S/PV.1173 Security Council

In accordance with the decision previously taken by the Council, and if there is no objection, 1 shall invite the representatives of the Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, Belgium, Congo (Brazzaville), Algeria, Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, the United Arab Republio, Burundi, Kenya and the Central African 1. Le PRESIDENT m.ent Conseil les représentants de la Belgique, du Mali, de la Nigéria, At the invitation of the President, Mr. U. A. H. Adeel (Sudan); Mr. M. Achkar (Guinea); Mr. K. Botsio (Ghana); Mr. P.-H. Spaak (Belgium); Mr. C. D, Ganao (Congo, Brazzaville); Mr. M, Yazid (Algeria); Mr. 0. Bà (Mali); M. T. Idzumbuir (Demooratio Republic of the Congo); Mr. J. A. Wachuku (Nigeria); Mr. M. El- Kony (United Arab Republic) and Mr. J, Mbazumutima (Burundi) took the places reserved for them in front of the Council table.

We shall continue the examination of the question. The first speaker on my list is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, to whom 1 give the floor.

Mr. President, gentlemen, as other speakers have done, 1 thank you for giving me the floor at this time; for 1 must admit that my patience was at an en& 1 have Lived through two of the most unpleasant days of my life and, by exerting great self-control, 1 have wîthstood the flood of oratory under which we have been submerged for the last forty-eight hours. This flood has borne with it boundless insults, attacks of violence and untruths. It has also revealed curious and humiliating inferiority complexes. At the same time-and this is what has most disturbed me, distressed me and caused me the most concern-there was sometimes apparent, in the statements of the speakers who preceded me, a sort of feeling of defiance, mistrust and almost hate, which came close to resembling that racist feeling which has been SO heatedly denounced and attacked. 4. 1 have listened to seven or eight charges, but I am not here as a defendant to plead mitigating circumstances or the indulgence of a court. 1 corne here with the strength of right and a good conscience, sure of approval by the great majority of public opinion in my country and also, 1 believe, encouraged and sustained by the express or tacit approval of many Governments’ throughout the world. 1 corne to try to explain frankly and, 1 hope, clearly, the reasoris which made it necessary for the Belgian Government to take a very, very serious decision, 1 oan tel1 you that we took that decision only after carefully and scrupulously weighing a11 the factors involved, and we were well aware, when we to6k it, that we would encounter some international difficulties. We realized, when we decided in favour of the Stanleyville operation, which 1 shall corne to in a moment, that we woùld provoke speeches such as we have SO often heard on colonialism, neo-oolonialism and imperialism. 5. 1 heard the expected speeches, and 1 noticed once again that the vehemence of the adjectives employed often demonstrates the weakness of the argumentation and that it is easier to find strong words than strong arguments, 7. These speeches were passionate, and 1 shallmake a very great effort not to answer with passion the passion we have already heard. 1 shall attempt to keep to the facts and to comment on the facts. 7. ferai de la passion essayer 8, In this statement, 1 want to speak about the Stanleyville operation and also about Belgian policy in the Congo, the problems facing that country and the difficulty of solving them. 8. l’opération politique dans ce pays et de la difficulté 9; As far as Stanleyville is concerned, 1 state-and I believe 1 shall prove to a11 who see things objectively -that the Stanleyville operation was not a military operation. It was not a matter of helping the Congolese National Army. It was not a matter of conquering or retaining any partioular territory. It was a question of saving between 1,500 and 2,000 persons whose lives were in danger. It was to Bave people who were regarded as hostages by the rebel authorities, people who had been imprisoned, threatened and beaten. My opponents tel1 me that that is net truc, that it was not a rescue operation, that it was premeditated military aggression. You have heard that charge repeated a number of times during the last two days. 9. En ce qui concerne crois je démontrerai n’était d’aider pas garder, personnes de comme étaient emprisonnées, avaient n’est de sauvetage, prémbditée. tée un certain 10. The speaker who preceded me, and the ont: who went furthest in that direction, was the representative of the Congo (Brazzaville). Not only did he accuse Belgium and the United States, and the Wnited Kingdom as an accessory, of deliberately premeditating a military aggression; but, referring to Belglum in particular, he added that we had worked out a plot to evacuate the whites who were in the rebel-occupied territories, in order to be better able later to carry out machine-gun attacks on the area and murder the blacks. 10. allé le plus loin dans cette voie, c’est du Congo Belgique Royaume-Uni, militaire, ajouté que nous avions sistait dans les parties procéder l’assassinat des noirs. 11. I defy the representative of the Congo (Brazzaville) to bring forward the slightest proof, the slightest beginning of proof, the slightest evidence in support of that vile accusation. 1 believe that people attribute to others only the ideas that they are capable to conceiving themselves, and 1 therefore leave the representative of the Congo (Brazzaville) to face his own conscience and his defamatory and unproved charges, 11. Je defie le représentant du Congo (Brazzaville) d’apporter la moindre preuve, le moindre commencement de preuve, le moindre indice a l’appui de cette infâme accusation, Je crois qu’on ne prête aux autres que des idées qu’on est capable de concevoir soi-même, et c’est pourquoi je laisse le représentant du CongO (Brazzaville) acousations infamantes et non prouvées, 12. Intentions have been on tria1 here, and many things bave been stated whioh no one has attempted tQ PrOVS. My desire is to keep to the faots; 1 will explain to you, step by step, what in fact happened at Stanleyville. 12. On a fait ici des pro& des tas de choses qu’on n’a pas essayé de prouver. Moi, je veux m’en tenir aux faits et je veux vous expliquer S tanleyville . 13. Buring July of this year, the rebel forces made an advance toward Stanleyville and from then on, in visw of what had happened in other parts of the Congo, we became deeply concerned; from that very moment, earlY in August, while Stanleyville was still unoccupied 13. Dans le courant du mois de juilletdeoette il y a eu une avance des forces rebelles vers Stanleyville Passé dans d’autres parties été profondément inquiets; dès ce moment, au début 14. The representative of Algeria showed a somewhat perverse imagination in daring to suggest that the fact that the Belgians remained in Stanleyville was a Government trick and that we had encouraged our countrymen to remain there because, from that very moment, we were preparing the liberation operation. 1 must admit that the representative of Algeria, after putting forward that theosy, was willing to make a concession. Ne admitted that it was perhaps farfetched and that he had no proof of his contention. 1 would not have wished to let this opportunity go by without thanking him for that attempt at objectivity. 15. As I was saying, Belgians, other whites and many foreigners remained at Stanleyville. By August, we had clear reason for concern, as the rebel authorities then publicly and officially put forward the theory that foreigners, especially Belgians and Americans, were considered not only prisoners of war, but hostages. 16. Although the speakers who preceded me pretended to be unaware of that fact, it is, none the less, the reason for the Stanleyville operation. 1 should like to know if there is any Member of the United Nations .which would dare assume the responsibility of defending the idea that a Government, whether legal or rebellious, has the right to seize innocent men, women and children as hostages and pawns for its policies. The practice of taking hostages is contrary to every international law, and 1 do not think 1 exaggerate in saying that it is contrary to every human law, What possible justification could there be for the idea that innocent men, women and childrén, who might evefi be o*pposed to their Government’s policy, cari be held and cari serve as pawns in political dealings? The representative of Algeria asserted that this was common practice in the West; that at the bf&Ming of the Second World War, Belgium arrested Belgians and even Germans, and that the Belgian Government transported these people as far as the Southof France, That is true: early in 1940, we arrested Belgians and Germans whom we considered to be agents of the Fifth Column. But at what time were those people, 17. The representative of Ghana, from this very Seat, dared to ask the following question: Who was threatened in Stanleyville and by whom were they threatened? It is really a rather extraordinary thing for someone desiring to speak in a debate such as this to dare ask such a question. Who was threatened at Stanleyville? One thousand five hundredforeigners, By whom were they threatened? By the xebel authoritics. That is a clear reply to that extxaordinary question, 17. Le représentant du Ghana a osé poser, de cette place, la question suivante: mais qui dont était menacé a Stanleyville, et par qui était-on menacé? Vraiment, pour quelqu’un qui veut intervenir comme celui-ci, celle-la était menacé a Stanleyville? Mille cinqcents étrangers. Par qui étaient-ils rebelles. Et voila une réponse Glaise à cette extraordinaire ques tien. 18. 1 should now like to tel1 you how our concern grew. 1 have here in my file the messages sent from Stanleyville, that is, by the rebel authorities, between 28 Octobex and 23 November, the latter date being the eve of the Belgian paratroop drop. 18. Je voudrais vous dire combien notre inqui6tude a grandi, J’ai ici, dans mon dossier, les messages émanant de Stanleyville, autorités rebelles, entre le 28 octobre et le 23 novembre; le 23 novembre, la veille du parachutage des troupes belges. 19. On 29 October, in reply to a letter sent by President TshombB to the International Red Cross, that organization stated that, despite several weeks of effort, it had not received permission from the insurgent Government to send an observer to Stanleyville. That action followed a hardening of the rebel authorities’ attitude towards foreigners. The monitoring service of the Congolese Government intercepted a radio message from General Olenga, requesting area commandexs to place a11 foreigners in their zone under house arrest. The same measure was carried out at Stanleyville. On 30 Octobex, the following message was heard: “We can no longer guarantee the lives of Belgian and United States national&” 19. Le 29 octobre, pr6sident Tshombé Fi. la Croix-Rouge internationale, celle-ci fait savoir qu’en dépit de plusieurs semaines d’efforts elle n’a pas reçu du gouvernement insurgé l’autorisation d’envoyer un observateur &Stanleyville. Cette démarche fait suite a un durcissement des autorités rebelles à l’égard des Etrangers, En effet, les services ont capté un message radio du général Olenga, demandant aux commandants regionaux de mettre en X&idence surveillée tous les étrangers de leurs zones, et une mesure identique était prise a Stanleyville. Le 30 octobre, on capte le message suivant: “Nous ne pouvons plus désormais garantir la vie des ressortissants belges et amBricains.” 20. On 2 November, in radio messages addressed to Messrs. Nkrumah, Ben Bella, Nasser, and S6kou Tour& Gbenye threatened to puxsue a scorched-eaxth policy: 20. Le 2 novembre, dans des messages radio adressés à MM, Nkrumah, Ben Bella, Nasser,Sékou Touré, Gbenye menace de pratiquer la politique de la Verre brûlée”: “The Peoples Liberation Army-he said-has always protected foreigners, but it will no longer do SO in the case of nationals of certain countries whose Governments are helping the imperialist Moi’se TshombB.” 21. nique: je vous donne l’assurance formelle qu’il n’y a jamais eu un seul bombardement sur Stanleyville le 24 novembre - “A cause des bombardements, tous les Américains régions libérges sont considér& comme prisonniers de guerre.” 22. Le 18 novembre, Gbenye dit: 22. On 18 November, Gbenye declared: 21. ,On 5 November, “President” Gbenye stated: “Because of the air-raids . . .“-Gentlemen, 1 give you a positive assurance that thexe was not a single air-raid on Stanleyville before 24 Novembex-“Because of the air-raids, a11 Americans andBelgians at pxesent in the liberated regions are considered prisoners of’ war.” “Negotfations concerning prisoners of war should be a matter of days not weeks, for the Will of the a 5 . 24. And, finally,, on 21 November: “American and Belgian troops have attacked us: there is a limit to the peoples’ patience, The Peoples’ Government has removed Belgian and American citizensfrom Stanleyville.” 25. And on 23 November, there was a message of which 1 had been informed on the 22nd. a message I would be ashamed to quote Verbatim, in which the man who is called “President” Gbenye threatened to “est upfl foreign prisoners or place barrels of petrol in front of their doors and burn them alive. 26. Did we or didwe not have reason to be concerned? Did we or did we not have reasonto be disturbed over the fate of our countrymen? 27. I am told, and the argument has some weight, that “no one was killed at Stanleyville before 24 Novemher”; and it is truc-or rather, only one person was killed and, in this grim period, the death of one person is unfortunately SO insignifioant that it is hardly mentioned any more; but what is also truc is that before 24 November, throughout the rebel-held area, many people were killed, often in an atrocious manner, 1 cannot say how many, but probably several dozen. 28. 1 have a file of the horrors which took place, I do not intend to use it or even to open it, provided, of course, that no over-dl doubt is cast on what occurred. Why am 1 not going to openmy file of horrors? Because even in the defence of a good and just cause, 1 do not wish to oreate an even greater gulf between the white and black than that which may exist today; because, even in order to make use of a sensational argument, 1 do not wish to run the risk of stirring up that feeling of racial antagonism which, to our regret, we have begun to notice. 1 do not wish to do SO because 1 have African friends whom 1 respect and because, until the very last moment and until the final effort has been made, I wish to avoid cutting myself off from them by bringing up these frightful things. . 29. I shall not do SO, furthermore, because 1 wish to make a somewhat painful admission, Since the Second World War, white men are unfortunately no longer in a position to preach or give advice eoncerning human horrors. Since Buchenwald and Auschwitz, no one belonging to the white race has any right to do SO. 1 sincerely believe that there are never guilty races. 1 sincerely believe that there are never even guilty peoples. 1 sincerely believe that there are only misguided men and contemptible men. Hitler was a contemptible man. Gbenye, 1 am sorry to say, is a contemptible man. nWe have in our hands more than 300 Americans and more than 800 Belgians, who have been placed under house arrest and in safe places. At the slightest bombing of our area or our revolutionary capital, a trip to be beyond Will do the trick; that is, they Will all be massacred.” And-here 1 must ask the forgiveness of my black friends, whom 1’ respect-in the same article, the same man wrote the following: “We willmakefetishes out of the hearts of Americans and Belgians and we will dress ourselves in the Belgians’ and Americans’ skins. n Et - respecte écrivait les cœurs habillerons 31. quelque qui, dans sabilit6 choses bilité sabilité monstrueuses phrases fanatisés, tragedie? 31. Do you really believe that we had no reason to be concerned? And, 1 ask you, who in this gathering would dare to assume the responsibility of defending a man who wrote or said such things? TO take up his defence is also to assume the responsibility for the consequences of his frightful and monstrous provocations, What, in fact could such words lead to, when read by unfortunate fanaticized people, except tragedy? 32. affaires de même aberration du nationalisme mérite 32, Although 1 do not wish to become too involved in the interna1 affairs of Africa, 1 nevertheless venture to ask whether it is not a curious aberration to make such a man the symbol of African nationalism. 1 feel that the question deserves to be asked and should be pondered. 33. The lives of the foreigners really were in danger, Everything we learned subsequently at Stanleyville and Paulis confirmed our most dire predictions,. What was to be done? “Nothing”, said some; “take the risk of letting them be killed”. Or else take the risk-1 knew it was a risk and 1 know it even better today-yes, take the risk of trying to save them. 33. Tout ce que nous avons appris ville pronostics. certains, siner.” c’était - 34. opération faîtes-moi pensé, aperoevions décidions tard vrai, l’opération temps nous pesé toutes tion moyens la rebelles, organisations a l’ONU, & la Croix-Rouge adressés de beaucoup 34. It was a risk, because this was a oomplicated parachute operation and beoause-believe me when 1 say that we had thought of this-we were faced with an alternative, the dangers of which we could clearly foresee. Either, if we decided to carry out the operation, we might arrive too late and then it would be in vain: or-and this is true, someone said as much-we might, by launching the parachute operation, thereby give the signal for the tragedy we feared. Believe me, we thought of these things and we weighed carefully a11 the possibilities. Before deciding on the paraohute operation, we exhausted a11 the means avallable to us in an effort to have the foreigners in rebel hands freed. We approached a11 the international organizations that might have helped us, the United Nations, the Organization of Afrioan Unity (OAU) and the International Red Cross. We communicated with ail the heads of African States and, in many cases, encountered an appreciation of our problems and of our fears. We ourselves approached the Stanleyville authorities and, as 1 shall explain later, 1 had perhaps 35. We are told: You acted too soon. The ad hoc Commission of the Organization of African Unity; meeting at Nairobi, was about to succeed. 1 have no intention of arguing with the members of the OAU Commission. 1 shall give my views on this later. Prom a11 that I know, however, 1 really do not think that the negotiations initiated on 22 November at Nairobi could have led to any result, since what could be foreseen did indeed happen: the rebel authoritics at Stanleyville really sought touse the hostages for bargaining purposes, When the United States Ambassador tried to get Mr. Kanza to agree to frae these innocent people, which was the abject of his mission, Mr. Kanza’s reply set political conditions: a ceasefire first had to be obtained. Neither the Wnited States Government-1 am sure it Will allow me to say thisnor the Belgian Government was capable of obtaining a cesse-fire on 22 November. Only the Leopoldville Government could have decided on a cesse-fire, and 1 do not believe 1 am betraying any secret when 1 say that it had not decided to agree to one, Its army was at the gates of Stanleyville, having advanced practically without difficultyfromKindu to Stanleyville. There was no way that day of getting Mr. Tshombé to halt the army’s advance and agree to political bargaining for the lives of ihe whites or foréigners at Stanleyville. 36. We waited until the last possible moment before taking our final decision. It is true that we went from Belgium to Ascension, where the British had offered us hospitality. We did not wish to proceed directly to the Congo because-you may believe me or not, but 1 am sure most people will-we hoped, until the very last moment, that we tiould not have to act. We halteci the Belgian paratroops at Ascension Island and then, feeling that the situation was becoming more and more serious and being increasingly disturbed by a11 the news we heard from rebel territory, we decided to make a further advance, it is truc, and we flew the Belgian troops on to Kamins. 3’7. I must coniess that when, on the evening of 22 November, 1 was shown Mr. Gbenye’s table which I mentioned earlier, 1 wondered, certainly for more than an hour, whether 1 could wait any longer. In spite of everything, as we were not sure that a miracle would not occur at the last moment, we waited another twenty-four hours. It was at the end of the day on 23 Nsvember that we, Americans and Belgians, decided that the paratroops would be dropped over Stanleyville at dawn on 24 November. Why at dawn on 24 November? That is the only point in my whole case where my opponents might find some argument, but my explanation will easily dispose of any such argument. Dawn on 24 November was chosenbecause, ever since we had been faced with this situation, we had wondered what would be the critical moment 38. Some speakers have said that it is we whc are responsible for the massacre which tookplace at Stanleyville. TO my distinguished adversaries 1 should like to say this: we aocept that responsibility and are acoountable to our own countrymen. Our conscience is not too heavily taxed, because ail, or almost all, the foreigners freed at Stanleyville told us they were convinced that, if the operation had not taken place, they would have been killed. Naturally, 1 deplore-1 greatly deplore-the fate of the Stanleyville victims, but cari you tel1 me what the position of those in authority in the United States and in Belgium would bave been if we had not undertaken the operation and if some dozens of foreigners had been murdered at Stanleyville? We would then undoubtedly have been filled w-ith remorse, beoause we would have had to live with the knowledge that we could have saved them and that we had allowed them to be massaored because we did not dare to aocept politioal responsibility. 38. responsables ville, dire nous compatriotes. car ou presque’ persuades auraient déplore voulez-vous hommes si nous n’avions dizaines ville? aurions sauver politique, 39. We carried out a second cperation at Paulis, also after much hesitation because the operation was more difficult, from the military standpoint, than the one’ at Stanleyville. We nevertheless decided to go ahead, because the news reaching us from Paulis was really alarming, and, if you want me tc cpen the record of the horrors which took place, 1 cari show that we had some reason for alarm. We sent some of the paratroops to Paulis, about half the group. They landed on the airfield and they carried out their mission, They freed and rescued several hundred forefgners, and a11 the foreigners at Paulis expressed their gratitude for the additional risk which we had taken. 39, Nous car cile que celle de Stanleyville. tout nous arrivaient et, si l’on veut que j’ouvre je vous d’y croire. & Paulis, descendus mission; d’étrangers, été reconnaissants avions 40. We landed at Stanleyville on the twenty-fourth. 40. By the twenty-seventh a11 were back at Kamina and 27, tout le monde était rentré by the twenty-ninth there remained on Congolese n’y avait soi1 not a single one of the Belgian paratroopers Jtanleyville Sent to Stanleyville or to Paulis. The resoue operation le was over, terminée. 41. Those are the facts. That is what happened and that is how this whole affair developed, both psycho- ’ $1. 42. Our opponents say it was premeditated aggression. Premeditated aggression for what purpose? 43. We left Paulis, which we had occupiedwhen there was not a single soldier of the Congolese Army within a radius of more than 300 kilometres and when, if we had wished to give any assistance to the Congolese National Army, we could have dug in at the airfield and awaited the Armyls arrival. At no time was there any question of sendinga single soldier of the Congolese National Army to Paulis to take advantage of the Belgian parachute drop, and, as soon as the 300 or 400 foreigners at Paulis had beenfreedandevaouated, we waited no longer and left Paulis. Are these the actions of a Government engaging in a military operation? 44. We left Stanleyville while the fighting was still going on, and the abrupt abandonment of the airfield which the paratroopers had occupied probably created further difficult problems for the Congolese National Army. We did not for one moment think that we could remain there to allow that Army to take over the town definitively and to consolidate what it believed to be its victory. We departed, abandoning the airfield; the fighting went on for several days longer and, as far as 1 am aware, is not even finished yet. We left the Congo with a11 the airborne troops at a time when, unfortunately-and 1 shall have more to say about this later-the civil war in the Congo is very far from ended. 45. How, then, cari anyone honestly and reasonably maintain that this was a military operation? 46. We used the expression whumanitarian operationn, and our opponents have ridiculed this. 47. 1 must admit that they have found an argument which 1 did not expect. They say that it was not a humanitarian operation, the proof being that there are still foreigners, especially Belgians, in the north-eastern part of the Congo and that we have abandoned them to their fate. Therefore, they say, it is obvious that it was not a humanitarian operation. 48. 1 wonder what my opponents would have said, had we remained in the Congo for days, or even weeks, in order to rescue a11 the foreigners, to the very last one. 49. Many Governments to which we explained the situation on the day of the lsnding at Stanleyville told us that they understood our action but urged us not to remain and to leave as soon as the foreigners had been rescued. 50. As this was completely in line with what we intended to do, we had no difficulty in complying with their wishes. It is, however, true that the north- 51, In the north-eastern pocket, on the other hand, the Belgians and other foreigners are scattered over hundreds of kilometres. We would have had to land with full equipment, with men who would have had to travel through the bush over distances of 200 to 300 kilometres. That was impossible with 400 men. We would have had to land with thousands of men and carry out an operation which would still be in progress today and would have been entirely contrary to the character we wished the operation to have. mètres. cela op&ation complètement ner $ ce que nous avons fait. 52. Finally, to dare to maintain that this was premeditated aggression is really to argue against the evidence. Aggressors do not normally announce their plans. It is necessary only to read the letter sent by Mr. Loridan the permanent representative of Belgium to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 21 November [S/SOSS]u to realize that the operation was a possibility. I wonder what those who read that letter understood from it and particularly from the following paragraph: les faits pour oser soutenir que c’était une agression pr6méditée. pas envoyée le 21 novembre par M. Loridan, représentant permanent l’Organisation se rendre eQt lieu. ceux graphe suivant: “Preliminary measures have been taken, in consultation with the Congolese Government and at its request, against the possibility that it might prove necessary to evacuate the hostages.” 53. What could readers of that letter possibly have thought when it was already known that the Belgianparatroops were at Ascension Island, when the world Press had announced the fact and when ourpermanent representative in New York had indicated that, if the situation deteriorated, we would have to take exceptional measures? Really, did those States Members who are today protesting and charging premeditated aggression not understand that we were announcing, indirectly but quite clearly, that we were poing to act? If we had premeditated any aggression for military purposes, is it conceivable that we would have behaved in that way? 53. s’imaginer parachutistes mondiale permanent situation mesures bres qu’il que nous annoncions - faitement avions prémédité que, vraiment, 54. qui me touche et qui a été répété ici a longueur journée, de plus c’est esprit 54. There is yet another argument, one which hurts me and which has been repeated here a11 day long, in speech after speech, in increasingly violent and insulting terms. 1 refer to the argument that the entire Paulis operation was racist in character and that the Belgians certainly, and the Americans probu Officia1 Records of the Security Council Nineteenth Year, Supple- -.. ._ ---_- -I. ment for October, November and December 1964. -- Supplément 55. Of course, we know that; but what would you have had us do? Would you have wanted us to carry out an operation-a military operation-in order to restore order at Stanleyville in accordance with our own political ideas, and to carry it out decisively? 1 should like to know what you would have said, had we done that. 56. No, we do not consider that one white is worth two blacks, or that the blood of a white man is more precious than that of a black man. It was the fact that the Belgian Government had a special responsibility towards the men, women and children it had sent to the Congo. Who were, in effect, those 3elgians we rescued? They were our technical assistance personnel, our teachers, oux veterinarians, our doctors, a11 those who have been helping the Congolese Government to overcome the problems with which it is confronted. They went at our request andit is because we had a special responsibility towards.those people that we had to make a special effort for them. 57. 1s it truc that in the rescue operation we made a distinction between the white and coloured’people? It fs completely ‘untrue. Among a11 the people evacuated’ from Stanleyville, there were at least 400 Indians and Pakistanis and more than 200 Congolese. And I must say that what forced us to stop’ evacuating the Congolese themselves was the intervention of the Leopoldville Government, which, for reasons that that Government Will explain, did not allow the evacuation of Congolese to continue. 58. That is the truth concerning this so-called “racial” operation. 59. Lastly, although this has not been olearly expressed, the Belgian troops are accused, in vague and ambiguous terms, of having committed massacres. Those who make this accusation are-1 am forced to say-wilfully misrepresenting the fac& They are confusing the action of the Congolese National Army, and perhaps of the mercenaries, with the action of the Belgian troops who were parachuted into Stanleyville. 1 know that you will not be greatly impressed by this, but on the day when the decision was taken 1 saw the officer who was to be in command of the operation and 1 advîsed him most strongly in the following words: “I beg of you, do not use your weapons unless you have tc in order to free persons in danger or for legitimate self-defence,” 60. From a11 the accounts 1 have reoeived, 1 cari state that the number of rebels killed by the Belgian troops is, net insignificant-1 dare not use the Word, because 1 know how cruel and odious it cari be to refer to the death of even one person as ninsignificantn-but it is very small, and that when mentionis made of the 61. 1 should like to say, once and for all, that the problem of the mercenaries is one that must be settled with the Leopoldville Government. It is a matter for discussion between the Organization of African Unity and Mr. Tshombé; the Belgian Government has no responsibility with respect to the recruitment of mercenaries, We do what we cari to prevent Belgians from enlisting as mercenaries in the Congolese National Army; we know the dangers involved, but we are also obliged to recognize that it is very difficult to take action against the mercenaries, because they arrive in the Congo by very diverse and roundabout routes. 62. That is what 1 had to say concerning the Stanleyville operation. 1 myself know what happened and 1 know it better, much bette??, than any of the speakers who have preceded me. 1 know the extraordinarily difficult and painful circumstances in which we had to take our decision. On 24 November, when 1 announced the operation, 1 told the Belgian Chamber that the responsibility 1 had assumed was undoubtedly one of the greatest, and perhaps, indeed, the greatest, of a11 the responsibilities 1 had assumed during the whole of my political lVe, That is still my opinion and my belief. 1 said, at a time when 1 did not yet know how the operation would end but when I already knew of the massacre which had taken place that mornipg at Stanleyville, that 1 did not know what would be the final judgement on my action, but that 1 had-and 1 repeat this’ to you, here, before this international audience-I must tel1 you this, that 1 have a clear conscience and the assurance that, ‘in assuming those responsibilities, 1 did my duty. qu’aucun pénibles dit quand j’ai que j’avais bilités de toute au long de ma vie politique. ?i le penser je ne savais minerait, qui que je ne savais que l’on porterait j’avais audience conscience ces responsabiliti%, 63. Stanleyville Congo est contre j’ai tenté. 63. Now 1 should like to place this incident at Stanleyville in the context of Belgian policy in the Congo and show you that the idea of aggression is contrary to everything 1 intended and everything 1 attempted. 64. $ une affirmation le représentant a parlé Congolais, connaît pense pages saierai colonialisme, XXème sais heureusement croire que la grande majorité et j’en toujours tinuer 64. Bowever, I must first reply to a statement made here by the representative of Ghana who, speaking of my country, mentioned a Century of cruelty committed against the Congolese. 1 do not know whether the representative ,of Ghana is familiar with the history of the Congo. TO my way of thinking, every period in history has had pages of splendour and pages of darkness, and 1 shall never attempt to maintain that the phenomenon of colonialism, in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries and even the twentieth Century, had only pages of glory, and 1 am well aware that that period is at an end and, 1 may add, happily at an end. What 1 doknow, and what leads me ta believe that the representative of Ghana exaggerates, is that the great majority of the Congolese whom 1 know-and 1 now know many of themhave always made clear their intention and their desire to continue to live on good terms with the 65, I went to Leopoldville early this year and 1 was most touched by my reception. 1 walked about the City, I spoke to many crowds, 1 was received by the Burgomasters of Leopoldville in the various suburbs; all, without exception, told me how pleased they were at my visit-the first Belgian Minister to rebrn to the Congo since the events of 1960!-how they hoped that this was the beginning of a new era, and they assured me, SOmetimeS in ail too exaggerated’ terms, that the Congo could not live without the assistance and friendship of the Belgians. 1 was deeply touched and moved, and 1 went back to my cou&ry determined to make yet a further effort help the Congo out of its difficulties. 66. 1 knew Mr. Adoula, 1 lmow Mr. TshombB, and I have had dealings with Mr. Gbenye. 1 have been in touch with many other Congolese politicians. 1 have never heard any of them speak otherwise. The one who was perhaps most ardent, when 1 met him in Brussels in August la&-1 am forced to believe nowthat he was not perhaps entirely sincere-was Mr. Gbenye, who said to me, among other things-1 give you my word of honour that this is true-when we were discussing what must be done in the Congo: Vhat must be done in the Congo is very simple. The Belgian administration, as it was up to 1960, must be re-established, an independent Congo, of course.” That was more than 1 was asking and more, indeed, than1 am capable of doing. 67. Al1 the same, before passing historical judgements as violent and, permit me to say, as insulting as this, sliould not one at least, when having the honour and responsibility of addressing an assembly and a tribunal like this one, weigh one’swords a little and address the Srcurity Council in different terms from those one uses at a political meeting in one’s own countly? 66. What I tried tado in the Congo was to help the Leopoldville Government by, among other things, terminating the secession of Katanga; to give the Government of the Congo technical assistance and, after much hesitation, military technical aid. When the disturbances began, when the rebellion developed, 1 constantly declared that a political solution must be found and that there was no military solution for the rebellion in the Congo. 1 did SO when Mr. Adoula was Prime Minister; I did SO when Iv&. Tshombe was Prime Minister. Lastlp, 1 sought Africanendorsement of Belgium’s foreign policy in the Congo, in the hope that, through sound relations with the Organization African Unity, what 1 tried to do would be understood in Africa. 69. Al1 this is totally at variante with the idea of military aggression. New, if you will allow me, I shall briefly restate some of these points. 71. 1 shall say nothing of the technical assistance given by Belgium to the Congo, but 1 want to dwell for a moment on the military technical aid because, in my view, it raises three questions: first, what is referred to as Belgian interference in the affairs of the Congo; secondly-1 am sorry to say-a certain measure of responsibility borne by the African countries; and lastly, the limited nature of this aid. 71. par instant avis, l’on appelle l’ingérence du Congo; puis - j’ai le regret taine responsabilité limite 72. I think it is neoessary to put an end to ambiguity and, if I may be forgiven for saying SO, to a certain measure of hypocrisy. 1 should like to understand clearly, once and for all, what is meant by the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of a country. As 1 do not wish to indulge in polemics, 1 shall not cite any of the examples which seem to me to cal1 for some explanation. 1 shall simply say what 1 myself understand by non-interference, 72. Je crois excusez-moi Je voudrais ce ingérence Comme je ne citerai devoir ment ingérence, 73. rieures légal de ce pays l’aide que ce gouvernement Il y a ing6rence pays quand on soutient, la rébellion explication B nous crois devrions la Bon-ingérence. 73, There is no interference in the domestic affairs of a country when the lawful Government of that country is given the assistance for which it asks, There is interference in the domestic affairs of a country when support is given to rebellion or revolution against the lawful Government. If anyone has a different explanation or a different definition of noninterference to propose to us, 1 hope that he Will do SO, because 1 consider that, in the interests of a healthy United Nations, we should know once and for a11 what is meant by non-interferenoe. 74. Adoula, prendre les pays qui disent le plus de mal de M. Tshomb6 cependant ont défilé à cette barre ont des relations normales l’a [117Oème M. Kasa-Vubu légal, des africaine. ment comme exemple une aide militaire vernement Eh bien! j’arr&e vernement-la, j’ai un homme qui est un homme bmoi, X si cet homme 74. Furthermore, everyone recognized the Adoula Government, and the point which still puzzles me somewhat is that even the countries which now speak the most il1 of Mr. Tshombé have nevertheless recognized him. SO far as 1 know, the delegations which have followed one another before this tribunal have normal diplomatie relations with the TshombB Government. As the representative of the Ivory Coast pointed out [117Oth meeting], the Congolese Government of Mr. Kasa-Vubu and Mr. Tshombe is the lawful Government and it is represented at the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. What, then, do you expert a Government like the Belgian Government to do? 1s it, for instance, to say: “1 give technical assistance, and even military aid, to the Adoula Government. There is a change of government. Another politician takes over. Very well, 1 stop giving technical assistance, because 1 do not like that Government; because 1 have a man in the Congo who is my man, X or Y, and if my man is not in power, ?/ Ibid., Seventeenth Year, Supplement for October. November and December 1962, document S/5053/Add13. décembre 76. I say, tbat in the matter of military aid-and it gives me no pleasure to say so-there is a certain measure of African responsibility. In December 1962, Mr. Adoula turned to the United Nations and said something which everyone knew. He said: “My armyis badly organized. Some day the United Nations Will leave the Congo; 1 need a well-organized army, and I should like to organize it under the caver of the United Nations .II That was a good idea. Certainly 1, for my part, had taken the Iiberty of giving such advice to Mr., Adoula. Why had this reorganization of the Congolese Army, which was vitally necessary as a matter of priority, not taken place? Everyone knows the answer: because a number of African countries objected, and it is known that those which especially objected to the Congolese Prime Minister’s request were tho United Arab Republic, Ghana, Mali, Guineathe very countries which we nowfind speaking the most violently before this tribunal on the situation in the Congo. If, in 1962, instead of rejecting Mr. Adoula’s request, you had helped him in the spirit of African brotherhood of which you speak SO often and which should have been displayed on that day, many troubles and many regrettable things would not have corne to pass. 77. Because of those countxies, the Secretary-General had to tel1 Mr. Adoula that he could not give the blessing or the protection of the United Nations to the Congo’s efforts at military organization. Thus, Mr. Adoula was thrownbackuponbilateral agreements. He turned to Belgium, and Belgium responded to the Congo’s appeal. 78. On 27 May 1963 1 was xeceived by U Thant, to whom 1 explained the rather difficult situation in which 1 found myself; 1 said to him: “It is now May 1963; the United Nations troops Will be leaving the Congo on 30 June; Mr. Adoula’s Government is in a difficult position. Do you think that 1 cari do anything and do you think that, if 1 do anything, 1 shall not be contravening the laws of the United Nations?” I think I may say that 1 encountered, if not direct approval, at least no objection in principle. In anyevent, I acted publicly, and no countxy which is a Member of the United Nations, none whatever, cari say that it was taken by surprise and was not aware of the effort which the Belgians were going to make, 79. That effort was a limited one, and why should 1 not have been allowed to make a limited effort of the kind which was requested and obtained by most African countxies in the period following their independence? Moreover, agreement and support was 81. It is true that later, when the situation became more serious, Mr. Adoula made a further request, to which we gave much thought before agreeing; he asked us to send a number of airmen. Our reply to Mr. Adoula was: “We appreciate your need to be able to move quickly from place to place sinoe there are very few reliable units in your army; we are willing to help you in transporting troops, but there Will be no Belgian participation in bombing or strafing operations.” And 1 cari say with the certainty that no one cari contradict me, that from that time on not a single Belgian airman took part in any strafing or bombing operation in the Congo, This is the extent to which we gave our military technical assistance, 82. But that is not all: this military technicalassistance must be considered in its political context. .Matters had become particularly difficult in the Congo when the rebellion broke out. 83. At this point 1 think it is necessary to clear up a misunderstanding, or rather a really monstrous historical errer; that is the errer of those who pretend-1 cari use no other Word-to believe that the present revolt in the Congo is a revolt against Mr. Tshombe and his Government. The truth, the sad truth, is that this revoit broke out while Mr. Adoula was Frime Minister; it broke out first at Kwilu, early in 1964, and then at Kivu, while Mr. Adoula was Prime Minister. We must be fair; Mr. Tshombé inherited this rebellion when he took office. 84. When the revolt broke out, 1 was perfectly well aware of the difficulties and dangers that Belgium would have to overcome. From that time on, 1 repeatedly told Mr. Adoula that a military solution was a bad solution, or rather that there was no military solution to the problem of the revolt; the right thing to do would be to try to find a political solution. 85. While 1 must apologize for speaking at such length-but, after all, 1 am alone against everybody-1 should like at this point to read an extract from a letter, written on 12 June 1964 at atime when 1 really do not suppose anyone will presume to say that it was written to fit the requirements of a cause 1 was to defend six months later. 1 have not the gift of propheoy. Nevertheless, this letter clearly indicates the spirit in which 1 co-operated with Mr. Adoula’s Government. ~II have embarked upon a road which may cause me troubles. bath at home and abroad unless I act with a great deal of caution, especially since a11 the information 1 receive is consistent on one point-namely, the great difficulty of reducing the present centres of revoit by purely military means. I think it is poor policy to think only in terms of coercive measures if there is a possibility of reaching negotiated political solutions without oompromising on any essential point. As 1 have often said to you, 1 think that the Congo needs a11 its energies to fulfil its great destiny and any measure which Will make co-operation in good faith possible should be encouraged. Although 1 am not in a position to judge the exact value of their statements, various Congolese leaders who are now opposing your Government have told us of their desire for reconciliation and their wish to find peaceful solutions to the present problems. It would seem to me especially difficult, at a time when Mr. Tshomb&, Mr,. Soumialot and a number of representatives of the CNL [Comite national de libération] at Brazzaville say that they are prepaxed to enter into discussions, to associate Belgium more directly with purely repressive measures. On the contrary, anything that could contribute -to the maintenance of law and order would be faoilitated if there was a general impression that a national reconciliation was being brought about. In that regard, 1 think that the measures of amnesty proposed in the Thant Plan should be adopted officially.” 87. 1 ask you, is this the Ietter of a man plotting aggression? 1s it the letter of a man who intends to intervene militarily in the affairs of the Congo? Or is it the Ietter of a man who believed and still believes today that the only solution to the problems of the Congo is a political solution? Unfortunately-and this shows that we Belgians have not SO much power over the Congolese Government-Mr. Adoula did not seefit to follow my advioe. 88. Mr. Tshomké then came to power. 1 know that there is a legend to the effect that Mr. Tshombé is the oreature of the Belgians and’the Americans. 1 oan 89. I therefore really had no reason to try to influence the choice of the Prime Ministerofthe Congo. In the end, however, Mr. Tshombe came topower. Did I change Belgium’s policy towards the Leopoldville Government? 1 pursued the very same policy, or rather 1 strengthened it a little in SO far as the policy of conciliation and the search for a political solution were concerned. 90. Nevertheless, there ensued an event of which a11 of you who have SO violently attacked Belgium from this rostrum are aware. On 16 August Icalled a meeting in Brussels of a11 the African ambassadors, not only those of the Governments ‘which 1 may cal1 friendly Governments, the Governments whichusually give me good advice, but even the representatives and ambassadors of the Governments which are generally hostile to Belgian policies. 1 did not wish to make any distinction between them because 1 did not wish anybody to be able even to suggest that 1 was trying to divide the Afrioan countries. 91. What did 1 say to these African ambassadors? 1 am sure that you must have, in your files, in your various Capital$, the telegrams and reports that were sent, 1 said-this was on 16 August, when the revolt was spreading to Kwilu and Kivu and elsewhere-: “1 am both extremely surprised and greatly disturbed to sec that there is no reaction from the African countries. 1 do not know where we are going in the Congo, but if things continue as at present, we shall be going towards increasingly serious and difficult situations which are unquestionably harmful to the Congo and which might also be dangerous for the whole of Africa. 1 therefore beg you to tel1 this to your Governments and to ask them to take action. l1 92. It was probably a coincidence-for 1 do not think 1 have that much influence on world affairs-but a few days after 16 August it SO happened that some African Governments decided to cal1 a meeting of a11 the African oountries at Addis Ababa. It was the right course to follow. And when the final communiqu8 Of the session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU at Addis Ababa was made public, 1 at once stated, in a public declaration, that 1 welcomed it, that 1 hoped that the OAU would succeed and that in any event 1 was at its service and ready to co- Operate with it should it deem that necessary.! I confess tliat at that time 1 thought that it would nOt only be the Americans who would be questioned 93. Here again, was this appeal to the African countries the policy of a man planning aggression? 94. 1 also did something perhaps a little more daring: 1 asked Mr. Gbenye to corne to Brussels. 1 say that this was a little daring because at that time Mr. Gbenye seemed to be the rebel chief and, in any case, to be the man who commanded even Ms. Soumialot. 1 shouldered my responsibilities. I must say, incidentally, that 1 notified the Tshombé Government of this, by saying to it: “1 believe in a golitical solution; 1 believe in reconciliation; 1 am inviting Mr. Gbenye to Brussels; I want to talk with him and if there is any possibility of acting as an intermediary, 1 do not want to lose it.” Mr. Gbenye came to Brussels and-an amazing thing in our democratic countries and in these times-this was, of a11 the things which have occurred in my political life, the only one that 1 have been able to keep secret. Mr. Gbenye came to Brussels. 1 met him twice and nobody knew about it. 1 had long conversations with him. 1 heard his views. 1 told you â moment ago what he said to me about his country’s relations with Belgium. 1 in turn explained to him the situation as 1 saw it. We parted on very good terms and 1 said to him: “1 shall keep in touch with you, for it is possible that after this exchange of views we might be able to try something.” 95. On 26 August 1 sent the following telegram to the Belgian ambassadcr at Usumbura: “As you know, 1 have had two conversations with Gbenye at Brussels. I am sending you by tourier the records of these meetings. It was agreed that Mr. Gbenye would keep in touch with you and 1 promised to give him a note, which 1 ask you to deliver to him. My intention is, therefore, to secure the agreement of Gbenye and his friends to the above text and, on that basis, to bring about a meeting with Tshombé.” 96. 1s this the attitude of a man who is planning aggression against the rebels and against the Congo? 97. 1 shall net read you the entire text of the note referred to above because it is rather long, but 1 should like to give you a rough idea of the main points in the advice 1 was trying to give to Mr. Gbenye (and 1 am aware that the present Government of the Congo will not like a11 of it): 1. A military solution of the conflict dividing the Congo seems to be impossible. II. If the civil war wexe to continue 3r if the Congo were to be divided among two or more authorities, there is every likelihood that there would be largescale foreign intervention. Neither the Congo nor Africa have anything to gain from the creation of a new Korea or a new Viet-Nam. IV. A political solution cari be found only if the parties refrain from attaching any prior conditions to their agreement and if, on the contrary, they ‘agxee on a positive programme of action. V. No solution Will be altogether legal. Neither the “loi fondamentale” nor the new Cons.titution oan be fully implemented. The new Covernment Will derive its legitimacy from the fact of its existence and of its recognition abroad. The objective to be sought is the formation of a Government of the broadest possible union, for the Congo needs a11 its able men, both at Leopoldville and in the provinces. VI, This course must be proposed as a temporary one that Will continue uni31 peace and order have been fully restored in the oountry, when it would be possible to hold elections. After the elections, it would be possible to return to a more normal form of government. 98. Thus, everything that 1 have heard from this rostrum for the past two days about the policy that should be followed-and 1 should not like this to be interpreted as a display of misplaoed pride-1 had already said. But 1 must say that it is with some pride and without fear of contradiction that 1 ask: what country did as much, during the critical days of August and September, to try to bring about a political reconciliation in the Congo, to prevent a civil war and to find the only solution that was still possible, the solution of union’? 99. It is in the context of that policy that the Stanleyville incident must be viewed. It is inconceivable that a government or a man who for many difficult months had laboured, both with Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombé and in co-operation with the African States, to find a feasible political solution could be someone who had perpetrated, and had wanted, a premeditated military action and a racial manoeuvre in the Congo, This is a heinous aspersion on my intentions which is not based on one shred-1 repeat, one shred-of evidence. 100. Those are my explanations. Stanleyville was a special operation within the framework of the general policy which 1 have described, Stanleyville was a painful affair. But-and on this point Iagreewith those who have spoken before me-it is the whole problem of the Congo that we have to face, it is the whole future of the Congo that is at stake. What could 1 have done other than 1 did? 101. of course, there is another policy that Belgium could have followed in the Congo. 1 do not hesitate in saying that during these la& few years, and especially during the last few months, this idea has sometimès crossed my mind, That policy would be to abandon everything. That is what some quarters have advised me to do. That was the advice given to me Of this country, which could be one of the most wealthy and prosperous in Africa.” 102. 1s it really in the interest of the Congo to let them fight it out before our indifferent eyes? 103. 1 have no wish to skirt any of the difficulties. It is true that there are Belgian economic interests in the Congo. But what 1 am going to tel1 you, in the certainty that 1 am speaking the truth, is that at the present time Belgium can do without the Congo, but that 1 really do not believe, from what 1 have heard from a11 the Congolese political leaders that 1 have seen, that the Congo cari do without Belgium. This capitalistic economic structure, which admittedly exists, is the only thing that remains standing in the Congo after four years. The governments which have succeeded each other have been weak and the administration almost non-existent; but the Congo has survived thanks to its economic structure. 1 concluded with Mr. Adoula some agreements in March which, if ratified, would enable the Congolese to be the absolute masters of a11 their mines, a11 their means of transport snd a11 their electricity. With a11 this, the Congo could be a great country; the Congo could be a prosperous and wealthy country. This is what Belgium ardently desires. 1 should like tobe absolutely sure that this is also the sincere desire of a11 the African countries without exception, 104. Belgium is neither colonialist, nor neo-colonialist, nor imperialist. Belgium is neither cruel nor racist. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium proudly makes this forma1 and solemn statement here. The Belgian Government is prepared to cooperate with the United Nations. The Belgian Government is prepared to co-operate with the Organization of African Unity, The Belgian Government is prepared to co-operate with the legal Government of the Congo, in order to help it to overcome its tremendous difficulties. And that, without boasting and without high-flown words, is really to work for peace, for friendship among peoples and for brotherhood among men.

1 should like to thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, The next speaker on my list is the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, on whom 1 now call.

My delegation fully appreciates the’ honour of being allowed to speak in this Security Council debate. We wish to take advantage of this opportunity to shed light on a certain number of facts and events which have occurred in our national territory, thus enabling the members of the Council to appraise them correctly. 107. 1 do not intend to remind you of the importance, of the functions which the United Nations has assigned to the Security Council. 1 merely wish to say that the 108, An examination of a11 the statements that 1 have heard thus far leads me to consider the following points : first, the problem of the United States-Belgian rescue operation, which is related to my country’s sovereignty; secondly, the problem of the rebellionthe armed opposition to the legal Government of the Republic, which is related to the suppression of the rebellion; thirdly, the African political solution proposed within the framework of the OAU; fourthly, the unilateral foreign intervention in the interna1 affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 108. entendues quatre de l’opération souveraineté de la rkbellion, au gouvernement’ répression; caine proposée ment, les affaires du Congo, 109. cana-belge moi certain l’opinion & Léopoldville, de l’avance de mort peser et américains. parler 109. 1 should like to place the United States-Belgian rescue operation at Stanleyville in its true context. For some time before the recapture of Stanleyville, Congolese public opinion had been disturbecl. The local Press in Leopoldville had reported a deliberate slowing down of the advance by our troops, motivated by the threat of death with whichr the Stanleyville rebels were menacing foreign civilians, particularly Belgians and Americans. 1 was at Leopoldville, and therefore 1 lmow what 1 say is truc. 110. One fact is certain: if our troops, which at that time were encountering virtually no resistance, had advanced too close to Stanleyville, the fate of the fore@ civilians whom the rebels had taken as hostages would have been sealed. Annex No. 18 in the brochure entitled The Congo Rebellionu published by the Government of the Democratic ReDublic of the Congo. u I contains a photocopy of a table from General Olenga to Major Tshenda Oscar at Kindu. This table shows the frame of mind of the rebels atthat time. The first words are reference numbers, but the text then reads: “Americans, Belgians must be guarded in safe I place, In case region is bombed, exterminate allwithout, asking for explanation. lt This, as 1 have said, is a photocopy of the table which was seized. 110. qui ne rencontraient résistance, c’en Btait fait des civils avaient brochure d6mooratique Con&/, est adress6 Oscar quel était l’état d’esprit Les premiers Puis le texte est ainsi libellé-je “Américains, En cas bombardement demander c’est la photocopie 111. Furthermore, the radio messages fromstanley- Ville which could be .monitored at Leopoldville at chat time are in tbe same vein. 1 shall read you one 111. qui pouvaient étaient 3/ Edited by the Press Service of the Gemocratic Republic of che Congo, Concordia Printers, Leopoldville, December 1964. 3/ Edité du Congo, 112, The Government found itself in a dilemma: it could either allow the troops to advance, and run tbe risk of seeing the hostages massacred, or halt the advance in the hope that the rebels would corne to their senses. It was during this period that Congolese public opinion .became impatient. 113. The Government took advantage of this lu11 to address repeated appeals to the rebels to permit the evacuation of the foreigners. The Secretary- General of the United Nations made a similar appeal. The ad hoc Commission of OAU, throughits Chairman, did likewise. Finally, the representative of the Red Cross, whom 1 know personally, to whom 1 have spoken, and whom 1 have frequently met, exerted himself for the same cause. Al1 these appeals were in vain, The rebels preferred to barter human lives for political advantages, such as recognition of the rebel Government. 114. It was in the face of. this shocking attitude and these impossible demands, that the idea of the rescue operation was born. Itithis connexion, rumours were already circulating in Belgium, which disturbed Congolese public opinion and, here again, 1 know what 1 am saying, because .I was there. These rumours spoke of the need for Belgium Jo intervene in order to save the Belgians held as hostages at Stanleyville. The Congolese Government then adopted a firm attitude, which was expressed by its spokesman, Mr, Sinda, qualifying any unilateral intervention of this kind as outright aggression-and this is not quite the interpretation given or the texts cited by one representative, the representative of Algeria. Talks were then begun, resulting in the approval given by the Government, which is recorded in the Ietters from the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the Ambassadors of the United States of America and Belgium at Leopoldville [S/6062 and S/6063].4/ [The speaker read out the text of the letters.] 115. Following the authorization of the Government, the parachute drop took place in specified zones and for a specific purpose, with the least damage possible. At no time did the paratroops concern themselves with putting down the rebellion; that they did not do SO is proved by the fact that the fighting between the Congolese National Army and the rebels continued after the paratroops had withdrawn. At this moment the paratroops are baok in Belgium, and have been sinoe 1 December; 1 was there when they a11 returned. 116. That is the context in which this rescue operation took place. You are now free to say whether or not this operation was what others have called an act of aggression by the forces of imperialism; you will also be free to say whether or not this operation 4/ Officlal Records of the Security Council, Ntneteenth Year, Supplement for October, November and Decsmber 1964. 117. As for the fears voiced by the Congo (Brazzaville), there is little basis for them in view of the distance separating Stanleyville from Brazzaville. TO thàt country, too, 1 would say that it got off with a acare: the paratroops are no longer in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 117. Quant aux craintes de la Rgpublique du Congo (Brazzaville), distance qui separe Stanleyville de Brazzaville, aussi, je dixai qu’elle en est quitte pour la peur; les parachutistes ne sont plus sur le territoire République dgmocratique du Congo. 118. Mais j’en viens ?l me poser une autre question: pourquoi ces mêmes pays, qui, a l’occasion de l’opEjlration l’Afrique, se sont-ils tus lorsque trois gouvernements de l’Afrique troupes étrangères pour mater lYnsurrection? C’est là que le bât blesse, c’est 18 l’illogisme qui conduira, s’il se poursuit, & la faillite de tout le système de coopération que nous voulons instaurer. Cela vient $ propos, Comme le disait le Ministre Sknégal de ces censeurs de la politique du Congo: “On ne voit touj0ur.s pas 8. quels principes on se réfère, mais on devine parfois 3 quels intérêts on se voue. Il 118. However, there is another point: why did these same countries, which spoke of threats to Africa when the Stanleyville operation was taking place, remain silent when three East Afrioan Governments requested the intervention of foreign troops to put down an insurrection? That is where the shoe pinohes, that is the illogicality which, if persisted in, Will lead to the failure of the whole system of co-operation we are trying to establish. It is worth quoting here what the Minister of State of Senegal said about the critics of the Congo’s policies: “One cannot always see to what psinciples they are referring, but one cai sometimes guess what interests they serve.” 119. You Will appreciate why no useful help in solving our difficulties could be found within the framework of OAU. We term rebels those who have set up an armed opposition to the legal Government; the same countries which have recognized our Government-Ghana, for example-cal1 them nationalists, while others speak of patriots. Of course, anarchists and rebels have only to let their beards grow ancl trot out certain homilies on imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, and to foment some trouble from a safe distance, to become nationalists in good standing. 1 know some of these nationalists wh0, for a time, shaved their beards in order to serve the Prime Minister during his stay in Madrid, and who today have become nationalists in order to fight him with bearded chins. That is paradoxical. 1 shall not dwell on this aspect, but I would wish the Council to have a clear picture of the manner in which the rebellion developed. 119. Vous comprendrez possible, au sein de l’OUA, de trouver une assistance valable pour, la solution de nos difficultés. appelons rebelles ceux qui ont formé une opposition armée contre le gouvernement légal; les mêmes pays qui ont reconnu notre gouvernement, en l’occurrence le Ghana, parlent de nationalistes patriotes, la barbe et de répéter certaines leçons sur l’impé- rialisme, le colonialisme et le néo-colonialisme, et de fomenter quelques troubles d’assez loin, pour que d’anarchistes, de rebelles, vous deveniez nationalistes de bon ton. Je connais de ces nationalistes qui, un certain temps, s’étaient fait couper la barbe pour servir Madrid et qui, aujourd’hui, sont devenus nationalistes pour le combattre avec la barbe sous le menton. Cela est paradoxal. Je n’insisterai pas sur cet aspect, mais je voudrais que le Conseil soit éclairé sur l’évolution de la rébellion. 190. It was after Parliament recessed that the opposition to the outgoing Government began to fm%me a violent character. At Leopoldville, where I had been since March 1964, painful incidents of Plastic bombing and the use of grenades against innocent people were the means employed by the opposition to express its discontent, There is no need for me to recount those appalling scenes, in which hand-grenades were thrown into crowds on their way to the polling booths, and into wedding Processions, injuring men, women and children indisoriminately. 120. C’est depuis que le Parlement a été mis en vacance que l’opposition au gouvernement précédent a commencé & prendre un caractbre Léopoldville, où je me trouvais depuis mars 1964,des s&nes pénibles de plasticage, grenades sur des populations innocentes, étaient les moyens auxquels recourait fester son mécontentement, Je n’ai point besoin de vous citer ont été lancées sur les foules se dirigeant vers l’isoloir de vote, sur les invités & une fête de mariage, blessant indistinctement hommes, femm.es et enfants. 122. The fact remains that, like the other big political groupings-the radicals and the ComitB demographique africain-the CNL appointed members to assist in forming thetransitional Governmentwhich undertook the task of restoring peace, of getting the economy started again, resuming the process of reconciliation and preparing for the parliamentary elections which are due to be held next February and March. 123. At that point the Government appealed to the whole population to put an end to violence, to return to their homes and to make up their differences in order to create the peaceful conditions necessary to hold elections, Some within the CNL heeded this appeal and returned home, and the aots of violence in Leopoldville ceased; others, intoxicated by the first military successes in the eastern part of the country, preferred to step up the violence in those regions. The Government was left with no alternative but to meet violence with violence, 124. Some have seen fit to lecture us on this matter of repression, 1 confess 1 am surprised to hear this kind of lecturing by the very same persons who, in their own countries, have practised and still practise violent repression of a11 opposition. 125. If we review the most recent examples of violent opposition in Africa, we note that in 1963 a revolt broke out in an East African State during the absence of its Head of State. On his return, the rebellion was put down mercilessly, with an iron hand. We heard echoes of this affair during our stay there shortly afterw ards, 126. In January of 1964, three East African countries called in foreign troops to suppress a rebellion. Those who, in 1960, condemned the Congo’s request for Belgian troops had to eat their words in February 1964 at Dar es Salaam, during the extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers .of OAU; Today, they indulge in this false African indignation over an operation whose purpase was not even to put clown the rebellfon. 127. In 1964, my country witnessed a steady influx of black refugees from the Sudan, who were fleeing the cruel repressive measures taken by the Arab authorities of the north against the black populations. No indignation was voiced by the false brothers in that connexion. 129. Nothing was heard in the Council from those now rising in false indignation when, in the areas they held, the rebels were barbarously massacring the entire intellectual &lite. 1 do not have to tel1 you that at Kindu, Albertville, Uvira, Ikela, Boende, Paulis and elsewhere, a11 of the officiais and employees of private organizations who could not show a MNC [Mouvement national congolais/Lumumbaj tard were executed. The atrocities that were committed in those places are SO frightful that 1 am ashamed to think that my people were responsible for them. 1 shall merely read to you testimony gathered from eye-witnesses, some of it reported to me personally and directly, 1 was in Leopoldville when the survlvors arrived and 1 questioned some of them-they w ere Congolese, for those who w ant their facts straight . 129. ont proclamé rebelles intellectuelle Je n+al pas besoin de VOUS dire qu+& Kindu, & Albertville, tous les fonctionnaires privée national atrocit& que j’ai l’auteur. reaueillis BtB rapport& tement; les rescap& uns, des Congolais, 130. Here is what these witnesses said: 130. “Mr. Jean-Roger Ngumba, a former confidant of ‘General+ Nicolas Olenga, quotes the following words spoken by the Commander-in-chief of the rebel troops: +The Chinese Communists have killed millions and millions of people. This is why they suoceeded. We must follow their example.’ ++M. Jean-Roger ++gén&ral++ Nicolas du Commandant communistes millions laquelle exemple. ++ “These threats w ere no empty ones, At Stanleyville @y assassinated the mayor, Ms. Léopold Matabo, who. was dismembered alive by the rebel cannibals at the public market; the Provincial Secretary, Mr. Gabriel Balete; the former Minister of Interior, Mr. Georges Kokonyange; the Director of the Provincial Ministry of the Interior, Pierre Alamazani; the mayor of the commune of Mangobo, Alfred Boningoli; the chief of the arabized district, Sabiti Mabe; the Editor-in-Chief of the local news- Paper, La Gazette, Guillaume Zambite; Abbé Etienne of the Premontres Order and a11 the Court Magistrates except Crispin Lubanzi. Three of these magistrates were victims of most savage acts of cannibalism. ++s/ “Ces ville M. rebelles secr&aire ministre directeur Pierre de Mangobo, scription en chef Zambité; et tous Loubar@. d’actes 131. In this connexion I cari recount to you what was told to me by an eye-witness who described 131. Até a se ‘Khe Congo Rehellion, OP. cit 5/ Voir “More thon 2,000 Congolese, the élite of the region, were massacrecl in Stanleyville, killed with machetes, beaten to death or burned alive. The Patrice Lumumba monument in the centre of the town served as an altar for these bloody sacrifices and it is truc that despile torrential equatorial rains the ground at this spot is still stained red from the blood of our compatriots. “A Pakistan refugee from Stanleyville gave his version of what he saw: “‘One day the rebels ledto the Lumumba monument prisoners. Al1 the population was forced to witness a horrible butchery: some of the prisoners had their feet eut off, others their legs, and still others their hands or their sexual organs which were thenthrust into their mouths’ II, 1 apologize for these details, but 1 had to give them to you. 1 quote again: “Another day a Stanleyville resident who had numerous friends inthe ranks of Stanleyville government officiais, was taken 100 kilometres from the City and killed by five shots. They busied him half in the ground and half out leaving the Upper part of his body above ground. We visited this spot with five of his friends and saw the bodies of several hundred Africans . . .ll. “In Kindu, capital of Maniema province, more than 800 personages and functionaries were assassinated without any form of legal process . . , “In Paulis the Governor of Uele Province, Mr. Mambaya, his provincial secretary, Mr. Joseph Tabalo, as well as members of Radeeo, the party of Mr. Cyrille Adoula, civil servants, teachers, magistrates and military prisoners, were oxecuted en masse . , . The number of victims exceeded 4,OOO,“S/ 132. 1 do not need to quote the testimony of a woman from Kindu, which 1 had from her own lips as she told it to me personally. This woman was forced to witness, together with her children, the murder-the execution of her husband. They made him swallow a litre of petrol, they pierced his stomach and set him afire, and his wife and children were showered with fragments of the body of their husband and father. 133. 1 shall desist from givingyou these details. Here you see what these false brothers cal1 liberation. And yet there are those who say that repression, in such circumstances, should be considerate! 134. 1 apologize for being SO deeplymoved as1 relate these facts. They affect me personally, a8 a man. As a matter of faot, 1 corne from the region in which the rebellion, the armed revolution, first broke out, and 1 do net need to go into how 1 feel in this matter or 135, Certain delegations, in speakingon this question, bave alluded to the African political solution recommended by the Council of Mini&ers of the Organization of African Unity at its extraordinary session of’ September last , 135, ont fait pr8conisbe sation de l’unît8 de septembre 136. pêcher lution suit: 136. 1 took part in the discussions and 1 feel bound to make some commente on the resolution, dated 10 September 1964 whioh reads as follows: “The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity meeting for its Third Extraordinary Session in Addis Ababa from 5 to 10 September 1964, to examine the Congolese problem, its repertussions on the neighbouring states and on the African scene at large: “Le l’unit8 ordinaire pour tussions africain “Ayant au Conseil ment prgsident la solution au sein de l’organisation “Having studied the messages addressed to it by several African Heads of State and Government, especially that of President Kasa-Vubu expressing his conviction that the solution to the Congolese problem should be found within the Organization of African Unity; “Having noted the invitations of the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) and the Kingdom of Burundi to the OAU to send a fact-finding and goodwill. mission to their oountries to seek means of restoringnormal relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) and between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Kingdom of Burundi; nAyant pris de la R6publique RBpublique du Burundi africaine et de bons offices de rechercher entre RIZpublique République du Burundi; “Taking note of the statement by the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo indicating his efforts and desire to bring about “Prenant Ministre faisant une r8conciliation national reconciliation in his country; nProfondBment de la situation Congo $trangères principalement du Sud et de la RhodBsie du Sud; “Deeply concerned by the deteriorating situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo resulting from foreign intervention as well as use of mercenaries principally reoruited from the racist countries of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia; “Rbaffirmant nisation africains de quelque ment d’apartheid; “Reaffirming the resolutions of the Organization of Amcan Unity inviting a11 African states to abstain from any relationship whatsoever with the Government of South Africa because of its policy of apartheid;” HoW many African States axe not complying with this Part of the resolution! I continue: Que d’Etats de la rbolution! “Considering that foreign intervention and the useofmeroenaries has unfortunate effects on the neighbouring independent states as well as on the struggle for national liberation in Angola, Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and the other territories in the region which are still under colonial domination, and constitutes a serious threat to peace in the African continent; “Consic%rant mercenaires sur lutte Rhodésie territoires coloniale du continent Then cornes the operative part of the resolution: ‘11. Appeals to the Government of theDemocratic Republic of the Congo to stop immediately the recruitment of mercenaries and to expel as soon as possible a11 mercenaries of whatever origin who are already in the Congo SO as to facilitate an Afrioan solution. “2. Notes the solemn undertaking of the Prime Minister of the Demooratic Republic of the Congo to guarantee the security of combatants who lay down their arms. “3; Requests especially a11 those now fighting to cesse hostilities .so as to seek. with the hein of the Organization of African Unity, a solution that would make possible national reconciliation and the restoration of order in the Congo. “4, Appeals to a11 the political leaders of the Democratic Republio of the Congo to seek, by a11 appropriate means, to restore and consolidate national reconciliation. “5. Decides to set up and to send immediately”- 1 emphasize this-Vo the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) and the Kingdom of Burundi an ad hoc Commission consisting of Cameroun, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Somalia, Tunisia, .United Arab Republic, Upper Voltaand plaoed under the effective Chairmanship of His Excellency Jomo Kenyatta, Prime Minister of Kenya, which will have the following mandate: 11 (a, TO help and encourage the efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the restoration of national reconciliation in conformity with paragraphs 2 and 3 above; l1 (-) TO seek by a11 possible means to bring about normal relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours, especially the Kingdom of Burundi and the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), 116. Invites this Commission to submit its report to the Administrative Secretary-General [of OAU], for immediate distribution to all Member States. “7. Appeals strongly to a11 powers at present intervening in the interna1 affairs of theDemooratic Republic of the Congo to cesse their interference. The Member States are further invited to give instructions to their diplomatie missions accredited to these powers with the view of impressing upon them this appeal. tt 8. Requests a11 Member States to refrain from any action that might aggravate the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or worsen the relationship between the Democratio Republic of the Congo and its neighbours. 137. This resolution, in the voting on which my Government abstained, requires some clarification on the question of a political solution, the halting of the recruitment of so-called ttmercenary” volunteers, the cessation of hostilities, the establishment of the ad hoc Commission and the way in which the latter fulfilled its task. 137. ment s’est quelques tioh politique, dits de la Commission s’est 138. My delegation must point out that thepreambular paragraph referring to a political solution links reconciliation with the restoration of order and makes it conditional on the restoration of order. None of us here would assert that order prevails where citizens engage in armed opposition to the legitimate authority. 138. politique, que la r&onciliation qu’elle Et personne part armée 139, On the subject of stopping the recruitment of mercenaries, as they are called, 1 rnust digress in order to make the situation clear. 1.39. Quant & lacessationdu mercenaires, mieux expliquer 140. Last September, at Addis Ababa, the Prime Minister asked the Council of Mini&ers to agree that any African country to which the Government of the Republic appealed might grant it military assistance for the maintenance of order in pacified areas. 140. Ministre ter que les pays africains de la République une assistance les r6gions 141, The Council stated that it was not its duty to do this, but on the other hand expressed the wish that volunteers who had been enlisted individually t0 serve in our army should be expelled immediately and not seplaced-this at a time when our army was having to face an opposition which was also armed. That was the stumbling-block. Since the one conditioned the other, the refusa1 of the one should make the other inapplicable. Some people, however, would have preferred the Organization of African Unity to force troops on the Congo without its consent, It is easy to guess fromwhich sources these mercenaries would have been sought: from one African Government, for instance, which advertises them ad lib on the specious pretext of its country’s African mission. This, again, was something to which we could not agree. 141. mais engagés & titre de notre Btse arm6e arm6e. ditionnant la non-application pref&-6 au Congo oti l’on serait des gouvernements volontt5 afrioaine non plus l’accepter. 142, Moreover, the resolution prescribed that we should half the recruitment of mercenaries of whatever origin, and expel, as soon as possible, aI1 those already in the Congo. I stress these words “of whatever origin” . ft would have been easy for us to eXpe1 those who were under our control; but we were also t0 seek out and expel those who might be under the control of the rebels. SO long as we are not in control of the whole of our territory, it is difficult for us t0 ComPlY fully with the obligation imposed on us by operative paragraph one. 142, cesser venance dans toute ceux qui Btaient sous notre contrôle; aussi qui auraient Aussi longtemps sur tout cuter paragraphe 143. AS regards the cessation of hostilities, whioh is referred to in operative paragraph 3, my Government and other Governments rightly pointed out that a cesse-fire could not be imposed on a Government which was coping with an armed rebellion. The 143. tionn6 ment & juste a un 144. 1 now turn to operative paragraph 5, whichdeals with the ad hoc Commission, 1 regret having to mention this Commission here, because 1 regard it as a Commission answerable to the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, to which body a.lone 1 consider myself authorized to criticize it. Nevertheless, since those whom a journalist has called the vanguard of Af-rica have discussed it, 1 feel obliged to place my own view, Iikewise, on record. 145. The ad hoc Commission received the following mandate: v@) to help and encourage the efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the restoration of national reconciliation in conformity with paragraphs 2 and 3 above; (bJ to seek by a11 possible means to bring about normal relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours, especially the Kingdom of Burundi and the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville). ” 146. With regard to the Congolese problem, the Council of Ministers wished the ad hoc Commission to visit immediately-I emphasize this last Word-the Congo (Leopoldville), Burundi and the Congo (Brazzaville). Those are the terms of the resolution. 147. ‘What did the Commission do? It hastily sent a sub-commission to Washington, while refusing to leave Nairobi and confining itself to appeals-which proved ineffectual-for the cessation of hostilities. 148. Why did it not go LoLeopoldville, as the Government has frequently invited it to do? Why did it not go to Stanleyville to ask the leaders of the revolt to cesse fighting? Why, when Ikela, Boende and other places were falling into the hands of the rebels and Coquilhatville was threatened, did the Commission make no protest? Why did it remain silent when officiais and compnny employees were being massacred by the rebels at Boende, Ikela and Stanleyville? 149. But now that Stanleyville has fallen, the rebel leaders are in disarray and thousands of combatants have laid down their arms, discouraged, disappointed and left in the lurch by their leaders-who had time to store their stocks of gold elsewhere, SO that they cari travel and live in luxury hotels-the Commission suddenly bestirs itself. Having found it unnecessary to meet since the Addis Ababa and Nairobi meetings, it convenes a meeting post-haste becauseStanleyville, the rebel stronghold, has fallen, 150. On the question of the mission to Washington, 1 should like to say that the Commission exceeded its powers by sending a sub-commission there. The Commission, of course, based its decision on opera- When this paragraph was discussed-and 1 took part in that discussion-one delegation wished to specify the States which were intervening. The Council of Ministers refused to accept this standpoint, leaving the responsibility to each country to make an appeal to the proper quarter. The Commission, turning a deaf ear to that part of its mandate from the Council, ventured to exceed its instructions and arrogated to itself the responsibility which the Council of Ministers bad specifically left to each member State. <. Mais, lors ai participe les Etats a refus8 dossant marche mandataire oreille, etait permis, son mandant, tion de chaque Etat membre. 151, Because of these variant attitudes, these illogicalities-which, 1 hope, stem from our Organization’ s youth and are consequently temporary-it Will be difficult, even within the Organization of African Unity, to reach an immediate solution to the thorny problem of the Congo. Even proposals that are excellent In theory Will be diffioult to apply within an Organization in which we are not a11 speaking the same language. 151. de l’organisation attitudes sont les conséquences sation et, par consequent, solution diat, trcuvesont cadre tous le même langage. 152. 1 regret that such a situation has arisen; but 1 must, if 1 am not to play the ostrich, draw attention to it. The solution to the Congolese problem must be found by the Congolese and by them alone, with the help of those who are willing to co-operate with tbem by respecting their sovereignty and by not trying to place their country under the trusteeship of some organization or other. 152, de l’autre, pas faire du Congo, trouver, coop&er et non en cherchant tutelle de quelque organisation 153. SC far as the ad hoc Commission is concerned, I shall stop there. 1 merely wished to explain the context in which this resolution, to which SO many speakers have referred, was adopted-especially as the text before you contained gaps which, at first glance, might have suggested that there had been some tendentious omissions, 153, mission rer B laquelle adoptee, aviez première omissions 154. 1 have listened to the previous speakers. 1 bave’ heard their references to foreign newspapers and foreign news agencies. May I follcw their example and say, in this connexion, that 1 happened to read issue No. 210 of the magazine Jeune Afrique of 13 December 1964, page 6 of which carries an article bY Simon Malley, an African journalist from Tunisia snd therefore better informed on the facts and events taking place in North Africa. Let us listen to this enlightening article. Its title is: “African reply: Direct Action in the Congo. Ten African countries declare war on TshombP. Here is the text: 154. Je les ai entendus faire des réferences Atrangers, Je me permettrai effet Jeune Afrique paru le 13 d&!embre il y a un article Tunisien, et BvBnements article action directe au Congo. - Dix pays d’Afrique la guerre un groupe derniéxe est entree la plus importante américaine conseillersw vient Wne of the ‘ultra-secret’ decisions adopted by a group of African Heads of State at the last COnferenCe Of Non-Aligned Countries at Cairo has been implemented. This is the most important result of the reCent Belgian-American intervention at Stanleyville. A battalion of military ‘experts and advisers’ cf the United Arab Republic has just left Cairo for an ‘unknown destination’ in Africa. About a hundred There is nothing conditional about this. “SO Africa has at last decided to react and to take direct action. These pioneer countries will no longer wait for ‘decisions’ by the OAUtl-the organization we are referred to for a solution-“and Will no. longer put up with the manœuvres of thosewho, Nigeria, I justify and expIain’ the Belgian-American military intervention, as the Nigerian Minister Foreign Affairs, Jaja Wachuku, recently did or as his Ambassador at the United Nations, Adebo attempted to do. “Secret conference.-It was at Cairo, at the suggestion of Modibo Keita andBenBella, that a number ) of African Heads of State Present forthe Conference of Non-Aligned Countries decided to hold a secret meeting, about which no newspaper in the world’ has yet given any details or even reported it took place”-a question of priority. “The purpose of this ‘conference within a conference’ was define the ‘concrete’ measures to be taken, in the i: months ahead, te tope withthe conspiracy threatening the Congo, ?Chose taking part in this ’ council of war’, SO to speak, w ere Nasser, Ben Bella, Modibo Keita, S6kou Tour& Nkrumah, Nyerere, Kenyatta and Massemba- Debat.” 1 continue: nConclusions.-TwO main conclusions were reached.” There is no conditional clause here. “First, the survival of Tshombe’s regime in the Congo constitutes a threat to every African State, and particularly to those whose revolutionary progressive r6gimes are a source of concern the Western Powers. Once it was consolidated had got rid of the ‘rebels’, the Tshombé régime would quickly becorne a connter-revolutionary from which a11 the plots hatched against ‘undesirable’ countries or regimes would radiate. Thanks to the substantial economic and militaryhelp thatl’shombe would then be able to obtain, Leopoldville wonld become a sort of fcancerr from which the evil’ could easily spread to the whole of Afrioa. That, at any rate is the analysis which was made by Massemba-Debat, Nyerere, Ben Bella and others.ll ! This is still unconditional. “At Cairo: ‘They’ are too powerful.-The second conclusion was to make long-term preparations with a view to helping the Gbenye Government clirectly and more substantially Tan in previous Cur volunteers; there was no mention of meroenaries. Nos volontaires; “Next, Nkrumah spoke at length on the Organization of African Unity: ‘It is obvious,l he said, ‘that, with things as they are at present in Africa, OAU Will not be able to take positive unanimous or quasi-unanimous action. Qur opponents are too powerful, and have too many ways of sabotaging efforts designed to save OAU from paralysis. Accordingly, if we cannot achieve unanimity, what is there to prevent us from co-ordinating a policy among those who are determined to defend our continent against plots hatched abroad and t tolerated’ by certain people within the continent’ .It “Ce fut ensuite de l’OUA: ne r&ussira de l’Afrique d’unanimitg sont de saboter de la paralysie. possible, une politique défendre notre continent de l’extérieur rieur. II 155, Having heard the account given in this article by someone who cannot be aocused of being biased or ill-informed, the Council may feel itself to have been enlightened. 155. Aprés article tialit8 s’estimer 156. There is also an Agence France-Presse dispatch from Khartoum, dated 2 December 1964, which, quoting the officia1 news agency of the Sudan, says: “The Government of Khartoum has authorized members of the Congol2se opposition who have taken refuge in the Sudan to undertake military training on its territory. 156, A ceci s’ajoute Presse oitant l’agence officielle ment de Khartoum actuellement tairement 1%‘. With assumed indignation, the Head of the Ben Bella regime, who appears undefeated by his economic tangles and believes he has hit upon a Malthusian solution to his problem by trying to expert bis mercenaries to “Blacktt Africa, exolaimed: “We ehall continue to send arms and volunteers ,” 1 quote the dispatoh AFP/156. from Algiers, dated 25 November. 157. Dans Ben Bella, qui n’a pas assez des déboires ians lesquels solution malthusienne i exporter s’est écrié: ;aires lépêche 25 novembre. 158. Toutes lui se disent e dois :hercher atgralement souverain en violation :n violation levant vous jouer e Conseil le ceux dont les armées iyrie, 158; Al1 these statements corne from people who claim to be concerned about peace in Africa. 1 must *aY that this is a strange way of seeking peace. They take it upon themselves to intervene unilaterally in the damestic affairs of a sovereign country, inviolation of the United Nations Charter and of the Charter of *AU, and then they corne to the Security Council PlaYing the role of innocent lambs. I hope that the CoUnCil Will not be taken in by the manœuvres of those whose armies have been seen in Yemen, in SYria, in Saudi Arabia, in Kuwait, in Algeria and 159. Of course, the reply Will be that these are inter-Arab affairs, in which 1, as a non-Arab, have no business to intervene. Truc enough, butwhy are they intervening in the affairs of non-Arab Africa? 1 do not have to tel1 you that at the last session of the General Assembly, when the African group had decided to present a proposa1 to tbe First Committee for a distribution of seats in certain United Nations bodies with certain seats reserved for Africa, a country claiming to be African surprised the group, or at least the unsuspecting members of it, by requesting a distribution which would leave a fixed number of seats to the Arab group. This is present-day Africa, the Africa in which we lead our daily lives and which some people, unfortunately, do not wish to see as it really is. My own delegation camot help but see what is obvious. 160, Some people, have thought fit to place these discussions on a racial level-which is doubtless why they have referred to the Prime Mini&er!s nonparticipation in the Cairo Summit Conferenceg and in the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries.7/ At the headquarters of OAU, situated in non-Arab territory, this problem did not arise. 161. 1 need not remind you of the vulgar way in which the Head of a Government was treated at Cairo. Under international law it is a true oasus belli. Of course, the pretext was used that diplomatie agents from Cairo had been tortured, and SO forth. As soon as I was informed about this, 1 personally saw to fie organizing of their departure. Everything proceeded in complete calm and with the strictest respect for diplomatie usage. The United Nations representative in the Congo cari testify to that. 1 myself, in agreement with the Ambassadors of the United Arab Republic and Algeria, invited him to be present, in order that no false reports on the subject should be spread. That very day, when the Embassy had both water and electricity, a foreign radio station announoed that the Algerian and Egyptian diplomats at Leopoldville had been deprived of water and electricity. No, we did not do that to our fellow-Africans, even though they were Arabs. 162. But where racism really becomes apparent is when the European and American whites are condemned for furnishing arms to an army of blacks because black soldiers are going to use them against their black brothers, 1 wonder whether the arms which the whites of North Africa are going to give to the black rebels of Stanleyville Will not be used against their black brothers? 163. That is naked racism. 1 am sorry to speak in such plain terms, but logic requires me to unmask p First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (17-21 July 1964). y Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Counrries, held in Cairo (October 1964). 164, We want to rise above such questions: we wish to be Africans, to be citizens of the world. But first we must respect ourselves, respect the human person as suoh, whatever be the colour of his skin. That is the appeal I make to a11 whites, wherever they may be, in America, Asia, Europe or Africa. 164. Nous vouions transcender voulons -être Africains, monde. Mais respecter, que soit lance & tous les blancs oil qu’ils soient, en Am&ique comme en Asie, en Europe comme en Afrique, 165. 1 corne to my conclusion. 165. J’en viens a ma conclusion. 166. The Belgian-American intervention took place with our agreement, for a humanitarian purpose and for a limited period. It came to an end on 1 December. There was nothing reprehensible about it. 166. L’intervention notre pgriode terminee. 167. The rebellion, for its part, exists; it is being dealt with from within. But it is supported by certain countries which have an interest in such disorder. The gold of Kilo-Moto is being taken from its rightful fnvner, the Congolese State: and certain foreignstates are profiting from traffic in diamonds. May 1 tel1 you the story of #an ambassador who said that bis country was the large& producer of diamonds; it is certainly the large& exporter of diamonds, but of a11 the diamonds whioh were trafficked in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Coffee is illegally exported to certain neighbouring countries whioh support the rebellion with men, arms and training faoilities, thus violating the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity concerning interference in the domestic affairs of member States. You, the guardians of the peace, ,aware that such interference is oalculated to disturb the peace, should condemn it, postulate respect for Congolese sovereignty, and proclaim the Congola capacity to find its own solution for these interna1 disputes, in accordanoe with the principles of the Charter. 167. La rébellion, résorption. qui ont intérêt SOUStrait diamant est l’objet d’un trafic Etats étrangers, anecdote d’un ambassadeur était le plus gros producteur certes, mais de tous les diamants faisant l’objet d’un trafic en République démocratique en fraude vers certains pays voisins qui ne manquent pas d’apporter armes aux dispositions de la Charte relatives d’un Etat membre, conscients nature a troubler et affirmer et sa capacité de trouver par elle-même, ment aux principes querelles 168. Quant & la référence africaine, qu’il y a menace P la paix et il faut alors convoquer le Conseil les recommandations et point alors si c’est régionale; avis, Le prestige mêmes qui devons le faire. 168. The reference to the Organization of African Unity is paradoxical. Either it is felt chat there is a threat to peace, in which oase the Council should be convened in order to make, in accordance with itS role, the desired recommendations; or else there 1s no such threat, in whiah event it is unnecessasy to convene the Council, even in order for the prestige Of a regional organization to be affirmed-which, in my VieW, iS not the Council’s role. We OUrSdVeS must look after tbe prestige of our organization. 169. Par ailleurs, que l’intervention par l’OUA imminente session quorum. 169. Moreover, there is no need to prove that the Organization of Afrioan Unity does not consider the American-Belgian intervention to be a permanent, ssrious and imminent threat to Africa. The emergency Summit meeting whioh was convoked could not take place, for want of a quorum. 170. De plus, si le Conseil de séourité doit se r8unir pour 170. Furthermore, if the Security Council had to meet in order to affirm the prestige of an orgarlization

Despite the lateness of the heur, the delegatien of the Ivory Coast considers it its duty, after the speeches we have SO far heard, to make the fóllowing statement. 173. It is most unfortunate that the problem before us should have been plaoed, wrongly, in a racial context, We might, obviously, have expected this to happen. Either in an attempt to justify the operation under discussion, or because the Press is seeking sensational news, the question has for some time been presented as a problem of CannibalisminAfrica, of whites waiting to be eaten. Thus, even before the Security Council met, an atmosphere of drama had been created, 1 am sure that the Counoil Will be able to disregard a11 this passion and reduce the problem ta its true proportions. 174, The question at issue is the normal diplomatie concept of a State’s duty to protect its citizens. That is a simple concept, uniformly accepted. The Council Will study what methods ?nd procedures should be adopte& in circumstances like these, in order to ensure the applicati& of this legal concept, which is reccgnized iti international law. Fox that purpose it Will have to set aside any subjectivè considerations. 175. In the second place, the Ivory Coast delegation is in duty bound to state that in Africa, among Africans, there cari be no question of race. When we speak of Africa or of Africans, we are speaking of a continent, We should net, in the context of the African continent, allow any sacial concept to creep into our debate. 176, Mr. SIDI BABA (Morocco) (translated from French): The Moroccan delegation is deeply grateful to the Ivory Coast representative for having set out the substance of what we intended to say when we asked for the floor. 177, The Moroccan deiegation has indeed been somewhat upset at the turn taken by the debate since this morning. We consider that the problem is limited to certain indisputable facts whioh should be the subjeot of an objective and impartial study by the Security Council. lis. 1 was a11 the more upset when 1 heard the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo indulge in a generalization and repeatedly use the term “North Afrioan whites”. It seems tO me that this generalization derives from an outlook bàsed on subjective considerations which Africa, 179. The representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, again unfortunately generalizing, even ventured to state a historical untruth when he said that the slave-trade with America was carried out through North Africa. 1 shall leave it to the historians to set matters right. We know what points in Africa most espscially interested the slave-traders whoiqok part in the hateful commerce of slave traffic between the African and the American continents. 179. Le repr&entant du Congo, toujours dans le cadre de cette lamentable généralisation, contre-V&it6 vers l’Am6rique l’Afrique de Pr&iser points de l’Afrique intéressé les négriers qui se livraient au détestable commerce qu’est le trafic du continent africain vers le continent amgricain. 180. 1 must also say that Morooco, as an African country situated in the north of Africa, has never accepted and never Will accept the idea that a subjective concept based on race has any influence in our country’s policy, either at the international or at the African level. 180. Je dois également dire que le Maroo, en sa qualité de pays africain situé dans la partie septentrionale de l’Afrique, n’a jamais accepté et n’acceptera jamais que la notion subjective fbnd6e sur la race ait une valeur quelconque dans le comportement de notre pays, soit sur le plan international, le plan africain. 181, Unfortunately, however, the enemies of African emancipation and development have, as we know , always sought to introduce divisive elements through ideas having not only a racial but also a tribal and regional basis; that is the most negative and most dangerous tactic used by colonialism against Africa. 181. Cependant, et cela est malheureux, les ennemis de l’bmancipation africain introduire notions ayant une base non seulement raciale, mais aussi tribale plus négatif et le plus dangereux que le colonialisme utilise contre l’Afrique. 182. I also feel the duty to say that Africa, as we could see when petitioners appeared before the Trusteeship Council, is a single entity; there are not two Afrioas. Ws most strenuously oppose any attempt’ to create several Africas. 182, J’ai aussi le devoir de dire que l’Afrique - nous avons pu le constater lorsque les pétitionnaires se sont pr6sentés devant le Conseil de tutelle - est une Afrique unique; il n’y a pas deux Afriques. Nous nous opposons de -la-fagon la plus vigoureuse & toutes les tentatives qui consistent à faire plusieurs Afriques. 183. Because of a combination of.historioal circumstances, certain countries and regions of Afrioa were, in our view, the first to play an important role in the struggle for national liberation and against colonial domination in Africa. 1 hope no one Will criticize them on account of that role. If anyone does SO, it cari assuredly be only one of those who have, fortunately, been evictedfrom Africa-pne of thosewho for SO long exploited the peoples of Africain the most odious and unforgivable way, through the slave-trade, the exploitation of human beings, or economic and Political exploitation. 1 think the greatest Service that cari be rendered to-Africa is for no African-whoever’ he is, even if he deserves to be called African only beoause of his colour-to make, either on the African or on the international plane, statements suoh as those unfortunately made, a few minutes ago, by the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 183, Nous considérons qu’il se trouve, en raison d’un certain nombre de concours de qirconstances historiques, d’Afrique ont &k les premiers à jouer le raie primordial dans la lutte de libiiration nationale et dans la lutte contre la domination coloniale en Afrique. ,J’esp&e qu’on ne leur reprochera pas le rôle qu’ils ont pu jouer B cet égard. Et, si quelqu’un peut se permettre à coup sQr que l’un de ceux qui, heureusement, ont étk évincés d’Afrique, longtemps, ont exploité les peuples d’Afrique de la manière la plus odieuse et la plus impardonnable, soit sous la forme de trafic des esclaves, soit la forme d’exploitation la forme d’exploitation crois que le plus grand service & rendre à l’Afrique, c’est de ne plus entendre un Africain, même s’il ne mkrite ce qualificatif que par sa couleur, prononcer, The meeting rose at 1.55 p.m, HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications may distributors throughout the Write to: United Nations, Sales COMMENT SE PROCURER LES Les publications des Nations Unies agences dépositaires du monde entier. ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de las Naciones casas distribuidoras en todas partes dirijase a: Naciones Ut-ridas, Seccion Litho in U.N. Price: $U.S. 0.50 (or equivalent in other currencies)