S/PV.1184 Security Council

In accordance with the decision previously taken by the Council and if I hear no objections 1 shall invite the representatives of the Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, Belgium, the Congo (Brazzaville), Algeria, Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, the United Arab Republio, Burundi, Kenya, the Central African Republic, du de la Nigeria,

We shall continue the debate of the question on the agenda. The first speaker on mylistis the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kenya to whom 1 now give the floor.

Mr. President, 1 am very grateful to you and the members of this Council for allowing me the opportunity of speaking once more to express my views on the many matters that have been raised before and since 1 spoke to this Council [ 1175th meeting]. 4. The representative of the United States in his statement to the Security Council said: “Every means-legal, moral and humane, including the United Nations-was exhausted to protect their” -that is, the hostages c-“lives and secure their release, and a11 without avail.” [1174th meeting, para. 57.1 5. This claim is totally inadmissible. I explained at length in my first statement to the Counoilwhat efforts were being made by my President, Mr. Jomo Kenyatta, in his capacity as the Chairmanof the ad hoc Commission on the Congo of the Organization ofAfrioan Unity [OAU], to effect the release of the hostages. Given time and due attention by the United States Government, the release of the hostages was a real possibility. But at the Nairobi talks, at the only meeting which was held, the American Ambassador declared clearly his preoonceived decision that force was the only solution, How cari one corne to aconference table with an inflexible, predisposed view and then hope for settlement? How oan one nego tiate exclusively on one’s own terms? In these circumstances, it is not difficult to imagine that the Amerioan Ambassador was not as interested in negotiating the release of the hostages as the UnitedStates Governmentwould have us believe. This is evident from the faot that, at the insistence of the United States Ambassador to Kenya, a further meeting was fixed for the following morning, and when the parties met to resume their talks they learned of the parachute drop over Stanleyville. Naturally, the meeting was called off. From the foregoing it is ob- 6. And when voices of protest and oondemnation by no less than eighteen Afrioan countries are raised against such a premeditated aggression, the representative of the United States describes this as Q’rational, irresponsible, insulting and repugnant language” , 7, The representative of the United States stated: I’From the beginning the UnitedStates has favoured responsible efforts for the political reconciliation of dissident groups in the Congo through compromise and consensus.” [g, para. 91.1 8. If this had been the polioy of the United States, it has never been manifest nor proved by its subsequent deeds or conduct, 1s it political reconciliation to arm one side to the hilt, and try to liquidate physically the other faction? 1s it political reconciliation to frustrate the efforts of the OAU to bring aboutpeace and order, normality and compromise between the fighting factions? 9. The representative of the United States stated further: “Statements have been made . , . which seem to add up to the astoundingproposition that the UnitedStates has no right to provide assistance to the Congolese Government and that that Government has no right to accept it because the aid cornes from outsicle Africa.” [Ix., para. 99.1 He stated further on in the same context: “But if every interna1 rivalry is to become a Spanish Civil War, with eachfaction drawingin othef Africans and great Powers from other continents, the his tory of independent Afrioa in this Century Will be bloody and shameful, and the aspirations of Afrioa’s wonderful peoples Will be cruelly postponed.” [IN., para, 108.1 parties peut que faire 10, It has never been suggested that theUnitedStates Government, or for that matter anyother Government, may not provide assistance to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. But surely this is an oversimplification of the problem. In the Congo today there is a bloody civil war with thousands of men, women and children being killed. It is our duty, by a11 possible means, to save the Congo and these innocent victims from the civil war. But if the United States, as it is now doing, gives arms and equipment to one side in the civil war, other countries might do the same, resulting in more and more deaths. This only frustrates efforts at peace and reconciliation. 12. The African peoples should be allowed to determine their own destiny. We do not want another scramble for power in Africa as happenedin the nineteenth Century. We appeal to the outside Powers to let the African peoples solve khe Congo problem peacefully. If this gqal is thwarted, no peaceful solution to the Congo crisis is possible. 13. In this context, 1 should like to reiterate what the representative of the United States has now admitted, that the problem of the Congocannotbe solved by military means alone, The solution, and the only solution, to the Congo problem is therefore apolitical settlement. 14. 1 should now like to say a few words about the mercenaries, who command, direct, and are an integral part of the Congolese Army. An attempthas been kade to differentiate between the mercenaries and the American l~advisers~~, the Belgian paratroopers, the anti-Castro pilots, the Belgian logistical units and the Congolese troops. These mercenaries are, as it ‘is well known, of Belgian, Rhodesian, Saut$ African, and Portuguese origins. It is equally well known that a substantial number of American l’adviserslt andother military personnel are there to “reorganize” the Congolese Army. They also draw up plans and carry out military operations for Mr. Tshombk. Inpractical terms, the meroenaries, the American advisers, and the Congolese troops are a well co-ordinated, well organized and integrated combat force, and there is hardly any distinction to be drawn between their activities or functions. They are employed to achieve the same objectives. They have been allowed free licence to kil1 and plunder, to punish brutally and with impunity. There have been indiscriminate bombings by the so-called anti-Castro pilots who wereobviously recruited by the United States Government. Thedeeds of the mercenaries and their supporting units are gruesorne and they have indulged in almost genocidal activities. 15. Furthermore, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium said [1173rd meeting] that he had taken every measure to prevent the recruitment of meroenaries for the Congolese Army. 1 challenge him to enumerate in detail exac tly what legislative, executive, or precautionary measures have been taken by his Government to end this despicable recruitment. 16. Let me once again state emphatically that the Congo is an African problem and Will be solved by 17, There were undertones in this Council to the effect that certain African States were irrational and irresponsible. Let it be known that we Africans have a long history of struggle against colonialism. We Will not barter our independence for neo-colonialism. We Will not sacrifice our nationalism to imperialistic machinations. 17. certains ponsables, cains, colonialisme. pendante fierons imp&ialistes. 18. taines questions etrangères de manière la “Voix de 1’Amerique” 18. Permit me now to xeply to certain points raised by the Ministex for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria[ll76th meeting], who SO pathetically and dramatically enac ted the role of “The Voice of Americal’ in this Council. 19. vertu de 1 ‘article africaine, faire du Congo sans son autorisation. 19. We were told in rather threatening terms that, based on Article 2 of the United Nations Charter and article III of the Chartes of the Organization of African Unity, no Afxican State has the right to represent the views of the Democratic Republic of the Congo without its authoxization. 20. Unies, paix et la sécurité sAcurit& l’unit8 africains de parler des reférences Unies de l’unit6 droit tairement sur tombe sous la comp&ence 20. A glance at the United Nations Charter shows clearly that any matter affecting peace and security cari be brought before this Council. Furthexmore, since the Oxganization of African Unity was seized of the matter, Afrioan countries represented thereon have every right to speak on the Congo situation. As regards his referenoe to Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, and article III of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, it is a well-known principle of international law that a matter voluntarily brought by express request before a duly constituted body, which has been authorized to take cognizance of it, oomes within the jurisdiction of that body. 21. de la Nigéria mercenaires r&ellement rais à Addis-Abeba des ministres dont la Nigeria que la condition était oubliant la conférence n’a tenu aucun compte de cette résolution. 21. Furthexmore, the Minister for Fore@ Affairs of Nigeria had expressed doubt on whether the mexcenaries employed by Mr. Tshombé oould accurately be described as “mercenarieslt. Here 1 would like to point out that the resolution adopted on 16 September 1964 at Addis Ababa by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, to which Nigeria was a party, explicitly stated that the precondition for the cessation of hostilities was the expulsion of “mercenariest~. This resolution was ignored oompletely by Mr. Tshombé, contrary to his solemn undextaking to do SO both at the Addis Ababa and Nairobi Conferences. 22. Nigeria demandé 22. Finally, the Ministex for Foxeign Affairs Of Nigeria stated ‘that some African countries had ‘demanded that the Congolese Government lay down its 23. I would solemnly like to warnmy Africanbrothers that it 1s my feeling that no African country cari by itself hope to achieve the unity and reconciliation in the Congo which we a11 SO passionately and fervently desire. The reference by the representative of Nigeria to the so-oalled ambitions of a vocal minority in the African group is a mere political mirage. It would be of interest .to this Council to know that the Nigerian stand in the Security Council regarding the Congo problem was convinoingly repudiated by an overwhelming m.ajority at the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the OAU held in New York on Friday, 18 December 1964. 24. Let me now outline some of the steps which my delegation believes would bring about reoonciliation and peace in the Congo. Al1 Governments must accept and recognize the following principles if a lasting solution to the Congo problem is to be found: (1) Aoceptance of the role of the OAU in finding a peaceful solution to the Congo problem; (2) Acceptance of the Addis Ababa resolution of 10 September 1964, which includes inter alia: (a) Immediate cesse-fire by both parties; (d) Dismissal of mercenaries; (c) Talks between the rival factions under the auspices of the OAU with a view to forming a coalition government; (3) The coalition government, once formed, Will organize elections under the supervision of the OAU and the United Nations, The elections will lead to a popularly elected government which must be supported by a11 African States; (4) During this interim period from cease-fire up to the formation of the new government, no foreign military assistance cari be given to any faction; (5) The OAU should assist the Congolese Government to maintain law and order, to reorganize and train its army, its police force, and its administration; (6) The OAU should establish a Congo peace fund to which a11 countries Will be invited to contribute SO that this fund could be used by the Congolese Government until it has reorganized its own finances, 25. My delegation firmly believes that it is not too late to bring peaoe to the Congo, Every Power interested in the welfare of the Congo must stop inter- 27, 1 hope that members of this august bodywill help in finding a solution to this difficult but human problem. 27. J’esphe aideront ;2 trouver une solution B ce probléme difficile mais humain, 28. Mr, IDZUMBUIR (Democratic Republio of the Congo) (translated from French): I thank you, Mr. President, and members of the Council, for allowing me to have the floor again in order to clarify a few points, I assure you 1 shall not impose upon your kindness. 28. M. IDZUMBUIR Congo): Je vous remercie, Monsieur le Président et Messieurs les membres du Conseil, d’avoir accepté de nous donner B nouveau la parole pour essayer d’apporter quelques précisions. Je vous assure que je n’en abuserai pas, 29, I have carefully noted the appeal by the representatives of Morocco and the Ivory Coast not to bring up the racial aspect in the course of this debate, even though the representative of Algeria did not consider himself under any obligation to heed that appeal and no member reminded him of it. 1 should like to say tc the representative of Algeria, however, since he spoke of racial discrimination against American Negroes, that their arriva1 in the United States was originally due to the slave-trade in which a number of countries, including certain African countries, engaged, But 1 shall not press that point. 29. Je prends bonne note de l’appel qui m’a ét6 lancé par les représentants du Maroc et de la Cbted’ivoire de ces débats, l’aspect racial, bien que le repré- sentant de l’Algérie n’ait pas cru devoir se conformer ?t cet appel et qu’aucun membre ne le lui ait rappel& Néanmoins, j’aimerais dire au representant de l’Algerie, puisqu’il a parle des noirs americains, objet de discrimination Etats-Unis l’esclavagisme de pays et m8me certains pays africains. Je n’insisterai pas. 30. J’en viens a certaines affirmations du représentant de l’Algérie. Je l’ai entendu affirmer ici qu’il parlait Africains, nom du peuple congolais. Qui lui a donn6 ce mandat pour parler donné ce mandat pour parler au nom de l’Afrique? Et qui lui a donne ce mandat pour parler au nom des représentants des pays africains? Quelques-uns,Peut- être! 30, I corne now to certain arrogant assertions made by the representative of Algeria. 1 understood him to claim to speak here on behalf of Africa, on behalf Of Africans, African representatives, the Congolese people and SO on. Who gave him a mandate to Speak on behalf of the Congolese people? Who gave him a mandate to speak on behalf of Africa? Who gave him a mandate to speak on behalf of therepresentatives of African countries? Some of them perhaps! 31, Quelle l’Afrique! affaires &Vident, et c’est pour cette raison que cela échappe au représentant de lfAlgerie. Il cherche des Preuves de son ingerence dans les affaires internes du Congo’ alors qu’il vient d’en donner lui-m&me! Au sur?@% sIil veut davantage de preuves, il a l’aveu de Ben Bella, qu’il n’a pas osé dementir. D’ailleurs, comment le ferait-il? 31. What audacity to claim to personify Africa! You ask for instances of interference incongolese affairs? Well, there you are. It is SO obvious it escapes the representative of Algeria. He seeks proof of Algerian interfer~ence in the interna1 affairs of the Congo, and he has just furnished it himself. Besides, if he wants further proof, he has Ben Bella% admission which he has not dared to deny. How could he? He iS even proud of it, since he says that Algeria Will always be there, whatever the circumstances and the situation, to 33. This is of course the method applied in Algeria itself where opponents of the régime are physically eliminated. Ben Bella’s representative has not said what became of Colonel Chaabani, Ait Ahmed, Boudiaf, Khider and others, the first fighters for an Algerian Alger& We know what the Congolese problem means to some countries, particularly Algeria which seeks by histrionic gestures to divert world attention from its difficulties at home and especially the serious opposition to the régime in Kabylia. 1 shall not elaborate on that theme in this august assembly. 34. Since my last statement [1173rd meeting], a few speakers made a number of comments whichmydelegation cannot allow to go unchallenged. Some of them regretted that my delegation saw fit to burden its staiement unduly-as theyput it-withdetaileddescriptiens of the atrocities committed by anarchists Stanleyville. 1 realize that those speakers were embarrassed by such descriptions but 1 would have expected them to say something-a word even-to deplore and disapprove the atrocities. None was forthcoming, 1 apologize to those sensitive SOU~S, but for anyone who has seen such horrors with his own eyes, what is surprising and shocking is not that such frightful events should be recalled here but that such remarks should corne from persons whose governments are giving material and moral support to theperpetrators of the atrocities. 35, As for the assertion made here by the representative of Burundi that the rebels are armed only with bows and arrows, 1 would remind that representative of the statement made by his senior comrade, Ben Bella, who spoke, not of arrows that he had sent and would continue to send to the rebels, but of arms, munitions’and mercenaries who, for obvious reasons, are called %olunteersll. The same representative mentioned a figure of 30,000 to 40,000 persons killed by the Congolese National Army when Stanleyville was retaken. What was his source7 A foreign correspondent whose name he was careful not to mention, 1 most oategorically deny such false allegations. Yet 36. 1 turn now to the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sudan [ 1181st meeting] who mentioned cases and trunk-loads of medical supplies and clothing shipped from Cairo and unloaded atKhartoum for the Congolese refugees in the Sudan. Knowing, as we do, that trunks do not always contain what they are supposed to contain-the reoent incident involving a diplomatie trunk is proof of this-we must needs be chary of accepting such statements. We mustalso note that among the loot left behind by the fleeing rebels, trunks were found bearing International Red Cross markings and containing munitions and arms, We must admit, however, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sudan has not even denied the report published by the officia1 news agency of Khartoum about the training ground granted to the rebels. 1 nevertheless take due note of his intention to stop now and in the future a11 traffic in arms crossing his territory and destined for the rebels. 36. faires nous a par18 de caisses et d’habillement Khartoum Soudan. Lorsqu’on pas toujours cident montre tions. par les rebelles marquées clui contenaient naissons Btrangeres velle faisant aux rebelles. tention du Soudan d’empêcher tout trafic son territoire. 37. The statement by the representative of Kenya on 15 December [1175th meeting] is undoubtedly the one which pained me most. Throughout bis statement, he spoke one moment on behalf of his President and his country and the next on behalf of the ad hoc Commission of the OAU. This confusion, whether unconscious or deliberate, is certainly not calculated to facilitate the task of President Kenyatta and even less to enhante the prestige of OAU as an arbiter in the Congolese crisis. 37. cembre m’a le plus touché son discours, dent, mission ou inconsciente, le travail augmenter la crise 38, du Ministre parler ad hoc de l’OUA. 38. It is really difficult to comment on the views expressed by the Minister for Fore@ Affaira of Kenya without mentioning at the same time the failures of the ad hoc Commission of the OAU. 39. constitutionnalité par Moïse B ce propos tude. caract&e aux fonctions dgmocratique testent les membres tête. Dans ces conditions, Kenya espère-t-il nement de LBopoldville liteT Est-ce Pour qui veut douter de cette attitude du Gouvernement du Kenya, je le renvoie à la déclaration de M. lorsqu’il Unies. 39. There is, first of all, the question of the legality and constitutionality of the present Government headed by Moi’se Tshombk. In that connexion, the representative of Kenya said certain things which left me very perturbe& He said that some countries challenged the legality of Tshombe’s appointment as Prime Mini&er of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. What countries challenge the legitimaoy of the present government? They are the members of the ad Commission led by Kenya, In that case, how cari the representative of Kenya hope to obtain the co-operation of the Leopoldville Government if he even challenges its legality? 1s that a position for an arbiter to adopt? If anyone doubts that this is the attitudeof the Government of Kenya, 1 would refer him to the statement in whioh Mr. Murumbi quoted Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations. 41. There is no point in our reaffirming here the legality, legitimacy and constitutionally of the transitional Government headed by Mr. Moi’se Tshombé, At the Addis Ababa and Nairobi Conferences no country made suoh grave allegations. The representative of Kenya, on behalf of his country or the ad hoc Commission, has just indicated to us the dangerous line that he intends to pursue: he would challenge the legality of the Government of ttie Democratio Republic of the Congo today in order to recognize that of the rebels tomorrow. 1s it not a faot that his country has virtually taken under its wing the exiled leaders of the rebellion? As for the position of the present Government, the representative of Kenya and the ad hoc Commission could already have found that out, had they taken the trouble to go and see for themselves. 42. The ad hoc Commission might also have done more itself to bring about a cessation of hostilities in the Congo instead of making such cessation a prer equisite , 43. Finally, I really deplore the.fact that the representative of Kenya paid SO little attention to the thousands of Congolese killed by the rebels since the outbreak of the insurrection, It seems that one’s crime Will be ignored or condemned depending on whether one wears a beard or not. 44. As regards the policy of using hostages to gain political advantages, we have net heard any oondemnation of this odious practice. 45. Al1 those who sought to justify the intervention of British troopa in East Afrioa stated that the motives and the situation were different. What are the facts? There was a mutiny involving disobedience to the Government which was likely to lead to disorders; a Government found itself powerless and its very existence threatened; ieft with no alternative that Government was obliged to cal1 upon foreign troops. 46. That was how the Government of Tanganyika itSSlf evaluated the situation. 1 wish to refer to the statement made by Presi.dent Nyerere on 12 February 1964 at the extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU at Dar es Salaam, and to quote the following passage: “It became apparent in the course of the next few days that although many soldiers were appalled at the consequences of their action, others beoame intoxicated by this first taste of power, Indiscipline increased and it seemed that arguments over pay and conditions were becoming like dealings between a blackmailer and his via tim. The situation worsened because dissident civilians had conspired with 47. We were informed only a few weeks ago that 5,500 British troops had just left Kenya, The situation in the Congo in I960 also arose from a mutiny. The cal1 for Belgian troops at that time was criticized by the very same people who, in 1964, found nothing objectionable in the wise and courageous attitude adopted by the Governments of Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda. Faced with that criticism, the Lumumba Government accepted Belgian intervention in Kasai and in Katanga, but would not allow it in Leopoldville. That prohibition resulted in a prolongation of the crisis, precisely because the Government’s weakness led to collusion between political groups and undisciplined military units. The situation thereforebecame difficult to correct. 47. Il y a quelques semaines à peine, on nous a annoncé que 5 500 soldats britanniques venaient de quitter le Kenya. La situation aucongo, en 1960, est nAe aussi d’une mutinerie, critiqué vaient rien a redire 9 l’attitude courageuse et sage des Gouvernements du Tanganyika, du Kenya et de l’Ouganda. C’est devant ces critiques que le gouvernement Lumumba, tout en acceptant Ifintervention belge au Kasaï et au Katanga, l’a interdite a Léopoldville. prolongation de la crise puisque, justement, la faiblesse du gouvernement a entraîné la collusion de groupes politiques avec des unités militaires indisciplinees. La situation, de ce fait, est devenue difficile a redresser. 48. 1 make this comparison only in order to point out that those who have always beenprompt to condemn foreign interventions, even those whichare requested, would do well to think first. What is there to criticize about this latest intervention where foreign troops were called upon, not to put downamutiny, but merely to liberate civilians who had been taken as hostages by a group of insurgents? The operation lasted only a short time-three days at most-whereas in East Africa the British troops remained for several months. 48. Si j’ai fait cette comparaison, c’est simplement pour dire que ceux qui sont toujours pr&ts à condamner en hâte les interventions Btrangéres, m8me sollicitées, feraient bien de réfl8chir d’abord. Quant 3 cette dernière intervention, oh il ne s’agit mi3me pas de faire appel a des troupes étrang&res pour réprimer une mutinerie, mais simplement pour liberer des civils pris comme otages par un groupe d’insurgbs, qu’a-t-on à lui reprocher? L’op&ation n’a éte que de courte dur&e - qu’en Afrique orientale les troupes britanniques sont restees plusieurs mois. 49. Des lors, on peut se demander d’oh vient l’acharnement de ces mêmes pays qui ont invit de leurs anciens colonisateurs à critiquer l’attitude du Gouvernement de la Republique démocratique du Congo. Que diraient-ils Republique democratique du Congo avait fait appel aux troupes belges pour réprimer la rébellion qui a pu s’implanter Stanleyville certaines unités militaires mutinerie? 49. Why, then, are those same countries which have called in their former colonialist troops, SO persistently criticizing the position taken by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo? What would they say if the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had called on Belgian troops to put down the rebellion which had managed to take hold in most of the eastern part of the country, and at Stanleyville in particular, as a result of collusion between certain m.ilitary units-in other words, a mu tiny ? 50 D A Dar es-Salaam, le Gouvernement du Tanganyika disait bien que, s’il avait pu faire appelà ses Voisins, il l’aurait était semblable, Le président Nyerere continue: 50. At Dar es Salaam, it is true, the Government of Tanganyika said that if it could have called on its neighbours for help it would have done SO; but its neighbours were in a similar predicament. President Nyerere went on* We however, would be quite entitled to askfor foreign intervention to put down the rebellion, particularly sinoe our request to the Organization of AfricanUnity went unheeded, owing to an obstruction by certain member countries. 51. Today, some would have our Government stand idly by while Member States-and especially certain African States-are inoreasing their aid to the rebels. We are willing to co-operate with the Organization of African Unity, but we feel that such co-operation is impossible unless there is respect for the sovereignty of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 52. Afrioan unity has been affirmed here repeatedly. 1 maintain that we are moving towards African unity, and that, for the moment, we are working to achieve it by seeking a basis for co-operation among a11 Member States. This common purpose in no way precludes divergencies or differences-it takes no great wisdom to see that. Some have said that the Congolese question has split Africa. That is not truc. Even as the OAU was being set up, differences developed ’ regarding the form of the organization we were about to found: some envisaged an integrated Africa, others merely an Africa at the stage of oo-operation between States at the institutional level. The Congolese question is only one subject among many on which these two basic concepts of African unity impinge. Mydelegation cannot help noting the present divergencies and differences in Africa and to draw inferences from them. Not to do SO would be unrealistio. 53. Finally, certain speakers felt it necessary to state here that the solution to the “Congolese crisis” was a political rather than military question, My delegation does not dispute that statement if its meaning is that a political solution Will be the final one. But what is the best political solution if not one which allows the people to decide their own future-in other words, to hold general elections? Who is preventing the organization of such elections? 1s it the Government, which has included them in its pro- ,gramme as called for in the national constitution? Or is it the anarohists who, fearing the outoome of elections, prefer to assume power by acts of terrorism and massacres? 54. Who is preventing this political solution? Frankly, the ansïver must be: the rebels; and since tbe Government has no choice but to oppose with a11 its might those who are preventing this political solution, which 55. 1 do not want there to be any misunderstanding as to what 1 mean when I speak of a military solution. A spontaneous cessation of hostilities is of course a military solution, Because it takes that view, in fa&, the Government of the Republic has promised safety for a11 those laying down their arms. That promise ture la cessation militaire. comme a promis armes. Lt l’heure Stanleyville, combattants s till holds good and, as 1 speak to you, in the Stanleyville area proper, we are keeping it in the case of many combatants who are now layingdown their arms. 56. We continue to hope that more of our fellowcountrymen who have been led astray by a few doctrinaire anarchists Will return to the fold, and that our country Will one day know peace and prosperity. Agarés nueront pays connaîtra 57. Because we are aware that peace and prosperity for our country also means peace and prosperity for our neighbours, we cal1 upon you to condemn the subversive action which corne of them have beencarrying on in our territory, as well as thematerial and moral support which they are still giving the rebels. We ask you to forbid any interference in our domestic affaira, and to condemn any assistance given to the Congolese people other than thatwhichpasses through the Central Government. 57. paix et la prosp&ité B condamner ceux-ci I’appui a la rébellion. ingérence toute assistance lais sans passer 58, 1 must now refer to the latest resolution and the latest meeting of the Council of Ministers of the OAU held in New York in December 1964. 1 would have refrained from doing SO, but since the representative of Kenya mentioned them, 1 cannot avoid giving my own views here. 58, lution nistres Je m’en Kenya en ayant parlé, mer ici mon point de vue. 59. de cette nisation conditions organisation. je le prouve. 59. First of all, 1 challenge the constitutionallegality of that session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity. The Council met in a manner which is contrary to that Organization’aCharter. 1 am not merely saying this; 1 shall prove it. p 60. In the first place it is rather surprising for such an important body to begin by saying that it is suspending its own rules of procedure. That is what happened. Rule 15 of the rules of procedure of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity was suspended for reasons of expediency. 1 was given to understand that there were precedents, and that it was on the basis of those precedents that Article 15 was suspended. Very well. But 1 CannOt agree with going SO far as to suspend the very Charter of the Organization of African Unity. Article XII of the Charter provides: “The Council of Ministers shall consist of Foreign Ministers or such other Min- 60. telle importance, son passe. du Conseil africaine Certes, existaient la base de ces précedents. jusqu’à de l’unité l’article ministres

When we opened the debate in the Security Council on the questionnow before us, exactly two weeks ago, we had only one thought in mind: to place the imperialist aggression at Stanleyville in its true context. 63. The speakers at this table, however, who have vainly tried to justify this aggression have deliberately misrepresented the problem in order to submerge the real issue, In this way they have created confusion in the minds of the members of the Council and it is OU~ duty, as responsible Africans, to dispel that confusion. We have therefore been compelled to ask for the floor once again and 1 thank you very sincerely, Mr. President, for having granted our request. 64. 1 must confess that 1 am very uncertain about the tone in which 1 must reply to certain speakers who have preceded me, for some of them have brought the debate to suoh a low level that 1 have to exeroise extreme self-control in order not to follow their example. 65. What have we heard at this table? There have been accusations levelledpersonally against our States and against those of us who represent those States here. For example, the Minister for Fore@ Affairs of Belgium, exhibiting a oomplacency that is as ridioulous as it is out of place, described the statements made by the African representatives as a “flood of oratory” which “bas also revealed curious and humiliating inferiority complexes” [ 1173rd meeting, para. 31. 66. We wish to say straight away-and we regretthat the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium is not present-that we have not corne here in order to show off or to display oratorical talents that we do not even possess, espeoially since we are expressing ourselves in very difficult languages that are not our own and that, unfortunately, we had only a few short years to learn. 67. Next we should like to tel1 the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium that we understand his attitude. What he has said here merely reflects the persistence of the attitude that he and his compatriots had when they marohed upon the Congolese population of Leopoldville 0 They had reduoed these people to suoh a condition that they oould only humiliate them and place them in a position of inferiority. The attitude that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium displayed here shows that, to this day, he continues to consider them inferior to the Belgian people. Since 68. Displaying the same attitude-which might best be described as offhancl-the representative of the United States of America stated here: “We have no apologies to make to any State appearing before this Council” [1174th meeting, para. 611. The eminent American diplomat, who in the next part of his statement went on to develop his Government’s well-known but false argument that this was a humanitarian operation in conformity with international law and moral law, mi,ght nevertheless have shown a little more regard for the African States even if, at the present time, some of those States have become what might, perhaps not too inaccurately, be termed American colonies. SO we should like to say to the representative of the United States of America that we have not corne here to ask for apologies from anyone, especially as we do not need them. 68. Non sans avoir attitude - attitude que nous qualifierions volontiers de désinvolte -, d’Am&ique excuse B presenter a aucun Etat présent au Conseil.” [11’74bme séance, par. 61.1 L’éminent diplomate amé- ricain qui, dans la partie suivante de son exposé, devait d8ivelopper ltargument de son gouvernement, suffisamment connu, mais faux - operation humanitaire moral -, africains avec un peu plus d%gards, m@me si, a l’heure actuelle, certains de ces Etats sont devenus ce que l’on pourrait tromper, des colonies américaines. Et ce que nous aimerions dire au représentant des Etats-Unis dIAmerique, c’est que nous ne sommes pas venus ici pour demander des excuses a qui que ce soit, d’autant que nous n’en avons pas besoin. 69. Donc, apr?+s ces attaques personnellement dirigees contre nous-mêmes, personnellement dirighes contre nos Etats, par des manoeuvres tr&s malhabiles on a déplacé le problème. On a d&plac& le problème et, procedé bien connu, on a fait intervenir debats des irresponsables qui ne sont nullement convaincus de ce qu’ils ont avance ici dans cette salle. 69. Thus, after these attacks directed personally against ourselves and against our States, the problem has been misrepresented by means of some very clumsy manœuvres. The problem has been misrepresented and, in a familiar move, irresponsible people were brought in to take part in this discussion who have no conviction whatever about the words they have uttered here. ‘70. We shall have occasion to refer later to the statements made here by the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but we should like to tel1 the Council forthwith, and very briefly, what we think of some of the other statements,partioularly that of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria [1176th meeting], or 1 should say the representative of the Government of Lagos, Here again, we bitterly regret that he is not present, beoause we should have liked him to hear for himself what we have to say, although we are suse that what we are about to say in this Council will be reported to him. ‘70. Nous aurons l’occasion de revenir sur les declarations faites ici par le repri%entant de la RBpublique démocratique du Congo, mais nous aimerions d’ores et déja dire au Conseil ce que nous pensons d’autres declarations, notamment - et ce trbs succinctement - de la déclaration faite ici [1176Bme séance] par le Ministre dirions par le représentant du gouvernement de Lagos, Et 1B aussi, c’est tr&s ambrement quenous regrettons qu’il soit absent de cette salle, parce que nous aurions voulu être entendus directement de lui-même, quoique nous soyons sQrs que ce que nous allons dire devant ce conseil lui sera rapport& 71. Nous voulons constater tout simplement que le représentant du gouvernement de Lagos a parlé en marge de la question que le Conseil est en train d’examiner. Nous devons cependant le fbliciter pour plusieurs raisons. D’abord, pour le courage ‘qu’il a eu de se présenter devant ce conseil en vue de joues officiellement et du néo-colonialisme; ensuite, pour avoir si bien joué ce r81e, car apr8s son intervention plus aucun doute ne subsiste chez tout Africain conscient: le representant celui-l& que l’on pourrait qualifier, justement, de traître et d’ennemi de l’Afrique. 71. We simply wish to point out that the representative of the Government of Lagos skirted the issue that was before the Council. Nevertheless, we must congratulate him on several counts. First of all, for his courage in appearing before this Council in order to officiaily play his role of the lackey of imperïalism and neo-colonialism; and seoondly, for having played that role SO well. For after his speech there cari no longer be any doubt in the mind of any perceptive African: the representative of the Government of Lagos could indeed be described, in a11 fairness, as a traitor and an enemy of Africa, 72. Nous sommes convaincus que ce speaker de %a Voix de llAmériquet’, que ce despote ridiculement suffisant et gravement irresponsable, 72. We are convinced that this speaker for “The Voice of America’!, this ridiculously self-satisfied and dangerously irresponsible despot, was only ex- 73. With regard to the accusations that he made agains t my country, 1 am very sorry that his commitments towards his masters made it impossible for him to be with me at Addis Ababa this September. Since 1 am not answerable to non-Africans such as he, 1 am simply going to refer him to the reply 1 intend to make shortly to his masters. There were other speakers for “The Voice of America”, besides the representative of the Lagos Government, but we shall net waste our time in quoting them a11 here. 74. 1 should just like to say one short word to the representative of Brazil, 1 should like to tel1 him that we are glad to accepthisoffer togo and live in Brazil, where, according to him, the black man is safe. However, he also said that Brazil’s anti-colonialist inclinations were well known, and in view of that statement, we are compelled to point out to him that the ’ régime which he represents here has, contrary to Brazil’s anti-colonialist inclinations, been harassing -and quite reoently-the nationalists of Portuguese Guinea who had taken refuge there. We are unable to reconcile these facts, but we cari tel1 him that we are mindful of his offer to go and live in Brazil and we shall certainly avail ourselves of the opportunity to do SO, but not as long as the régime is the one he represents here. 75. The problem has been misrepresented. Yesterday the Bolivian representative gave us a very good lesson in morality. We are most grateful to him for this, ‘but we should like to supplement his story a little by informing him that our relations with our former colonizers are not as bad as a11 that and that, in any case, we have never been colonized by the United States of America. 76. The United States representative told us in his statement that the Secretary-General’s report of 29 June 1964 on the withdrawal of the United Nations Force in the Congo said that “the resolutions of the Security Council concerning the Congo continue to be applicable, since they have no terminal date”[S/5784, para. 132l.y We too have read this report and we understood it in the same way as did the United States representative. We must point out, however, that the references he made to it show a partiality that we cannot ignore. I/ Sec Officia1 Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year, Supplement for ApriI, May and June 1964. “Decicles that an immediate and impartial investigation be held in order to ascertain the circumstances of the death of Mr. Lumumba and his colieagues and that the perpetrators of these crimes be punished”. 78. A commission of investigation was set up in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1601 (XV) and it submitted a report [S/4976]3 which presented. inter alia, the following conclusion in paragraph 124, sub-paragraph 2: “On the oontrary, the Commission accepts as substantially true the evidence indioating that tbe prisoners were killed on 17 January 1961 after their arriva1 in a villa not far from Elisabethville and in a11 probability in the presence of high officiais of the government of Katanga province, namely Mr. Tshombe, Mr. Munongo and Mr. Kibwe, and that the escape story was staged.” The paragraph states further, in sub-paragraph 5: “The Commission wishes to put on recordits view that Fresident Kasa-Vubu and his aides, on the one hand, and the provincial government of Katanga headed by Mr. Tshombé on the other, should not esoape responsibility for the deathof Mr. Lumumba, Mr. Okito and Mr. Mpo10.~~ The same paragraph goes on to say, in sub-paragraph 6: “The record of the Commission’s work bristles with evidence indicative of the extensive roleplayed by MI!, Munongo, the Katanga Minis ter of the Interior , in the entire plot leading to the murder of Mr. Lumumba, Mr. Okito and Mr. Mpoio. The Commission again repeats that the attitude of the Government of the Republic of the Congo had prevented it from going to the scene of the crime to carry out its investigation. Nevertheless, the Commission hopes that the rgsults which it has managed to obtain oan, to some extent, serve as a basis for a further investigation in the Congo, and also in judicial proceedings which, in its view, should be instituted as soon as possible.” 79. We should have liked such quotations as these t0 be made, also. But that was not the only deliberate 2/ Ibid., Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, Fehruary and March 1961. 3( Ibid., Supplement for October, November and December 1961. 80. The measures referred to were for the restoration of law and order in the Congo. 1 think that this is what the Organization of African Unity, and in particular its ad hoc Commission, has been trying to do. yet no mention is made of this document, which is of great importance, because the American intervention in the Congo (Leopoldville) represents notonlyfailure to co-operate’with one African State, but, more serious still, failure to co-operate with the whole of Africa, which has been trying, within the Organization of African Unity, to study, if not to salve, the Congolese problem, 81. There are other resolutions that have not been quoted, suoh as the one adopted by the Seourity Counoil on 21 February 1961 [S/47413, to which Ihave already referred. The fourth preambular paragraph of part B reads: “Convinced that the solution of the problem of the Congo lies in the hands of the Congolese people themselves without any interferenoe from outside and that there cari be no solution without conciliation, , . .I’ , 1 wonder how anyone could expect the Congoleseproblem to be solved, since even under the Government of Mr. Adoula, who did at least have unmistakable proof of legality, the Congolese people were unable to agree among themselves. How, 1 say, could anyone hope that with Mr. TshombB’s arriva1 the conditions for a reconciliation would be provided, and thus allow the United States of America to give Mr. Tshombé the assistance we know he has received? 82. The problem has been misrepresented. False accusations have been levelled here against my country. They were made by various delegations but were very specificaliy expressed by the representative of the United States of America, who said, without any possibility of misunderstanding, that the Congo (Brazzaville) was supporting the rebellion. We are not conoerned about the accusation of having supported the rebellion, for we are prepared to prove the contrary. But the following statement by theUnitedStates representative is a more serious matter: n * * . the Foreign Minister of Congo (Brazzaville) seems to attribute the difficulties that have SO long beset bis country’s neighbour, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to a mythical otruggle between black and whites.” [1174th meeting, para. 54.1 4/ Ibid., Fifreenth Year, Supplement for July. August and September +E!t!& 84. But my delegation knows that this is not just ignorance; it knows that this is simply to ensure that nothing is said about the evils of racial segregation, &bout which, in any case, no one in this room should be more ashamed to speak than the representative of the United States of America. Yet he has dared to Speak to us of what he calls the “efforts” made in this matter by his Government in bis own country-as if the restoration of the civil rights of the blacks who live in that country were not a right and as if it were a favour clone to the blaoks. 84. Mais ma délégation sait qu’il ne s’agit pas là d’ignorance; d’une manœuvre tendant 21 faire passer sous silence les mbfaits de la ségr&gation raciale, dont, en tout cas, personne dans cette salle ne devrait avoir plus honte de parler que le représentant des Etats-Unis d’Ami%ique. Cependant, ce dernier a osé nous parler de ce qu’il appelle les “efforts” sens par son gouvernement dans son propse pays, - comme si le retablissement des droits civiques deS noirs qui habitent ce pays n’était pas un droit et comme si c T&ait une faveur faite aux noirs. 85. Nous avons 4% accuses d’appuyer la rebellion au Congo (Léopoldville), surpris entendre d’aujourd’hui; donn8 des explications suffisamment claires et precises pour représentant des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, neformulent plus % nouveau cette accusation denu8e devant un public que nous voulons respecter et qui doit Btre respecté. 85, We bave, 1 have said, been accused of supporting the rebellion in the Congo (Leopoldville). We were surprised to hear this accusation repeated in this room. For it is not new and we had thought that our explanations were sufficiently clear and precise to prevent any representatives, particularly the representative of the United States of America, from repeating this groundless accusation before an audience whioh we wish to respect and which ought to be respec ted, 86. Nous avons commencé par &tre accusés par Etats-Unis partir nistes - pourraient organiser des expeditions contre le Congo (Leopoldville). semaines après que nous venions de renouer les relations diplomatiques avec la Chine (la vraie)+ j’ai reçu dans mon bureau M. van O~S, chargé d’affaires des Etats-Unis venu me dire que son gouvesnement eprouvait des inquiétudes trés sérieuses parce que les Chinois qui arriveraient diplomatiques que nous venions de renouer avec eux ne manqueraient pas de preparer, & partir du Congo (Brazzaville), 86. We began by being acoused by the United States of America of preparing the ground on whioh the Chinese-the real Chinese, the Communists-could organize expeditions against the Congo (Leopoldville). On 10 March 1964, two weeks after we had resumed diplomatie relations with China (the real China), I received Mr. van OS~, the Chargi$ d’affaires of the CJnited Rates of Amerioa at Brazzaville, in my office. He had corne to tel1 me that his Government was SeriOuSly disturbed because the Chinese who would corne t0 Brazzaville as a result of the diplomatie relations we had just opened with them would certainly use the Congo (Brazzaville) for preparing expeditions in order to sow subversion in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We gave him our reply 87. A little less than a’ month later, at the close of his stay in Leopoldville, Mr. Averell Harriman, Under-Secretary of State in the State Department, declared that the Congo (Brazzaville) constituted an imminent danger for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We denied this and a few weeks later we were visited by Mr. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of African Affairs, also in the State Department, who came to explain Ms. Harriman’s statement to us. 88, We thought that the matter would rest there. Unfortunately, we were mistaken. It was precisely from that time that the Democratic Republic of the Congo began to imagine thousands of Chinese based in the Congo (Brazzaville). 89. What did we do then? Since we were accused of having granted bases to those who were opposed to the Leopoldville régime-and who hadchinese experts to train them in guerrilla warfare-what did we do to try to remove a11 lingering suspicions at one fell swoop? We invited the Am.bassador of the United States and the Ambassador of Belgium at Brazzaville to visit the north of our country, where their creative imagination was conjuring up visions similar to those of the Leopoldville leaders, of camps which have never existed and which Will never exist. 90. 1 should like to tel1 the Security Council that this invitation which is still standing and is valid to this day did not suffice to calm those who are agitated and who, moreover, have reason to be agitated because they know they are where they ought not to be. We had to go to Addis Ababa, 91. 1 had thought that the Council of Ministers,which met from 5 September at Addis Ababa, had provided a sufficient lesson for the United States of America to realize once and for a11 that we have never helped anybody against their Leopoldville protégés, 1 shall spare you a report, which would be out place here. 1 should like to tel1 you, however, that at Addis Ababa it took us forty-eight hours to get Mr. Tshomb6 to define the accusations which, on the banks of the River Congo, he hurled at our Government a11 day long. Mr. -Tshombé took refuge in the fact that the Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie 1, had asked for CalmneSs and olarity in the debate, to say that he had net corne to engage in any polemics. That was totally untrue; the fact was that Mr. Tshombé was quite unable to produce the slightest proof in support of the accusations he had hitherto been making against us, 92. This was confirmed when we drove Mr. Tshombé to the wall and he was forced to say the only thing he oould say. We. then’denied everything he said, for a11 93. 1 should like to add that 1 personally seized the opportunity to tel1 Mr. TshombB, who had himself admitted that the cadres of his army were rotten, that he ought to be very careful because it was not only the cadres of his army which were rotten but possibly bis political cadres too. 93. pour lui-même 6taient ce n’était 6taient politiques. 94. Attempts have been made to present the September meeting of tbe Council of Ministers of the OAU at Addis Ababa as a victory for Mr. Tshomb&, as a recognition of his Government. 1s it really necessary t0 meet around a table SO that this may be regarded as recognition of a Government? 1s not each of our Governments capable of individually recognizing another .Government without having recourse to this method? It has been alleged that on this occasion Mr. Tshombé had been venerated, that he had been’ praised, that it was a victory for him. The fact is that quite the contrary occurred. Mr. TshombB tried to get the Council of Ministers to agree that the OAU would supply him with Afrioan troops and the OAU refused, Mr. Tshombé was told that he should obtain African troops under thebilateral agreements between his oountry and other States, SO that it would remain the responsibility of those African countries which were willing to supply troops to chat illegal Government, the Government of the Demooratic Republic of the Congo. 94. ministres comme reconnaissance aller se réunir considérer gouvernement? pas autre , cette méthode? sion, encensé, c’est a cherché l’OUA a refusé. dans le cadre entretient africaines, pays africains gouvernement Republique 95. nons l’avons prou& la rébellion. s’agir ment étaient traqués pour leurs c%tait accordee - si l’on peut même appeler cela’ de l’assistance. Beaucoup de conventions ont été élaborees& Genève, et je ne pense pas qu’elles soient muettes sur le cas des Sugi& que l’on parle aussi, dans cette affaire, d’uneconventien-de GenBve sur l’octroi de l’asile politique a ceux qui le sollicitent. 95. We proved at Addis Ababa-and we have just told you briefly how we proved it-that we had never supported the rebellion. We proved that there was no question of %ebellion” and that we had merely received on our territory persons who were hunteddown in their own c6untry because of their opinions and their political ideas. We proved that this was the only assistance we had rendered them-if it cari even be called assistance, Many conventions have been prepared at Geneva and 1 do not think that they are silent on the question of political refugees. We should have liked mention to be made in this matter of a Geneva Convention on the granting of politioal asylum to those requssting it. 196. En tout cas, si ce que nous avons fait, si le Seul fait d’accorder sont présentés a nous parce qu’ils Btaient dans leurs vies et dans leurs biens constitue un soutien 96. In any case, if what we have done, if the mere fact of granting political asylum to persons who came m US because their lives and property were threatened, constitutes any kind of support of the members of the J 97. Efforts have been made to misrepresent the question, to make us say things we did not say. We did indeed speak of racism in this room. That we bo not deny. But let it not be alleged that we have tried to create a gulf between Africa and Europe, that we have said that we want to set the black man against the white man. That is not a11 that we have said. Let no one invent stories of racism inAfricainvolving the Arab and the black man. When we opened the debate here we spoke of the obvious character of racial discrimination of the Stanleyville operation and we said that it was the work of a certain group of whites. In saying that, we were being sufficiently explicit. Everyone knows who fits into the group we spoke of, Why then try to smother the question7 Why try to distort the meaning of our remarks and give them a meaning we ourselves have not given them? 98. We are perfectly aware that a11 whites are not alike. From the beginning, a11 whites have not treated us in the same way. But there are some who have treated us with oontempt and who continue to do SO, in particular, the Belgians and the Americans who perpetrated the Stanleyville aggression. Moreover, it was not only on the occasion of the Stanleyville attack that they displayed this contempt. They have done SO in many other circumstances which we do not wish to recall here. We are not the only ones to have observed the racism, the contempt displayed by this type of white man for the black race, It is true that things change, which leads me to recall one of my country’s proverbs which says, in substance, that although we deplore the presence in the enemyls ranks of a strong and powerful person, we are on the contrary very glad when this same personcomes over to OUF side. For 1 have not been the only one to emphasize the racist character of the actions of the whites who intervened in the Congo, It was acknowledged two years ago, by the present representative of Mr. Tshombe in the United Nations, namely the speaker who preceded me, Addressing the General Assembly on 19 December 1962, Mr. Idzumbuirspoke in these terms: “a * I the words I have just quoted show that what Mr. TshombB means by ‘order’ is that the whites should not be disturbed, We oan understand, therefore, the support given him by the racists of Northern Rhodesia and South Africa and by reactionary and facist ciroles in certain States. This is the person, 100. As we said, the problem has been misrepresente& But as far as we are concerned it is still there; it was not we who brought it up; it arose of itself, and it is still there. An act of imperialist aggression was oommitted at Stanleyville and that aggression was premeditated. Let no one tel1 us that we are saying things here whioh we cannot prove. We cari prove that the aggression was premeditated. 100. Le probleme a et8 déplacé, disions-nous. Mais pour nous, il reste posé; ce n’est pas nous qui l’avons posé; il s’est pose de lui-m&me et il reste ~OS& Il y a Stanleyville, Qu’on ne nous dise pas que nous nous permettons d’affirmer, Nous sommes a même de prouver que l’agression a 8té pr8méditée. 101. We have been bld that the duty of the American and Belgian Governments was, first and foremost, to save the lives of their nationals and to ensure their safety. It seems to us, however, that military intervention is not the only way of ensuring the safety of a COUntry’s nationals, The political action of a oountry, when it is clear and lucid, cari be a sufficient guarantee that its nationals Will be safe wherever they may be. If the Belgian and Amerioan Governments wanted to ensure the safety of their compatriots in the Congo, as they claim to have done after thiscowardly intervention, there were peaceful means available. There was the precedent of 1960. 101. On nous a dit que le devoir des Gouvernements americsin de leurs ressortissants, d’assurer leur S&urit& Mais nous croyons savoir qu’on n’assure pas la sbcurite des ressortissants vention militaire. qu’elle suffisante pour assurer a ses nationaux la securité dont ils ont besoin, OU qu’ils se trouvent. Si les Gouvernements belge et am6ricain voulaient assurer h leurs compatriotes qui se trouvaient au Congo la S&urit& une intervention sition des moyens pacifiques. Il y avait le precédent de 1960. 102. Que s’est-il passe, en 1960, lorsque les troupes belges sont intervenues au Congo (LBopoldville)? Il y a eu une réaction de la part de lapopulation congolaise, une hostilité Belges. Cette hostilit8 a abouti & l’exode que l’on oonnaît des Belges en direction de Brazzaville. l’occasion de dire au representant de la Belgique que nous ne sommes pas racistes, car nous avons accueilli les Belges. C’est le contribuable congolais qui adonné 102. What happened in 1960, when Belgian troops intervened in the Congo (Leopoldville)? The Congolese peuple reacted by showing clear hostility towards the Belgians. That hostility led to the exodus of the Belgians towards Brazzaville. 1 should like to take this opportunity to tel1 the Belgian representative that we are not racists, for we took in the Belgians. It was the Congolese taxpayer who gave of his bread, his water, his light. We sheltered those Belgians for Séances s/ Officia1 Records of the General Assembly, Seventeentb SesSiOn, Plsnary Meetings, 1199th meeting, para. 39. 103. As for the racial discrimination that accompanied that operation, it was evident, there is no need to emphasize it further. On 21 November 1 received in my office the Ambassador of Belgium, the Ambassador of the United Kingdom and the Chargé d’affaires of the United States of Amerioa, who told me, in terms that could not have been clearer, that the Stanleyville operation was intended to save the whites who were there. We were not told that it was to save the civilians, as has been claimed. That same day, the Ambassador of France at Brazzaville came to see me and he, at least, told me that his country was taking steps to try to ensure that the lives of a11 the civilians, whoever they were, would be spared in the fighting that was going on there. 104. Let no one tel1 us that the operation was not discriminatory. It was designed to save the whites, and even if some blacks or whites of other nationalities were saved, that was purely by chance, 1 was informed of this in the course of the preparations which preceded the operation. It was clear that that operation was intended to save only the whites, Tshombe was used as a caver to legalize that infamous operation. It had been authorized by the legal Government-and I should like to ask the Council what it understands by fllegalitylf, because on another occasion, in 1961, this very Council, in a resolution appearingindocumentS/4741, deplored the general absence of legality in the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), and did SO because the Parliament was no longer able to meet. I wonder whether at that time there was not already President ‘Kasa-Vubu, in whose Will alone legality is constituted today. It is enough for him to appoint you for you to become “legaltl even if that appointment is not made in accordance with the “loi fondamentale” which has hitherto been the law governing the Republic of the Congo. 106. In conclusion, we should like to say thefollowing. In appearing before this Counoil, we knew that there -would be no miracle which would enable you to reverse the roles in this jungle which is the United Nations, given the present lack of balance in this Organization. We are not, unfortunately, the only ones to have observed this imbalance today, for it has been noticed even by those against which this Organization has fought in the past and whioh now seem to be secure here since they have the protection of the kings of the jungle. This imbalance was observed by Mr. Munongo when, in a statement made on 13 February 1961 following the death of Patrice Lumumba, he said, in order to show the striotly domestio nature of that odious assassination: 106. Nous qu’aucun mettre jungle que sont les Nations actuel reusement ce dés8quilibre l’Organisation semblent les protéges avait une déclaration mort le caractere de Patrice “1 shall here recall the cases of Sacco and Vanzetti, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, and even Cary1 Chessman in the United States , . , The United States ignored them, considering the matter to be within its exclusive jurisdiction. “There are some who would deny us this right solely because we are black and belong to a Young nation.” [S/4688/Add.l] 9. M. Munongo demandait egalement avaient du leader suivait: Further on, Mr. Munongo asked whether the United Nations had opened an inquiry “into the poisoning of the Cameroonian leader Moumié in Switzerland” and he oontinued: “This enumeration could be oontinued indefinitely. What 1 have said is enough to strike shame into the plément 61 Officia1 Records of the Security Council, Sixteenth Year, SuPPlement for January, February and March 1961. 108. As my Head of State has said, despite their 21,600 soldiers in Viet-Nam, the Americans have not killed ideas with guns. And now, having sabotaged the strenuous efforts which the ad hoc Commission of the Organization of African Unity was making, they oontend that the Congolese problem has become too great for the Crganization of African Unity to resolve and they are trying, by clumsy manœuvres, to take it out of the hands of that Organization byrecommending that a Security Counoil committee should be sent to the Congo. 109. 1 should like to say-at the risk of repeating myself-that we are indeed Young nations but we are not unaware. In the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) we are a mature people, one of those mature peoples as defined by my Head of State, the President of the Republio, who said that a mature people is one which, once it has made a choioe, is resolved to defend that choice at a11 costs, to the very end. 110. We leave it to you, gentlemen, to decide the fate of humanity today, for tomorrow the history of humanity Will deoide the fate of us all.

Because of the late hour, 1 Will confine myself to afew words in reply to the references made to my oountry by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Congo (Brazzaville) in his statement. 112. Fifteen days ago, the Minister for Fore@ Affairs of Congo (Brazzaville) came ta this Counoil t0 plead his case with a kind of language that, to say the least, is far removed from the kind of language we are accustomed to hear in these chambers. Among t other things, he addressed some insults to the very organ before which he had asked to speak, and whioh agreed to listen with patience to his unusuallanguage, Among other nioeties, he called this Council a “council of insecurity”. 113. NOW he has oome again with the same kind of language, attributing immobility to the representatives of countries which are not in agreement with his point of view. 114. The Foreign Minister of Congo (Brazzaville) did not bring a single new argument to support MS defence of the crimes perpetrated by rebel troops, not belonging to any Government of Africa, in Stanleyville. try, Furthermore, I would not advise anybody who has lt in mind to engage’ in political interference in the domestio POlitiCS of my COUntry or to preach sub.. version in any foreign country to pay us such a vi&, because it is very likely that he would have the same kind of treatment as the few professional agitators to whom Mr. Ganao made reference in his speech and egainst whose aCtiVitieS we believe my Government has every right to defend itself.

1 ehall now take the flOOr as the representative of BOLIVIA. 116. drais representant 11’7. Convaincu de securité de la Charte est securit6 thode appropriee de l’huile suis pour ce problème, iXev& faveur 117. Convinced as 1 am that the.members of the Seourity Council are in duty bound, under the Charter of the United Nations, to do everything within their power to preserve world peace and international security, 1 do not consider that the best way of doing 1 this is by adding fuel to the fires of violence. It was for this reason that 1 ventured to intervene in the debate yesterday, both in order to state my oountry’s position in regard ta this problem and in order to make a strong and friendly appeal to the representatives of the African States for good Will and harmony, 118. In reply to my appeal, 1 heard today from the .lips of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo (Brazzaville) an insinuation to the effect that Bolivia was one of the countries colonized by the United States of America. 118. d’hui, geres laquelle les Etats-Unis 119. tion qui est maladroite est un peuple souverain dignité même ideologique. 119. 1 formally protest against this insinuation, which is chimsy and ill-judged. The Bolivian nation is a sovereign nation with a long history of dignity and heroic struggle and it does not accept even the idea of colonization, whether economic or ideologioal. The meeting rose at 1.15’p.m. I 27 HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications may distributors throughout the Write to: United Nations, Sales COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS Les publications des Nations Unies agences dépositaires du monde entier. ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de las Naciones casas distribuidoras en todas partes diriiare a: Naciones Unidas, Seccian Litho in U.N. Price: $U.S. 0.35 (or equivalent in other currencies)