S/PV.1177 Security Council

In aecordance. witli the decision previously taken by the Counoil and if 1 hear no ,objection, 1 shall invite the representatives of the Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, Belgium, the Congo (Brazzaville), Algeria, Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, the United Arab Republic, Burundi, Kenya and the Central AfricanRe- 1. Le PRESIDENT mbment Conseil les représentants de la Belgique, du Mali, de la Nigéria, rundi, pUl$ic to Jake the seats reserved for them opposite

1 wish to inform the Council that we have received a communication dated 15 December 1964 from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations asking ta be allowed to participate in the debate on item 2 of our agenda [S/6110].1/ If there is no obection, 1 shall invite the representative of Uganda to participate, without vote, in the debate. A t the invitation of the President, Mr. S. N. Odaka (Uganda) took the place reserved for him in front of the Council table.

The people of Burundi, its Government and its delegation to the United Nations express their gratitude to the Security Council for permitting their representative to sit at the Councfl table and to participate, without voting rights, in your discussions. 4. It would have been heartening to use their first opportunity of enjoying this privilege in a cilse in which one of our bxother African countries was not involved. 5. My country associated itself with thoee who quested that the question of the Congo shouldbe placed on the Security Councills agenda, for two reasons: first, as an African country, a brother of the Congo and an active Member of the United Nations, its sole objective being that the Security Council should adopt a positive position by denouncing the Belgo-American intervention at Stanleyville; secondly, as a neighbour country of the Congo and a country which certain Powers have often reproachedfor its political attitude, because 1 thought-and 1 was not mistaken-that those same Powers, including the United States of America, would not fail to accuse my country of having facilitated the rebel or nationalist action in the Congo, It is in this double role that 1 permit myself to speak before this international body. 6. I shall deal with the subject in the same way would, except for slight differenoes of approach, any African who is aware of the dangers of imperialism and neo-colonialism and is anxious to spare his y Officia1 Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year, Supplement for Ocgber, November and December 1964. 7. 1 must say, further, that the Congo is of concern to the free States of Africa because it forms part of their problem. It has been economically ravaged and Culturally debased; and this has happened in every ex-colonial country. Its independence has been betrayed and its leaders massacred or exiled, which is a constant danger for any independent African State. Its problems therefore are those of a nominal inde- Pendence, of an incomplete and artificial education and of a fanatic imperialism. 7. Il Etats libres problemes. lement ex-colonial. leaders massacrés ou exilés; cela est un danger permanent pour n’importe Ses problbmes pendance nominale, cielle et un imperialisme 8. 1 must add that the more truly independent the Congo becomes, the less dangerous it Will be for its neighbours to establish normal relations with any oountry in the world. Furthermore, the more educa- Mon is distorted in the Congo, the more Will political leaders fail to understand the phenomena of resistance ta exploitation and alienation; the more fanatic im- Perialism becomes the easier it will be for cynical profiteers to proclaim theis independenoe and the more aggressive will the popular masses become. 8. Il faut ajouter ment independant, voisins denouer des relations normales quelle au Congo sera déformée, résistance.& a la comprehension outre, p’lus lrimp6rialisme ment les profiteurs pendance et plus les masses populaires leur combativité, 9. As for their intentions, the imperialists are irreproachable. They have everything and they promise to give everything except real independence. Thus the Congo is flooded with chemically fattened chickens, surplus foodstuffs and, at the same time, fascist mercenaries. 9. Dans irréprochables. donner sauf l’indépendance inonde de poulets plus alimentaires fascistes. 10. Yet what the Congolese need above a11 is real independence. That, at least, is the first proposa1 of the Leopoldville daily newspaper, Le Courrier d’Afrique, of 20 May 1963, which goes on to make the following complaint: 10. Cependant, d’une independance propose 20 mai ensuite la plainte suivante: “Once more, there will be nobody willing to take such an initiative because that is not the plan of the imperialists, .who wish fraudulently to deprive the Congolese people of their possessions after having completely balkanized them. “If, then, no one dares to do anything except that whicli is ordered from outside the country by the sharks of high finance, the Congo becomes a paradise lost. “Thus the Government of the country is stillfaced with a dilemma. Either it must submit to the demands of the people and concern itself directly with their interests by courageously rejecting any requests from puppeteers or it must accept its failure by renouncing its political mandate, Unless one of these two imperatives is obeyed, the second Congolese revolution will break out because the policy of deceit does not psy.” 12. Certain delegations, and many press circles whose speciality, as everyone knows, is to distort the truth, tend to present the Congolese question as being of racial origin, with Arab Afsicans on one side and non-Arab Afrioans on the other. Those who make these same allegations even go SO far as to conclude that it is an open quarrel with the upholdess of savagery , communism and oannibalism on one side and the saviours of democracy and western civilization on the other. 13. If that is really how they define the situation, Burundi cannot remain indifferent in the face of such dishonest machinations, which distort the. truth by oreating confusion, untruth, suspicion and, 1 must say, racism between African countries. That is why my delegation extends its brotherly congratulations to the representatives of the Ivory Coast and Morocco who have vigorously opposed this type of racial propaganda. There is no problem of Arab or non-Arab in our Afsican affairs, but there are problems which alienate the Africans from the non-Africans who intervene openly in Africa in general and in the Congo in particular. My country cannot allow any country, not even an African country, to arrogate to itself the right to secession and to the balkanization of Africa under the pretext of being the spokesman of coloured Africans. These attempts must be denounced publicly because they aim at dividing Africans in osder to better subjugate them. 14. The various speakers who have preceded me, particularly the representative of Kenya, have dealt with all the aspects of the Congolese problem, 1 shall therefore confine myself to the material facts of the Congolese crisis, for my country, being-.a neighbour of the Congo, cannot remain indifferent to the situation, which is of special concern to it. The problem of the Congo is a purely African problem and must be solved in an African framework, and hence by the Africans themselves. In this respect, my delegation firnly supports the efforts made SO far by the Organization of African Unity, and particularly by the ad hoc Commission of the OAU on the Congo, which despite the operation on Stanleyville-an operation which is a flagrant insult to our African Organization-has spared no effort to find a peaceful solution to the Congolese problem. 15. When the advancing mercenaries, led by Vandewalle the Belgian, and Hoare the Bsitish Major, were leaving ashes, corpses and civil war in their wake, the Africans offered the.world an African solution to 16. Bow did this sudden repression occur when only a few days earlier everyone was talking about the advance of the revolutionary forces whose victories at the beginning were following SO olosely on each other that those who were humiliated had to ensure that they ended in tragedy. The fa11 of Kabalo and Kongolo was announced on 14 July. Kasongo was besieged on 18 July, Baudouinville on 21 July, Kindu and Kalina on 25 July and Kabongo on 30 July. The following day the revolutionaries invaded Kivu, the nosth of the former province of Katanga, the north of the province of Kasai’, and Orientale province, approached the province of Equateur and threatened Léopoldville itself. The popular army was then 100 kilometres from Leopoldville. Kwamouth and Mushie were occupied. 17. It was at this point that the Belgian Ambassador to the Congo was recalled to Brussels, where, together with the Minister for National Defence, he tookpart in meetings attended by the Head of the Belgian Military Mission in the Congo, formerly in command of the Belgian battalion in Korea. 18. Moreover, Mr. Harrfman arrived at Brussels on 7 August 1964, and the newspaper Le Monde reported that it was confirmed in Brussels that the United States intended to intervene directly in the Congo in ord,er to prevent, at any price, that countrygoing over t0 communism. Washington, it was said, wasirritated 19. At the same time, strictly atthe sissistance level, Mr. Mennen Williams went to Leopoldville and settled the problem. The newspaper La LibreBelgique, which spoke of this on 14, 15 and 16 August 1964, reported that at Leopoldville enormous transport aircraft unloaded powerful military equipment placed at the disposa1 of the Government to enable it to clean up the rebellion, the extension of which would have been tragic. The journalist alluded to the first four CI-30 transport aircraft, which had unloaded fifty American paratroopers at Ndjili airfield and had opened the airlift taking armoured vehicles, trucks, jeeps and instructors. Later they were joined byfighter aircraft equipped with machine-guns and rackets and piloted by ami-Castro Cuban pilots engaged under contract through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). There were H-221’s transporting troops and ammunition or giving logistical support to the columns of the forces of suppression. There were also helicopters piloted by Belgians and some B-26K’s, a sort of long-range reconnaissance aircraft. 20. The men who assembled such an armadainorder to fight against revolutionaries whose only arms are bows and arrows must be held responsible for the military adventures now taking place in the Congo. That is how the delegatîon of Burundi views the situation. 21. We a11 know that the majority of the white population living at Stanleyville shared the hopes andfears of the black people. We realized later that the danger had corne about as a result of the Belgian-American intervention, The argument which would have us believe that the repressive intervention.of the Belgians and Americans was intended to rescue the imperilled whites from the hands of the black rebels ie nothing but a fascist justification. The truth is that the Belgians, Greeks, Indians, Amerfcans and other foreigners at Stanleyville found themselves in imminent danger only after the parachute drop on Stanleyville and the arriva1 “en masse” of tanks and mortars. 22. Before 1 reply to the accusations that somedelegations have levelled against my country, 1 should like to share with you some of the ideas set forth by Jean Ziégler in his book entitled: La contre-rfivolution en Afrique.?/ ZiBgler writes: V.he African revolution is a community of intention and if possible of action, Its primary goal is to liberate the regions of the continent which are still under white domination, Its action therefore is directed against the white societies of Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique andthe Republic of South Africa. 2/ Paris, Payot, 1963. He continues: “In the face of the revolutionary community of indepenclent Africa, Africa under white domination is preparing for war. Neither the South African leaders, nor the Southern Rhodesian Government, nor the Government of Portugal intends to comply with the demands made at Addis Ababa. The white leaders are taking up the challenge, They accept the test of strength and are preparing for it.” 23. In order to reveal the state of mind of the counterrevolution, Jean Ziégler interviewed some mercenaries. Here are the remarks he gathered-these are the mercenaries speaking: Vhe blacks are, by definition, liars and fakes. They want to kil1 us all. It Will be either us or them. Yes, gentlémen, your decolonization is a communist plot. We are determined to fight, we are the last bulwark against communism in Africa.” Another mercenary, who served in the Katanga army in the glorious days of the secession, said: “After the armistice of January 1963, a great many mercenaries crossed the Congolese frontier. Some of them joined the Portuguese army, others travelled on and entered the service of Southern Rhodesia and of the Republic of South Africa. They are therefore at the disposa1 of the counterrevolution.” 24. du Burundi, dangereuse rations que l’intervention sud-rhodésiens le intention militaire le l’égide &chelle. au Congo Katanga l’Afrique. identiques. fréres résolu nisation crutés fanatiquement comme sainte, colonisé dans leur camp et s’assurer tielle entre la revolution 24. I should like to say at this point that, in the opinion of the delegation of Burundi, armed interventionin the Congo greatly endangers peace inthe world. The statements which 1 have just quoted show clearly that the intervention of South African and Southern Rhodesian mercenaries is not a simple case of intervention within the normal context of voluntary enlistment, but reflects a deliberate intention of engaging in a military adventure in central Africa. 1 should like to say that the Congo (Leopoldville) is nothing but a large-scale Katanga operating under the protection of the interventionists. Financial circles want the Congo (Leopoldville) to play a part that was formerly allotted to Katanga in the struggle against the decolonization of Africa. The methods are the same and the aims identical. 1 feel 1 must tel1 you, 1 must tel1 my brother Afrioans, that this group is the most resolute enemy of the ideal expressed in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity. The mercenaries recruited in Rhodesia and South Afrioa are fighting fanatically because they consider that fight to be their own, a sacred struggle, a holy war, and because they consider the neo-colonial Congo to be a spearhead which they must maintain within their camp in order to make sure of a strategic position in the inevitable confrontation between the revolution and the counter-revolution. 25. Need 1 cite, for the benefit of those assembled here, the etidence of a foreign journalist who, returning to Leopoldville from Stanleyville, reported on the 25. le retour 26. 1 do not think that this is any exaggeration, for it is a non-Afrioan journalist who has related these disastrous results of the activities of the South African and Southern Rhodesian mercenaries. In slaughtering the African people at Stanleyville, the mercenaries killed just for the sake of killing; they did not kil1 only those who were opposed to the r6gime; they massacred because there had to be a massacre, 26. Je crois il s’agit qui rapporte auxquelles et sud-rhod6siens africaine dans l’intention ceux qui étaient sacr6 parce 27. At this point my delegation would like to draw attention to the fact that armed intervention in the Congo may one day prove to be disastrous for the peace of the world. The Powers which have intervened in the Congo, the non-African Powers, were well aware that South African mercenaries are prompted only by racism and 1 think that the Europcan Powers who have hitherto maintained good relations with the African countries, the non-African Powers who have always helped the African countries in denouncing the pernicious policy of South Afrioa, must once again give proof of their goodwill by refusing to support the nefarious activities of the mercenarias in the Congo, 27. C’est 18, de l’avis d’attirer au Congo risque un jour d+&re tr8s n6faste pour la paix dans le monde. Les puissances venues au Congo, savaient tr&s bien que les mercenaires ne sont guides que par un esprit raciste, que les puissances europ6ennes qui, jusqu’a présent, ont toujours les pays africains, ont toujours politique trer appuyer l’action 28. 1 shall now, with your permission, proceed tothe second part of my statement. As 1 had expected, my country has been singled out by certain delegations whose countries are known to be responsible for the present crisis in the Congo. The United States representative has acoused Burundi of interference in the domestic affairs. of the Congo. 1 had thought up to now that that gratuitous statement had been made inirony, for 1 had never thought that the United States of America, responsible as, it is for SO many crises in the world-in Cuba, in Viet-Nam, and in the Congo (Leopoldtille)-could ever dream of incriminatfng a defenceless Afrioan country simply because its foreign policy might not tally with the views and the ideas of the State Department. 1 was even reluctant to mention those countries by name in my statement before the Council, but 1 am oompelled to do SO since my oountry has been mentioned by name by the United States representative, for whom 1 have great respect. My country will have no difficulty in explaining its point of view with regard to its polfcy towards the, Congoits brother country and neighbour. 28. Permettez-moi de mon exposé: mon pays a Bté cit6 par certaines pays qui sont tenus pour responsables actuelle representant dans les affaires mation gratuite, étant faite par ironie, que les tant de crises dans le monde - a Cuba, au Viet-Nam, au Congo (LAopoldville) h incriminer la simple rieure du DBpartement nommément devant le Conseil, car mon pays 51 6t6 oit6 nommement sentant des Etats-Unis, respect. Il sera facile a mon pays de pr6senter point son frère voisin, le Congo. 29, The Government of Burundi had occasion to out- 29. Le Gouvernement line its position before the third extraordinary session d’expliquer 30. Al1 the free countries of the world are aware of the policy which the United States of America has been conducting up to now: there cari be no peaceful coexistence as long as there is divergency of views and as long as there is real independence in the choioe of a policy of neutrality. 30. politique rique: qu’il réelle 31. The history of the Congo has shown that the majority of that countryts misfortunes are the result of intervention by foreign Powers. The American bombardments at our frontiers, the flagrant and repeated violation of our air space by T-28 bombers manned by ami-castre Cubans, the extermination of Africans in the town of Bukavu in the course of air operations ever that town, which is larger than our capital, Bujumbura, leave no shadow of a doubt that the punitive operations undertaken by a number of Western Powers under the leadership of the United States constitute flagrant aggression and a challenge to the Afrioan continent, 31. L’histoire malheurs des puissances etrangeres. Les bombardements ricains réppétee de notre espace aérien par des bombardiers T-28 l’extermination lors grande que notre capitale, aucun doute sur le fait que les opérations entreprises sous le agression africain. 32. Burundi knows full well that a11 the accusations of these Powers are invented; their fabrication will not prevent my Government from taking the path which it considers to be sound and in the best interest of the people of Burundi and of our whole African policy. 32. Le Burundi sations pièces; mon gouvernement saine, dans l’inté& Burundi et de l’ensemble 33. Les pays africains politique dérés par ces derniers communistes, d’épithetes de citer dans son numéro les propos menaçants suivants : 33, African countries which decline to pursue a policy dictateci by their former masters are considered by the latter to be extremists, or communists, and a11 Sorts of gratuitous epithets are bestowed upon them. In this connexion 1 should like to read out a passage from the Belgian newspaper Le Soir of 6-7 June 1964, which contained the following threatening statement: “The Belgian Government has not failed to point out to Usumbura that in siding with the rebellion in Kivu the Government of the Mwami is taking considerable risks, if only that of seeing its Belgian subsidies tut off.” 34. Cela veut dire que s’il y a un soupçon d’aide & la révolution du Burundi, au Congo, réagira Cela signifie ne se fait pas complice du pourrissement nous risquons de la reaction internationale. montre nent actuellement 34. In other words, if the Government of Burundi makes the slightest gesture to aid the revolution in the Congo, Belgium, which is responsible for the situation fn the Congo, Will retaliate by withdrawing its aid to Burundi. This also means that if the Government of Burundi refuses to become an accomplice in the disintegration of Africa, it runs the risk of invasion by the brutal forces of international reactionaries. 1 think that this passage shows olearly that the Powers now intervening in the Congo, supposedly at the officia1 36. 1 shall also venture, on behalf of my delegation, to tel1 this Assembly that we are here to study a definite problem; we are not here to listen to certain systematic statements calculated to create dissension, and 1 repeat, there is no problem of racism among Afrioans, no slavery practised by Africans against their African brothers, In the eyes of my delegation, the greatest slavery is brainwashing, mental derangement, for that alone is chronic and incurable, the other kinds of slavery cari be overthrown by revolution, as has been done in many countries, especially in Africa. pas 37. Before concluding, 1 should like to read out a passage from an address delivered by the Head of my country, His Majesty Mwambutsa IV, at the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU held at Caire in July 1964. My Head of State solemnly declared: “Since authority always imposes a restraint on those subject to it, power must find its justification in its basic aim, that is to say in the good or the benefits it secures for those who obey. Poser must ensure order and tranquillity, prosperity, a higher standard of living, cultural development. It must combat poverty, illiteracy, disease and hunger. We a11 know that negligence on the part of authority, and govexnmental shortcomings, aetually give the people the right to rebel.” This shows clearly the concern of a11 African countries for the grave problem now besetting the Congo. 38. Al1 African countries which have at heart the good cause of our African policy and the good cause of the defence of our interests should make statements identical to my own. cause de notre politique la défense ventions 39. 1 do not think that thereis the slightest exaggeration in what 1 have said here. 1 have simply tried to Prevent racism, tribalism and savageryfrom influencing the course of this debate, for in listening to the statements made by certain delegations here 1 haie observed that those delegations were fomenting distord among the Africans themselves and trying to render ration j’ai voulu éviter influencée gerie, ici délégations 41. Mr. President, 1 shall ask you to give me the floor again in order to refute any allegations and accusations against the delegation of Burundi and against my country, which are sure to be made after the statement 1 have made today.

The Belgian delegation was not of course expecting this debate in the Security Council to take place in an atmosphere of objectivity and serenity. It was natural that the emotions aroused by the tragic events in the Congo should find expression in some outbursts of verbal violence. But I was hopingat least that men who had charge of their countries’ foreign policy, even though they harboured certain feelings of hatred, would control their passions and master them in their public utterances. 43. The Belgian delegation entertains no hostile feelings, and SO it cari take no credit for not piling insult on insult or heaping offensive remark on offensive remark. It Will not answer sweeping, wanton and defamatory statements by more wanton, sweeping and defamatory statements. 44. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kenya, inhis statement before the Council on 15 December [1175th meeting], even went SO far as to make personally insulting remarks about his colleague from Belgium. 45. Belgium’s position has been stated very fully here by the Minister for Foreign Affairs [1173rd meeting]. 1 shall not revert to the question of the legality of the Stanleyville operation, particularly since Mr. Wachuku, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, has shown eloquently and irrefutably that it violated neither the principles of the UnitedNations Charter, nor those of the Charter of the OAU, nor the fundamental principles of international law, 46. Nor do 1 intend to refute point by point the manifold allegations made here by the representatives of 3/ Officia1 Records of the Security Council, Nineceenth Year. Supplement for October, November and December 1964. 47. When Mr. Spaak spoke here, he commented that there had been a vague and ambiguously worded accusation that Belgian soldiers had indulged in massacres in the Congo. Subsequently, the representative of Kenya, after speaking in similarly ambiguous terms of the “butchery that tookplace as a consequence of the armed act of violence against the Congolese people” and of the “organized violenoen whichhad Vet loose SO much blood”, stated without equivocation, and 1 quote his precise words: “1 put it to the Council that the Belgian and United States aggression was wholly and directly responsible for a11 the excesses that were committed in the Congo. How can one speak of a blood bath which one has designed and caused, in one breath, and of humanitarianism in the other? n [ 1175th meeting, para. 61.1 48. Alas, there have been blood baths in the Congo, and Belgium is the first to deplore this fact, but the statements whioh 1 have just quoted-and to whiah 1 prefer not to apply any epithets-are devoid of a11 foundation and cast a slur on my country’s honour. 49. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kenya gives no details and does not produce a single fact to back up hi6 allegations. 1 cari only protest most categorically against such wanton statements, which, moreover, were taken up again by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central Afrioan Republic, I leave with the sowers of hatred the responsibility for the damage their irresponsible words may cause to harmony in international relations, 50. There is another statement 1 have heard repeated here by various accusers-and just today by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Burundi-who have not felt it necessary to denounce the odious practice of taking hostages. According to them, there would have been no massacre of hostages if the rescue operatien had not taken place, The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium has already stated here that in the regions occupied by the rebels several dozen foreigners had beenmassacred before 24 November, often in an atrocious manner. 1 have before me a list of thirty-seven persons of many different nationalitirs who dfed at the hands of the rebels before the rescue operation. 51. As Mr. Spaak said, the Belgium delegation does not intend to open its file of horrors. However, I am forced to recall this fact now when 1 hear it asserted that the detained hostages were perfectly safe in the custody of the rebel authorities. 52. 1 thank you, Mr. President, for having given the Belgium delegation an opportunity to make these clarifications which, 1 repeat, it considered essential, 54. 1 am therefore going to endeavour, on behalf of my country and as a member of the Security Council, to make my modest contribution, not to a solution of recrimination or condemnation but to one of appeasement and Concord, calculated to restore an atmosphere of friendship and international solidarity. Now that the questions referred to in the letter of the twenty-two States of 1 December 1964 [S/6076 and Add.l-5141 and in that of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, dated 9 December 1964 [S/6096],4/ are being considered together, my delegation proposes to state its tiews on the problem as a whole, 55. The Council does not need to be reminded that the Congo tragedy has been going on for over four years; while the facts have remained unchanged with the passage of time, only the players have changed sides. Yesterday it was a central government appointed by Mr. Kasa-Vubu, the President of the Republic, supported by the United Nations; that was fighting against a secessionist government upheld by foreign troops and mercenaries. Today it is a central government appointed by Mr. Kasa-Vubu, the President of the Republic, that, with the assistance of foreign troops and mercenaries, is fighting against a so-called nationalist government supported byforeign troops, ancl there is a regional organization whichhas been invited to seek and is still seeking an African solution. There cari be no doubt that the aims of the de facto governments, which in both cases opposed the central Government, are not identical. .56. In the first case, there was an attempt to breach the unity of the Congo; .in the second, the objective is one that my delegation finds hard to understand, considering that the struggle began under Prime Minister Adoula, the very man who, with the assistance of Mr. Gbenye, bis Minister of the Interior, overcame the de facto governments of Katanga and Stanleyville, and is being continued under another Prime Minister. * 58. On the other hand, military aid for the benefit of a section of the population which xejects the normal pays of gaining power and rebels against its govexnment is not only completely illegal but immoralin case of Africa, where the conflicts are nOt between ideologies or programmes but between persons. What we Africans cal1 counter-revolution or subvexsion the north, west or east of Afxica deserves the same name in central Africa and to cal1 it by any other name would be mexely a ruse or pretence to salve someone’s conscience. 59. In any event, there is no escaping the fact that the violence and murderous nature of the stxuggle in the Congo are in direct proportion to the extent and intensity of the various foreign interventions. In fa&, the seoessionist government did not falluntil the United Nations had expelled the foreign troops and the mercenaries had taken refuge outside the country. unity of the Congo was then xestored. It must, nevertheless, be recognized that in safeguarding Congolese unity the United Nations staked its own existence, although we cari hardly say or believe at this moment, that its existence is no longer threatened. 60. The xeproaches which axe levelled at the United Nations and from which its present difficulties spring, are the xesult of its initial mistake of ignoring the government which asked it to intervene and in finding itself a helpless witness to the murder of the Head of that government. 1 feel that the Organization African Unity should, in the interests of its survival, profit by the experience of the United Nations in the Congo and avoicl becoming involved in futile doctrinaire disputes, 61. There is a saying in the Ivory Coast to the effect that blood relationship is, by its very nature, indissoluble; however you behave, however he behaves, Your brother remains your brother; you did not create the tie and you cannot kfck him without hurting yourself. Similarly, the Congo, with a11 its diffioulties, remains an African land, its leaders axe still Afxicans, and the establishment of trust between the Organizatien of African Unity and the Leopoldville Government prerequisite for any peaceful solution, achieved by PeaCefUl means. 1 am convinced that the loyal COopexation of that Government, whose title to sovereign rights and obligations is as just as ours, Will depend upon this one condition. 62. One fortunate result of the Congo problem been to arouse woxld support for United Nations intexvention. This support is both moral and material. Organization of African Wnity must continue to have the benefit of the moral support, and above a11 the assistance, of international public opinion, In the case 63. In terms of the number of oasualties and the moral principles at stake, the present wax in the Congo has developed into something far bigger than a mere local civil war. Thousands upon thousands of Congolese have been massacred indiscriminately by the two armies in the field. Because of local habits and customs, the Iayout of the villages and the materials of which the houses are built, the destruction caused by the military equipment supplied to bothsides is suoh as to give the appearance of a mass slaughter for which the description “apocalyptic” would not, in my opinion, be disproportionate or exaggerated. What is really regrettable is that hitherto public opinion has not seemed to be unduly disturbed by this; on the contrary, seizing upon one of the many disasters which have befallen that country as a pretext, albeit a humanitarian pretext, it has tried to embroil the brotherly relations between whites and blacks. y I 64. This is undoubtedly a pitiless and lawless war. It is highly regrettable that hostages were taken; it was constantly affirmed in this Council that they were taken as a reprisal-a practice which has been condemned by my Government. This is our unalterable view, whether such things happen in America, in the Middie East or in Africa. It is desirable that everything possible should be done to save these human lives, without discrimination. 65. The truth is that a11 these threats are part of an unfortunate policy of blackmail, a fact which is confirmed by the statements of Mr. Soumialot and of the survivors who have already announced their intention of returning to Stanleyville; this is confirmed by the newspaper Le Monde, which reported on 28 November 1964 that the order which had been given and carried out up to the time of the parachute drop was: “anyone who harms a single white man Will be executed immediatelyl’. Unfortunately, innocent people have nevertheless paid with their lives. 66. The real misfortune was that the Stanleyville authorities had not reckoned with the sensational Press, which headlined the matter and, by publicizing it, enràged European and American public opinion, already prepared by the Tintins in the Congo, the Tarzans in Africa, the Jimbos in the jungle and other television films of the “African Adventure” type. 67. That the racists and enemies of Africa, taking full advantage of the situation, have tried by every means in their power to attribute this disaster to racial strife demonstrates the moral degradation of the world. They have already forgotten the cremation ovens , the shame of Oradour-sur-Glane of which the barbarity and savagery have never been equalled and the origin of which was not the work of Negroes. 69. After 1,800 lives had been saved, 20,000 other persons were rounded up to be interrogated and the suspects were automaticaily executed. The mercenaries claim that a11 prisoners were executed for humanitarian reasons. They think that the solution to the problem would be the extermination of the so-called cannibal tribes. What should we, who bear the responsibility, think of this solution? 69. AprBs sonnes d’interrogatoire, abattus. sonniers Ils pensent que la solution mination des tribus nous responsabilités? 70. The Ivory Coast delegation, which, despite passions and emotions, has always refrained from condemnation, would like to be able to continue its firm policy of constantly seeking to solve problems by peaceful means. ‘70, La délégation les passions de condamner, la constance inlassable d’apaisement. 71. It therefore remains firm in its belief that the Counoil should be able to remain detached from the emotional aspects of the problem, to determine the facts and to promote a solution which would remove the danger of a oonflict of this nature, The tension which was felt in Europe prior to the parachute drop, and in Africa after the event, shows, if further evidence is needecl, thepossible repercussions and proportions of the Congolese tragedy. il. doit pouvoir du probleme, une confiit Europe, celle qui l’a suivie en Afrique, besoin, les proportions 72. The carefully contrived murders by the white rnercenaries in return for a salary are unworthy of civilization. The massive destruction of human life through the use of heavy armaments supplied by foreign intervention has consumed SO many adult lives that the Congolese are obliged toput a11 available human resources, including children from ten to thirteen years, into the front line. It would be cruel indeed to remain unmoved by such a situation. 72. naires allouee destruction l’utilisation interventions d’adultes en ligne de bataille disponibles, C’est situation. 73. It must be admitted that up to now the purpose of the aid supplied to the Congolese by both sides has net been to promote a solution to the Congolese problem but rather to help the Congolese kill each other. It is strange to observe that aid for killing is easier to obtain than aid for preserving life. 73. tée aux Congolais eu jusqu’ici probleme B s’entretuer. que l’aide que l’aide pour faire vivre. 74. What is more, the information we have been given in the course of this debate shows that the same dangers from which the United Nations had wished to save the Congo are reappearing. 1 want to speak about the confrontation of the great Powers and the unhappy example of the countries which are suffering as a result of it, SO that 1 might induce the smaller Powers to launch the Congo rescue operation before it is too late. 74. donnés mêmes dangers que les Nations gner l’affrontement des d’amener de sauvetage 75. It seems to me quite clear that the Congo’s interests lie in peace, unity and reconciliation. 75. Il m’apparaît reside liation. 77. We should therefore be able to lay aside our preferences, our ideology, and undertake no action which does not help to reconcile the Congolese and enable them to solve their own problems. 77. toutes rien Congolais leurs 78. TO maintain, with good reason, that the Congolese problem Will not be solved by military means is to maintain that neither party Will make its views prevail in their entirety; it is therefore to recognize that oompromise is inevitable. Compromise cannot be achieved, hqwever, if preliminary conditions and exceptions are laid down. A good mediator is one who cari put aside his own feelings, who cari remain detached from the struggle in order to avoid making it impossible for one or the other of the parties to become reconciled and who cari, whatever the behaviour of both sides, determine which factors unite them and remove the factors which divide them. 78. lais c’est ne fera reconnaftre Or, ou d’exclusives. étouffer au-dessus ou l’autre que soit leur ments de division, 79. africaine ver pas elle ne recherche ment de la Republique lors Toutefois, la souveraineté les Unies, s’abstiennent rieures 79. My delegation thinks that the Organization of African Unity cari help the Congolese Government to find a solution, but it would be unrealistic, as indeed would any such action by the Security Council, if it did not seek the co-operation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The task of the Council is therefore extremely difficult, In any case, since the Charter demands respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a11 States Members of the United Nations, the Council should ensure that a11 States refrain from intervening in the domestic affairs of the Congo. 80. The Council should declare that the solution of the problem of the Congo is dependent onthe restoration of law and order and reconciliation, and should induce a11 States to refrain from anything liable to prevent or retard the achievement of these two objectives, 80. probleme public Etats d’emp&cher deux objectifs. 81. The Council has been informed of the endeavours of the Organization of African Unity under the Addis Ababa resolution; my Government is one of those whioh deplore the hesitancy of the Organization of African Unity and its futile persona1 quarrels, but it is certain that, once tempers have cooled, African wisdom Will triumph. The Council should therefore encourage the Organization of African Unity to continue its efforts and should invite a11 States to assist it in those efforts, 81. déployés le cadre vernement de l’Organisation querelles la passion Le l’Organisation efforts sens. 83. Mr. Felix Houphouët-Boigny, the President of the Republic of the Ivory Coast, statedon 10 December at Ouagadougou: “we are beginning to be anxious about the situation in Africa”. This is undoubtedly truc now that the spectre of a confrontation of the great Powers has reappeared. It is for this reason that, in the present state of the Congolese problem in particular, 1 appeal to the great Powers to do nothing which might prevent the Security Council from settling the question to the satisfaction of the Congolese people, for to do otherwise would be a catastrophe.

A few weeks ago, the knowledge of the atrocities perpetrated in Stanleyville on innocent and unprotected hostages spsead throughout the entire world, Aocording to evidence and proofs which have not been denied, those responsible for the crimes were the rebels who were fighting for the establishment in the Congo of the so-called “Congolese People’s Republic “, 85. During the course of our debates in the Security Council on the complaint presented by several African States against Belgium, the United States and the United Kingdom, with reference to the humanitasian operation to free those hostages who escaped the cruelty of the rebels, not one fact was brought forth, not one proof was offered, which could justify the acts which took place in Stanleyville and elsewhere, The criminal facts, widely publioized, supported even by photographs, have not been denied. They stand exposed to us, in the full extent of their inhumanity, Even more, this debate has served only to amass new evidence and additional information, reinforcing the general feeling of repulsion toward such extraorclinary acts, carried out, as they were, with overtones of perverseness. 86. Brazil cannot fail to decry such actions. The adverse opinion of the Brazilian delegation takes on an entirely special significance, since it would be impossible to accuse us of partiality. Since. the dawn of the United Nations, Brazil has been one of the most constant and most resolute adversaries of colonialism. The desire of the African peoples to emerge out of the limbo of subjugation to foreign soveseignty into the full exercise of their independence has always met with my country’s enthusiastic support and sympathy. It was been thus in the past, it is SO in the present, and it Will be SO in the future. 87. We continue to look with favour upon a11 the efforts made here at the United Nations toward decolonization and for the oomplete suppression of the 88, My delegation cannot fail to express its forma1 reservations to the opinion which states that to condemn the barbarisms of Stanleyville is to take part in a global racist conspiracy against black people. In my country, there is no swch situation of permanent humiliation and shame for the Negro population, alleged by the representative of the Congo (Brazzaville) to be the lot of his race throughout the world. In Braeil, Negroes are Brazilians like all other Brazilians, and have the full use of their citizenship’s rights and guarantees. Our people are proud of the participation of African civilization in the formation of our nationality. Anti-colonialist by tradition and anti-racist by the exercise of a constant, true racial democracy, we feel at ease to voice our disapproval of the Stanleyville nightmare. The operation liberating thehostages . held by the rebels of Stanleyville was requested by the constitutional Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the only legal Govesnment of that country, recognized by the United Nations as such, and the request was made in the use of its sovereign rights. It is worthwhile to point out that the legitimacy of the Government of Leopoldville was substantiated here, at the first meeting [1170th meeting] devoted to the question now before us, by the representative from the Ivory Coast. On the other hand, 1 have been informed that the majority of the African countries which have been taking part in the work of the Council recognize the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and maintain normal diplomatie relations with that Government. permanentes bresiliens. nationalite. racistes principes le droit des actes, a Stanleyville. de la République vernement par les raineté, avait réclame l’operation de libération des otages detenus par les rebelles de Stanleyville. Il y a lieu de souligner que la legitimite du.Gouvernement de Léopoldville Premiere examinons [Il’lOème de la CBte-dTvoire. que la majorité des pays africains qui prennent part aux travaux ment de la République démocratique du Congo et entretiennent avec lui des relations diplomatiques normales. 89, Consequently, from the formal juridical point of view, the life-saving operation was completely legitimate, solicited as it was by the Congolese Government itself, in the use of its powers. 89. Par consequent, d’un point de vue purement juridique, l’opération de sauvetage a Bté entièrement legitime, puisqu’elle a et6 réclamee par le Gouvernement congolais lui-meme, dans l’exercice 90. Une operation de cette nature est justifiée par son objet crime, qui est reconnu comme tel au regard du droit international regissant les relations entre Etats, et qui consiste B utiliser titre Le cas est d’autant plus grave en l’occurrence la plupart des otages - parmi lesquels des femmes, des enfants et des membres de congregations religieuses - ne faisaient en presence mais Btaient des ressortissants d’autres pays. La prise d’otages est Condamn&e par le droit et par les conventions internationales sur la guerre, qui tendent B limiter a ceux qui prennent une part active aux operations militaires, cipent pas aux opérations militaires contraire 90. Such an operation fin& its justification in the very objective which inspired it, which was to frustrate the perpetration of a crime, recognized as such by international law and by a11 the norms of conduct governing relations among States, which consists in the use of innocent civilians as hostages, as a bargaining point in war-time. In this case, there is an additional aggravation, the fact that most of the hostages -which inoluded women, children and members of religious orders-did not belong to either -of the warring parties, but were nationals of other countries. The praotioe of taking hostages is oondemned by law and by the international war conventions, which aim te limit the oonsequences of warfare to those directly involved in military activities. It is utterly repellent to the spirit of international law governing the oonduct of war-inspiration of the Geneva Conventions of 1949- to imprison civilians, non-participants in the belligerent actions, and even more proscribed is the use 92. The solid links of sincere and authentic friendship which unite Brazil to her sister ,countries in Africa, our unclouded and always vigorous disposition to fight for the continuationof theprocess of liquidating colonialism, encouraging development and the full participation of the Young African nations in international life, only reinforce our moral obligation to condemn the deeds of the rebel forces in Stanleyville. The violations of basic principles of law and of international morality perpetrated in the Congo were performed by irregular troops, by insurrectionists, and are not the responsibility of any legally recognized African Government. This fact, however, does not make the insurrectionists any less reprehensible. 93, In the gallery of horrors of modern history, Stanleyville Will certainly figure next to names marked by the unhappy notoriety of those who saw the worst hours of .the human race at Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Lidice and Oradour. I do not believe that this name, besmirched by sinister memories, can be made the battle-cry of a crusade for the development of any country, or the symbol of action for the grandeur and Prosperity of a noble, resourceful and magnanimous race. 94. While deploring the grim episodes that tookplace in Stanleyville and elsewhere in the Congo, my delegation wishes to emphasize the importance of exploring a11 possible ways of finding a peaceful and effective solution for the Congolese problems. We strongly support the suggestion to establish an investigating committee to report to this Counoil as soon as possible. Furthermore, my delegation deems it appropriate for the Council to reaffirm those principles which have served as a guideline to its previous decisions on the matter. 95. It follows that the Security Council must make it clear that the ultimate solution for the problems of the Congo lies exclusively in the hands of the Congolese people. Therefore, we cannot acoept any justifications for the various forms of assistance allegedly being given by certain Governments to the rebel movement, They are contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter and represent an intervention in the interna1 affairs of a sovereign State. The unity of the Congo, as well as its territorial integrity, should be 97. These are, in the opinion of the Brazilian delegation, the basic principles which should be respected and enforced in order to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Congolese people and of the African continent as a whole.

In associating myself at this late hour with the previous speakers who, in common with the Uganda Government, jointly signed the letter of 1 December 1964 [S/6076 and Add.l-51, 1 am fully conscious of thefact that much of the ground has been covered. However, because of our geographical position vis-à-vis the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with which we are neighbours, my country is, to say Che least, deeply interestedin what goes on in the Congo. This is partly because of the purely selfish but natural preference for a peaceful and prosperous neighbour, and partly because the whole of Africa, and indeed the whole of the world, is greatly aroused by the invasion of Stanleyville of the allied Powers, 99. Some Foreign Mini&ers have compared the use of foreign troops by East African Governments to quel1 mutinies in their armies early this year with what is going on in the Congo. I submit that there is no comparison whatever between the situation either in Uganda,or in any otherpartof EastAfrica,whereafew soldiers in one company disobeyed lawful instructions and British troops were brought in only to guard vital installations and to disarm those soldiers, with that of the situation in the Congo, Inthe case ,of this mutiny, it was caused by the dissatisfaction with conditions of service and was not-1 repeat, was not-a rebellion against the lawful Government of Uganda, It is absurd, therefore, to compare the use of foreign troops in East Africa with the use of mercenaries and the pouring in of iarge quantities of military equipment in the Congo in support of one faction whioh is fighting fox political domination over the other. 100. Yesterday [1176th meeting] the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria suggested that those who brought the question of military intervention by foreign Powers to the Security Council should have taken it to the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity. 1 should like to state here why Uganda was a signatory to the letter of 1 December 1964 addressed to the President of the Security Council. - - 21 102. But it has also been contended that African States have interfered in the sovereignty and independence of the Congo and that this matter should be discussed in the Security Council. We do not agree. Lf either Nigeria or the Congolese Government considers that other African States are interfering in the interna1 affairs of the Congo, then Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo should know the right body before which this matter should be raised. It is the Organization of African Unity, to which a11 African countries belong. Surprisingly enough, the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Jaja Wachuku, did not share this view. 1 shall therefore pass over the rest of what he said, and appeal to him to raise the matter before the Organization of African Unity. 1 suggest that this course would be in keeping with the traditions that were referred to yesterday. This would conform to what was done in the case of the dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia, and between Somalia andKenya. This would also conform to the noble tradition which led to the settlement of the dispute between Algeria and Morocco. 103. However, as two of the States accused of intervening in the Congo, the United States and the United Kingdom, are not only Members of the United Nations but also of the Security Council, Uganda feels very strongly that the intervention must be looked at critically and exposed in the right body, and not sidetracked, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria tried to suggest yesterday. 104. Since the Congo became independent, because of the unsettled international situation, Uganda has had thousands and thousands of refugees of a11 races pouring into our country, whom we have had to support at great expense financially and by using the scarce manpower at our disposal. Therefore we were optimistic when President Kasa-Vubu appealed to the Organization of African Unity to try to help his country find a peaceful solution, 1 Will not repeat the steps which led to the meeting in Addis Ababa of the Council of Ministers of the OAU and the appointment of an ad hoc Commission under the chairmanship of Mr. Kenyatta, but 1 must express the disappointment of my delegation that, in spite of the clear terms of reference and conditions which were laid down by the Foreign Ministers at Addis Ababa and which were accepted by Mr. Tshombé, Mr. Tshombé was unable to fulfil his promises which were first of all, to stop the fighting and to ensure the security of the anti-Government forces, which would also cesse fire; secondly, to withdraw the mercenaries; thirdly to start negotiations 105. It has been argued that Afrioan oountries refused military aid to TshombB in replacement of mercenaries. In my delegation’s opinion, no selfrespecting African country could agree to the sending of African troops as mercenaries. The whole aim and intention of such mercenaries is clearly contrary to African objectives and aspirations. We believe that, *instead of helping to maintain law and order, they are actually in the Congo to exterminate innocent lives or the sake of money. In any case, if Mr. Tshomti ‘had fulfilled what he promised in Addis Ababa-namely, to stop the fighting-the ad hoc Commission would have been in a position to persuade the Stanleyville régime also to stop fighting simultaneously, and that would have created the necessary peaceful conditions without which effective negotiations could not be entered into. 1 know that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria was not present at the extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers of the OAU held in Addis Ababa. It is becausein the absence of Mr, Wachuku we prevailed upon Mr. TshombB not to be legalistic that he agreed to the resolution that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria is now praising. 105. refusé en ma delegation, ne pouvait a titre mercenaires tiens lieu sont moyennant M. Tshombé a Addis-Abeba ad hoc aurait r6gime ce qui aurait saires negociation affaires a la session de l’OUA de M. Wachuku de ne pas a acoepte etrangeres 106. It must be clear that other factors apart from Iegal and constitutional arguments have to be taken into consideration. For example, we have for a long time been opposed to the inhuman practices in South Africa because we felt a11 along that its domestic policies affected human rights. The United States did stop the legal Government of Cuba from obtaining military aid, because it felt that other factors were involved. In that case thoss factors were military and strategic. In the case of the Congo, we in Uganda who are its neighbours, have suffered from the confusion going on in the Congo through the influx of refugees, We are also concerned with the non-Afrioan approach which Prime Minister Tshombe has taken by inviting white mercenaries who. as soldiers of fortune are hired to kill-and they kil1 people who happen not only to be human but to bs Africans. We are also concerned with the %old-warn aspect of the Congo problem. 106. rations teurs que nous nous elevons pratiques du Sud, parce politique droits que Etats-Unis Cuba En d’ordre Congo, ce pays, qui a provoqu8 egalement solution naires est de tuer - qu’ils sommes froide” 107. Therefore we cannot be expected to support Mr, Tshombé when he fraternises with South African soldiers of fortune. No African in his right senses could do SO. It seems quite clear to the Uganda delegation that TshombCI and his advisers are interested only in the legalistic interpretation of sovereignty and that these imperialistic adventurers arepreparing 107. pas M. Tshombe turiers son délegation Tshombe une interprétation 108. We a11 remember how the Sub-Committee ofthe ad hoc Commission was rebuffed and prevented from seeing the President of the United States and how the ad hoo Commission was unfdrly accused of not going to Stanleyville or Leopoldville. It is impossible to expect the ad hoc Commission to go to Leopoldville or Stanleyville as long as the mercenaries are still fighting. 109. We have a11 heard of the evénts of 24 November. It ‘was a tragic day for the Congo and for Africa. As 1 said in the general debate of the General Assembly,g it raises the whole issue of the independence of small States. 1 should like from the outset to olarify my Government’s abhorrence of the practice of holding oivilian hostages. I would also strongly condemn the bombing and machine-gunning of whole villages, which resulted in the loss of the lives of SO many innocent oivilians. TO understand the events of 24 November, it is important to know that the mercenaries led by a Captain Hoare were advancing on Stanleyville, and it was an open secret that Stanleyville would be bombed. The only impediment to this operation was the presenoe. in Stanleyville of a large number of whites, mostly nationals of Belgium and the United States, It was quite clear to anybody who cared to look at the situation with anunbiased eye that, although the United States, Belgium and the United Kingdom were claiming the proposed rescue operation to be humanitarian, it was obviously an operation insupport of the one led by Major Hoare. 110. My Government, therefore, considered it extremely unbecoming that the United States and the others, after encouraging soldiers of fortune to mount military operations in Afrioa, after already deciding on a date to attack Stanleyville, appealed to the ad hoc Commission to plead on behalf of the white hostages who were already endangered by the impending military operation. They knew full well that if there had been no threat of attack either from the air or by the mercenaries who were advansing towards Stanleyville, the whites would not have been taken as hostages, 111. The telegram, quoted in this Counoil, from Gbenye, illustrates this very clearly. It was because of the grave concern about the deteriorating situation in the Congo that my Prime Minister, Mr. Milton Obote, on 2 November appealed to the United States and asked them to use their influence with Tshomb6 to stop the attack on Stanleyville by land or by air, ‘5 .%e Officia1 Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 1293rd meeting. 112, It is now an historical faot that at the Nairobi Conference the Stanleyville régime, on the one hand, and Leopoldville and the United States, on the other, were talking at cross-purposes. The latter were interested in only two things; first, to save the lives of the white hostages and, seoondly, ta maximize the military advantages that had been gained at the expense of the Stanleyville régime. ‘They were, therefore, only too ready ta misinterpret the intentions of the Stanleyville, régime in the .negotiations at Nairobi, and they accused it of trying ta make political capital out of the hostages. ! 113. It is difficultto imagine .that ,any Afric‘an leader could sit at the oonference table and consider only the future of the whites, and remain indifferent ta the future of his fellow Africans in the City. We made it clear that we were interested in saving a11 lives, and I repeat, ail, lives, white snd black. But ta the United States ‘and ta Mr. Tshombé this signified an attempt to elevate the Stanleyville regime to the Ievel of a legal ‘Government. 112. de Nairobi regime Leopoldville ci sauver au maximum assurés pourquoi intentions ciations les otages a des fins politiques. 113. africains pencher férent vaient bages rbpete, Mais vaudrait au rang de ‘gouvernement legal. 114.’ 1 am not going to comment on the accusations and charges of oannibalism made against the Congolese people by their own representative. My delegation is now only interested in finding a way of tidying up the Congolese mess, We believe that given ,a gqod leadership, a leadership which is interested infinding a permanent and peaceful solution ta the,problem of the Congo .with the minimum loss of lives, the future of the Congo Will be a bright,one. We believe that no amount of military aid for either side Will help in solving the Congo problem. 114. Je nI.ai pas l’intention accusations de, cannibalisme portées contre le peuple congolais par son propre representant. Le seul désir de ma délegation, en ce moment, est de trouver un moyen de mettre de l’ordre dans l’imbroglio congolais. Nous sommes convaincus que lorsque le Congo aura trouve des chefs capables, des chefs désireux de regleipacifiquement le problème du Congo en reduisant au minimum les pertes de vies humaines, le Congo aura devant lui un avenir prospere. Nous pensons que ce n’est pas en apportant une aide militaire, l’importance, contribuera & regler le probleme congolais. 115. Depuis la mort de Lumumba, le Congo n’a malheureusement pu trouver un autre chef national qui soit populaire et accepté par le peuple congolais, et nous pensons qu’il s’agit là d’un probl&mepolitique plutôt que militaire, 115. Since the death of Lumumba, the Congo has had the misfortune of not being able ta find another national leader who is popular and acceptable ta thecongolese people, and we believe that this is a political rather than a military problem. 116. Que pouvons-nous faire? La délegation ougandaise est convaincue que, malgré la regrettable agression contre Stanleyville, il n’est pas encore trop tard. C’est pourquoi je propose que le Conseil de securite - et en particulier le Royaume-Uni - exercent toute leur influence sur M, Tshombé pour qu’ il accepte la résolution de 1’ Organisation de l’unit% africaine concernant le retrait de tous les mercenaires était termin6e d’ici prendre un nouveau depart. 116. What cari we ‘do? My delegation is convincedthat in spite of the unfortunate aggression on Stanleyville, the time is not too late. Therefore, 1 propose that the Security Council-and especially the United States, Belgium and the United Kingdom-should bring a11 their influence ta bear on Mr. Tshombé to accept the resolution of the Organization of African Unity for the withdrawal of a11 mercenaries from the Congo. If this could be accomplished by.31 December, ,then a fresh start. could be made. 117. M. s’efforcer mission ad hoc de l’Organisation de l’unité africaine. On pourrait nion à laquelle assisterait 117. We appeal ta Prime Minister Tshombé to recpnsider his stand and ta make a genuine attempt to co-operate ,with’the ad hoc Commission of the Organization of African Unity. An urgent meeting should be convened, attended by Prime Minister TshombB, with the main, objective of stopping a11 fighting. At the 118. 1 would join those who have spoken before me in condemning most strongly the attempts to divide Africa into what they have called the “Arab North” and the “blaok South”. There is only one, indivisible Africa, and we stand for solidarity. There must be no attempts to divide the African Continent. 119, Finally, 1 would repeat that the Congo problem essentially is an African problem, and it is the hope of my delegation that the African States, if given the chance, cari solve this problem. 120, Mr. LIU (China): After SO much impassioned oratory, 1 believe it is useful to remind ourselves the essential facts involved in the present case, These facts are, firstly, the rebels in the Stanleyville did hold thousands of innocent men, women andchildren as hostages, and secondly, that they threatened hostages with imminent execution. These facts are not in dispute, what is in dispute is whether the rescue operation launched by Belgium and the United States was neoessary. 121. Those who have brought the matter before the Security Council contend that it was not necessary and that instead of saving lives it actually made the massacre inevitable. Here we are in the realm of speculation, and 1 do not believe that anybody cari prove with any degree of certainty what might or might not have happened if the rescue operation had not been launched. 122. In the circumstances, my delegation is fully satisfied with the statements made in this Council by the representatives of Belgium and the United States that the operation was necessary to save the lives of the hostages, and that it was an humanitarianmission, and nothing more. 123. Inasmuch as the operation was expressly thorized by the Government of the Democratiç public of the Congo, which is recognized by a11 as the legally constituted Government of the country, difficult to see how the charges of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism, of violating the Charter of the United Nations and of threatening the peace and security of the African Continent cari be substantiated. 124. However, the rescue operation did take place and it did succeed in bringing some two thousand people of various nationalities to safety. It seems to my delegation that it serves no useful purpose to indulge in recriminatory oratory on a matter which has already passed into history. What the Council should 125. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has charged that certain sister States have been aiding and abetting rebellion within its territory and have been subverting its independence and territorial integrity. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, in his statement before the Council yesterday, asked the Council to take seriously the complaints of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to dissuade those African States that have been accused of unlawful intervention in the Congo from further interference in its affairs. 126. Needless to say, the Council has a special and continuing responsibility in this matter. its resolution of 22 July 1960 [S/4405]6/ is still in force today. In that resolution, which was adopted unanimously, the Council requested “a11 States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Congo of its authority and also to refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo”. 127. If the complaints of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are true-and there is ample reason for believing that they are true-then the Council cannot do less than what the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria has asked of it. 128. 1 believe that there is considerable merit in the suggestion that the Council should, as an urgent matter, establish an inspection and investigation group to proceed to the Congo and to report to this Council, SO that outside intervention in the affairs of the Congo cari be brought to an end at the earliest possible moment, 129. The Council is, of course, awase that the Congo suffers not only from the intervention of its sister African States, but also from that of countries which lie far keyond the African continent. It is common knowledge that the Communists of my own country regard tlne Congo as a political vacuum, and they intend to fil1 it. They are a threat not merely to tne independence of the Congo; they are a threat to a11 Africa. 130. The Council’s obligation to the Congo is clear. It must see to it that the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Congo are preserved; that it does not become a cockpit for alien ambitions, and that it be given an opportunity to solve its problems and develop its political institutions in its own way, free from outside interference and with the goodwill and assistance of all. 1 believe it is in the interest of a11 the African States to help to bring this 61 Officia1 Records of the Securiry Council, Fifreenth Year. Supplemant for July. August and September 1960. /. 131, The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): There are no further speakers on my list for today, 1 shall therefore adjourn the meeting. 132. However, before cloing SO, 1 wish to inform the Council that, after the customary consultations, we have decided ta hold a meetingof the Council tomorrow morning to continue the discussion on the ‘Congo. The Council Will also convene tomorrow afternoon for the purpose of resuming considération of the complaints submitted by the delegations of the Syrian Arab Republic and of Israel in the letters dated 14 and 15 November 1964, respectively. 133. 1 wish also to inform members of the Council that we have agreed to hold alfurther meeting of the Council on Friday at 10.30 in the morning to consider the report of the Secretary-General on the question of Cyprus. The meeting rose at 6 p.g. 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