S/PV.1178 Security Council
▶ This meeting at a glance
5
Speeches
3
Countries
0
Resolutions
Topics
War and military aggression
Security Council deliberations
Arab political groupings
Global economic relations
UN procedural rules
Southern Africa and apartheid
In accordance with the decision previously taken by the Council and if 1 hear no objection, 1 shall invite the representatives of the Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, Belgium, the Congo (Brazzaville), Algeria, Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, the United Arab Republic, Burundi, Kenya, the Central African Republic and Uganda, to take the seats reservedfor them opposite the Council table and to participate in the debate without the right to vote.
1. ment & la dgcision et s’il n’y a pas d’objection, sentants Belgique, Mali, la Nigeria, du l’Ouganda du Conseil reservées
1 wish to inform the Council that we have received a letter dated 15 December 1964 from the Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations asking to be allowed to participate the debate [S/SllZ].u If there is no objection, 1 shall invite the representative of the United Republic Tanzania to participate, without vote, in the debate.
At the invitation of the President, Mr. Kambona, representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, took the place reserved for him in fron f of the Council table.
Mr. President, 1 am grateful to you and to the Council for affording me the opportunity of participating this debate. Originally, 1 had not intended to participate. My country, it is truc, is one ofthe twenty-two signatories to the letter [S/SO76 and Add.l-5]2! which initiated the present proceedings of this Council. And we hold as strong views as any other Member about the responsibility of the United Nations to maintain peace and security, and the jurisdiction of the Security Council in this respect. But, as 1 have said, my original belief had been that the participation in the discussion in this Council of the representatives of our brother States of Africa would have been sufficient to inform the Council of the facts of thematterunder discussion and establish the basis for corrective action.
4. However, as the proceedings in this Council have unfolded, there have occurred two unfortunate developments which have made it imperative for me to intervene.
5. The first development has been the charge by the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, supported by the representatives of the United States and Belgium, that certain countries have assisted or are assisting rebel groups in the eastern part of the Congo. This has been denounced by these representatives as constituting intervention in the domestic affairs of the Congo, in violation of the provisions of the United Nations Charter and of the Security Council resolution of 22 July 1960 [S/4405].31 This serious charge, affecting as it does the sovereignty and independence of a fellow Member of the United Nations and a brother member of the Organization of African Unity, is as impossible to ignore
y Officia1 Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year. Supplement for October, Navember and Dscember 1964.
2lIbid.
3/ Ibid., Fifceenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 19ti0.
6. The second development has been the levelling of the charge of racism, by the representatives of the United States and Belgium, against those representatives of African States who have attemptedto explain why we cannot accept the explanation of the Stanleyville operations as an act of humanitarianism, as a mere rescue mission.
6. racisme et de la Belgique africains pouvions rations comme une simple
7.
7. I shall first discuss the charge of intervention.
8, Some previous speakers have dwelt at great length on the fact that the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a sovereign State and equal in status to any other member of the Organization of African Unity or Member of the United Nations. From this fact they have argued that the charge before the Council should not bave been made in the first place, because the paratroop operation was made with the consent and approvai, and by the invitation, of the legal Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
8. insisté mocratique mêmes nisation nisation soutenu n’aurait chutistes du Gouvernement du Congo et sur l’invitation
9. 1 do not want to enter into a discussion of the legality of the Government of Mr. Tshombe, although some of my fellow complainants have correctly pointed out that such legality is held in dispute by many people ,and several Governments. Such people are not found just outside the Congo. Indeed the very unrest and civil war now in the Congo arises from, and is testimony to, the fact that many people within the Congo itself have decided of themselves to question the legality of Mr. Tshombe’s Government.
9. la légitimité que certains B juste bien des gens et par plusieurs gens troubles ont pour le fait de M. Tshomb&
10. Some wild and unwarranted allegations have been voiced here-and, 1 regret to say, from some of the most unexpected quarters-about the ineffectiveness of the Organization of African Unity and its ad hoc Commission in dealing with the Congo problem. It has been asserted that, because the ad hoc Commission had proved unable to solve the Congo problem, Mr. Tshombé was justified in callingfor British, American and Belgian intervention. It has been suggested that, because the ad hoc Commission had proved incapable of saving the lives of the hostages, Mr. Tshomti was justified in calling on the three Governments toundertake the so-called rescue operation. Had the ad hoc Commission proved its inability to salve the Congo problem? Had it proved its incapacity to ensure the lives of the hostages?
10. taisistes grette tendues l’unit8 l’affaire sion bleme l’intervention P&endu pas rï5ussi Btait d’entreprendre Commission cité de r&oudre rév818e
11. la matinée parachutistes ration, me demanderai mencé.
Il. The ad hoc Commission was set up on the morning of 10 September 1964. The actual landings of the
ParatrOOps took place on 24 November. The operation
is said to have been completed on 29 November; I shall not speculate on when it actually began.
12. chait patiemment nale le Congo d’obtenir tent
12. The evidence is clear that the adhoq Commission was patiently seeking the bases for national reconciliation in the Congo and between the Congo and its neighbours. It was making substantial progress towards getting the Stanleyville authorities to agree to a negotiated settlement of their differences with the
13. Had the ad hoc Commission provedits ineptitude? Or is it that the methods of peace and patience and negotiation, which it was employing, had proved unpalatable to the authors of this intervention and their friendly host?
14. As my President, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, stated shortly after the Stanleyville operations began:
“In an action reminiscent of Pearl Harbor, fore@ troops wese flown into the Congo at the very moment that negotiations were taking place to secure the safety of a11 who live in the Stanleyville area.
“As a member State of the Organizationof African Unity, Tanzania depsecates in the strongest terms the landing of Belgian paratroopers by American planes from a British base. This action has been taken in defiance of the whole of Africa.
‘1It is with great regret that the Tanzanian Government has heard of further loss of life, both Congolese and foreign, in our neighbouring and brother African State. The concern of the United Republic is, and Will be, to bring conditions of peace to that country SO that the welfare of the people, and the future of the whole of Africa may be assured.”
15. I should now like to turn to the complaint of the Congolese Government that certain African States have been subverting the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The charges in the letter of Mr. Tshombé [S/6096]4/ are extremely vague, and speak only of reports that these Africancountries are lending moral and material support to the rebels. Neither Mr. Tshombé nor the representatives of the Democratio Republic of the Congo has found itpossible to lay before this Council any evidence, written or concrete, of this African intervention. 1 shall not therefore speak on this matter.
16. In his address to this Council [1173rd meeting], the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, has, however, made a specific ctiarge against my Government and my President. He alleged that my President, Mr. Julius Nyerere, held a conspiratorial meeting with Presidents Nasser, Ben Bella, Modibo Keita, Sékou Tour& Nkrumah, Kenyatta and Massemba-Debat during the Conference of Heads of State’ or government of Non-Aligned Cotintries in Cairo. He further alleged that this secret meeting agreed on the liquidation of the Tshomw Government and the
4/ Ibid., Ninereenth Yek, Supplement for October, November and December 1964.
18. The representative of the Democratio Republic of the Congo sought tq justify the military intervention of the United States and Belgium in Stanleyville by comparing the Congo situation with the situation that prevailed in the east African countries earlier this year when their armies mutinied. The comparison would be simply facetiotis had it not been made in this Council. 1 should therefore like to put the record straight with regard to British military assistance to my country in January of this year. My Government was faced with a mutiny in its colonial-trained army. This mutiny did not involve a11 the ranks and was occasioned by the dissatisfaction of the soldiers with their foreign offiçers and with the army rates of pay. The army mutiny was not a reflection of general dissatisfaction in the nation with the policies of my Government. The Government enjoyed, throughout, complete popular support, British military assistance was employed to put down a mutiny, not to put down a civil war. When, having disbanded the old army, with the approval of the Organization of African Unity, we obtained the military assistance of Africantroops, the agreement specifically provided that they ‘were not to be employed in the event of civil war. And 1 might add here that we were obliged and bound by the decisions of the Organization of African Unity. We didnot undermine it.
18. Le representant de la R&publique democratique du Congo a tente de justifier l’intervention des Etats-Unis Etablissant un parallble entre la situation au Congo et les mutineries de l’année dans les pays d’Afrique comparaison serait tout simplement ridicule, si elle avait 6té faite ailleurs qu’au Conseil de sbcurit6. Je voudrais donc mettre les choses au point, en ce qui concerne l’assistance militaire niques ont fournie & mon pays, en janvier dernier. Mon gouvernement a dfi faire face 3 une mutinerie dans l’armge qu’il avait héritge du régime colonial. Ce mouvement, qui n’a pas rallié toute la troupe, était dû au fait que les soldats étaient meContents de leurs officiers solde, La mutinerie de l’armee ne reflétait mécontentement g6n6ral de la nation a l’égard de la politique de mon gouvernement. Celui-ci a constamment bénéfici L’assistance militaire britannique a servi aréprimer une mutinerie Lorsque, ayant licencie l’ancienne armge, nous avons obtenu, avec l’approbation de l’organisation del’unitb africaine, l’accord que ces troupes ne seraient pas employées en cas de guerre conformQs strictement aux dgcisions de l’organisation de l’unit6 contre cette organisation.
19. 1 wish that the conditions in the Congo could be compared with those in Tanzania. 1 wish that the Congo enjoyed a popular, democratically-elected government. I wish that the Congo enjoyed the blessing of a government of national unity.
19. Je voudrais bien que la situation au Congo soit comparable a celle qui existe en Tanzanie. Je voudrais bien que le Congo b6n6ficie d’un gouvernement populaire, bonheur d’avoir un gouvernement d’union nationale.
20. The Stanleyville operation Will go down in history as the meanest, most unwarranted and provocative interference by the western world in the affairs and peace of the African continent. The representative of one of the countries involved in this despicable affair has expressed the convictionbefore this Council that the operation is now over. Let me express the earnest hope that the operation is really over. 1 hope that tomorrow we Will hear no claims that there are further nhostagesn-white or Congolese-inside the Congo, or outside in the neighbouring countries which will. necessitate yet more humanitarian resoue operations.
20. L’op6ration de Stanleyville entrera dans l’histoire comme la plus vile, la plus injustifiee et la plus ré- voltante des inggrences du monde occidental dans les affaires et la paix du continent africain. sentant de l’un des pays impliques dans cette lamentable affaire a exprimé, devant le Conseil, la conviction que l’op&ation souhaite vivement qu’elle le soit vraiment. J’espere que nous n’entendrons pas parler demain d’autres llotagest’ - blancs ou congolais - au Congo même 0; dans les pays voisins, qui obligeraient à lancer de nouvelles opérations humanitaires de sauvetage.
21. In order ‘to ensure that there will be no more Stanleyvilles in the future, we must understand clearly
21. Pour Stanleyvilles
22. The representative of the United States bas attempted to answer these questions in the following passages:
flLet US not be hypocritical. Either each Government recognizes the right of other Governments exist and refrains from attempting to overthrow them, or we shall revert to a primitive state of anarchy in which each conspires against its neighbour. The golden rule is to do unto others as YOU would have them do unto ~OU.~’ 11174th meeting, para. 103.1
Il .I. Where the government, recognized diplomatically by other States as the responsible government, exercises its sovereign right to ask for outside help, then it would seem that the response the involvement of outsiders is a11 right.” [Ibid., para. 106.1
1 wish that were true.
23. Let us indeed not be hypocritical. Intervention consists in the attitude and policies of those major Powers which oppose the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination. It consists in the use of force and in a11 forms of intimidation, interference and intervention which are aimed at preventing exercise of that right. The activities of the United States and Belgium in the Stanleyville operations, with the support of the United Kingdom, constituted intervention because they were a conspiracy to impose upon the people of the Congo the disputed authority of the Tshombe Government. The operation providing the indispensable air caver forthe storming and capture of the nationalist liberation headquarters was the intended result and not a ooincidence.
24. It was with regret that 1 listened to the representatives of Belgium and the United States raising charges of racism. My regret stems as much from the content as from the tone of their interventions.
25. Some representatives have raised the spectre racial antagonism or racial incompatibility between Arab Africans and their black brothers. Others raised that spectre between black Afrioans and Europeans. 1 have been profoundly disturbed and saddened by the apparent inability of certain distinguished statesmen of world renown to look beyond the patterns of black and white killings in the Congo, They have failed to see the human tragedy as a whole, devoid of any overtones of race or colour or nationality.
26. 1 should like to read to the Council a statement which illustrates the indiscriminate nature of the tragedy of the Congo and the Stanleyville operations. Since some repreSentatiVeS have produced here doouments with no authenticity at all, I shall read out an admission made by a white mercenary about the operation:
“When we came in sight of thetownfrom a hilltop, it seemed a fine place, with many modern homes
“As we thundered into the town, there was a wild soramble by the Africans to get from our side of the river to the other side, Pew made it. Scores were mown down as we approached. And then we were in amongst them. They did not put up any fight. We just killed, until, by the time it was dark, we thought there was not one person left alive.
“As we tried to settle down for the night by the river bank, we stumbled and tripped over bodies. Some of us, tired out, lay down to sleep right alongside corpses. ”
27. We in the Organization of African Unity affirm the unity and solidarity of a11 Africa. We in the Organization of African Unity appeal to a11 the non-African countries to leave the problem of Africa to the OAU. Since the inception of the Organization of Africsn Unity, we have tried to prove to the world that that organization is effective; we have tried to minimise the dangers on the borders; we have tried to solve the problems of a conflict between brother African countries. We are sure that if the non-African countries Will leave this problem to the OAU and not undermine that organization, we shall find an African soIution to this African problem.
27. non toute non l’Afrique. l’unit6 monde essayé aux frontieres; conflits sQrs blème nous probleme
28. We reject racism or distinctions ox discriminations based on ethnie or religious origin. We shall fight a11 attempts to drive a racial wedge between brather African States or to insinuate the poisons of imperialism, colonialism or neo-colonialism amid high-sounding protestations and expressions of noble intentions. Good credentials and an eminent past are not enough to excuse blatantly wrongful actions or exonerate anyone from having committed them.
28. tinctions ethnique tive Etats de colonialisme & la proclamation acquis, excuser l’auteur.
29. le monde Suez, celle de la baie des Cochons etd’autres nous l’emploi une leqon de plus. de ramener chemin, derni&re
29. Since the end of World War II the world has been sadly disilluaioned by the adventures of Suez, the Bay of Pi@ and other reminders that we must be eternally vigilant against the naked and unsestrained exercise Of power. Stanleyville is yet another reminder. Let this be the last time a shocked world has to recall itS mightiest Powers to the paths of peace and rectitude.
MY delegation has listened with particular attention to the statements made here by the repressntatives of the countries which have been allowed
30. avec une attention ici par part
31. It is common knowledge that within the Congo (Leopoldville) itself civil peace was unfortunately far from restored, and that that country is still torn by interna1 conflicts which are maintained not only by the existence of certain negative factors inherent in its former social structure, but also, and abcve all, by undeniable and continuing interference by certain colonialist interests, which are firmly rooted in the country’s economy and regrettably do not yet appear to have been able to adapt themselves to the requirements of an African State which is truly independent, sovereign and responsible for the security and wellbeing of its nationals.
32. Therein lies the drama of that country. It is also the basic reason which explains both the confusion of the Congolese themselves and the concern voiced on many occasions by the independent States of Africa. It is the reason why many believe that the so-called rescue operation at Stanleyville-one more case of interference in the interna1 affairs of the Congoconsidered as such and taken separately, is not in fact the beginning of the tragedy. It is not specifically that operation which has created a situation that has provoked such strong reactions and caused SO much anxiety throughout the African continent, TO place it in the correct proportion, the Stanleyville operation might perhaps be compared to the straw that broke the camel’s back, and it is for this reason that it led to the urgent convening of the Security Council.
33. Indeed, we know that the Council of Ministers the Crganization of Afrioan Unity, at its third extraordinary session from 5 to 10 September 1964, unanimously adopted a resolution expressing deep concern at the deteriorating situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo resulting from foreign intervention as well as the use of mercenaries recruited principally from the racist countries of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.
34. Pursuant to this resolution, and with the consent of the Leopoldville Government, the ad hoc Commission on the Congo, under the chairmanship H.E. President Jomo Kenyatta, then concerned with the problem when United States military assistance to the Congo and the arriva1 of new mercenary reinfcrcements had reached exceptional proportions, having as their clearly stated objective the liquidation of the Congolese rebel movement whichinthelast months had apparently been able to extend its control over large areas of the Congo,
36. The whole world, and Afrioa in particular, Will long remember the murder of Lumumba and his companions, the attempted secession of Katanga and the traglc death of Dag Hammarskjold, the Secretary- General of the United Nations, not to mention the sufferings, woes and sacrifices of a11 kinds which bave been endused by the gallant people of the Congo, Indeed, those who have been the most severely condemned in Africa and elsewhere in the world for having been the docile instruments of the colonial policy of divide and rule are the very ones who today would set themselves up as false apostles of the unity and independence of the Congo.
36. Le mondeentier - et l’Afrique enparticulier - se souviendra Lumumba et de ses compagnons, de la tentative de &cession Bammarskjold, secrétaire géneral de l’organisation des Nations Unies, sans parler des souffrances, des douleurs et des sacrifices de toutes sortes support& par le courageux peuple du Congo. Aussi, ceux qui ont Bté le plus sév&rement jugés en Afrique partout ailleurs instruments dociles de la politique de division et de domination coloniale sont-ils les mêmes qui, aujourd’hui, veulent jouer les faux apôtres de l’unit8 et de l’indépendance du Congo.
37. At the same time, and as a logical consequence of this sad state of affairs, we are witnessing an implacable was against the nationalist elements whose true patriotism has apparently earned them the active and natural sympathy of the Congolese people. It is thfs phenomenon, which is both a moral and a political catastrophe, which is at present causing the Africans SO much anxiety, making them see the independence of their States and the hard-won freedom of their peoples in a perspective which justifiably disturbs most of them.
37. En même temps, et comme conséquence logique de ce triste état de choses, nous assistons a une lutte implacable dirigée contre les Bl(tments nationalistes, dont le patriotisme authentique a BveillB, CI ce qu’il semble, la sympathie agissante et naturelle du peuple congolais, C’est ce ph&om&ne catastrophique, tant sur le plan moral que du point de vue politique, qui bouleverse actuellement les Africains voir - chi?rement acquises - de leurs peuples dans une perspective qui inquiète la plupart d’entre eux, et a juste titre.
38. Today, every African is distressed at the thought that bands of mercenaries, thirsting for blood and money, paid by some phantom government and xecruited among racists and embittered colonialists, might one day operate unchecked in his own country, as they are now doing in the Congo, in the most heinous manner. 1 believe that it would be unwise to underestimate the state of mind which has thus been created and which has been gradually crystallizing since 24 November 1964, that is to say, since the regrettable joint. United States-Belgian operation launched on Stanleyville from the British island of Ascension.
38. Aujourd’hui, angoisse a la pensée que des bandes de mercenaires, assoiffés de sang et d’argent, Zi la solde d’un quelconque gouvernement fantôme, et recrutés parmi les racistes et les colonialistes aigris, puissent un jour sévir dans son propre pays, comme elles le font actuellement au Congo de la mani&re la plus odieuse. Je crois qu’il serait peu sage de sous-estimer l’état d’esprit qui s’est ainsi créé et qui se preoise de plus en plus depuis la journée du 24 novembre 1964, c’est-à-dire bin8e americano-belge 51 partir de llfle britannique de l’Ascension.
39. We feel, however, that the motives which have been invoked to justify the execution of that operation should not be overlooked, much less rejectedoutright. On this point, my delegation deems it only fair to say
39. Nous consid&ons cependant que les motifs qui ont Bté invoqués pour justifier de cette opération ne doivent pas être ignores, et encore moins rejetés
40. However, we cannot ignore a fact which, moreover, should not esoape the attention of the Council: it is said that none of the foreigners held as hostages would have lest their lives if the so-called rescue operation had not taken place, Mr. Spaak, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, in the statement he made to the Council, more or less endorsed this assertion when he said:
“I am told, and the argument has some weight, that ‘no one was killed at Stanleyville before 24 November’; and it is true-or rathes, only one person was killed and, in this grim period, the death of one person is unfortunately SO insignificant that it is hardly mentioned any more.” [1173rd meeting, para. 27.1
4X. Since, therefore’, there was no massacre of foreigners prior to 24 November, it is logical to ask orieself: what was the cause of. the massacre which unfortunately occurred after that date, if not the confusion and anger which must obviously have governed the behaviour of certain irresponsible and uncontrolled elements?
42. At a11 events, it must be recognized that it has been virtually established that, prior to the Belgian parachute drop, the Stanleyville authorities, for their part, had carefully avoided carrying out horrible designs which were-somewhat too hastily, it would seem-attributed to them.
43. 1 feel, therefore, that it would be unreasonable to hastily accuse these authorities of having carried out a premeditated plan of extermination in regard to these innocent victims. However, the tragic, most painful and regrettable death of afew dozenforeigners in this series of violent events ought not to obscure the spectacle which we have been witnessing for some months, the most frightful spectacle of the Congolese civil war. Press reports drawn from the most varied sources are unanimous on this point: the massacre of
44. That is the most tragic and revolting aspect Of the Congolese drama which-1 say this with some sorrow-does not appear to have sufficed to arouse as much feeling as was created by the position of the hostages. A country which is officially independent and sovereign is now at the mercy of mercenaries of the worst kind whose concern, in exterminating what they cal1 “bad tribes”, is certainly not to help safeguard that dearly-bought independence for which, let us recall, the United Nations made exceptional sacrifices which were unprecedented in the history of this Organization,
44. du drame certaine pour susciter qui a été créée par la situation officiellement maintenant espéce, appellent pas de contribuer qui a été, rappelons-le, laquelle les Nations exceptionnels, cette organisation.
45. It is especially this deplorable state of affairs and these dreadful spectacles, to which Africans are reaoting with-1 must say-justifiable indignation,
45. table, contre cains reagissent, de legitime indignation.
46. Considering the situation now prevailing, in ciroumstances of which we are a11 aware, the Congo remains and-1 regret to say-Will continue to remainin an extremely critical state. First, as they say in budgetary language, we must discharge the liability of colonization-colonization which was unfortunately unable to treat the natives of that country otherwise than with senseless oontempt, and an almost complete indifference to their human condition.
46. conditions rera le dire - dans un état extrêmement d’abord on dit en langage n’a malheureusement de ce pays autrement une indifférence tion humaine,
47. Another factor is the proximity of those areas of Africa where a still virulent colonialism continues
47. Il y a aussi encore dominées lent et un racisme de façon implacable cipation dionale de facteurs et les difficultés monter que le Maroc, pour sa part, appelle de tous ses vœux, pour le plus grand bien du Congo et de l’Afrique entiére.
to hold sway together with a racism which knows nothing of tolerance and implacably opposes every form of African emancipation in the central and southern parts of the continent, including the Congo, These are factors which explain the misfortunes of that country, and the difficulties of every kind which it Will have to surmount before it achieves-as Morocco fervently hopes it may-that stability whioh is necessary for the greater good of the Congo and of Africa as a whole.
48, Tout ce que je viens de mentionner l’on que la Republique devenait constituerait lutte et qu’elle
48. Al1 these factors explain why people in Africa are SO deeply conscious of the fact that the Uemocratic Republic of the Congo, if it were truly inde- P#endent and sovereign, would represent an impostant element in their progress and in their struggles, and therefore has a role to perform in the policy of de-
49. In making these remarks, the Moroccan delegation does not wish improperly to interfere in the interna1 affairs of the Congo. The only competency to which my delegation cari lay claim in speaking of these matters is that conferred on it by Morocco’s participation in the OAU, and by its membership in the Security Council, whose role now is to assume its responsibilities in a question brought before it. My Government considers, moreover, that no State, not even an African State, has the right to interfere in the interna1 affairs of the Congo. That country must itself settle its own affairs; any assistance which may be offered to it should, in any event, be offered only for disinterested and peaceful ends, forthcpurposeofhelping that strife-torn country to strengthen its independence and overcome its present problems. It is the Organization of African Unity in partioular that should play that role.
50. It is our duty, therefore, to state that the events in the Congo, and those at Stanleyville in particular, have sesiously undermined the authority of thefledgeling African organization to which the question had already been referred. The task entrusted to it was, as we know, to as sist in bringing about a reconciliation between the Congolese and in bringing to an end a murderous and fratricidal struggle-an interna1 struggle which offers no solution, least of a11 a military one. That is precisely why my Government, as a member of that organization, was concerned at the patently dangerous course which events, in the end, suddenly took, and which served only to block the ad hoc Commission’s efforts. Those efforts were undertaken in extremely difficult conditions, of course, but they nevertheless offered some hope for the foreigners taken as hostages, and perhaps some hope with regard to the Congolese problem as a whole.
51. Thus, besides a worsening of the interna1 situation in the Congo, a serious moral injury was done to the OAU, that fragile organization which has other serious problems to solve in the interests of justice and peace in Africa. In judging the situation in the Congo and in Africa, and the repercussions which -were to be expected from it, many considerthatthose responsible for the Stanleyville operation would have acted more wisely had they taken that aspect of the question into account.
52. 1 believe, however, that, at this stage, no one would stand to gain if he used this unfortunate crisis to inflame racial passions and increase political differences, or took advantage of the bitterness felt almost everywhere in Africa following these events. We would a11 stand to gain if we considered appropriate measures to limit the damage which has been
truc friends of Africa, 1 repeat, must actively help to find those solutions. The solutions must be those which fmplement the principles of justice, progress and noninterference. Without them nothing lasting or of value cari be achieved on the African continentwhichhas too long suffered injustices and inequalities of every kind.
FZ 53. We especially address the great Powers which are seeking to divide up the world among themselves. We cal1 for their understanding and ask them, in the interests of international peace and stability, to allow Africa to remain the continent of the non-aligne& Oust as we wish the Congo to regain national unity and equilibrium as an independent and sovereign country, SO also we wish ifrican to beable to develop its various inter-African institutions in a free and unrestrictecl manner. The present crisis shows how mutually indispensable these two objectives are. The greatest harm that could be done to the strife-torn Congolese nation would be to exploit its weaknesses and interna1 conflicts in order to imposeonit a policy of subjugation, for that would be contrary to the objectives of the Organization of African Unity and the interests of the Congolese people themselves. Those who would undertake such a policy would find themselves, whether they wish it or not, in open conflict wfth that organization and with the values and psinciples it embodies.
53. Nous nous adressons surtout aux grandes puissances qui cherchent B se partager le monde. Nous faisons appel & leur compréhension pour qu’elles acceptent, dans, l’int0rêt internationales, que l’Afrique non-alignés. Autant nous souhaitons que le Congo retrouve son unité nationale et son Aquilibre en tant que pays indépendant et souverain, autant souhaitonsnous aussi que l’Afrique puisse d&elopper librement et sans aucune contrainte ses institutions africaines actuelle montre combien l’une est indispensable & l’autre. ce pays d&hiré ses faiblesses et ses contradictions internes en vue de lui imposer une politique de sujetion, c’est-&-dire une voie contraire aux objectifs de l’Organisation de l’unit& africaine et aux intérêts du peuple congolais lui-même. Ceux qui pratiqueraient cette politique se trouveraient en lutte ouverte contre cette organisation et aussi contre les valeurs et les principes qu’elle incarne,
54. Should the major Powers choose to turn that continent into avast cold-war battlefield, the consequences would be catastrophic both for the Africanpeoples and for the entire world. Let those Powers reflect seriously upon this. Africa today, as a result of the profound and serious orisis in the Congo, is in danger of being the sceie of struggles for influence between political ideologies. We are already beginning to feel their effects, and, in the long run, they canonly lead Africa onto the dangerous road of division.
54. Si les grandes puissances choisissaient de faire de ce continent un vaste champ de la guerre froide, les conséquences en seraient à la fois catastrophiques pour les peuples africains et aussi pour le monde entier. Qu’elles veuillent bien réfl8chir profondément & cette question. Les luttes d’influente entre les idéologies politiques dont l’Afrique risque aujourd’hui d’être le thé&tre par le fait d’une crise aussi profonde et aussi grave que celle du Congo, et dont nous commençons ZI sentir d&ja les effets, ne conduiraient ce continent, en definitive, que sur la voie dangereuse de la division.
55. Perhaps we still have time to sound the alarm before it is too late, before Africa, too, is divided into two opposing camps, following the example of what has unfoxtunately happened elsewhere, particularly on the European continent.
55. Peut-être avons-nous encore le temps de tirer la sonnette d’alarme c’est-a-dire tour, en deux camps antagonistes a l’instar de ce qui s’est malheureusement produit ailleurs, et plus particuliérement
66. If it should prove that Africans do not yet have
56. S’il s’av&re que les Africains ne poss&dent pas encore suffisamment de force et de sagesse pour se placer a l’écart des champs de tir de la guerre froide, que lesgra,ndespuissances sachentprendre conscience du fait qu’une Afrique divisée en blocs antagonistes ne saurait être qu’un élément de discorde de plus dans le monde et, par consequent, susciterait graves incertitudes la sécurité internationales.
enOugh strength and wisdom to stand aside from the cold war firing line, let the great Powers realize that an Africa divided into opposing blocs would only be one more element of distord in the world and therefore would create grave uncertainties for the future of international peace and security.
58. My Government also wishes the COUnCil to exert its full authority to ensure that ,States refrain from any interference in the interna1 affairs of the Congo, and that there is no foreign intervention in that country in the future,
The Security Counoil is today continuing its consideration of the question included on its agenda at the request of twenty-two States Members of the United Nations. This fact alone shows clearly the serious concern and anxiety aroused by the sinister events in the African country of the Congo.
60. What is at issue, as we know, is unconcealed armed interference in the interna1 affairs of the Congo by Belgium and the United States supported by the United Kingdom, and the obstinate pursuit by the NATO Powers of a policy of arbitrariness and Violence against the long-suffering Congolese people. The combined action of the oolonialists, executed by Belgian paratroopers brought to Stanleyville in United States military transport aircraft from Ascension Island, a United Kingdom colonial possession, shows that this time the interventionists decided to act quite openly, abandoning the camouflage of the United Nations flag.
61. The latest aggressive actions by the colonial Powers in the Congo, and the outrages committed by the Belgian paratroopers upon the Congolesepatriots, are not only a monstrous crime against the people of the Congo, but are also endangering the security of the peoples of other African States and the cause of world peace. For this reason, it is quite right and natural for the States of Africa and Asia to turn to the Security Council, the United Nations organ bearing the primaxy responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.
62. In their statements to the Council, the Ministers for Foreign Affaiss of the Congo (Brazzaville), Ghana, the Sudan, Guinea, Mali, Kenya, the Central Afrioan Republic, Burundi, Uganda and, today, the United Republic of Tanzania, as well as the permanent repre- SentatiVeS of Algeria, the United Arab Republio and Morocco, have convincingly shown that the intervention of the NATO Powers in the.Congo is an intolerable interference in the affairs of Africa, a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and a threat to the peace and security of the whole African continent, These extremely sound speeches rang with the indig-
63. As the representatives of African countries rightly emphasized in their statements to the Council, the colonialists have openly challenged the African countries which, through the Organization of African Unity and its ad hoc Commission presided overby ths leader of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, were making efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Congolese problem, Belgium, the United States and the United Kingdom are trying to revive the internationally condemned colonizing methods of the last Century. They forget, however, that the death warrant for colonialism has now been signed and that the peoples of Africa, whioh are the only true owners of theirland, are themselves masters of the fate of the African continent. The peoples of Afrioa are not now unarmed and defenceless, as they were in the dark times when the whole of Africa was enmeshed in the chains of colonial servitude, The resolute determination of the African countries to defend their freedom and independence is a powerful and irresistible force.
mes et sans defense comme aux sombres jours oB nial. La ferme resolution dont font preuve les pays africains dans la cWense indépendance constitue une force invincible.
64. The landing of Belgian paratroopers at Stanleyville and then at Paulis is only one of the links in the chain of the colonial Powerst aggressive acts, whioh are known to have begun long before the latest invasion, It is impossible not to see-what has rightly been pointed out in statements here-that the aim of these actions was and is to suppress the patriotic forces of the Congo, to strengthen the puppet régime of Tshombé and to transform the Congo into a vast beach-head of colonialism in central Africa.
parachutistes belges n’est qu’un des chahnons de la niales, on le sait, ont commencé 2 commettre bien avant cette dernière invasion. Il est évident que ces agissements, comme cela a étg fort bien dit ici, ont eu et continuent d’avoir pour but d’Bcraser les forces patriotiques du Congo, d’affermir fantoche de TshombB et de transformer le Congo en une vaste tête de pont du colonialisme en Afrique centrale.
65. L’intervention intgrieures du Congo n’est pas dirigée seulement contre le peuple congolais, Elle a Bgalement pour but de saper la lutte que menent les peuples de l’Angola et du Mozambique pour secouer le joug du colonialisme portugais; elle a aussi pour objet de maintenir le régime raciste en Rhodésie ainsi que la pépiniere de racisme qu’est l’Afrique du Sud, oil se poUrSUit la criminelle politique d’apartheid. C’est pourquoi, comme les reprgsentants des pays africains l’ont souligné fort le mouvement de libération nationale du Congo represente la cause commune des peuples africains, qui luttent pour se libhrer de la domination coloniale,
65. The imperialist interference in the interna1 affairs of the Congo is not directed against the Congolese people alone. The aim of this interference is to undermine the struggle for liberation which the peoples of Angola and Mozambique are carrying on to shake off the yoke of Portuguese colonialism; it is to preserve the racist regime in Rhodesia andthe hotbed of racism in South Africa, where the criminal policy of apartheid is being pursued. For this reason, as the representatives of African countries have rightly emphasized in their statements in the Council, the cause of the national liberation movement in the Congo is the common cause of the peoples of Africa who are fighting for deliverance from colonial domination.
phique que le Congo, avec ses 14 millions d’habitants et ses immenses ressources naturelles, se trouve au cœur de l’Afrique. Il convient de rappeler a cet Egard ce qu’a dit récemment le president M. Kwame Nkrumah: IlLe sort final de tout le continent africain dépendra en grande partie du degré d’indépendance qu’atteindra le Congo,”
66. The Congo, with its population of 14 million and its tremendous natural resources, is in the heart of Africa not from the geographical standpoint alone. It is appropriate to recall what the President of Ghana, Mr. Kwame Nkrumah, recectly stressed: “The degree of the Congo% independenoe will have a direct bearing on the final fate of the whole of the African continent”.
67. essayer de réaliser les desseins contre lescluels
67. We are witnessing the fulfilment of the coloni& ists ’ designs, which the African States had warned us
68. The President of the Republic of Algeria, Ben Bella, appraising the present situation, recently emphasized:
“Today, if we tolerate this, the Congo Will fall; tomorrow the Congo (Brazzaville) Will fall; the next day it Will be the turn of Burundi, Tanzania and then Zambia; and why not of Conakry, Bamako, Cairo and Algiers? We know that this is one and the same struggle. o
69. This is why the President of Algeria has called upon a11 Africans to rise as one man, so as to frustrate the imperialist schemes. This is howthe African States themselves have been and are assessing the importance of the Congo and of the events taking place there,
70. A new stage in the intensification of the colonialists’ efforts in this region began when in July of this year Tshombé, the Katangese separatist and agent of the foreign monopolies, was placed by them at the head of a puppet regime in the Congo. When the patriotic forces in the Congo replied to this by intensifying their struggle and when within a short time they liberated a large part of the country, the imperialists speeded up their armed intervention and committed new acts of aggression in order to suppress the national liberation movement,
71. The threads of the new plot woven bycolonialism led, on this occasion too, to the same foreign Powers and to the same powerful monopolies which are drawing thousands of millions in profits from the copper, uranium, diamond and other mines in the Congo, Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa, and are making every possible effort to prevent the implementation, in the south of Africa, of the historic Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
72. Early in August 1964 it was already being reported that the foreign monopolies, which still owned the natural riches of the Congo, were taking steps to put an end to the patriotic movement in that country.
73. Belgian monopolies are known to have invested about $3,000 million in the Congo and they have made up their mind to continue pumping millions out of this country in profits. This, for example, is why the wellknown company, Union Miniere was displeased, according to the Press, because only a small group of Tshomb@s troops stood between the victoriously advancing patriots and its mines and plants at Jadotville. UnitedKingdommonopolies, especiallyunilever, also have important financial interests in the regions liberated by the patriotic forces. Particularly in recent years, United States companies and banks
74. The interests of the international monopolies are the motive force which has again led to open imperialist aggression in the Congo,
74. Les int8rêts des monopoles internationaux constituent la force qui a mené à la nouvelle agression ouverte des impérialistes au Congo.
‘15. It is known from press reports that in the first half of August direct negotiations were held at Brussels between representatives of the Governments of the United States and Belgium. According to the Press, these negotiations were attended by the leaders of the Belgian companies interested in the continuation of the colonial exploitation of the Congo.
75. Au cours de la Premiere comme l’indiquent les informations de presse, des négociations directes se sont déroul8es a Bruxelles entre les représentants du Gouvernement des Etats- Unis et ceux du Gouvernement belge. Toujours selon la presse, ont pris part aussi à ces négociations les dirigeants des compagnies belges int&es&es suivre l’exploitation coloniale au Congo.
76. Everyone knows what happened after that. As Mr. Ganao, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo (Brazzaville), stressed in his statement to the Security Council [1170th meeting], the African States meeting at the Addis Ababa Conference learned at the beginning of September, that for severalweeks already feverish preparations had been going on for the armed intervention of the NATO Powers in the Congo. Indeed, as the facts show, theunitedstateswas the first openly to corne to the aid of Tshombé in the struggle against the national liberation movement.
76. Tout le monde sait fort bien ce qui en est ré- sulte. Comme l’a souligné dans son intervention Conseil de sécurité [1170ème séance] le ministre des affaires M. Ganao, les Etats africains qui s’btaient réunis en conférence & Addis-AbBba au debut de septembre ont appris d’intenses preparatifs Btaient en cours en vue d’une intervention IlOTAN. En effet, les Etats-Unis ont 6% les premiers, comme le montrent les faits, a venir ouvertement en aide a Tshombé dans sa lutte contre le mouvement de libération nationale.
T’l. This henchman of the colonialists was first given United States C-130 transport aircraft with United States servicemen, then made out to be tlguardstl of some sort for these aircraft. It is known that these soldiers reoeived instruction at the United States base at Fort Bragg, where “specialists in guerrilla war-are” are trained. Tshombé was then given United States B-26 bombers and T-28 fighter-bombers, piloted hy Cuban counter-revolutionaries who, as the United States Press openly reports, were recruited for this purpose by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) SO that they could be trained in battle conditions. Thus the United States started directly to put its military techniques to first-hand use in the fighting operations against the Congolese patriotic forces.
77. Cette créature des colonialistes a d’abord reçu des avions de transport américains du type C-130, avec des militaires américains pr&endument chargés de “garder” taires avaient reçu un entrafnement spécial a la base américaine de Fort Bragg, qui prt5pare des “spécialistes de la lutte contre les partisans”. Par la suite, TshombB a reçu aussi des bombardiers américains B-26 et des chasseurs-bombardiers T-28 pilotés par des contre-révolutionnaires comme le rapporte ouvertement la presse américaine, ont étB recrut&s % cette fin par l’Agence centrale de renseignements des Etats-Unis [CIA] pour être entraifnds aux conditions du combat, Ainsi, les Etats- Unis ont directement engagé leur appareil militaire dans des operations de combat dirigées contre les forces patriotiques du Congo.
78. At the same time, detachments of hundreds of mercenaries, composed of Belgians, South African and Rhodesian racists, and Britons, were sent to save the agents of moribund imperialism in the Congo. This criminal rabble, the Congolese version of the Fore@ Leglon, sent to the front lines in United States aircraft and using Belgian, United States, West German
78. En même temps, des centaines de mercenaires, parmi lesquels des Belges, des racistes sud-africains et rhodesiens et des Britanniques, ont 6th envoyés au secours des agents de l’impérialisme au Congo, Toute cette racaille criminelle, congolaise de la légion étrang&re, amende sur le front par des avions américains et employant des armes
80. The imperialist armed intervention in the Congo, following the collapse of plans to stifle the freedom of the Congolese people under caver of the United Nations flag, has placed that country’s sovereignty and independence under a direct threat. The facts show that the foreign puppet Tshombé, who by the wish of the African States was not admitted to the first session of the Assembly of the OAU or later to the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Cairo, has defied Africa by openly selling the riches of the Congo to foreign colonialists.
81. In the middle of November-that is, immediately before the latest intervention of the colonialists in the Congo-Tshombe, as we now know, worked out a detailed plan whereby the Congo would be abandoned to the imperialists. The ill-famed “Tshomb6 plan” is composed of three interrelated parts. The first is the reliance on the use of foreign mercenaries and on direct assistance from the colonial Powers in the further struggle against the country’s patriotic forces, The second is the reliance on the transfer of the State maohinery in the Congo to the oolonialists. Under this part of the plan, each Congolese Minister and highranking officia1 is seconded by a Belgian, who will in fact replace him in everything. Finally, the third part of the plan is Tshombe’s decision to conolude long-term contracts with foreign companies, vesting directly in these foreign monopolies full responsibility for the “maintenance of order” in the regions in which they operate.
82. After this, is there any need to prove in detail chat impatience and craving to see this treacherous plan rapidly implemented were one of the real reasons whioh drove the colonial Powers to open military intervention in the Congo?
88. As we ~IMJW, the first reports of preparations for the transfer of Belgian paratroopers to Ascension
84. On 24 November, as we know, Belgian paratroopers were dropped from United States aircraft on Stanleyville and then on Paulis on 26 November. What was happening on these same days behind the scenes of this operation that the colonialists have blaephemously named “mercy mission”? The truth is that on the days, precisely when the armed intervention in the Congo was being prepared and launched, in the capitals of the Western Powers by the government officiais of these countries, fore@ monopolies and representatives of Tshombé’s Ministry of Planning were hurriedly putting the finishing touches to the predatory conspiracy for the literal dismemberment of the Congo into “spheres of influence” for the Western Powers. In its final form, this planconsisted of giving a special area in the Congo to each Western Power that had given money to Tshombe. At the same time, each Power would undertake to furnish the administrative officiais and other personnel for its own ” sphere of influence”,
84. On sait que le 24 novembre ont lâché a Stanleyville le 26 novembre, Que se passait-il ses, listes tage”? préparait des fonctionnaires monopoles étrangers du Plan de Tshombé occidentales, de la conspiration Congo en “sph&res dentales. que chacune des puissances saient Congo et s’engagerait nistratif
85. These are the real motives behind the appearance in the Congo of Belgian paratroopers, with the cooperation and assistance of the United States and the United Kingdom. It is not surprising that, on the very day when the Belgian paratroopers initiated the Stanleyville tragedy, Tshombe openly boasted that the fa11 of Stanleyville would stimulate new foreign investment in the Congo. On the same day, at Leopoldville, an important “development” plan was announoed, to be implemented in co-operation with the United States, the United Kingdom and West Germany.
85. Tels sont les véritables des parachutistes et l’assistance Il n’est pas étonnant que, le jour même oil les parachutistes ville, de cette ville, qui, disait-il, veaux investissements Ce même jour, plan de “développement” la coopération de l’Allemagne
86. La revue 1964 a publié un commentaire crimes dentales:
86. The following words, which appeared in the British journal Statist of 27 November 196400nstitute a highly eioquent commentary on these criminal aotivitics of the Western Powers in the Congo:
nel au sol, et, d’autre
“History Will no doubt force us to admit that, after a11 the tergiversations of the last four years, M. Tshombe and his army are now fighting for Western. ideas, that is to say, for the control of Congo economic resources by Western company formations , , , , In fact, his army would have been in a sorry mess if it had not been, first, for the material and logistic support (not to mention pilots and aircraft maintenance) of the Western Powers; and, second, for the mercenaries.”
On ne saurait
One cannot expect greater frankness.
88. The Minister for Fore@ Affairs of Mali, in his statement to the Security Council, convincingly vealed the true meaning of the move of the colonialists in selecting Stanleyville as the main target for their attack. He said:
“The objective of the imperialist aggressors that part of Africa was none other than the fa11 of Stanleyville, the stronghold of popular resistance to foreign domination and aggression. 9 a “[11’71st meeting, para. 30.1
“From then on, the objective was clear precise: the assault was to be made on Stanleyville, SO that when it fell the imperialist hegemony over the political and economic life of the Congo could be reinforced under the caver of puppets whose chances of rernaining in power in the face of the Congolese people’s desire for liberation were dwindling every day,” [Ibid., para, 31.1
That is why the Belgian paratroopers who landed at Stanleyville handed over the positions they had captured to the Tshomb6 mercenaries who arrived time,
89. It was in fact a combined operation of the colonialist troops on the one hand, and Tshombé’s bands of mercenaries and military units on the othes. The attempts of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, in his statement to the Council[ 1173rd meeting] * somehow to draw a distinction between the actions of the Belgian paratroopers and those of the mercenaries, and his plea that the operations of the former should not be confused with those of the latter, show once again the futility of his efforts to make the ends of his argument meet.
90. Who, in fact, is at the head of the mercenaries in the Congo, who directs a11 their criminal activities? None other than FrBdBric Vandewalle, formerly gian Consul-General accredited to the Katanga of tha separatist Tshombe. Cnly now he appears, not as Belgian Consul-General, but in the guise of a colonel. We also know that, out of a total of over 500 mercenaries commanded by Vandewalle, more than 120 are Belgians. Lastly, in Tshombé(s army there are 250 Belgian military “adviser@, who in actual fact direct its operations.
91. The question arises: what fundamental difference oan there be between Belgian military advisers, gian mercenaries and Belgian paratroopers? As we know, they wear virtually the same uniform, as was seen when the Belgian paratroopers tried to shift the responsibility for the mass murders at Stanleyville to the shoulders of the Belgian mercenaries.
92. The attack on Stanleyville was a joint operation by two columns of the colonialists’ troops, one acting from within the country-the mercenaries and the advisers-and the other introduced by plane when it
94, As for the “humanitarian motives” inwhichthose guilty of aggression against the Congo now try to cloak their criminal activities, that hypocritical pretence is by no means new and Will deceive no one. Wistory is full of examples of how imperialism, on the false pretext of “ensuring the security” of white diplomats, settlers and missionaries, has used violence on the peoples of the countries invaded by it.
94. Quant aux affirmations humanitaires”, dont les responsables de l’agression au Congo se servent pour essayer de couvrir aujourd’hui leurs agissements oriminels, ce pr6texte hypocrite n’est pas nouveau et ne saurait tromper personne. L’histoire est remplie de cas où l’impérialisme, sous le prktexte de diplomates, de colons et de missionnaires blancs, a sévi contre le peuple des pays oii ces gens s’&aient introduits.
95. Soviet people, too, in their own country have had ample experience with the habits of the imperialists. At one time, the imperialist Powers planned to divide the Young Soviet Russia into ‘lspheres of influence” and with that end in view launched an armed intervention against our country. Then, in the same way, suoh actions were officially justified by the false allegations that it waa necessary “to save civilization in Russia” or “to protect foreigners”, or of other such deceptions. The sound is that of heaven, but the truth, when seen, is that of hell.
95. Le peuple soviétique connaît fort bien, par expé- rience, les procédés chers aux impkrialistes. A une certaine époque, les puissances impérialistes ont également préparé le démembrement de la jeune Russie soviétique en ‘lsphères d’influente” lancé à cet effet une intervention armée contre notre pays. Ces agissements, eux aussi, ktaient officiellement couverts par des affirmations sur la néoessit8 de “sauver la civilisation en Russie”, de “proteger du même le paradis n’est en réalitk que l’enfer.
96. This time, again, the interventionists could think of nothing better than to spread the lie that it was necessary to “save” foreigners in the Congo. After a Century of cruel and most inhuman oppression and enslavement of the Congolese, the Belgian inquisitors and behind them the United States neo-colonialists began to make speeches about innocent “rescue missions”, about humanitarian feelings and mercy. But this humanitarianism has, as the Japanese saying goes, “a Dragon’9 head and a Pythonla tail”.
96. Cette fois encore, les interventionnistes rien trouvé de mieux que ce mensonge sur la nécessité de “sauver” les étrangers au Congo, Après un sièole d’oppression inhumain des Congolais, les inquisiteurs belges, suivis par les neo-colonialistes américains, se sont lancés
dans
“mission de miséricorde.
japonais, de dragon et une queue de python”.
97. But although the Congolese patriots suffered most from the triple aggression in the Congo, they were not the only victims. The foreigners themselves, for whom the interventionists supposedly cared, were quite consciously, cold-bloodedly and deliberately sacrificed to the ends of the imperialists.
97. les seuls a souffrir Congo, bien qu’ils enaient été les principales
Les
nistes aux objectifs des impérialistes, et cela de sang-froid, délibérément et en pleine connaissance de cause.
98. In this connexion attention should be drawn to the publication, in the Western Press, of the text of the radio appeal made by theUnitedStates and Belgian
98. A l’appel, publie dans la presse occidentale, que le consul des Etats-Unis
3 Sec Officia1 Records of the ,$ecurity Council, Fifteenth Year. %@@ment for July, August and Septemher 1960.
Q Voir Documents Supplément
“The American and Belgian Consuls beg their Governments tc be SO good as to adopt this pclicy of absolute neutrality fcrthwith, as it is the cnly means of safeguarding the lives of their nationals. This is an urgent appeal . . ,11
However, we know the answer to this appeal: in crder to safeguard the interests of the moncpolies, the interests of the white citizens were disregarded and Belgian paratroopers were sent intc action.
100. 1 would also draw attention to a statement recently made at Paulis by one of the leaders of the Congclese patriots, Mr. Gbenye, with whomMr. Spaak had said the other day in the Ccuncil he had several conversations at Brussels. Mr. Gbenye said that the leaders of the patriot forces had taken a11 possible measures to prevent the unleashing of a blcody massacre in the Congo. 1 quote from his statement:
“On the eve of the Belgo-American aggression, 1 assured Mr. Spaak, the Belgian Minister Foreign Affairs that 1 considered it my duty to ensure the security of a11 those living on territory controlled by the insurge&, without distinction of race or creed . ..* Only three hours after my message, however, there began the aggression, full respcnsibility for whose consequences falls upcn the United States of America and Belgium.”
Mr. Gbenye challenged Washington and Brussels tc tel1 the world the actual number of completely innocent people killed by the white mercenaries and by the Belgian and American paratroopers. We are sure, he said, that they Will never do this. Mr. Gbenye added that he had proof that more than 10,000 Congolese men, women and children were killed by the army of savage white mercenaries.
101. Thus the so-called l’humanitarian mission” of the interventionists, which led to the barbarous massacre of Congolese patricts, was in fact the sole reason why there were subsequently viotims among the white population, Attempts to justify armed intervention in the Congo by false allegations of the need to prote& foreigners, once again reveal the colonialist nature of this action, the monstrous hypocrisy of the interventionists and their mercenaries.
102. But whatever the pseudo-humanitarian declarations made by the colcnialists in order to cloak their aggressive actions in the Congo, they Will not succeed in deceiving the peoples and escaping their responsibility.
oh pas et de se retrouver
104, In our view it seems particularly significant, that Mr. Spaak quoted here very, very much of what he had said and to whom and when he had said it. But his statement did not include the most important thing -where, when and in what precise form the Belgian Government had acted. Yet it is precisely this-the actions of Belgium as well as of the United States and the United Kingdom, and not the worthy interpretation of those actions-which is the essence of the matter.
que M. Spaak ait fait de très de ce qu’il certains & savoir où et quand l’action et du Royaume-Uni, pas l’interpr&ation
105. It is, of course, possible to try to prove here -as Mr. Spaak sought to do-that the only dream of the Congolese is a complete reinstatement of the Congo in the Belgian colonial regime, as it existed up to 1960, But enough of this; even when joking one needs a respite. Mr. Spaak himself admitted here that he understood that, after all, he was alone against everybody in his thesis. And it was also he who admitted, that the moment that a man in the Congo is regarded as being the creature of the Belgians or the Americans . . . that man loses 75per cent of his following. With whom then does Belgium wish to negotiate about returning the Congo to the period of Belgian colonial domination?
comm.e a cherch8 d8sir une fois de avant 1960. Cependant, ‘et M. Spaak a reconnu il se trouvait lui-m&me pour perdait qui la Belgique le Congo sous sa domination
106. Permit me, in this connexion, to dwell on the thesis of the so-called l’legality’l of the Tshombé régime, which is not the least of the arguments used in the attempt to justify the intervention by the Western Powers in the Congo.
106. A ce propos, instants pas ici pour justifier dentales
107. As was to be expected, thosewhoplayeda direct part in the recent intervention have laid particular stress on this false thesis. In this connexion the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium tried to instruct the Security Council as to what it should or should not regard as intervention in the interna1 affairs of the Congo,
107. ticipants plus volontiers des affaires cet égard, sur comme du Congo.
108. Cne might, however, recall that the first time Tshomld summoned Belgian troops to the Congo was four and a half years ago, on 10 July 1960, when he was only “PresidenV of the province of Katanga. And although even Belgium at that time formally recognized that the Central Government of the country was the legal Government, that did not, as we well
108. a appel6 les troupes fois 10 juillet ltprésidentV avait légitime qui n’a pourtant belges d’intervenir
know, prevent Belgian troops from invading the Congo.
109. de Tshombé justifier sances de 1’OTAN au Congo.
109. The threadbare argument of the t’legality” of the Tshombe regime is nothina but a pretext to iustifv ex POSE facto-the new intervention in the Congoby the NATO Powers.
110. tention la Commission sur ses
110, The Soviet delegation deems it necessary to draw attention, in this connexion, to the fact that in the report of the United Nations Commission set UP to investigate the circumstances of the death of Mr. Lumumba, Prime Minister of the Congo, and his
111. In this connexion it is also appropriate toreCal that in a Security Council resolution of 27 February 1961 [s/4741],7J’ it was clearly presoribed, not only that an investigation be held in order to asoertain the ciroumstances of the death of Patrice Lumumba and his colleagues, but that the perpetrators of these crimes be punished.
112. TO proolaim, in the light of this, the “legality” of the Tshombé regime is to defy the resolutions of the Security Council, to mock the heroic struggle of the Congolese people for the freedom and independence of its country, and to hurl a challenge at the African States that are resolutely protesting against the interference by the colonial Powers and their puppets in African affairs.
113. But it seems that for some Western Powers even this is not enough. Already they are openly declaring, as for example the United States representative did in his speech [1174th meeting], that they are proud of their part in the events in the Congo. More than that: after having overthrown the legal Government of the Congo and having imposed from abroad the regime of their protége Tshombe, they would like, through the organization of various missions, and SO on, to make the Security Council into an accomplice in the suppression of the Congolese people’s struggle for freedom and independence.
114. But to make such calculations is to lose a11 sense of reality. Do not the organizers of the intervention even wish to olaim that the United Nations should pay, out of its regular budget, the cost of this new massacre by the oolonialists in the Congo?
115. The Congo is now enveloped in the flames of a national liberation struggle. No one, today, ventures to question the justice and legality of this sacred struggle, which is in complete accordance with the basic principles of the United Nations Charter and with the standards of present-day international law and the numerous deoisions of various United Nations organs .
116. One cannot but be surprised at certain other arguments which the United States representative advanced in his speech. Instead of answering the substance of the well-founded charges brought by the representatives of the African countries in the Seourity Council, he sought not only to relieve the United States and the other colonial Powers of a11 responsibilityfor the aggression in the Congo, but he could think of nothing better than to attribute the responsibility for the Congolese tragedy to the African States themselves. But, as Mr. Mahgoub, the Minister for Fore@ Affairs of Sudan, rightly observed, TshombVs slander “isnot worth the paper on whioh it is writtenfl [ 1170th meeting, para. 1671.
dl Ibid., Sixteeh Yew, Supplement for October, November and December 1961.
71 Ibid., Supplement for January, February and March 1961.
118. It is also known that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, in justification of the intervention in the Congo, referred earlier to the fact that a11 the members of the NATO military bloc approved the intervention. Thus we have yet another graphie confirmation of the already long-known truth of the aggressive nature of the NATO bloc, which is used as a means of suppressing the freedom and independence of peoples.
118. de Belgique, Congo, a soulign8 que cette intervention v6e par tous les membres Nous que nous bloc de l’OTAN, liberté et l’indépendance
119. The foreign aggression in the Congo has given rise to wratbful indignation throughout the world. Al1 those who value the idea of freedom and independence for the peoples of the world are expressing their solidarity with the courageous and just struggle of the Congolese patriots. Progressive forces in a11 countries have demanded the immediate cessation of the colonialist aggression. The United Nations cannot rem&n aloof and disregard the unanimous appeal of the people, who demand that the colonial Powers and the imperialists take their hands off the Congo.
119. col&re 2 qui sont chéres dance des peuples se solidarisent congolais forces la cessation L’ONU outre que les puissances ne touchent plus au Congo,
120. Le mémoire des pays qui ont demandé laoonvooation juste titre des puissances d’autres flagrante Unies de l’unité que l’agression Unis, seulement une inggrence d’un Etat, violation
120. In the memorandum from the countries which requested a meeting of the Security Council [S/6076], it is pointed out, with absolute correctness, that the aggressive military operations of the NATO Powers at Stanleyville and in other parts of the Congo con- StitUte complete defiance of Article 52 of the United Nations Charter and a deliberate affront to the authority of the Organization of African Unity. The memorandum underlines, with full emphasis, the fact that the aggression by Belgium and the United States, supported by the United Kingdom, constitutes not only intervention in domestic affairs, but also a threat to peace and a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter.
121. L’agression le Congo doit être énergiquement l’Afrique, aux o&&, lutter que le Congo soit toute le peuple IndGpendance.
121. The collective aggression by the colonialists against the Congo must be decisively repulsed. The whole of Africa and a11 the forces of freedom and peace [are on the side of the Congolese patriots, who are continuing their struggle against the imperialist aggressors. And although the Congo is far away from the frontiers of the Soviet Union, a11 Soviet people bave very much at heart the cause of the Congolese people in its defence of freedom and independence.
122. les agissements le peuple congolais, grante la paix et la sécurité
122. The Soviet Union has resolutely condemned the aggressive actions of the colonialists against the Congolese people as a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, constituting a threat to international peace and security.
124. The Soviet Government has already drawn Security Council’s attention to the dangerous character of the actions undertaken by the colonialists against the people of the Congo, and has declared that full responsibility for the consequences of those adions lies with the Governments of tbe States concerned. is the duty of the Security Council to put an end to the activities of the interventionists in the Congo, and to support the African States in their efforts to eliminate the dangerous hotbed of tensionwhichhas beencreated by the colonialists in the heart of Africs.
125. In view of the time factor, 1 shallnot insist on a consecutive interpretation of my statement into other languages, subject to theusual understanding in regard t0 procedure.
The meeting rose at Z2,5’0 pm.
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