S/PV.1168 Security Council

In accordance with the previous decision of the Security Council, 1 invite the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel to take places at the Council table. (Israël) et M. Rafik Asha (Syrie) prennent place à la table du Conseil. A t the invitation of the President, Mr. Michael S. Comay (rsrael) and Mr. Rafîk Asha (Syria) took places at the Council table.

First, 1 should like to associate my Government and delegation in the heartfelt condolences that have been expressed in connexion with the passing of Arkady Sobolev, Deputy Poreign Minister of the Soviet Union. His untimely death was a great shock to my country and to me personally. 1 had the great privilege of being associated with him in his capacities as Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, Permanent Representative of his great country to the United Nations and Deputy Foreign Minister in Moscow, where 1 had the honour to serve my country. We express to the 2. M. ASHA (Syrie) [traduit de l’anglais]: Je voudrais tout d’abord associer le Gouvernement et la d6légation syriens aux condoleances tres sinc&res qui ont Bté exprimées a l’occasion du déces de M. Arkady Sobolev, vice-ministre soviétique, dont la mort p&matur&e est vivement ressentie dans mon pays et par moi-même. J’ai eu le grand privilege de voir M. Sobolev à l’œuvre quand il etait Sec&taire général adjoint & l’ONU, reprhsentant permanent de son grand pays auprès de l’ONLJ, et Vice-Ministre oh j’ai eu l’honneur de servir mon pays. Nous expri- 4. In hi5 statement on Priday 27 November [1165th meeting] the Israel representative, in his usual manner, tried once more to confuse the issues, 1 must say that the llfaotual observations” whioh Mr. Comay said he would present to the Council on General Bull’s report [S/6061 and Add.lJy were, to say the least, as divoroed from the real facts of the case as was the information contained in his opening and subsequent statements. Therefore, it is not surprising ta see him avoid, in each case, noting the exact references to the text of thc report. 5. 1 shall now endeavour to verify, as the Israel representative has invited us a11 to do, the correctness of each one of his so-called eight facts. One could easily conclude, after such a tedious but unavoidable analysis, that the report, which he said corroborates Israel’s account, is quite different from General Bull’s report, Here are Israel’s so-called facts * Fact 1. The Israel representative, in his subtle attempt to prove that the activities oi the Israel military patrol were performed in the open and with the knowledge of the United Nations Observers, told us that the Israel patrol vehicle was directly observed by United Nations Observation Post No. 1 (OP-l), which is situated on the eastern side of Tel-El-Qadi. 6. It is clear, however, acoording to paragraph 4 of the report, that OP-I could not observe the area in which the Israel military patrol was located. This fact is further confirmed by paragraph 4 (2) of Annex C of the report, which states: “It was noted that the track and location in which the vehicle was stated to be at the time of first shots being fired are entirely out of sight to both OP Alpha and OP-1.1’ Fact 2 The Israel representative stated that the -ns themselves admitted, and that paragraph 4 of General Bull’s report, Annex C, Appendix F, and Annex B a11 confirmed that the Syrian position at Nukheila opened fire on the Israel patrol vehicle. 7 < 1 wish to differ with that statement for the following reasons: (5) Paragraph 4 of the report speaks onlyoffiring started by the Syrian side and of a warning shot. g Sac Officiel Records of the Securlg Council. Nineceenth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1964. (9 Annex C, based on the Israel complaint and declaration made by Israel witnesses, is silent on the result of the investigations relating to this particular point. Fact 3. The Israel representative said that at the time the patrol vehicle was attacked it was in Israel territory. That is a gratuitous assertion since the Israel representative said in the same breath that this was not directly confirmed by the United Nations reports. He then proceeded to relate what the Israel topographers thought of this questibn, and what Captaia Brizzi from United Nations Military Observers indicated as being the place of the initial incident on the patrol track. He also indicated the observersl conviction that the area where the alleged violation-that is, the encroachment on Syrian territory-took place was the same for both complaints, the incidents of both 3 and 13 November 1964. Fait No 3. Le représentant premier duite est le même dans les deux plaintes 8, In this connexion 1 should like to make the following observations : 8. suivantes: (a) Paragraph J of annex C indicates that the survey carried out by Captain Brizzi was based on the location of the Israel patrol vehicle indicated by the Israel side. (5 TO say that the area where the alleged violation took place was the same for both complaints could mean many things, including among others: (i) That the term tlarealt is not precise enough to exclude any violation of a few metres on the part of Israel. (ii) It could also be said that the “area”, being the same in both incidents, was an Israel encroachment on Syrian territory. 9. ment: qu’un le& du tronçon est de la piste est nacessaire; tance que les travaux interrompus résultat n’a pas BtB provoque par la P&ence militaire selon la d&Egation sur travaux que les Bvbnements le succès major la surveillance par le Président tice d’Israël du tronçon relevé 9. General Bull’s report has clearly indicated: that a survey of the eastern part of the road was necessary; that a few metres might be particularly important in the Tel-El-Qadi area; that the work had been stopped several times by the Israelis to await the result of the requested survey; that the origin of the 3 November incident was not the presence of a military patrol on the Israel track in an area where, according to the Syrian delegation, it encroached upon Syrian territory, but the aotual reconstruction of that part of the track; and that the events of 13 November jeopardized the success of the efforts made by the Chief of Staff or tl-te United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine /UNTSO] and by the Chairman of theI.srael- Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission to secure the CO-operation of Israel and Syria with a view to establishing the location of the portion of the Israel track which had not been surveyed in 1963. Fact 4. The Israel representative declared that a number of Syrian forts and artillery positions, covering a wide arc, promptly joined in the attack and that this was confirmed by paragraph General Bull’s report, by the United Nations servers and by a subsequent investigation report. 11. Paragraph 5 of the report actually states “as soon as firing started, it was heavy on both sides . . . Ten minutes later, tanks and mortars joined in the exchange of fire between the Nukheila and Tel-El- Qadi positions, 130th parties obviously were prepared for an intensive bombardment”. As far as the findings of the United Nations Observers and the investigation reports are concerned, the Syrian warning shot or shots were returned immediately by a barrage Israel fire. Fact 5. The Israel representative stated that the Syrian positions opened a bombardment by artillery and heavy mortar fire directed at civilian villages on the Israel side, particularly Kibbutz Dan; he added that tbe investigators found no evidence military fortifications or positions in thesevillages. It is clear, however, from General Bullls report that the Israel village of Tel-El-Qadi is a military position, that military activities were going on at the time of the incident of Shear Yashov where Israel tanks were spotted firing at Syrian positions and villages, and that it could be assumed that other Israel villages also participated in providing Israel patrol with the necessary fire caver, 12. In this connexion, 1 should like to draw the attention of the Council to the statement of the Israeli witness number 12, Amir Kanter, a soldier in the Israel army, as reproduced in paragraph 5of annex C of the report. The soldier, according to his own admission, was, on Friday 13 November 1964, ina position w est of the demilitarized zone, opposite thesyrian village of Tel-Azziziat. 1 should like to quote the following from the questions asked by the United tions Military Observera! and the answers given by the soldier: lfQuestion 2: Did the Syrian positions on Tel- Azziziat open fire first on your position? “Answer 2: Yes, the Syrian positions opened fire first and 1 was surprised to find they fired on our position as 1 thought they would fire on the patrol and net on our position. “Question 3: A patrol is mentioned. Where what was the patrol? “Answer 3: The patrol of a military vehicle the track on Tel-El-Qadi to the west. 13. These questions and answers clearly demonstrate that a11 Israel positions in the area must have been informed earlier that an Israel military patrol would be sent to the eastern part of the road, presumably to prote& the work restarted there, in violation of UNTSO’s instructions to stop work on the road, and that these Israel positions were requested to provide the necessary fire-caver whenever the need arose. TO confirm further that suoh a caver was provicled, 1 refer to Annex C, Appendix F of the report, which indicates that three Israel tanks-medium size-were observed in position some ,200 metres north-west of Observation Post 1 firing against Nukheila village, and that this position was the one which the Israel military patrol had been seen leaving. 13. deux faits: gion avaient d0 être informhes trouille tronçon les travaux violation ter les travaux assurer, Pour assurbe, dice qu’on a pu observer sions 200 métres d’oh ils tiraient position israélienne Pact 6, The Israel representative stated that no evidence of any bombing was found at any of the four villages marked on the sketch, that is, Nukheila, Abbasieh, Mourhr Chebaa and Banias. Fait No 6. Le representant 14. Paragraph 11 of the report points to the damage sustained by the villages of Nukheila and Abbasieh. As far as the other locations which might have sustained damage are concerned, 1 bave already stated why the United Nations Observers were not permitted to visit these locations. 14. subis ce qui avoir subi des dégâts, j’ai déja donne les raisons lesquelles n’avaient Fait No 7. Le representant Pact 7 - The Israel representative stated: “The reports from the United Nations observation posts confirm that the Israel planes went into action at about 1456 hours local time, that is, an hour and a half after the initial Syrian attack, and over an hour after the shelling of the villages had commenced.” 11165th meeting, para. 7.1 The Israel representative, however, failed to refer Or, rapport, to paragraph 6 of the report which clearly stated that: “By 1446 hours, both the Syrian Commander and the Senior Israel Delegate had accepted 1500 hours for the beginning of the cesse-fire, and the United Nations observation posts were informed accordingly.” 15. The Israel representative also failed to refer to paragraph 8 of the report which stated that the Israel air attacks continued after 1500 hours, c?nd to psragraph 9 which indicated that those nttacks did not end until 1527 hours. 15. se reporter que les attaques aériennes suivies que ces attaques n’ont pris fin qu’& 15 h 27. Pact 8. The Israel representative stated that the bombing by Israel planes was strictly confined to Syrian military positions directly involved in the attack on Israel villages, Fait No 8. Le représentant 17. As far as the Israel statement regarding village of Nukheila is concerned, I should like to stress once more the following: that fire was direoted from the village itself, and that the civilians living in that village were immediately evacuated after tbe incident, since the village itself is not provided with the necessary Shelters. I must also say that the Syrian civilians who testified before United Nations Observers were not produced by the Syrian authorities, and that the practice of producing witnesses has not yet reached the Syrian Arab Republic from Israel-occupied territory. 18. No matter how ingenious Israel’s devices falsify the truth, and no matter how subtle the Israel representative’s attempt to escape the hard facts General Bull’s report, these facts Will remain with us for a very long time. May I be permitted to recapitulate them very briefly. (FL) The Israel authorities provoked the incident of 13 November by sending a military patrol to the eastern part of the road encroaching on Syrian territory, where work was resumed by the Israelis in spite of UNTSO’s instructions to the contrary. (d) The Syrian warning shot or shots were immediately returned by a barrage of fire directed from Israel military positions. (2) In spite of the cesse-fire agreement reached at 1446 hours, a large number of Israel military planes attacked Syrian villages and military positions using a variety of weapons, and these attacks continued from 1456 hours until 1527 hours. 19. As far as concerns the conclusions to be drawn from these facts, which 1 underlined on 27 November, it would also be useful at this stageof our discussions to summarize them very briefly. (5) The Israel authorities provoked the incident of 13 November 1964, to attain certain far-reaching objectives which 1 exposed in my statement 27 November , o$ The Israel air attack was not a last resort Since a cesse-fire agreement was reaohed prior to this attack, @) The premeditated Israel air attack was out of proportion to the nature of the Syrian provocation, if there was any provocation, 20. In this connexion, my delegation would like psy a particular tribute to the representatives who had the intellebtual courage and probity to state du 13 novembre semonce suivi veau, taques ces constances, de la provocation.” IfLike a11 such incidents, the 13 November clash started with the firing of a warning shot from the one side which was followed by retaliation from the other. But unlike previous incidents, this time the retaliation took the form of air attacks by Israel aircraft. It perhaps may be said that the retaliation, however justifiable under the ciroumstances, was out of proportion to the nature of the provocation.” [1166th meeting, para. 25.1 21. de la Tchécoslovaquie, le 30 novembre, sage suivant: 21. I have also in mind the representativeof Czechoslovakia who likewise spoke on 30 November, as follows, and 1 quote: tir(i en territoire Dans de la Commission contacts cessez-le-feu dant, alors Israel avoir revenu apres, le territoire moment auraient feu a et.6 negocid, sont poursuivies avant son entrée materiels l’ai dit, deplorer Mais force ont t%B tues et neuf autres les pertes tués et 26 blesses, “Let us repeat some of the facts. A warning shot provoked by the presence of an ISrael patrol on Syrian territory was followed by an exchange of heavy firing on both sides. Within a few minutes, necessary contacts were established by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission in order to arrange a cesse-fire as soon as possible, However, while the position of Syria towards thisinitiative was co-operative, the attitude of Israel was quite different. After having accepted a suggested cesse-fire Israel reversed its position at the last moment, Immediately afterwards an air attack fallowed on Syrian territory. New attacks went on after the original cesse-fire should have corne into effect. A new cesse-fire was negotiated, but the air attacks went on and did not stop until three minutes before the entry into force of the new cesse-fire, causing heavy material damage and loss of human life. These losses, as 1 have said, are deplorable on both sides. It is, however, characteristic that on the Israel side three soldiers were killed and nine wounded and on the Syrian side seven were killed and twenty-six wounded, most of them civilians. “When a11 these circumstances are taken into consideration, it would be logical to conclude that an aggressive action was undertakcn on the part of Israel against Syrian territory, violating both the Israel-Syrian Armistice Agreement of 20 July 1949 and the general principle contained in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations. It is evident that to justify this action the principle of legitimate self-defence cannot be invoked, as no attaok against Israel territory has taken place.” [Ibid., paras. 19 and 20.1 a d&olench& une agression en violation israélo-syrienne g&&ral Charte impossible justifier étê par. 22. 1 should like to quote also from the statement of the representative of Morocco who said the following on 27 November: 22. du representant “In conclusion, 1 should like to stress that the Syrian complaint which we are at present examining should be studied in its true context. On the one hand, we have an incident provoked by the encroachment of an Israel armoured patrol on Syrian territory, The report said SO clearly; there should be no further argument about this. On the other hand, we bave this other matter which is equally serious and equally dangerous-the aerial bombing of Syrian syrienne étudiée un incident trouille rapport l’objet cette dangereuse, 23. Now 1 should like to quote from the most important speech we have heard today, made by the representative of the Soviet Union. The representative of the Soviet Union made a very impressive statement and 1 should just like to quote some parts of it. Mr. Fedorenko said: “As is further revealed in the report, on 3 November 1964-that is ten days before tho events of 13 November-Israel’s unilateral actions in connexion with the construction of the track had already given sise to an incident similar in origin to that whioh led to the events oP13November. The essence of the rnatter, as is known, lay in the fact that on 3 November an Israel bulldozer had ontered Syrian territory. In this connexion, the report states that anencroachment by the Israel bulldozer into Syrian territory would appear to be confirmed by the map that is annexed ta the General Armistice Agreement. That action in turn precipitated the events which are described in detail in the relevant part of the report.” [ 1167th meeting, para. 42.1 Mr. Fedorenko went on to say: “It may be noted, therefore, that attempts by Israel to engage in unilateral actions in this area are bound to be, and in fact are, a source of every conceivable complication, Nevertheless, as recent events have shown, Israel has continucd and is oontinuing to engage in such actions. “It can now be considered as established that the initial incident that occurred on 13 November and precipitated a whole chain of events, which we shall speak of later, had its origin in provocative actions from the Israel side in this highly sensitive area.” [Ibid,, paras. 44 and 45.1 24, A little later, Mr. li’edorenko said: “As is indioated in paragraph 6 of the report, however, by 1446 hours local time, on 13 November, both the Syrian and the Israel sides had agreed to a cease-fire at 1500 heurs. It seemed that a further dangerous turn of events had thereby been averted. “But it was precisely at chat time that what amounted to a new chapter of events was opened by the Israel side.” [Ibid., paras. 48 and 49.1 Mr. Fedorenko went on to say: “Thus Israel-and not Syria-repudiated the ceasefire. And, at almost the same time that the ceasefire was repudiated, Israel aircraft began a systematic bombardment of Syrian territory. “In other words, it may be stated undisputedly, as regards the happenings of 13 November, not only that the entire chain of events was initiated by the actions of the Israel military patrol, but also that the Israel side, after agreement had been reached on a cesse-fire, violated that agreement and sent military aircraft into action in this area- 26. Let us turn now to the statement made on 27 November [1165th meeting] by the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Caradon, which was, 1 must confess, welcomed by a11 those who knew his courage and fair-mindedness with a deep sense of frustration that this maiden statement in the Security Council did not measure up to the reputation he had built up for himself over the years and to the courage of a Government whose leaders had publicly condemned the tripartite aggression on Egypt in 1956. 27. 1 regret to say that the representative of the United Kingdom was carried away by his high ideals of the brotherhood of man and Christian charity, and his nostalgie reminiscences of the first years of the British Mandate in Palestine. Although the expression of such noble feelings is strongly needed fromtime to time to brighten and warm up our debates, one cannot fail to recognize that such ideals are more easily preached than applied, and that they are more easily recommended in other people’s cases than in one’s own. The representative of the United Kingdom would certainly admit, too, that by recommending such a course in the circumstances surrounding the case with which the Counoil is seized he runs the danger of being branded as the spokesman of those who are attempting to whitewash Israel. 1 should like very respectfully to remind the representative that the Palestine problem is not a racial problem. It is, as most of us know, the product of Zionist conspiraoy and terrorism, and Israel military occupation. He would also readily admit, 1 am sure, that tolerance should net distract the Council from the urgent business to which it has to attend, and that such tolerance could best be advocated after the resolutions of the United Nations on Palestine are oarried out by the Israel authorities. 28. When the representative of the United Kingdom says that we are gathered not to condemn but to conciliate, he seems to overlook what his colleague, Mr, Jackling who is sitting with us today, said in the Security Council on 28 August 1963. 1 quote Mr. Jackling: “In our view, our funotion here is twofold. In the first place, the Council must study and must weigh a11 the evidence available and attempt to form some judgement on it. If, however, it is to perform its funotion of keeping the peace in a constructive way, the Council should also consider what action it is proper to reoommend to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents in the future.” [1059th meeting, para. 70.1 29, Lord Caradon seems also to have overloaked the fact that this attitude is shared by the representative of the United States, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, who declared on 28 August 1963: “New that the Council has been summoned to act, it must accept its responsibilities and act with courage and wisdom in the light of thebest evidence available to it. For us, the course which this body should follow is clear. In a11 justice and in the interests of law and order in international affairs, we believe this reprehensible act of murder 20 August deserves the strongest condemnation, Only then cari it be made clear that outrages of this kind cannot pass without the Stern disapproval of the international community.ll [1058th meeting, para. 39.1 30. In this connexion, 1 should like to ask the following question of the representative of the United Kingdom. 1s there a double yardstick which applies in one case and not in the other? The representative of the United Kingdom considered the incident of August 1963 as a very grave incident which deserved thestrongest ccndemnation. This time we did not hear about any condemnation from him. We heard of conciliation. But the case before us is far more seriaus than the one of August 1963. 31. The representative of the United Kingdom should also be reminded that these views were shared by the representative of Norway, Mr, Nielsen, who said on 30 August 1963: “In our view, the situation that has arisen places a twofcld task on the Council. First, it is the duty of the Ccuncil to examine a11 the evidence before it and objectively tc pass judgement on the question of responsibility for the incidents which have occurred. Secondly, we think it is the duty of the Council to ccnsider appropriate measures and actions to prevent ox at least to reduce thedanger of a recurrence of similar incidents in the future. Suitable measures to this effect would also contribute to a better general atmosphere in the area.” [LOôlst meeting, para, 12.1 32. Although the representative of the United Kingdom assured us at the beginning of his statement of 2’7 Ncvember 1964 that he would refrain from drawing conclusions or pronouncing judgements on the evidence before him and that he would not attempt to allocate blame or make accusations, yet in the same breath he said: “It is surely greatly to be hoped that both Israel and Syria Will now recognize the overriding need 33, If the representative of the United Kingdom, for political reasons into which 1 shall not go at the present stage, does not have the instructions toblame Israel publicly, he should at least have refrained from speaking in a manner detrimental to Syrian and Arab interests, the more SO when the Government he represents professes the desire to improve its relations with the Arab world. 34. My delegation is also dismayed at the fact that the representative of the United Kingdom put on the same level an act of defence by Syria in the face of provocation and the brutal use byIsrae1 of its artillery and tanks and the oriminal aerial bombardment of the Syrian villages. No evidence SO far produced before the Council entitles the representative of the United Kingdom to adopt such a position, which is a complete departure, to say the least, from the attitude adopted by the majority of the Council whenever it has had to consider air attacks of this nature. Unless there are special reasons for such a novel attitude, my delegation cannot but express its surprise and regret to see political expediency prevail over justice and fairness. tendre le repr&entant du Royaume-Uni mettre sur le même plan une mesure de défense prise par la Syrie devant une provocation et l’emploi brutal d’artillerie et de chars, ainsi que le bombardement a&ien criminel de villages syriens par Israël. Aucune preuve produite au Conseil ne permet encore au representant du Royaume-Uni d’adopter pareille attitude qui s’8carte totalement, c’est le moins qu’on puisse dire, de celle qui a étB adoptée par la majorite des membres du Conseil chaque fois que celui-ci a dû s’occuper dlattaques aériennes analogues. A moins que des raisons particuliéres ne justifient une prise de position aussi inattendue, ma délggation ne peut qu’exprimer sa surprise et ses regrets de voir l’opportunisme politique l’emporter sur la justice et l’bquité. 35, The representative of Norway subscribed in his statement [1166th meeting], to the views of therepresentative of the United Kingdom that “we are gathered here not to condemn but to conciliate”. The representative of Norway would appear to be under the same misapprehension as his British colleague, and my comments on the latter’s stand would equally apply in his case. 35. Dans son intervention [1166ème séance], le repré- sentant de la Norvege a approuvé l’opinion du repr& sentant du Royaume-Uni selon laquelle “nous sommes ici non pas pour condamner, mais pour concilier”. Le repr&entant de la Norvège parait commettre la même erreur d’interpr&ation Royaume-Uni et ce que j’ai fait observer au sujet de la position de ce dernier vaut également pour lui. 35. In the course of my statement on 27 November 1964, 1 said the following: 36. Dans ma d(tclaration du 27 novembre 1964, j’ai dit ceci: “On 12 May 1949, the Arab States and Israel signed the Lausanne Protocol under the auspices of the Palestine Conciliation Commission . . , It was later revealed, however, that Israel’s agreement to the provisions of this Protocol, which was subsequent to the so-called Arab invasion of Israel, was only for the purpose of gaining admission to the United Nationstl. [1164th meeting, para, 41.1 37. At the 1165th meeting of the Security Council, Mr. Comay said: 37. A la 1165eme seance du Conseil de securite, M. Comay a déclare: 1, . . . Cne point mentioned by Mr. Asha this morning is typical. He said that we signed a certain protOcoltTand the word “protocol” is spelled with a small “P”-~ in Lausanne on 12 May 1949 as a subterfuge to secure our admission to the United Nations, If he had checked a little bit more oarefully, he would have found that Israel was admitted to this Organization on 11 May, the day before that protocol was signed in Lausanne”. [1165th meeting, para. 45.1 38. Mr. Comay belittled the Lausanne Protoool-an international instrument which would have lessened tension in the area, had the Israelis fulfilled their obligations and shown respect to the United Nations, Now Mr. Comay, after sixteen years, calls that important document Ila certain protocol”-with a small tt II P - 39. Mr. Comay further questioned that the proceedings at Lausanne had any connexion with the admission of Israel to membership of the United Nations, May I draw attention to the preamble of resolution (III) of the General Assembly, relating to the admission of Israel to the United Nations, which refers the declaration of the Israel reprssentative to the effect that his Government Wnreservedly accepts the obligations of the United Nations Charter and undertakes to honour them from the day when it becomes a Member of the United Nations”. By the same resolution, the Assembly noted the declaration of the Israel representative on the implementation of ‘lits resolutions of 29 November 1947” (dealing with boundaries and internationalization of Jerusalem) “and 11 December 1948” (dealing with repatriation or compensation of the refugees), 40. If the preamble to the resolution of admission -and it is the only time the UnitedNations made such conditions in the admission of members-does mean what it says, what does it mean? The deceit of the Israel leaders becomes quite clear from following statement to be found in the Government Yearbook for 19 50: “Some members of the United Nations wished this opportunity to test Israel’s intentions with gard to the refugee, boundaries and Jerusalem issues, before approving its application for admission. In a way, Israel’s attitude at the Lausanne talks aided its delegation at Lake Success in its endeavour to obtain the majority required admission+*. &f 41. It Will be recalled that Israel’s first application for admission, made in December 1948, was rejected on the ground that Israel did not fulfil the requirements of the United Nations Charter, Hence it became necessary for the Israelis to use deception and for the United Nations to show a certainamount of caution by providing in the preamble of its resolution safeguards referred to above. 42. After Israel’s wanton armed aggression against my country and people, thesyrian Government, choosing the course most appropsiate for the maintenance of peace, invoked the, authority of the Council, It has clone SO in the hope that the Israel Government be strongly censuredforits reckless and irresponsible behaviour and warned in clear and unequivocal terms that such acts must cesse. My Government feels that 2/ Government Yearbook 5711(1950) (Jerusalem, Government Printer, Eecember, 1950). p. 143. 43, My Government also feels that, in the final analysis, the basis for the maintenance of peace and stability in the area must lie, as a first and overriding prerequisite, in the full adherence by the two parties to the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement. It is in this spirit that my Government has co-operated fully with the machinery established by the United Nations for the supervision of this Agreement. It is also in this spirit that my Government will continue to do SO in the future. 43. analyse la r&gion doit être fonde - prealable parties genéral. a apport.8 son entiére par l’Organisation veiller même le faire !J. l’avenir. 44. Ayant entendu les représentants a maintes avec l’ONUST, rer veillance la plupart contredisent israeliennes mixte doivent être bien averties injonctions les ses r&olutions. de ce cercle methode ne fait Unies de faux espoirs 44, Having heard repeated assurances from the Israel representatives that they would co-operate with UNTSO, having also heard repeated Israel statements according to which the machinery for the supervision of the truce is functioning properly at the present time-an assertion which is rejected by most of the reports issued by that body-the Council should require the Israel authorities to attend the meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission. These authorities should be clearly warned that, unless they heed the Councills injunction in this respect, theywill have to face the oonsequences of their continued flouting of the Council’s resolutions. There is no other way to break this vicious circle, and whoever is preaching otherwise is simply lulling the Council and the United Nations into false hopes and expectations. 45. d’empêcher plosions moi de formuler duisent sur la question essentielle phique du tronçon Israéliens; sur ce tronçon en attendant qu’un levé topographique tial ait ét.6 effectue, Syrie; troisièmement, pas & ce qu’on jalonneune partie de la ligne de d8marcation 2 la frontiare aussi sur toute la longueur de la ligne de dgmarcation, y compris 45. As far as the measures proposed to prevent any such violent and dangerous explosions in the future are concerned, 1 should like to formulate certain observations which reflect clearly the position of my Government regarding the case under discussion. First, the central issue in the present case is the survey of the eastern part of the road built by the Israelis. Secondly, a11 work on this part of the road should cesse immediately until an impartial and general survey has been completed and approved by the Syrian side. Thirdly, my Government does not abject to the marking of any section of the northern demarcation line, provided that such marking is also carried out along the entire demarcation line to include the three sectors of the demilitarized zone, 46, In this respect, 1 should like to quote from the statement of the representative of France at the 1166th meeting of the Security Council. In supporting the report Of General Bull, he referred to the Chief of Staff’s suggestion for: 46. ration faite par le représentant 1166eme du g&&ral pele les suggestions “an on-the-spot determination both of the exact Israel-Syrian boundary, in the area where the demarcation line was laid down by the Armistice Agreement, and of the limits in the use of land where the Armistice Agreement has provided for the existence of demilitarized zones” [1166thmeeting, para. 91. The remarks of the representative of France are not only pertinent, but constructive. 47. The demilitarized zones were created specifically in order to separate the Israel and Syrian forces and remove the causes of tension. In our view, the only way to stop Israel incursions into the demilitarized zone and into Syrian territory is by strict observance by Israel of the Armistice Agreement, which is a single and indivisible instrument. cannot follow the example of the Israelis, who invoke a.part of the Armistice Agreement when it suits their purpose, and ignore the rest when it is against their selfish interests. We, for our part, adhere fully the Armistice Agreement as a whole, and it is the duty of the Council to see to it that Israel also complies with this Agreement. 48, 1 should like to remind the Council, and through the Council the Israel rqpresentative and those represents, of the essential purport of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement regarding the demilitarized zone. “The armed forces of both Parties shall betotally excluded”-from the demilitarized zone- “and which no activities by military or paramilitary forces shall be permitted.” “The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission . . . and United Nations Observers attached the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring the full implementation of this article.” “The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be empowered to authorize the return civilians to villages”-Arab villages-‘land settlementsI’-Jewish settlements-“in the demilitarized zone and the employment of limited numbers locally recruited civilian police in the zone for interna1 security purposes , , .ll Y 49. The question may be asked: in what manner have the Israelis carried out their obligations under aforementioned provisions, Fd in what manner to what extent have the United Nations Observers been allowed by Israel to carry out their responsibilities? The present deplorable state of affairs in the demilitarized zone, to which the report of General Bull has referred in unequivocal terms, is clearly stated follows: “The suspicion and bitterness which characterize the relations betweenthe two countries are nourished to a considerable extent by Israel’s firm refusa1 recognize any locus standi to Syria in the demili- 3/ See Officia1 Records of the Sekurinr Council. Fourth Year. S~ecial Supplement No. 2,document S/1353/Rev.l, articleV, para. 5, a, c, and g. 50. This situation which, unfortunately, has not yet received the necessary attention in the Security Council takes the appropriate andnecessary measures in accordance with the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement. 51. At the 1164th meeting of the Security Council 1 informed the members that: “On the morning of 25 November . . . an Israel armoured car was again patrolling alongside this track and encroaching into Syrian territ0ry.l’ [1164th meeting, para. 118.1 This taok place at approximately 11.45 hours local time. 1 also said that the Syrian delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission “bas lodged a complaint” and ‘Lrequested a full investigation”, It is not surprising to see that Israel has continued its provocative acts in this sensitive area, even during the discussion of this latest aggression by this body. 1 have been informed by my Government chat on 1 December 1964, at approximately 9.15 hours, the armoured car returned to the track and was immediately warned to withdraw. Instead of withdrawing, the Israelis opened fire on Syrian positions, using machine-guns and heavy weapons. The exchange of fire lasted fifteen minutes, Bte somm8 immgdiatement positions armes 52. Again, yesterday, 2 December, at approximately 8.28 hours, an Israel armoured car returned to the so-called “Israel track”. It was also warned, but the Israel positions again opened machine-gun fire on Syrian defensive positions. In addition, anti-tank fire was directed on our positions and firing lasted about thirty minutes, The Syrian delegation to ISMAC protested to the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission and requested an immediate investigation. défensives dblégation tice a protesté mission 53. It is difficult at the present time to estimate the extent of these latest acts of continued aggression, in the face of which we cannot remain idle. It is the sole responsibility of the Security Council to see that Israel aggression must be stopped and a11 neoessary measures taken to prevent a further deterioration of the situation, which is already tense and fraught with danger. l’ampleur devant C’est au Conseil de sécurite seul qu’incombe la responsabilité de faire prendre empêcher tres tendue et lourde de dangers. 54. Je prie les membres d’àvoir ciser permission, droit d’une prochaine 54, 1 apologize for speaking at such length, but 1 wanted to make very clear the position of my Government. With your permission, Mr. President, 1 reserve the right to ask you to give me the floor when we meet again, if necessary. 55. Le PRESIDENT la parole au représentant répondre sentant de la Syrie. 55, The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): 1 cal1 upon the representative of the United Kingdom, who wishes to exercise his right of reply in respect of some of the remarks made by the representative of Syria. 58. What is not in dispute is that there was a heavy exchange of fire; what is not in dispute is that there is a rapid escalation. These are the circumstances that cause my delegation, which deplores a11 violent action on this or any other frontier, to believe that it is indeed conciliation and not condemnation at which we should aim here, and that these proceedings would have no purpose if this Council did not, by supporting the recommendations made in General Bull’s report, contribute to that conciliation. 59, Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America): 1 was pleased to hear SO many expressions here today of regard for the late Arkady Sobolev. May 1 also add mine, for 1 had the privilege of knowing him from the first days of his service in the United Nations, almost twenty years ago, and fully shared the respect and the admiration which he earned and enjoyed among a11 of those who knew him. 60. The presence here at our table today of a distinguished international figure, Mr. LeitZo da Cunha, Minister for External Relations of Brazil, ia an honour to this Council and also, 1 believe, a meaningful testimony to the importance which his great country attaches to the United Nations. Therefore 1 take advantage of thia opportunity to thank him for his .participation in our deliberations and also for the significant speech that he delivered in the General Assembly this morning. 9 61. The recent incident on the Israel-Syrian frontier presents once more the tragic spectacle of two countries which have been unable to live as friendly or even as peaceful neighbours. For seventeen years the boundary line between Syria and Israel has known little peace. There the people have lived and have 4/ Sec Officia1 Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, 1289th plenary meeting. 63. We have listened to statements by the representatives of the parties with careful attention. 1 confess my profound disappointment that, on 13 November, Syria and Israel once again saw fit to resort to arms. We are disappointed that they were instantly prepared to do this, with armaments that have no place in defensive areas, that the first shot fired from a rifle quickly escalated into fire on the spot and elsewhere by tanks, by artillery and, finally, by jet aircraft, We are saddened, as previous speakers have said here, by the loss of life on bath sides. We find it difficult to excuse the readiness with which the whole military action was unclertaken. 64, The general significance of the events is clear. In a time of tension and of the build-up of military forces, controversial activity along the Armistice Line was met with abrupt firing across it. Instead of resorting, in the first instance, to United Nations machinery, each side struck immediately at the other and, according to recent reports, this pattern of activity has even been repeated. 65. Within the context of what has been done in the past the Council should, we believe, now recommend ways to make such incidents less likely to occur in the future. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization’s Chief of Staff offers us some specific steps. In paragraph 24 of his report., as has been noted, he asks: “1s the reconstructed track entirely, as asserted by Israel, on the Israel side of the Armistice Demarcation Line or does it at some places encroach upon Syrian territory, as asserted by Syria? 67. Upon the success of limited surveys depends the possibility of more general ones, The former is at present a necessity, the latter is desirable in the future. We would urge both sides to avoid any further provocative aots and to take seriously the counsels of self-restraint contained in paragraph 25 of the report, that is, to submit complaints to the Mixed Armistice Commission rathsr than to commence shooting and to suspend activities about which a party has oomplained if the Chairman of the Commission deems it necessary during an investigation or alter its results areknown. These are not trivialor temporary exhortations, They embody the elements of co-operation without which the General Armistice Agreement would be dishonoured and ineffective, 68. In Paragraph 26 of the report the Chief of Staff points out the crippling effect which a semi-operative Mixed Armistice Commission has upon UNTSO’s efforts to effect an orderly truce. Full participation in the activities of the Mixed Armistice Commission, more than any other single act, would increase the chances for a more effective observance of the truce by both sides. Full participation by both parties would add greatly to the authority of the Commission and reduce the suspicions and the uncertaintieswhichgive birth to these repeated acts of violence. 69. Al1 of us here know that peace is more than the absence of war. A Council table in New York cannot legislate Peace for the people who live in the settlements and the towns near Tel-El-Qadi. Nor cari the Council dictate to the Governments of Israel and Syria that they must live at peace with each other. We cari only recommend, urge, plead with a11 of our energy that the mechanisms for peaceful settlement and not guns be used. If they were, it is not beyond hope that we should never again discuss this subject which has corne SO often to this Council table. 71. I would now make some observations on the statements which we have heard today, First, 1 would express my gratification at the reference by the Minister for External Relations of Brazil to “the cordial and most fruitful relations we have maintained with Israel since its inception”. [1167th meeting, para. 16.1 That sentiment is warmly reciprocated by the Government and the people of Israel. At the end of bis statement the Foreign Minister expressed the hope nthat both parties will make full use of restraint and contribute in whatever possible way towards the implementation of the constructive suggestions put forward by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization” [&, para. 211. 72. 1 would assure him, and also other members of the Council who have spoken in Similar vein, that my Government certainly proposes to act in that spirit. We have a high regard for General Bull. We are in close and constant touch with him and his aides and we co-operate with them in promoting our shared objective, which is to maintain peace on the border. 73. The representative of the Ivory Coast is quite right when he contends [1167th meeting] that the best way to achieve fruitful results would be by the processes of dialogue. That is more important than forma1 judgements on border incidents and we would welcome any possible way in which it could be promoted. 74. 1 must, however, reluctantly express regret at the tone of the statement made this morning by the representative of the Soviet Union. When a small country like mine appears before the Council to plead its case, it is discouraging to find the representative of a great Power, with a permanent seat on this body, acting more as counsel for one party than as judge and presenting the issue before the Council in a onesided manner. My delegation repudiates the view expressed by the representative of the Soviet Union this morning, both as to responsibility for the incident of 13 November and as to responsibility for the general state of tension between Israel and Syria. With a11 respect to the journalistic source invoked by Mr. Fedorenko, the harassment of our population and our developing projects by Syrian gun-fire is not inspired by some mythical “strategic doctrine” on the part of Tsrael, We want peace with our neighbours; and until that is achieved, we want the right to live unmolested by them. 75. It is unfortunately true that much of the Council’s time has been taken up in a11 these years with the 76. The very last time that the Council dealt with an Israel-Syrian dispute was last year when Syrian soldiers crossed the border and ambushed and murdered Israel farmers. And 1 should like to ask the representative of the Soviet Union if he regards that as another example of Israel aggression. Aresolution condemning that murder was blocked only by the Soviet veto. 77. It is a Eact of life in the Security Council that any impartial and constructive approach to these problems which is not pleasing to the Arab side runs into the roadblock of the Soviet veto. It is not for me to state the reasons for that; I cari only deplore the fact. 78. 1 turn now to the statement which we have just heard-from the representative of Syria. 1 did not find in that statement any new matter that had not already been covered in our previous statements or in dozens of General Assembly debates. 1 shall therefore not take up the Council’s time by trying torefute in detail the statement just made by the representative of Syria. 1 should like merely to mention one point-that is, the convenient habit of opening fire on Israel activities and then calling this warning shots. According to some of the statements made here, a single alleged warning shot on 13 November seems to haveproduced the most dramatic results, including the population of villages taking shelter and the Air Force swinging into action. That is not a very likely story-least of a11 in regard to a border area where Syrian shots are a regrettably common feature of daily liîe. 79. General Bull says that on 13 November the Syrians opened fire on an Israel vehicle. Mr. Asha inlormed the Council on 16 November: “Our defensive positions opened fire on the patrol and prevented it from advancing inside Syrian territory”. [1162nd meeting, para. 12 (ii).] That, I suggest, shoulddispose of the matter. 80. Before concluding, 1 should like to recapitulate the Pacts on one of the main themes of this debate: our border road and its relation to the frontier. 81. First, the track in question was constructed in 1961 and has been in use for several years. 82. Second, the survey by UNTSO’s Canadian team last year established that a three-kilometre stsetch 83. Third, after the 13 November incident, Captain Brizzi, a qualified suryeyor on the UNTSO staff, pinpointed the place where the patrol was when it was attacked and established, furthermore, that the 3 November incident had taken place at the same spot. His pinpointing indicated that the track at that spot is definitely within Israel territory. 83. vembre, de topographes sion l’endroit de l’attaque 3 novembre ressort d’un doute en territoire 84, Fourth, the incidents of yesterday and the day before, to which the Syrian representative has just referred, took place at the same spot as the incidents of 3 and 13 November. 84. Quatriemement, veille, dont le repr&entant se sont produits 13 novembre. 85. Fifth, the Syrians have never brought forward any evidence which would substantiate the encroachment alleged by them at that spot. Their allegations have been vague, unfounded and contradictory. In their officia1 complaint to the Mixed Armistice Commission on the 13 November incident, they alleged an encroachment of fifty metros. On 27 November [1164th meeting], the Syrian representative at this Council table claimed that there had been an encroachment of 250 to 300 metres. On 1 December, the daybefore yesterday, the Syrian spokesman alleged an encroachment of seventy-five metres. Today, the representative of Syria says that it might be only a few metres, if 1 understood him correctly. And a11 those allegations refer to a particular locality which Captain Brizzi’s survey shows to be on the Israel side of the demarcation line. 85. aucune preuve tendent, qu’il y aurait eu empiétement toire. de fondement et contradictoires. cielle d’armistice ont par18 d’un empiétement [1164ème seance], le representant au Conseil de sécurité de 250 à 300 m. Le ler porte-parole de 75 m. Aujourd’hui, déclare m&tres, ces allégations d’après israélien 86. Sixth, in proposing that Captain Reichert’s survey of last year be continued along the stretch where the recent incidents took place, my Government does not imply that there is any doubt about the track’s being in Israel territory. It is agreeable to the survey for the sole purpose of putting an end to these Syrian claims of encroachment and in the hope that that would put a final stop also to the Syrian practice of shooting at Israel activities there. 86. SixiBmement, par le capitaine Reichert sur derniers à entendre la piste est en territoire a seule Fin de mettre un terme aux allagations piétement faites par la Syrie et dans l’espoir mettra ont prise vaillent dans ce secteur, 87. In brief, on the face of the matter there is no reason to believe that there has been any encroachment. It is our belief that the continuation of Captain Reichert’s survey Will confirm that. I suspect thatthe Syrians realize that too. Why else should the Syrian representative have rejected this afternoon General 3~11’s proposa1 on the subject? I-Ie has told the Council that Syria Will not co-operate in surveying the Tel-El-Qadi sector, to which General Bull refers and where these incidents occurred, unless the whole of the Israel-Syrian border is surveyed together with it. This is a ramified and complicated problem. The difficulties that have been encountered in connexion with it in the past-diîficulties which go back to 1957 and are due to Syrian non-co-operation-need not detain us here. The fact that a survey of this two- 87. ser qu’il y a eu empiétement. tion que le prolongement le confirmera. compte aussi. Syrie aurait-il du géneral Conseil secteur se réf&re ne releve israélo-syrienne un probl&me éprouvées remontent de la Syrie - ne doivent pas nous retenir 88. This afternoon the Syrian represenfative has referred to the two latest incidents at the spot in question, which took place the day before yesterday and yesterday. Between 13 November and 1 December, routine patrolling proceeded and there was no UNTSO demand that it be stopped. The patrolling proceeded without incident. The patrols went throughquitepeacefully and in a normal way on 15,17, 22 and 25 November. It was only because of bad weather and heavy rainstorms that the patrols were not more frequent. I mentioned to the Council earlier that the repair of the road had to be hurried up, before the rainy season set in. 89. On 30 November, the Security Council adjourned without fixing a date for its next meeting on this subject. On 1 December, the next day, the routine patrol was suddenly attacked again. It is permissible to ask what is the significance of that timing and whether it is meant to put pressure on the Security Council. 90. In conclusion, may 1 endorse the eloquent plea for peace that we have just heardfromMr. Stevenson, We in Israel long, above a11 things, for the day when the people of Israel and the Arab peoples around us will live togetber in freedom and in tranquillity and Will work togethér for the common good of the ancient region which we and the Arabs share.

I have no further speakers on the lise for this meeting, and 1 should like to ask whether any member of the Council is prepared to speak tomorrow. As no member of the Council wishes to continue discussion of this subject for the moment, 1 would suggest that the Council now adjourn. As President, 1 shall undertake the necessary consultations with a view to settingthedate for the next meeting, The meeting z-ose at 5.30 p.m. Litho in U.N. Price: $U.S. 0.35 (or equivalent in other currencies)