S/PV.1155 Security Council

In accordance with the previous decision of the Council, 1 invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece to take places at the Council table. 1. g la dbcision pr&édemment prise par le COnSeil, j’invite et de la Gsèce & prendre place B la table du Conseil. A t the invitation of the President, Mr. Orhan Eralp (Turkey), Mr. Spyros Kyprianou (Cyprus), and Mr. Dimitri S. B&ios (Greece) tookplaces at the Council table. sur (Turquie), S. Bitsios (Grèce) prennent place àla table du Conseil.

The first speaker on my list is the Brazilian representative, t0 whom 1 give the floor. 2. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Le premier orateux inscrit est le représentant du Brésil, a qui je donne la parole.

On behalf of the Brazilian delegation may 1 be permitted initially to express the gratification of my Government on the very comprehensive, objective and impartial report, which the Secretary-General has submitted to this Cauncil on the subject of the United Nations operation in Cyprus [S/5950 andAdd.1 and 2].1/The report shows clearly how, in implementing the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 [S/5575], zlthe Secretary- 3, M. CARVALHO SILOS (Brésil) [traduit de l’anglais]: me soit permis, gouvernement a apprécié le rapport très complet, très objectif et impartial que le SeorBtaire g6n8ral a pr&sent& au Conseil au sujet de l’op8ration des Nations Unies ?L Chypre. Ce rapport [S/5950 et Add.1 et 2]Y de la resolution 1L/ See Officia1 Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year. Supplemenr for July, August and September 1964. y année, 2/ 33. 4. It is my duty to honour the memory of the first Mediator in Cyprus; in carrying out his mission, late Mr. Sakari Tuomioja furthered the cause of the United Nations and enhanced his outstanding qualities as a diplomat and statesman. The Brazilian delegation also wishes to congratulate the Secretary-General on his choice of the new Mediator, Mr. Galo Plaza, who had already contributed SO much to the success the United Nations operation in Cyprus as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Nicosia. 1 am confident that Mr. Plaza’s persona1 qualities and bis thorough knowledge of the complex situation in the area Will enable him to do extremely well in his new assignment. 5. The Brazilian delegation has noted with great satisfaction the measures which, as shown in the Secretary-Generalls report, the parties concerned have taken or indicated they intend to take, to alleviate the tension existing on the island and in the region, thereby helping to render the United Nations operation more effective and paving the way for a final, peaceful settlement of the whole problem. 6. May 1 be permitted to recall that on 2 March, when he submitted the draft resolution, throughthe adoption of which the Council decided to station a United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus and to appoint a United Nations mediator, the representative Brazil said: “We are confident that this draft resolution, once approved, could contribute substantially to bringing about conditions of peace and harmony inside Cyprus indispensable to a thorough review of a11 the issues that have been bedevilling the life of the Republic of Cyprus since its inception. “The stabilizing presence of an international peace-keeping foroe and the endeavours of an impartial and respected mediator open the best prospects for a settlement of one of the most complex and delicate problems the United Nations has faced, “In the absence of such action, the already plosive situation threatens to deteriorate further, endangering not only the life of the Republic, peace and security in the area.” [llOOth meeting, paras, 18, 19 and 20.1 7. If, as the Secretary-General points out in paragraph 216 of his report [5/5950], the United Nations Force in Cyprus “bas not, obviously, been able to achieve the full objectives defined in the general mandate of the Security Council~~, it has contributed to imprOVement in the security situation on the island, to the prevention or limitation of fighting, to the betterment of the general situation concerning 8. Thus, in ciur view, the deployment of the Force has already attained one of the objectives of the decision taken by the Security Council in adopting the resolution of 4 March. This alone suffices to prove the wisdom of the decision taken by the Council to set up the Force. It is my belief that now it is incumbent upon us to lengthen its stationing in Cyprus and endeavour to improve the conditions under which the Force has been operating. 9. In this connexion, the Secretary-General has pointed out in his report the extremely difficult conditions under which the Force has been compelled to operate. In order to improve those conditions and to render more effective the deployment of the Force, the Council and the parties concerned should give the utmost attention to the assumptions to which the Secretary-General has referred in paragraph 232 of his report. 10. The Brazilian delegation considers that a11 the principles mentioned are important, but we view with especial interest the implementation of the principle regarding freedom of movement. Without freedom of movement, the Force cannot discharge its duties and the whole peace-keeping operation will become a losing game. 11. The final settlement of the Cyprus problem depends, naturally, on the patience, prudence and good- Will of a11 the parties concerned. The United Nations, through the Secretary-General, the Mediator and the Peace-keeping Force, has already contributed substantially to such a solution and, we are a11 certain of this, Will continue to do SO indischarging its duties under the Charter and in carrying out thedecisions of the Security Council,

Before going on to the matter under discussion, 1 should like to associate myself with the tribute my colleagues have paid to the memory of Mr. Sakari Tuomioja. By his impartiality, his qualities ofwisdom and moderation and the rectitude of his judgement, this statesman was an honour to Finland and helped to sustain our hope that a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem is still possible despite obstacles, the magnitude of which is recognized by all. 13. We are glad, too, that the Secretary-General, with the agreement of the parties concerned has been able to appoint without delay a new mediator, Mr, Galo Plaza, who has already given proof on the spot of the effectiveness of his actions and who, we are sure, Will continue the work SO unfortunately interrupted by the death of Mr. Tuomioja. 14. Very soon, the new Mediator Will establish contact with the Governments concerned. 1 would like to stress how important it is that a11 parties should 15, And are not the parties themselves beginning to realize this need for the restoration of calm? My delegation sees evidence of this in the decision taken by the Cypriot Government to remove the economic restrictions previously applied to a sector of the Turkish community and in the Tact that a Turkish ship has been authorized to unload supplies for the people of Kokkina. 16. For its -part, the Turkish Government has just made conciliatory gestures with regard to the position of Greek nationals in Istanbul and also in postponing the rotation of its contingent, at the request of the Secretary-General. 17. Finally, my Government appreciates the restraint which the authorities at Athens have shown in a number of different circumstances. 18. The favourable attitude of the parties towards the renewal of the mandate of theUnitedNations Force constitutes an essential element of the question the solution of which is the aim of the present debate of the Council, It was this consideration that my delegation already had in mind when it supported the resolution of 4 March 1964, but not without indicating clearly by abstaining on paragraph 4 of that resolution the reservations of principle which suoh an operation inspired. Our position has not changed and under those conditions my delegation Will aocept, as it did on 20 June 1964, the renewal of the Force!s mandate for a period of three months [S/5’7’78.]31 19. In the same spirit, the French delegation would have no objection to the proposa1 that the mission the Force should be clarified in certain respects, as the Seoretary-General suggests, if this is indeed the wish of the Council. 20. With regard to the financing of the operation as of 27 September 1964, my delegation can only adhere to the provisions of paragraph 6 of the resolution 4 March. This text was adopted by the Security Council with a full knowledge of the Tacts, and we fail to see how an agreement could be reaohed in practice on any other method of financing. 21. Having made these remarks, 1 am glad to pay a tribute to the objectivity of the Secretary-General! report which provides members of the Council with information and material for reflection of the highest interest. In particular, I should like to commend the Secretary-General for his tireless efforts at conciliation in which he is supported both here and in Cyprus by colleagues who have won our respect. 22. Finally, 1 should like to express the hope that the signs of a relaxation of tension thathave appeared 3/ Ibid Supplement for April, May and June 1964. A 23. M. USHEH (C&e-d’ivoire): Depuis bientbt neuf mois, le Conseil de securite tente d’endiguer unfoyer de guerre chaude qui risque d’enflammer les c8tes m&literranéennes et de s’étendre au monde entier, à cause de l’interdépendance actuelle des Etats ou des systemes d’alliances. Depuis bientôt neuf mois, nous assistons presque impuissants ades mouvements réguliers de hausse et de baisse des tensions entre les adversaires, qui se soldent fatalement par des pertes de vies humaines; la plupart du temps, hélas! celles d’hommes, de femmes et d’enfants innocents. - Depuis bientOt neuf mois, tandis que nous tentons, mais en vain, de trouver par voie de mbdiation, une solution politique au probléme, tout se mobilise pour entraver Les forces des Nations Unies, a qui nous demandons beaucoup de sacrifices sans toujours leur donner les pouvoirs qu’exige leur mission, assistent, quelquefois sans pouvoir intervenir, à une bataille sans merci entre les deuxcommunautes de Chypre, bataille doublée d’un bombardement abrien difficilement acceptable. Et tout cela parce que le Conseil, a cause d’éventuels vetos, a éte assez souvent emp@ché de parler un langage clair, ne se prêtant pas a des interprétations qui, parfois source de conflits.

For nearly nine months the Security Counoil ha8 been trying to control an outbreak of hostilities which threatens to engulf the toasts of the Mediterranean and indeed-suchis the present interdependence of States and systems of alliances-the whole world. For nearly nine months we havebeen watching, almost powerless, as the tensions between the two sides rise and fa11 regularly, bringingwith them a fatal reckoning of casualties mostly-alas-among innocent men, women and children. For nearly ninemonths, we have been trying to follow the path of mediation and to find a political solution to the situation, but everything seems to impede the laudable efforts of the Mediator. The United Nations forces of whom we demand many sacrifices without yet giving themthe powers required by their mission are sometimes standing by without being able to intervene in the merciless battle between the two communities in Cyprus, a battle accompanied by an aerial bombardment that is quite indefensible. Al1 this has happened because the Council, threatened with possible vetoes, has often been prevented from speaking out in clear language, not admitting of interpretations which are frequently different and contradictory and thus sometimes become the source of conflict. 24. For example, the resolution of 4 March 1964 [3/5575] established the Force and instructed it to maintain order while entrusting the Government of Cyprus with the main responsibility for the maintenance of order, yet without making it olear that the Force must co-operate with the Government. The same resolution instructs the Force to preserve peace and prevent the two communities from fighting, while at the same time forbidding the Force to use its arms. What a perilous situation to stand between two antagonists who are using automatic weapons, the most advanced machine-guns and bazookas! It cannot be compared with that of the referee who, with bare hands between two boxers in a ring, only has to raise his arm to stop the fight and send each man back to Ns corner. 24. Ainsi, la r6solution du 4 mars 1964 [S/5575], qui a cree la Force, lui demande de maintenir l’ordre la responsabilité principale de ce maintiende l’ordre, sans pourtant dire que la Force doit collaborer avec le gouvernement, La même resolution demande a la Force de maintenir la paix et d’emp&cher les deux communautés de se battre, tout en interdisant a la Force antagonistes utilisant des armes automatiques, les fusils-mitrailleurs zookas, quelle situationp&illeuse! Rien de comparable h celle boxeurs, h qui il suffit d’btendre le bras pour arr@ter le combat et renvoyer chacun dans son coin du ring. 25, The Secretary-General clearly indicates the difficulties facing the Force, Ne admits in his report that a United Nations force has never been placed in such a difficult situation and that “it requires great courage, a very special kind of courage, aswell as an unusual amount of patience, understanding and Compassion”. 25. Le Secretaire géneral nous fait toucher du doigt les difficultes que rencontre la Force; il admet dans son rapport que jamais force des Nations Unies n’a et& placee dans une situation aussi difficile, et qu’il faut >‘beaucoup de courage, un courage toutk fait spécial, et une dose de patience, de comprehension et de compassion peu commune”. , t 26. Je voudrais, ici, associer mon pays a l’hommage merite que le Conseil doit rendre aux officiers et aux hommes de troupe qui composent la Force des Nations Unies à Chypre, ainsi qu’a la gratitude et aux remerciements que le Conseil ne manquera pas d’exprimer au Secrétaire genéral, B ses collaborateurs, aux pays qui fournissent des troupes et a ceux qui Participent au financement de l’operation. 26, 1 would like here to associatemycountrywith the deserved tribute which the Council must pay to the officers and men of the United Nations Force in Cyprus. 1 would also like to join in the vote of thanks which the Council Will certainly address to the Secretary-General, his colleagues and the countries providing troops and money. / , 28. It seems to me that the other difficulties mentioned in the report. find their answer inthe important propcsals which Archbishop Makarios has just made @/5950/Add.2, annex]. Wethinkthat theUnitedNations Force should be able tc co-operate with the Government of Cyprus in carrying out the Archbishop’s propcsals which are aimed at laying the foundation for peace on the island, namely, removal of a11 eccnomic restrictions, remcval of a11 armed posts thrcughout Cyprus, financial assistance to certain Turkish Cypricts and a general amnesty. Such propcsals should not remain unanswered. In the face of this tragic, painful and dangercus situation, a11 cppcrtunitics which are offered must be seized. 29. 1 would like topay a fervent tribute to the memory of Mr. Sakari Tucmicja, By his laudable efforts encourage a peaceful solution of the problem he has rendered a great service to peace. 30. Without wishing tc criticize or minimizewhatthe mediators have done SC far, especially since no results are yet apparent, 1 would like to stress that, in my humble opinion, this question cannot be sclved without taking into account certain fundamental principles and certain psychological criteria. Cyprus was a colony. It cbtained its independence after an armed and murderous struggle which rightly made it jealcus of its achievement and suspicicus of its former rulers and their predecesscrs. In this case, its reacticns are those of any State in Europe, Africa, Asia or Latin America which was once a colcny. 31. Subsequently, Cyprus became independent, sovereign and a Member of the United Nations, As in a11 other States, its administrative, political and constitutional organizations are domestic matters, a fact which derives from the principle of sovereignty. For the protection of its mincrity and its rights it must therefore make propcsals which are satisfactcry and acceptable to a11 the cther parties concerned. In any case it seems certain to us, knowing the psycholcgy of a formerly colonized country such as ours, that the time when it was possible tc conclude withcut Cyprus a treaty to be imposed on Cyprus, after the observance of a few fcrmalities, has gone for ever. 32. Consequently, the Security Ccuncil, the negotiators and the States ccncerned must abandon the fiction that the independence of Cyprus is conditioned 33. It is the hope of my delegation that these conditions Will be met and that a solution Will begln to emerge, and it is therefore of the opinion that the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus should be extended for three more months. My Government wishes the new Mediator every success in the delicate task that has been entrusted to him.

Before giving its views on the Secretaxy- General’s report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus, my delegation would like to pay tribute to the memory of the United Nations Mediator, Mr. Tuomioja, whose premature death robbed his country, Finland, and the United Nations of the distinguished services of a man who, in a particularly serious situation, gave of his best to the cause of peace in that troubled area of the Eastern Mediterranean. 35. My delegation would like to take this opportunity to express its gratification at the nomination as SUCcesser to this particularly delicate position of that distinguished figure, Mr. Galo Plaza, whose great experience and brilliant record of service in his own country, Ecuador, have. earned him the confidence of the Secretary-General and of the Governments concerned. From the bottom of our hearts, we wish the new Mediator in Cyprus every success in his efforts for the greater good of that strife-ridden island. 36. The serious situation in Cyprus has now been under consideration by the United Nations for nine months. Despite the efforts of a11 kinds made by the Organization and supported by efforts from other quarters, the situation remains grave and the possibility of reaching a solution by negotiation is still remote. 37, During this critical period, the United Nations Force in Cyprus has grappled daily with aparticularly thankless task. Its mission is primarily one of persuasion and non-military assistance, but it has had to deal most of the time withcertain localrealities characterized as we know by olashes between the two communities on the island, that are sometimes m.urderous. 38. It seems that this situation, which was a severe test of the effectiveness of the Force in maintaining order, has m.ade it clear that the Forceneeds greater freedom of movement in order to make its actions more positive and better adapted to the circumstances. This state of affairs prompts us to consider that the Force, in the exercise of its functions, might when necessary .be called upon to resort to certain 39. My delegation therefore considers that, in accordance with the resolution of 4March 1964, the extension of the mandate of the Force, which the Council will have to decide at the end of this debate, could at the same time indicate that this is the meaning that it is proper to give to that mandate. It seems to us that, as long as the chances of reaching a solution by negotiation remain vague and uncertain, the United Nations Force in Cyprus Will have to show great vigilance, for the two communities, in a headlong arms race, have transformed the population of the island into two opposing armed camps that are in danger of clashing at any moment. 40. It is significant that behind this regrettable unleashing of passions in Cyprus lie two diametrically opposed ideas concerning the political future of the island: cne upheld by Greece, the other by Turkey. The logical oonsequence of this situation is that any mediator must bend a11 his efforts towards seeking an agreement between these two countries. There are even some who think, or are inclined to think, that a final settlement of the Cypriot question primarily depends upon the way in whioh these two ideas might ultimately be reconciled. 41. As far as we are concerned, Cyprus is, and remains, an independent, sovereign State, a Member of the United Nations and a non-aligned country. Its political future, even if changes were involved, is a question that depends above a11 on the freely expressed Will of its population. 42. There is however reason to suppose that, once it has been established that the future of the two communities cari no longer be one and the same, because the national and sovereign entity within whioh they have lived since independence would be brought intc question, it Will perhaps be necessary tc seek new agreements behveen the parties conoerned in order to arrive at a peaceful and reasonable solution that Will bring the tragedy of Cyprus to an end. We are among those who believe that the present tension could at any moment result in two allied neighbours making war upon each other. It wculd be truly senseless such a thing occurred and it is difficult to foresee what the consequences might be in SO sensitive and important an area of the world as the Eastern Mediterranean. 43. We believe however that, in the search for suoh agreements, the chances of reaching a peaceful solution by negotiation depend to a very large extent on the goodwill shown by the leaders in the island, Greek as well as Turkish, and in particular by the present Government. At a11 events, it is our sincere hope that the crisis Will be settled through the successful outcorne of the efforts now being made by the new Mediator to bring peace to the island. We do not in fact see how it could be solved otherwise, for without the United 45. We should also like to express our satisfaction that the Government of Cyprus, in a wise gesture that we are glad to weloome, has decided to raise the economic blockade that for several weeks has been imposed on the Turkish cornmunity of the island. It is our hope that this humanitarian move, whioh is at the same time a gesture of appeasement, will lead to a general easingof tensionin the relations between the two elements in the population of Cyprus and, above ail, that it Will allow negotiations to be resumed in an atmosphere of peace and tolerance. After the harsh trials to which the inhabitants of Cyprus have been subjected in the course of the last few months, we believe that such a move is signifi- Gant enough to be welcomed with great relief. May 1 recall that it was with the same feeling of satisfaction that we have also welcomed other measures that both sides have taken in the past with a view to ending the sufferings of the population and allowing the voice of reason to be heard in that strife-ridden island. 46. My country, a Mediterranean country and a friend of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, has been following the development of this serious conflict with particular interest, and at times with great distress. If my country has any opinion to express on this question, it is simply to remind everyone that the ties of union and mutual understanding among the peoples who live in that part of the world are muoh stronger and more important than anything that might divide them. It is my Government’s earnest desire that this objective reality, in a region that is iri the throes of transformation, Will be taken into aocount in the final settlement of the problem. We wish to renew the appeal we have already had occasion to make to both sides to show a measure of restraint, level-headedness and common sense. It is clear that only under these conditions cari a11 ou?? hopes be realized. 4’7. Before concluding, I should like to mention another matter disoussed in paragraph 231 of the Secretary-General’s report [S/5950]. The financial difficulties encountered by the United Nations in this kind of peace-keeping operation are naturally due to the fact that the operation often turns out to be longer and more extensive than had been foreseen. Since such factors, which might be called imponderables, result from applying the directives contained in the resolution of 4 March 1964, my delegation is of the opinion that the Secretary-General should be authorized, as a last resort, to appeal for aid from other sources, with a view to meeting in some measure the budgetary defioit resulting from the peace-keeping operation in Cyprus.

May 1 be permitted to join other members in paying a tribute to the memory of Mr. Sakari Tuomioja, whose passing away is a grave loss to his country as well as to the United Nations, both of which he served with his great ability, talent, ski11 and dedication. 50. Once more the Security Council is dealing with the problem of Cyprus. Once more we have to examine and analyse the facts brought before us in order to draw our conclusions from them and to help us find the proper solution. We have spent a oonsiderable number of our meetings in the past dealing with this problem, some of them in an atmosphere of tension, facing a threat of invasion and even acts of armed aggression with a11 the horrors of the use of modern arms. The problem of Cyprus and even its consideration by the Security Council thus has a history full of dramatic events, From this history-which we have followed and which is reflected in the Secretary- General’s report [S/5950 and Add.1 and 2]-we ail may have acquired experience and may have learned to understand the substance of the problem better. 51. This history, and especially the turbulent days in the second week of August, has given us sufficient proof of what is the primary element, the paramount reason why the question of Cyprus has become a concern for the Seourity Council, and why it may give rise to a grave danger for peace in the Mediterranean and in the world. It is quite obvious that it is not the existence of two national communities with their differences which is the main cause of the confliot, but the fact that these differences are being used as a Pretext for external interference, for pressure, and even for invasion and aggression. 52. At the beginning of the consideration of the Cyprus problem by the Security Counoil, our delegation on 25 February 1964 made the following observation: “It is neoessary to say that the atmosphere in which bloodshed and regrettable oonflicts have takenplace results from the continuous threat of foreign aggres- Sion, invasion, intervention, occupationandpartition of Cyprus, which constitute a heavy element nervousness, over-irritation, suspicion and tension. Only in an atmosphere completely free from the dangers of an external attack and pressure, and in which every possibility of invasion, occupation partition is unambiguously rejected, Will it be possible to reintroduce into the relations between the Greek majority and the Turkish minority in Cyprus that element of confidence and harmony which Will enable their coexistence to be secured in full respect for their rights.” [1097th meeting, para. 58.1 The history of the events both in Cyprus and here in the Security Council has proved that we were right, together with other members who considered the question from the same point of view. L’histoire qu’au que nous avions envisage 53. The danger of a foreign invasion, of an attack on Cyprus, was and is a real one. The Security Council had to act not only to prevent a possible invasion, but to stop an attack which had materialieed and which had serious consequences in human casualties and material damages. In SO acting, the Council, in spite of the reluotance of some of its members, had to acknowledge and protect the security, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, represented by its Government both in the country and here in the United Nations. And this was correct. Any measure which did not respect that primary fact andposition could not be helpful in solving the critical situation in Cyprus, nor the problem here in the Council 53. Chypre, a d0 agir qui C%sw? et qui avait qui concerne dommages malgré d0 reconnaftre l’independance blique dans le pays même et ici, a l’Organisation Unies. pas tenu compte de ce fait essentiel et de cette position fondamentale de la situation solution 54. Any attempt at weakening this positionwouldonly increase the instability of the situation and thereby the danger to peace. On the other hand, a11 moves-even though indirect and timid, which we have hadoccasion to deplore-that helped to repel invasion, aggression, or interference in the affairs of Cyprus and to strengthen the sovereignty of independent Cyprus, bave been a direct contribution to re-establishing peace and security and bringing about a permanent and satisfactory settlement. 54. ferait partant, D’autre Btaient l’occasion Echec dans les affaires la souveraine% ont constitue ment d’un règlement 55. Striking proof of this is given in the telegram dated 15 September [S/5950/Add.2, annex] frompresident Makarios to the Secretary-General, which stated that the Cyprus Government had decided to remove ail economic restrictions on the rebellious parts of the Turkish community and to remove a11 its armed posts, provided that the Turkish leadership would do the same, and to assist those Turkish Cypriots financially who wish to resettle and to afford them any protection needed; it was also stated that the Cyprus Government was disposed to granting a general amnesty and accepting any suggestion of the United Nations in respect of certain praotioal security measures that would contribute to the pacification of the island, provided that such measures did not affect the political solution of the problem. 55. le t616gramme au SecrBtaire [5/5950/Add.2, que le Gouvernement toute rebelles Les postes fassent Chypriotes assurer ie Gouvernement me amnistie les Iratiques i condition solution politique jfi. çeneral lorsqu’il mportantes 56. We cannot but agree with the Secretary-General when he describes these suggestions as an important step toward reducing current tensions and enabling 57. Our dolegation has to draw attention to the fact that the danger of invasion or armed attack, which the Council has stopped by its action in the past, has not been definitely excluded. Nor is it the only threat to the Republic of Cyprus andto the aims of the United Nations, During the whole development of what is called the Cyprus crisis, we have been observing constant attempts at subordinating the independence of Cyprus to the interests and aims of a military alliance, namely, NATG. The authors of theseefforts, after having tried in vain to prevent the United Nations from dealing with the Cyprus crisis have been attempting to duplicate the functions of the United Nations and to turn events virtually away from and against the aims of the United Nations, 58. It is generally known that the leading Powers NATO had appointed uninvited so-called “assistants” to the United Nations Mediator. Ignoring entirely fact that the Government of Cyprus had rejected those “self-appointed mediators l-to use the Cypriot Government’s expression-whose activities couldonly, as The New York Times of 2 July 1964 reported Government of Cyprus to have stated, “raise the danger of the Cyprus question becoming involved in circles outside the United Nations”, these Governments then took one more step of intervention in Cyprus on behalf of NATO. There has been much information in the Press concerning these activities, May 1 quote, as an example, the well-known publication Newsweek of 31 August, where we read that II.. . a11 along, the U.N. presence in Geneva has merely been a camouflage for NATO efforts to solve the island’s problems within the family” -the family to which, as we know, the Cypriot people certainly are not keen to belong. And, after this passage, there follows a description of another version of that famous Acheson plan called “Enosis Plus”, whose basic elements, according the numerous and various press oommentaries, con- Stitute a certain bargain: a bargain with the interests and aspirations of the Cypriot people, a bargain where one SPeakS of such prices as a Turkish base, or the de facto partition of Cyprus, or even the cession of a Greek island to Turkey-in any case, a bargain which seeme to ignore the interests and aspirations of the population, the national and historical entities, and seems to be animated solely by the desire for military bases and for removing certain difficulties in a military alliance at the expense of a peaoeful people which chooses the way of non-alignment, the way of 69. Let us recall on this occasion the recent words of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus about the NATO arms which, more than a month ago, were killing and maiming Cypriot people and destroying their houses. Then we Will see the whole picture of the role of NATO and of its leadership, whose aims, of course, are far removed from and contrary to the interests of the Cypriot people. 60. We are gratified that the Government of Cyprus, faithful to the principles of the Charter, rejected those different plans, but we deem it necessary to remind the Council of the danger that those and other possible plans constitute not only for the independence of Cyprus but also for peace and for the role of the United Nations. 61. May 1 remind the members of the Council that public opinion even in the Western countries is pointing at the danger of such attempts andthe neces- Sity of stopping them. Such, for example, seems to US to be the undertone of an editorial published in yesterday’s issue of The Observer of London, a well-known Sunday paper with a certain authority as far as public opinion is ooncerned. After recognizing the positive direction of the recent conciliatory moves made by the Government of Cyprus, and which 1 have just oited, the paper insists on the necessity of removlng nsuspicions that the defence interests of the West, operating through NATO and CENTO, may impose a constitutions1 settlement on the Greek Cypriots against their Will and better judgement, as happened at the time of the Zurich agreements”. Accords 62, It is certainly gratifying to hear such voices in Western countries, and we may only hope that these voices will be heard by those with whom the decision lies. 63, The Czechoslovak Government, following with attention and preoccupation the events in and around Cyprus, once again expressed its opinion recently in a communiqué published jointly with the Government of the Soviet Union on ‘7 September, after therecent oonversations between the President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; the communiqu8 stated: dans un communiqu8 avec la République du Conseil socialistes “The inadmissible interference by the NATO countries in the interna1 affairs of Cyprus, the artificial stirring up of nationalist conflicts, are an attempt to deprive the Cypriot people of national independence and subject Cyprus to the military and political plans of NATO. Both signatories to the communiquué declare that they support the legitimate s truggle of the Cypriot people against foreign interference. They prpceed from the premise that it is necessary to respect the inviolable rights of the Cypriot people, withdraw a11 fore@ troops from 64. It was with a view to facilitating such a solution that the United Nations presence was recommended by the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964. We have heard from the representative of Cypruswho is the main interested party and whose opinion on this question is a decisive one-that his Government considers the role of the United Nations Force as positive and wishes, as does the Secretary-General, that it should be extended for a further three months. The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is willing to agree to such an extension under the assumption that the further activities of the Force will continue to be undertaken strictlywithin the framework of its original mandate, stipulated by the resolutionof 4 March, and Will neither impose financial obligations on Member States nor infringe upon the sovereign right of Cyprus and its Government. The meeting rose at 5.15’p.m, 14 -- Price: $LE 0.35 (or equivalent Litho in U.N.