constantinople to see what is happening to the Greeks there. It should go to other parts of Turkey where there are war preparations directed against Cyprus and recently against Greece. That is where the fact-finding committee should go, not to Cyprus. We have the United Nations in Cyprus, we have UNFICYP, we have the representative of the Secretary-General, we have the Commander of UNFICYP, we have an international force of theunited Nations, What better fact-finding team could he wish to have in Cyprus? 180. de faire 180. Ke then tried to impress again upon the members of the Council that Greece has invaded Cyprus, 182. 1 reserve my right to elaborate further on the points upon whioh 1 have just touched in reply to the statement of the representative of Turkey. 1 want to conclude by stressing in the most solemn manner that my country’s policy is peace, my country’s policy is to try and restore peace in the island, which Will be in the interest of international peace. We want peaoe and we want security, but at the same tim.e as 1 said in my opening statement, we shall defend ourselves if the need arises, weak and small though we are. 183. As far as the political solution of the problem is concerned, for us it is the simplestof the solutions because for us it is the simplest of the problems. There is a minority and that minority must be proteoted. There is a majority; that majority rule and decide the future of the country. This, I believe, is the cornerstone of the Wnited Nations Charter. 1 believe that these are the rights for which two wars have been fought and in which, if 1 may say again, Turkey had no part and therefore cannot express a view on how the United Nations s hould function and how its principles should be implemented. The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m. Litho in UN. Price: $US. 0.50 (or equivalent