S/PV.1175 Security Council

In accordance with the decision previously taken by the Council, and if 1 hear no objection, 1 shall invite the representatives of the Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, Belgium, the Congo (Brazzaville), Algeria, Mali, the Democra- 1. mement Conseil les de la Belgique, du Mali, de Burundi, a participer, sur sont réservées tic Republic of the Congo, ,Nigeria, the United Arab Republic, Burundi, Kenya and the Central African Republic t8 take the seats reserved for them opposite the Council table and to participate in the debate without the right to vote, 2, Lord CRRADON (United Kingdom): 1 shall prcsently rnake my comment on the rescue operation and answer the charge made against my Government. 3. The main fact about the operation is that it is over. The promise was made that when the objective had been achieved the troops involved would immediately be withdrawn. The promise was kept, and the operation is now a matter of history, 4. 1 shall strongly refute the accusationmadeagainst my Government, but 1 am far moreconccrned with the future than with the past. 1 suggestthat a11 of us, however strong our feelings, should turn to think and plan for the future, Surely we should concentrate a11 our efforts on the restoration of good order in the whole vast territory of the Congo, and recovery from past errors and evils, and reconstruction on the basis of a new united effort in the interests of a.11 the Congolese people. Surely it is far more important tounite a11 our endeavours to seek the right course for the future than to’pile on the agony of the past. 5. It has seemed to me, as 1 listenecl to the speeches made earlier in this Hebate, that there are several factors which dominate our deliberations. TO some extent they also dominate the situation in the Congo, They are factors which poison relations and bedevil a11 attempts to make progress. 6. First, there is indignation and anger arising from race and colour feeling. The speech of the representative of Brazzaville [117Oth meeting] gave expression to those bitter feelings. But from my own experience in Africa, 1 would testify that one of the most striking fa& about Africans is not how much racial hitterness they benï, but how little. Whe we consider the frustrations and humiliations and injustices and cruelties which the peoples of Africa have suffered from ancient slavery to up-to-date apartheid, we may well be astonished that SO many African leaders have SO consistently preached and practised not hate and violence but tolerance and co-operation. 1 myself have recently been in a dozen African capitals, including Leopoldville and Brazzaville, and 1 found in every country1 visited net animosity but friendliness, not malice but good humour, not antagonism but a most sincere eagerness for constructive co-operation. 8. Racial feeling Will not help us in this Council to reach any sound conclusion in the desperately dangerous situation we now consider. Indignation and anger will make bad advisers. The test in OU~ deliberations must constantly be the best interests of a11 the people of the Congo, They have already suffered much too much and much too long, If we are to serve them well, and Africa too, we must surely bring to our deliberations a judgement free from heat and free from hate. 9. The second factor which bedevils the situation is the terrible burden of the bloody past. The Congo staggers under that weight today. Each new @vent, each new act is judged in the light of a11 the tragic developments of the past four years. The representative of the Sudan in his eloquent speech [1170th meeting] spoke of the ghosts of the past. Indeed they haunt the Congo now. They haunt us here. Suspicion and distrust are now SO strong-we have seen evidence of them in many of the speeches made here-that they often twist opinions and distort judgements. Al1 the more on that account it is essential to make a sustained effort to bring to these problems steadiness and objectivity and-if it is not expecting too muchsome balance and some fairness to our conclusions, 10. espoir tifs, le favoriser 10. The third factor which makes it SO difficult to hope that we cari reach praotical and constructive results is the fact that there are those who do net wish to see good order and good sense prevail, There are those who deliberately wish to foster and perpetuate a state of chaos. par des intentions du progr&s, 12. parler inutile traités eu l’honneur 11. We cari understand, even if we do not accept, intense race feeling, and we cari understand an obsession with past events in the Congo, These two faotors are serious enough. But by far the most serious factor standing in the way of progress is the fact that there are those who regard the Congo, and indeed Africa generally, as a convenient battleground for ideologies. They are contemptuous of casualties and careless of human suffering. The Congo to them 1s merely a cockpit for the cold war. 1 do not believe that such evil intention originates in Africa, I am convinced that the overwhelming majority of Africans wishes to see the Congo proceed in peace on the path of progress. 12. I turn from these general consiclerations to the rescue operation. 1 have no need to go over the ground which has been covered in previous speeches. We bave been privileged to hear from the Foreign Minister of Belgium [1173rd meeting] and the representative of the United States [ 1174th meeting] speeches 13. The issue which faced my Government was simply this. In defiance of every provision of international law and the basic prinoiples of humanity, many hundred non-combatants, many of them men and women who had been prepared to risk their lives in order to continue to serve the people of the Congo, had been held for months as hostages. Al1 appeals, including those of President Kenyatta and Secretary- General U Thant, for their safety and release had been of no avail. Dreadful threats against them increased. A proposa1 was made to try to save them. The request was put to my Government that, in order to make this effort possible, the airfield at Ascension Island should be made available. The decision which my Government and the Governments of Belgium and the United States had to take was indeed a most difficuit and delicate one, but the permission sought of us was promptly given. We clearly understood that the abject of the operation was solely one of saving lives. We understood that the troops employed would be engaged on that olject and that abject alone. We understood that they would be withdrawn as soon as that abject had been achieved. We knew and we accepted the purpose. The purpose was ta save 1iVeS. 14. Here let me say that where the test is one of saving lives, then 1 have no doubt at a11 that risks are well justified. Even if the risks are grave and if they include the risk of misunderstanding and the imputation of false motives, they should still be taken. Where lives are at stake the onus of argument is not on those wishing to save them but on those prepared to see them destroyed. It was a dangerous operation, but it was an honourable one. TO have refused the request made to us would have been an act, SO it seems clear to me, not of caution but of cowardice, an act of callous inhumanity; indeed itwould have been a shameful act. 15. These were the questions. After allthebloodshed and the ruthless killing in the Congo, should an effort be made to save nearly two thousand innocent lives? Shoulcl grave risks be taken in doing SO? Should my Government facilitate and assist that aim? The answer to those questions was: yes, yes, yes. 1 m.yself do not doubt for a minute that that answer was right. Indeed 1 feel that no other answer was conceivable, and we are deeply grateful to those who oarried out this rescue operation which succeeded in saving SO many lives including those of many Commonwealth citizens. 16. Having said that, 1 beg leave to return from the past to the future, and 1 pray that out of the intensity 18. Secondly, we reoognize that the problems of the Congo require above a11 political settlement. Force alone Will solve nothing, Violence has alreadybrought untold suffering to the Congo, and the recent history of the Congo has shown how violence breeds violence, and makes the task of political reconciliation infinitely more difficult. 18. problémes politique; La violence indicibles, que la violence de r6conciliation 19. Thirdly, 1 hope that a11 that has happened in the Congo Will bring home to Africans in particular the danger of giving outside support to rebel movements against legally established African Governments. Such support would provide aprecedentwhichmight destroy a11 hopes of African unity, for unity cari only be based on a respect in a11 countries for the authority and independence of the newly established independent Governments. Those who start civil wars in other countries may find that they encourage civil war in their own, and, worse still, they may split Africa into opposing camps. 19. pas& notamment, aide extérieure les Soutenir cedent africaine, respect, pendante ment Etablis. Ceux qui dgclenchent dans d’autres qu’ils pays et, pire encore, en camps oppos?%. 20. gouvernement 16gitime interventions l’extérieur tout tussions manifesteraient 20. The existing Government in Leopoldville is the legitimate Government of the Congo, The legal Government must be recognized and must be dealt with as such. Continued intervention by force and violence from outside the Congo would destroy a11 hopes for a settlement, and would have repercussions and consequences disastrous far beyond the Congo. 21. There Will surely be no dispute about the need for an agreed African solution and a political solution, a solution based on a Congo free from a11 outside domination, a solution based on international respect and support, for a Congolese Government which must win and hold the allegiance of a11 the people of the Congo. ’ 21. une solution solution, Congo respect nationale, gagner congolaise 22. de conduite qui nous permettrait Une aide est certainement dans bien des domaines: tion, il faut aider a former laises apportex loppement tout, d’intervention 22. How cari we a11 help to set a course which cari lead to the achievement of such aims? Help is certainly required, help of many kinds: help in reconciliation, and help in training Congolese security forces capable of maintaining law and order, and help in the whole range of economic development and social services, and help above a11 in preventing a11 attempts at armed intervention and foreign domination. 23. In the past four years the United Nations has made heroic efforts in these directions, It has been 23. Unies 24. Such help cari be continued. It is more than ever necessary. But what is needecl now is muchmore than that. What is needed now is a new political initiative, We want to see an initiative which cari restore order and restore confidence and protect the Congo from intervention in its own interna1 affairs. Where cari we look for such help and such an initiative? 1 feel sure that we should look to the African States. We should look to the Organization of African Unity. 25. We know that the efforts already made by the Organization of African Unity have SO far been unsuccessful. It is true that the organization fias only recently been established. It may be that the organizatien has not yet the capacity and the unity to make a joint, resolute, successful effort. If SO, and if the African States are divided, 1 cari see no hope for the Congo. But if the Organization of African Unity, facing its greatest challenge, cari in true unity turn from polemics and pérsonal animosities and take a new initiative now to assist in the achievement of an African political solution of national reconciliation and national security and true national independence for the Congo, it Will surely deserve the full support of the United Nations and of every State here represented. It is a challenge of immense consequence. is an opportunity of overwhelming importance. And it is certainly a task of the utmost urgency. 26. 1 believe that at this moment we in this Council cari best contribute to the result which 1 trust we a11 wish to see-a peaceful and prosperous Congo-by turning from rhetorical recrimination to o,onsider the practical proposals for actionputforward yesterdayby Mr. Stevenson, In particularwe should, 1 am sure, give every encouragement to the Organization of African Unity to take a new initiative which cari command general support, and also we should gi.ve every encouragement to the Congolese Government to cooperate to the full with the Organization of African Unity to that end. If such an initiative cari now be taken 27. There are those who wish to see the new African States fail, who wish to see them divided and weak. And there are those who wish to create and perpetuate chaos in the Congo, and wish to see it spread. But a11 those of us who wish Africa well and wish to see the peoples of Africa free and strong Will pray that African statesmanship Will not fail in this its greatest test.

1 am grateful for being allowed this opportunity of speaking to the Security Council ahout the recent United States and Belgian military intervention, with the assistance of the United Kingdom, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Kenya, as an African country and as Chairman of the OAU ad hoc Commission on the Congo, is vitally interested and in duty bound to speak on this subject today. 29. First of all, 1 should like to quote an excerpt from the concluding part of the statement made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium to this Council. He stated: “Belgium is neither colonialist nor neo-colonialist, nor imperialist.” ‘[1173rd meeting, para. 104.1 30. That is an extraordinary statement, coming as it does from the lips of the representative of a country which has systematically practised over a longperiod of time the worst forms of colonial exploitation, political subjugation and economic plunder. No solemn declaration on his part, no belated expressions of sweet reasonableness, no affirmation of faith or conviction, no attempt to absolve Belgium from its infamous role in the tragedy of the Congo, Will ever wipe out the judgement of history that Belgium is fairly and squarely responsible for creating what the Congo is today. The Congo is a divided country; a country weak and dismembered; a country in the throes of a civil war and subjected, through its helplessness, to imperialist violence and aggression on the least of deceitful pretexts. History points its finger of guilt at Belgium for its nefarious record of colonial exploitation. Had the almost Century-long record been oommendable, the Congo today would be a strong, united, wealthy and efficiently administered State, proud of its sovereignty and independence and of its progress and importance in the world. 31. However, 1 am not here to lecture the Council on incontrovertible facts of history ConcerningBelgian misrule in the Congo, I mentioned this inpassing, just because the matter has been raised. If the Minister of Fore@ Affairs of Belgium had added to the statemeni 1 have just quoted that Belgium is Still interested in the minera1 wealth of the Congo, perhaps his statement would have been more realistic. 32. We are here to register our strongest indignation and protest at the reoent happenings in the Congo. We consider that the recent military intervention mounted 33. The Stanleyville intervention was the climactic outcome of a systematic and prolonged interference to maintain Belgium’ s economic interests in the Congo which are tied up with the vast minera1 w ealth of the country. One cari go back to the Officia1 Records of the Security Council and the General Assembly and find that ever since the attainment of independence by the Congo in 1960 the resolutions of these organs regarding the Congo crisis have been deliberately flouted. 34. On 14 July 1960 the Security Council passed a resolution [5/438’7],g the operative part of which called upon the Government of Belgium Yo withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo”. At that time, within days of granting independence, Belgium intervened militarily, supposedly to safeguard the lives and interests of its nationals resident in the Congo. Patrice Lumumba, the celebrated Congolese patriot and Prime Minister, appealed for United Nations help to put an end to Belgian aggression. That resolution seems to have been conveniently forgotten by the Belgian Government. In deliberate defiance of that early resolution, it deemed it fit to have yet another military adventure in the Congo, 35. The General Assembly then, by its resolution [1474 (ES-IV)] of 20 September 1960, requested: “Al1 States to refrain from any action whichmight tend to impede the rostoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Republic of the Congo of its authority and also to refrain from any action which might undermine the unity, territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo”. 36. The present intervention by Belgium and its col- -1aborators cari hardly be interpreted as promotingthe restoration of law and order in the Congo, Far less cari it be said that it respected theunity, the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Congo. It has heightened the crisis, endangered peace and totally defeated the intentions of the General Assembly. 37. In September 1964, the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity met in extraordinary session in Addis Ababa to consider the Congo situation. President Kasavubu took the initiative and expressed his conviction that the solution of the Congoleseproblem should be found within the Organization of African Unity. This conviction was shared wholly by several African Heads of State and Government. TheCongolese Prime Minister, himself, conscious of the deteriorating situation resulting from foreign intervention, expressed his desire to bring about a national reconciliation in the Congo. The Organization of hfrican I/ Officiel Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year. Supplement for July, August and September 1960. 38. It was this historic session of the Organization of African Unity which set up an ad hoc Commission, under the Chairmanship of my Pr-t, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, to achieve national reconciliation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the normalization of relations between the Congo (Leopoldville) and its neighbours. 39. My President immediately issued an appeal for the cessation of hostilities to a11 the combatants in the Congo. This appeal was disseminated widely, in several languages, through a11 media of information available today. This appeal, in part, stated: “Since i’ndependence the people of the Congo have endured great privations, and it is in their interest that they should be given an opportunity to live in peace and unity. The atmosphere of hostility, tension, and destruction should be brought to an end. The ground should be prepared for constructive talks and the elements of trust, understanding and co-operation established. “In order that the Commission may fulfil its responsibilities, 1 appeal to youAfrican brothers inthe Congo who are engaged in fighting to lay down your arms. The Prime Minister of the Congo (Leopoldville) has given a solemn undertaking that he would guarantee the security of combatants who lay down their arms SO as to seek with the help of the Organization of African Unity a solution that would make possible national reconciliation and restoration of order in the Congo. As Chairman ofthe Commission it is my responsibility to ensure that the Commission works in an atmosphere of harmony and impartiality. 1 have always believed that African people cari solve their problems amicably, Your immediate and maximum co-operation is needed. 1 appeal to you, therefore, to stop fighting at once and to lay down your arms in the spirit of African unity. 40. int&&ts “1 am confident that the goodwill and co-operation of the Congo, strengthened by the sympathy and the good wishes of the entire African continent Will bring about popular victory and good order in the Congo. Only in unity, peace and prosperity cari we achieve this worthy aim. fl 40. My President, having only the interests of the Congolese people and African unity at heart, im- 41. The Commission decided to appoint a special delegation of five Mini&ers, oomprising the Ministers of Kenya, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic, and accompanied by a representative of the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, to see the President of the United States. The intention was to lay before him the matter relating to the problem of peace and reconciliation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, It was the feeling of the ad hoc Commission that without the withdrawal of a11 foreign military intervention in the Congo the a &o+ Commission could not find the right atmosphere whlch fitted the hgh mission of reoonciliation entrusted to its members. 42. For reasons best known to the President of the United States, the delegation was unable to meet him in person. However, the delegation met representatives of the United States Government, who expressed sympathetic understanding of the Commission’s most significant undertaking in lhe service of peace and unity in Africa. They clearly stated that they attached great importance to the success of the Commission, A communiqué was issued which assured the Commission that the United States Government would co-operate in every appropriate way to help thecommission achieve its objectives, 43. What transpired later only proved that the assurance of the United States Government was hardly worth the paper it was written on. When the Belgian and the United States military intervention took place with the connivance of Britain, it clearly proved that the United States had committed a breach of faith and the assurance was only a ruse to further its domination in the Congo and its carefully prepared military objectives, It is difficult to understand how the act of aggression against the Congolese people contributed to the peace mission of the ad hoc Commission, The three-power conspiracy was a calculated attempt to impose American-Belgian domination in the Congo, to undermine the Organization of African Unity, and to obliterate the hopes of Africans for the peaceful solution of their differences. 44. The sordid collusion of the three Powers does net end here. There arose the questionofthe hostages in Stanleyville, which constituted a ready-made pretext for the United States and Belgian Governments to intervene in the Congo to achieve their objectives: economic, military, and ideological. Before 1 discuss this further, allow me to lay before the Council the supreme efforts which my President, Mzee Jomo 45. The Seoretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, sent an appeal to my President, to act in his capacity as Chairman of the ad hoc Commission, to save the lives of hostages. TheUnitedStates Secregary of State, Mr. Dean RUS~, sent in a similar appeal, particularly requesting that the life of Dr. Carlson be saved. Even before reoeiving these appeals, my President had in fact contacted several times the Stanleyville and Leopoldville authorities, appealing for cessation of hostilities, the safety of civilians, both fore@ and national, held hostage in the Congo and particularly in Stanleyville and the admission of the International Committee of the Red Cross to carry out its humanitarian work for the needy, ~ 45. tions Unies, U Thant, a adresse Kenyatta Commission d’Etat un appel semblable, épargnee reçu a plusieurs rites dant de faire des civils comme otages au Congo, notamment d’autoriser B accomplir 46. Repeated telegrams were sent following repre- Sent&ions macle by the United States Government, one specifically requesting the stay of execution of Dr. Carlsan. My President, in reply to the appeal of the United Nations Secretary-General stated: 46. des grammes, surseoir Kenyatta, de l’Organisation “As recently as 15 November, 1 cabled appeals to both authorities to employ nothing but humane methods in treating those in custody. “1 shall continue to insist that the authorities concerned in the Congo should do nothing to innocent civilians that may be oontrary to international law. “As regards your suggestion that 1 send aparty to Stanleyville for discussions with a view to getting the authorities there to permit the civilians concerned to leave the town if they SO wish, 1 should like to inform you that after very careful examination of this proposal, 1 consider that the necessary prerequisite is the stoppage of fighting by’ both sides and any influence you may have on Mr. Tshombé’s supporters outside Africs to achieve this end would be highly appreciated. “The OAU ad hoc Commission on the Congo is determined to continue with its efforts of reconciliation in accordance with its mandate. n 47. Attwood, vembre ConfBrence l’intervention sauvé l’intervention dent Kenyatta et il n’y aurait eu aucune effusion 47. The American Ambassadortoltenya, Mr. William Attwood, addressing the Nakuru Round Table at a dinner on 18 November 1964, admitted that my President’s intervention appearod to have saved Dr, Carlsonfrom death. This is indicative of the fact that continued efforts by my President would have had even better results, and no bloodshed would have taken place at a11 but for the military intervention 48. It is evident that the cardinal necessity in the Congo was the cessation of hostilities. Upon this prime need rested the restoration of peace and order, of reconciliation and normality in the Congo. Thiswas the fundamental point in the OAU resolution of last September. It was also basic to the workof the ad hoc Commission. The Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had promised to bringabout the 48. de faire primordiale l’ordre, normale de la l’OUA. de la Commission 2 49. When the situation took hourly a more dangerous turn, my President arrangedtomeetwiththe American Ambassador on 21 November. Mr. Kanzarepresenting the Stanleyville authorities, arrived a day later, SO that the meeting did not take place until 23 November. Meantime, yet another appeal was made by my President for the safety and gcod treatment of civilians held hostage in Stanleyville. The Ambassador was warned in no uncertain terms that the negotiations then in progress would be wholly nullified by any military intervention, and that perilous conditions would be created not only for the hostages, but for the whole of Africa and the world. Mr. Kanza sent a telegram to Stanleyville, and received a telegraphic assurance that the hostages would be safe as long as the talks were going on. At the meeting, Mr. Attwood was tolcl that the OAU could not be held responsible for anything that happened following landing of troops. My President said in unequivocal terms that provided the parties concerned agreed he could promise that the peaceful discussions would continue, Mr. Attwood, on the other hand, stood for force only. My President totally rejected this view, At the meeting, Mr. Kanza requested that discussion should concern not only the question of civilian hostages, but a11 elements of the Congo situation. 50. The American Ambassador said he had onlybeen empowered to discuss the question of hostages, and that he would seek further instructions fromwashington. He suggested, and a11 the others present agreed readily, that a further meeting should take place that night, or the following day. 51. On 23 November, after receiving information that military paratroopers were ready on Ascension Island. my President hurriedly sent yet another message to Mr. Attwood. It read: “1 have the honour to confirm inwrifing the request 1 made to you this morning that your Government should use its influence on Mr. Tshombé to with- III must make it quite clear to you that the presence of mercenaries in the Congo makes it very difficult for the OAU ad hoc Commission to send its delegatien to the Congo in accordance with the mandate given to it by OAU. 111 wish to emphasize the fact that in order to ensure the safety of a11 civilians now held in custody by the Stanleyville regime, it is important that the invasion of Stanleyville, either by mercenaries or by the 1,000 Belgian paratroopers now situated in Ascension Island, must be stopped in order to facilitate peaceful negotiations. ‘7 am aware of the contents of your Note No, 3 of 21 November on the subject of paratroopers but my Government holds the view that the sending of the paratroopers to Stanleyville Will aggravate the situation rather than save it.” 52. The following morning, when the parties went to resume their discussions, the paratroopers had been dropped over Stanleyville and the military intervention had begun. This new development led to the breaking off of negotiations, leaving my President ,and the rightthinking peoples of the world shocked, stunned and immensely grieved. The shock was a11 the greater at that time because there were tangible prospects that arrangements could be made to repntriate civilians through the services of the International Red Cross. Further steps to bring about a cesse-fire onboth sides were within the grasp of my President if the United States and other countries supporting Tshombé had been willing to co-operate. The Stanleyville representative had shown goodwill, and, given a chance, complete success of the talks was not animpossibility as the United States and Belgian Governments have since tried to prove. After ail, the very fact that the meeting between the United States Ambassador, my President, and the Stanleyville representative had taken place was something new, something indicating flexibility of attitude and the desire to solve the problem in a spirit of goodwill and conciliation engendered by the talks. 53. The American-Belgian intervention, with British collaboration, in view of the foregoing facts, was an insult to my President, an attempt to humiliate the OAU, and to disregard the African interests. At best, it was a very poor and impatient exhibition of diplomatic negotiation. 54. Subsequent events have made it clear that the intention to drop paratroopers was there long before the Nairobi talks and that the negotiations then going on were intended to play for time, to deceive the world and to scoff at OAU efforts to bring about peace and reconciliation in the Congo. We have had the proof in a draInatiC fashion that every effort to resolve the frairicidal conflict in the Congo has been frustrated. 55. It is extraordinary that, considering the perilous and grave decision that had been taken to browbeat into submission the Stanleyville authorities through the use of force and intimidation, the United States and Belgian Governments did not bring the matter to the Security Council for the necessary action, Resort to Article 33 of the United Nations Charter would have been of immense value. Article 33 reads: [The speaker read out Article 33 of the Charter.] 56, Furthermore, the OAU ad hoc Commission was seized of the matter. It would have been the most practical, speediest and effective organ to resort to. The facts that 1 stated earlier inescapably point to the conclusion that instead of seeking its good offices to resolve the issue, its efforts were undermined and its work in this regard was deliberately subverted. 57. How then cari the Fore@ Minister of Belgium claim, as he did, that the last resort to every remedial action had been taken? This assertion is incredible. It cari hoodwink nobody, not even when proclaimecl in this Council by an eminent personality in the most conciliatory tones after an act of organized violence has let loose SO much blood and SO much loss of life which the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo relished describing in gory terms. 58. Both Belgium and the United Statcs have declared publicly that the intervention in the Congo was t’humanitariann. This justification confounds the good sense and conscience of the vast majority of peoples throughout the world. It is significant to note that not a single hostage was killed before the military intervention, It is equally significant to note that the dropping of the paratroopers coincided perfectly with the assault of the white mercenaries commanding the Congolese Army on Stanleyville. An attempt has been made to prove that it was a coincidence. 1 personally am not convinced that coincidences occur SO marvellously in a contrived situation. 59. It should have been crystal clear to the conspiring pow ers that any armed action in the Congo would arouse passions and fury; that it would create asituation im- 60. Considering a11 this, weighing a11 the consequences of military intervention and ignoring the fact that thousands of innocent lives would be lest, the United States and Belgium thought fit to promote the “humanitarian” mission of rescue in the Congo. As the representative of Algeria put it SO Weil: “, , . if Brussels had really been motivated by humanitarian aims, as we are told it was, it should have realized from the outset that its military intervention in the Congo required the previous repatriation of a11 Belgian civilians, or at least those living in the threatened regions” [1172nd meeting, para, 291. do.’ 1 put it to the Council that the Belgian and United States aggression was wholly and directly responsible for a11 the excesses that were committed in the Congo. How cari one speak of a blood bath which one has designed and caused, in one breath, and of humanitarianism in the other? Where is this humanitarianism when the white mercenaries are allowed full licence to murder innocent African men, women and children? Where was this humanitarianism when Patrice Lumumba, later brutally done to death, was held hostage? He was a nationally acclaimed hero, legally the head of his Government, but under detention in Katanga. Where was humanitarianism then? What happened to this self-same humanitarianism when innocent Africans were butchered in Sharpville in South Africa? Where is this humanitarianism when American Negroes are Ijrutally done to death in Mississippi and elsewhere? IL is a peculiar brand of humanitarianism coming from countries whose record and international behaviour do not entitle them to boast about their achievements. It is peculiar also because it is reserved for the Congo only, dished out in the appropriate doses as and when it suits the policies of the neo-colonialists. This type of humanitarianism is partial-thousands of African lives lost to rescue a few whites who could have been saved in any case through peaceful negotiations-and it gives rise to journalistic sensationalism. 62. The Belgian Fore@ Minister has tried to misinterpret the situation by accusing African countries of racism and of having an inferiority cornplex. He iS gravely mistaken. Why should the simple truth be unpalatable to him? After ail, the lives of Africans were indiscriminately sacrificed in the process ofthe sa-called humanitarian intervention, 63. The military operation of the three Powers has created today a sense of insecurity in Africa. One had hoped, and hoped fervently, that the days of gun-boat diplomacy were over. Alas, we have learnt today that that is not SO. A dangerous precedent has been set and it involves the security of Africa and the maintenance of international peace and understanding. That is why this Council must condemn this armed intervention 15 ; a 64. The British role in this conspiracy has shocked African countries. One had hoped that under a Labour Government the United Kingdom would not be caught red-handed in an infamous act. 65. The United States Government has pleaded one further justification for its intervention in the Congo, It asserts that the military action was launched with the approval and full knowledge of the Congolese Central Government. Surely, this consent was not intended to be ‘a licence to let loose terrer and bloodshed. Surely, the realities of the situation shouldhave dictated a different course of action. In this connexion, it is worthwhile to mention the Cuban crisis. The Cuban Government had voluntarily, with full approval and knowledge, asked for and received military equipment from the USSR. The UnitedStates was in a furor, and the world was put on thebrink of nuclear disaster, until certain weapons were withdrawn. Where was the question of consent then? Who gave the United States consent for its interference in Cuba? There were a11 sorts of justifications for American action: The Monroe Doctrine, the right of self-defence, etc. Do these apply only to the Western Hemisphere and give freedom to act otherwise, with impunity, in other areas? 66. While 1 am still on the question of consent, 1 may add here that some countries challenge the legality of Mr. Tshombb’s appointment as the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and his competence to give consent to interference in the Congo, They point to the lack of effective control over the Congolese territory, constitutional irregularities, the absence of elections, the unpopularity of Mr. Tshombé’s Government and Mr. TshombB’s entry to the troubled Congolese scene through devious and legally doubtful methods. But 1 mention this just in passing. 67. Permit me to say a few words ahout certain matters raised by the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo before this Council [lL73rd meeting]. 68. He made a reference to the recentdisorderwithin the East African armies, when foreign military help was called in to contain it. The cause and nature of the disturbances in Kenyawere completelydifferent 69. Fuxthermore, the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo read out at length a report allegedly written by a Tunisian journalist, claiming that during the last Cairo Conference of Non-aligned Countries there was an ultra-secret conference of certain Heads of State and Government of African countries, who decided to support the Stanleyville Government with arms and military men. The report quotes the names of those who attended this mysterious meeting, and my President’s name appears in it. It is a well-known fact that my President did not even attend the Non-aligned Confexence in Csiro in person: how absurd cari one get by making an allegation without verifying his facts? It is a ludicrous case, based on inaccurate newspaper surmises and fabrications, and it throws doubt on the whole veracity of the report, 70. The Congolese representative tried to drive a wedge into African unity by making repeated references to the two-Africa concept-one Arab, and the other Black. This imperialist-inspired concept Will never find any acceptance. We are a11 one in Africa, bound by ties of history, culture, custom, blood, and the community of interests and the problems that face us. 71. Turning to the broader problem of the Congo once again, permit me to say that we believe that a solution to it is possible in the Africancontext. There 72. The Organization of African Unity cari and Will help the Congolese brothers to live inpeace, progress and prosperity. OAU cari bring about national reconoiliation and normalization of relations between the Congo (Leopoldville) and its neighbours. OAU cari render other multiple forms of assistance to the Congo to resolve the differences peaoefully. Let the interventionists give up their dreams of neo-colonialist control of the area, and allow Africans to solve their own problems. This Will be a beneficent move on their part, which Will change the course of events for the better. This Will be their greatest contribution to the cause of peace, freedom, and unity of Africa. And we solicit this today from them in this Council. 73. Mr. President, 1 have not replied to the speech of the representative of the United States, and 1 therefore reserve the right to speak again, if necessary.

At the outset, 1 wish, on behalf of the Government and people of the Central African Republic and on behalf of my delegation, to express our deep gratitude to the President and members of the Security Council for having agreed unhesitatingly to hold an urgent meeting to consider the situation arising from the recent events at Stanleyville. We also thank the Council for having, in this spirit, authorized us to participate in the discussion. 75. 1 think it is worth noting that a11 the statements that have been made since 9 December before the Security Council on the question of the Congolese tragedy-1 repeat, a11 the statements-strengthen my conviction that. my country w.as not mistaken in joining in the request for a Security Council meeting, In my oountryts view, a negative attitude was incompatible with its established position on the Congo problem and with the opinion it has formed of the events of 24 November 1964. 76. The action taken by the twenty-two representatives of States who signed the’ request of 1. December was eventually based on the provisions of Articles 34, _ 35 and 52 of the United Nations Charter, It was prompted, moreover, not only by an obvious concern for the quickest possible restoration of peace in the Congo but also by the fact that the heinous acts recently committed exceeded a strictly African frame- 78. As 1 just said, the statoments of the preceding speakers have only strengthened the confidence of the Central APrican Republic in the decisions which the Security Council Will take. Al1 the preceding speakers have described the situation very frankly and clearly. There is a rule that one should not repeat those ideas in others’ speeches with which one agrees: 1 ask your pardon for not following this rule in the rest of my staternent. The need ta make known my Government’ s views on SO difficult a problem before SO important a body leaves me no ohoice. - 79. Accordingly, 1 shall corne directly to the point. After 1 have explained our position on the matter before the Council, 1 shall say a word on the steps that the Council might take, within the scope of its authority, to correct the situation, 1 shall do SO, of course, with the sincerity thai has guided the foregoing discussion and also with honesty and realism. 80. Since it has been recounted by other speakers on several occasions, the history of events in the Congo (Leopoldville) is SO well known that 1 may spare the Council a repetition. In this connexion, 1 shall merely say how distressing it is to find that, for five years, this large, densely populated and rich country-this continent within a continent-has been in a state of chaos, which has kept it from enjoying its independenoe and from organizing and promoting greater prosperity and well-being in the best possible conditions. Tribal, political, and even capitalist strife has been allo\ued full scope. Hatreds, ambitions and personal squabbles have become the .order of the day. 81. The Central African Republic is concerned with the problem not only because the Congo is an African country, a member of the Organization of African Unity and a Member of the United Nations, but also because our peoples, on account of their close proximity, are linked by kinship, as a11 neighbouring countries are. Moreover, at this very moment some of my fellow nationals in our territory wear mourning for their Congolese relatives who have fallen ‘victim to atrocities committed in that neighbouring “The news of the intervention by Belgian paracommando troops at Stanleyville, where they had been transported from the United Kingdom Island of Ascension by United States bombers, was received here with profound consideration. It is clear from the information received that the United States-Belgian militasy intervention in the Congo (Leopoldville), organized with the approval of the United Kingdom Government, has caused the death of several thousand persons, including civilians. “It must be noted that, despite assertions intended to persuade us that the purpose of this intervention was humanitarian, that its objective was to save hostages held at Stanleyville and, moreover, that the prior consent of the lawful Government of the Congo (Leopoldville) was obtained, this interventjon constitutes direct interference in the domestic fairs of an independent State Member of the Uni ed Nations, and that the military operations, which xtended to the town of Paulis 360 kilometres north fast of Stanleyville, have destroyed innocent humanli es and inflicted considerable property damage upon ur Congolese brothers. / “Considering this distressing situation, the Government of the Central African Republic, anxious to have peace restored throughout the Congo, urgently appeals to a11 Congolese to settle their problems themselves, without vindictiveness or bitterness, in Concord and unity. It considers that the immediate withdrawal of a11 foreign troops from the Congo would help to quiet passions and restore peace. It invites the Organization of African Unity to consider this problem again and to find a solution in keeping with the Addis Ababa recommendations.” 83. Furthermore, at a Pïess conference at Bangui on Tuesday, 24 November, His Excellency David Dacko, President of the Central African Republic, declared in reply to a question that “the Central African Republic would grant asylum to ail refugees from the Congo (Leopoldville), but on theclearunderstanding that such rcfugees would refrain from using the territory of the Central AfricanRepublic as a base for any subversive political activity”. 84. Our response did nQt stop there. President Dacko also referred to the Stanleyville affair in his statement of 27 November at the close of the budgetary session of our National Assembly. I apologize for reading out another passage, although it is not very long.We wish however, to have our position clearly understood. The President of the Republic said: 85. Thus, our position may be summed up as follows: (1) the solution of the Congolese problem should first be attempted by the Congolese themselves, but by peaceful means; (2) the Organization of African Unity should continue to give its attention to the problem; (3) we condemn the presence of mercenaries in the Congo: (4) we disapprove of the intervention of Belgium and the United States of America, perpetuated with the aid of the United Kingdom; (5) we shall grant the right of asylum to refugees, even to such rebels as ask for it, on condition that they refrain from subversive political activity in our territory. 86. While the first proposition in this statement of our position is uncontroversial, the other four frequently give rise to discussions indicating basic differences of view on the Congoleseproblem. We continue to hope that a solution Will be found within the Organization of African Unity, if the efforts of that organization are supported by the goodwill and the honest and sincere co-operation of all. We are aware that the resolution adopted by the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at Addis Ababa on 10 September 1964, which has been read out a number of times before in this chamber, took due account of a11 the opposing trends of opinion, past and present, on the Congo question within the great African organization. The Central African Republic oonsiders this resolution to be still valid and deems that the application of its recommendations should not have been impeded SO rudely-1 would even say-so offhandedly, as it was at Stanleyville. The Security Council should take acoount of thesefaots and, at the stime time that it condemns the Stanleyville tragedy, it should take suitable steps to avoid any recurrence of suoh actions. 88. After President Dacko had made the aforementioned statement indicating that my country did not intend as a general rule to refuse the right of asylum to such Congolese rebels as requested it, the PreSS of one African country announced that President Dacko by this action was openly making himself Mr. TshombB’s accomplice! Needless to say, we were somewhat surprised at this gratuitous assertion. Of course, a rectification was soon made. 89. 1 drew your attention to this incident simply to demonstrate the complex character of the Congo affair. In any event, the Central African Republic Will never tolerate subversive plots in its territory against a lawful Government to which it has granted de jure recognition. It is true that, becauseour territory SO close, anarchist or insufficiently controlled Congolese forces have from time to time committed what I shall cal1 acts of banditry against our own inhabitants. Most of these are serious acts, and some have resulted in loss of life, Nevertheless, we do not consider that this authorizes us to question the legitimacy of the Central Government of Leopoldville. On the contrary, because we have always wished to follow a generous good-neighbour policy with a11 our neighbours, we have been able to deal with this Government in Perfect good faith. 90. 1 therefore emphatically express again our earnest hope that, if neither side is subjected to any outside influence from any source, the Congolese, with the disinterested assistance of the Organization of African Unity, Will succeed in righting the situation in their country by legal and peaceful means. We consider that, where the causes of unrest are essentially political, the solution must be essentially political, and must accordingly exclude any resort to force. Bistory teaches us that‘power seized by force, in defiance of the popular Will and the principles of justice, cannot endure, 91. Mr. President, 1 trust that this brief statement Will have given the Council a clear idea of the position of the Central African Republic on the distressing situation which the Council is considering. The Congo (Leopoldville), which cannot be blamed for having attained its independence when it did, has had to face for many years a11 sorts of difficulties and crises: political crises, tribal and persona1 strife, flagrant foreign interference, assassinations, massacres, etc. Th’e Central African Republic earnestly hopes that The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m. HOW TO OBTAIN United Nations publications distributors throughout Write to: United Nations, COMMENT SE PROCURER Les publications des Nations agences dépositaires du monde ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de las Naciones casas distribuidoras en todas dirijase a: Naciones Unidas, Litho in U.N. Pri~e: $US+ 0.35 (or equivalent in other currencies)