S/PV.1185 Security Council

In accordance with the decision previously taken by the Council and if 1 hear no objection, 1 shall invite the representatives of the Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, Belgium, the Congo (Brazzaville), Algeria, Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, the United Arab Republic, Burundi, Kenya, the Central AfricanRepublit, Uganda and Tanzania to take the seats reserved for them opposite the Council table and to participate in the debate without the right to vote. 1. ment a la decision et représentants de la Belgique, du Mali, de la Burundi, de l’Ouganda droit

Since this is the first time that 1 have the privilege of addressing this most important organ of our world Organization, 1 should like to extend to the President and the other members of the Security Council my appreciation for the strenuous efforts they are a11 making towards the solution of world problems, and my prayer that in future more of those efforts will be crowned with success. 3. Since my Foreign Minister exhaustively put before the Council Nigeria’s position on the questions now under consideration here, I had hoped not to have to intervene again. Developments which we did not anticipate, however, have compelled me to seek the Council’s indulgence to say these few words. 4. We were well aware, of course, that Nigeria’s stand was at variante with that of .a number of our African fellow Members of this Organization. It was therefore only to be expected that when representatives of those Members came to address the Council they would express disagreement with our point of view. 5. What we did not anticipate was the persona1 attacks that have been levelled against our Minister. Even his right to speak for his country has been questioned. And the persona1 attacks have been made, in one or iwo cases, in language of a type which, because of the respect that any African Ambassador must show to any African Foreign Minister, 1 cari only say was unfortunate. 1 am intervening to place on record that Nigeria regrets that occurrence. which in our judgement is hardly calculated to pyomote a fair and reasonable settlement of the vital issues before the Council. 6. We are glad that in their speeches a11 the members of this Council have agreedon one thing-namely, that the problem of the Congo would best be solved within the framework of the Organization of African Unity, an organization of which Nigeria is proud to be a founding member and to which we shall continue to make the ut&ost contribution of which we are capable, Those of ouf fellow members who take a different view must bear with us if we continue to feel, as we honestly do, that that solution can be achieved only by co-operation between the Organizatlon and the legally constituted Government of the Congo. But co-operation is a two-way street, and, just as we have always expressed ourselves firmly on the need for the Organization to respect the sove-

Before exercising my right of reply, 1 should like to draw the attention of the Council to a fa&, which appeared some time ago to be questioned by a certain number of Governments, It is perhaps scarcely necessary for me to mention what everyone has now learned, namely that President Nasser himself admits having helped and that he is continuing to help the rebels in supplying arms, munitions and men. When 1 said yesterday 11184th meeting] that there was reason to suspect those cases which were passing through Khartoum and apparently contained medical supplies, if we are to believe the statement of the Foreign Minister, 1 think 1 was not altogether mistaken. 8. Congo) : Avant d’exercer mon droit de r&ponse, j’aimerais attirer il y a quelque temps, a semble &tre contesté par un certain nombre de gouvernements. Peut-Btrepourrais-je que chacun a pu apprendre, à savoir l’aveu du president Nasser lui-même qui reconnaît avoir aidé et continue d’aider la rébellion, en armes, munitions et hommes. Lorsque je disais hier [1184ème s&nce] qu’il y avait lieu de se mefier de ces caisses qui transitaient des medicaments, si l’on en croit la déclaration du Ministre n’avais pas parfaitement tort. 9. Having made that point, 1 should like to exercise my right of reply, especially with regard to the statements made here on behalf of the Brazzaville Government i1184th meeting]. 1 am sorry that 1 do not see in the Council chamber the Foreign Minister of the Brazzaville Government-in referring to him, 1 use his title, for 1 would not go SO far-1 might even .say SO low-as to use the kind of language he employed. 1 shall keep my remarks above the plane of personalities and speak from a standpoint of friendly relations, the friendly relations which have always existed between our two peoples and which will continue to exist, regardless of the politicians, whocome and go. 9, Cela dit, je me permettrai de rhponse, particulierement qui a parle ici au nom du gouvernement de Brazzaville dans la salle le Ministre de Brazzaville voudrais pas me laisser aller, dire, m’abaisser, B utiliser le ton et le langage qu’a utilises le Ministre des affaires étrangeres de Brazzaville. personnes pour parler dans une perspective de relations amicales, de ces relations amicales qui ont toujours uni nos deux peuples et qui continueront de les unir, qui, eux, passent. 10. Le Ministre ville a fait hier une confusion que je me dois maintenant de redresser, Gouvernement Congo, il a fait une confusion entre ce qui, en droit constitutionnel, c’est-&-dire la fin d’une législature, la dissolution d’un parlement et un gouvernement transitoire tutionnel j’aimerais lui faire très succinctement l’historique du problème, l’ignorait 10. The Brazzaville Foreign Minister yesterday confused two things which I must now clearly distinguish. When he spoke of the legality of the GOVernment of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, he failed to distinguish between certain elementary concepts of constitutional law, namely between the recessing of a parliament, the ending of alegislature, the dissolution of Parliament and a transitional government, which may be constitutional, and in this case is SO. This is why 1 should like to give him a very brief historical summary of this question, since it is perhaps owing to his unawareness of the historical background that the confusion arose. 12. Since, furthermore, a new Parliament could not be formed without holding elections and the Government was bound in the normal way, at the end of the legislature, to hand its resignation to the Head of State, that is what in fact happened: the Government submitted its resignation to the Head of State, who accepted it. However, it was necessary to have a government to carry on the day-to-day business the country and to make preparations for the electians. In accordance with’ the transitional provisions of the new Constitution adopted in June 1964, the Head of State appointed a prominent person-namely, TshombB-to form a provisional Government, a perfectly constitutional one, for the specific purpose of preparing for elections which were to be held no later than nine months after the formation of that Gcvernment. That time-limit too was laid down in the transitional provisions of the Constitution. 13. 1 believe that the explanation 1 have just given shows clearly that the fact that a Government transitional and that there is no parliament, does not mean that that Government is illegal or that it exists unconstitutionally. 14. Secondly, the Brazzaville Foreign Mini&er that we went to Addis Ababa to seek recognition,. even saw fit to leoture us, telling us that reoognition is an act of sovereignty on the part of a Government. We are fully aware of that and we did not at sll go to Addis Ababa to seek recognition. The Governments which reoognized us did SO, and those which did not had every right to refrain from recognizing us; we have certainly no intention going down on our knees to beg them to recognize us. We did not, therefore, go to Addis Ababa to secure reoognition; we simply went there because we are a member of the Organization of African Unity, 15. At Addis Ababa, the question of the legitimacy of a government was not even a matter for discussion, We are members of OAU and as long as a Government is accepted as a member and is recognized as representing its country, the question of recognition in the international sense of the word does not arise. 16. Thirdly, the Brazzaville Foreign Minister said that we went to OAU to ask for troops. 1 do not know where he obtained this information, but 1 was at Addis Ababa myself, as he was, and 1 cari say that our request was in no sense a request to OAU for troops; chat we did ask was that OAU should agree that those merder States to which we might apply should be allowed to make certain military assistance available to us. That is quite a different thing from the suggestion that we went to Addis Ababa toask for troops. 16. étrangères allf% sais moi-même dire demander der a l’OUA d’accepter nous notre Cela est tout différent nous des troupes. 17. 1 Will conclude by saying that it is somewhat strange-it is perhaps due to the Foreign Minister’s very special form of dialectic-that when a text is quoted one should carefully choose certain words and amputate the text by omitting what preceded the phrase chosen, the very words which would have enabled the reader to understand properly what was meant, In short, it is a rather strange procedure to take a passage out of its context and to distort it. That is how the Foreign Ministes quoted here a short extra& from my statement (which 1 remember very well, as it was my very first statement in the General Assembly-it was at the 1199th meeting on 19December 1962) and he took it entirely out of its context. 1 must state that 1 am still absolutely opposed to any kind of secession in my country, whatever its origin and whoever its leader may be. 1 have always been consistent on that point and shall remain SO. 17. un attribuer Ministre de citer les omettant et ce qui, précisément, texte; procéder et d’en Ministre partie bien, puisque devant le 19 décembre Je dois sécession qu’elle Je resterai Et je le suis resté. 18. May 1 remind the Foreign Minister of the Congo (Brazzaville) that he was a director in the Ministry of Poreign Affairs at the time of the Government of Fulbert Youlou. 1 do not think that that Government was always in favour of the unity of my country. I do .not need to tel1 the Foreign Minister that the Prime Minister, Mr. Tshombg, himself, declaredthat it was thanks to that Government that he was able to consolidate the secession. 18. Congo &ait du temps pense faveur dire Premier que c’est grâce à ce gouvernement qu’il a pu consolider la s&ession. 19. 1 do not wish to dwell on that point. 1 believe that in dealing with this question we must show a certain kind of sincerity. 1 have said, and 1 should like to conclude by repeating, that politicians corne and go: what is important is the friendship existing between our two peoples. Only by working in future to safeguard and strengthen that friendship shall we be able to secure true well-being and happiness for our two peoples. 19. Je ne voudrais Je pense que, dans tout cela, il y a une esp&ce de sincérité que nous devons avoir. J’ai dit et je réphte, en terminant, Ce qui importe, c’est l’amitié qui existe ,entre nos deux peuples. C “est dans la mesure où nous travaillerons pour sauvegarder cette amiti8,. la consolider, que nous pourrons apporter un véritable véritable bonheur & nos deux peuples. 20. 1 shall go further still and, regardless of a11 that may have been said and everything the Foreign Minister of the Congo (Brazzaville) said about my Government, 1 Will say to him simply that 1 extend to him and his people my best wishes for Christmas and the New Year. 20. J’irai qui a pu se dire et de tout ce que le Ministre des affaires étrangéres du Congo (Brazzaville) a l’égard de mon gouvernement, je lui dirai simplement que je formule, peuple, mes meilleurs vœux de Noël et de Nouvel an. 22. When I spoke here a week ago [1174th meeting] about the role of the United States in the Congo and in the mission to rescue the civilian hostages of many nations, held by the rebels in Stanleyville, 1 had high hopes that this role would be oorrectly understood, if not indeed applauded by the nations which. had signed the complaint against my country. 1 had high hopes because the rescue mission was inspired by principles which 1 thought unassailable and by motives which 1 fancied were shared by a11 men of goodwill and of humane instincts everywhere. 23. In the intervening days of this debate 1 have been torn between disbelief at the incessant parrotlike repetition of absurd charges and sorrow that several African nations are disdainful, evenresentful, of my country’s long and consistent efforts to help achieve the unity, integrity and peaceful development of the Congo by assistance in many forms, first by the United Nations and subsequently by the central Government. 24. Yet these same countries proclaim again and again that an independent stable Congo is what they want. 1 believed them at first, and now 1 wonder what their real objectives are. 25. 1 heard no such complaints about United States aid during the years of the struggle to end secession in Katanga and preserve the unity of the Congo, when the troops of many Members of the United Nations were transported to the Congo inUnitedStates vessels and aircraft, used Amerioan equipment and were supported by American voluntary contributions and matching bond purchases when other means of financing failed. We did our part, as did many other nations, and in view of the accusations by a small group of African States, 1 am proud to recall in the Council today the part that we played at that time. 26. But for the most part, 1 have heard only a repetition of charges that my Government was insincere in its efforts to extricate the hostages, and that together with Belgium we planned aggression in the Congo, using the resoue mission as a pretext, and that we alone are responsible for frustrating peace and order in this troubled country, 27. Perhaps the most outrageous, the most despicable charge that we have heard in the Council during thes8proceedings was the one made yesterday 28. 1 shall say no more about this repulsive charge. 1 am sure, however, that, like the racialism that has emerged in this discussion, it Will have been noted well by a11 responsible men. 28. Je ne m%tendrai pas davantage sur cette accusation répugnante. Je suis sQr cependant que cette accusation, de même que certaines idées racistes qui se sont manifestées au cours du dgbat, n’aura pas 6chapp6 aux hommes responsables, 29. The facts are that my Government sought to persuade a11 Americans, except the staff of our Consulate in Stanleyville, to leave the region prior to the occupation of Stanleyville by the rebels on 5 August. Our consular officiais remained because it was their duty to stay until a11 others were out. These consular officiais were, however, imprisoned and held as hostages until released by the rescue mission. Some Americans left, but others, particularlymissionaries, refused to leave their posts at the side of the Congolese people to whom they had devoted their lives. Some in the bush could not be notified in time. Some who sought to leave failed to reach the airport before it was seized by the rebels. Some who had left the region returned, against our advice, in order to tend their flocks. 29. En réalité, mon gouvernement a cherché B persuader tous les Americains, B l’exception du personnel du consulat de Stanleyville, avant l’occupation de Stanleyville par les rebelles, le 5 aotlt. Le personnel du consulat est reste parce qu’il avait le devoir d’attendre que tous les Américains soient Partis. Cependant, les agents consulaires ont kt6 emprisonn6s et gardés comme otages et n’ont Certains Americains sont partis, mais d’autres, en particulier leur poste et voulu rester aux côt6s du peuple congolais auquel ils ont consacré leur vie. Certains, qui se trouvaient venus a temps, D’autres, qui cherchaient a partir, n’ont pu atteindre l’aéroport avant qu’il ne soit occupé par avaient quitt6 la r6gion y sont retournés, malgré nos avertissements, ouailles. 30. J’ai également entendu exposer ici d’etranges doctrines, inspirées, je l’esp&!e, plut6 t par l%motion que par une mare r&flexion. On a dit, par exemple, que les Etats africains pouvaient intervenir un Etat africain d’autres lancé par 1’Etat en question, J’ai entendu assimiler les rebelles certainement faire armée contre un Etat Membre. 30. 1 have heard also some strange doctrines asserted here, provoked, 1 hope, more by emotion than by mature reflection. For example, that African States cari intervene against a neighbouring African State while denying the right of other States to answer that State’s cal1 for help, 1 have heard a rebellion equated with a legitimate government-which must indeed be the first attempt to use the United Nations to validate an armed attack against a Member State. 31. J’ai également entendu dire que le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis était indiffférent ?t la mort des noirs du Mississippi que mon pays cherche systématiquement à renverser les gouvernements qui ne lui sont pas favorables. J’ai entendu aussi, de source non africaine, l’accusation que mon pays cherche a faire du Congo un poste avan& du colonialisme en Afrique Centrale, en vue de monopoliser l’exploitation naturelles sur un autre plan, cette source d6forme ainsi, depuis des années, le sens de l’aide publique et privée que les Etats-Unis d6veloppement. Ce procéd6 est vieux et bien Connu. Ce qui est nouveau, c’est l’écho rencontre aupr8s d’un petit groupe de pays africains qui reprennent en ohœur le m.ême refrain. 31. And 1 have heard that the United States Government is indifferent to the death of Negroes in Mississippi and of Africans in the Congo, and that my country habitually seeks to overthrow unsympathetic Governments. 1 heard too, from a non-African source, the charge that my country sought to establish in the Congo a beach-head for colonialism in 1 Central Africa for the purpose of monopolistic exploitation of the Congo’s natural wealth. But thus has that source misdescribed for years of United States public or private efforts to assist undercleveloped nations, efforts which it cannot otherwise assail. The technique is old and familiar; what is new is the small chorus of African voices that now echo the same refrain. 33. This is the sort of intervention by the established government of one independent country against the established government of another independent country which, if continued, Will tear apart the fabric of international co-operation and world peace. This is precisely the sort of intervention in which communist countries normally, regularly and as a matter of doctrine engage. We hardly think that this qualifies them to denounce others who furnish aid to recognized, sovereign Governments resisting armed rebellion inspired from abroad. 34. The bulk of the charges against my country appear to fa11 in the category of motivation rather than of facts, although, in some cases, the latter also are disputed. Allegations have been made which cal1 into question the good faith of my Government and of the statements which 1 made here last week. This 1 cari only regret, since motives-and other men’s speculations concerning them-are, unfortunately, not psovable. 1 have, as 1 said, explained my country’s motives and purposes at length in my earlier remarks. 1 cari only hope, in the light of what is known of my country’s long record of assistance to other nations in their efforts to improve the lot of their peoples, that the leaders of the Governments represented here among the complainants Will examine, in the privacy of their consciences, what 1 have said to this Council. If they do, 1 believe they will find that they do not themselves really believe their intemperate remarks. And if we question motives, 1 too could question theirs. 35. Socrates said in the Dialogues of Plato: “The partisan, when he is engaged in a dispute, cares nothing about the rights of the question but is anxious only to convlnce his hearers of his assertions.” 36. And 1 recall, too, a Danish proverb, which has its equivalent in a11 countries, 1 dare say, that “Empty waggons make the most noise". 37. It is said that no foreign civilian was killed by the rebels before the Belgian paratroopers landed in Stanleyville. This too is demonstrablyfalse. 1 reported earlier that thirty-five foreign civilians were mur- 38. History Will record the long efforts of the Congolese Government to obtain help in the training, the disciplining and the equipping of its army in order to preserve law and order within its boundaries against the day when the United Nations forces would have to leave and that the United States and Belgium were among those who answered that call. It Will record the fact that the rebellion was against the Government of Prime Minister Adoula in the beginning-a fact which the complaining nations seem to overlook. It will record Mr. Adoula’s appeals to African nations to help him fil1 the void created by the final departure of the United Nations forces. It Will recall their failure to respond, and it will also now record their denunciation of those who did. And it will aIso record the unashamed-indeed exultantadmissions by the Chiefs of State of Algeria and the United Arab Republic, President Ben Bella andPresident Nasser, that they are sending arms ta the rebels to help overthrow the Government of the Congo and that they will continue to do SO. 38. le Gouvernement qu’on armee de ses frontières Unies les pays qui ont repondu & cet appel, Elle rappellera la rébellion nement nations registrera aux nations bler des Nations est resté y avaient les d’Etat le président reconnaissent les aider déclarent 39. It seems to me 1 have been challenged here again and again to prove the complaint of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo that members of the Organization of Afrioan Unity were assisting the rebels. 39. maintes plainte tique du Congo, nisation 40. orateurs du Gouvernement n’ayant ment comme a éti? reconnue aperçu internationale chant la fraternité 40. A few days ago we heard speakers say in this Chamber that the complaint of the Government of the Congo should be dismissed because “it has no substance”, to quote the words literally-dismissed without substance when the charge is admitted, when we bave an alarming preview of the kind of legality and of international conduct that they intend to practise regardless of what they preach about Africanbrotherhood and unity. 4l.. soutenu qui effrontément mettre devant l’Organisation qu’en accusations, nement - avec Gouvernement une économiques maintenant fin cette dangereuse,offensante qui a avili ce temple de la justice, 41. Contrary to the bold assertions of the Foreign Minister of Kenya that the United States isfrustrating peace in the Congo, I remind you that the promise of the United States to co-operate with the Organization of African Unity has already been reaffirmed in this Council and I repeat again that the United States, in spite of everything-the disappointments, the accusations, the contradictions in the reasoning-stands ready to co-operate with the OAU, with the Security Council and with the Government of the Congoin finding a solution, a bona fide solution, to the problems, political and economic, which beset this great country. And 1 now wish tp appeal once more for an end to this ugly, abusive and dangerous polemic which has demeaned this hall of justice, peace and international fraternity. A calm and constructive approach to the 42. 1 say ta the complainants that the hand is extended. If others Will grasp it we may still be able to act before it is too late.

Those who have attentively followed the latest statement by the United States representative may have differing opinions about the substance of the questions he touched upon. I dare say, however, that the general opinion of those who have just listened to his statement may at least be summarized as being that the terminology, epithets and general tone of this speech are completely out of keeping with what he said in it to the effect that, in speaking today, he wished to act in a spirit of conciliation because of the great religious festival which, if we are to believe him, he and many others regard with very great reverence. 44. Al1 that the United States representative has just said hardly looked like an attempt to give a Christmas present to those here-the members the Security Council and the representatives of many African and Asian countries-who are participating in the Council’s discussion of this question. 45. Still, de gustibus non disputandum, as the saying goes; and if 1 have nevertheless touched upon this aspect of the matter, it is in order to stress once more-as I shall later prove-that the assertions made here by the United States representative are just as hypocritical as the entire thesis and position adopted earlier by the United States during the discussion of the recent Belgo-United States intervention in the Congo. 46. The African countries have correotly judged the armed intervention by the United States and Belgium to be a most dangerous threat to the independence of the peoples not only of the Congo but of a11 Africa. 47. TO say, after this, that the Unitedstatesexpected to be applauded for its renewed but this time unprecedented armed invasion of the Congo-this, indeed, beats a11 records for hypocrisy,hitherto established. 48. The United States representative has complained here that the charges against his delegation have fallen int0 the category of motivation-into what might be called the category of psychology, if that part of his statement may be SO interpreted-rather than into the category of facts, 49. Of course, the United States representative himself has again, on this occasion, evaded any kind of serious analysis of the factual circumstances 50. 1 shall have to speak of certain facts which are far removed from anything psychological or subjective, which are among the hard and indisputable facts established by history as it has unfolded since, in JURY 1960, the colonial intervention was first unleashed against the peoples of the Congo, just after that countsy’s political independence had been secured. 50. loin de relever des faits par le jour oh, en juillet s’est venait d’accéder 51. 1 do not intend now, at this rather late hour, to recapitulate the whole history of the colonialintervention in the Congo: but 1 feel it my duty to start this history, not from the point ox under the influence of its present distortion by the United States representative, but laying stress on its most important aspects and circumstances. 51. de retracer liSte vient 52. As 1 said, the imperialist, colonialist intervention began, as a matter of history, in July 1960. It continued thereafter, despite the Security Counoil resolution of 14 July 1960 [S/4387];u and it led to the tragic death of the national hero of the African peoples in the struggle for their liberation, to the villainous murder of Patrice Lumumba. Not content with this, the colonizers continued to extend their offensive, against the independence, freedom and territorial integrity of the new African State of the Congo. nialiste lution pour contre ritoriale 53. 1 shall now deal with the historic landmarkwhich the United States representative and certain others argued that under the Adoula Government there had already been interference by the colonizers in the interna1 affairs of the Congo and that the continuation of such interference is lawful because it has nothing to do with the operations, activities and actions of interference which are taking place now, when the puppet of the imperialists and colonizers of the Congo -Tshombé-is in power. 53. le représentant en faisant deja dans les affaires du gouvernement cette reduit actions Tshombe, des colonisateurs 54. Revenons-en le représentant sont des puissances tement injustifiees, on le sait, était Amerioains. proche et non sur un temoignage 54. Let us revert to this period which wasmentioned just now in the statement of the United States representative. The attempts which are made to justify the Western Powers’ flagrant interference in the Congo by references to the agreement of the Adoula Government are just as unfounded and cynioal because, as is well known, this ex-Premier of the Congo was generally acknowledged to be also Vhe man of the Americans”. Lest we be accused of entering the realm of motives and not of facts, allow me to cite one quite authoritative testimony on this subject. 55, 26 aoQt 1961, entre le Premier 55. 1 refer to a conversation which took place on 26 August 1961 between the Prime Minister of the former Pederation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Roy Welensky, and the United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mennen Williams, This conversation is reported in Welensky’s memoirs, whioh were published a few months ago under the title WelenskY’s 4 000 Days. This is what is written bY Welensky, whom even the Ùnited States repre- F&lBration Welensky, aux affaires tien P&li& Welensky’s qui n’est U Officia1 Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year. SuPPlement for July. August and September 1960. Supplément 56. TO this it may be added that Adoula himself, in the last press conference he held before his departure, was forced to admit explicitly that everyone in tbe Congo openly described him as “the man of the Americansl’. 57. As we havc already pointed out, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs made a most valuable statement in the Council [1173rd meeting] when he admitted that, the moment a man in the Congo is regarded as being the creature of the Belgians or the Americans, “that man loses 75 per cent of his f ollowing” . 1 am quoting part of the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Mr. Spaak. One cannot but agree with this, The only question is whether this loss is 75 or 100 per cent. 1 would rather favour the latter figure. In this connexion, 1 endorse the opinion of those representatives of African countries who have already given an evaluation of the attempts by the United States and other colonial Powers to force their own henchmen on the people of the Congo, 58. Let us continue this historical inroad and try to bring it as far as the most recent days, to the events we have witnessed and are continuing to witness. Reference is made to the fact that the Tshombé rggime agreed to foreign interference, but everyone knows quite well that the true meaning of the colonisers’ support of TshombB, and previously of Adoula -although Adoula is not equal to Tshombe and Tshombé is not equal to Adoula-was and is that the person in question has always and in a11 matters been the henchman of the imperialists, the agent of the foreign colonizers in the Congo. 59. The former special United Nations representative in Katanga, the Irishman O’Brien, who knew Tshombé and bis entourage well, quite recently-a few days ago-gave to this henchman of the imperialist Powers’ foreign monopolies a detailed testimonial in his article which was published in the weekly newspaper The Observer [of 6 December 19641. This is what O’Brz writes: n . . . Tshombb’s whole record shows that his astuteness as a politician lies in working closely with those who control the resources of the Congo, and with those States in which the controllers of those resources have allies, influence and support. He and the political party which obtainecl power in Katanga were launched in politics in 1959-just in advance of the Congo’s independence-by the agents of the Union miniére du Haut-Katanga; it was the Union mini&re which supplied his Government with the sinews of ‘war throughout the secession, and financial interests throughout the world allied with 60. Of course, 1 do not think that even in the heat of polemics the United States representative Will in future put Roy Welensky or Mr. O’Brien in the category of people whom he no longer trusts politically. These are people who cannot be suspected of testifying against the fac&; they are adducing facts known to them as a result of activities in which they have engaged in their respective officia1 capacities. 60. polemique, jamais comme des de faux témoignage; ont eu connaissance tions officielles 61. It may be added, to Mr. O’Brien’s testimony, that TshombB and his régime have at various stages of their existence-and this has been established in documents of United Nations bodies and reports by the Secretary-General-obtained the support of Belgian, United Kingdom, West German, South African and other mercenaries and secured United States, West German, United Kingdom and other weapons and corresponding assistance. 61. que Tshombe ses documents ports cenaires africains d’armes magne occidentale, 62. Thus the Tshombé regime, which the United States is still supporting and which has been imposed on the Congo by force, is in the true sense of the word a foreign rggime in the Congo and has nothing in common with the Congolese people. Even in the last few days, while the Security Council has been meeting, TshombB-as the Western Press reportshas again made the rounds of the Western capitals, selling his country wholesale to foreign colonizers and retail in payment for their support. 62. Unis Congo, continuent ger, au sens propre avec le peuple congolais. que le Conseil comme nouvelle vendre listes 63. This is why, during the discussion here, many representatives of African count;ries-including the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mali [ll’llst meeting, para. 60]-have quite rightly emphasized that to speak of the “legitimacy” of the Tshombé Government is just like speaking of the legitimacy of the fascist régimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. Incidentally, it is no accident that the Tshombé rggime and the régime of the racists in the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia are being supported by the selfsame forces, and this fact in itself cannot but. arouse, and is in fact arousing, justifiable concern on the part of the African countries. 63. sentants des par. du gouvernement timité de la Rhodesie, Soit dit en passant, ce n’est pas un hasard si le régime de Tshombe et les r&imeS racistes de l’Afrique l’appui des mêmes forces, justifie l’alarme des peuples africains; 64. On a rappel8 à juste titre, quIHitler lui aussi s’abritait ~~légalit&l et de la ~tlégitimité*fl, Donc, si nouS PaSSOnS au crible des faits toute la these pr8Sentée ici par les Etats-Unis pour defendre leur derniers intervention armée au Congo, si nous Bcartons l’argument usé et d&n& de tout fondement intervention nement dit, l&itime 64. In the course of the discussion it has rightly been pointed out that Hitler, in his time, likewise took caver behind a screen of ttlegalitylt and “legitimacy”. If we now examine the facts, if we remove that rotted and quite ineffective prop constituted by the “request f1 from the so-called legitimate Government of the Congo for United States interference, nothing is left of the edifice erected here by the United States delegation for the defence of the latest 66. The United Rates and Belgium-since the fact of their armed interference in the Congo cannot be denied-are resorting to a very old method, known in military terminology as “creating a diversion”. not think 1 need now dwell in any detail on that part of the United States representative’s statement which he made a deliberate attempt to substitute question for another, in order to draw the discussion away from the substance of the matter-the intervention by the United States and Belgium in the Congo. 67. The representatives of African countries have spoken in the Security Council have already ridiculed this clearly unhealthy desire of the United States to see the threat of communism in everything and have shown where this is actually leading United States, which has assumed the roleof an international gendarme repressing the national liberation movement in many, many regions of the world. This has led, and cannot fail to lead, to increased tension in international relations. 68. The Soviet Union sympathizes with those who genuinely want peace and are prepared, in a businesslike fashion and in a spirit of respect for the interests of a11 the parties concerned and for the sovereign will of a11 peoples, to solve international problems and to proceed along the road to an international Wétentef’. However, one cannot bypass or ignore the fact that in many regions of the world, including Congo, American imperialism is still trying to stifle the peoples’ desire for freedom. Peace-lovingpeoples in a11 countries of the world cannot fail to be alerted by the intrigues of the oolonizers, who are trying regain lost ground and for this purpose are oommitting one aggressive act of interference after another. This interference in the interna1 affairs countries and peoples fighting for their liberation a11 the more intolerable in that, while waging a war of the most genuine kind, with weapons, against the sacred national liberation struggle, some would still like to be allowed to perform this black deed with impunity. 69. In waging this wax against patriotic forces different regions of the world and throwing into it 70. There is one simple and very effective way of ending the justified condemnation and indignant resentment which the United States has encountered in the discussion of the Congolese question in the Security Council and throughout the world. Flagrant interference in the interna1 affairs of other oountries -in the interna1 affairs of the Congo-must cesse; the United States and Belgium must withdraw a11 the foreign contingents and military equipment whioh are tcday being used in the struggle against the national liberation movement, against the patriotic forces in the Congo. Such withdrawal and such action could really-not in words, but in deeds-promote the true strengthening of peace, which is in the interests of a11 peoples, including the people of the United States. 70. Il y a, pour les Etats-Unis, un moyen tr&s simple et tres efficace d’eohapper a la juste réprobation et B la vive indignation qu’ils doivent affronter, au Conseil de sécurite, à l’occasion du débat sur la question du Congo, et dans le monde entier. 11 faut mettre fin & l’intervention flagrante dans les affaires intérieures d’autres pays, dans les affaires intsrieures du Congo; il faut que les Etats-Unis et la Belgique retirent matériel militaire qu’ils emploient actuellement dans la lutte contre le mouvement de libération nationale et contre les forces patriotiques du Congo. En effeotuant ce retrait, pas en paroles mais en actes, à renforcer la paix, ce qui &Pondrait et notamment à ceux du peuple americain. 71. In view of the late hour, I shall not insist on the oonsecutive interpretation of my statement, subject to the usual reservation that this does not create a precedent. 71. Vu l’heure tardive, je ne demanderai pas l’interprétation entendu que cela ne constituera pas un prscédent. 72. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l’espagnol): A titre d’information, indications statistiques sur l’examen par le Conseil de la situation au Congo.

1 should like to give you, for your information, some statistics regarding the work of the Security Council on the question of the Congo. 73. Le Conseil de sécurite a consacré jusqu’ici 13 seances & cette question, siegeantplus de 30 heures et entendant une trentaine d’orateurs. Je ne me permets de communiquer ces precisions que pour inciter respectueusement & 73, The Security Council has thus far devoted thirteen meetings to this question; it has worked for more than thirty hours and has heard approximately thirty speakers. I have presented these figures for the sole purpose of respectfully requesting that in continuing our consideration of this question we should be as brief as possible. 74. Il n’y a plus d’orateurs inscrits sur ma liste et, en raison de la f&te de Noël, je proposerai que notre prochaine reunion ait lieu le lundi 28 decembre, a 15 heures, à moins que les membres du Conseil ne soient d’un autre avis. 74. There are no more speakers on my list and, in view of the fact that this is Christmas Eve, 1 think that, unless the Counoil deems otherwise, our next .meeting should be held on Monday, 28 December, at 3 p.m. 75. Puisque j’ai le privilège d’occuper la presidenoe le 24 decembre, je tiens a souhaiter mi joyeux Noël & tous les membres du Conseil. 75, It is a privilege for me topreside over the Council on Christmas Eve and 1 should like to wish YOU a11 a very happy Christmas. The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications distributors throughout the Write toi United Nations, Sales COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS Les publications des Nations Unies agences dépositaires du monde entier, ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de las Naciones casas distribuidoras en todas partes dirfjase a: Naciones Unidas, Section Litho in U.N. Price: $U.S. 0.35 (or equivalent in other currencies)