S/PV.1164 Security Council

1 am sure 1 express the VieWS of a11 the members of the Council when 1 take occasion to cal1 attention to thefact thatwe welcome this morning to the Security Council table Lord Caradon, representative of the United Kingdom. He is an old friend of a11 of us due to his prior service in the United Nations. Speaking for my Government, we look forward to his participation in the deliberations of the Council and to his contribution to thc work of the United Nations with confidence and with a warm welcome. du Conseil si je me permets d’attirer le fait que nous accueillons ce matin a la table du Royaume-Uni. C’est pour nous tous un vieil ami, puisqu’il a déja servi l’Organisation Unies. Parlant au nom de mon gouvernement, je puis dire que nous sommes particulierement de le voir participer et aux activites des Nations Unies. Nous savons que son assistance nous sera des plus utiles. 2, Lord CARADON (Royaume-Uni) [traduit glais]: Je vous remercie tres vivement de vos paroles de bienvenue et j’ai pleinement conscience de l’honneur qui il y a a siéger au Conseil de sécurite. Qu’il me soit permis d’ajouter c’est pour moi un privilège particulier mes fonctions au Conseil alors qu’il est presids par un homme pour qui j’ai toujours eu tant d’admiration. 2. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom) : Mr. President, 1 wish to thank you most warmly for the welcome which you have expressed to me. I am extremely conscious of the honour of serving in this Council. Perhaps 1 might be permitted to add veryrespeotfully that it is a special privilege and honour to take my place under the presidency of a man for whom 1 have always had suoh a high admiration. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The Palestine question aJ (2) Letter dated 14 November 1964 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed to the Presidentof the Security Councii W6Q44); At the invitation of the President, Mr. Michael S. Comay (Israel) and Mr. Rafik Asha (Syria) places at the Council table.

Since the Council last considered the question before it, the Secretary-General has submitted the report of General Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) in Jerusalem relating to the incident of 13 November 1964 in the northern area of the Armistice demarcation line between Israel and Syria, The report is oontained in document S/6061,9 to which annexes A to D are being distributed separately. 5. The first name on my list is that of the representative of Syria upon whom 1 now call.

It is not my intention to repeat today a11 the facts of the Syrian case against Israel which 1 had the privilege to put before the Council at our last discussion. 1 feel compelled however, inview of the many distortions contained in the Israel letter of 14 November [S/6045] 2/ and opening statement of its representative [1162nd meeting] and of the additional information made available to my delegation since the 1162nd meeting on 16 November 1964, to restate briefly some of the salient features of the premeditated and unprovoked armed attackperpetrated by .Israel against my countryls national territory people on 13 November 1964. 7. Before recalling the major aspects and significance of the incidents of 13 November, 1 shouldlike to make some preliminary observations, 8. First, in his opening statement, the Israel representative alluded to a single discrepancy he said he had found between what he termed the first version, in my press release, which referred to Israel planes attacking Syrian posts and the revised version, in my opening statement, which described such planes as attacking Syrian villages. 1 would like in this connexion ta point out that whenit cornes ta cliscrepancies between the Israel letter of 14 November 1964, and the opening statement by the representative of Israel on 16 November 1964-such as theconflictingversions as to whether theIsraelpatrolwasapolice or military patrol. or the differences in the number of Israel villages hit by Syrianfire-such discrepancies become suddenly, by the Xsracli representative’s magie wand, g Officia1 Records of the Jecurity Council, Nineteenth Year, Supplement for October. Navember and December 1964. 2(Ibid. 9. Second, the Israel representative devoted a substantial part of his opening statement to therepetition of some of his old statements to the Council, or to his own interpretation of past events, or to what he called broken Syrian assurances, commitments, undertakings, promises and SO forth. 1 do not think the Israel representative moved or impressed anybody by merely repeating himself and giving a rehash of his former misleading statements, It is evident that repeated distortions and inaccuracies are not likely to bring us an inch closer to the truth which we seek here in a11 earnestness. 9. En consacre naire faites donner sa propre rieurs sans lendemain, n’ont representant voir ses precédentes Il est tudes procher recherchons 10. Mr. Comay should have realized, long before embarking on his long and boring oratory, that our Organisation is not supposed to function according to his whims, or on the basis of his unproven assertions, or of his one-sided version of what tookplace between Syrian and UNTSO representatives, or of unsubstantiated claims and complaints by Israel, or of unconfirmed and unchecked investigations made by Israel. The Israel representative should be reminded by the Council that when the Israel authorities make their i own investigations, draw their own conclusions from these investigations, and take military action on the basis of these conclusions, as has been the case in SO 10. M. Comay aurait se lancer dans son long et ennuyeux exercice torique, pas sur les faits; de ce qui s’est sentants ou encore non fondées menées ni Confirm&es devrait les autorités investigations, et se fondent mesures tant aujourd’hui, de la Convention Israël prevu pour llapplication it many instances, inoluding the matter with which we are dealing today, these authorities are thus destroying a the very foundation of the Israeli-Syrian General @ Armistice Agreement by substituting themselves for the machinery set up to supervise the implementation e of that Agreement. l UI 11. Third, the Syrian representative who preceded me in the Council on similar occasions often had the opportunity to draw the Council’s attention to the Consummate technique of distortion and falsification developed by the Israelis over the years, either by quoting out of context from documents and statements, or by circulating fake maps prepared by their self- ‘appointed cartographie experts, TO cite only one such example, the latest map attached to the Israeli statement distributed to the members of the Council on 11. qui m’a precédé blables du Conseil et de falsification au long de documents contexte, quées graphes. 12. The Israel positions at TelDan,Danitself,Dafna, and Shear Yashov-and what I say applies invariably to a11 advanced Israeli settlements, if not to a11 Israeli settlements-are military strongholds strategically situated and called upon to perform a military role. Therefore, to draw arrows from the Syrian posts villages allegedly showing directions of the firing, to deny aforementioned Israel military positions same treatment is clearly meant to mislead Council. 13. The faks Israel map eliminates altogether northern section of the demilitarized zone which also sometimes called the northern clemilitarized zone. This deliberate omission is in line with Israel’s efforts to claim sovereignty over the demilitarized zone in Palestine, in flagrant violation of the General Armistice Agreement. 14. In the Israel map, the Dan River, which is referred to i,n the Armistice Agreement maps as the Liddani River., stops short at some distance from road in Israel shown on the map, whereas the original source of thi,s river lies in Syrian territory close to the demarcation line. In this connexion, I should l&e to give the Council detailed information regarding this particular aspect of the problem. 15. The Israel road, or track as the Israelis cal1 it, SOmetimes to minimize its importance, or border road, as tbe Israel representative called it in bis opening statement to bestow political importance it, runs, in the map distributed by Israel to Council members, parallel to the northern Syrian-Israel marcation line and at a certain distance from it. Thls as we shall see is no pure accident. This seemingly innocent road, allegedly situated in so-called Israel territory, has an interesting history which I Will summarize very briefly. This history refutes every Count *of the fantastic version given to the Council about this road in the Israel letter of 14 November 1964, and it was completely omitted, for obvious reasons, from the opening statement by the Israel representative on 16 November. This history could be summed up as follows. 16. On 15 May 1962, Israel opened a new dirt road running along the Syrian-Palestine border and the 17. As is well known, the map attachedto the General Armistice Agreement3 has a scale of approximately 1/50,000, and the degree of error in this map is approxi-mately 100 metres. Therefore neither of the delegations to the Mixed Armistice Commission should permit any work to be undertaken without leavingfifty metres on each side of the demarcation line as a separation zone to allow for the above-mentioned degree of error. In that area fifty metres, which is more than 150 feet, involves a very considerable smount of territory. This practice has always been observed in the Mixed Armistice Commission, and in a11 works performed along the demarcation line. It follows from the preceding remarks that the delineation of the Israel road in some places on the demarcation line itself constitutes a clear violation. 17. d’armistice 1/50 000 environ carte tres. Commission que l’on entreprenne une d’autre ser 50 mbtres, sentent de faire dl armistice, accomplis suit certaines ligne lation flagrante. 18, A more serious violation lies in the fact that the road crosses the demarcation line and encroaches upon Syrian territory to the extent,of 250-300 metres in some places, In 1962, UNTSO was convincedof this encroachment and work on the road was stopped by verbal order of its Chief of Staff; UNTSO also prohibited the use of the road by Israel. On 3 November 1964, however, Israel reopened this question. 18. route, en certains ritoire de la trêve construction verbal egalement route. remis 19, envoyé a preparé la route est précis&ment syrien. surveillance dans la lettre de I’armee drais qui a trait 19. When Captain Reichert, the Canadian surveyor dispatched by the United Nations to survey this road, prepared his survey, the drawing of the eastern section of the road was necessarily omitted. This section is precisely the one which is part of Syrian territory. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO referredlately to this omission in a letter addressed to the Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army on 13 November 1964. This reference is embodied in the above-mentioned letter, and 1 would like to quote it in its entirety: a Suppl&mene 3/ Ibid., Fourth Yaar Spec~al Supplement No. 2. ._. --- 20. In the light of what 1 have just said, 1 would like to formulate the following observations: (i) theIsraeli road is meant to perform a military andpolitical role which violates the provisions of theGeneralArmistice Agreement; (ii) the construction of the road is fairly recent since it goes back to May 1962 only; (iii) Syria opposed the construction of the road right from the beginning for the reasons 1 have already mentioned, and requested that a survey of its eastern part be made to establish beyond any doubt Israel’s encroachment upon Syrian territory; (iv) the completlon of this susvey proved impossible due to Israel’s lack of cooperation; (v) Syria cannot be rightly expected to toleratb any military patrolling by Israel on the road, especially on its eastern section. Any reference by Israel to such routine patrolling in the past is therefore misleading. As long as the encroachment on the part of Israel continues, Syria Will continue to oppose and denounce such unlawful andprovocative patrolling; (vi) Syria is prepared to discuss at any time any aspect of this question in the Mixed Armistice Commission, which is the proper machinery established for the discussion and settlement of questions of this nature, 21. Many other defects of the same order are to be found in the rem.arkable Israel map. I Will not take more time to expose them. Council members have already noticed, 1 am sure, Israel’s rather familiar and unsavoury extravagances which should be strongly denounced as misleading, lacking in intellectual honesty, and unworthy to be produced as evidence before a world forum such as the Security Council. 22. Ms. President, with your permission, I would like to turn now to the incidents of 13 November 1964. 1 am inolined, for the sake of clarity, to distinguish three phases in the sequence of these incidents, and not two phases, as the Israel representative indicated in his opening statement. 23. The first phase was the exchange of fire between the Israel military armoured patrol, supported by tanks and artillery from the rear, which, 1 maintain, entered Syrian territory at approximately 1327 hours local time, and a Syrian position in the vicinity of the Syrian village of Nukheila which had no military elements. I would hasten to point out that this phase, which amounted to a border incident, could have been easily averted had the Israelis refrainedfromsending suoh a patrol into Syrian territory across the demarcation line, where as the Israel representative readily admits, the atmosphere is extremely tense. My submission is that, by this action, the Israelis not only 24, It would be useful in this connexion to quote from The Jerusalem Post of 15 November 1964: “The clash, which the Chief of Staff, Rav-Aluf Yitzhak Rabin, told correspondents, was the most serious of its kind in many years, started at 1.20 Priday afternoon when a small party of soldiers set out on foot to inspecta recently gravelled border track connecting fields in the Tel-El-Qadi area.” 25. In this connexion also, 1 should like to recall the resolution 113 (1956)4/ which was adopted by the Security Council on 4 April 1956, and from which 1 should like to quote the following provisions: “The Security Council rr . I . “Requests the Secretary-General to arrange with the parties for the adoption of any measures which, after discussion with the parties and with the Chief of Staff, he oonsiders would reduce existing tensions along the armistice demarcation lines, including the following points: “(a) Withdrawal of their forces from the armistice demarcation lines; “(b) Full freedom of movement for observers along the armistice demarcation lines, in the demilitarized zones and in the defensive areas; “(ol Establishment of local arrangements for the prevention of incidents and the prompt detection of any violations of the Armistice Agreements. It 26, 1 should like to repeat what we have always said, that we stand ready to discuss withIsraelin the Mixed lutions 41 Ibid., Eleventh Year, Resolutions and Cecisions of the Security Councll, 1956. 2’7. TO accept without scrutiny Israel’s version the so-called Syrian trigger-happiness is CO ignore completely the real conditions prevailing today along the demarcation line. The Israelis, by their continuous attempts to encsoach upon Arab territory, by their unlawful and exorbitant olaims, their constant violations of the Armistice Agreement, their disregard United Nations resolutions, and their persistent refusa1 to co-operate with the organs of the United Nations responsible for the supervision of the abovementioned Agreement, are to be held principally and soleiy responsible for the existing deteriorated conditions, 28. 1 corne now to the second phase. The second phase of the incidents of 13 November comprised the artillery duel and the exchange of tank, gun and mortar fire which ensued between theIsrae1 military positions at Tel Dan, Kibbutz Dan, Dafna, Shear Yashov and Hakortarin, and the Syrian positions at, or in the vicinity of the Syrian villages of Nukheila, Abbasieh, Tel Azaziat and Tel Ahmar. 1 should like to point out that this exchange of shelling was initiated by the Israelis at 1330 hours in their efforts to caver the retreat of their armoured patrol. 1 should like to add that this second phase could have been averted had the Israelis refrained from initiating the shelling and had they refrained from enlarging the scope of the shellings by subjecting unarmed Syrian villages their artillery, tank and mortar barrage. 29. The third phase-by far the most serious since it constituted an open and deliberate aot of war-was the massive Israel air-raid which was carried out at 1456 hours, after UNTSC) observers hadsucceecled, at 1446 hours, in securing Syria’s andIsrael’s acceptance of a cesse-fire to be effective at 1500 hours local time. This unwarranted and savage air bombardment administered by an assortment of a large number of planes consisting of Mirage, Mystere, Super- Mystere, and Votour jets, added more casualties the list of peaceful Syrian villages subjected earlier to shelling from Israel. The swiftness of the Israel air attack, the large number of planes used, the use of rackets and highly incendiary napalm. bombs, and Israel+s non-compliance with the cesse-fire order :; 30. The overflying of the town of Quneitra situated deep in Syrian territory by Israel Mirage planes at 1530 hours the following day, on 14 November, shows clearly that some of Israel’s objectives were not as yet fully realized and that the intention to perpetuate the state of tension was still present in the minds of the Israelis. The violation of Syria’s air space to which 1 am referring was dulywitnessed by the UNTSO observers who were present at the scene of this incident and who, 1 am sure, must have noted that in their report. 30. Le survol de la ville de Quneitra, situee en plein territoire Mirage, 14 novembre, montre nettement que certains objectifs atteints et qu’Israël persistait à vouloir faire durer l’état de tension existant. Cette violation de l’espace aérien syrien a eu pour t8moins des observateurs de l’organisme chargé de la surveillance de la treve qui se trouvaient j’en suis certain, l’ont noté dans leur rapport. 31. 1 should like to add, before concluding my remarks on the three phases of the incidents of 13 November 1964, that the air raid showed once again how the fervour of the Israelis is excitecl by defenceless Arab villages. As killers, the raiders of 13 November again showed themselves to be specialists. The present rulers of Israel could boast Chat those who manned the planes are worthy of the members of the Irgun, Haganah and Stern gangs who started the practice of massive killings in Palestine, 31. Je voudrais ajouter, avant d’achever mes observations sur les trois phases de ces incidents du 13 novembre 1964, que l’attaque aérienne israélienne a montré, d’Israël est stimulé par des villages arabes sans dBfense. En tant que tueurs, les agresseurs du 13 novembre sp&cialistes. Les dirigeants actuels d’Israël peuvent se vanter du fait que ceux qui pilotaient les avions sont dignes des membres composant les bandes de l’Irgun, instaure en Palestine. 32. incidents du 13 novembre, provoqués par Israël et, je l’ai démontre, par Israël seul, je vais m’efforcer maintenant de determiner actes commis par les Israéliens contrairement au droit, Le reprgsentant d’Israël, tentant vainement de justifier gouvernement, a soutenu que l’attaque de l’aviation israélienne, venant Zt la suite de plusieurs autres violations defense prise en dernier ressort. Il a soutenu Bgalement que cette attaque n’ Btait pas un acte de represailles. Ma dW5gation rejette de la mani&re la plus categorique ces allegations sans fondement. 32. Having thus reviewed the three phases of the incidents of 13 November, provoked by Israel and Israel alone, as I have demonstrated, 1 shall endeavour now to ascertain the true nature of these unlawful acts, The Israel representative, in a futile attempt t0 Iegalize and excuse his Government’s reckless behaviour, bas contended that the Israel air attack, which oame in the wake of a seriesof numerous other violations and provocations on the part of Israel, was a defensive measure taken as a last resort. The Tsrael representative has contended also that the air nttack was not an act of reprisal. My delegation ‘rejects most emphatically these unfounded Israeli contentions. 33. Etant donné qu’il existe en droit international certains la legitime défense et les repr0sailles - les affaires bien connues du Caroline et de l’incident de Naulilaa sont l& pour le confirmer - et Btant ailleurs, 33. Since there are certain well-established principles of international law , dealing with both measures of self-help and measures of self-defence, and with reprisais-the classical Caroline and Naulilaa cases Will bear me out in whatI say-and since, as is underlined in J. L. Brierly’s well-known book, The Law of 34. My deiegation submits that a11 the elements which make the massive and unwarranted use of force by ISrael illegal were combinedin the air raid. The aerial bombardrnent of peaceful and unarmed Syrianvillages such as Nukheila, Abbasieh, Mourhr Chebaa, Zaourra, Baqaata, Jabata-Al-Zeit, andBanias, alongwithsyrian military positions, was excessive and an unwarranted illegal degree of force was used, The objective of the aerial bombardment was not solely the silencing of Syrian gun positions, This bombardment was aimed at achieving, as we shall see later, other illegal objectives. This coercion of Syria, which had aocepted the cesse-fire order, was illegal. Not only clid Israel not seek resort to the procedures for the redress of border grievances but even refused to do SO. Its systematic boycott of ISMAC and refusa1 to abide by the cesse-fire order, amply prove this assertion. My delegation therefore considers that the Israel aerial bombardment was not strictly limited to the needs of defence but was converted, for reasons beyond these needs, into reprisals or punitive sanctions rightly condemned by the United Nations. 35. My delegation considers further that even the principles of international law governing reprisals were also uiolated by Israel in this instance, since Israel had many other choices and means to obtain redress, and since the measure employed was out of a11 proportion to the so-called and non-existent provocation received. 36. My delegation would lilte to remind the Council of the following provisions which were adopted in its resolution [93 (1951)]h/ of 18 May 1951 and its resolution [101 (1953)]7/ of 24 November 1953. The resolution of 18 May 1951 states that the Security Council Wonsiders that it is inconsistent with the objectives and intent of the Armistice Agreement to refuse 10 participate in meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission or to fail to respectrequests of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission as they relate to his obligations under article V and calls upon the parties to be representedat a11 meetings called by the Chairman of the Commission and to respect such requests; ?/ 6rh ed. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1963). p. 417. 6/ Officia1 Records of the Seau-ity Council, Sixth Year, Resolutioos and Decisions of the Security Council, 1951. 7/ Ibid., Eighth Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security CounciI, 1953. l’(a) Aerial action taken by the forces of the Government of Israel on 5 AprilI.951. , . constiiute[s] a violation of the cesse-fire provision provided in the Security Council resolution of 15 July 1948 and [is] inconsistent with the terms of theArmistice Agreement and the obligations assumed under the Charter.” Gouvernement tue[nt] une violation par la resolution 1948 la Convention sees par la Charte 37, The resolution of 24 November 1953 states that the Council: 3’7. Aux 1953, le Conseil: “Finds that the retaliatory action at Qibya taken by armed forces of Israel on 14-15 0c)ober 1953 and a11 such actions constitute a violation of the cesse-fire provisions of the Security Council resolution of 15 July 1948 and are inconsistent with the parties’ obligations under the General Armistice Agreemeht , . . and the Charter of the United Nations; à Qibya et 15 octobre constituent résolution 1948 sont aux parties et la Charte nExpresses the strongest censure of that action, which can only prejudice ttie chances of thatpeaceful settlement which both parties, in accordanoe with the Charter, are bound to seek and calls upon Israel to take effective measures to prevent a11 suchactions in the future. V cette chances ties doivent et requiert caces pour prevenir 1’ aveniF 38. 1 should like to deal now with the questions which the Israel representative addressed to me on 16 November 1964 [ 1162nd meeting], and which relate to peace and the use of force. Since the Arabs are often unjustly accused of being irrational and emotional, 1 shall refrain from qualifying the questions which were put to me as being impudent and ill-timed, inasmuch as we are dealing with a fresh onslaught by Israel against Syrian territory and people. 1 shall endeavour to discuss these questions in a detached and serene manner, 38. que 16 novembre et du recours et injustement la passion de qualifier portunes, massive ritoire avec detachement 39. je dirai aspirent du colonialisme de la guerre. de tout bilités. qu’elles lies Attachés ne font que les ferends gande. Il est vraiment de voir dieusement sans nombre sainte. rique ser en même temps les raisons. 39. Regarding the Israel peace offers, 1 should like to say the following. Peace is yearned for today by a11 the peoples of the world, especially thosewho have suffered from colonialism and the useless miseries of war. The search for peace is the preocoupation of every responsible statesman. Thorefore, peace offers of any kind by any party tu a conflict are welcomed by public opinion the world over. In their dedication t0 the cause of peace Lhe Arabpeople are no exception. The situation has arisen, however, wherein offers to resolve differences have been used by Israel merely as propaganda slogans. It is indeed a tragedy that the desire of the world for solutions to outstanding problems should be deviously exploited as a device for perpetuating the multiple injusticeswhichnowpervade the Holy Land, For this reason 1 propose to review the history of the Israel peace offers and, in SO doing, t0 expose the motivating forces behind them. 41. On 12 May 1949, the Arab States and Israel signed the Lausanne Protocol uncler the auspices of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, which was established by the General Assembly in 1948 [resolution 194 (III)] to work out a peace settlement between Israel and the Arab States. By virtue of the Protocol both parties undertook to settle the Palestine Question within the framework of the Planof Partition of November 1947. The Arab countries, thereby, formally committed themselves to a policy of peace. It was later revealed, however, that Israel’s agreement to the provisions of this Protoool, which was subsequent to the so-oalled Arab invasion of Israel, was only for the purpose of gainingadmission to the United Nations. In the Israel Government Yearbook of 1950 we find the following rexg statement: I, . . I Some members of the United Nations wished at this opportunity to test Israel’s intentions with regard to the refugee, boundaries, and Jerusalem issues, before approving its application for admission. In a way, Israel’s attitude at the Lausanne talks aided its delegation at Lake Success in its endeavour to obtain the majority required for admission,“8/ 42. The General Assembly admitted Israel as a Member, noting the declaration of the Israel repsesentative to the effect that his Government “unreservedly aocepts the obligations of the United Nations Charter and undertakes to hon0ur them from the day when it becomes a Member of the United Nationsl’ [sec General Assembly resolution 273 (III)]. However, soon after Israel had succeecled in misleading the members of the international community, it repudiated its signature of the Lausanne Protocol. Once again, the sanctity of an international agreement meant nothing to Israel. 8( Government Yearbook 5711(1950) (J erusalem. Government Printer, December 1950). 44. Israel is the only Member State which has drawn no less than six condemnations and censures frorn the Security Council and the GeneralAssembly. Israel bas consistently obstructecl the supervisoryfunctioning of the United Nations and boycotted the Mixed Armistice Commissions. Israel has ignored fourteen repeated United Nations resolutions calling for the repatriation or compensation of the Arab refugees. Furthermore, following its participation in the colonial aggression against Egypt in 1956, it refused to allow the United Nations Emergency Force into the territory it now occupies. 44. & avoir par Israël fonctions sion mixte successives nisation participe l’Egypte, Unies qu’il occupe actuellement, 45, This is only a glimpse of the past record of Israeli lawlessness in regard to the Partition Plan, the Lausanne Protocol and the wishes of the United Nations. However , this is not the total picture, for Israel has not only flouted United Nations efforts and disregarded a11 international agreements, but it has exploited these for its own ends, Each Israel peace offer has been a camouflage for an armed adveature indiscriminately directed at innocent men, women and children. 1 shall have occasion to prove this to the Council. 45. feste Protocole Unies. non content pas les de paix n’ont prise hommes, l’occasion 46, In addition to the linking of peace with a consistent pattern of aggression, the solemn pronouncements of Israel leaders have also demonstrated that its peace slogans are not truly intended to achieve a just solution to the Palestine question, By making it clear that it Will not, under any circumstances, accept the internationalization of Jerusalem, surrender the extra territory acquired by force, or repatriate the Arab refugees, Israel is ignoring the minimum standards of justice afforded by standing United Nations sesolutions, and certainly leaves nothing for negotiation. 46. d’une politique israbliens rations visaient la question circonstance de JArusalem, taire réfugiks plus lutions laisse 47, It is not a cal1 to negotiate peace that Will bring peace, but the acceptance of the principles on which a peace cari be negotiated. In the case of Palestine, these principles involve admitting that a crime agalnst humanity has been committed; recognizing one’s responsibilities to the community of nations and fulfilling them; and taking measures to redress the wrong and remove the injustice. 47. Ce n’est gocier lesquels la paix. Dans sont l’humaniti5 sabilites et s’en acquitter; torts 48, Israel’s offers for peacc do not fulfilanyof these requirements and therefore they have been described as being as far from real peace offers as blatant Propaganda is from the truth. They have been shouted 80 loudly and SO often by Ben-Gurion and other Israeli keaders for the last fifteen years that theyare well on the way to becoming clichés of the Century. 48. Les ces conditions, aussi ehontee W proclamées et d’autres passe de devenir 48. Events since 1948 have shown that each time Israel talks about peace, it does SO in the hope that it Will lu11 the Arab States into false security, and then attacks them. The following samplings of statements made by responsible Zionist and Israel authorities and the sots of a.ggression that occurred thereafter, Weal with startling clarity the motives which have 49. Depuis chaque l’espoir d’une sages i?té faites responsables, 50. A statement issued on 20 March 1948 by the Haganah High Command contained thefollowingassertion: “The Jewish State that iS to corne into being . . , Will find the path to mutual understancling and true frienclship with the hrab peoples in the neighbouring countries . , ,“. On 9 April 1948, less than twenty days after this expression of desire for “truc friends hip ” with the Arab people, the “Irgun Zvai Leurni”, a Zionist terrorist organization that spread havoc in the Holy Land, committed an outrageons act of terror against Deir Yasin, a village near Jerusalem, slaugh-, tering without meroy 250 of the 300 men, women and children of the village. 51. The following semarks were contained in a deolaration of the Zionist General Council, issued from Tel Aviv on 12 April 1948: “At this heur . . . we turn to the Arabs in the Jewish State and our neighbours in adjacent territories with an appeal for brotherhood and peace.” Less than two days elapsed after the Zionist General Council’s “appeal for brotherhood and peace” before more innocent Arab blood was shed indiscriminately. On 14 April 1948, members of the Irgun a3d Stern terrorist organizations assaulted the Arab village of Nasr El Din, near Tiberias. The Deir Yasin horrors were repeated again. The entirepopulation of Nasr El Din, consisting mainly of defenseless women and children were attacked with machine-guns and hand grenades, Only forty women and children survived by fleeing to a neighbouring Arab village. The rest were added to the long list of Zionist victims. 52. The following passage was contained in the text of a letter from Moshe Sharett, the then Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Chairman of the Palestine Conciliation Commission on 8 May 1950: “a . * the Government of Israel is willing to negotiate . . . to conclude a final settlement of a11 outstanding questions with a view to the establishment of permanent peace”. 53. After its establishment in 1948, Israel pursued a deliberate policy of persecuting the Arabs who remained in the occupied part of Palestine with the main objective of forcing them to leave their own country. The Israel authorities set up large concentration camps throughout the country, in which untold atrocities were perpetrated. 54. In furthering this policy, which was carried to the extent of annihilation, on 31 May 1950, Israel forces herded into trucks 120 Arab internees of one of the camps, Qatra, and drove them to a place known as Wadi Araba in the barren desert between the Dead Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba. In promoting their desire to establish “permanent pence”, the Israelis forced these internees to proceed on fool in the direction of a mountain range in Jordan. The Issaelis then opened fire, forcing their unfortunate victims to run in terrer. Only ‘75 per cent of them withstood the rigours of the trip. The rest perished from thirst and hunger in the 55. The following assertion was contained in the reply of the Israel delegation to proposals submitted by the Chairman ‘of the Palestine Conciliation Commission at the Paris Conference on 21 September 1951: W has always been the earnest desire of my Government to see permanent peace’ established between Israel and her Arab neighbours . . ,“. Following the Israel delegation’s assertion of its Government’s “earnest desire” for “permanent peace”, one, finds the Israel army speaking another language. Blatantly defying the Armistice Agreement, an Israel armed unit crossed the Jordanian frontier on the night of 25 September 1951 and demolished a large number of houses in the village of Ghor As-Safi on the southern ooast of the Dead Sea. The murder of twenty-five persons, including women and children, at this time was but the beginning of another reign of terror. 56. A little more than three months lster, the occasion of Christmas Eve was used as an occasion for further surprise attacks by Israel. On the eve of 6 January 1952 the Arab Christian communitybelonging to the Eastern Church was celebratingchristmas, and most Arab policemen were in Bethlehem disecting the traffic of pilgrims to the Church of the Nativity. At this time three houses were demolished over the heads of their unsuspecting occ,upants in the vicinity of Beit Jala, an Arab town on the western side of Bethlehem in Jordan. In the attack on one of the houses, located near the tomb of Rachel, a11 six members of the family were brutally murdered. This attack at Beit Jala was condemned by the Mixed Armistice Commission as another Israel violation of the Armistice Agreement. 57. On 9 January 1952 Aba Eban told the United Nations: “, , . the Arab and Israel peoples, united by SO many bonds, may yet make this region the scene of civilization worthy of its ancient and medieval pastn. On 28 January the Jordan villages of Falama and Rantis were attacked. les blessures causbes par le déchakement de violence.” Le 14 octobre, Qibya a fait l’objet d’une attaque brutale au cours de laquelle 42 civils ont étB tués, 4 hommes et 38 femmes et enfants blessés, et une mosquée, une école et quarante maisons detruites. 58, On 29 September 1953, Aba Eban told the 449th plenary meeting of the General Assembly: IrMy Government continues to uphold the vision of the Middle East at peace within itself, uniting the efforts of its two kindred peoples to heal the wounds of aggressive violencetl. On 14 October the brutal attack on Qibya took place in which forty-two civilians were killed, four men and thirty-eight women andchildredwounded, and a mosque, a school and forty houses destroyed. 59, On 11 December 1953, the then Foreign Minister, Moshe Sharett, declared: “There is also a major problem of our relations with the Arab States around us. Al1 1 cari say on this is that the conclusion of permanent peace between us depends on them alone-on our part we are always ready for it,” I 61. On 14 August 1955 Mr. Ben Gurion cleclared: “We must faithfully observe the conditions of the Armistice Agreements . . . We must . . . strive cessantly for relations of peace and CO-operation hetween Tsrael and the Arab States.” On 31 August, Khan Yunis ancl Bani Suheila in the Gaza Strip were attacked, and the demilitarized zone was occupied. 62. On 2 July 1956, Mss. Golda Meir said: “1 should like to survey some of the basic considerations that guide our foreign policy. First foremost cornes peace , . , Our policyhas . . , always been one of peace,” On 29 October of that year the invasion of the Sinai Peninsula started. 63. The Israel Digest of 25 December 1959 quoted the “Basic Principles of theGovernmentProgrammett agreed upon by the Israel Parliament on 17 December 1959. One of these was said to be: “The sincere desire to strcngthen peace in the entire world andparticularly in the Middle East.” A further demonstration of the meaning of Israells “desire to strengthen peace” was given on 1 February 1960. In the early morning of that day Israel artillery and morturs began shelling village and surrounding area of Tawafiq, located in the demilitarized zone on the Syrian frontier. Two hours lates Israel armed forces with heavy truckn and armoured oars entered, occupied and demolished village. 64. The Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission thoroughly investigated this incident and reported 16 February 1960 that the attack had 11. . . resulted in the almost total destruction of the aforesaidvillage, in violation of elementary humanitarian principles with two killed and two wounded on the Arab sidett. [See S/4270, annex IV.] s/The investigation corroborated assertions by the Syrians that they hadhad no military fortifications in the area prior to the attack. This wanton des truc tion of an unarmed village, as well as the violation of Syrian air space byfour Israel on the same day as that of the attack, was Porthrightly condemned by the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission. 65. During the discussion in the Security Counoil in 1962 of an Israel armed aggression against Syrian territory which oocurred on the eastern shore Lake Tiberias, the representative of the United Kingdom strongly condemned the ‘Ideliberate attack” -/ Officia1 Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1960. 66, Israël conditions. passe, israéliennes raisonnables, consideration 66, Israel may want peace, but it wants peace on its own terms. Under such circumstances and in the light of past experience, the Arabs regard Israel “peace offerst’ as dishonest and inconsistent with justice and reason, and SO long as they remain SO they Will continue to be ignored. 6’7. 1 should like, in this connexion, to refer to what the Jewish Chronicle of 13 November 1964 published regarding a recent Swedish television programme in which Mr. Gunnar Haggloff, the Swedish Ambassador to Britain, appeared. The Jewish magazine said: 67. Je voudrais dans à propos .d’un programme auquel participait Suede en Grande-Bretagne. ceci: “Mr. Gunnar Haggloff, the Swedish Ambassador to Britain since 1946 and the doyenof the diplomatie corps in London, has described the establishment of the State of Israel as a mistake, has charged Jewish ‘terrorism’ with responsibility for driving 1,200,OOO Arabs out of Palestine and has denounced Israel’s offer to accept a limited number of Arabs as ‘net serious II He did SO in a Swedish television program devoted to discussion of the Israel-Arab problem. “Mr. Haggloff’s television appearance took the form of a debate with Professor Herbert Tingsten, the former Chief Editor of the newspaper Dagens Nyheter, and now a Liberal Member of Parliament. Professor Tingsten, who has long been a supporter of the Jewish State, pointed out that it was Israel, not the Arabs, which had consistently offered to make peace and had proposed a formula for the return of some of the refugees. “TO this Mr. Haggloff replied that Israel’s offer was propaganda whioh had no serious intent. It was ‘a lie’ that Israel had offered an acceptable solution of the refugee problem. What Israel should do now, he declared, ‘was to accept Arab repatriation on a large scale’. n 68. le représentant drais rite 68. Also with regard to the questions raised by the Israel representative conoerning peaoe, I should like to recall three resolutions which were adopted by the Security Council on 24 November 1953 [ 10 1(1953)], ‘1.. . Weaffirms that it is essential in order to achieve psogress by peaceful means towards a lasting settlement of the issues outstanding between them, that the parties abide by their obligations under the General Armistice Agreement and the resolutions of the Security Council.” 69, 1 shall now quote the following from the March 1955 resolution: “The Security Council II . . . “Expresses its conviction that the maintenance of the General Armistice Agreement is threatened by any deliberatc violation of that agreement one of the parties te it, and that no progress towards the return of permanent peace in Palestine oan be made unless the parties comply strictly with their obligations under the General Armistice Agreement and the cesse-fire provisions of its resolution 154 (1948)] of 15 July 1948,” 70, The following appeaxs in the June 1956 resolution: l’The Security Council ‘1 , 8 . “Endorses the Secretary-General’s view that the re-es tablishment of full compliance with the Armistice Agreements represents a stage which has to be passed in order to make progress possible the main issues between the parties.” 71. The conception underlined in these three resolutions and fully endorsed by the Security Council is, according to my delegation, a valid and well thought out policy as far as the realization of conditions eonducive to peace is concerned. The Israel representative would do well to ponder these sesolutions before trying to impress the Security Council with his shallow peace proposals, 72. As far as the use of force is concerned, 1 should like to remind the Israel representative that Syria, along with the other Arab oountries, participated the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Cairo from 5-10 October 1964, and signed the Declaration titled “Programme for Peace and International operationtt adopted by the Conference.-/To refresh further the Israel representative’s memory, 1 would like to quote the following excerpts from the abovementioned Declaration: &!f Ibid., <enth Year. Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1955. -/ Ibid., EIe venth Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security counci1, 1956. ~\~CUment AJ5763. . II I 1 I “At present a particular cause of concern is the military or other assistance extended to certain countries to enable them to perpetuate by force colonialist and neo-colonialist situations which are contrary to the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, ,I , . * “The Conference condemns the imperialistic policy pursued in the Middle East and, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, decides to: (1) endorse the full restoration of a11 the rights of the Arab people of Palestine to their homeland, sud their inalienable right to self-determination; (2) declare their full support to the Arab people of Palestine in their struggle for liberation from colonialism and racism.” 73. passage 73, 1 shall continue to quote from that Declaration: “The Conference solemnly reaffirms the right of peoples to self-determination and to make theirown destiny. “0 * I “It condemns the use of force, and a11 forms of intimidation, interference and intervention which are aimed at preventing the exercise of this right. ‘1. I . “Deeply convinced that the absolute prohibition of the threat or use of force, direct or disguised, the renu,nciation of a11 forms of coercion in international relations, the abolition of relations of inequality and the promotion of international co-operation with a view to accelerating economic, social and cultural deveIopment, are necessary conditions for safeguarding peace and achieving the general advancement of mankind, ” a.0 n * . . a situation brought about by the threat or use of force shall not be recognized. 7, 4 . . ‘lAll international conflicts must be settled by peaceful means, in a spirit of mutual understanding and on the basis of equality and sovereignty,in such a mariner that justice and legitimate rights are not impaired, n I.. “The participating countries are convinced of the necessity of exerting a11 international efforts tofind solutions to a11 situations which threaten international peace or impair friendly relations among nations, ” 74. Israel has tried in vain to convince thé United Nations and world public opinion that the Palestine question iS an issue of peace in the Middle East, while the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries decided that the question of Palestine is a question of liberating whole nation-the Arabs of Palestine-from colonialism and racism, and endorsed the full restoration of a11 the rights of the Arab people of Palestine their homeland, and their inalienable right to selfdetesmination. There is a great deal of differenoe between what Israel claims and the conclusions of this great Conference. This great Conference, whichrepresented over a billion human beings, has, 1 believe, the right to be heard. 75. In his lettess to the Security Council [S/5981), S/6020 and S/SOSS],-/ and in his statement before the Council. at the 1162nd meeting, Mr. Comay made reference to the Declaration issued by the Council Of Kings and Heads of State of the Arab League at its second session, held at Alexandria, from 5 to 11 September 1964. As one of the thirteen representatives ta the United Nations in New York of the States that were signatories to document 5/6003,‘4/ to whioh the aforementioned Declasation was annexed, and whioh was the reply of the thirteen Arab States to Mr. Comay’s letter [5/5980-j, 1 should like to draw the attention of the Council to what was stated in that reply: “1, In an attempt to deal with the Palestine Problem detached from its historical oontext, the Israel representative made deliberate misrepresentations and deletions regarding the statement on Palestine in the Declaration issued by the Counoil of the Heads of State of the Member States of the Arab League in its second session held at Alexandria, 5-11 September 1964. This Declaration has reaffirmed the views that our Governments separately and jointly have expressed in the United Nations, and whioh were supported by joint declarations and resolutions adopted in intkrnational oonferences, to uphold, restore a& safeguard the rights of the Palestinian people to their usurped homeland, 13/ Officia1 Records of the S-acurity Council, Nineteenrh Year, Supplement for October. November and December 1964. “2, Therefore, the declaration ‘stressed the neoessity of utilizing a11 Arab potentialities, and the mobilization of their resources and capabilities, in order to counter the challenge of colonialism and Zionism as well as Israel’s continued aggressive policies and its insistence on denying the rights of the Arabs of Palestine to their homeland’. tiel des Arabes nialisme toujours leur patrie”. #3. Israel, which was born as a result of colonial aggression, has consistently violated and disregarded the resolutions of the Security Council regarding Palestine. While no Arab Government has over been condemned by the Security Council, the unfounded statement made in the letter regarding the ‘years of hostile and bellioose policies against Israel on the part of the Arab States’ must therefore be examined in the light of the fact that Israel has been condemned five times by the Security Council for premeditated military attacks. et6 condamne firmation considgrée, politique par examinee condamne pour des attaques Il II. “4. The record of Israel in the international comrnunity hardly qualifies it to accuse other States of violating the United Nations Charter and of posing a threat to international peace and security. No other Member of the United Nations has such a consistent record of aggression, violations and lawlessness. munaute internationale ser Unies nationales, aussi violations “5. Furthermore, our Governments deem itnecessary to draw the attention of the Security Council to recent Israel aggressive policies and statements which create an imminent danger to international peace and security.” .appeler recentes d’Israël, paix et la sécurite 76. plusieurs une polemique sentants sommet de même quelques aideraient 76, Since the Israel representative has taken the liberty of subjeoting my delegation to a series of questions, and has taken issue with the Arab States and their representatives on the outcome of the Alexandria Summit Conference, 1 would like, in turn, to take issue with the Israel representative on a speclfic matter and ask him a number of questions, the answers to which, I feel, would greatly contribute to the clarification of the present issues, 77. ter lettre ‘IL’Etat juif saura Ma delegation sentant qu’il juifs du Conseil, ment n’existe 77. My delegation feels compelled at this juncture to take issue with the Israel representative on anassertion incorporated in his letter of 18 Septem.ber 1964, [5/5980], in whioh he claimed: “The State of Israel, which embodies the hopes of the Jewish people, and within whioh the Jewish survivors have gathered, Will know how to defend itself, and to repel any aggression. ’ My delegation fails to understand what the Israel representative really meant when he said “the Jewish people”. Unless he was referring at the time to the handful of Zionists or misled Jews who disturbed the solemnity of our deliberations on 16 November 1964 and violated the rules of our proceedings by cheering 79. Furthermore, we cari equally benefit from reading the letter dated 20 April 1964 and addressed by the Honourable Phillips Talbot, United States Assistant Secretary of State, to Mr. Elmer Berger, Executive Vice-President 0% the American Council for Judaism. This letter clearly and unequivocally states: “The Department of State does not recognize a legalpolitical relationship based upon the religious identification of American citizens. Accordingly, it should be clear that the Department of State does not regard the ‘Jewish people’ concept as a concept of International Law.” 80. My dclegation knows of many respectable and well-meaning people of Jewish faith living outside Israel occupied territory; their number actually far exceeds those gathered in Israel. My delegation also knows that many people of Jewish faith living outside Israel today do not approve of Israel’s bellicose and aggressive activities. Since the concept of the “Jewish people” is a claim which has already been dismissed, the Israel representative would bave done well not to beat around the bush by obliquely considering Israel as the so-callecl ‘State whioh embodies the hopes 0% the Jewish people”. Of which hopes is the Israel representative the self-appointed spokesman? 1s it of the non-Israeli Jew’s hope to link his destiny to that of a reokless minority ruling ISrael tOday? Or iS it Of his hope to be treated as a second class Citizen whenever he ohooses to immigrate to Israel7 Or is it of the non-Israeli Jew’s hope to be compelled to be untrue to his own home country? Or is it of the hope of the non-Israeli Jew to be milked as a cow, day in and day out, fox the sske of maiataining anIsrae1 war machine, which is out of a11 proportion to Israel’s real defence neeas? 81. Israel, whose birth was an aCt of aggression,and whioh bas been subjecting the Arabs, since its tien and some time before, to a long SerieS Of aggressions, is not in a position tolevelsuch chasges. TO say, as the Israel representative boasted, un- 82, As far as my questions to the Israel representative are concerned, and inasmuch as the Israel representative is not likely to answer these rather embarrassing and soul-searching questions, 1 would endeavour , at the same time, to give the members of the Coüncil some clues which might help to find the answers , 82. Quant aux questions sentant pas questions de conscience, quelques indications ver les r8ponses. 83. My basic question is the following: Since no country acting rationally according to its national interests would choose to follow a hazardous course SO fraught with dangers of general conflagration, such as the one which was followed by the Israel authorities, without aiming at achieving some vital objectives, is it not therefore right for us and for the Council to ask the Israel representative what Israel’s objectives really were when the Israel authorities decided to launch the massive air raid against Syria, which was an act of war? The following clues serve as the answer to this question. 83. aucun pays intér&t hasardeuse général israbliennes, essentiel, nous d’Israël pays contre constitue suit question. 84, First clue: The Israel propaganda machine has been subjeoting Syria and its leaders, since the early part of November, and, to be more precise, since 6 November , to an unprecedented campaign of vilification. 84. israelien le début du mois de novembre, Pr&is, diffamation 85. Second clue: The following three excerpts from the Jewish Chronicle of 13 November 1964, which is not an Arabie magazine, give a clear picture of the interna1 difficulties with which the present Israel authorities are confronted. I quote: 85. citer qui n’est idée tr&s quelles aux prises: (i) “Meanwhile, Mr. Eshkol continues his tirelsss efforts to strengthen his leadership regardless Of these recent setbacks. Though his image has been slightly bruised, even bis adversaries acknowledgs that he may succeed in mastering the diffi- CultieS sooner than is generally expected.” inlassables ces échecs quelque peu entame, m&me ses adversaires naissent difficultés la releve, serait pas pourrait et des marchandages (ii) “If there were an alternative Government ready, the upheaval in Mapai might not be SUC~ a bad thing, but there is not: Mapai’s further weakeniUg could mean endless coalition, bargaining, in which principles and the greater good of the country are habitually sacrificed to quiet other considera- (iti) Q. was SO difficult for Mr, Eshkol to replace Mr. Dayan with Mr. Haim Gvati as Minister of Agriculture. It Will be a much greater problem to prevent. Mr. Dnyan from becoming the rallyingpoint within Mapai for a11 those who may be, or may becorne, dissatisfied with Mr. Eshkol’s leadership.” 86. 1 corne to the third clue: The Jerusalem Israel domestic service reported in Hebrew on 16 November 1964, in its programme called “Press Review” a significant passage of an articlepublished by Haboker, the Liberal Party paper. I quote: “While the papes understands the world’s sensitivity about the use of air forcesinborder conflicts, it points out that the Security Council has recently discussed similar incidents, such as the American air operation in South Viet-Nam and the Turkish operation in Cyprus.” Haboker notes that in these cases ?he United Nations showed understanding of the background of the conflictsIf. 87. The fourth clue is the dwindling pioneering spirit in the Israel border settlements and the increasing resistance of the settlers to being systematicallyused as pawns for the execution of Israel’s aggressive policies. 88. The fifth olue is the vilification campaign launched by Israel sinoe the convening of the Arab Summit Conference at Alexandria in order to convey to the world that the Arabs are bent on aggression and that preventive action by Israel is necessary. 89. The sixth olue is the swiftness of the air attack of 13 November and the great number of Israel military planes participating in it. 90, The seventh clue is the defiant attitude of the Israel representative who, speaking of the air raid of 13 November bluntly declared on 16 November 1964: “My Government accepts full responsibility for this defensive measure.” [1162nd meeting, para, 59.1 91. The eighth clue is the violation of Syrian air space by Israel military planes on 14 November 1964, the day following the incident. 92. The ninth clue is Israells desire to oatapult itself to the forefront of the international scene, with 94. The eleventh clue is the Zionist-Israel desire to bolster the world-wide fund raising Campa@s for the benefit of Zionist and Israel activities. 94. Le onzieme ment à la collecte les activités 95. 1s it not in order, in the light of the clues which 1 have just listed, to ask a series of questions such as the following? Has Mr. Eshkol’s bruised image emerged enhanced from the Israel air attack of 13 November 19647 1s not the persistence of Israel’s acts of provocation such as its violation of Syria’s air space on 14 November, a sufficient proof of the fact that the real Israel objective is to oreate a state of acute tension in the area, which could be then attributed by Israel to the Arab Summit decisions? Was the military adventure upon which the present Israel authorities SO lightly embarked an easy way out of the interna1 political tantrum in which they found themselves, and with which they are stillunable to tope? Were theSouthViet-Nam and Cyprus episodes used oonvincingly in Israel policy planning councils by those %saeli Activists” advocating drastio measures against the Araboountries? Were the drastic measures taken against Syria a means used by the present Israel authorities to appease the opposition clamouring for action? Was the incident of 13 November 1964 a prelude to a preventive war such as the one which was launched by Israel against Egypt in 19561 95. N’est-il donc pas logique, vu tous ces Blements, de poser les questions suivantes: le prestige atteint de M. Eshkol est-il sorti grandi de l’attaque aérienne israelienne du 13 novembre 1964? Si Israël persiste dans ses actes de provocation, comme la violation, le 14 novembre, de l’espace aerien de la Syrie, cela ne suffit-il dans la région une situation extrêmement tendue dont il pourrait dire que les decisions de la Conférence arabe au sommet sont la cause? L’aventure militaire dans laquelle les actuelles autorit& se sont engagées a la lbgere nI etait-ellepas un moyen facile de dsnoncer l’imbroglio politique oh elles se trouvent et dont elles ne savent toujours pas se sortir? Les incidents du Viet-Nam du Sud et de Chypre ont-ils éte utili& dans les cercles dirigeants israéliens par les activistes qui pr&conisent une action draconienne à l’egard des pays arabes? Les mesures draconiennes prises a l’encontre de la Syrie ont-elles 6% pour les autorites israeliennes actuelles un moyen d’apaiser une opposition qui r&?lame à cor et a cri des actes? L’incident du 13 novembre 1964 est-il le prelude d’une guerre preventive semblable a celle qu’Israël a lancee contre l’Egypte en 19567 96. I think 1 have answered, to the bestof my ability, a11 the questions put to me by the Israel representative. TO sum up, 1 would like to say that the basic issue is net one of peace or no peace, as the Israel representative put it. It is one of peace with justice or no justice. It is whether real peaoe and security in the world cari be attained nowadays if these are achieved only at the sacrifice of justice, 1 did not invent the 96. Je pense avoir repondu de mon mieux a toutes les questions que m’a posees le représentant d’Issae1. En resumé, je tiens fi rappeler que l’essentiel n’est pas de savoir s’il y aura ou non la paix, comme le dit le représentant d’Israël, mais s’il y aura ou non la paix et la justice, Il s’agit de savoir si le monde peut vivre dans la paix et la sécurite rbelles si cette paix et cette securité sont obtenues au prix de la justice. “justicetl pas plus que ne l’ont invente les resolutions des conférences arabes au sommet qui préoccupent tant le representant d’Israël. Il est 151, dans la Charte des Nations Unies, Le représentant d’Israël aurait intérêt à lire cet instrument fondamental de notre organisation, notamment l’énonce des buts et principes qui figure au paragraphe 1 de 1’Article premier et au paragraphe 3 de 1’Article 2 et qui corrobore ce que je viens de dire. Word lljustice”; neither was it invented by the resolutions of the Arab Summit Conferences, which are disturbing the Israel representative. It is right there in the Charter of the UnitedNations. The Israel representative would do well if he were to read the basic instrument of OUI‘ Organization, and particularly the purposes and principles embodied in Article 1, paragraph 1, and Article 2, paragraph 3, whioh bear witness to what 1 have just stated. 97. A cet égard, permettez-moi de rappeler les paroles de Foster Dulles: 97. In this connexion, I should like to recall what the late Mr. Foster Dulles said: elle consiste d’une part h éviter l’emploi de la force et d’autre part a créer un état de justice. Il n’est pas possible, a long terme, de faire l’un sans l’autre.” “Peaoe is a coin which has two sides, One is the avoidance of the use of force and the other is the WeatiOn of conditions of justice. In the long run you 0annOt expeCt one without the other.t’ 98, It Seems, therefore, to say the least, that the 98. Il semble donc, c’est le moins qu’on puisse dire, questions put to me by Israel are mere attempts to que les questions que le representant d’Israël m’a shed bad light on these decisions by distorting tbeir intent and contents. We are therefore entitled to ask ourselves what is seally bothering the Israel representative. 1 would submit that what is really disturbing him is net the so-called aggreSSiVe Syrian Arab mood, nor is it the alleged trigger-happiness of the Syrians, but the fact that, fox the firs t time their long history, the Arabs are bent on a concerted and fnlly conscious course aimed at the utilization of a11 Arab potentialities and the mobilization of their collective resources and capabilities in order to counter the challenge of colonialism and Zionism as well as lsrael+s continuod aggressive polioies and its insistenoe on denying the rights of the Arabs of Palestine ta return to their homeland. 99. The Israel representative is also disturbed by the glaring fact that every day an increasing number of countries outside the Arab world, as was so eloquently demonstrated by the Conference of Non- Aligned Countries and Governments meeting incairo, are subscribing to the ideal of a world peace based on justice. 100. Al1 of these disturbing elements should invite the members of the Council to treat this matter with a11 the seriousness it deserves and to assess rightly its far-reaching implications. The most ominous sign is that, if Israel believes that the best way to deal with the Arab Summit decisions is ta launch a series of armed acts of aggression against its Arab neighbours, such a course would take us back to the Suez episode, which is still fresh in our memories. 1 would like at this juncture, and aoting under preoise instructions from my Government, to warn the Israel authorities that Syria Will not tolerate any more of these criminal Israel sorties into its territory, Will hold these Israel authorities entirely and solely responsible for a11 the consequences wh.ich might ensue from such an adventurous course. It is very disturbing indeed to see the Israel representative corne and tel1 us here in the Council that his Government bears entire responsibility for the murderous and massive air attack of 13 November. This olearly shows how callous the conscience of the Israelis has become when they defy world opinion with such an arrogant attitude, 101. Before concluding my remarks on the incident of 13 November, its causes, significanoe, and implications, and On Israel’s motives and objectives, 1 would like t0 turn now to the report of the UNTSO Chief of Staff [S/SOSl], which confirms in every respect our well-founded claims and contentions. Before stating my observations on the main body of the report, 1 would like to underline three points, Post Two in the area on the Israel side. 103, Second, paragraph 28 of the report states: II I . . Military Observera from eight Member States have participated in the observation and investigation processes . . . . Their objectivity and their devotion to duty reflect credit to themselves and to the United Nations, ” 104. Third, acoording to paragraph 28 of the report, Military Observers in Observation Posts were in danger on 3 and 13 November 1964. 105. My delegation would like to avail itself of this opportunity to pay tribute to the Chief of Staff and to the Observers for their objectivity and their devotion to duty, as well as their honesty. 106. Turning now to the main body of the report, 1 would like to emphasize the following facts, fully supported by UNTSO’s investigations: (i) The great gravity of the incident of 13 November, as indicated in paragraph 1 of the report. (ii) The occurrenoe of these incidents particularly in the area of the Israal military position of Tel-El-Qadi, that is, the area of Tel Danparagraph 1 of the report-where the eastern part of the road constructed by the Israelis encroaches on Syrian territory. (iii) According to paragraph 4 of the report asingle shot of unknown origin, and presumablycoming from a point west of the Syrian village of Nukheila, was heard by Observation PostAlpha at 1328 hours; that the target of this single shot was, according to UNTSO, an Israelpatrol heading westward on the reconstructed Israel track on the northern edge of Tel-El-Qndi which entered the area encroaching on Syrian territory, and which was the subject of a complaint on 3 November 1964 and of another complaint [No. 80421, lodged with ISMAC on 13 November, in which it was stated that at about 1327 hours an Israel arm.ouredpersonnel carrier had encroached fifty metres into Syrian territory (paragraph 4 of the report). (iv) Paragraph 5 of the report indicates that, according to Observation Posts One and Alpha, heavy firing, which involvedfrom the outset recoilless guns, rifles and heavy machine guns, was not initiated by Syria, but was exchanged between a Syrian position at Nukheila and the ISrael military position of Tel-El-Qadi; that both Syrian and Israel parties were prepared for an intensive bombardment; that, ten minutes later, According to paragraph 6 of the report: 1446 hours, both the Syrian Commander the Senior Israel Delegate had accepted hours for the beginning of the cesse-fire, the United Nations Observation Posts informed accordingly.fl And, accordingtoparagraph 7 of the report: “At 1450 hours, Senior Israel Delegate advised the United Nations Control Centre in Tiberias that his acoeptance of the cesse-fire was not final;” which means that the Israelis broke undertaking to observe the cesse-fixe, viously given before, or at 1446 hours. (V) (vi) According to paragraph 7 of the report, Israeli aerial bombardment was started 1456 hours, that is, six minutes after Israelis broke their undertaking to observe the cesse-fire. (vii) According to paragraph 8 of the report: Israel air attacks continued after 1500 hours. United Nations Observer% reported at 1503 hours that Israel aiscraft had dropped some ten bombs ont1 -the Syrian village of-“Tel Azaziat and followed up with more. At 1510 hours, they reported that Israel planes dropping phosphorus bombs on Tel Azaziat and were also using machine guns. At 1513 heurs, Tel Azaziat was also fired at from Shear Yashov by Israel tanks.” (viii) Accoxding to paragraph 9 of the report, and in spite of Israel’s broken undertaking, accompanied by intensive aerial bombarclment, shelling, and maohine gun strafing, the Syrian side accepted another cease-fire proposa1 be effective at 1530 hours. Yet, in spite of the fact that the Senior IsraelDelegate had accepted at this new cesse-fire at 1508 hours the Israel aerial bombardment was not called off until three minutes before the new cesse-fire came finally effective, that is, at 1530. Inother words, the Israel air attacks, which were reported first by the United Nations observation posts to have started at 1456 hours, lasted from 1456 hours until 1527 hours, that is, something like thirty-one or thirty-five utes. Paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the report the Syrian villages and positions whioh subjected to these air attacks by Issael. to be noted that paragraph 7 of the report referred, together with paragraph 8, to the shelling by Israel tanks from Shear Yashov, that paragraph 8 of the report referred Israel’s dropping of phosphorus bombs on the Syrian village of Tel Azaziat; and that paragraph 5 referred to Israel tank activity Tel-El-Qadi. It follows clearly from paragraphs 5, 7 and 8 of the report that intense (ix) As far -as the casualties and material damages sustained by the Israel and Syrian sides are ooncerned, paragraph 10 of the report mentions that three soldiers were killed and nine wounded at the Israel military position of Tel-El-Qadi and that the only Israel village which suffered substantial damage was Kibbutz Dan. On the Syrian side, the casualties of seven dead and twenty-six injured were confirmed, and additional material damage was noted by the United Nations Observers in the village of Nukheila, which had already been damaged by Israel firing in the previous incident of 3 November. A large burnt area was also seen on the Syrian village of Tel Ahmar where what could have been a napalm bomb container was clearly visible, When it cornes to visiting the areas deep in Syrian territory, where additional damage and casualties might have been sustained, it has never been the rule SO far, in a situation like the one obtaining between Syria and Israel, and when the precision or nonprecision of enemy fire is at stake, to open such places to public scrutiny. The more SO, when the Israel aerial attacks and military activities had been SO clearly andfully observed and reported. Had the United Nations Observers then deemed it absolutely necessary, for the proper oonduot of their investigations, to visit the Syrian areas involved, the Syrian side would have been most willing to arrange for such visits, and to lend its entire and full co-operabon, as it has always done before. I should like t0 add in this connexion that the three locations stated to be military positions, and referred to in paragraph 11 of the report, are in most likelihood Syrian military positions situated inside Syrian territory. (x) Paragraph 12 of the report clearly indicates that the recent tension in the area of Tel-El- Qadi-the Israel “Tel Dan”-which culminated in the 13 November incident, began with the carrying out by Israel of its unlawful and objected-to road project, which, according to paragraph 13 of the report, and to what 1 have stated earlier, was already stopped by UNTSO in the past, and re-stopped by it once more recently when theIsraelis expressed the desire, on 23 October 1964, to resume the work in the Tel Dan area, and in the same location that had been objected to previously. Paragraph 21 of the report also indicates that the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission investigating the incident of 3 November 1964, requested the Senior Israel Delegate to take a11 necessary measures to ensure that no Israel enoroachments would take place in the area. Paragraph 14 of the report further indicates clearly that Israel opposed in the past the continuation, further east, of the survey of the (xi) Paragraph 18 of the report, which draws certain certain analogies between the incident of 3 November 1964 and that of 13 November, and whioh states that “the two parties were prepared for the likelihood of” the renewal of the incident of 3 November. in which artillery was used by both sides, olearly implies that the Israelis were certainly aware of the expected reaction from Syria when they decided to send their military patrol to watch and defend, by force if necessary, the work unlawfully resumed in the eastern part of the road encroaching on Syrian territory. Paragraph 18 a’lso implies that the Israelis should have known clearly that the Syrian expected reaction would, in a11 likelihood, be stronger this time if an Israel army patrol were to be sent to the scene, when no such patrol had been involved in the incident of 3 November. (xii) Paragraph 21 of the report, referring to the incident of 3 November 1964, clearly skates that the Chairman of the MixedArmistice Commission, taking into account the 1:50,000 scale map annexed to the General Armistice Agreement, found that an encroachment into Syrian territory by an Israel bulldozer working at approximately MR21085-29495, that is, in the eastern area, which had not been surveyed by the Canadian team. would appear to be confirmed. (xiii) Paragraph 22 of the report stresses the fact that, although the Israel encroachment on Syrian territory may have been a matter of metres, the maps indicate that in the Tel-El- Qadi area a few metres may be particularly important in view of the issues at stake. My delegation failed, however, to understand how access by Syxian farmers to a spring to which they were legally entitled to have access, since it was located in their territory, and which was traditionally used by them for watering their cattle, could be treated in the report as a comparatively minor question. My delegation also failed to understand how encroachment of a few metres whlch could be as far as 250 or 300 metres, as it is currently estimated by the Syrian side, could be treated lightly. Therefore it was with a sigh of relief that my delegation read paragraph 24 of the report which states that the incidents of 3 and 13 November indicate that the question should not be left inabeyance. 107. Turning now the conclusions and suggestions contained in the report, I should like first of ail, to stress that the Syrian delegation is of the opinion that, although the warning single shot presumably coming from the Syrian side cannot be considered as a lawful alternative to a complaint to bé submitted to the Mixed Armistice Commission, such a warning shot, supposing it was fired by aSyrianmilitary posi- (-) The Syrian authorities rightly consider that such an Israel military incursion into Syrian territory, in a particularly sensitive and tense area, is a very serious matter 0 cc) The Syrian restraint in the face of Israel military incursions is always interpreted by the other side as precedent establishing practice and as acquiesoence by the S@ans in the resumption of unlawful Israel projects. Since the report stressed in its paragraph 25 that t’suspension of the activities about which a party has complained” should also be observed whenever such suspension is deemednecessary by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission during an investigation or after results are known, my delegation feels entitled to say that the two suggestions contained in the aforementionedparagraph should go hand in hand, a position we feel is also shared by t.fle Chief of Staff. 108. Secondly, my delegation cannot but welcome whole-heartedly the observations contained in paragraphs 26 and 27, whereby the paramount importance of having the Israel side attend a11 meetings of the Mixecl Armistice Commission is fully recognized. 109. My delegation is grateful to the Chief of Staff for having SO unequivocally and SO courageously acknowledged the fact, which we have been repeating for the last twelve years, that the normal functioning of the truce supervision machinery is at present greatly hampered by Israel obstruction and nonco-operation and that the greater part of the demilitarized zone is now under de facto Israel authority, in flagrant violation of article V of the General Armistice Agreement governing the zone, 110, It is obvious, on the basis of the information contained in the Chief of Staff’s report, and in the light of the observations 1 have just formulated, that the Israel authorities provoked the incident of 13 November by sending their military patrol across the demarcation line into Syrian territory and by resuming work on the eastern part of the road, in violation of the repeated instructions issued by the organs of UNTSO; that the Syrian side did not initiate the heavy firing which ensued, and that the Israel air attack was an unnecessary resort to force, since it occurred after the Syrian and Israel sides had agreed to abide by a cesse-fire order. 112. 1 wish, first of all, to respectfully remind the Council of its unanimous adoption with regard to the incidents in the area of Lake Tiberias, of the resolution [lll (1956)] of 19 January 1956,-/ from which I should lilce to be allowed to quote the following highly significant and relevant provisions: “The Securi ty Council, If .a, “Reminds the Government of Israel that the Counoil has already condemned military action in breach of the General Armistice Agreements, whether or not undértaken by way of retaliation, and has called upon Israel to take effective measures to prevent such actions; “Condemns the attack of 11 December 1955 as a flagrant violation of the cesse-fire provisions of its resolution of 15 July 1948, of the terms of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria, and of Israel’s obligations under the Charter; l’Expresses its grave concern at the failure of the Government of Israel to comply with its obligations; Walls upon the Government of Israel to do SO in the future, in default of which the Council Will have to oonsider what further measures under the Charter are required to maintain or restore the peace; 11 I I a lfCalls upon both parties to co-operate with the Chief of Staff in this and a11 other respects, to carry out the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement in good faith, and in particular to make full use of the Mixed Armistice Commission!s maohinery in the interpretation and application of its provisions.11 113. My delegation rightly feels that, as long as Israel is not oompelled to oo-operate with the machinery established for the supervision of the General Armistice Agreement, it Will be able to corne to the Council and tel1 us that it had to do what was done as a last resort and with no choice of doing something else, suoh as obeying .oease-fire orders fully observed by the other side, or trying to have its armistice grievances redressed in the Mixed Armistice Commission which is the organ specifically designed to deal with such disputes, -/ ibid., Eleventh Year. Resolutions ancl Cecisians of the Security Council. 19156. 115. My delegation would like to seize this opportunity to acknowledge with praise and satisfaction the Secretary-General’s and UNTSO’s untiring efforts towards preserving peace, reducing tensions and upholding the high ideals and authority of the Uqited Nations, My delegation considers it equally proper to point out in this connexion that the Secretary- General’s requests Will not by themselves solve the problem with which the whole truce supervision apparatus is faced, namely, Israel’s non-co-operation with that machinery. We rightly feel, and this feeling is widely shared, that unless the Israelis are made to participate in the meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission, no real progress cari be made towards attaining the objectives set forth in the Armistice Agreement. This latter thought is not a persona1 or isolated opinion lightly expressed. It is what the resolutions of the Security Council to which 1 have already referred have been stating for the past several years. bleme qui se pose a ltensemble du dispositif l’on progres tion d’armistice la d’une a la legere; citees. 116, My delegation feels also that it is high time that the Council considered what further measures it should take under the Charter, such as the measures provided for in Article 41, to deal effectively with the persistent defiance of Israel and its failure to comply with its obligations. If the Security Council does not take drastic and effective measures agsinst the Israel air attack, and if it does not censure in the strongest terms the Israel authorities for this act of war for which they admitted entire responsibility, then 1 am afraid it Will become an established Israel policy to resort to aerial bombardment on each occasion where minor armistice incidents take place. My delegation is confident that the Security Council is well aware of the disastrous consequences which would result from such a reckless and adventurous policy initiated by Israel, and which would be a most serious threat to the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the area. delegation, mesures - comme, 1’Article obstine ses obligations. pas par des mesures taque dans les termes ment israélien m&me fort qu’Israël bombardement mineur produira. securité treuses aussi tres region. 117. que ltArticle défense, On a parle “mesures les armées. ment attaques du “mesures prises fiants dont le représentant 117. My delegation, 1 think rightly, considers that there is already an extensive literature on Article 51 of the Charter dealing with self-defence. Terms such as “exploratory self-defence”, “preventive selfdeferme”, etc., have already found their way to the highest councils dealing with asmed aggression. The Council would certainly be the first to see ta it that armed attacks of the nature of the Israel massive air raid of 13 November, be not construed as “an emergency defence measure” or as “a measure taken in the last resort”, fantastic expressions with which the latest Israel armer) aggression is lightly dismissed by the Israel representative and authorities. Although o/ Document A/C.5/1017. 118, I have just received the following table: “On the moxning of 25 Novembex”-the day befoxe yesterday- “an Israel armoured car was again patxolllng alongsidé this track and encxoaching into Syrian t~xritory”. The Syrian delegation to the Armistice Commission has lodged a complaint. 1 shall read the oomplaint: “On 25 November 1964, at 0945 hours local time, an Isxael armoured car took the Israeli track which encroached into Syrian territory north of Tel-El- Qadi, which had been the subject of numerous complaints, in the full view of the United Nations militaxy obsexvers, Our delegation”-that is the Syrian delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission- “strongly protests and requests the Chairman to take immediate and adequate measuxes. It 119. The Syrian delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission bas requested a full investigation of this matter. 1 am sure the Secretaxy-General Will bear me out; I am sure he has received copies of this complaint. 120. In bringing this statement to a close, 1 should like to recall to the Council what Philip C, Jessup, our dear fxiend and a member of this Council in the past, obseryed xecently in his book A Modern Law of Nations -! He said: “International situations in --’ which there is no choice of means and no moment for deliberation are rare indeed”. TO this 1 would add that the plea of “emergency defence measure” or l’measure taken in the last resort” employed by the Israel representative and authoxities to justify the wanton air attack of 13 Novembex on Syrian territory and population are at best an abuse of xight. 1 would respectfully xemind the Council in this connexion that Gexmany jllstified its invasion of Belgium in 1914, and Nazi Germany its invasion of Norway in 1940, by employing the plea of “preventive self-defence”. 121. 1 apologize for my long statement, Mr. President, and 1 should like to express to you and to the honourable members of the Council my delegation’s thanks, gratitude and great appxeciation for my having been SO kindly allowed to speak on this sgcond occasion. My delegation would also appreciate being aocoxded, at a latex stage, an opportunity should it deem it necessaxy. to speak again

1 have three more names on my list of speakers, those of the xepxesentatives of Israel, Moxocco and the United Kingdom. If there is no objection 1 propose that the Council adjourn until -/ New York. ‘IIe Macmillan Company, 1948. 124. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l’anglais): J’aidonne lecture de la liste des orateurs dans l’ordre de leur inscription, mais si le représentant duRoyaume- Uni ne s’oppose pas & la demande du representant du Maroc, je ne m’y opposerai certainement pas non plus.

The requests for the privilege of speaking came to me in the order 1 have inclicated, but if the United Kingdom delegation has no objection to changing the ordes the President certainly has none. 125. M, JACKLING (Royaume-Uni) [traduit de l’anglais]: Je ne pense pas que ma délegation ait une objection a formuler, mais le, Conseil pourrait peut- être remettre sa decision & plus tard. 125. Mr, JACKLING (United Kingdom): 1 do not expect that my delegation would wish to take any exception to this suggestion, but might we perhaps be allowed to reserve a final decision until alater stage. 126. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l’anglais): Dans ce cas, les representants du Maroc et du Royaume-Uni pourraient désirent prendre la parole; le Conseil pourrait lever la séance maintenant; il entendrait cet après-midi d’abord le représentant d’Israël puis les repré- sentants du Maroc et du Royaume-Uni, selon la decision qu’ils auront prise. 126, The PRESIDENT: Perhaps, in the circumstances, the representatives of Morocco and the United Kingdom could consult on the order of speaking, and we ,could adjourn now and hear the representative of Israel this aftesnoon, proceeding thereafter in accordanee with whichever order they agree upon. The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications may distributors throughout the world. Write io: United Nations, Sales COMMENT SE PROCURER LES Les publications des Nations Unies agences dépositaires du monde entier. ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, Section COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de las Naciones casas distribuidoras en todas partes dirijase a: Naciones Unidas, Secci& Litho in UN. Price: $US. 0.50 (or equivalent in ocher currencies)