S/PV.1172 Security Council

In accordnnce with the decision previously taken by the Council, and if there is no objection, 1 shall invite the representatives of the Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, Belgium, COngO (Brazzaville), Algeria, Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, the United Arab At the invitation of thepresident, Mr. 0. A. H. Adeel (Sudan), Mr. M. Achkar (Guinea), Mi-. K. Botsio (Ghana), Mr. P.-H. Spaak (Belgium), Mr. C. D. Ganao (Congo, Drazzaville), Mr. T. Bouattoura (Algeria), Mr. 0. Ba (Mali), Mr. T. Idzumbuir (Democratic Republic of the Congo), Mr. J. A. Wachuku (Nigeria), Mr. M. El-Kony (United Arab Republic), Mr. J. Mbazumutima (Burundi), Mr. B. Nabwera (Kenya) and Mr. A. Guimali (Central African Republic) took the places reserved for them in front of the Council table.

First of all, Mr. President, mayIbe permitted, on behalf of the Algerian delegation, ta express our thanks to you and to the representatives of the States members of the Security Council fox granting OUI: request of 1 December 1964 to be allowed to participate in the debate, in accordance wîth the rules of procedure. 4. 1 feel it is myduty to state our reasons for this reque&. We believe that, in this way, we cari enlighten the Council regarding the emotion and concern SO clearly expressed by the Government of theRepublic of Algeria when the announcement was made of the intervention in Congolese territory by the Belgian armed forces supported by the United States of America with assistance froc the United Kingdom. We cari also contribute to a better understanding of the possible impact that such an unjustifiable act cari have on the evolution of the African continent. There cari be no doubt whatsoever that such an evaluation would be incomplete without a fearless, fair and lucid estimate of the immediate and long-term international implications of the military action of 24 November 1964. 5. In point of fact, in order better to assess the situation that has been created, it Will probably be helpful to revîew briefly the history of the Congo since it achieved independence just over four years ago. Its history has been marked by a series of armed interventions, some overt and some clisguised. The day alter independence was declared, Belgian military units returned in force, in order, SO we were told, to re-establish order and save the lives of foreign nationals. 6. At the request of Prime Minister Lumumba, the Security Council did deprecate this blatant colonialist interference. A whole series of manœuvres lead to the intervention of the United States of America, which used the United Nations as a Trojan horse. Finally the United Nations forces withdrew, and the very person who with the help of the United Nations had been re- !/ Officia1 Records of the Securiy Council, Nineteenth Year, Supplement?& October, November and December lY64. 7. This brief revîew was, in our opinion, called for, for it illustrates, as if that were necessary, the contention that the Stanleyville operation is merely the result of the logical development of a seemingly endless tragedy. 8. What is this operation and what are its chief developments? The facts Will doubtless save us the trouble of commenting on it. It is onlynatural that the main motive of those who helped the prime mover of Katanga’s secession or who handed over the leadership of the Leopoldville Government to him should have been ta retain a monopoly over the exploitation of enormous wealth, which is the source of the considerableprofits about which we a11 know. 9. It is also natural thnt the opposition to a man who has identified himself with the idea of separatism and has shown himself to be an agent of foreign imperialist interests should assume such extraordinary proportions. This opposition has clearly appeared on three separate fronts: first of ail, on the Congolese front, the situation was such that an observer who could not be accused of partiality felt himself obligecl to declare, with reference to the mercenaries, in The New York Times Magazine of 15 November 1964: “Without them Leopoldville, not Stanleyville, would now be the rebel capital. R Then, on the Africsn front, the African Heads of State and Government refused to allow the psesent Prime Minister of Leopoldville to participate in the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity which met at Cairo last July. Lastly, on the international front, the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries adopted the same attitude. plan partialité Times CL refuser sa participation de gouvernement qui plan international et de gouvernement même attitude, 10. This being SO, those who wished to maintain in power a man who was devoted to their cause were faced with the urgent necessity of leaving no stone unturned in order to achieve this goal. At first they decided, therefore, to send weapons, means of transportation and military advisers only. At the same time the number of units in the Congolese National Army was increased and, to be on the safe side, mercenaries were recruited from Rhodesia and South Africa and people who were unable to foment counter-revolution in their own countries were also mobilized, 10. pour d’un homme œuvre lton que conseillers le nombre mais, en Rhodésie qui n’ont pu faire 11. But things did not go according to planand direct intervention became inevitable; but since the community of nations is governedby conventions and treaties, these had to be invoked, as was subsequently done. 11. pr&u. dant, comme des conventions pensable 12. On 21 November 1964, in a letter to the President of the Security Council [S/6055],.‘&/ the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations raised the problem of some thousand foreign nationals whose lives, according to the author of the communication, were in danger. Attention was also drawn to Article 3 12. de la Belgique Unies, sécurité de l’auteur 13. We InUSt, kOWeVer, point out that at the time this note was transmitted, Belgian units were stationed on Ascension Island. A spokesman for the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed, on 20 November 1964, that the troops sent to Ascension would be used only if their assistance was required by the central Congolese Government. But, on that same day, 20 November 1964, Mr. Emmanuel Sinda, the Minister of Information at Leopoldville, cautioning against “United States and Belgian action”, cleclared that “such a move wo~llcl be a clear case of aggressionfl, 14. In the above-mentioned letter, the representative of Belgium to the United Nations concluded: YVIy Government reserves the right to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council should it becorne necessary to consider the matter with a view to saving the lives of the innocent civilians in the region of Stanleyville. n 15. This statement led us to believe that, before anything was done that could not be undone, a11 peaceful means would be tried to find a solution to this in many respects very disturbing problem. The statement was even more reassuring in that it echoed, to some extent, the wise and firm statement of 20 November 1964 by the Secretary-General, U Thant, who said: “Any situation endangering international peace and security should be brought to the Security Council under the terms of the Charter. Any other course is bouncl ta lead to undesirable consequences.” 16. My delegation was surprised that the Belgian Government did not think it necessary to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council. It is true that, between 20 and 24 November 1964, under the auspices of OAU, negotiations were taking place at Nairobi between Mr. Thomas Kanza, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Stanleyville Government, ancl Mr. William Attwood, United States Ambassador, with the participation of Mr. Jomo Kenyatta, Prime Minister of Kenya and Chairman of the ad hoc Commission, and Mr. Dia110 Telli, Secretary-General of OAU. 17. As Ambassador Adlai Stevenson mentioned in his letter to the President of the Security Council on 20 November, [S/6056],3/ Mr. Christophe Gbenye sent “a message [to the United States Government] suggesting preliminary discussions in Nairobi”. Ambassador Attwood proposed opening negotiations at noon on 21 November. For obvious reasons, Mr. Thomas Kanza did net arrive at Nairobi until 22 November. 18. It was noted with a certain amount of relief thst in the communication to which 1 have just referred, the representati.Je of the United States of America hinted at the possibility of appealing to the Security ?/ Ibtd - 20. No one cari fail to observe that the proposals put forward by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Stanleyville Government are in keeping with the spirit, if not the letter, of the action taken on 19 November 1964 by Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta, Chairman of the ad hoc Commission of theOAU, when he announced that he could not assist in the evacuation of civilians unless a cesse-fire was declared in response to the appeal of the Secretary-General U Thant. 20. sitions g&res du gouvernement B l’esprit, 19 novembre de la Commission qu’il ne pouvait aider à l’evacuation d’un cessez-le-feu lancé le Secrétaire 21. The Chairman of the ad hoc Commission undertook, however, to impress upon the Congolese authorities that civilians should be treated in accosdance with international law. At this point it might be opportune to draw the attention of the Council to two identical letters sent simultaneously on 21 November 1964 to the Amhassadors of Belglum and the United States at Leopoldville, [S/6062 and S/6063],4/ 1 do not think 1 need to point out again that thepresent Prime Minister of Leopoldville authorized the armed intervention of the United States and Belgium while preliminary conversations were still taking place at Nairobi, Neither do 1 need to stress the fact that the offer to utilize this force of intervention came from the addressee of the letter 1 have just referred to, as the introcluction to that lettes implies. And need 1 say how confusing it is if one compares the statement by the Belgian spokesman of 21 November 1964, to the effect that the troops sent to Ascension would only be used if their assistance was required by the Central Congolese Government, with the information from United States sources accosding to which the decision was taken jointly by the United States and Belgium, in agreement with the Congolese Government, which had been duly informed? 21. cependant l’engagement d’insister congolaises national ne soit imposé opportun, sur les deux lettres ment, Belgique [S/6062 relief Léopoldville cana-belge, de Nairobi y fait que l’offre été faite par enfin dire l’embarras prochant du 21 novembre voyées a 1Yle de l’Ascension si leur assistance central caine selon laquelle la décision a été prise ment par les Etats-Unis le Gouvernement 22. Il apparaît d’abord, droit faire, authentique légale faisait par pays ami, C’est dire qu’il s ‘agit d’un acte exceptionnel qui procéde d’un événement. du processus que celle d’une intervention voici, 22. Apparently the aggressors first wished to have some legal basis consistent with international Isw for their intervention. But, in order to do SO, they had to have a request, i.e. an authentic and constitutionalact whereby a legal authority appealed to a friendly country for military assistance, in circumstances protidsd for in the Constitution. In other words, it would be an exceptions1 act necessitated by a serious and imminent emergency. If one wished to analyse the birth process of a decision as serious as that of armed intervention on African soil, here, then, is the answer from United States sources. The decision was taken jointly by the United States of America and Belgium 4/ Ibid -’ 23. Furthermore, we think it will help to dispel any misunderstanding that might arise from Sesding the letters addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Permanent Representatives of the United States and Belgium [S/6062 and S/6063], we refer to the statement made on 27 November by Mr. Kenyatta, Chairman of the ad hoc C;ommission of OAU, in which he expressed himself in the following terms: “1 had already made it clear to the American Ambassador that any parachute drops at Stanleyville would be a serious matter and that I could not be held responsible for the results. 1 was in favour peaceful negotiations through the medium of the OAU.” This statement evidently refers to the discussions which took place before 24 November 1964. SO if we take stock of the situation at this stage, it becomes obvious that the war preparations were already under way at the very time the United States was promising, on the one hand, ta stop sending arms and, on the other hand, to start negotiations. There cari no longer be any doubt that the aggression was premeditated. Furthermore, it is undeniably an act designed to counter the forces of peace. 24. This aggression has not only nullified the efforts of the ad hoo Commission which w’as seeking a peaceful solution to the problem, but has also flouted the authority of the said Commission and the moral authority and prestige of the Organization of African Unity. This is a challenge fraught with grave consequences flung in the face of our continent and no African worthy of the name cari fail to take it up. 25. The aggression committed against the people of the Congo by the United States and Belgium w+s regarded throughout the African continent as an attack on our dignity and a direct threat to our independence and security. Africa, which is only just emerging from the shadow of colonial domination, which is seeking ways of settling its own problems, which is attempting to build a new society in peace and harmony, is once again confronted with the ageold problems that are the cause of a11 its ills. In face of such a situation, Africa cannot remainpassive. 11: cari no longer tolerate gunboat diplomacy, punitive expeditions and the scorched-earth policy. 26. It is claimed that the action of those who took it upon themselves to launch military operations against the Congo was inspired by high humanitarian motives. The humanitarian aims of those who for months have been using their political ski11 and material resources V3y allowing Air Force pilots and techniciansthe number does not matter-to go to the Congo, our country îs allowing itself to become more and more entangled. “There is no need to describe in detail what this involvement may corne to mean in afew years’ time; Belgîans implicated in acts of oppression, even if those acts are justified; reprisals, even if only in isolated cases, against Belgian nationals; increased aid to rescue threatened Belgians; and then the futile business starting a11 over again. In truth, the Belgians in the Congo have no need for this further tria1 and neîther has Belgium. What îs worse is that this dangerous gesture is completely useless. n WIr. Nothomb, with remarkable lucidity, was clearly warning his country’s authorities that the best way of ensuring the safety and the future of his compatriots in the Congo was non-intervention by Belgium in the Congo’s domestic affairs. Avec une frappante lucidité, clairement moyen d’assurer la sécurit& et l’avenir de ses compatriotes dans les affaires int&ieures 27. There cari be no doubt that the Brussels Government knew what would happen when it gave its unreserved support to the militaryforces of the Leopoldville regime. It was natural and, unfortunately, only to be expected that there should be a dsterioration in the situation of the civilîan nationals of a country which, in the eyes of the rebel forces, had become a belligerent Power. Such a process, as we have learned to our cost, is one common to a11 wars and one for which the very States which are now complaining have often been responsible. 1s it not true that in 1940 the Belgian Government imprisoned a11 German cîvilians, regardless of their politîcal îdeas or the length of their residence in Belgium, and forced them to accompany it in îts flîght to the south of France? 27. Nul doute qu’en accordant un appui sans réserve aux forces militaires gouvernement de Bruxelles savait Èl quoi s’en tenir. Il était normal et attendu - hélas! - que la situation se dégrade pour les civils ressortissants d’un pays devenant aux yeux des forces insurgées unepuissance belligerante. nous avons connu durant toutes les guerres et qui a été pratiqué m&mes qui s’en plaignent actuellement. Le Gouvernement belge n’a-t-il les civils idées politiques, Belgique? Et ces Allemands n’ont-ils pas été traîhés par le Gouvernement belge dans sonexode jusquedans le midi de la France? 28. It was quîte clear from the very beginning that intervention by Belgîan officers in the military operations of the army of the Leopoldville regime could only give rise to anti-Belgianfeeling among the people. The Belgian Government consequently became responsible for exposîng its nationals to dangers of which it was perfectly aware and which it knew must inevitably occur. 28. Il Btait évidemment clair, l’intervention militaires pouvait que suscite? des r8actions anti-belges au sein de la population. Le Gouvernement belge, d’ks lors, avait pris la responsabilit& d’exposer ses compatriotes k des périls qu’il connaissait parfaitement et dont il savait qu’ils se présenteraient inévitablement. 29. It is certainly not our intention to imply that the Belgian Government had knowingly left its nationals in the troubled areas of the Congo SO that later it could have occasion to intervene even more directly. We merely wish to point out that if Brussels had really been motivated by humanitarian aims, as we are told it was, it should have realized from the outset that itS mîlitary intervention in the Congo required the previous repatriation of a11 Belgian civilians, or at least those living in the threatened regions. 29. Il suggl5rer par là que le Gouvernement de la Belgique avait sciemment lais& regions troublkes tard l’occasion d’y intervenir plus directement encore. Ce que nous voulons expliquer, gouvernement d’intentions il aurait pu penser dks le départ que son intervention militaire de tous les civils belges, du moins ceux qui vivaient dans les régions exposées. 31. In this connexion, it may be appropriate to recall what Mr. Théo Lefevre said in July 1960 when the Eyskens Government was contemplating military intervention in the Congo. Mr. Lef&vre said-and 1 am quoting the newspaper La CitB of 11 July 1960: nsome cal1 for spectacular measures which, even if they help groups of whites in the big centres, might also seriously harm the white population scattered throughout the country. n Two days later, Mr. Lef&vre was to add-and I quote the newspaper Le Soir of 13 July 1960: “It is a11 very well to say that we must drop parachute troops in the Congo. But has anyone thought of the’whites who live scattered in the brush?We must not be drawn into adopting attitudes which would give rise to a series of unforeseeable consequences.” 32. Four years later, for reasons which are described to us as humanitarian, the Government of Mr. Lef&vre no longer thought of the whites he wsnted to save when he condemned the dropping of parachute troops. He was drawn-to use his own words-into adopting an attitude which is already giving rise to a series of consequences, many of which it is still difficult to foresee. 33. Now that some time has passed we see that, in the towns retaken by the mercenaries, there had been no massacre of whites despite the threats and that, unfortunately, the eighty persons we know of were killed after the United States-Belgian aggression and because of that aggression. The fears expressed by Mr. Lefi%re four years ago were well Eounded. There is reason to believe that, were it not for the exploit that the interventionists embarked upon, those eighty persons would still be alive. On the strictly humanitasian plane on which this action has beenplaced, the balance sheet seems catastrophic, and the catastrophe could have been foreseen. 34. For a11 that, we cari still believe that it was not foreseen. For a11 that, we cari still believe that the interventionists were indeed acting in good faith and that they were tortured by the anguish of the Europeans and Americans whose llves were in danger. We cari beneve it, but in that case, we are forced to believe that for them the life of awhite man cannot be weighed in the sarne scales as that of ablack man. Colony dter colony is acceding to independence, but the colonialist and racist mentality has not yet disappeared. tragbdie sont jouait pour dit le titre des internationale. “New white opinion is discovering that a tragedyis being played out in the Congo because whites are involved. As though that tragedy had not been taking place for a long time with the blood of black people as its raw material! Red is the blood of black men, says the title of a novel. The blood of white men is just as red, but muoh more precious in intexnational politics.” 36, With regard to the monstrous massacres of the Congolese, let us listen to the words of an eyewitness, Mr. Emile Lejeune, who wrote in Le Nouvel Observateur: n . . . But we might at least ask that this emotion should not distinguish between victims of different colour and that this indignation should not be SO cynically selective. For in the space of four months 1 saw aircraft settingfire todozens of villages, 1 saw tens of thousands of peasants exterminated in the hush bY the army of the Leopoldville authorities , , , 36. monstrueuses oculaire, Observateur: cette de diffarentes soit cours “strafer” vu des dans la brousse n .0. “Net a single voice in the Western worldwas ever raised in support of the Africans. The detachments of the Congolese national army which are being trained in the region of Albertville in the use of flame-throwers Will in the days to corne burn down a11 the villages in the region of Fizzi and Baraka: that is the mission that has been assigned to them. They Will burn alive a11 the men and women they meet. Those are their orders. Only the children Will be spared. No Government is intervening. There is one law for the whites and anotherfor the blacks.” s’est de l’armbe d’Albertville, flamme tous les villages c’est vifs rencontreront. seront Il y a une loi poux les blancs et une autre pour les noirs. When one is guided by humanitarian aims, the first consideration should be that a11 men have equal rights; and the most elementary hurnan right is the right to life. Lorsqu’on doit d’abord en droits, est le droit 37. The humanitarian aims of those who are assisting in the massacre of tens of thousands of Congolese cari deceive no one. It SO happens that Stanleyville, the stronghold of Lumumbism and the nerve-centre of the insurgent movement, was a city that could not be taken by the mercenaries of Hoare, the South African, and by Colonel Vandewalle’s professional murderers. 37. massacre peuvent que centre une Africain du colonel Vanclewalle. 33. In Point of fact, we are confronteclby an aggression on the part of imperialist forces against the people of the Congo. It is a classic political manoeuvre to give Political independence to a country while maintaining a sYstem that allows economic exploitation and even Political control to continue, Such plans sometimes go awry and then, after first creating the necessary legs1 and psychological conditions, everything possible is done in order to recover the lost ground. 38. En vérité, agression caract8risée le peuple du Congo, C lest un phénomène politique classique que de donner l’indépendance politique B un pays tout en maintenant un syst8me qui permette la continuation de la direction culs soient fauss& et que l’on remette alors tout en ceuvre pour reprendre le terrain perdu aprBs avoir pris psychologiques nécessaires. 40. The political operation began with the transformation of the Congo into an immense Katanga, This manœuvre having failed, the imperialists began to send arms, then transport aircraft, armoured lorries, jeeps and fighter aircraft with crews instructors, while recruitment offices for mercenaries were set up wherever convenient. 41. Neither the arms furnished by the United States, nor the technicians furnished by Belgium, nor the mercenaries succeeded in reconquering the country. The only recourse open to Washington and Brussels in their impatience was direct military intervention, their intention being to place a winning tard in the hands of the armed forces commanded by the racist mercenaries recruited in South Africa. The pretext was easy to find. The lives of white men had to be protected. The history of colonization abounds examples of this kind. SomeMmes, as in the case of Suez, the pretexts are not even clothedin humanitarian guise; they are openly materialistic. 42, The aggression recently perpetrated in the Congo has aroused deep emotion and great anxiety throughout the African continent. Such aggression is aimed at reintroducing in the world a kind of morality that we believe is on the wane. Some had been happily saying that gunboat diplomacy designed to intimidate small countries was a thing of the past. 43. Unfortunately, we are forced to recognize even more extreme measures are being employed. The intervention of armed troops to prote&, acquire or reconquer territories and wealth to which aggressors alone believe they have a right is a return to the direct methods of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In 1956 it was Suez; today it is the Congo. 44. Thus the States of Africa anclAsia mayfind themselves at the mercy of an armed aggression as soon as the interests of the imperialist Powers are involved. In other words, the problem before us today goes far beyond the frontiers of the Congo. 45, We are justifiably ledto wonder whether the United Nations is in a position toput into effect the principles enshrined in its Charter. The question is whether United Nations cari guarantee the independence of the small States in face of the greed of the highly industrialized and powerfully armed States. The question is whether the United Nations, whose task it is to ensure security and peace in the world, canput an end to the exploits of those who would return to the past and reintroduce colonial practices in international relations, 47. Yesterday we were informed of a complaint submitted to the Security Council [S/6096]5/ against certain countries, including Algeria. This complaint, furthermore, was submitted in rather confused circumstances. This too is a classic manoeuvre: by means of such expedients, it is hoped to create a diversion in order to prevent a genuine debate from taking place in the Security Council. 47. déposée au Conseil pays, leurs La veut par dont le but est d’empêcher Conseil 48. 1 shall therefore at this stage refrainfromentering into any polemics of the type that was intended and confine myself to stating the problem in its truc context. Consequently, 1 reserve the right to intervene at a later stage if necessary, at an appropriate time. 48. Aussi une quelconque en me bornant réel. venir moment 49. a pas membres propose sentants cieusement et l’heure

Ihave no further speakers on my list for this meeting, Before adjourning the meeting, 1 would ask the members of the Security Council to be good enough to meet informally in my office to decide on the time of our next meeting. The meeting rose at 4.35 p.m. HOW TO OBTAIN United Nations publications distributors throughout the Write to: United Nations, COMMENT SE PROCURER LES Les publications des Nations Unies agences dépositaires du monde ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de las Naciones casas distribu.idoras en todos diriiase a: Naciones Unidas, Litho in U.N. Price: $US. 0.35 (or equivalent