S/PV.1170 Security Council

The provisional agenda for this meeting of the Council 1s contained in document S/Agenda/ll’lO/Rev.l. If there is no objection, 1 shall declare the agenda adopted. 1. du jour au document d’objection, adoptk 2. M. FEDORENKO listes sov#Sque à l’ordre 1964, adressee par les representants du Burundi, du Dahomey, de l’Indonésie, Mauritanie, de la RBpublique Soudan, Zambie gation sovi&ique tion a l’ordre

The Soviet delegation has no objection to the inclusion in the agenda Of the letter received on 1 December 1964, addressed t0 the President of the Security Council, fxm the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Zambia [S/6076 and Add,l-5].1! However, the Soviet delegation emphatically abjects to the inclusion in the agenda of the provocative question of so-called interference by some of the African States in the affairs of the Congo, ‘1’ Officia1 Records of the Security Council, Nlneteenth Year. Supple- I/ ment for October, November and December 1964. Supplément 4. NO prooedural manoeuvres or tricks cari help the instigators of this bloody adventure in the Congo to escape responsibility for this shameful act of armed intervention committed against the Congolese people. This joint action by the colonizers in the Congo constitutes aggression against the Congo in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter and of the rules of international law. This flagrant interference by the imperialists in the affairs of the Congo is a challenge hurled at the Afrioan States, which has created a threat to the peace and security of the African countries-and not to African countries only. 5. That is why the Security Council must proceed without any delay to consider precisely this prqblem, and no other. 6. The Soviet delegation considers that it is the duty of the Security Council decisively to defeat the attempts of the colonizers and their puppets to substitute, for the discussion of an urgent and important question of armed intervention by NATO countries in the domestic affairs of the Congo, provocative slander having nothing to do with the interests of the Congolese people. 7. The Soviet delegation proceeds from the standpoint that the Security Council is bound to give due attention to the letter from twenty-two African and Asian States Members of the United Nations, and to consider immediately the question of the threat ta peace and security which has risen in connexion with the armed intervention by Belgium, the United States and the United Kingdom in the Congo,

1 assume that the Council is proceeding under rule 9 of its provisional rules of procedure, which relates to the adoption of the agenda, 9. 1 cari hardly say that 1 am surprised by the statement that we have just heard from the representative of the Soviet Union. But 1 would take the liberty of POinting out that a complaint has been brought to this Council by certain African States, a complaint alleging that the United States and Belgium have intervened militarily in the Congo. The Members who have brought that complaint ignore in their memorandum the fact that the action taken by the United States and by Belgium was purely and simply a rescue mission, authorized in advance by the legally constituted Government of the Congo, And yet now certain membess of the Security Council seek to prevent the Counoil from considering a complaint by the 11, 1 cari only surmise that the Soviet Union, which has already been reported to be resupplying those who aid the rebels, is seeking in this way to protect itself from a disclosure of the facts in this sorry situation, The question, the representative of the Soviet Union says, is provocative action against the Congo. 1 agree-and the provocative action by the rebels, aided and abetted by complainants in this very room, is proceeding day by day. 11. Je ne puis dont on nous aident les rebelles que la lumière navrante, il y a une provocation une provocation appuyés poursuit 12. 1 would suggest that the Security Council should proceed to hear the two complaints as a whole. 12. les deux plaintes

In considering the adoption of its agenda, the Security Council Council must consider the true facts and bear them in mind; it must also think of its dignity. This is the situation before us: twenty-twa States Members of our Organization have asked us tc give urgent consideration to certain irrefutable and deplorable facts. The issue is armed intervention, on the part of certain States, in the interna1 affairs of the Congo, intervention which has deeply shocked the peoples of the whole African continent, That intervention, which my delegation, in the General Assembly, has just termed collective colonialist intervention by the NATO Powers, is a fact which no one in this chamber, no one around this table, cari question, 13. la question de sécurité examiner; dignite. est la suivante: sation nous demandent d’examiner faits incontestables de l’intervention affaires profondhment le delegation d’intervention puissances sonne dans cette salle, table, ne peut mettre 14. lettre certaines sinon fictif, 14. On the other hand, the letter in document S/60969 merely contains obviously hypothetical, not to say fictitious, assertions. 15. assertions document diminuer que celle de l’organisation 15. It seems to our delegation that to consider the rather fictitious assertions submitted in document S/6096 would serve only to obscure the facts and to weaken the authority both of the Security Council and of the United Nations itself. 16. pose Bnergiquement du Conseil cembre procede par priant de l’intervention affaires 16. Therefore the Czechoslovak delegation is firmly opposed to.the inclusion of the letter dated 9 December 1964 [S/6096], in the Security Council’s agenda; and we request the Council to proceed forthwith to the consideration of the letter submitted by twenty-two States Members of our Crganization, asking us to giVs Dur urgent attention to the armed intervention by ,certain States in the interna1 affairs of the Congo. 17. glais]: de procédure Conseil ce qui 17. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): 1 hesitate t0 intervene on a question of procedure when 1 am a new member of the Council. However, 1 have heard what has been said, and it seems to me that there la one overriding fact which none of us cari possibly 21lbicJ. 18. In the memorandum attached to the letter addressed to us on 1 December 1964 [S/SO76] by a number of States we see in paragraph 7: “Appeals strongly to a11 Powers at present intervening in the interna1 affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to cesse their interference”. We then received a letter from the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo referring specifically to that point, It seems to me that it would be impossible for us to consider adequately the very request of the States that made the original proposal to us, without examining the subsequent complaint of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo itself. 19. At this stage of our proceedings when we are considering solely a matter of procedure, 1 should have thought that a11 of us would wish not to pick and choose or to prejudge or prejudice the matter-or indeed to enter into the substance at this stage when we are dealing with a question of procedure-but should agree to go forward to consider both the letters before us and indeed the whole question before us, including both the complaints which have been made, Therefore 1 would strongly urge that we should consider both the letters which have been presented to us.

The discussion now under way concerning a question of procedure, which has already revealed the complexity of the problem we shall have to consider during the coming days, impels me to make a few remarks. 21. TO begin with, the Morocoan delegation is not in the habit of making a priori objections to any complaint submitted to the Counoil, even if that complaint cornes from a most questionable source. 22. As my delegation sees it, the problem is this: for some days, we have had before us a request by a number of States Members of the United Nations to convene the Security Council as a matter of urgency. So far, no member of the Council has made any objection to that request for a meeting, and on that basis the President, after holding the usual consultations, decideci to convene the Security Council today. 23. We feel that the second item on the provisional agenda does not require any comment. We cari be glad of that, since it is always desirable for the Security Council to ‘discuss an agenda item to which there is no major objection, especially on the part of some States members of the Council. 25. However, when 1 perused the text of the letter in question, 1 could not help observing that it was not a complaint, submitted in good and due form, against a given State, but merely a few items from newspaper sources which canstituted the basis for the request for a Security Council meeting contained in that letter. The text refers to press reports attributing statements to a prominent African which, in mny delegation’s opinion, it would have been wiser to verify and authenticate officially. Also, in referring to some reports, the text repeatedly uses the conditional mood. 26. In our opinion, in view of the important part it plays in the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council should only consider problems concerning which precise information has been submitted and affirmed. 27. My delegation therefore finds it somewhat difficult to make a favourable judgement concerning a procedural decision on the third item of the agenda. 28. 1 should also like to say that the observations made by my delegation at this juncture do not in any way prejudge our basic position, which we Will set out at a later stage. 29. But 1 consider that the request for a Security Council meeting in the letter of 9 December is nothing more than a reaction to the initiative taken by the signatories of the original request for a meeting; the Security Council has already accepted that request, and it is because of it that we are now examining this problem. 30. In conclusion, 1 wish to make it clear that my delegation is not in a position to takea truly objective and well-founded stand on the third item on the agenda before us.

Without wishing to join in the procedural debate, 1 feel that perhaps we ought to consider the needs of tlie moment, the urgent need to take up a very serious problem. As the speakers who preceded me remarked, the question at issue here is the question of the Congo, and of complaints Of foreign intervention. These complaints, whether

Without prejudice to the Ivory Coast’s position on whether it is advisable to oall a meeting of the Security Council on this problem, 1 should like to say a few words in the discussion now in progress concerning the agenda. My delegation considers that we should have abided by the usual procedure followed by the Security Council in such matters. Originally, on 1 December 1964, we were presented with a letter requesting that the Council should be convened, and stressing the urgency of that request. The President of the Council then, as is bustomary, consulted members of the Council, not on the merits of the complaint, but on the date to be set for the Council meeting. Following those consultations, and as a result of the complaint contained in the letter dated 1 December 1964, the date of the meeting was set for today. 33. Before today’s meeting, which was called as a result of the letter in question, we were not aware of the existence of another complaint; and some delegations, including my own, found the Congolese Government’s letter on the Council table only a short time ago. The Government of the Congo, too, requests an urgent meeting of .the Security Council. Here again, the members of the Council have not been called upon to discuss the merits of the oomplaint, for the Congolese Government has every right to present such a request, as have the twenty-one States which asked for the current meeting. Accordingly, what we must do is to set the date for a meeting to oonsider this second complaint; it would be standard procedure for the President to hold the usual consultations in this regard, In the course of those consultations, members of the Council might well corne to think that bath complaints have some bearing on the substance of the problem, and wecould thendetermine how the agenda for another meeting of the Council should be worded. By that 1 mean that during a future meeting of the Council, perhaps this new item could be linked to the first item of the agenda, or else we might decide to hold a separate meeting to consider the second complaint. 34. The normal procedure, then, would have been prior consultation of members of the Council, aocording to the President’s customary practice, before we were asked to adopt the agenda, 35. The delegation of the Ivory Coast thus considers that at the 1170th meeting of the Council-that is, the meeting now in progress-we could begin the debate on the first two agenda items only, namely: (1) adoption of the agenda and (2) the letter dated 1 December 1964 from the representatives of twenty- 37. 1 should also like to point out that if the Secretariat had included in the agenda only the letter from the group of African States without including the other, we should be confronted with the sameproblem because the other side would be requesting the inclusion of the letter from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Consequently, as President of this body, 1 am glad to state that we have proceeded, in dealing wlth this difficult matter, with due objectivity. 38: Mr. SEYDOUX (France) (translatedfrom French): The French delegation feels it would be somewhat odd to refuse to include a communication bearing on a problem whioh several other countries have asked us to examine. Moreover, I think it would be hest to bring this procedural discussion to a speedy conclusion, Arguments, certainly most interesting arguments, have been brought forward; but we Will have an opportunity to listen to them when we debate the substance of the question. The present discussion runs the risk of duplicating the one for which we have met and which, in my delegation’s view, should begin without further delay.

We should like to exercise our right of reply. A few minutes ago the Soviet delegation expressed its objection to the inclusion in the agenda of the question raised by the TshombB régime, pointing out that this was nothing but athinly disguisedprovocative manœuvre-initiated, moreover, very belatedly. 40. In the statement which the United States representative made-from a text, as it seemed to us, pre- Pared in advance and prior to our own statement here: in itself a very interesting point-Ambassador Stevenson graphically confirmed the flimsiness of this piece of slander. 41. As was to be expected, the United States representative, attempting to distract attention from the real issue-the armed intervention by NATO countries in the affairs of the Congo-launohed an attack upon the African States and the Soviet Union, But the flimsiness of a11 the insinuations which the United StateS representative thought it fit and permissible to make here in this connexion is SO patent and 43. It is also not surprising that the United Kingdom representative should have given, here, complacent support to the United States representative since, as we a11 know, the United Kingdom has already given a different kind of support to the United States outside the walls of this building by plaeing Ascension Island at its disposa1 as a spring-board for the commission of armed aggression. 44. What 1 have said shows how legitimate and well-founded is the position of the Soviet delegation, which Will vote against the provocative question which the Tshombé rbgime is trying to raise.

I regret the necessity of being obliged to address another word to this matter of procedure. On the question of timing, however, which was raised by the representative of the Ivory Coast, 1 should like to point out that this Council has on many occasions adopted a provisional agenda which has contained items proposed for inscription within a matter of only hours before the meeting concerned. 1 was called back to New York frok a vacation last summer, and 1 have occasion to remember very well that we met in this Council on an evening in August to adopt an agenda which included two letters dated 8 August, one from the representative of Turkey and the other from , the representative of Cyprus, and the day we met was 8 August [1142nd meeting], 46. Going further back, 1 recaI1 a meeting of this Council in October 1962 [1022nd meeting], when the agenda which was adopted contained three letters, two of which had been submitted the previous day and the other the same day. Then, again, in 1958 this Council met on 17 July to consider an agenda comprising two letters, one dated 22 May from the representative of Lebanon and the other dated the same day, 17 July, from the representative of Jordan [ 831st meeting]. 4’7. 1, therefore, see nothing abnormal on the basis of our precedents, in the procedures proposed by the Secretariat in connexion with the adoption of this agenda. 48. 1 shall overlook the oharacterisation by my colleague, Mr. Fedorenko, of my suggestion that we consider the two complaints of intervention simultaneously as ridiculous and as nonsense, -1 shall not be as uncharitable about his remar,ks. As to whether 49, The tradition Of thiS Council is to give wide latitude to a11 Members to express their views, and surely no one Will be called upon to comment on the third item of our agenda this afternoon if he does not wish to do so. 49. membres de leur opinion, ?I prendre l’ordre pas. 50. I submit that there are before us two complaints of intervention. That is the only subject on our agenda. There are ample precedents for this, and 1 see no reason for any further delay in the proceedings of this Council in the adoption of this agenda. 50. pour intervention. 2 notre ordre et je ne vois nos debats sur l’adoption

1 think we have now reached the point when we cari take a decision, and the delegationof the Ivory Coast believes it should give a brief explanation of its position; in particular, we would state that this position does not in any way prejudge the decision on the substance of the matter. 51. oit nous en sommes une décision, croit elle tient surtout absohlment 52. The cases just cited by the United States representative are correct. Some of them occurred before the Ivory Coast was a member of the Security Council, but in regard to the cases which arose since the Ivory Coast has been in the Council, it seems to me, if I remember rightly, that there was unanimity concerning the agenda, Thus, when there: is unanimity the Council cari decide on the wording of an agenda item or on the manner of dealing with that item. 52. des eux, la C&e-d’ivoire Conseil produits il me semble l’unanimité! quence, en cas d’unanimité, une decision tion a son ordre cette question. 53. The delegation of the Ivory Coast, however, still believes that, when the Council is divided on the question of the adoption of the agenda, it should have recourse to the rules of procedure. 1 think this is the only way in which the matter cari be settled. 53. de penser question r&glement. departager. 54, My delegation recalls that rule 7 of the provisional rules of procedure, which has been invoked, states: Wnly items which have been brought to the attention of the representatives on the Security Council in accordance with rule 6 . . .” And rule 6 states: “The Secretary-General shall immediately bring to the attention if a11 representatives on the Security Council a11 communications from States . . .” 54. aux termes provisoire à l’ordre BtB portees Conseil Et immediatement sentants cations 55. nimm8diatement”, Or, l’ordre nous ont Ata distribués 55. Between the words nhave been brought” and the word “immediatelyn, there is a time sequence. In the present instance, both documents-the letter and the Provisional agenda on this matter-seem to have been circulated to us at the same time. 56. l&ve biendes passions, croit tiens juridique, 56. As this is a problem which has aroused considerable feeling, the delegation of the Ivory Coast believes, as always, that such a question cari be only decided by strict application of the rules, and this belief determines our position, which Will in no 58. 1 think it surely must be the wish of this Council that we leave our procedural discussion and proceed to the urgent ancl dangerous matter which we have been convened to discuss.

1 merely want to say that my delegation is prepared to take a position, bearing in mind the remarks of the representative of the Ivory Coast. Indeed, we have here a document which reached US only as the Council was almut to meet, that is at the eleventh hour, and we have not yet had an opportunity of forming an opinion on it. Tbat, at least, is the case where my delegation is concerned. r 60. 1 must also express my agreement with the remarks made here to the effect that the provisional agenda submitted for consideration to the Security Council should be adopted by its members unanimously. This is very desirable for the sake of harmony in our work and my delegation, accordingly, feels that we must not lose sight of this point, which is essential to the smooth. progress of our deliberntions in the Security Council. 61. 1 think, therefore, that the third item on the provisional agenda before us deserves to be examined at a later stage. We could now adopt the first two items of the provisional agenda, and decide on the third item at a subsequent meeting. That is a11 1 have to say at this stage,

In the light of the discussion which has arisen in the Council concerning the adoption of the agenda, 1 have the impression that no member has objected to the inclusion of item 2, while some members have objected to the inclusion of item 3. 63. 1 consequently propose, if the Council SO wishes, that we put the question of including item 3 in our provisional agenda, to the vote, provided there is no objection to such a procedure. A vote was taken by show of hands. In faveur: Bolivia, Brazil, China, France, Norway, United Kingdom of Great Britain andNorthern Ireland, United States of America, Agains t: CzechosloYakia, Ivory Coast, Morocco, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The agenda was adopted by seven votes to four. Letter dated 9 December 1964 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/6096) 64, The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): 1 wish to inform the Council that the representatives of the Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, Belgium, Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), Algeria, Mali, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic have requested to participate in the discussion in the Council of the item on its agenda. These requests appear in documents S/6078, S/6079, S/6080, S/SOSl, S,‘6086, S/6090, S/6091, S/6093, S/6095, S,‘6097.3/ 65. If there is no objection, according to the established procedure pursuant to rule 37 of our rules of procedure, 1 shall invite the representatives of those countries to take seats at the Council table to participate without the right to vote in the debate on this subject. 66, 1 cal1 on the representative of the Soviet Union. 67, Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation considers it necessary to make the following statement regarding the proposa1 to invite the representative of the Congo to the Council table, 68, The Congo is at present caught in the grip of events with which we are a11 familiar. The country is enveloped in the flames of a struggle for national liberation. This noble struggle of the Congolese people is completely in line with the basic purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and with the rules of contemporary international law. The justice and the legitimacy of this struggle are confirmed in numerous resolutions adopted by the various organs of the United Nations. On the side of the Congolese patriots, who are defending the freedom and independence of their homeland from the encroachments pf the imperialists and their henchmen, are ranged a11 progressive forces throughout the world. The foreign origin and nature of TshomWls puppet r6gime in the Congo are known to everyone. The Tshomb6 régime is the creature of colonialism, with whose Will that puppet personnage obsequiously complies, 69. The USSR representative in the United Nations in his statement of, 6 July 1964 [S/5798],4/ drew 3/Ihid. 4/ Ibid., Nineteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1964 A 70. The Soviet Government, concerned about the possible consequences of these events, already at that time drew the attention of a11 States to the dangerous situation developing in connexion with the Congo and urged them to use a11 their influence to prevent any new encroachment by the imperialist forces and their agents on the national independence and territorial integrity of the Young Republic of the Congo. 71. The forces of colonialism, hiding behind the puppet régime of Tshombé as behind a shabbyscreen, are hatching plans for the division of the Congo into spheres of influence for them and have already launched a new aggression against the Congolese people. The attempts of colonialism to hide behind the back of its protégé cari, of course, deceive no one. 72. Tshombé% claims to represent the Congo have, as we a11 know, been categorically rejected. The African States refused to allow this agent of imperialism to attend the First ordinary session of the Assembly of the Heads of States and Government of the Organization of African Unity. Tshomti was likewise not permitted to attend the Cairo Conference of the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries. 73. The Soviet delegation considers that the Security Council cannot fail to take into account the unanimously expressed Will of the African States Members of the United Nations. It goes without saying that the puppet régime of Tshombe does not represent the Congolese people and has no right whatsoever to speak in their name.

The delegation of the Ivory Coast considers it necessary to define its attitude with respect to the problem facing us. 75. We believe that the Government of the Congo is a lawful Government and that this applies equally to its representatives. It is by virtue of the fact that the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo sits in the Organization of African Unity, in the Council of Ministers, in the African Group and in the United Nations, the Security Council should therefore treat a11 the States which have requested to be heard on this question without discrimination. The representative of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has the right, as such, to be seated at the Council table during the discussion of this problem. A t the invitation of the Presiden t, Mr. M. A, Mahgoub, (Sudan), Mr. L. Beovogui (Guinea), Mr. K. Botsio (Ghana), Mr. P+H. Spaak (Belgium), Mr. C. D; Ganao (Congo, Brazzaville), Mr. 2’. Bouattoura (Algeria),

This meeting of the Council has been called. in response to the request made in a letter received on 1 December 1964 and signed by the representatives of sixteen Member States [S/6076]. As may be seen from Addenda 1 to 5, the number of signatures has increased to twenty-two. 77. The President of the Council has also received a letter dated 9 December 1964 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo [S/6096] conoerning a request from that oountry for an urgent meeting of the SecurityCounoil. 78. The Council Will begin consideration of this question. 79. Mr, GANAO (Congo, Brazzaville) (translated from French): After the semblance of agreement which the Council has just reached on matters of procedure, 1 might, in other circumstances, have spoken of the honour which it usually is for a representative to open the debate on the substance of a question, and of SO serious a question. 1 must confess, however, that for me it is, rather, a duty, and a painful one at that, since the question with which we shall have to deal here affects me directly, and this for two reasons. First, the question affects the race to which 1 have the misfortune to belong, namely, the black race; and secondly, it affects me especially since 1 am the national of a country bordering on the Democratic Republic of the Congo in which thedrama, the tragedy, whose origins are familiar to us ail, is being unfolded. 80. 1 must also confess that my delegation regards the fact that this meeting of the Security Council has taken place, as a success. For weknow that since we signed, together with a number of friendly States, the request for the convening of the Council, there have been machinations and manoeuvres. We had even thought that the Council might not meet at all. That is why we look upon the meeting of the Council as a success. 81. 1 think that it is not for us to comment on the Council, its composition or its functions. We wish merely to recall, for our own orientation, that it had been originally conceived and established in order to try, on the one hand, to maintain international peace and security and, on the other, to restore them if, for one reason or another, anything happened to disturb them. 82. 1 said that we have no comment to make regarding this Council; nor do we wish to pass judgement on it. If, however, we were to make a judgement, we would say that unfortunately this Council, which is called the Vecurity Council”, might perhaps one day be more realistically termed (and this is not impossible) the “insecurity council”. Study of the problem which this meeting has before it Will perhaps show us that we are not very far wrong. 84. What is the problem? In the viewof the Congolese delegation, it is solely the latest aggression committed by the Americans, the Belgians and the British against the black population. 85. Some people might consider, in a11 good faith, but perhaps not being well informed, that the tragedy which has just taken place at Stanleyville was confined to the day of 24 November. In reality, this aggression was premeditated; it was planned a long time in advance. We were holding a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at Addis Ababa on 5 September of this year when we learned of the measures, which even then dated some weeks back, undertaken by the oountries which committed this aggression, with a view to evacuating the white inhabitants of Stanleyville. Those Congolese who, at the time and until 24 November last, had control of Stanleyville understood the manœuvre, which, 1 must say, was not very well disguised. 86. What was that manoeuvre? Why, in a conflict in which the Congolese are fighting between themselves, should there be no concern fox the safety of the civilian population in general and why should the fate of the whites be the sole consideration? The answer is that it sufficed that the whites be evacuated from Stanleyville SO that, under a cloak of legality, the most powerful means might be placed at the disposal of the Leopoldville authorities, or rather, that the placing at their disposa1 of the means of mass destruction could be completed, and that bombs could be dropped on Stanleyville. It was of little consequence: the whites were no longer there; it was the blacks who .would have to die. Having seen that their first attempt had failed, there only remained one other thing for our good friends-I mean the Americans, the Belgians and the British-to undertake: direct intervention. That is what happened on 24 November; we a11 know the consequences. For the operation to be carried out, a11 that was needed was an excuse, and this excuse already existed: there were hostages, and a humanitarian operation had to be organized. 87. I might now make a brief pause, since 1 might well be asked on whose behalf 1 am speaking, seeing that the Leopoldville Government, which would be the one with cause to complain or protest, had given its approval to this famous humanitarian operation at Stanleyville. Let me reassure a11 those present: it is not our intention at this time to look into the origins of this affair. We shall go further and disregard the plain fact that the entryofthe troops of the Congolese national Army into Stanleyville coincided with the dropping of Belgian military paratroopers. Coincidence plays a great part in human affairs! 89. Since the intervention at Stanleyville took place in the name of humanity, 1 should like ta know who was threatened there and by whom; in the name of what humanity is it that, as 1 said earlier, people are armed not for self-defence but to commit massacres? Naturally, the oountries which organized this humanitasian operation at Stanleyville were not embarking on their first adventure, but, for the sake of logic, 1 shall confine myself to discussing that latest operation. 89. Puisqu’on est intervenu h Stanleyville au nom de l’humanité, à Stanleyville parle-t-on on arme des gens non pas pour se defendre mais pour commettre des massacres? Il va de soi que les pays qui ont organise cette operation humanitaire de Stanleyville ture. Mais, logique avec moi-meme, je me bornerai a parler de cette dernière. 90. The humanitarian operation referred to was fundamentally only a pretext. It was organized, first, by people who still feel a certain nostalgia because of their departure from the African continent, forced by historical evolution, and, secondly, by people whose greed has been aroused and who are trying more and more to replace, in Africa as elsewhere, the former occupying colonialist Powers. 90. L’operation humanitaire dont on a parle n%tait au fond qu’un prétexte, car elle a Bt6 organisee, d’une part, par des gens qui n’arrivent pas à se débarrasser encore d’une certaine nostalgie pour avoir Bté contraints, aller du continent africain et, d’autre part, par des gens dont les appetits augmentent de plus en plus, dont les tentatives de chercher ailleurs, aux anciennes puissances occupantes colonisatrices. 91. What humanitarian principles are at stake, when the Stanleyville operation was conceived only to safeguard selfish material interests? What humanitarian principles are at stake, when, on the pretextof saving the lives of an insignificant number of whites, tens of thousands of blacks are massacred-innocent biacks who know nothing of political manœuvres and whose only crime is that of having been born in a country whose natural resources are shockingly plentiful? 91. Au nom de quelle humanit8 nous parle-t-on, alors que l’opération de Stanleyville n’a et6 conçue que pour sauvegarder nom de quelle humanit6 nous parle-t-on alors que, pour P&endre de blancs, on massaore des dizaines de milliers de noirs - de noirs innocents, de noirs ignorant tout des calculs politiques, de noirs qui n’ont commis d’autre crime que celui d’être venus au monde dans un pays dont les richesses naturelles s’averent scandaleuses? 92. Lorsque nous &ions plus jeunes, nous avons appris qu’en musique une blanche vaut deux noires. La fameuse opération humanitaire de Stanleyville vient de nous prouver s’appelle Carlson, ou s’il est de nationalite amgricaine, belge, ou britannique, vaut desmilliers et des milliers de noirs. 92. When we were younger, we learned that in music one white note was worth two black ones. The famous humanitarian operation of Stanleyville has justproved to us that one white, particularly if his name is Carlson, or if he is of American, Belgian or British nationality, is worth thousands and thousands of blacks, 93. It is, then, in the name of humanity that the most cowardly, savage and infamous aggression of our era has been committed. This is how the mighty decide these matters. Let me say in passing that we do not intend to lecture anyone, but if everything were permitted we would today venture to tel1 the mighty that their might is on the material plane only and that morally they might have muoh to learn from us. Indeed, some of them-and this is the height 93. Ainsi, c’est au nom de l’humanit8 que l’agression la plus lache, la plus sauvage, la plus scandaleuse de notre époque vient d’être commise. C’est ainsi qu’en décident les grands. Soit dit en passant, nous n’avons pas l’intention mais, si tout ktait permis, nous nous permettrions aujourd’hui grands c’est uniquement sur le plan matgriel, que sur le plan moral ils auraient peut-être beaucoup 94. HOW could the Security Council fail to condemn decisively practices which are both inhuman and immoral? How could the Security Council fail to condemn once and for ail, on that account alone, the sinister action undertaken by a certain group of whites and designed to exterminate black men? 95. The Stanleyville aggression is an extremely serious matter. It has just proved, in strikingfashion, that there is no place for the black man in this world, wherever he may be, whether it be in a country which he came in the same way as others before him, or in his own homeland of Africa. Indeed, it is sufficient for a minority of white imperialists and racists to appear anywhere, for the black man find himself deprived of every right, even the right to live. NOW, even in his owncountry, even in a country with a black Government, the black rnan no longer feels safe. That is why 1 ask: what is to become the black part of mankind, assuming that you admit that it actually exists? 96. The situation brought about in Africa, as aresult of the aggression perpetrated by the Americans, the British and the Belgians against the black population, is very serious, because it gives not only the population of the Congo (Leopoldville) but a11 blackpeoples everywhere, and in particular, the peoples of the countries bordering on the Congo (Leopoldville), feeling of permanent insecurity. 97, New, while the Security Council is meeting here, the impression prevailing in my country, the Congo (Brazzaville), is that what had never before been proved has just received confirmation, namely, that the white man is not to be touched and that we must be very careful, since because of the slightest thing the lives of millions of black men cari be endangered. 98. At this very moment, the people living in the remotest parts of the Congo (Brazzaville) are coming to believe, after the Stanleyville aggression, that another basis Will have to be found for the relations between white men and black men and that they, on their own initiative, must find new terms of submission, since the white man is untouchable and invulnerable. The people of the Congo (Brazzaville), who are in great need of foreign technical assistance, especially from white sources-and not always offered by those whites who still have some humane feeling for the black man-wonder whether such technicd assistance will not soon lead to aggression such as that which has just been committed at Stanleyville. While the United Nations, whose principles Were originally righteous and praiseworthy, has sought to ensure that the less-developed countries would be assisted by the more advanced countries, the Stanleyville aggression is raising problems for us 9 9. Comment concevoir que les Membres originaires de I’ONU, permanents à aller innocentes la paix? Autant de questions que nous nous posons, sur les bords du fleuve Congo, et que mon gouvernement m’a demand8 de poser & ce qui veut s’appeler Conseil méditation. 100. 1 venture to hope that some of these questions may be answered, even if their answers are not satisfactory. 1 shall stop at this point, after thanking you for having allowed me, as it were, to open the debate on the substance of the problem, and for any further opportunity you may give me to supplement this preliminary statement and to define ourposition more precisely. 100. pourront ne devait pas être satisfaisante. expose, d’ouvrir de fond et en vous remerciant sion que vous me donnerez de compléter liminaire

The next speaker on my list is the representative of Ghana, on whom 1 now call. 101. suivant & qui je donne la parole.

Mr. President, allow me first of a11 to thank you and the Council for the opportunity which has been offered me and my Government to participate in the present discussions of the Council. 102. Monsieur de vous remercier qui nous a bt6 offerte, 2 mon gouvernement et a moi, de participer 103. In view of the fact that my delegation was unaware that the item listed as number 3 on the agenda which the Council has adopted would be discussed at this meeting of the Council, 1 wish to reserve the right of my delegation to intervene again should we find it necessary to do SO. 103. de l’ordre serait examiné voudrais d’intervenir 104. This meeting has been convened at the request of twenty-two Member States of the United Nations, including eighteen African States, Ghana being one of them, to consider the grave situation which has arisen in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a result of the recent joint Belgian/United States military aggression and intervention in that country. 104. 22 Etats Membres de l’organisation dont 18 Etats pour RBpublique et l’intervention et des Etats-Unis 105, [S/60’76 et Add.1 a 51, les 22 Etats Membres explique considerent deux puissances, a Stanleyvllle du Congo, comme une intervention africaines, Nations Unies et une menace a la paixet a la securité du continent africain. 105. In their memorandum to the Council [8/6076 and Add,S.-51 they have explained in detail thereasons why they consider the recent two-Power military cperations in Stanleyville and other parts of the Congo as an intervention in African affairs, a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a threat to the peace and security of the African continent. 106. Ma 8trangere doit &tre detachée de la situation politique d’ensemble au Congo. En d’autres solution une affaire qu’il les mains du peuple congolais, llassistance cet égard. tout en sachant que la situation présente 106. It is the view of my delegation that this particular foreign intervention in Africa, and in the Congo in particular, must be isolated from the overallpolitical situation in the Congo, In other words, we feel that the ultimate solution of the Congolese political problem is a matter better left primarily in the hands of the Congolese people, who have already sought the assistance of the Organization of African Unity in this regard, Therefore, the Ghana delegation wishes to make it emphatically olear that whilst there are various aspects of the situation now existing in the [The speaker read ouf document S/4387.1 108. Events before the passing of this resolution showed clearly the wisdom of the then Prime Minister Patrice Luhumba in seeking the assistance-military and technical-of this Council rather than such assistance as he could have secured for his troubled State from individual States. In seeking the Security Council’s help, the Republic also secured a decision of paramount importance that still remains indelible in the annals of this Council. 1 refer to operative paragraph 1 of the resolution, which called upon Belgium flto withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republio of the Congo”. Yet, in flagrant breaoh of this resolution, Belgium has by one way or another got its troops back into the Congo, 109. Again, 1 would like to recall the decision taken by the General Assembly in its resolution 1474 (ES-IV), at its 863rd meeting on 20 September~l.960. In operative paragraph 5 (a) of that resolution the General Assembly requested: “Al1 States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Republic of the Congo of its authority and also to refrain from any action which might undermine the unity, territorial integrity and the politizal independence of the Republic of the Congo;” 110. In spite of the clear language of this resolution, these foreign Powers have not only defied the authority of the Council by their military intervention in the Congo but, in doing SO, they have impeded the restoration of law and order and have undermined the unity, territorial integrity and politioal independence of the Democratio Republic of the Congo. 111, From 5 to 9 September last, the Council of Mini&ers of the Organization of African Unity met in extraordinary session in Addis Ababa, “to examine the Congolese problem, its sepercussions on the neighbouring states and on the African scene atlarge”. 112. This extraordinary meeting of the Council of Minfsters of the OAU was convened at the request of the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bis Excellency Mr. Joseph Kasa-Vubu. In his s/ Ibid., Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960. - II . . . “Having studied the messages addressed to it by several African Heads of State and Government, especially that of President Kasa-Vubu, expressing his conviction that the solution of the Congolese problem should be found within the Organization of African Unity, tt . . . nTaking note of the statement by the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo indicating his efforts and desire to bring about national reconciliation in his country, “Deeply concerned by the deteriorating situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo resulting from foreign intervention as well as use of mercenaries principally recruited from the racist countries of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, n .*. “Considering that foreign intervention and the use of mercenaries have unfortunate effects on the neighbouring independent States as well as on the struggle for national liberation in Angola, Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and the other territories in the region which are still under colonial domination . , ., Wonvinced that the solution to the Congolese problem, although essentially political, depends on the pursuit of national reconciliation .and the restoration of order SO as to permit stability, economic development of the Congo, as well as the safeguarding of its territorial integrity, “Deeply conscious of the responsibilities and of the competence of the Organization of African Unity to find a peaceful solution to a11 the problems and differences which affect peace and security in the African continent, “(1) Appeals to the Gcvernment of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to stop immediately the recruitment of mercenaries and to expel as soon as possible a11 mercenaries of whatsoever origin who are already in the Congo SO as to facilitate an African solution; “(2) Notes the solemn undertaking of the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of the COngO “(4) Appeals to a11 the political leaders of the Democxatic Republic of the Congo to seek, by a11 appropriate means, to restore and consolidate national reconciliation; “(5) Decides to set up and to send immediately to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, . . . an adhoc Commission consisting of Cameroun, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta and placed under the effective Chairmanship of H. E. Jomo Kenyatta, Prime Minister of Kenya, which Will have the following mandate: “(a) TO help and encourage the efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the restoration of national reconciliation in conformity with pasagsaphs 2 and 3 above; ” . . . “(6) . . . “(7) Appeals strongly ta a11 Powers at present intervenina in the interna1 affairs of tbeDemocratic Republic if the Congo to cesse their interferenoe. The Member States are further invited to give instructions to their diplomatie missions aocredited to these Powers with the view of impressing upon them this appeal; “(8) Requests a11 Member States to refrain from any action that might aggravate the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or worsen the relationship between the Democxatic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours. ‘it .,. 114. The two-Power military intervention is the more regrettable in view of the supreme efforts being made through its ad hoc Commission, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Jomo Kenyatta, to seek national reconciliation in a problem regarded by the African States as essentially political. TO this end the Commission has, among other steps, also sent a delegation to Washington. In the discussions which took place with representatives of the United States Government on the plans of the Commission to support and encourage the efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the restoration of national reconciliation, the United States not only expressed its sympathetic understanding of the Commission% most significant undertaking in the service of Africa, to the success of which it attached great importance, but, more than that, it assured the Commission of its co-operation in every appropriate way in carrying out the mission entrusted to it. This was on 30 September 19 64. 117. As in a11 difficult anddelicate problems involving human lives, the Commission felt that patience and wisdom should prevail. The Commission felt that the solution of the problem did not lie in the flexing of muscles, but rather in the use of intellect. Unfortunately, through its representative in Nairobi, the United States Government broke off the talks which were going on with the representatives of the nationalists on the question of the so-called hostages. 117. difficiles humaines, la sagesse solution ment de l’intelligence. diaire ment poursuivaient sur 118. The Govornment of the United States of America has, 1 believe, explained its part in tlie military intervention by asserting that its conduct was law-ful in view of the fact that it was invited by the legal Government of Mr. Tshombé to engage in the acts that have resulted in the wanton destruction of thousands of Congolese and other lives. Quite apart from the question of the legality of Mr. Tshombé’s Government, which under the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo could only exist for one month, subject to the approval of Parliament, one does not have to look far to find a parallel example in which the legal government of another State voluntarily sought military assistance from another State. My clelegation recollects most vividly the vehemence with which that small State was opposed by the Government of the United States, not to mention the manner of that opposition which involved the risk of plunging the world in nuclear war. 118. a cherché l’intervention Btait invites B entreprendre de milliers Mise de M, Tshombé, de la Rapublique durer Parlement, pour le gouvernement l’assistance se souvient nement des Etats-Unis parler manifestee, guerre 119. Cuba. On a dit que ce qui estbon pour l’un est bon pour l’autre, croire rait des Belges, ne pouvait demander taire famine 119. 1 need not add that 1 am referring to the Cuban incident, It has been said that “what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander”, but here the United States would have us believe that the Democratic Republic of the Congo could cal1 for military help by the Americans and the Belgians whereas the legal Government of Cuba could not cal1 on Russians for military assistance without being bullied and almost starved out by a blockade. 120. 1s the Congo problem for the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo alone? The answer iS, of course, it is not. The United States has already indicated that as the Chinese are giving help to the nationalists, they would ‘not retreat. Hence the hot “cold war”, which has caused SO much damage to life and property in the Congo. The work has already been entrusted by the Congolese authorities to the Organization of African Unity, and, in any case, the Congo is bordered by nine other States, some of which are already having trouble with the Congo about the present crisis there. 120. Gouvernement Congo? Bien entendu, la r8ponse tains une ils devenue de Congo, eté confiée sation Congo est entoure 122. The view has also been expressed that the two-Power military operation was undertaken because the nationslist forces of Stanleyville were also receiving outside help. 1 wonder what the Unitecl States would say if, in view of their active assistance to, the Taiwan Government, other States were to take sides militarily with the People’s Republic of China. 123. It has also been said that the Belgian-United States military intervention was motivatedby humanitarian considerations; and humanitarianism in this context is held to relate to the saving of the lives of a few persons of the white race, while at the same time thousands of African lives are destroyed. I am sure that the teeming millions of Africans would bave understood the objective better if it had been prefixed by the letters “in” to read “inhumanitarian”. In matters of this kind humanitarianism would have a better meaning if it were related to the consideration of the consequences of one’s actions. 124. It is demonstrably true that more people have been killed-and 1 especially include Dr. Carlson-as a result of the aggression committed by these two States. The action of these two Qovernments released forces which the Organization of African Unity had been at great pains to control. 125. It is not the intention of my delegation to gloss over the atrocities committed in the Congo by a11 sides or the wanton and deliberate massacre of Congolese people by the Belgian troops in the so-oalled “mopping-up” operations. It is my view that the unfortunate loss of life on both sides was most unfortunate and unnecessary. 126. Had the United States Government looked back a few years, had it not been obsessed with the avowed mission of hunting Communists, it would have realized that in the context of the Congo, it is extremely ridiculous to be associated with Belgians in a so-called “humanitarian” mission. 127. When did the Belgians hearofthe word “humanitarian”? After almost a Century of abject cruelty committed against the Congolese, after years of the most inbuman and gruesome wickedness, the.Belgians now talk about humanitarian rescue. TO the Belgians, 1 say, let sleeping dogs lie. One may ask: does humanity apply to the white race alone? Perhaps it does. 128. 1 must say that the racialist turn that is SO represented by the headlines of newspapers in this country about this event is painful, The sickening 130. The Government of Ghana has taken note of the statement made in London on Saturday, 28. November 1964, by Mr. Ball, Assistant Secretary of State of the United States of, America. In this statement Mr. Bal1 said that Belgian, British and United States intervention in the Congo was not undertaken for rescue of nationals of the three Powers concesned, but was designed to rescue nationals of a11 States and such Congolese citizens as might, in the opinion of the Unfted States and Belgium, be in danger. 130. que M. Bali, secrétaire d’Amérique, vembre Belgique, Congo visait des trois des Congolais, Belgique, 131. This statement by Mr. Bal1 underlines the entire illegal and provocative nature of the United States and Belgian intervention. In international law the United States is no more entitled to intervention than would, say, Ghana be entitled to intervention in the southern states of the United States of America toprotect lives of Afro-American inhabitants of those states who are, from time to time, tortured and murdered for asserting their legitimate rights and whose lives are entrusted to the United States Government. In fact, there are more citizens of Ghana in the Congo than there are American nationals, and citizens of African States residing there outnumber the total number of Europeans there; yet, SO far as the Government of Ghana is aware, Belgium and the United States undertook this action ostensibly on behalf of a11 foreign nations without consulting any African State, despite the faot that frcm these States corne the great majority of foreign residents in the Congo, The Government of Ghana, like a11 other Governments, deplores any lcss of life wbich has occurred amongst the foreign nationals, but it considers that the murders and killings which took place were the direct consequence Of Belgian and American intervention. 131. ce qu’il vention international, ris&3 exemple, d’Am8rique afro-americains autre, tortur&s droits Gouvernement Congo plus de GhanBens que d1Am6ricains, de ressortissants NBanmoins, ghaneen, cette action prétendument etrangbres, que la grande Congo viennent de ces Etats. Le Gouvernement ghaneen, comme pertes les Etrangers; et les executions directe 132. If great Powers cari intervene at Will, if their nationals are experiencing any hardship in any country, then is there any security for smaller countries? If 132. comme eprouvent g WO55. SJ6056, S/6062, S/6063, S/6067, Sf6060. S/6074. Sf6075; Sec Officia1 Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year. Supplement for October. November and December 1964. 6/ voir Supplément 1,33. 1 repeat that the aggression and the military intervention of Belgium and the United States precipitated the killings of the very citizens itwas meant to “rescue”. It is paradoxical in such a situation that martyrs have been created by the very people responsible for their death. 134. The Ghana Government, I should say again, is unreservedly opposed to the killing of innocent people wherever it may occur, and this is SO even if such shedding of innocent blood is purported to be on tfhumanitariann grounds. My delegation accordingly registers its unqualified condemnation of this action, 135. My delegation further expresses the hope that the Council Will take such steps as Will obviate the recurrence of the unfortunate and unwarranted intervention by those two Powers-and the same thing applies to other Powers too-and SO close a chapter in the history of Africa that must remain just another act of colonialist and imperialist oppression and neo-colonialist action. 136. Allow me to end by reiterating the appeal by the ad hoc Commission of the OAU. 1 appeal to a11 combatants in the Demacratic Republic of the Congo to lay clown their arms SO as to enable the Commission charged by the Organization of African Unity with the task of bringing about national reconciliation to carry out its mission, With your co-operation, the Democratic Republic of the Congo shall know thepeace and stability it had never known for centuries. 1 join to this appeal a warning to a11 those foreign States that are constantly interfering in African affairs. The Organization of African Unity is capable of settling its own affairs. 137. Mr. Tshombb’s Government, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, must be helped. Without going into technicalities for or against, 1 shoulcl say that the Organization of African Unity as such, and Ghana, recognize it as such. But when a Government with one of the largest armies in Africa cannot control its people, then one oannot just give it military assistance without being cautious. The Organization of African Unity besides feels that the Government and the nationalists must be reconciled and not helped to crush each other. This was the Addis Ababa decision to which Mr. TshombB agreed. This was the same decision which the African Foreign Ministers took in Leopoldville in 1960 during the struggle between Lumumba and Tshombé. How cari anyone accuse the Organization of African Unity of not helping the Government in this case? This is the African way of solving suchproblems. It has succeeded in other cases, and it would have succeeded in this 138. Those who seek a military solution do not know the Congo nor have they learned any lesson from history. At first it was Katanga, then Kivu, and now Orientale Province. Tomorrow it Will be some other province. The Belgians, in their abominable colonial oppression, intentionally prevented the people from coming together. It Will take time to have a truly national organization, and SO only one of national reconciliation Will do. why? Mr. Tshomh&. started this grand idea, and SO he must allow the Organization of African Unity to help him complete that work. 139. The Organization of African Unity says: Let there be a cesse-fire followed by national reconciliation and general elections. What is there difficult about this? Mr. Tshomb6 himself agreed to this in Addis Ababa. Why this change? Let him not be deceived by those who have their axe to grind. 140. There is one missing link which Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, President of the Republic of Ghana, has been advocating over the past year without getting any response. He foresaw that when the United Nations forces withdrew from the Congo, various warring factions would rise up again in the Congo, and SO the Africans should fil1 the vacuum, created by the United Nations withdrawal, with an African peace force until the situation could be stabilized. Again, when the present hostilities started, he also advocated that foreign planes, arms and mercenaries should be withdrawn and replaced by an African peace force until after the general elections had taken place. That also was not heeded, Anyway, it is not too late to reconsider it. But let it be done quickly. 141. It has been said that other States are helping the nationalists, SO foreign Powers too cari help the Government. 1 do not know the veracity of this allegation, But if it is true, it goes precisely to prove the OAU contention that unless there is an immediate cesse-fire, that Will surely bring the cold war to Africa. g&res peuvent bien a leur tour aider legouvernement. 142. Here 1 must digress a little and say that the cold war is no longer cold once it leaves the frontiers of the East and West power blocs. Yes, there is no war in Europe or in America or in the Soviet Union. But what about Korea? What about Viet-Nam? What about the Congo? The people of Viet-Nam and Laos have never known any peace since the end of the second world war in 1945, while Japan and Germany are among the most prosperous nations of the world today. What an irony of fate. jamais plus prosp&res 145. TO conclude, I should like to say this. It seems that some big Powers have not yet learned the lessons of history and think that Africa cari just be made the oat’s-paw of international cold-war politics. Let us remember the doleful tale of the rape of Ethiopia by Italy and the criminal inactivity of the League of Nations in the matter which eventually brought chaos and disaster to the whole world. This Council should unequivocally decide against intervention by foreign Powers in the Congo and support the efforts of the OAU to bring peace and stability to that strife-torn country, lest this small spark should excite another mighty conflagration. 146, The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): 1 cal1 on the representative of China, who has asked to speak on a point of order. 147, Mr. LIU (China): Unless 1 am mistaken, 1 heard the representative of Ghana make a fleetingreferenoe to Taiwan on which my Government is based. Without studying more fully the text of his statement, 1 am unable to grasp the logic or relevance of that statement ox that reference, and 1 should like, with your permission, Mr. President, to reserve the right of my delegation to reply to that point at an appropriate moment and in the proper context. 148. Mr. MAHGOUB (Sudan): Mr. President, may 1 first of a11 be permitted to say, on behalf of the Sudan Government, how grateful we are to you and to the members of the Security Council for entertaining the application which we, together with many other Member States, have addressed to the Council with regard to recent events in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, snd slso for accedingto my Government’s request [S/6076] to be permitted to participate in the debate on this subject. 149. Once again the Security Council is seized of the tragedy of the Congo, Ever since July 1960, the Congo question has affected the life of the United Nations to an extent unprecedented in the history of our Organieation. Politically, psychologically and financially, the Congo has been with us every day. 151. No one cari be in doubt that the Congo is in bad need of help, but after these few, yet long, years of tria1 and tribulation one cannot suppress the feeling that it could have done better without some of its helpers. The Congo needs help, but who cari understand its needs better than fellow Africans? A closely knit family has for thousands of years been the mainstay of African life, and today, the African family should be, as always, called upon to help its less fortunate African brothers heal their wounds. 151. besoin d’aide, mais apres ces derni$res en tribulations de penser s’abstiennent besoin besoins depuis des milliers Atroitement africaine doivent 152. The policy of my country towards the interna1 conflicts that have characterized the political life in the Congo since independence has been a policy of strict neutrality. We have neither harboured nor manifested any bias for or prejudice against any of the contending factions in the Congo. Speaking before the Security Council on 16 February 1961, our permanent representative explained this attitude of neutrality and non-interference as follows : 152. internes à l’independance tralit& prejugé ou parti pris contre les factions qui s’affrontent dans ce pays. le 16 fgvrier defini notre politique de neutralite et de non-ingerence dans les termes “Our policy of neutrality and non-interference does not stem from any kind of indifference or lack of concern on our part. The exact reverse may be true. If 1 may say SO without impertinence, of all the countries participating in this debate, with the only exception of the Congo itself, the Sudan is the one most directly affected by this cruel Congolese drama. Because of our common frontiers with the Congo, because of the great ethnie and blood relations between the Congolese and Sudanese peoples and because of many other strong ties between the two nations, we have always regarded the effective independence of the Congo, its security and the happiness of its people as an insurance-a necessary insurance-of our own independence, our own security and the happiness of our own people. But, to bring about these desired ends in the Congo, we do not think that interference from outside, however wellmeaning, is the best way. In fact, if it is a way at ail, it is the sure way to increased anarchy, to increased bitterness, to fratricidal conflict and to the final liquidation of the Congo as a State. The ugly consequences of a11 this Will not stop at the frontiers of the Congo. It may not be an exaggeration to say it Will engnlf the whole African Continent , . .” [937th meeting, para. 160.1 154. But alter a11 this, where do we find ourselves today? The answer is as simple as it is cruel: developments in the Congo have corne full circle. The foreign mercenaries whom the United Nations took SO much pain over such a long period to dislodge from their entrenched positions in the Congo are back; and they are back even in possibly greater numbers than ever before. These latter day Hessfans are living off the fat of the land, shooting to kill, and scoffing at every effort at conciliation between the Congolese. Conciliation and peace are definitely no part of their concepts. Their credo is, openly and avowedly, that the best opponent is a dead opponent. 155. A few days ago Africa and the world as a whole were convulsed by a violent shock in the form of the re-appearance of a sinister ghost from the past, a past that we had hoped would never corne to haunt us again. At dawn on 23 November 1964, Belgian paratroopers were flown into the Congo in American aircraft taking off from a British base and dropped over Stanleyville. We are a11 aware of the excuse givenfor this surprisingand impulsive action. Brussels and Washington spoke in impressive unison to the effect that the action was in the nature of a humanitarian mission; that it had no military pur-pose, and that it was not an action against the “rebels”. 156. In normal ciroumstances, it would be difficult to oppose a rescue mission undertaken for humanitarian purposes. But in this particular case it is olear to everyone today that the dropping of paratroopers could only have the effect of a provocation to violence. It has been argued-and this argument cari go on forever-that the launching of the operation had become necessary to save the lives of over a thousand white hostages; and I underline the word “white”. But did this military action save all those lives? know that this was not the case. 157. We do not condone the massacre of hostages in Stanleyville or elsewhere in the Congo. We deplore brutality of all kinds and from any quarter. But we do feel that this terrible reaction could have been easily foreseen. Was it not asking too much to expect 158, Wbatever verdict history may hand down some distant day in the future, is it not a sad faot chat the hostages were killed only after the paratroopers landed? We réad in the Amerioan Press that further rescue missions were discontinued because, according to an American source in Leopoldville, there was danger that paratroop landings in other areas might trigger new massacres of hostages. 158. n’est-il &t! tues après l’atterrissage avons entreprises parce que l’on craignait, & Léopoldville, dans massacres 159, 1 could have mentioned here the indifference to the suffering of the Congolese observed inmany actions taken during the intervention. Indeed, 1 oouldhave told you a number of tales that came tous from across the border, African lives are as precious as any other lives; but this is elementary, and many men of goodwill have oommented on the callous way in whioh African nronertv and lives have been treated. 1 am not doina that. Do look at this week’s Observer, if you have noi done SO alreadv. and see Connor Cruise O’Brien marking this side of the question along with the other sides-a man who ought to know. Brutality is nasty whatever corner it cornes from. We deplore it whether the afflicted person is an African or a European, but others only deplore it when the afflicted are Europeans. TO these others 1 have only one word to say: “The quality of mercy is not strained.” 159. l’on a fait des souffrances des Congolais pendant cette opération. ahoses fronti8re. cieuse lieu ont dit leur indignation dont les Africains et dans leurs biens. Mais je n’en parlerai dans l’Observer deja fait, ce que Connor Cruise O’Brien pense de cet aspect particulier qui doit savoir de quoi il parle. Tout acte de brutalite est odieux d’oh qu’il vienne, Nous le fl&rissons, la victime ne le font A ceux-là misericorde 160. a LBopoldville, Times 160. In a dispatch from Leopoldville dated 30 November The New York Times reported: “Six days after the paratroop drops onStanleyville and Paulis, well over nine hundred foreigners are still in the hands of the Congolese rebels and their lives appear to be in far more danger as a result of the Belgian and American military action.” Aad again on 1 December, The New York Times reported from Washington: A nouveau, bcrivait, “Other officiais said that after the Stanleyville and Paulis landings, the whole rescue operation had brought diminishing returns, and that the continued presence of the paratroops could have led to additional killings.” 161. précis vention 161. This, in our view, is the most accurate and damning comment on the military intervention. 162. There is another very important facet to this whole opesation which has highly alarmedus in Africa. It was undertaken in the face and in defiance of an action set in motion by the Organization of African Unity. The OAU had, as you know, setup a nine-member w commission on the Congo. This Commission worked unceasingly to bring about a truc& betweenthe tW0 warring factions in the Congo and the release of 162. opération opération mesures L’Organisation une de neuf membres. sans relgche 163. Al1 the good spade work of the Conciliation Commission of the Organization of African Unity was, however, nullified by this rash military intervention, The Belgian paratroopers brought death and violence where the OAU had been on the way to bringing conciliation and peace. 164. We do not look with favour onthis demonstration of distrust by Western Powers-distrust in the ability and the Will of African organizations and African statesmen to ward off conflicts and violence. The Organization of African Unity, since it came into being only just over a year ago, has managed to contain many situations that would otherwise have produced violence and bloodshed of much greater proportions. 165. In that connexion 1 should like all of us to read again carefully the testimony of a man better qualified than any other to give such testimony. 1 refer to my colleague, Mr. Joseph Murumbi. His statement in the General AssemblyZ/ was the outcome of direct contact with the problem. Africa had handed oves the Congo question to be handled by one of its most eminent sons-indeed, its elder statesman-President Jomo Kenyatta-and Mr. Murumbi was his top aide. What he said represents the African view, and he said it well. 166. My country is concerned with the crisis in the Congo for another reason as well. If members look at the map, they Will immediately see that the Congolese civil war is raging very close to our border with the Congo. That civil war is a clear and present danger to the security of the Sudan, and any worsening of the situation directly increases that threat. Moreover, as members have certainly heard and read, units of the opposition forces and several of their most prominent leaders, such as Christophe Gbenye, Gaston Soumaliot and Nicholas Olenga, have already sought refuge on our soil. 167. This is perhaps as good a place as any to say a word or two about the Press reports that have been reaching us here since I left Khartoum last Saturday. 1 believe that Mr. Moise Tshombé was motivated by those Press reports in bringing his application to this august Council, an application in which he hints of a complaint against my country, the Republic of the Sudan. I have read that application. It is not 7/ Officia1 Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 1293rd meeting, para. I to 30. 168, We also read in the document: “Furthermore the Government of the Sudan has acknowledged that certain deliveries have been made to the rebels without the consent of the lawful Government of the Congo.” 1 do not know who made that acknowledgement, to whom it was made or what kind of acknowledgement it was. What were those deliveries? TO whom were they made? Nothing could be more vague. The document also states: “There is other information which indicates that the Governments of Ghana and the United Arab Republic are closely involved in the supply of assistance to the rebels, ” 169. 1 think that members of this august Council are well aware of the sources of information used by Mr. Moise Tshombe, the Prime Minister of Congo (Leopoldville). It was on the basis of such sources of information that Mr. Tshomb& said that some of his fellow citizens-his opponents, 1 believe-had died; he said that the proof was that he had their passports in his pocket. But some months later, those people who he said had died were found alive. I hope that in the present case his information is somewhat better than the other information he has given to the world. 170. At this time 1 would merely reserve my delegatiqn’s right to speak, if necessary, on any complaint that Mr. Tshombé may make before this Council. 171. 1 myself am a retired journalist and cari therefore appreciate the difficulties of men who are trying to inform the world about situations like the one at hand. Some of these men have been putting us in the dock, SO to speak. 1 cannot, in the short time 1 am allowing myself, attend to every detail which the Press has been giving. Al1 1 want to say at the moment is this. It is not true that we have been partial to either party in the Congo. It is not true that our airports have been used for this or that purpose. What is true is this. We have allowed medical equipment to go through to those who have asked for it. And they are Congolese-Congolese who are refugees on our soil. One does not cesse to be a Congolese when one is in Stanleyville. And that has been the Sudanese peoplels view throughout the difficulties which the Congo has had to face. 1 repeat: We are not partial to this party or that. We are very partial indeed to the Congolese as such. 173. 1 am sorry if there is a bit of passion in putting things in that way, but the Council Will understand. We have been maligned. However, the cause is bigger than any personal sentiments. Tolerance is part of our creed. TO us religion is a safe anchorage against doubt and mental conflict, an assurance of a better world to corne-in short, a morai code. 174. We in Africa have faith in ourselves, in our potential and in our future. What we need at this moment is to have our trust in the United Nations reaffirmed and strengthened. The United Nations has played, and we hope will continue to play, a very important role in a11 phases of African development. It is preeisely because of this that the United Nations, and in the present case its highest organ, the Security Council, should proclaim it loud and clear that unilateral actions by foreign Powers, and quite particularly by former colonial countries, are entirely out of place in the Africa of today and indeed in all parts of the world. 175. The Security Council should ilso indicate to whom it may concern that the practice of using fnreign mercenaries against one’s own people is an ugly vestige of an ugly past. The Security Council should also encourage and endorse efforts by the Organization of African Unity to persuade bofh sides in the Congo to enter into direct talks, man to man, aimed nqt at unconditional surrender of either of the parties to the conflict but at unifying the people of the Congo under a government which is representative of a11 the people and enjoying the confidence of a freely elected Parliament. We are confident that we cari trust our eminent Secretary-General not to refuse his aid and assistance in bringing about such talks. 176. NO~$ at the risk of repeating the obvious, should like to remind us a11 that the Organization of African Unity ad hoc Commission’s solution to the problem at hand is the only solution. It is as follows: (8) the withdrawal of a11 mercenaries from the Congo forthwith; [k) the immediate stoppage of foreign military intervention in the Congo; (c) a cesse-fire among a11 fighting parties; (b) the gran%gof a general 177. congolais. et ensuite être r&3olu que par le peuple congolais lui-même, l’aide de ses frères africains. ce n’est pas la force des armes, parachutistes la voix de la raison, de la conciliation, la voix de l’Afrique. 177. The Congo problem is first aCongoleseproblem and in the second place an African problem. It cari be solved only by the people of the Congo themselves with the help of their African brothers. Not the force of arms, not a &y-full of foreign paratroops, not hired killers are needed in the Congo, but the voice of reason, of conciliation, of honour-the voice of Africa. 178. avoir proc6d6 propose de lever maintenant r&mira

Having carried out the appropriate consultations, 1 have decided to adjourn the meeting now. The Council will reconvene at 10.30 a.m. tomorrow. The meeting rose at 7.0s’p.m. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications may distributors throughout the world. Write to: United Nations, Sales COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS Les publications des Nations Unies agences dépositaires du monde entier. ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, Section COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de las Naciones casas distribuidoros en todas partes dirijase a: Naciones Unidas, Section Litho in U.N. Price: $U.S. 0.50 (or equivalent in oiher currenciee)