S/PV.1181 Security Council

In accordance with the decision previously taken by the council and if I hear no objection, 1 shall invite the representatives of the Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, Belgium, the Congo (Brazzaville), Algeria, Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, the United Arab Republio, Burundi, Kenya, the Central African Republic, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania to take the seats reserved for them opposite the 1. Le PRESIDENT ment & la décision et s’il représentants de la Belgique, du Mali, de la NigBria, du Kenya, de la RBpublique centrafricaine, et de la République-Unie 2, Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia): My delegation has studied with great attention the statements made before tbe Council and the documents concerning the present question. From what has been said here and from the analysis of the events which took place at Stanleyville and other places in the Congo on 24 November, as well as from their repercussion in Africa and elsewhere, the Czechoslovak delegation thinks it is in a position to draw certain conclusions. We are in agreement with the letter of 1 December, signed by twenty-two Member Rates [S/6076 and Add.l-5],1/ which states that the military operations launched hy Belgium and the United States, with the concurrence of the United Kingdom, in Stanleyville and other parts of the Congo constitute an intervention in Afrioan affairs, a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and a threat to the peace and security of the African continent. 3. The representatives of many African States have adduced a number of facts and arguments which confirm and fully prove the rightness of this statement. The representatives of Belgium, the United States and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, have not succeeded in disproving it. They have tried to deny that their operation on 24 November was a military operation at all: such was the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium. This is, of course, very difficult to maintain, as this operation was undertaken by a strong unit of parachutists, fully armed with modern arms, against Congolese patriots and the civilian population at Stanleyville. Moreover, this operation was launched at a moment when fighting took place at Stanleyville between groups of Congolese patriote and the meroenary units of the central Government, There is no doubt whatsoever that the parachuting of Belgian units at that moment had a military significance as regards at least the temporary result of the fighting at and around Stanleyville. 4. That the actions of the mercenaries were synchronized with the parachuting may be proved bywitnesses such as the mercenary Major Hoarethink he is sufficiently known from articles in the Press-who, in an article published by the American weekly National Observer on 14 December, said: “Later, Belgian Colonel Vandewalle arrived and ordered me to Stanleyville immediately. The ‘paras’ were goingin y Officia1 Records of the Securfty Council. Nineteenth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1964. 5. ment participé fondée faits prononces nitaires les représentants employée. pas convaincu 5. If such was the opinion of people associated di- ‘rectly with the Stanleyville operation-an opinion based, without any doubt, on knowledge offacts-there is no wonder that a11 the lofty words about the purely humanitarian reasons for and aims of the operation, in spite of the very high rhetorical level on which they were pronounced, failed completely to impress the African representatives. And may 1 be allowed to add that they did not impress me, either. 6. There was a good deal of indignation expressed about the fact that many Americans and Belgians had been taken as hostages. With a11 respect for the difficulties and the duress under which thesepersons have been-and some of them, were perhaps, innocent-it is understandable that this happened in a civil strife, which, as the representative of the United Arab Republic rightly stated [ 1174th meeting], resulted directly from a systematic policy of fore@ intervention by 6, Americains Malgré et les épreuves lesquelles évenements guerre sentant souligne que des puissances matiquement. des contre torturées ‘placés Belgique dont les Equipages tionnaires aiept emprisonne sans désignaient envoyaient population Ministre reconnu, tivité exécute, malheureux par leurs Bte exécute ments les suffisamment à plusieurs Au fournis debat, mieux, pour sous a leur lancee avait, belge des affaires rances negociations auspices de sa Commission directement k .Powers from outside Africa. The patriots witnessed daily atrocities by these enemies committed against thousands and thousands of people who were slaughtered, tortured, mutilated by white mercenaries under command of the former Belgian Consul General andby American bombing military aircraft manned by Cuban counter-revolutionaries, 1s it, then, really SO extraordinary that they took into custody a11 people who, by reason of their nationality-and some of them, certainly, by their activities-could be considered agents of those Powers which sent the arms by which the~ population of whole areas was being massacred? But we know-and this has been conceded even by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs-that, in spite of their long captivity, none of these internees or hostages was killed, in contrast to the hundreds and thousands of those who fell under the hands of the mercenaries and those whom they trained. 1 repeat: none of these hostages was killed before 24 November. There were, of course, some verbal warnings or threats, which those who defended the Stanleyville operation managed to dramatize sufficiently and to repeat here several times. But there was no killing. On the contrary, there was much testimony in the speeches during the present debate to the effect that the Stanleyville authorities did their best, in the situation they faced, to protect the lives of Europeans in their custody as well as the lives of those who were present in the territory under their jurisdiction. A feW heurs before the Belgian-American attack, as was recalled here, Mr. Gbenye gave Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak his forma1 assurances in that sense. And there were negotiations in Nairobi under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity and its ad hoc Commission. From those who were closely associated with them, we have heard of efforts of Africsn leaders such as President Kenyatta to reach an agreement to stop the bloodshed in the Eastern Congo and to find a political solution of the interna1 Congolese strife fully in harmony with the interests 7. 1 would like on this occasion to recall what was said by the representative of Kenya: ,t . * I allow me to lay before the Council the supreme efforts which my President, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, was making to save the lives of the hostages-efforts which had every chance of succeeding without loss of lives and the butchery that took place as a consequence of the armed act of violence against the Congolese people.” [1175th meeting, para. 44.1 8. The representative of Kenya went on to explain: “The American Ambassador to Kenya, Mr. William Attwood, addressing the Nakuru Round Table at a dinner on 18 November 1964, admitted that my President’s intervention appeared to have saved Dr. Carlson from death. This is indicative of the fact that continued efforts by my President would have had even better results, and no bloodshed would have taken place at a11 but for the military intervention.” [Ibid., para. 47.1 9. The representative of Kenya also said: “It was this support from the United States and Belgian Governments which encouraged Mr. Tshombé to ignore the resolutions of the Organization of African Unity and the work of the ad hoc Commission. As a consequence, fighting was more intensified.” [Ibid., para. 48.1 10. Further, concerning the negotiations with the United States Ambassador, Mr. Attwood, the representative of Kenya said: “The Ambassador was warned in no uncertain terms that the negotiations then in progress would be wholly nullified by any military intervention, and that perilous conditions would be created not only for the hostages, but for the whole of Africa and the world. Mr. Kanza sent a telegram to Stanleyville, and received a telegraphic assurance that the hostages would be safe as long as the talks were going on. At the meeting, Mr. Attwood was told that the OAU could not be held responsible for anything that happened following a landing of troops, My President said in unequivocal terms, that provided the parties concerned agreed he could promise that the peaceful discussions would continue. Mr. Attwood, on the other hand, stood for force only. My President totally rejected this view.” [Ibid., para. 49.1 11, From those parts of the representative of Kenya’ s statement which 1 have quoted, we cari see that Presi- 12. 1 would like to make one more observation ooncerning these negotiations. The Americans and Belgians apparently were concerned for tbe lives of the white hostages-threatened, perhaps-but not for the lives of those who were actually killed as a consequence of the paratroopersf operations. That canbe seen from the fact that whereas the Africans wished to negotiate a ceasefire, the other side was willing to negotiate with regard to the hostages only. EVen SO, the negotiations were to continue. There were prospects of repatriatingcivilians through the International Red Cross, and everything broke down only after the Stanleyville attack, about which 1 would again quote the representative of Kenya: “The American-Belgian intervention, with British collaboration, in view of the foregoing facts, was an insult to my President, an attempt to humiliate the OAU, and to disregard the African interests. Atbest, it was a very poor and impatient exhibition of diplomatic negotiations.t’ [Ibid., para. 53.1 13. This is perhaps an appropriate interpretation of the idea which we quoted some minutes ago in speaking about the testimony of the mercenary, Major Hoare, “It was a political decision”. The operation at Stanleyville was, in fact, a political decision, and a political decision is always an expression of acertain policy, What policy was expressed by this particular political decision? It was oertainly not one inspired by the principles of the Charter. 14. In trying to find the roots, the concepts and ideas from which such kind of action may emanate, we bave to turn to past periods, and we have to think of cases when citizens of some highly industrialized and well-armed nation lived in a less developedcountry and sometimes got into trouble as a result of the interventionist policy of that nation, and they were rescued from these troubles by acts such as naval demonstrations, bombings, the landing of marines, armed invasion and even the occupation of thecountry which dared to be impolite and to insult and sometimes even threaten the citizens of such a strong Power. 15. The history of the nineteenth Century and the keginning of the twentieth Century contains perhaps hundreds of suoh cases, in Africa, in Asia, Latin America and even in Europe, In the textbooks used for the education of the Young generations of those great Powers, these cases are often mentioned with pride, and it is pointed out that such is the protection for ths Citizen of a great country while he is abroad. However, in the memory of the people of the countries “From Bohemia cornes a persistent and steadily more urgent cal1 fo> help from the Germans living there and threatened by the Czechs. In a11 parts of the country, chaos, tumult, and terror prevails. In such a serious situation, the Government of the Reich, conscious of itsresponsibility , . , wasforced to take the necessary measures.” 17. Those measures were, as is well known, the occupation of my country by the Nazis and the other sinister consequences which came with it. Inaddition, the Nazis found a way, after they haddrafted the telegram 1 have quoted, to force the then authority of my country illegally to accept that illegal action, 18. TO avoid any misrepresentation, 1 do not in any way imply an identity or mechanical comparison of the military action in Stanleyville with the sad event in the history of’my country. The whole context and content is very much different. However, in quoting that case of gunboat and big stick policy as applied against my country, 1 am trying to explain the reason why our delegation is SO much in sympathy with those who definitely reject any return to those forms of diplomacy which belong to the age of the gunboat and big stick policy. Those days have gone forever; our age is the age of the principles of the Charter, 19. Of course, looking at it in this context, we also feel that certain concepts of humanism may be different. That was called humanism in the context of *‘gunboaV’ and the t’big-stickn policy which thought only of men of master races. The true humanism in our context thinks in terms that a11 human beings are alike. My delegation was not at a11 impressed by the indignation of the Belgian and the United States representatives when faced with the criticism that “After 1,800 lives had been saved, 20,000 other persons were rounded up to be interrogated and the suspects were automatically executed. The mercenaries claim that a11 prisoners were exeouted for humanitarian reasons , , .” [1177th meeting, para. 69.1 20, Some other representatives of African States have said the same thing, only more bluntly. The Belgian and the United States repreeentatives very eloquently rejected this African approach and spoke even about ominous undertones of black racism. We, our delegation, understood our African colleagues difterently. In criticizing the Belgo-American socalled humanitarian motivation, they simply told us that the humanism of the Stanleyville operation, if any, ïs a humanism of the “gunboattt and “big-stick” period. Some delegations were trying to claim their record as anti-racist. The Czechoslovak delegation cari claim that its record shows that we have fought against racism in its most brutal and ugly form, we fully agree with-,9ur African friends. In trying to justify the attack on Stanleyville, its authors referred to its approval by NATO. This is in no way a recommenda-. tien, and 1 do not think that it impressed anybody since we know that this military alliance always seemsa to be very efficient when-defending the oldcolonialism or some forms of neo-colonialism, much more efficient than in other respects. !Xl.. But there is another point which 1 should like to make, According to the North Atlantic Treaty, this militarily aggressive organization should be effective in the area of the North Atlantic, as is stipulated in article 5 of the Treaty, or, if speaking of islands, in the area north of the Tropic of Cancer, as stipulated in article 6. According to my geographic knowledge, the Congo lies south of that area, Does it perhaps mean that NATO is attempting at going beyond even the stipulations of its Treaty in including Africa in its sinister machinations? That would, of course, have some serious implications, and 1 think that it would be a very grave matter that needed to be looked into. Our Minister for Foreign Affairs, speaking .in the general debate in the General Assembly, said in connexion with this NATO approval: “This collective intervention by the old and new NATO colonizers constitutes a further flagrant 22. The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republio took its stand on tbe invasion of the Congo in lts statement published as a document of the Security Council (S/6082).3 The Czechoslovak Government stressed in particular: UThe acts of aggression by Belgium and the United States, plotted under NATO assistance, violate the fundamental principles of the Charter and are directed not only against the people of the Congo but against Africa on the whole. As is well known, the Organization of African Unity, in its efforts to restore peace in the Congo, demanded that the intervention be stopped. However, the Governments of Belgium and the United States ignored that demand, and they are trying to excuse their proceedings by assertion that they acted only to protect their citizens and other foreigners. As a matter of fact, such allegation was a mere pretext for attacking the patriotic forces in the Congo.” 23. In the opinion of our delegation, the Security Council should reject and condemn theBelgo-American operation of Stanleyville on 24 November 1964, as an act oontrary to the spirit and letter of the Charter and to the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council calling for the withdrawal of the forces of the former colonial Power and of foreign mercenaries and for non-interference of a11 foreign Powers in the interna1 affairs of the Congo, as an act whioh resulted in increased tension and agrave situation in Africa and in the world. From what has been said in this present debate, the Stanleyville attack and its repercussions have proved once more that no external interference nor any military force cari solve the grave problem of the Congo, The solution is a political one. 1 think that a11 those who have spoken agree to this. Only the Congolese people itself, in the framework of African unity is competent to find suoh a solution and put it into practice. We are aware of many obstacles which SO far have prevented this people from doing SO. For the most part, these obstacles were created during the colonial period, and let me recall only what has been said several times in the United Nations, that in the seoond half of that period the population of the Congo diminished from 20 million to less than 13 million and that at the declaration of independence there were only twelve Congolese university graduates. u See Officia1 Records of the General Assembly, Nineteentb Session, Plenary Meetings, 1294th meeting, para. 146. 3/ Officia1 Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year. Supplement for October, November and December 1964. 24. The process of the formation of the Congolese nation as a modern political entity is, of course, considerably hampered by these obstacles, by the actions of foreign monopolies in withholding the countryls immense natural resources from its legal owners, the people, and, finally, by the interference of imperialist Powers. The success of these disturbing factors in bringing about a halt or a reversa1 in the process of the full emancipation of the Congolese people would produce sinister results not only for the Congolese people, but also for the whole of Africa, beoause it would mean a consolidation of the remnants of colonialism and racism and the temporary crippling of national independence movements in the whole southern part of the African continent. 25. The Organization of African Unity, a regional body fully within the provisions of Article 52 of the Charter, has played a positive part in trying to protect the Congo from outside interferenoe and bringing its development into harmony with other independent African States. It deserves the full support of the United Nations, of which the Africannations constitute an important part. positions la liberte 26, We have had the opportunity on many occasions to refer to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)] the provisions of which permitted the United Nations to give assistance to the peoples concerned in their struggle for emancipation. At the same time, in SO doing, the United Nations assumed an active role in the process of decolonization that has beoome one of thefundamental historical factors shaping the present epooh. Naturally, the peoples who are struggling to achieve their complete independence constitute the main factor in that process. The task of our Organization is to ensure that this process is not affeoted by any external obstructions whatever; and this means, first of all, that it Will not be subjected to obstructions and interference by the colonialist and neo-colonialist Powers directing their activities against the interests, complete independence and fr,eedoms of peoples. ne ne faisait prevenir nl appliquerait des buts de la Charte. 27. It is in this sense that the Security Counoil must sot in the present case. Not to do SO, to condone the attaok on Stanleyville, not to make sure that such actions Will never be repeated, would mean failure in accomplishing aims of the Declaration and the aims and purposes of the Charter. la parole Soudan.

1 cal1 now on We Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Sudan. 29, Tout d’aujourd’hui. un dialogue qui pouvons

Al1 this is a sad commentary on the state of the world today. For over a week now, we-1 mean a11 of us here at this tablehave been talking at cross purposes. We cannot even agree on the facts of the Congo situation; when we do, we interpret them differently. We donotgive them 30. The Congo problem is a live tragedy. It should be treated with a11 the solemnity which Mr. Spaak has mustered. The Government of that country ought to have given us the lead. It should be treated with a11 the solemnity a11 of us cari muster. Mr. Spaak has done it, but not the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It ought to have given us the lead because it is living the tragedy. But unfortunately for the Congo, it did not do SO. The counter-complaint in front of you, for instance, is not a serious one. It has no substance and could not have any. After all, it is only an afterthought calculated to counter our -1 mean the twenty-hvo signatories-calling on the Council to help. Manœuvres? Al1 right. We a11 do some manœuvring. But the Congo Will not be saved by manœuvres or by charm or by publicity; nor cari it be saved by antics; not allthe antios of the world. It has to be taken seriously byits own Government. The Foreign Minister of Nigeria enjoined you to look into that complaint carefully. You Will, of course. What is there for you to look at? A series of hazy statements hastily knotted together chiefly to distract your attention from the real challenge the Congo poses to the world. None of thesestatements is substantiated-but you are the judges. 1 Will speak no more on this subject except to submit that in the view of my delegation, there is not a particle of evidence to disclose a cause for action, 1 would, accordingly, urge the Council to dismiss this so-called countercomplaint as frivolous. Your verdict Will teach the Government of the Congo that its task is a formidable one and that it would do well to go seriously about it, not as blithely as they formulated this complaint. 32. But there is much more to Mr. Wachuku’s peroration than meets the eye, There is mischief in it. He is harping on an old story that speaks of Black and White and Brown Africa. Africa is not made, nor has it got the time, to divide itself because it is SO wanted by a few individuals. Mr. Wachukn is the pontiff, of course, but to qualify properly for the job he must know a little about his own country. About a million Nigerians live in the Sudan, and never have they been molested on account of their race. They own property; they are free to worship; they move about the country the way they like, and this has been SO for a considerable length of time. What the Foreign Minister of Nigeria says indicates a persona1 obsession. Africans have no time for hair-splitting. Being an Arab does not exclude being an African. A Yoruba is Nigerian as well as a Fulani. A Tunisian is African as well as a Zambian. We a11 beliew in this and act on it. If one single person is finding it difficult to catch up, heought to do something about his weight. Even pontiffs are catching up with the times nowadays. 33. SO much for the odd man out. Now let us turn to some constructive dialogue, some impartial thinking. Mr. Wachuku’s is not of that type. He speaks with a view to ingratiating himself with one Power or other, and if 1 were in his place 1 would be careful. A wise friend assumes complete agreement on fundamentals and tells you the honest truth. He acts from common grounds and fears not. Having said that, 1 want to assure everybody here that Nigeria and the Sudan have long historical ties that cannot be marred by one man’s own prejudices. 35. For a11 1 know, the resolution of the dilemma in the Congo is not as impossible as it looks. A number of positive suggestions have been put to us and a11 we need is to look at them objectively. Governor Stevenson% speech contains the germs of a solution. In fact, the principles he set out in paragraphs cannot be much disputed by any. They are well summarized in the pasagraph that “urges the Council to reaffirm its support of the unity and territorial integrity of the Congo and to cal1 on a11 States to refrain from any action which would impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Congo of its authority . , .” [ibid., para. 12’71. 36. And here 1 stop quoting because the idea of “the establishment of an inspection and investigationgroup n would be undermining the work of the adhoc Commission of the Organization of African Unity. There cari be no objection to this in principle, but do let us start from, say, 23 N-ovember, Let us start there and consider the episode of 24 November as a disastrous interruption of the good work started in Nairobi. 1 would have considered the idea of an inspection group sympathetically if there were the slightest doubt in our mind ahout the competence of the Organization of African Unity to handle the matter. The evidence before us is that, by now, it would have got us somewhere had it not beenfor the interruptionof 24 November. It distracted everybody andnothinguseful has been done ever since. Let us temporarily forget about that and concentrate on what to do now. From the point of view of procedure, the regional arrangements and agencies are as fit as their parent, this Council, to handle matters of the region. In fact, the Security Council is urged to encourage them to do the job. As long ago as in 1944, when the foundations of the United Nations Organization were laid at the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, the following was the guide: “2. The Security CounCil should, where appropriate, utilize such arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority, but no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. “3. The Security Council should at a11 times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security “9 . 37. 1 hope I have expressed myself properly in wanting the matter referred to theOAU, SO that it may handle it in the way conceived at the Extraordinary Meeting of the Council of Ministers in Addis Ababa last September. That must however not be construed wrongly. 1 am not asking the Security Council to keep its hands off the question. No, on the contrary, if this meeting could formulate a resolution that would give the matter back to the OAU, and associate the Council most closely with it, 1 would be very happy, 1 cannot a.t the moment think how this Council should go about keeping the situation in hand with a view to helping, if necessary, through the good offices of the Secretary- General. Be that as it may, the essential elements in the situation are clear and simple, and, most fortunately, there seems to be general agreement onthem. pouvait problame der faisant général, Evidents y avoir 38. ont d4ploré, cenaires, ministres devraient militaire doit cessez-le-fëu prises de 1’ étranger. cessez-le-feu plus alors 38. Al1 who spoke seriously of the problem deplored the recruitment of the mercenaries, for instance, and SO did the Council of Mini&ers in Addis Ababa. “The mercenaries ought to go immediately. Foreign military intervention, which we a11 deprecated, must cesse. Without that, we cannot hope for a cesse-fire among the warring parties. These are-a11 of them-using equipment coming to them from outside the country, and, as soon as that stops, the ,cease-fire Will be only a matter of time-a logical consequence. des Nations 4/ Yearbook of the United Nations: 1946-1947, chapter VIII, (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 1947 1.18). 40. 1 am sure some Will think this is naite and over-simplifies the problem. But please let not forget that the Congo problem could have been just one of those problems that newly independent States experience. Al1 of us have had our difficulties. Some of us verged on disintegration and pulled back to unity. The Congo was never left alone to experience the hardships of regaining independence and to learn the art of building up a national unity. It is too rich to be left alone-it is the riohest land on the continent-but it is time everybody realized that the Congo’s wealth oan be of no avail to anybody, least of a11 to the Congolese themselves, SO long as the country is treated by the Powers as a pawn in the cold war and by some Africans as a springboard for aligning themselves with this or that Power. 41. Mr. Spaak% speech was a most revealingone and, among other things, confirmed in my own mind a suspicion that the West was tricked into intervention. 1 shall explain this, but let me preface it by stating clearly that my Government does recognize thepresent Government in Leopoldville and need not be reminded of that every time. Those who keep repeating that the Government of the Congo is a legitimate one seem to be in doubt about it. Nor need 1 say how we, in the Sudan, feel about Mr. Tshomb6. I do not find that relevant-even if others, with something on their consciences, seem to. Bad, good or indifferent, Mr. Tshombe is there and we have no ohoice in the matter; we have to address ourselves to the Government he leads. We cannot be interested in whether he is a creature of Power X or Power Y. He is part and parce1 of the Congo tragedy today. We do not think hs is a St. Paul, nor do we think he is a Judas Iscariot. We are just not interested in that aspect of the tragedy, except in SO far as he treads on our toes, the way he did in the counter-complaint in front of you, which I hope you Will dismiss as unfounded. Not a single African country, be it mentioned in the complaint or not, had a good word to say for it. One Foreign Minister did, as you know-but how much credit cari the complaint get from one voice in the wilderness? As far as serious Africans are concerned, the answer is: none at all. 43. An identical impression was created in my mind when 1 read the letters addressed to the Ambassadors of the United States and Belgium by the Prime Mini&er of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They are there for a11 of us to read, but let me quote a relevant passage: 43. J’ai lecture des lettres adressées aux ambassadeurs des Etats-Unis d’Am&rique et de Belgique par le Premier Ministre Ce sont des documents que chacun c ,<@:rekon me permettra “In view of the deteriorating situation in Stanleyville and the failure of a11 humanitarian efforts, and because of the odious blackmail conducted by the rebel leaders in StanleyVille, the need arises to do everything possible to prohibit them from carrying out their criminal design against the persons of the innocent civilians whom they are holding as hostages. “The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has aocordingly decided to authorize the Belgian Government to send an adequate rescue force to carry out the humanitarian task of evacuating the civilians held as hostages by the rebels, and to authorize the American Government to furnish necessary transport for this humanitarian mission.” [S/6062.]5/ 44. There is no indication at a11 that the three Powers involved had requested the Congolese Government to allow them to sescue their citizens. On the contrary, it was the Congolese Government which “authorized” them to do what they did. 1 would say Yricked” them to do what they did, because Mr. Tshombé wanted the road prepared for his mercenaries to enter Stanleyville. IIe got what he wanted, and here are the Powers pilloried by almost a11 Africa, not because they want 44. Rien n’indique que les trois puissances impliquees dans cette affaire aient elles-mgmes demandé au Gouvernement congolais la permission d’aller au secours de leurs ctincitoyens. Au contraire, c’est le Gouvernement faire. ce qu’elles ont fait. Je dirai mbme ~~pousseesW a le faire, car M. Tshombe voulait faire ouvrir a Stanleyville. que la presque totalith de l’Afrique a cloué au pilori les puissances en question, non par principe, mais parce qu’elle estime que sa nouvelle organisation a reçu un camouflet et que l’on a fait fi de son aptitude a resoudre ses propres problémes. Lorsque tout se réduit visées , sans que l’on s’embarrasse du choix des moyens, peut-on, autorites de Stanleyville d’avoir consid8r8 les otages comme monnaie d’echange? C!l est evidemment une affaire des plus déplorables, mais c’est Léopoldville qui 1’ a dbolenchée. t0 do SO but because they feel their own organization was slapped in the face and their ability to resolve their problems despised. And when everything is reduced to suthless manœuvring and the gainingof ends, irrespective of the means, cari any fair-mindedperson blame the authorities in Stanleyville overmuch if they look upon hostages as a bargaining counter? A most disagreeable course to take, but the green light was given them from Leopoldville. 2 Officia1 Records of. the Security Council, Nineteenth Year, Supple; ment for October. November and December 1964. SupplEment 46. 1 did not mean to talk at length in this second intervention of mine, But as 1 said before, the Congo problem is our problem, as Sudanese, as we live only a few miles from the theatre of the war, and as Africaris most interested in giving our Young organization a11 the support it needs. The OAU Will grow into a bastion of freedom and peace. Humiliating it may retard its advance towards maturity, but it cannot stop it. The big Powers are duty boundto give it their moral support and to begin now by leaving the Congo problem to it and abstaining from acts that do not help it do the job. It is in our interests and yours to see that the OAU succeeds. There cari be no peace in the Congo, in Africa, indeed in the world, while that wasteful war rages there and this wasteful bickering goes on here.

1 must apologize to the Council for speaking again on the matter before it. Were it not for the fact that we have been charged with introducing racism and for the fact that my Government has been mentioned by name, I would have felt that Africa’s case had been most forcefully and appropriately put already. 48. The charge of racism which the representatives of Belgium and the United States see hovering over the Council, as a result of our various statements, is, to say the least, unfounded. Theyseem toconfuse deep feelings with hatred. But after all, the African has a sou1 which generates a feeling and this feeling is not only towards the black race, but towards entire humanity. The very fact that Africa lives with the worst form of racism, which some choose to cal1 “apartheid”, makes it abhorrent for any African to think of dividing the world into two or of trying to push Africa away from Europe, 49. The less said of this, the better. But 1 want to emphasize here with a11 the force that 1 cari muster that after nearly six centuries of contact between Europe and Africa, Africa stands in no need of lectures on racism. 50. Al1 the world knows the barbarous cruelties and the most objectionable racial discrimination to which Africans in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa are being subjected to today. Yet Africa sits here and has to listen to pious and pompous statements about racism. The point at issue here is not the persona1 record of the representative of the United States, nos how many African friends Mr. Spaak has. 11 a.* 1 must reply to a statement made here by the representative of Ghana who speaking of my country, mentioned a Century of cruelty committed against the Coiigolese. 1 do not know whether the representative of Ghana is familiar with the history of the Congo.tt [1173rd meeting, para. 64.1 Further on he said, What 1 do know, and what leads me to believe that the representative of Ghana exaggerates, is that the great majority of the Congolese whom 1 know em. have always made clear their intention andtheir desire to continue to live on good terms with the Belgians.” [Ibid.] 52. No, we have not exaggerated; in fact 1 cannot exaggerate, and a11 of us here are fully familiar with the history of Belgian colonialism in the Congo, What saddens me is that it does not seem as if the Foreign Minister of Belgium is as familiar with the history of his country in the Congo as one would expect. 1s the Foreign Minister aware, as everybody else in the world now seems aware, that the history of Belgian colonialism in the Congo has made angelic the history of colonialism in other parts of Africa? 1s the Foreign Minister not aware that of a11 the independent countries controlled by Africans in Africa, the former Belgian Congo is the only part of Africa where the ex-colonial Power has had to go to the’ aid of its citizens more than once in four years? 53. But the Foreign Minister ,of Belgium answered himself, and 1 Will quote him again. He said: “. , . the moment that a man in the Congo is regarded as being the creature of the Belgians or the Americans . , . that man loses 75 per cent of his following,” [Ibid., para. 88.1 54. What further evidence, then, does one need regarding the veracity of my statement? No, 1 did not exaggerate when 1 said that the history of Belgian colonialism in the Congo is one of cruelty. 55. The Foreign Minister of Belgium also raised another point which is worth replying to. He stated that certain African countries, including Ghana, had been violently opposed to Mr. Adoula’s plan for the reorganization and training of the Congolese national army. If the well-known Foreign Minister of Belgium is prepared to admit it, and 1 see no reason why he should not, he would have realized that no Head of State has made more efforts than my own Head-of State, Csagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, to provide the Congo with an all-African military force for the Purpose of maintaining law and order and for training “As 1 have reported previously, recognizing how vital it would be to the future of the Congo to have its Army made effective and dependable through retraining and reorganization in order that it might regain a reasonable measure of discipline morale, repeated efforts were made by the United Nations to induce the Government of the Congo to accept United Nations assistance in the retraining and reorganization of the Army. Indeed, atone stage the persona1 approval of Prime Minister Adoula was given to me directly for the United Nations training plan, based mainly on assistance to beprovided by other African countries-and we proceeded to make arrangements and even recruit personnel for that purpose-but 1 understand that the Prime Minister was unable to obtain the approval of the .’ Commander of the Army, General Mobutu, for the J project.“d/ 57. 1 leave it to the Council to draw its own conclusions. The Foreign Minister of Nigeria may also do well to ponder over this, because he also made a fleeting remark in connexion with the same problem. 58. On 14 December, the representative of the United States stated in this Council: “We received reports . . . of Ghanaian aircraft transferring cargoes of rifles to Egyptian aircraft at Khartoum , . ,” [1174th meeting, para, 1111. 1 would have ignored this statement, coming as it does from suoh a distinguished statesman, 1 deem it necessary to give it the dignity of a reply. 59. The representative of the United States went on to say that the Government of Ghana states only that “it does not know the veracity of this allegation”. 1 Will attempt very briefly to answer the representative the United States. We note that the representative the United States treated Mr. Gbenye as a liar, when he claimed that Major Carlson was a spy. We also note, however, that when Mr. Gbenye said that President Nkrumah of Ghana and other African leaders had promised to send him help, the representative of the United States took Mr. Gbenye’s word for it. He cannot have it both ways. Either Mr. Gbenye is a liar, in which case his word is worthless, or else he tells the truth, in which case his word is equally valid whether he is speaking of Major Carlson or of military assistance. In any case, I know that Ghana, and particularly my President, Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, have been working for national reconciliation in the Congo and Will not do anything to prejudice it. In fact, if Dr. Nkrumah’s numerous warnings and suggestions had been heeded, the Congo wouldnot stfll be suffering such a hard fate. 6/ Sec Officia1 Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Supplement No. lk 61. It is pertinent to reCal1 here that paragraph 6 of the Council’s resolution of 24 November 1961, “Bequests a11 States to refrain from the supply of arms, equipment or other material which could be used for warlike purposes, and to take the necessary measures to prevent their nationals from doing the same, and also to deny transportation and transit facilities , , .” [S/5002].8/ 62. Yes, this was what the Security Council said as far back as 1961. And if the resolutions of the Council are in full force today, this request by the Council can neither be ignored nor would its tacit omissian from the statement of the representative of the United States remove its burden on his Government. 63. We have been told that the military assistance provided to the Tshombe Government was inconformity with the exercise of the sovereign rights of the Congo. But one would ask whether the Security Council in its resolution of 24 November 1961 had sought to trespass on Congolese sovereignty. No, the Council was trying desperately to solve the critical problem of the Congo, a problem which to our great regret still bedevils it because of continued and, indeed, intensified foreign intervention. 64. In a clear and calculated defiance of this admonition by the Council, both Belgium and the United States, ssizing upon the vaouum created as a result of the United Nations withdrawal, reintroduced military and war material into the Congo, This is an incontrovertible fact. 1 Will not take the time of the Council to go over the list of Belgian and American war equipment in the Congo, Yes, we shall be told that they are there at the request of the sovereign and legitimate Government of the Congo. We have been told that, but when the Council has requested a11 States not to send these very things into the Congo. 65. This leads me to ask again whether the.Cuban Government is not sovereign and is not entitled under its sovereignty to seek and obtain equipment and material for the defence of its citizens and whether the United States Government has not violated and oontinues to violate this sovereignty by seeking, by military means, the removal of this equipment and material which the Cuban Government has acquired and whether the United States Government has not and 71 officia1 Records of rhe Securicy ~ouncil, Nineteenth Year, SuPPlemm for Aprii, May and June 1964. 8/ Ibid., Sixteenth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1961. 66. This Council also asked for the withdrawal of a11 foreign troops and the expulsion of a11 mercenaries from the Congo. But these mercenaries have returned to the Congo, swelled by a great number of Cuban renegades who are supposed to be under political asylum in this country. We have been told that these Cuban exiles, mostly pilots, are on their own as mercenaries. 67. But to us in Africa, the recruitment of white racist mercenaries from South Africa and Southern Rhodesia in particular is one of the most painful aspects of the present phase of the Congo problem. It makes us sad, very sad, to think that the United States knowing Very well that a11 Africa has taken a firm stand against apartheid and racism practised by the white minority settler governments in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, should lend itself to or be involved in such an affair, 68. My friend, the Foreign Minister of Nigeria, made a statement here the other day [1176th meeting] in connexion with this debate which cari only be described as unfortunate; he sees imperialism and neo-colonialism with tinted glasses, differentlyfrom how some of us see it. 69. But how cari it be said that a vocal minority has engineered this debate? The very papers before this Council today testify that a majority of African States signed the letter to the Council and that of a11 the African speakers, his was the lone voioe supposting this naked United States-Belgian aggression and intervention in the Congo. The truth of the matter is that there are those in the OAU who prefer to be positively non-aligned, who detest anyforeignintervention in African affairs and who truly work to shield Africa from the whims and caprices of big Power blocs and from the cold war; who prefer to be friends to a11 and enemy to none. This is the voice of the new Africa as enshrined in the Charter of the OAU. 70. There is a very important point, that is, the present Congo crisis is one that needs a political settlement. The statements of the Foreign Ministers of Belgium and Nigeria, and the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Ivory Coast, a11 agree on this point. The Ghana delegation concurs. 71. The point that seems to have been missed in a11 our discussions is simply this, that it isnot a question whether one accepts or does not accept the legality of Mr. TshombB’s Government. The ad hoc Commission of the OAU was asked to bring a11 factions-and I rePeat, a11 factions-of the Congo together SO that it might achieve a reconciliation and solve the problem politically, In its wisdom. the Council of Mini&ers of the OAU did not-and 1 must emphasize this-ask the ad hoc Commission to support only Mr. Tshombéls Government because that would be tantamount to seek- 72. One cannot really just support Mr. Tshombé’s action in suppressing what some choose to cal1 a ++rebellion++ without making a reconciliation impossible. Therefore, those who support the OAU in its endeavours to solve this problem must realize that they cannot at the same time ask this Council to ignore the role that the leaders in Stanleyville cari play in achieving the end that we a11 claim we want. Hence, it is my contention that we cannot achieve a reconciliation in the Congo or support the ad hoc Commission of the OAU by arguing .that Mr. Tshomb6 is the only leader in the Congo who should be supported. That may be legally truc, but it will most certainly not contribute ta the ‘achievement of a positive solution, whioh even the United States and BeEgium endorse. 73, If this Council does not take early and urgent steps to end the fighting in the Congo, we shall be saddled with another Viet-Nam. This would be a further threat to the peace and security in theworld for which this Council is responsible. 74. What are the steps? What does Africa expect of this Council? We would like this Council to resolve, firstly, that a11 mercenariee should be withdrawn and foreign military intervention cesse, and, secondly, that the OAU efforts towards reconciliation in the Congo should be endorsed and supported. The Council is, therefore, only being asked to reaffirm its previous decisions on the Congo, especially concerning mercenaries and foreign military intervention. It is also being asked to let the OAU take on where this Council left off, 75. TO conclude, the OAU charter, with its aim of African unity, provides eloquent evidence of the sincerity of our organization and the passionate zeal and lofty ideals which propel us to the goal of a union government of Africa, of a more abundant life and concrete exemplification of the African personality. The OAU has demonstrated by its achievements that it cari also deal with the explosive and dangerous situation in the Congo if foreign military intervention cesses. This is the assignment for this Council. 76. After the various statements by African representatives before this Council, cari there be any further doubt as to what Africa wants? The Press in this country and elsewhere cari try to smother or misrepresent the shrill but articulate and true voioe of the new Africa, but cari this Council fail to heed it? The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications distributors throughout the Write to: United Nations, COMMENT SE PROCURER LES les publications des Nations Unies agences dépositaires du monde entier. ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de las Naciones casas distribuidoras en todas partes dirijase a: Naciones Unidas, Section Litho in U.N. Pkice: $U.S. 0.35 (or equivalent in other currencies)