S/PV.1174 Security Council

In accordance with the decision previously taken by the Council, 1 shall, if there is no objection, invite Lhe representatives of the Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, Belgium, Congo (Brazzaville), Algeria, Mali, the 1. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l’espagnol) : Conformement & la dt5cision prise pr&&lemment et s’il n’y a pas d’abjections, repr&entants de la Belgique, du Congo (Brazzaville), du Mali, de la République démocratique du Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, the At the invitation of the President, Mr. M. A. Mahgoub (Sudan), Mr. M, Achkar (Guinea), Mr. K. Botsio (Ghana), Mr. W. Loridan (Belgium), Mr. C. D. Ganao (Congo (Brazzaville)), Mr. C. Cuellal (Algeria), Mr. 0. Ba (Mali), Mr. T. Idzumbuir (Democratic Republic of the Congo), Mr. J. A. Wachuku (Nigeria), Mr. M. El-Kony (United Arab Republic), M’r. J. Mbazumutima (Burundi), Mr. 0. Odongo (Kenya) and Mr. A. Guimali (Central African Republic) took the places reserved for them in front of the Council table,

Mr. President, allow me to thank you and the members of the Council for giving me this opportunity to intervene to explain the reasons for which my Government has felt from the very beginning that the military intervention launched by the Governments of Belgium and the United States of America, with the concurrence of the United Kingdom Government, in Stanleyville on 24 November 1964 should be examined by thesecurity Council. 3. First, we consider that this military action constitutes a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and is in complete defiance of the very purposes of the world Organization itself. It is no longer admissible in present international relations to implement a policy based on the use of force regardless of the justification of such a policy. The Foreign ‘Minister of Belgium admitted in his speech last Friday [1173rd meeting] that he knew the seriousness of the decision that his Government had taken, and that it woulcl encounter international opposition. But we disagree with him completely when he said that the military operation in Stanleyville would only provoke opposition in the form of statements on colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism. 4. It is the military aspect of the operation and its threat to peaoe and security in Africa, with a11 its grave, world-wide repercussions, that prompted my country, together with many others, to bring the situation to the Security Counoil. 5. Imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism constitute a basic source of international tension and conflict because they endanger world peaoe and security. 6. The third reason which prompted my country to bring this question to the Security Counoil is that it constitutes an intervention in the interna1 affairs of Africa. 7. The Heads of States and Governments of African countries assembled more than a year ago deolared that: II . . . “Convinced that in order to translate this determination into a dynamic force in the cause of human progress, “--unanimously agreed that-“conditions for peace and secuxity must be established and maintained, “Determined to safeguard and consolidate the hardwon independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integxity of our States, “-and unanimously decided-“to fight against neo-colonialism in a11 its forms. ” 8, On safeguarding our sovexeignty and consolidating oux hard-won independence, we are united in determination. Al1 Africans are dedicated to fighting against colonialism and neo-colonialism. Of peace and secuxity in our continent we axe a11 staunch defenders, TO the welfare and well-being and total advancement of our populations we are a11 aspiring. 8, de durement & lutter Nous et de la s6curit6 tous au bien-être 9. The Organization of African Unity is Young and the problems it is facing axe complex. If ourorganization is to survive-and we have every reason to believe it Will-it must learn to function as a positive voice in Afxican affaixs. It canonly progress when it has a11 the co-operation of its members and if it is spared the transgression of Powers outside Africa. 9. et les problémes Pour toutes apprendre les qu’avec si exthrieures 10. For, my brother of the Demooratic Republic of the Congo, whether we are “strange brotherst’,or “whites of the North”, we are ail. bouncl to live together, and we have only one commonpurpose andobjective-tolivein freedom, eyuality, dignity, and self-respect, In the words of the President of the nineteenthsessionof the General Assembly, we nare conscious of our ancient roots. We dxaw strength and inspiration from our glorious past, from the efflorescence of the powexful and enIightenedcivilization along the banks of the lifegiving Nile, from the famous institutions of advanced studies in Timbuktu and fxom the gloxious existence of Ethiopia” y and, if 1 may add, from the glorious past of the Kingdoms of the Congo. There is no cal1 to mention cannibalism or to open a briefcase full of horrors. 10. du Congo, fibres” appel& objectif dans la dignité le disait dix-neuvième l’anciennete et I’Bpanouissement rée qui fleurit dans les &&bres de Tombouctou l’Ethiopie”g, dans n’y d’ouvrir 11. The Foreign Minister of Belgium, every time he cornes to the United Nations in a crisis to defend his country’s policies, whether in the Congo or Rwanda and Burundi, presents us with a,n ultimatum stressingthat Belgium has been told just to wash its hands of the Congo, or Rwanda, whatever the case, and to allow the iocal people to fight each other. With a11 our esteem for the Foreign Minister of Belgium, we cari only tel1 him that he cannot afford to wash his hands of the Congo. However, a11 we want is that Belgium, or, for that matter, any Power dealing with Africa shouldcarry on a polioy based on equality andrespect for the independence of African countxies. 11. gique, de son pays du Congo, un ultimatum se laver au Rwanda, locales que nous gères peut pas se permettre Quoi c’est ‘/ Officia1 Records of the General Assembly. Nineteenth Session, Pkary Meetings, 1286th meeting, para. 23. u session, 13. The twenty-two countries which alerted the Security Council to this grave situation belong to one category of nations, namely, the developing countries, and nothing cari be more harmful to the interests of the developing nations than a threat to internationalpeace and security. Nothing indeed cari spoil the spirit of international co-operation, which is SO desired by the developing nations, more than an encroachment on their independence and sovereignty. Finally, nothing cari really harm the interests of the industrialized countries more than to act in defiance of the established rules of international behaviour, the more SO when it is done in seeking unjustified, selfish ends. 14. The Foreign Minister of Belgium does not need to be reminded of the damage caused to foreign relations as a result of the Suez aggression, and we are sure that the repercussions of the Stanleyville operation are already SO grave that it Will need an enormous effort to repair the harm that has been done. 15. Before coming to the Council it was never our intention, and still is not, to bring the whole Congolese question for discussion. The memorandum attached to our letter of 1 December 1964 [S/6076],q is selfexplanatory and relates solely to the foreign military intervention in Stanleyville. It is necessary to affirm our belief that the Congolese problem, as any other problem, belongs to the very people concerned, in this case the Congolese people. It was only on the request of the Government of the Congo that the question was brought to the attention of the Organization of African Unity, which we believe is theproper forum and appropriate institution to discuss the question-with, of course, the consent of the Congolese Government. 16. TO our regret, the Poreign Minister of Belgium and the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo deemed it fit to bring the whole question to the attention of the Council. 17. Although we believe that the statement of the Foreign Minister of Belgium was informative, we find it very misleading in some aspects, andwith your indulgence, 1 intend to comment briefly. 18. The Foreign Minister of Belgium said that the aim of the Stanleyville operation had been to save the lives of some 1,500 to 2,000 hostages who were being held 2/ Officia1 Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year, Suppl+ ment for Occobcr, Nmber and Eecember 1964. 19. The Foreign Minister said that he had strong reason to believe, in deciding upon the timing of the landing on the morning of 24 November 1964, that the executions would take place on that very day, because the Congolese Army was advancing towards Stanleyville1 and was expected to reach it by that time. But the facts show that the unfortunate killings of the foreign citizens took place only when theparatroopers started to land and not when the Congolese Army reached the town of Stanleyville. 19. qu’il fixe vembre, méme, et devant montrent étrangers ont commencé golaise 20. The Foreign Minister certainly knows that under such circumstances, to achieve a military objective, au air drop is usually essential toprecede the advance of the ground armed forces. The militaryplanningand preparations which preceded the operation are a further proof of the military purpose ofthis intervention. 20. sans nécessaire. de faire forces pré&dé jectif 21. The Foreign Minister of Belgium emphasizedhis keen efforts to work out a conciliation between the various political factions in the Congo. He went even further to break for the first time the secret news that he met with Mr. Gbenye and counselled him. Was it not possible for the Foreign Minister, with a11 his conccrn for the lives of the innocent patriots and others, to impress upon Mr. Tshombé, with whom he undoubtedly has much stronger relations, to delay the advance of the Congolese Army for even a few days until a11 the foreigners, at least those who wished to go, had been evacuated? 21. de concilier Il a même révél8 pour la premi&re contré Ne lui btait-il ainsi d’autres avec lequel il entretient beaucoup l’avance les étrangers, soient 22. If the Foreign Minister considered the situation as grave as he did, why did he net cal1 for an urgent meeting of the Security Council? Or has he lost faith in this body, despite his assertion that his Government wants to work with the United Nations? 22. la: situation d’urgence en cet organe, laquelle l’Organisation 23. The Foreign Minister of Belgium seems to blame a11 African countries, but he was specific in charging certain African countries with gross accusations, He said that my country and certain others haa failed to endorse a plan for the reorganizatioa of the Congolese Army. But let me put the record straight. We objected to that plan at the time as a member of the Advisory Committee on the Congo, because we felt that the United Nations could not and should not serve as an umbrella for implementing policies of the NATO countries in the Congo. Our objection was based on a fundamental principle that United Nations peacekeeping operations must not be exploited in a way to serve the purpose of a certain military grouping. 23. gique semble blâmer tous les pays africains mais contre certains &organisation permis Bleve des objections consultatif que nous Unies pour permettre quer laient du principe tions Nations servir 24. Perhaps it is useful to bring to light to the Belgian Foreign Minister the fact that the United Arab Republic was the first African country to send, upon the request 24. du Ministre le 25. It is unfortunate that Mr. Spaak still believes that the main source of trouble in the Congo is the failuse to maintain law and order. This, of course, is a gross simplification of the situation which suits certain policies and interests. The danger of such a thesis is that as long as there is no law and order hi the Congo, then foreign intervention is admissible whether it is to safeguard the interests or to save lives of the foreign citizens, mainly Belgian. 26. No single African country, if called upon to contribute to building a strong Congolese national army, Will hesitate to do SO, but African countries see the solution of the Congo problem in a different light. 27. In fact the OAU has already started towork out a peaceful solution, Had the OAU and its ad hoc Commission been given the time and good Will on the part of a11 concerned, it could have achieved its purpose. Had the same Powers which intervened with their troops in Stanleyville refrained from such action and similar actions preceding this operation, the OAU could have engaged itself in serious efforts aimed at bringing about a policy of reason and conciliation, 28. The civil strife and the instability whichprevails today in the Congo results directly from a systematic policy of foreign intervention by Powers from outside Africa. This policy of intervention has continued ever since the Congo attained its independence. Had the Congolese people been left free to exercise their own independence from the outset, they would have been spared a great deal of suffering and neither would this Organization have been called upon to devote SO many efforts and resources, which today seem to have been in vain. 29. The Security Council resolutions of 14 July, 22 July, 9 August 1960 [S/4387, S/4405, S/4426], 21 21 February [S/4741],41 and 24 November 1961 [S/5002],9 as well as theGeneralAssemblyresolution 11474 (ES-IV)] of 20 September 1960, were either calling on Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo or requesting certain States to refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Congo, 30. Everyone knows the countries which are still intervening in the Congo. In fact, the some 500 mercenaries which spearheaded Congolese troops corne mostly from South Africa, Rhodesia and Belgium.3 3/ Ibid., Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960. 4/ Ibid., Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, Februaryand March 1961 -.-.-.2 s/ Ibid., Supplemenr for October, November and December 1961. ++This is common knowledge in the Congo, but Brussels still contends that Mr. Vandewalle is a nonoperational ‘military -viser’ to Mr. Tshombé., . . In reality, Mr. Vandewalle has been given the rank of colonel and is the man who shapes mercenary strategy. Al1 mercenaries, including Major Michael Hoare+s South Africans and Rhodesians, are responsible directly to Mr. Vandewalle, who in turn reports to Major-General Joseph D. Mobutu, Chief of Staff of the Congolese Army.++ In another report of the same paper dated4 December 1964, it states: Dans “Reliable sources [in Leopoldville] reported today that 100 to 150 mercenaries from South Africa and Rhodesia had been recruited to reinforce Major Michael Hoare’s Fifth Brigade of mercenaries in Stanleyville, the former capital of the Congolese rebels. Major Hoare’s second-in-command, Captain Alistair Wicks, was sent to Johannesburg today to assemble the new recruits. The contingent is expected to arrive here within 10 days. Unoonfirmed reports said that 500 additional mercenaries were being recruited in Belgium and in other European countries++. 31. What are these mercenaries doingbesides the socalled pacification task which has resulted in the killing of thousands of innocent Congolese, and here 1 am quoting a certain Reverend Adolf MartinBormann, who happened to be in Stanleyville: +‘They broke into our missions, took everything they liked and pillaged the native villages )+. 31. tendue tsche sacre un pasteur, trouvait nos ont mis au pillage 32. These are the same mercenaries with respect to whom the Security Council, in its resolution of 21 Pebruary 1961 [S/4741], called upon a11 States to take immediate and energetic measures to prevent from departing from their territories for the Congo and to deny transit and other facilities to them. These are the same mercenaries whom Mr. TshombB promisecl would be ousted, and whom Mr. Spaak said his Government had no control over. Yet recruiting of adclitional mercenaries is continuing. 32. desquels du 21 février Etats giques pour empêcher pour facilites mercenaires expulser selon recrutement 33. As for sending arms and equipment to Mr. Tshombg, reports are numerous and facts are evident. As far back as 21 August 1964, Time magazine published the following: 33. ment ?3. M. Tshombé, et les faits hebdomadaire ++Off to Leopoldville last week winged four C/l30 Hercules Transports. . . , Aboard the bigplanes were 44 hand-picked United States paratroopers equipped with jeeps, bazookas, grenade launchers, and machine guns. . . D The United States has given TshombB+s army about 10 C47 transport planes, 10 helicopters, 70 jeeps, 250 trucks, and 7 of the lubiquitous] little T28 trainers that have proved SO useful on strafing and bombing missions against + 7 34. Early in June of this year, under the title, “Whose war in the Congo?“, The New York Times offered these comments: “The State Department has been showing a salutary sense of shock over the news, which curiously it was among the last to know, that American civilians were flying combat missions for the Congolese Government against rebels in Kivu Province. It looks like one of these cases where the left hand did not know what the right was doing.” 35. My Government is clistressed and alarmed, and 1 believe we are entitled to ask these questions: What do the Governments of the United States, Belgium, South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia want for the Congo, and indeed for a11 of Africa? Do they want turmoil and bloodshed, or do they want instead peace and prosperity for the Congolese and a11 of Africa? 36. Let us examine our conscience and face thesituation. On 21 September of this year, the ad hoc Commission called on the United States Government to withdraw a11 its military supplies, equipment and men from the Congo. A special African delegation flew to Washington to appeal to President Johnson for an immediate end to American military support for Mr. Tshombé. 37. The Commission believed that American withdrawal was essential before peace could be restored in the troubled Congo. Before the departure of the special delegation to Washington, the Prime Minister of Kenya declared in Nairobi that a similar delegation might be sent to other countries. He also said that “we are trying to persuade our friends ancl those interested in the Congo to refrain from supplying war materials to the Congolese’. It must be emphasized that this decision and these steps were taken after four Stanleyville leaders had appeared before the Commission, The appeal of the Prime Minister of Kenya enclorsed, by a11 of Africa, was not heeded and the delegation of the ad hoc Commission returned chagrined and frustzatecl because of the lack of response from the United States Government. 38. 1 corne now to the letter of the representative of the Congo dated 9 December [S/6096] 6; containing a message from Mr. Tshombé to the Presiclent of the Security Council. The procedural debate which precedecl the adoption of the agenda of the first Council meeting on this question [11’70th meeting] was ample enough to show the nature of this move. It is no secret that efforts were macle to prevent a meeting of the Security Council which hsd initially been requestedby sixteen countries since the first of this month. When 6/ Ibid., Nineteenth Year, Supplement I~I’ Jctnber, November and -. - A.- December 1964. 39. Mr. President, you may have noticed that the United Arab Republic delegation did not request from the very beginning to intervene in the present debate because of our belief that the African Foreign Ministers would present also on our behalf the case of the recent aggression in the Congo, as in fact they did, truly and ably. However, after the Council received the letter dated 9 Decembe.r 1964, we thought it fit to take part in the debate lest our silence be construed as an acquiescence to whatever falsifications may corne from the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 39. que la df%gation pas demandé tout au d8but Bintervenir debat parce que nous pensions bien que les Ministres des affaires notre nom Bgalsment, au Congo, tr8s reçu la lettre qu’il que acceptation pourrait démocratique 40. The members of the Council, 1 think, by now have had enough time to appraise his intervention and SO far as the United Arab Republic is concerned it is evident that the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was extremely embarrassed. He had no documentation or arguments to support his Government% allegations embodied in his letter, except to weary the Council with an article in the Jeune Afrique magazine, 40. maintenant vention, que le repr&entant du Congo était extrêmement ni assertions lettre, dont le Conseil 41. As a representative of a responsible Government and with every respect to the Council and its members, we do not propose to be tempted or clragged by his endeavours to divert the attention of the Council from the followingpoints: first, there was a naked aggression committed by Belgium and supported by its allies, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and against its objectives; second, by this military intervention the aggressors were hitting deep in the heart of the Organization of African Unity, its charter, and were hindering a11 the efforts and aspirations of the Africans to free themselves from colonization. This is the crux of the whole question. Belgium, by this aggression did not want only to suppress the national movement, but also assert its colonial position in the affairs and future of the Congo. 41. responsable au Conseil pas tenter l’attention ment, la Belgique, une agression Nations deuxi8mement, agresseurs sation de l’unit8 africaine tous leurs C’est Belgique, supprimer sa position du Congo. 42. In this no African country cari concur. The independent Congo should be left alone. There is the machinery which the African countries themselves established and a11 difficulties should be taokled and solved through this machinery-the Organization of Afrioan Unity-and the United Nations. My only answer to the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is that the United Arab Republic is proud of its record concerning the Congo in the United 42. Congo ingérence. africains mediaire africaine difficultes seule r8ponse la Rhpublique blique Nations Nations. 43. TO refresh his memory, we have sponsored practically a11 the resolutions in the Council and the Assembly which tried, in vain, to solve the Congolese problem. Similarly, the United Arab Republic, through the Organization of African Unity, exerted and is still exerting every effort to support the objectives of 43. nous rEsolutions ces probleme unie, 44. The United Arab Republic, and 1 believe a11 African countries, adhere to these basic principles. What we are asking from the foreign Powers is that from time to time they should not stifle our efforts by naked aggression under any pretext whatsoever. This is why we firmly believe that the Security Council in its wisdom should not let this aggressionpass without condemnation. The Council must deplore the recurrent use of mercenaries and cal1 on the Governments concerned strictly to apply the Council’s previous resolution of 21 February, and in particular paragraph 3 thereof. The Council may find it necessary to cal1 upon the Organization of African Unity to continue its efforts to bring about a national reconciliation in the Congo, It would be encouraging if the Council would appeal to a11 Governments concerned to extend their full co-operation and assistance to the Organization of African Unity to bring the situation to normalcy. 45, In concluding, 1 have nothing to add to what the representatives of the Ivory Coast and Morocco have said [1173rd meeting], except that Africa Will stay united and the African people Will attain their goals in spite of a11 the efforts which are deployed against fulfilling the ultimate aspirations of the Africans. An independent, united Africa would be a pillar and an asset to a peaceful and a prosperous world. Let us ail work towards this end.

Before I comment on the subject on the agenda, there is something that 1 must say about some of the speeches that 1 listened to here last week. 1 am glad that a whole week-end has intervened, and I hope that this pause in our proceeding has somewhat restored my perspective. 47. In the last few days, the United States has been variously accused-ancl I quote from the transcripts of OUT proceedings-of “wanton military aggression”, of “premeditated aggression”, of plotting a humanitarian mission as a “pretext” for military intervention, of a “nefarious action” designed “to exterminate the black inhabitants”, of “inhumanitarianism”, of a “wanton and deliberate massacre of Congolesepeople”, of rra murclerous operationt’, of a “premeditated and cold-blooded act”, that “the hostagés’ lives were not the real concern of the aggressors” of a “crude subterfuge”, of ltmassive cannibalismll, of having killed Lumumba “with cynicism and premeditation”, of genocide against an entire people, of being caught “red-handed”, of using the United Nations as a 48. And that is net all. We have also heard words in this Chamber either charging or implying that the United States Government was an accomplice to the death of Dag Hammarskjold-and even the assassinatien of President Kennedy, 48. dans selon aurait et ml?me dans l’assassinat 49. 1 have served in the United Nations from the day of its inception off and on for seven years. But never before have 1 heard suoh irrational, irresponsible, insulting and repugnant language in these Chambersand Ianguage used, if you please, contemptuously to impugn and slander a gallant and successful effort to save human lives of many nationalities and colours. 49. j’ai particip8 Epoques, entendu auparavant irresponsable, cette pour couronné de nombreuses 50. But even SUC~ a torrent of abuse of my country is of no consequence compared to the spectre of racial antagonism and conflict raised in this Chamber. 1, personally, need no credentials as a spokesman for racial equality and social justice in this country, and the Government of this country needs none in the world. Yet, at a time when a11 responsible men and Governments are trying to erase every vestige of racial antagonism, when racism has become an ugly word in a11 nations, we hear its ominous undertonesin the United Nations, 50, mon pays de l’antagonisme ici. créance et de, la justice ment pourtant, tous disparaître le mot langues, aux Nations 51. entre depuis fautes blanc toutes u’ne offense des d’encourager des libertes de race, 51, 1 say that racial hatred, racial strife, hascursed the world for too long. 1 make no def&ce of the sins of the white race in this respect. But the antidote for white racism is not blackracism. Racismin any form, by anybody, is an offence to the conscience of mankind and to the Charter of the UnitedNations, whioh enjoins US to promote and encourage “respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for a11 without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”. 52. et de haine, avons representants le tactiques ont altéré soulagement declarations et du Maroc, de la lutte entièrement 52. The verbal violence, the mistrust, the hatred, the malign accusations that we have heard from a few representatives of African nations is not, 1 fear, just an echo of the language and thetactics of the cold war. which for SO long corrupted international discourse, And 1 heard with relief the statements of last Friday by the representatives of the Ivory Coast and Morocco, deploring the introduction into our debates of racial strife and hatred. We share profoundly their concern. 53. We had hoped that the era of racial discrimination which has poisoned the atmosphere of Africa was coming to an end. It is precisely because the policy of apartheid in South Africa is inconsistent with the 53. raciale allait politique 55. The Government of Congo (Brazzaville) has, for well over a year, encouraged and supported rebellion against the legitimate Government of Congo (Leopoldville) under President Kas a-Vubu, Prime Minister Adoula, and Prime Minister TshombB. It is precisely the rebellion supported by Congo (Brazzaville) and other States, which has been responsible for the massacre, often in atrocious circumstances, of thousands of Congolese civilians, for the most part local leaders and intellectuals formerly associated with the Adoula Government. And yet the Foreign Minister of Congo (Brazzaville) has without foundation accused the United States and Belgium of killing “thousands and thousands of Congolese It in the recent rescue operation. 56. The Council has heard the sober, factual account of that operation by the Foreign Minister of Belgium. In fact, only a very small number of rebels was killed as a consequence of that operation, and these only in self-defence or because they were at the moment resisting attempts to rescue the hostages. The grim story of thousands of innocent civilians-many ofthem foreign-illegally seized, brutalized and threatened, and many murdered by rebels against the Congo Government, has already been related to this Council. 57. Every means-legal, moral and humane, including the United Nations-was exhausted to protect their lives and secure their release, and a11 without avail. When it became apparent that there was no hope, the Belgian and American Governments, with the cooperation of the Government of the United Kingdom, and with the express authorization of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, undertook an emergency rescue mission to save the lives of these people. 58. The operation was carriedout with restraint, with courage, with discipline, and with dispatch. In four days, 2,000 people-Europeans, Americans, Africans, and Asians-were rescued and evacuated to safe territory. These included Americans, Britons, Belgians, Pakistanis, Indians, Congolese, Greeks, French, Dutch, Germans, Canadians, Spaniards, Portuguese, Swiss and Italians; as well as citizens of Ghana, Uganda, Ethiopia and the United Arab Republic. 59. The mission lasted four days îrom first to last and left the Stanleyville area the day its ta& ended; it returned immediately to Belgium; the episode is finished. 60. Yet the memorandum 18/6076] from certain African States supporting the request for this meeting charges that the United States and Belgium, in defiance of Article 52 of the Charter, and as a cleliberate affront 61. The United States emphatically denies the charges ‘made in this memoranclum and in the debate. We have no apologies to make to any State appearing before this Council. We are proud of our part in saving human lives imperilled by the rebellion in the Congo. de la discussion. Nous n’avons aucune excuse Zi présenter a aucun Etat pr&ent sommes fiers, vies humaines mises en péril par la rbbellion au Congo, 62. The United States took part in no operation with military purposes in the Congo. 62. Les Etats-Unis n’ont pris part au Congo a aucune opération ayant un but militaire, 63. We violated no provision of the United Nations Charter. 63. la Charte des Nations Unies. 64. Notre action n’a pas constitu8 une menace 2 la paix et B la sécurite; elle n’a étB en aucune façon un affront - délibéré ou non - pour l’Organisation de l’unité africaine, et elle n’a nullement constitua une intervention africaines. 64, Our action was no threat to peace or to security; it was not an affront-deliberate or otherwise-to the OAU; and it constituted no intervention in Congolese or African affairs. 65. This mission was exactly what we said it was when we notified this Council at the very beginning [S/6062]2-nothing more and nothing less than a mission to save the lives of innocentpeopleof diverse nationalities, many of whom were teachers, doctors, and missionaries who had devoted their careers to selfless service to the Congolese people. 1 say that to anyone willing to consider the facts-in good faiththat must be clear. TO anyone who Will face the facts, unobstructed by hatred for Tshombé or for the Congo or for Belgium, or for the United States or for the United Kingdom, that must be clear. 65. Cette mission a BtB exactement ce que nous avons dit qu’elle etait lorsque nous en avons averti le Conseil, des le début [S/60623]: ni plusni moins qu’une mission chargée de sauver les vies d’innocentes personnes de diverses nationalités, dont nombre d’entre elles étaient des professeurs, des médecins et des missionnaires qui avaient consacré leur carrière au service désin& ressé du peuple congolais. J’affirme voudront examiner les faits de bonne foi verront ces choses clairement. Tous ceux qui s’en tiennent faits, non deformés par la haine de TshombB, ou du Congo, de la Belgique, des Etats-Unis ou duRoyaume- Uni, verront ces choses clairement. 66. Notre premi8re obligation Btait de protbger les vies de citoyens américains, mais nous sommesfiers que cette mission ait pu sauver tant cle personnes innocentes, appartenant 2 18 autres nationalitbs, qui se trouvaient 66. While our primary obligation was to protect the lives of American citizens, we are proud that the mission rescued SO many innocent people 01 eighteen other nationalities from their dreadful predicament. We mourn the thousands of others-Congolese and foreign-already sacrificed in the prececlingmonths of the horrible civil strife in this tortured country. And we urge a11 nations to appeal for the s afety of those who remain in danger. Nous et Etrangers, d8jh sacrifiés dans les mois precédents dans l’horrihle pays torturé. Nous demandons instamment 2 toutes nations de lancer un appel pour la sécurit8 de ceux qui sont encore en danger. 71 Ibid 4 69. Let me therefore speak to that point. 70. For months before the rescue mission was discussed, let alone undertaken, diplomatie efforts had been pursued through every conceivable channel to persuade the rebels to release the hostages. 71. Conscious of the legal and humanitarian issues at stake, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the ad hoc Commission of the Organization of African -- Unity, the Government of the Congo, and various other Governments, including African Governments, made repeated efforts to secure the rights and releaseof the hostages for three long, anxious and frustrating months. Every available avenue was tried; every appsoach was ignored or rejected by the insurgents; and in the process, the Red Cross, the World Health Organization and the United Nations were vilified by the military leaders of the rebels as “espionage organizations in the service of the neo-colonialists”. These are the exact words used by the so-called general, Olenga, in a mesgage on 3 September 1964. This accusation was also repeatedly broadcast by Stanleyville radio. 72. For some days before 23 November it was difficuit ta be sure who was in charge in Stanleyvilleor indeed whether aayone was in control. It was impossible to know whether any agreement that might be made with any alleged representative of the rebels could in fact be carried out. 73. Nonetheless, when the possibility arose, through the good offices of the Chairman of the ad hoc Commission of the Organization of African Unity, ofa meeting with a representative of the rebels in Nairobi on 21 November, my Government immediately named its Ambassador to Kenya, Mr. William Attwood, to represent it for the purpose of discussing the safety of the hostages. 74. Mr. Thomas Kanza, who wns said to represent the rebels, did not appear. Instead, on that day, 21 November, the Stanleyville radio, spokesman for the rebel forces, suggested that the hostages be burned alive or massacred with machetes and “devourecln. 75. On the following day, 22 November, the rebel representntive belatedly did appear in Nairobi and a meeting was subsequently held with Ambassador Attwoocl on 23 November. The rebel spokesman, however, refusecl to address the problem of the release of the hostages on its humanitarian merits; he persisted in C~~OLIS efforts to barter their lives for 77. The rebel representative categorically refused the request of Ambassador Attwood to make a public oominitment with respect to the safety of the hostages. 78. When Ambassador Attwood reported this refusai and we continued to receive threats of imminent execution of the hostages, it was clear to my Government that a11 hope had run out and that time was short. 79. & that very moment, five members of the American consular staff in Stanleyville, who had been held in illegal captivity for three months, during which time they were repeatedly beaten, were under threat of public execution. 80. Similarly held was Dr. Paul Carlson, charged with being a spy, in spite of a11 the evidence that he was a dedicated medical missionary working solely to relieve human suffering among the Congolese, inclucling the rebels. Day by day his imminent execution was announced to the world. 81. The fate that awaited these men and thehundreds of other hostages-men, women and children-was clearly foreshadowed by the atrocious execution of Congolese officiais, describecl to LIS by the representative of the Democratic Repuhlic of the Congo, and by the public statement oî the rebel leader, Christophe Gbenye, read to us by the Foreign Minister of Belgium, that “we Will make our fetishes with the hearts of the Americans and Belgians, and we Will dress ourselves in the Belgians’ and Americans’ skins” [11’73rd meeting, para. 301. 82. 1 have heard in this Council, nevertheless, the astonishing thesis that nothing needed to be done, that the threats were not real. 1 heard it asked whether it was “net a sad fact that the hostages were killed only after the paratroopers landed”, and then heard it asserted that it was l’well known that no Europeans had been executed”. 83. The threats were very real indeed; they hadbeen carriecl out in the past and we had every reason to expect that they would continue to be carried out in the future. From mid-August onwarcl after the rebel forces had taken Stanleyville, seizing and holcling foreigners as hostages became a cleliberate act of rebel policy, and in the following months this mediaeval practice was widely applied. Many of those hostages were cleliberately killecl. By the time the Belgian paratroopers arrived in Stanleyville, ancl before the outlaws even knew of their impending arrival, the 84. During this period of many months before the rescue mission arrived in Stanleyville, the rebels not only murdered these foreigners but systematically slaughtered local Congolese officia&, police, teachers, intellectuals, members of opposing political groups, labour leaders and rank-and-file members of labour unions, who were considered unreliable or even undesirable by their captors. The exact number of Congolese SO liquidated may never be known, but it had reached thousands long before 24 November. 85. In case there is still any doubt in anyone’s mind that the rescue of the hostages was a matter of life and death, members of the Council may findof interest this photostatic copy of a telegram from General Olenga to Major Tshenda in Kindu, dated 30 September 1964. It says this: “Major Tshenda Oscar, Kindu: Reference your unnumbered telegram, Amerioans Belgians must be held in secure place Stop In case of bombing of region, exterminate a11 without requesting further orders [Signed] General Olenga”. 86. Again, if there is any doubt about what was happening befoxe the rescue mission arrived, 1 cal1 your attention-and 1 do SO with reluctance-to what happened at Isangi, not far from Stanleyville on 19 November , five days before the parachute drap. Isangi is a place 1 had the privilege of visiting years ago. There the entire religious community of seventeen priests and thirteen nuns were stripped of their clothes, beaten, and the nuns raped, Of these, an American nun, Sister Marie Antoinette, and a Dutch Pri=t were murdered and thrown into the river. A Belgian Sister, Anne Françoise, was beaten to death. 87, Throughout this debate 1 have waited in vain to hear one word spoken by those who have brought this complaint, in condemnation of the taking of hostages and the deliberate liquidation of an intslligentsia. Whatever their fancied complaints about the Belgian and American rescue mission, 1 would have thought that the complainants would at least have shown an awareness of and a respect for accepted standards of humanitariaa conduct, particularly as they are required by article 3 of the Gelleva Convention for the Protection of War Victims, of 1949, which expressly prohihits the taking ofhostages in time of interna1 coaflict and requires humane treat- 89. SO much for the complaints of certain countries that the rescue operation was a cynical pretext for armed intervention in the Congo and that the hostages wauld have been secure had there been no attempt to rescue them. 89. de certains tage n’aurait vention les otages essaye 90. Let me now put the position of my country into context. It has been consistent since independence day in the Congo, and that was 30 June 1960. 90, la position toujours a l’indépendance, 91. From the beginning the United States has been opposed to any break-up of the Congo by secessionist movements-secessions based in Elisabethville, in Kasai, in Stanleyville or anywhere else-and 1 would de@ anyone in this Council to pxove otherwise. From the beginning the United States has favoured responsible efforts for the political reconciliation of dissident groups in the Congo through compromise and consensus. And from the beginning we have been opposedand remain opposed-to foreign intervention in the interna1 affairs of the sovereign and independent State of the Congo. 91. a tout partage sionnistes, au quiconque contraire, faireur d’accord des groupes nous toute rieures 92. In July 1960, the Government of the Congo-perhaps some of you may have forgotten this-faced with a mutiny in its Security forces and with a oollapse of order and essential services, formally requested the United States to lend military assistance in restoring order. That request was declined by the United States Government in favour of a United Nations effort. The United States Govesnment supported in principle and in practice-including very large financial and material contributions, as you know-the United Nations aid to the Congo, precisely for the reason that any other course might have brought international conflict to the heart of Africa with dangerous consequences not only for the Congo itself but for the whole continent, 92. peut-t?t.re trouvant armees services E,tats-Unis pour Unis n’a pas ac&dfZ % cette requ&e, a l’Organisation le n&cessaire. pratique, tions financieres vous apportf5e attitude au cœur dangereuses mais poür le continent 93. The accomplishments of the United Nations area matter of history. Law and order were maintained, secession was crushed, some advance towardpolitical stability was made, massive economic and technical aid was supplied from a11 over the world. 93, accompli public écras6, et une nique, a BtB fournie 95. Well before the United Nations left, new insurrections broke out, encouraged from neighbouring countries where enemies of the Congo Government found comfort and aid through the embassies of anon-African Power. Ever since that time both the Adoula Government and the present Government have been afflicted by insurgents aided and supported from the outside. Prime Minister Adoula repeatedly sought help from Africa, but with one or two notable exceptions his plea for help was unheeded. In those circumstances he sought military aid from the United States and Belgium. 96. It has been charged in this Council that, quite apart from the rescue mission, the United States has intervened militarily in the Congo, a charge repeated here this afternoon. 97. I reject this charge. These are the facts: as 1 have stated, at the request of Prime Minister Adoula earlier this year, the United States provided some military material and training assistance to the Congo. This is exactly what a11 other AfricanStates have done or are doing. There is not oneofthem, 1 dase say, that does not obtain military equipment or training or both from outside Africa in the exercise of its own sovereign right. 98. When, in accordance with the Constitution of the Congo, President Kasa-Vubu selected Prime Minister Tshombé to succeed Prime Minister Adoula, who had resigned, the United States continuedthis programme, It did SO upon specific affirmation by Prime Minister Tshombé that the Government of the Congo desired that the programme be continued. As the need arose, the United States, at the request of the Government of the Congo, provided adclitional equipment and transport. It was not requested to, and it did not, undertake military operations in the Congo. 99. Statements have been made here which seem to add up t0 the astounding proposition that the United Rates has no right to provide assistance to the COllgOleSe Government and that that Government has no right to accept it because the aid cornes from outside Africa. 1 repeat that there is nota single African State which has not requested and received military aid, in the form of arms or training or both, from outside Africa. Certainly Algeria, for example, bas received and is receiving massive foreign militau aid in both of these categories. 100. IS this sovereign right to be exercised by some and to be denied to others? Would other States in Africa which receive arms and military assistance from outside the continent re#quish this equipment or assistance, or aSk for itS withdxawal, in the un.. 102. Would any African country which has spoken at this table deny that, under similar circumstances, it would have urgently appealed for and gratefully accepted military aid from outside Africa? And, 1 must add, if these countries sincerely wish theGovernment of the Congo not to seek such aid, let them scrupulously refrain from stirring up rebellion and aiding the insurgents. If they demand that the Government cesse to defend itself with the only means at its disposa.& while at the same time themselires refusing aid to the Government and granting aid to the rebels, what confidence in their good faith cari anyone bave? On what grounds and for what purpose do they appeal to a Council, the duty of which is to maintain international peace and security? If the practice of supporting rebellion against a Government which is disliked by other Governments becomes prevalent in Africa, what security Will any African Government bave? 103. Let us not be hypocritical. Either each Government recognizes the right of other Governments to exist and refrains from attempting to overthrow them, or we shall revert to a primitive state of anarchy in which each conspires against its neighbour, The golden rule is to do unts others as you would have them do unto you. 104. The world has made some progress, it seems to me, and military invasions of one another’s territory are diminishing, thanks in large measure to the United Nations. But a new practice has developed, or rather an old practice has cleveloped new momentum-the more or less subtle, hidden intervention by nations in the interna1 affairs of their neighbours. Most of the fighting and the killing that still ioes on cari be traced to outside interventions designed to undermine or overthrow Governments. 105. In Africa, nearly every country wants andneeds the help of outsiders in achieving those better standards of life in larger freedom which are the goal of their rising expectations and the promise of their political independence. SO outsiders are bound to be involved to some extent in their interna1 affairs. 107. But 1 concedc that it is not aneasy line to draw. The principle that outsiders should be invited and not crash the party is far from-an infallible guide to good conduct. But still, 1 submit, the principle of permission is certainly the best one yet developed to prevent a reversion to imperialism ancl foreign domination. For if the outsiders, not the insiders, decide when intervention is sight, the fragile fabric of nationhood Will corne apart at the seams in a score of new African nations, 108. Every nation has its dissidents, its internal struggle for power, its interna1 argum-ents about who should be in charge and how thebountry should be run. But if every interna1 rivalry is to become a Spanish Civil War, with each faction drawing inother Africans and great Powers from other continents, the histori of independent Africa in this Century Will be bloody and shameful, and the aspirations of Africa’s wonderful peoples Will be cruelly postponed. 109. This is why we supported the United Nations operation in the Congo, and were sorry that, because of financial difficulties, it had to be withdrawn, its mission incomplete. And that is why we oppose unsolicited foreign intervention in the Congo. 110. Contra& the aid that has been supplied to successive Governments of the Congo, upon request, with the current intervention in the interna1 affairs of the Congo-in support of rebellion against the Government. These foreign elements have corne from as far away as Pelring and MOSCOW, as near as Burundi and the neighbouring Congo (Brazzaville). They have included admissions as flagrant as the public statement by the President of Algeria. 1 quote his words: “It is not enough to demonstrate. What we are now doing is sending arms, rifles and volunteers. We say that we are sending and we Will continue indefinitely to send arms and men.” 111. Last week Algerian military aircraft flew to Juba in the Sudan near the border of the Congo, They transferred cargo to trucks which then departed towarcls the Congolese frontier. We received reports of Algerian personnel in transit at the airport in Khartoum . , D of Ghanaian aircraft transferring cargoes of rifles to Egyptian aircraft at Khartoumfor shipment to Juba , , . of rebel leaders being received in Khartoum and Cairo . . . of mortars, machine-guns 112. The representative of Algeria has SO far not commented on these charges, although he was vexy liberal in his criticisms of my country’s long effort to assist the Congo to preserve its independence, integrity and unity. At the same time, the Government of Ghana states only that it “does not know the vexacity of this allegation” that it has supplied arms to the enemies of the Government of the Congo. 112. aucun commentaire qu’il que mon pr8server unit& déclare allégations aux ennemis dLi Gouvernement 113. 1 note with interest in this regard that the Foreign Minister of the Sudan appeared to deny Sudan’s role in this traffic in these words the other day: 113. Ministre nier l’autre soutenu l’une ou l’autre au Congo, Il n’est pas vrai que nos aéroports 6% utilis& du materie demande , , . Tout ce que l’on a trouve la plupart nos a&oports Congolais produit.” 1% is not true that we have been partial to either party in the Congo, It is not true that our airports have been used for this or that puxpose . . . We have allowed medical equipment to go through to those who .have asked for it., , The press reports . , . that ‘apparently’ . , , our airports have been used for shipment of axms to the Congolese in Stanleyville . . . nothing of the sort has takenplace.” [1170thmeeting, para. 171.1 114. The statement of the Foreign Minister of Sudan is most encouraging in that it gives hope that the Sudan intends to prevent traffic in arms and men to the Congo from the Sudan. 114. g&res nous permet d’empêcher Congo par le Soudan. 115. Or, le Premier Ministre en termes matarie Unis la République Khartoum et y ont, comme je l’ai déj&dit,d&haxg8 lequel a 8tB ensuite transport8 la frontiare 115. But the Prime Ministex of Algeria has specifically stated that he is sending men and militaxy supplies into the Congo, And it is known to the United States that Algerian and United Arab Republic military planes have landed in the Sudan, both inKhartoum and Juba, in the last few days andunloadedcaxgoes, which were subsequently trucked to the Congolese border. 116. des explicite et qu’il nous donne llassur’ance que son gouvernement n’expedie pas ou ne permet pas l’envoi d’armes, dtdquipement ou de personnel militaire, volontaire l’autorisation du gouvernement legitime de ce pays, et qu’il prend les mesures n8cessaixes pdur empêcher tout trafic illegal de s’effectuer par ses fxontibres. Je rappelle que par le pas&, lors de la secession et de la rebellion qui se sont produites au Congo, le Gouvernement soudanais avait adopt8 cette politique. 116. It would accoxdingly be helpful if the Foreign Minister of the Sudan could further amplify his remarks and assure us that his Government isnot shipping or pexmitting shipment through the Sudan of any arms or military supplies or persons, volunteer or otherwise, destined for the Congo without thepermission of the Congo Government, and that it is taking a11 possible steps to pxevent any such illegal traffic ta cross its borders into the Congo. 1 recall that on past occasions during secession and rebellion in the Congo the Sudanese Government did adopt this policy. 117. Au cas oil il y aurait le moindre doute concernant l’ingérence illégale au Congo, permettez-moi observer que, la semaine derni&re, M. Gbenye luimême a d&laxé que les rebelles recevaient une aide militaire specifi8 de Congolais, form& et entrafnes en Chine 117. If there should be any question about illegal interference in the Congo, let me point out that, last week, Gbenye himself stated that the xebels were receiving foreign militaxy assistance. He declared that an unspecified numbex of Congolese, who have been trained in Communist China, are en route to join the 118. The rebel leader further statcd that the operational plan was being hcld up pending Security Council action. He aclded that the centre for the builcl-up of rebel strength would be Brazzaville, and thal the abject was to assemble outside assistance, including volunteers snd supplies, from which a drive would Chen be launched to take Leopoldville. 119. Let us understand what is happening. What is happening is that outside Governments are claiming that they-not the Government of the Congo-shall decicle whether that Government cari be assistecl, or whether its enemies shall be assisted to overthrow it. 120. 1 submit that this is the proper andurgent business of the Security Council-not the complaint against a four-day effort to save innocent lives, which has long since ended. This is intervention in gross violation of the United Nations Charter and of repeated resolutions of this Council concerning the Congo. And let me remind you of those. 121. On 22 July 1960, by unanimous vote thesecurity Council adopted a resolution [S/4405] requesting: I! . . . a11 States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration oflaw ancl order and the exercise by the Government of the Congo of its authority and also to refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Congo”. 122. On 24 November 1961, this Council adopted another resolution [S/5002] urging: II . a. a11 Mcmber States to lend their support, accorcling to their national procedures, to the Central Gaverament of the Republic of the Congo in conformity with the Charter and the decisions of the United Nations”, 123. These resolutions are in full force today. In his last report on the Congo to the Security Council dated 29 June of this year, the Secretary-General explicitly stntes: Ilo . . the resolutions of the Security Council concerning the Congo continue to be applicable, since they have no terminal date.” [S/5784, para. 132.1% 124. Obviously, a11 States are not refraining from actions which “irnpede the restoration of law andorder and the exercise by the Government of the Congo of its authority”. Obviously, a11 States are not refraj.ning from actions which “undermine the territorial integrity ancl the political inclependence of the Congo”. And, -/ Ibid., Supplemenr for April, May and June 1964. 125. de veiller appliqu8es r8solutions 125. It is now up to this Council to see to it thnt these prior decisions are enforced; that the flagrant violations of the resolutions of 1960 and 1961 are stopped. 126. The danger of foreignintervention intheinternal affairs of the Congo is no less today-to the Congo, to Africa and to the whole world-than it was in 1960. It is no less a danger whencertainof those who intervene are themselves Africans. And the responsiùility of the United Nations is no less olear than it was then. 126. affaires aujourd’hui pour le Congo, mais encore pour l’Afrique tout entier. lorsque mdmes des l’était 127. My delegation, therefore, urges the Council to reaffirm its support of the unity and territorial integrity of the Congo and to cal1 on a11 States to refrain from any action which would impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Congo ofits authority, andto consider, as an urgent matter, the establishment of an inspection and investigation group to proceed to the Congo and to report to this Council, SO that outside intervention in the affairs of the Government of the Congo cari be brought to an end at the earliest possible moment. 127. ment B l’integrité les empêcher l’exercice congolais. titre un groupe au Congo et ferait aussi intervention ment congolais. 128. aux d’agissements Gouvernement l’obligation constructives le Congo; il doit le faire dans le plein nialveill:mce ou id8ologique. de protéger du Congo; choisir propres puisse 128. But it is not enough that we should merely cal1 apon Members of this Organization to refrain from hostile and illegal acts against the Government of the Congo. The Security Council has a solemn obligation to propose constructive and positive solutions to the problems which that country faces, and to do SO rationally and responsibly, without malice or emotion, or political or ideological self-interest. Our obligation, 1 submit, is to protect and assure the integrity and inclepenclence of the Congo; it is to enable the people of the Congo to Select their own government and create their own institutions. And 1 do not believe that there Will be any audible dissent to that proposition. 129. The principles required for a viable solution to the Congo are not difficult to identify; they have been inherent in the problem from the very beginning and have formed the basis of repeated Security Council resolutions on the Congo problem. NOW, what are those principles? 129. du probl&me mérer; question nombreuses tives 130. sonne puisse l’integrité Congo doivent les Etats. 130. Pirst-ancl again 1 would doubt that there is any dissent on this point-that the unity, territorial integrity and political independenoe of the Congo should be respected and strengthened by a11 States. 131. Second, that a11 States should refrain from any action which might impecle the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Congo of its authority. 131. tenir retour vernement 132. Third, that secession, civil war, tribal rivalries and acts of defiance of the authority ofthe Government 132. les 134. 111 that connexion, 1 should like to remincl the Council that the present Governrnent of the Congo was appointed by Presidcnt Kasa-Vubu under the transitional provisions of the new Constitution, which charges it with the responsibility of preparing for national elections to he held early nextyear. 1 am sure that a11 Member States Will ngree that it is in the interests of the Congo, of Africa and of the world community that that Government should be given every opportunity and every encouragement to create the conditions for full and free elections which Will permit the Congolese people to make their ownfree choice of their own leaders. 135. Those principles provide a basis on which to build constructively and responsibly. But they are, after all, principles and have value only as they are translatecl into action. That in turn imposes a heavy obligation on a11 States which are in a position to help the Government of the Congo-and whose assistance that Government desires-to redouble their efforts to bring about a viable solution to the stubborn and debilitating problems that plague that country. 136. Let me say a few worcls about those who are in a position to help. No country is more aware than my own that the Congo is an African country, In the interrelated world of toclay, it must be clear that the Congo problem must be solved in an African context. It is for that reason that my Government viewed bath with sympathy ancl with hope the constructive initiative which the CoUncil of Mini&ers of the Organization of African Unity took at Addis Ababa in September iti its efforts to contribute to a solution of the Congoproblems. The fact that its efforts to achieve th& objective& set forth in the resolution which it passed at that time have not yet yielded the desired results does not, it seems to us, constitute a cause for clespair; it is, iiistead, a reason for ieaffirmation of the soundprinciples which were expressed in that resolution, and for trying to find new ways of applying them SO aS to assist the Democratic Republic of the Congo in achievingarapid ancl penceful solution of its problems. 137. Given the special responeibility of the members of the Organization of African Unity to assist the Government of the Congo, the United Nations also hears a continuing heavy responsibility to help. That obligation arises not only out of the history of its pnst efforts to assist that country, but also out of its continuing mandate to promote worlcl peacc and stability. Although, for reasons of which we are a11 coulcl severally or jointly re-examine with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo the psoblems which the latter faces, ancl thereby bring their combined wisdom and their combined efforts to bear on the solution of those urgent difficulties. 139, At the last meeting of the Security Council, Mr. Spaak, the Foreign Minister of Belgium, expressed the strong conviction that the problems of the Congo cannot be solved by military means alone. My Government whole-heartedly concurs in that judgement. We hope to see an early end to the rebellion, in a manner which Will assure that a11 of the Congo’s responsible political, economic and social resources are effectively and peacefully mobilized in tackling the great tasks of national rehabilitation and national building. Toward that end, 1 wish to pledge the whole-hearted support of the United States to co-operate with any and a11 responsible efforts by this Organization, by the Organization of African Unity and by other appropriate international organizations. 140, With goodwill, with imagination, with a disinterested sense of our international responsibilities, the continuing difficulties in the Congo-like SO many of the other stubborn problems with which this Organization has had tu deal during its history-Will, we believe, yield to the combined wisdom and urgent efforts of those who are genuinely dedicated to responsible and constructive solutions. 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