S/PV.1165 Security Council

In accordance with ourprevious decision, 1 shall invite the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and of Israel to take their seats at the Council table, 1. Le PRESIDENT ment B la décision prise représentants d’Israël Sur l’invitation (Israël) table du Conseil. Af fhe invitation of the President, Mr. Michael S. Comay (Israel) and Mr. Rafik Asha (Syria) took places at the Cout~il table, 2. Le représentant déclaration,

The representative of Israel has asked to make a statement, and I now cal1 upon him. 3. M. COMAY (Israel) [traduit de l’anglais]: le Président, mis de prendre au sujet des plaintes dont il est saisi.Dans ration fourni disposait également questions

Mr. President, 1 thank you once more for permitting me to address the Security Council on the complaints before it. My previous statement, on 16 November [1162ndmeeting], provided the Council with whatever information was available at that time about the incident which took place on 13 November, and also dealt with the background to that incident and the wider issues raised by it. 1 am sorry that my Syrian colleague found that statement 4, First, regarding the incident of 13 November, the report, I submit, corroborates the Israel account. The main fa&ual elements in our account were as follows: Fa&, 1, An Israel patrol vehicle was proceeding at the time along the border road in the vicinity of Tel-El-Qadi. This is not disputed, and in factit was confirmed, amongst other evidence, by the direct observation of United Nations OP-l, the observation post which is situated on the eastern side of Tel-El- Qadi. Thés is mentioned in the report inparagraph 4, and also in Annex C, Appendix F. Fact 2 - The Syrian position at Nukheila opened fire on the Israel patrol vehicle. This is admitted by the Syrians themselves, and confirmed by the investigation reports; that is to say, inparagraph 4 of General Bull’s report, also in Annex C, Appendix F and also in the shootrep in Annex B. Fact 3 A At the time it was attacked, the patrol vehicle was inIsrae1 territory. This is not directly confirmed by the United Nations reports, but on 16 November the surveying expert of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) Captain Brizzi, plotted the location of the vehicle when attacked, and he gives the map reference in his report, which is Annex A. According to Israel topographers, this map reference establishes beyond doubt that the vehicle was at the time in Israel territory, a question about which we have never felt any doubt. 5. 1 should like at this point to digress briefly to paragraph 21 of General Bull’s report, which relates to the earlier incident on 3 November. The Syrian representative relied very heavily on that paragraph, but it may now need to be revised. That paragraph reads in part: “The Chairman, taking into account the 1:50,000 map annexed to the General Armistice Agreement, found that an encroachment by the Israeli bulldozer into Syrian territory would appear to be confirme& However, the 1:50,000 map was not of a scale to permit definitive judgements in a matter of metres. I1 & Officia1 Records of the Securiry Council. Nineteench Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1964. Fact 4 / A number of Syrian forts and artillery positions, covexing a wide arc, promptly joined in the attack. This appears from paragraph 5 of General Bull’s report, and it is confirmed in detail by the observations at the time of the United Nations Observers in the area, and by the subsequent investigation reports. Fait No 4, Un certain nombre de casemates et de po- Bact 5 These Syrian positions opened a bombaxd- -* ment by axtillery and heavy mortar fixe directed at Israel civilian villages, particularly KibbutzDan. This also is indisputable, and is confixmed in detail by the observations from the United Nations observation posts and by the subsequent United Nations investigations. The calibre of the weapons used, according to these United Nations reports, included medium and heavy artillery of 105 mm and 155 mm and heavy mortars up to 120 mm. The damage, particularly at Kibbutz Dan, is reported as extensive. The investigatoxs found no evidence of military fortifications or positions in these villages. Fact 6. The description of the terrain bears out that the Syrian positions wexe on high ground, and not vulnerable to counter-Tire from below. pas nécessairement la position de Nukheila, d’oii par un croquis joint a l’annexe D. Ce croquis indique 7, Addxessing the Council this morning [1164th meeting], the Syrian representative pointed out that this does not necessarily apply to Nukheila, from which the fixing started, because that is at approximately the same height as the Israel position on Tel-El-Qadi. That is substantially correct, and 1 think that accounts for the fact that Nukheila was not counter-attacked by Israel planes. It was subjected only to counter-fire, return fire, from the ground. That, 1 think, appears quite conclusively from a sketch attached to Annex D. That sketch indicates the places at which the United Nations investigation teams found Fact 7. The reports from the United Nations Observation Posts confirm that the Israel planes went into action at about 1456 heurs local time, that is, an hour and a half after the initial Syrian attack, over an hour after the shelling of the villages commenced. Fact 8. The bombing by the Israel planes strictly confined to Syrian military positions directly involved in the attack on our villages. Ihave already mentioned this very revealing United Nations sketch, which disclosed where traces of bombing were found. I should like to add, on that, the following points which emerge from the reports: (a) The United Nations investigators found Syrian village which had been bombed. @) The Syrlans refused to let the observers most of the places mentioned in their own complaint. With regard to three of these places, the Syrians themselves claimed that they were military positions, That cari be found in Annex D, paragraph 4 (0). (c) Syrian witnesses alleged that there had been civ?lian casualties, but the United Nations investigators were not allowed to check on or verify statement. In fact, they were refused access to any casualties at ail, That appears also from Annex D, paragraph 4 (m). 8. I should like to say a little bit more about the village of Nukheila, because it is a hamlet, it was attacked of‘ counter-attacked, it was subjected ground fire, and it is said that some damage was caused to it-and this has been used to suggest that there were Israel attacks on at least one civilian village. 9. At the time of the incident on 13 November, only life ,at Nukheila hamlet was that of Syrian troops occupying military positions situated in, next to, and in front of, the hamlet. There has never been any doubt about the existence of those positions. And it may be noted that, when the United Nations investigators tered the hamlet, they were stopped andnot allowed see the whole of it. That is stated by the observer% Annex D, paragraph 4 (e). They also interviewed nesses regarding what happened in Nukheila. That is in Annex D, paragraph 5. These were a11 military nesses, who said they were stationed there at the time. The investigators found no civilians in the village, The Syrians explained that, immediately the incident, the inhabitants had been evacuated. According to our quite clear observation, the inhabitants had been evacuated-but in advance of the incident on 13 November-and there were no civilians there during the exchange of fire. Here, again, it should be noted from the investigation reports that, although civflians from other places were produced to the 10. TO sum up, then, the over-allpicture that emerges from the report and a study of the detailed annexes to the report is substantially the same picture that my delegation presented to the Council at its 1162nd meeting. 11. I should like to make some further comment on one point to which a good deal of attention was given this morning by the Syrian representative, who tried to draw’ some far-reaching inferences from it. 1 refer to the successive attempts to arrange a cesse-fire. 12. The report and the annexes indicate. firstly, that the first cesse-fire was proposed for 1430 hours and fmmediately accepted on the Israel side. This discounts the Syrian representative’s suggestion thatand 1 quote what he said this morning-“the air attack was planned a long time ago, that it was meant to be a massive show of force” [1164th meeting para. 291. If we had planned to throw planes in as a show of force, and planned it a long time before, it seems odd that we should immediately agree to a cesse-fire which would stop the firing there in the whole engagement long before our planes appeared on the scene. 13. It is net our fault st a11 that this cesse-fire did not take effect, because the United Nations representatives explained to us that they could not locate the Syrian delegates to the Mixed Armistice Commission. It is a very curious circumstance that no Syrian delegate attached to the Mixed Armistice Commission couldbe located for about an hour and a half after the start of Ws action, this att;ack, in spite of the fact that the headquarters of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission is at Damascus, with the control centre at Quneitra, in Syria, near the scene of this incident, and that four permanent United Nations observation posts are situated on the Syrian side of the border, No explanation has been offered for the vanishing of the Syrian officers who should have been in touch with the United Nations representatives as soon as the incident commenced. If there is any sinister element in the story of the cesse-fire, it is this. The ceasefire, which was proposed for 1430 hours, failed because of this oircumstance to which 1 have referred. 14, The next cesse-fire proposed for 1500 hourswas arranged on the Syrian side through a local Syrian Army Commander-the Syrian representatives on the tiixed Armistice Commission still being incommunicado. There is no evidence, however, that a11 the Syrian positions had actually been informed of the cesse-fire or that it would have taken effect on the Syrian side at 1500 hours. The United Nations investigators were denied access to the Syrian positions and to those in charge of them, and therefore had no opportunity of checking who had or had not already received instructions about the cesse-fire, 15. On the Israel side, the arrangement was made with the Israel Senior Delegate to the Mixed Armistice Commission in Tiberias at the United Nations control centre. Four minutes later, at 1450 heurs, the Israel delegate returned ta the control centre, and informed the control centre in Tiberias that he had been unable to establish contact with forward positions: which, think, suggests, that he had tried immediately, in the few minutes remaining before the cesse-fire was supposed to corne into effect and had net succeeded. That 1s corraborated when Lieutenant Ben Yacov, Commander of the Israel post at Tel-El-Qadi, which was right in the thick of the fighting, was afterwards interrogated by the United Nations investigators. confirmed to them that he had not received any word of a 1500 hour cesse-fire. The relevant passages the testimony of Lieutenant Ben Yacov-this is from the investigation report of the Israel complaint-are as follows: “A short time before half past two we had an order for cesse-fire at 1430 LT, but as the Syrians continued firing towards us and Kibbutz Dan, contlnued to return the fire. Firing continued quite a time and at about 1515 local time, 1 was ordered to cesse fixe at 1530 LT, which was done and strictly adhered to. “We were under very intense fire, dust smoke covered the Tel around us and mortar tank shells exploded and covered the whole area of Tel-El-Qadi. II .*a “Question 3. Did you receive a message to the effect that the oease-fire pu refer to as proposed for 1430 LT was not effective, as UNTSO had not been able to contact the Syrian authorities? “Answer 3. 1 did not receive suchamessage, maybe due to communications diffioulties. “Question 4. Did you receive instructions regarding a cesse-fire proposed for 1500 LT? “Answer 4. None were received, possibly because we were having difficulties with our telephones which had been damaged by mortar and shell fire.” [S/6061/Add.l, Annex C, para., 5.1 The third attempt to arrange a cesse-fire was concluded at 1508 heurs and at this time it duly came into effect at 1530 heurs, 16. 1 have gone carefully into this because of the suggestions that the Israel authorities were concerned with trying to stall off a cesse fire or to prevent one coming into effect. That is not SO at all. 18. As far as the Israel side is concerned, there 1s no ground here for surprise or disapproval. This is a sensitive border area the peace of which was disrupted on 3 November by a violent Syrian attack against civilian workers repairing the roadway. Immediately after that, work had to be resumed on the roadway as well as regular patrolling on it. In fact, the patrols did corne through on the road aftes the 3 November incident on 5, 6, 8 11 and 13 November, when the patrol vehicle was attacked. It was necessary after 3 November to take the measures required to safeguard and protect the area against further attack. A possible renewal of the 3 November incident meant only one thing, a possible renewal of Syrian attacks upon Israel activities-as happened on 3 November and 13 Kovember, and on every other occasion when there has been shooting on the Israel-Syrian border. 18. Pour Israël, il n’y a pas matière ici& étonnement OU gique, dont le calme a et6 troublé le 3 novembre par une violente attaque syrienne contre des ouvriers civils qui réparaient laroute. Il afallu, immédiatement après l’attaque, reprendre les travaux sur la route et les patrouilles ordinaires. En fait, les patrouilles ont repris sur la route en question après l’incident du 3 novembre: il y en a eu les 5, 6, 8, 11 et 13 novembre, jour oit le véhicule de la patrouille a BtB attaque. Aprés le 3 novembre, il a fallu prendre les mesures nécessaires pour protéger la région contre une nouvelle attaque. Une éventuelle répétition de l’incident du 3 novembre ne pouvait signifier qu’une chose: une éventuelle reprise des attaques syriennes contre les activités d’Israël, comme cela s’était produit les 3 et 11 novembre et chaque fois qu’il y avait eu échanges de coups de feu le long de la frontiére israélo-syrienne. 19. On ne connaît pas de cas oii les forces israé- liennes aient ouvert le feu en direction du territoire syrien, alors que les forces syriennes l’ont fait des centaines de fois en direction du territoire israélien, A cet égard, il est intéressant de noter que dans la deuxiéme partie de l’annexe E au rappost du gé- néral Bull figure une liste de 155plaintes syriennes - pour la plupart desquelles il n’est pas demandé d’enquê te - pour la période du 10 octobre au 13 novembre, Dans aucune de ces plaintes les Syrienseuxmarnes n’ont prétendu que le feu avait été ouvert par les Israéliens. Il faut dor.c préciser que lorsque le rapport parle de &Pétition possible de l’incident du 3 novembre les deux parties ne doivent pas &tre mises a Qgalité, et que c’est la Syrie qui est en cause, 19. There is no case on record of Israelforces opening fire into Syrian territory, as against literally hundreds of cases of Syrian forces opening fire on Israel territory. In this connexion, it is interesting to note that attached to General Bull’s report, as Annex E, Part II, there is a list of 155 Syrian Complaints, most of them not requesting an investigation, relating to the periodfrom 10 October to 13 November. There is not a single case in which even the Syrians themselves allege that fire was opened from the Israel side. It is necessary to make the point that when the report mentions a possible renewal of the 3 November incident, the two parties should not be equated because this meant a possible renewâl by Syria. 20. Just one further comment before I leave the events of 13 November. The representative of Syria, in concluding his remarks this morning, based himself on the Security Council resolution [111(1956)]2/ of 19 January 1956 concerning an incident in the area of Lake Tiberias. IIe knows as well as 1 do that 20. Permettez-moi observation au sujet des événements du 13 novembre. Ce matin, & la fin de sonexposé, le représentant de la Syrie s’est fondé sur la résolution [lll Conseil de sécurité en date du 19 janvier 1956 relative Tibkriade. aucune analogie entre cet incident et celui du 13 novembre, et que la résolution qu’il invoque est hors de propos. there is no analogy between the facts of the two cases, and the resolution he invokes is irrelevant. 21, une question qui touche de très prbs le rapport du général Bull, ZL savoir celle de la piste qui frontière clairement du rapport que, pas plus le 3que le 13 novembre, territoire des particuliers, de citoyens israéliens sur une route construite par Israal. concerne l’emplacement de la piste elle-mgme et non ses 21. 1 should now lïke to make an observation on a matter which is very relevant to General Bull’s report, and that is the border track in the Tel-El-Qadi area. It is clear from the report thatwe are not dealing either on 3 November or on 13 November with alleged penetration by indivlduals into Syrian territory, in the normal sense of the term, but with Israelis working or travelling on an Israel-made road. The charge of encroachment, therefore, relates to the location of the track itself, and not to the persons using it, although unfortunately it is the latter who were attacked. General Bull’s seport refers to rité, 1956. 2/ Ibid., Eleventh Year. Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Councll, 1956. 22. This track is in fact one section, about five kilometses long, of the road which runs on the Israel side of the Lebanese and Syrian borders, for a distance of about 120 kilometres, a11 the way from the Mediterranean toast to Lake Tiberias. The roadway is essential, amongst other purposes, to ensure regular patrolling of long and vulnerable borders with hostile neighbours, in view of civllian activities in t.he vioinity of the border. 23. The part of the track which is on the northern Israel-Syrian border, in the Tel-El-Qadi area, was constructed in two sections. The first section is from Tel-El-Qadi eastward to Wadi Asal about two kilometres, and that was completed in October 1961; and the section westward from Tel-El-Qadi to tht Hasbani River, about three kilometres, was completed in May 1962. .as the report itself states. 24. As the Council will note from paragraph 14 of the report, a Canadian Army survey team placed at the disposa1 of UNTSO carried out early last year a survey of the western part of the track starting at the Hasbani River, up to a point approximately 250 metres west of Tel-El-Qadi. That paragraph in the report suggests that the survey stopped at that point as Israel had “withdrawn its co-operation for a continuation of the survey further east”. 1 regret to say that this remark in the report is unwarranted by the fa&, as 1 shall show, 25. The proposa1 for an expert border survey came originally from Israel representatives in 1962 and related to another sector & good distance away, on the eastern frontier at Kfar Szold, or Border Pillar 45, as it is known. UNTSO obtained Syrian agreement to this proposal. The Syrians had also beencomplaining about the new section of the border track west of TeliEl-Qadi, which had been completed in May 1962. Shortly after the completion of that section, on 29 June 1962, General von Horn wrote to Mr. Erell, the Israel Director of Armistice Affairs, as follows: “1 had promised to keep you informed of the results of my conversations in Damascus. 1 am. doing SO without delay. The main problem which was raised was that which 1 had discussed with you, tiz., the situation resulting from recent Israel work in the vicinity of the armistice demarcation line west of Tel-El-Qadi and from the Syrian allegation that part of the new Israeli track encroaches on Syrian territory.” 26. The Chief of Staff(s letter goes on to suggest how UNTSO might clear up the matter. In replying to him on 1 July, Mr. Ere11 offered to make available to “The same material was used by our surveys last year to determine the alignment for another stretch of track, closer to the Tel, As you recalled in our meeting of 26 June, the Syrian authorities had alleged encroachment there and later admitted a mistake on their part.” “Le même materie a servi l’année derni8re pour déterminer l’alignement d’un autre tronçon de la piste, vers le Tel. Comme vous l’avez rappel6 de notre réunion du 26 juin, les autorités syriennes avaient prétendu qu’il y avait empiétement sur ce point, mais avaient reconnu par la suite qu’ils s’étaient trompés. II 27. At a later stage it was agreed that an expert survey should be made not only of the sector at Border Pillar 45 but also of the sector west of Tel- El-Qadi, the sector which was in fact surveyed. 27. Plus tard, il a été convenu d’effectuer un levé d’experts, non seulement du secteur de la bornefrontibre de Tel-El-Qadi; a été établi. 28. On 13 January 1963, Mr. Ere11 wrote to General von Horn summarizing the position. 1 do not need to quote his letter in full. 1 merely wish to say that in that letter, which is on file with UNTSO, he refers no less than four times to the sector to be surveyed by the Canadian team and each time he describes it as “the track”, or “the new track”, tlwest of Tel-El- Qadi “, This definition of the task of the Canadian surveyors in that area is completely in accordance with the earlier correspondence 1 have mentionecl and it was not queried by UNTSO in any way. 28. Le 13 janvier 1963, M. Ere11 a écrit au général von Horn pour lui résumer la situation, Je n’ai pas besoin de cites intégralement sa lettre. Qu’il me suffise de dire que dans cette’lettre, qui se trouve dans les dossiers de l’ONUST, M. Ere11 mentionne& quatre reprises le secteur dont l’équipe canadienne devait faire le levé, parlant chaque fois de “la piste” ou de “la nouvelle piste” % l’ouest de Tel-El-Qadi”. mission ainsi confiée aux géomètres canadiens dans le secteur concorde exactement avec celle dont il était question dans la lettre précédente dont j’ai donné aussi lecture, et 1’ONUST ne l’a jamais mise en doute. 29, The Canadian team thereupon proceeded to carry out a survey of precisely those two aseas stipulated in the foregoing correspondence: that is, the section west of Tel-El-Qadi and the sector on the eastern frantier at Border Pillar 45. There is no record of an UNTSO request that Captain Reichert’s survey be continued eastward past Tel-El-Qadi, still less of any Israel refusa1 to co-operate with such an extension, That is borne out by the exchange of letters officially confirming the results of the survey. On 16 April 1963, Colonel Churley, the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO, wrote to Mr. Erell, stating: 29. L’équipe canadienne a donc effectué un levé des deux secteurs indiqués dans ces lettres, celui qui est situ partie est de la frontière, a la borne 45. On ne trouve dans les archives aucune requête de 1’ONUST tendant ?i continuer le levé du capitaine Reichert vers l’est au-delà de Tel-El-Qadi, et B plus forte raison aucune indication qu’Israël ait opposéune fin de non-recevoir. La preuve en est l’échange de lettres confirmant officiellement les résultats du levé. Le 16 avril 1963, le colonel Churley, chef d’état-major par intkrim de 1lONUST a Ecrit a M, Ere11 ceci: “This letter is written for the purpose of providing you officially with the results of the topographie survey by the Canadian survey team of UNTSO in recent weeks.” “Je vous communique officiellement par la pré- sente les résultats du levé topographique effectué par l’équipe des géomètres canadiens de 1’ONUST au cours des derni&res semaines.” Aprés avoir donné quelques détails techniques, le colonel Churley a poursuivi: After some technical details, Colonel Churley’s lettes continues : “Du 25 au 28 février llONUST, accompagnés de ceux d’Israël, ont fini de relever le tracé de la piste , , . ni la piste ni le fossé ne franchissent la ligne de démarcation; ils n’empiètent pas sur la Syrie. Aux points les plus rapprochés, le fossé comme la piste se trouvent & 8 mstres au sud de la ligne de démarcation d’armistice. montrant la position de la piste israélienne par rapport & la ligne de démarcation d’armistice, de la rivière 250 mbtres à l’ouest de Tel-El-Qadi; C’est le plan No 1, 1963.” “On 25 February 1963 to 28 February 1963, UNTSO surveyors accompanied by Israeli surveyors, completed the survey of the track . . . neither the track nor the ditch crossed the demarcationline into Syria. At the nearest points the ditch is eight meters south of the armistice demarcation line and the track also eight metres south. The graphie result 0% the survey of the relative location of the Israel track to the armistice demarcation line from the Hasbani River to a point about 250 metres west of Tel-El-&a& is enclosed as plan No. 1, 1963.” “The survey having cleared of a11 doubts the remaining portion of the track extending from Wadi Asal to the Hasbani, we are preparingnow to reopen the whole length of the track for traffic and to complete work on certain sections. Commander Melin’s request not to do SO before the beginning of next month Will be takén into account.” 31. By the middle of 1963 the position could be summed up as follows: (s) In 1962 the Syrians complained that the new section of the border track west of Tel-El-Qadi, encroached into Syrian territory; (b) It was agreed that the Canadian survey team would survey that section of the track; (c) Canadian team did survey that section of the track; (b) UNTSO officially informed Israel that the survey showed the track to be in Israel territory and that the Syrian charge of encroachment was unfounded; (e) The Israel representative then informed UNTSO that the whole of the traclc would now be opened to traffic the work on it completed. 32. In June 1963 there was some shooting at patrols on this track, but from then until last month-a period of fifteen months-there were no incidents or complaints involving this track. 33. Recently it was found that the trackwouldhave undergo considerable reconstruction andrepair before the onset of the winter rains, which normally commence in November. On 23 October 1964, the Israel representative informed the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission in writing of the intended repair work on the track near Tel-El-Qadi. Some discussion then took place regarding the location of the work, from which it transpired that it would be east of the sector surveyed by the Canadian team. Thereupon, on 28 October, Israel representatives proposed that the area in which the work would take place should be surveyed. 34. On 29 October, this proposa1 was confirmed writing in a message from the Senior Israel Delegate to the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission in the following terms: WI wish to confirm my request to the Tiberias Control Centre made on 28 October for a survey in the area intended for the reconstruction of the track in the vicinity of OP-l. The survey start from the eastern point which was surveyed by UNTSO Canadian survey team, to the eaSt Tel-El-Qadi. The survey to be conducted by the same terms of reference jointly agreed for the 36, 1 trust the indulgence of the Council has not been unduly taxed by this recital of the background, but my delegation felt it necessary to place in its proper sequence and perspective the history of the border Crack and the survey thereof. 36. J’espere n’avoir pas trop abusé de l’indulgence des membres du Conseil en rappelant tous ces faits, mais ma délégation a jugk &cessaire de retracer chronologiquement et dans le cadre approprié l’histoire de la piste frontalière et de son levé. 37. Je suis maintenant autorisé a informer le Conseil que, conform.kment à la proposition qu’il a faite en octobre, Israël est disposé 2 accepter que le levé soit continu8 de mani8re à préciser la position de la piste par rapport a la frontigre. Les travaux à cet effet reprendraient donc à partir de l’extr&nité du tronçon dont le tracé a étk relevé l’année derniére par l’équipe de 1’ONUST sous la directionducapitaine Reichert et se poursuivraient vers l’est jusqu’à la borne 39 ou tout autre endroit se mettraient d’accord, en prenant pour base le le& effectué l’an dernier par 1’ONUST. 38. Je voudrais maintenant examiner brihement certains points soulevés aux paragraphes 24 a 28 du rapport du chef d’état-major. 39. En premier lieu,ilestquestion, auparagraphe 24, du levk qui devait être effectué pour la partie la plus ancienne de la piste; j’en ai déja longuement parlé. 37. 1 am now authorized to inform the Council that, in pursuance of the proposa1 made by us in October, we are prepared to agree to the continuation of the survey for the purpose of establishing the position of the track in relation to the border, This continuation would be from the eastern end of the stretch of track surveyed last year by the UNTSO surveying team, headed by Captain Reichert, thence eastwards to Cairn 39 or to any other place which Will be agreed upon by the parties on the basis of the aforesaid UNTSO survey of last year. 38. 1 would like now to touch on some of the points dealt with towards the end of the Chief of Staff!s report, in paragraphs 24 to 28. 39. Pirstly, paragraph 24 of the report refers to the survey whioh should be carried out of the older part of the track, and 1 have already dealt fully with that question in my present statement. 40. Au paragraphe 25 du rapport, le gkn8ral Bull revient sur l’échange de coups de feu a la frontiare. J’ai parlé en détail de ce problème et de la tension dont il est cause dans ma précédente déclaration au Conseil [11628me séance]; il me reste seulement & ajouter que mon gouvernement soutient des plus fermement le principe selon lequel nul ne devrait ouvrir le feu, quelles que soient les circonstances. Les forces israéliennes ont a cet Egard les ordres les plus stricts et ne doivent riposter que si cela est indispensable a des fins de légitime défense ou pour des opérations de dégagement. 41. Toujours au paragraphe 25, le général Bullparle de suspension des activités. En ce qui concerne la 40. In paragraph 25 of the report, General Bull again refers to the question of firing across the border. 1 dealt with this particular problem and source of tension fully in my previous statement to the Council [1162nd meeting], and a11 1 need do at this stage is to give my Government’s strongest endorsement to the principle that there should be no opening of fire, under any circumstances. The Israel forces have the most stringent orders never to open fire, and to return fire only when it is essential for self-defence or for rescue purposes. 41. In the same paragraph 25, General Bull refers to suspension of activities. As regards suspending 42. Paragraph ‘26 refers to the Mixed Armistice Commission. 1 should explain that although it does not have forma1 meetings, the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission is not in suspense, as is commonly believed, but, on the contrary, is more active and has more extensive machinery than any other Mixed Armistice Commission on our boxders. It fully performs a11 normal functions of observation of the border and investigation of complaints, and in addition it deals with the adjustment of a wide range of other border problems between the parties. Israel cooperates with the Mixed Armistice Commission and its Chairman, and with the Chief of Staff, concerning a11 these matters. 43. While preserving our position on questions of principle, we are ready to discuss with the Chief of Staff ways and means of utilizing the machinery of the Mixed Armistice Commission to the best advantage possible undes the circumstances. 44. Finally, General Bull refers to the state of tension on the border in paragraph 27 of the report. My Government w,elcomes his forthright statement that “The prevailing atmosphere of tension between the two countries is also a consequence of Syria’s steadfast refusa1 to seek an end to its conflict with Israel”. 45. We heard this morning [1164th meeting] alengthy propaganda attack on my country’s peace offers. 1 do not propose here to refute that attack in detai1. The records of the serile annual debates in the General Assembly on the refugee item speak for themselves. One point mentioned by Mr. Asha this morning’ is typical. He said that we signed a certain protocol in Lausanne on 12 May 1949 as a subterfuge to secure our admission to the United Nations, If he had checked a little bit more carefully, he would have fcund that Israel was admitted to this Organization on 11 May, the day before that protocol was signed in Lausanne. 46. I shall merely make a blanket reservation about a11 those portions of the Syrian representative’s statement which cari be regarded as propaganda, andI corne back to the sentence 1 have already quoted from the report. 1s General Bull right or not? Is Syria willing to seek by peaceful means an end to its confliot with Israel, or is it not? A clear, simple, unambiguous and affirmative answer to that question posed by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO would greatly clear the air. It would lessen tension and would at least prcmcte a process of peaceful coexistence as a stage towards peace. 47, In my previous statement to the Council, 1 dealt fully with the broad political background and I asked certain questions, adding that those questions go to 49. It is my Government’s earnest hope that the 49. United Nations, and especially the Security Council, que l’Organisation wfll corne to grips with the real problem, on which le Conseil General Bull squarely puts his finger when he speaks blème, celui sur of “Syria’s steadfast refusa1 to seek an end to its doigt conflict with Israel.” de chercher 50. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): This is the 50. Lord first occasion that 1 have the honour to address this 1 glais]: Council, and 1 would not be SO presumptuous as to l’honneur attempt or pretend to speak with authority on quesje n’aurai tiens of which the full facts are much more familiar 1 de questions to other members of the Council than they cari be to naissent me. 51, Nor would it be appropriate for me now to draw 51. Je ne chercherai conclusibns or pronounce judgements on the evidence tenant des conclusions before us, Still less would 1 attempt now to allocate les faits qui nousontétéprésentés.Aplus blame or make accusations, for to do somight merely i n’essaierai-je inflame feelings which, as we sec, are SO strongly and 1 des accusations, sincerely held. We are gathered not to condemn but ’ effet que d’exacerber to conciliate. But I have carefully studied the cons’exprimer structive report of the Chief of Staff of the United sommes Nations Truce Supervisory Organization in Jerusalem cilier. which so thoroughly describes the events of 13 constructif -November and the circumstances which led up to it. nisme des Nations Unies charg8 de la surveillance And I have listened with close attention to the la trêve, & Jérusalem, speeches made in this Council. Having done SO, 1 am les évdnements most strongly convinced that we must direct our atqui les ont amenés. J’ai écouté avec beaucoup d’attentention and our undivided effort not to recrimination tion les déclarations and bitterness about what has taken place, but to Conseil. practieal steps to prevent any such violent and dangerque nous devons, non pas nous abandonner aux &Crious explosions in the future. minations attacher d’empêcher explosions 52. The loss of life and the damage caused in the 52. Certes, events which we now consider were certainly serious ont fait bien des victimes enough, but it is clear that the danger of new violence est évident que le risque in the future continues to threaten as long as nothing violence persistera is clone to deal with and to remove the causes of the faire outbreak. And, as we read the reports, it must also be ports, plain to a11 of us that, had it not been for the timely les efforts and energetic efforts of the United Nations authorities, Nations the situation might have rapidly become îar more s’aggraver serious, The tireless vigilance and scrupulous fairet reconnaissants ness which they constantly show are assets for which loyauté we should be both proud and thankful. ment preuve. 54. In many parts of the world 1 have subsequently seen how much good cari be done when men corne together in constructive effort to remove the causes of racial and national friction and to establish. the machinery of international consultation and conciliation and co-operation. 55. With these thoughts in mind, it seems to me that we should concentrate OUP attention on the practical reoommendations set out in the Chief of Staff!s report. 56. The first necessity is surely to go to the root of the trouble by defining and marking this section of the Armistice Demarcation Line, and 1 hope that the Council will specifically endorse the recommendation that the necessary survey should be urgently undertaken with that aim in view. 57. Equally important, the Chief of Staff underlines the need for the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission to be made an effective instrument for keeping the peace and used as such. He points out that the arrangements which he has proposed for the hearing of complaints have been made necessary by the failure of the Commission to meet in regular or even emergency session. The reasons for this failure are explained by the Chief of Staff, and were described in even greater detail in the conclusion of his report to the Security Council last year following the incident at Almagor. [S/5401 and Add. l-413 58. It is surely greatly to be hoped that both Israel and Syria Will now recognize the overriding need for them to play their full part in the Commission from now on. 1 understand that similar Commissions dealing with other sections of the border between other Arab States and Israel have been able to perform their essential tasks, and if no other lesson has been learnt from reoent events in the area we are now considering, it must be plain to everyone that only by full co-operation in and with the Commission cari 3/ Ibid., EIighteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1963. 60, 1 am sure that we would a11 wish to join in de- Ploring the tragic casualties and the needless damage to property and the hardship caused to the civilian population which resulted from the violence of 13 November. 1 am sure that we also feel together a deep concern that a situation was allowed to develop with terxifying speed into a savage exchange of fire in which artillexy, tanks and aircraft were used. 61, We should be failing in our duty if we did not now take practical action to reduce the dangerous tensions and to remove the causes of such tragic events. Fortunately, we do not have to search for the action which is sequired or to devise some new solution. The recommendations before us are clear. The necessary machinery already exists. The evil of violence cari be turned to good effect if, as a result of what has taken place, we proceed urgently to support the pxactical proposa& which the Chief of Staff has made.

Once again the Security Council hasbeforeit the Palestine question and must consider a complaint of aggression against Israel. This time the aggression is characterized by a large-scale air attack by the Israel air force upon villages and defence posts in Syria, during which napalm and phosphorous bombs and rackets were used among other weapons. Syrian losses, according to the information furnished by the representative of Syria, amounted to seven dead and twenty-six wounded, most of them farmers. The material damage was considerable. 63. When my delegation made its preliminary study of the report [S/6061 and Add.l] provided to us by the Chief of Staff, General Bull, what struck me most was the enormous disproportion between, on the one hand, the localized nature of the incident that occurred in the Tel-El-Qadi-Nukheila section and, on the other, the scale of the aerial incursion into Syrian territory and also che provocative and bellicose way in which this grave matter was presented to the international Press by Israelgs military chief. 64. For my delegation, therefore, the problem is something more than just an incident. TO see this one need only examine the development of the Palestine tragedy. What emerges is that Israel’s policy-makers seem to have a kind of physiological need to engage, 65. The political and psychological profit which the operation was expected to yield, both domestically and in the world at large among Zionists, and the potential value of a crisis produced shortly before SO important an event as the opening of the General Assembly session--these are factors capable of engendering in the Zionists a sort of willing disregard of the risks involved in again becoming the abject of condemnation by the United Nations Security Council. This is how the dangerous Zionist phenomenon in the Arab East appears today, and it is without doubt the factor that explains why, in previous cases, it was not simply by chance that Israel was condemned here on several occasions. 66. Indeed, in bis last statement [1164th meetinglthe representative of Syria recalled and enumerated the five most important resolutions in which the Security Council has been compelled, in recent years, to condemn Israel’s policy towards its neighbours. 67, Today the Council is confronted with an equally dangerous action, similar to the preceding ones for which the State of Israel was reproached in earlier resolutions, but with the differenoe that the technique of aggression employed hitherto seems to have been modified in order to give the operation greater speed and destructiveness. Now there is resort to largescale aerial bombardments, and a11 that is needed for them to begin is a pretext founcl in an exchange of shots between two patrols. 68. This new aspect of Israel’s military policy was revealed to world public opinion in an article appearing in the newspaper Le Monde on 17 November 1964, which stated: “In previous incidents, such as those in the area of Tiberias and Tel-Qazir, the Israelis sent land forces to storm and destxoy Syrian positions. This tactic seems to have been abandoned for the following reasons. TO take enemy posts in the rear, the heights had to be skirted and therefore fairly deep penetrations into enemy territory had to be made, something which has always made a bad impression on world opinion. Moreover, casualties were sometimes very heavy. It seems to have been decided since Friday, as General Rabin has implied, to make use from now on of aircraft, which have the advantage of being more effective and less costly in personnel, and of producing a less spectacular incursion into enemy territory than do troops and armoured vehicles.” 69. The incidents to which Le Monde’s Jerusalem correspondent was referring, at least as far as the Tiberias area is concerned, were probably those in connexion with which the Security Council adopted 71. The representative of Israel tried in bis statement on Monday, 16 November [1162nd meeting] to offer some justification for the aerial attacks on Syria by referring to the topography of the terrain, which, according to him, puts the Israel positions at a disadvantage. He also used the argument that the Israel reply, intended to silence the Syrian artillery, did not obtain the expected results. 72, I think that this is a very serious matter, and it is up to the Council to proceed, with the utmost objectivity, to make its own judgement of these serial attacks. Moreover, it is known that these attacks were launched after the two parties had accepted a cesse-fire for 1500 hours on the basis of a proposa1 made by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission in paragraph 6 of the report. This in itself elearly contributes to the establishment of Israel’s responsibility for an aerial action carried out deliberately after a decison had been taken by common agreement as a result of the speedy intervention of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. ?3. Wy Govesnment accepts full responsibility for >his défensive measurel’ [1162nd meeting, para. 591. This is what the representative of Israel said the other day after trying to justify the bombings of Syrian villages and defence positions. The best way of defending oneself, if one accepts this singular concept advanced by Mr. Comay, is to attack the adversary and to carry the war into his territory, even if there is an armistice line supervised by the United Nations in the area. 1 do not think that the advocates of preventive war, who are ever active in Israel, could have expressed their views better. This is a11 the more significant in the light of paragraph 27 of the report, which stresses the suspicion and bitterness which characterize the relations between Syria and Israel. According to the report, these feelings are due to %sraells firm refusa1 to recognize any locus s&&i to Syria in the demilitarized zone, the greater part of which is now in point of fact controlled by Israel, limited only by the efforts of the Chairman and the United Nations Observers to fulfil their responsibilities under article VI’. 74, This is a most pertinent remark, which the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization made in connexion with a flagrant and 4/ Ibid., Seventeenih Year, Supplemenc for April, May and June 1962. “In this atmosphere of tension, the 13 November incident in the area of Tel-El-Qadi developed into aerial action against villages andmilitarypositions.” Clearly this cari refer in the circumstances only to Syrian villages and military positions. 75. This is the context in which the aerial aggression against Syria took place, Contrary to what the representative of Israel would have us believe, the context is certainly not one of a routine incident like that caused by an Israel patrol moving along a path whose line is in dispute. As Iar as my delegation is concerned, the incident of 13 November is nothing more than a pretext for punitive action against a country which refuses to seek an end to its conflict with Israel. 76. But to return to the 13 November incident itself, which the report rightly calIs an incident of great gravity: according to the description of its development given in the report, it appears that the tension began when an Israel armoured patrol encroaching Syrian territory received a warning shot, as is customary in such cases. We know that a warning shot, as the term implies, is not in any sense an attack in the accepted meaning of that Word. It represents a summons or an order to stop a suspicious movement which may be hostile or illegal. 77. However, the Israelis needed no more than that to open heavy fire on Syrian villages and positions with artillery of every calibre, tanks, heavy machine guns and mortars, which clearly placed the Syrians in a position where self-defence was justified and obliged them to reply by using some anti-tank guns against a concentration of Israel tanks on Tel-El- Qadi, which had immediately gone into action against the Syrian village of Nukheila. If we refer to the data in the report, it is noteworthy, as an indication of the complete accuracy of the return Pire, that only military personnel suffered losses on the Israel side. However on the Syrian side the casualties, which were incidentally muoh more numerous, were mostly civilians, 78. 1 should also like to mention that, in reading the report, my attention was drawn to the fact that the encroachment of the Israel asmoured patrol Syrian territory on 13 November occurred at the very same place as another violation, on 3November, which was the subject of a Syrian complaint. 79. With regard to this first violation, the investigation clearly showed that the reconstxucted track bor- 80. We are therefore dealing with systematic viola- ‘tien in a sector which the United Nations observers consider to be one of the points of the armistice demarcation line where the tension is most acuteviolation by means of which the Israelis, for some doubtless specific purpose, are trying to keep alive an atmosphere of war during this period. This explains why, after having accepted, at the same time as the Syrians, a cesse-fire on 13 November for 1509 hours, the Israelis went back on the initial decision and, a few moments later, notified the United Nations Control Centre in Tiberias that their acceptance was not final, and gave a reason for this which was really no reason at all, especially in view of the very small area of ground involved and the excellent quality of the Israel army’s equipment, 80. Il s’agit un secteur considérent demarcation vive, cherchent, un climat ce qui explique temps vembre tiale, les Israéliens apres Tiberiade invoquant pour cela une raison qui n’en est d’ailleurs pas une, surtout superficie qualité de l’équipement 81. En effet, aupri% de la Commission une curieuse pu joindre toutes les positions lignes déroulement decrit dans les paragraphes d’etablir apres commandant lienne avaient l’un et l’autre pour 15 heures”, blindés postés à la colonie israélienne deShear Yashov bombardaient de Tel-Azaziat. 81. The Senior Israel Delegate to the Mixed Armistice Commission in fact claimed that he had not been able to contact a11 the Israel positions and that the lines of communication were broken. But from the way the incident developed, as described in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the report, it is clear that noground action was reported after 1446 hours, that is to say, the time at which %oth the Syrian Commander and the Senior Israeli Delegate had accepted 1600 hours for the beginning of the cesse-fire , . . II, with the sole excep- Mon that two armoured cars posted at the Israel colony of Shear Yashov again bombarded, from 1500 heurs to 1513 hours, the village of Tel-Azaziat. 82. Ingoing back on his decision to accept the ceasefire for I.500 hours-which was practically in effect at that time, as far as the positions occupied on both 82. En revenant sez-le-feu presque positions délegation rapport de toute évidence dissimuler du commandement pour engager une action aerienne de grande envergure contre de 14 h 56 & 15 h 27, selon les precisions aux paragraphes de temps, c’est-&-dire plusieurs toute une région intervention, de Nukheila, basieh, pour ne citer que ceux dont les noms figurent rapport, civils habitations, et de recueillement. Sides were concerned-the Senior Israel Delegate, as paragraph 7 of the report makes abundantly clear, obviously wanted to disguise the Israel Command’s already fixed intention of seizing the opportunity to launch a large-scale air attaok against Syria, For that is what took place between 1456 heurs and 1527 heurs, according to the information given in paragraph 9 of the report. During this period-that is to Say, a little more than half an hour-several dozen Israel aircraft pounded a whole region of Syria, turning it into a vast scorched-earth zone. The villages Of Nukheila, Tel-Azaziat, Tel-El-Hamra, Abbasieh, Massada, Mourhr Chebaa and Banias, to mention only those whose namas appear in the report, were those most severely damaged. Innocent civilians died in their own homes on that Friday, a day of prayer, rest and meditation. 1 do not know whether the damage has already been assessed, but it Will obviously amount to several times the figure of $500,000 given the other day by the representative of Israel in assessing the .9 83. “The Israel air attacks continued after hours’l, according to the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, inparagraph 8 of his report. Contrary to what the representative of Israel would have us believe, it was not therefore a question of counter-attacks. still less of defensive measures. In order to stop these aerial attacks, United Nations Observers tried to obtain a new ceasefire from the Israelis, and 1 say “new’l deliberately, for the first cesse-fire, although accepted by both parties, was not respected by the Israel side; but before that point could be reached, Israel had first to carry through this operation of destruction terror, and it was only after this unjustifiable gression that the Israelis finally agreed to another cesse-fire, which this time became effective 1530 hours. 84. In his statement the other day, the representative of Israel tried to establish a sort of cause-and-effect relationship between the events of 13 November the decisions taken by the heads of the Arab States on the Palestine question. 1 should merely like to say to the representative of Israel that his efforts may very well boomerang. By carefully examining the report, and in particular the reasons for the tension in the Tel-El-Qadi-Nukheila sector, or analyzing that part of the report devoted to the incidents of 3 and 13 November, it is easy to prove that the responsibility of the Israelis is beyond doubt, 85. In the first place, in the case we are considering there is no valid argument to justify, inmilitary terms, aerial bombing on the scale seen on 13 November. A reason other than necessity of an operational nature must therefore be sought. 86. Then there is the fact that the Israelis have embarked upon the construction of a road along the demarcation line, which encroaches on Syrian territory. This road is regularly used by military patrols, despite the recommendations of the United Nations Observers, It is equally truc that the Israelis to have refrained from any action, whether military or connected with construction work, until the point at issue in this zone had been settled by the United Nations on the basis of the evidence of impartial perts and in the light of arbitration by competent bodies acting in accordance with the provisions the General Armistice Agreement. 87. We know, however, that in this respect Israel is persistently and categorically refusing co-operate in the manner required of the signatories of the General Armistice Agreement; according the report, Israel is preventing meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission and making its 86, In the light of these considerations, it seems that Israel is too short-winded to put up with this makeshift state of affairs. Its leaders want to impose their solution and they want to do SO as soon as possible. They do not forgive Syria for its steadfast refusa1 to try to end its conflict with Israel. They are therefore agitating at a11 levels in a systematic search for the final solution which is their dream, because of the territorial and economic expansionism of international zionism, and which they wish to impose upon their neighbours, taking advantage of a de facto situation which they think is also a position of strength. Not content with attacking Syria alone and trying to break its resistance by large-scale aerial bombing, Israel is taking the opportunity provided by the Syrian complaint before the Security Coucil to make sweeping attacks on the members of the Arab League. porter veulent, avec Israël. tous les plans de l’expansionnisme nisme pays croient Non satisfait en essayant bombardements occasion Conseil gér&rali&es arabe. 89. In this connexion, 1 have said-and 1 repeat today-that the collective measures which the Arab countries decided to take in respect of the Palestine question are based on the principles of law and justice. They cannot in any way be regarded as contrary to the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Our aims cari never be divorced from the aims of peace-loving peoples or from the aim, which the peoples of the world pursue, of ensuring the triumph of justice and of their inalienable right to self-determination. This is the case of the people of Palestine. This is a peaceful people, which had been living for thousands of years on land which belonged to it, land which it had inherited neither from a religious faith, nor from an empire, nor from colonization. This people-the Arab people of Palestine-has, for reasons for which it was certainly not responsible and which did not directly concern it, been driven from its very homes, its ploughlands and its pastures. The vast majority of this people are now living destitute in tents, exposed to the rigours of cold and heat, left to ignorance, disease and hunger. Every morning they look to the horizon and see their towns and their usurped fields which are beyond their reach because they have been torn from them by groups from abroad, composed of heterogeneous elements, belonging to different races and different cultures, and united only by a religious belief. que les mesures décid8 de prendre sur peuvent en aucune maniére allant Charte des Nations se dissocier celui dont se reclament de la justice d’eux-mêmes. Voilh un peuple pacifique, qui vivait depuis desmillé- naires n’a héritée d’une Palestine, ment pas directement, de ses terrains peuple, dans sa tr&s grande majoritb, dans la misère, du froid et du soleil, 9 la faim, villes, teindre, par des groupes ments rentes, que par une croyance 90. fussent-ils fest& nazisme, de d&ruire Mat de misère 99. DO the feelings of sympathy and compassionhowever deep, sincere and legitimate-which were expressed regarding the Jews of Europe persecuted under nazism give international zionism the right to destroy a nation and to reduce its people to the state of destitution and degradatiod in which we now find them? 91. In the name of what principle or of what historic or other right does international zionism, taking ad- Vantage of its material superiority and exploiting a t&@callY mediaeval religious fanaticism, dare to 92. For the Arab States and for many other States in the world, this is therefore an injustice committed against a whole nation, and an injustice which must be redresse& A legitimate right which claimed is never lost. This was the objective sought by the Arab States when they took the Alexandria decisions regarding Palestine at the Second Arab Summit Conference. 93. There is no need to seek much further causes of the tragedy in order to realize that the implementation of these decisions is a reasoned and just undertaking but a long-term one. It is an undertaking inspired by a profound feeling of justice and equity; it follows the course whioh the non-aligned peoples adopted, quite recently, with the aim eliminating colonialism and racism in a11 their forms. 94. Acting with this aim, the Arab States are profoundly consclous of their collective responsibility in an undertaking which excludes a11 forms of haste or isolated action. Al1 the countries of the world must first know more about the extent of the harm done to the Palestinians. It will therefore not be the Arab side which Will take action that might endanger peace and security, This is no reason, however, for ignoxing the reality of a de facto situation. The threat exists and is a lasting one. The Israel adventure created it and it is the practical exposition policy pursued against the Arab States, which proclaimed long ago and whose results are familiar to the United Nations. 95. The aerial bombing, for which the incident 13 November was merely a pretext, should leave no room for doubt about the aggressive behavior of Israel, while the Arab neighbours of the Zionist State-as everyone should know-havep sinoe the Alexandria Summit Conference, refused to take any individua or collective action which might justify. in any way whatever, the attacks which Mr. Comay saw fit to make against them. 96. Thus, the fact that the Palestine drama continues to give rise to serious concern for thefuture of international peace and security is entirely the fault Israel. This State, with its present military strength, its inexhaustible resources in .the world and the support of a11 kinds which it receives from abroad, continue to issue its challenges and to set little store by its obligations under the Charter, As an instrument of colonialism, disregarding the General sembly resolutions on the Palestine question, Israel is undoubtedly playing a game whioh it is not exaggerated to describe as dangerous to peace in this region. 97. By thus recalling the past, when the behavior Israel was far from flattering to the resolutions 98. In conclusion, 1 should like to emphasize that the Syrian complaint which we are at present examining should be studied in its true context. On the one hand, we have an incident provoked by the enoroachment of an Israel armoured patrol on Syrian territory. The report said SO clearly; the.re should be no further argument about this. On the other hand, we have this other matter which is equally serious and equally dangerous-the aerial bombing of Syrian villages and defence positions by Israel airmen, after the acceptance of the first cease-fire agreement. 98. syrienne étudi6e dans son contexte véritable. un incident trouille rapport l’objet cette autre affaire qui est aussi grave et aussi dangereuse, aviateurs accord villages 99. Knowing the objectivity and impartiality which Member States bring to the problems of international peace and security referred to the Council, my delegation is convinced that this serious matter Will be given a11 the attention it deserves by this body, SO that the State of Israel may learn once again that the Security Council does not tolerate such free and easy playing with fire in a region where tension is still extremely high on both sides of the armistice line. 99. Connaissant lesquelles de la paix et de la s6curit6 Conseil cette merite d’Israël s6curité avec particuli&rement d’ armistice. 100. plus d’orateurs qu’il poursuivre 30 novembre, il en sera ainsi d6cidé.

1 have no further speakers on my list. After consultation, 1 believe it has been determined that the Council is agreeable to meeting next on this item Monday morning, 30 November, at 10.30 o’clock. If that is agreeable, it Will be SO decided. It was SO decided. Il en est ainsi d&id& The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m. I HOW TO OBTAIN United Nations publications distributors throughout Write to: United Nations, COMMENT SE PROCURER Les publications des Notions agences dépositaires du monde ou adressez-vous à: Nations COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de las casas distribuidoras en todas diriiase a: Naciones Unidas, 1,