S/PV.119 Security Council

Yes, there is no objection. I did not rule on this matter, but just gav~ my opinion to the Council for its consideration. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of Ameica): I 'should like to cr~e the legal aspect of this amendnient from three points ef view. On~ is the point of view of the United Nations: what does. this amendment propose to do to the authority and e.ffective power of the United Nations? Secondly, I should like io place this amendment in relation to its attempt to deal. With so-called Japanese rights and the authority and effective powers of the conquero~ of Japan. Th!rdly, I. should like to disclose the attitude of.the United States in a'legal sense towards this proposal, on the ground that it amounts to a condition precedent to any agreement coming into effect·... The PRESIDF;NT:"': I will interrupt you, if you will permit me. I think the best way for us to proceed now is to imite the other interested countries to sit with us at·the table and follow our discUssion. I' now invite the representatives of Canada, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the Philippine Republic to sIt at the Council table , and take part in our discussion.1

In the name of the Council, 1 welcome the representativ~ who have. just taken seats at the table. I present my ~xc'!1ses'to the representative of the Uriited States for this interruption, and ask him to continue. Mr. AUSTIN (United.·States of America): Thank you, Mr. President. The United States welcomes the presence at the Council table of the representatives ot these Governments, and is vert glad to have s.uch an important matter as trusteeship, regardless of the contents of the agreement, COl:sidered directly by allwho might have any ~terestin it whatsoever. First, I wish to consider the proposal from the Le PRESIDENT (tradui~ de l'anglais): Je n'y vois aucune objection. Je n'ai pas pris de decision sur cette question, je me suis contente de donne'" mon opinion au Conseil pour son appreciation.· , M. AUSTIN (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (troiIuit de l'anglais): Je voudrais examine:r le care juridiqu~ de r,et ameudement de trois points de vue difl'erents. D'abord,.du point de vue des Nations Unies = que! effet eet amendement doit-il exercer sur l'autorite et les pouvoirs effectifs de l'Organisation des NationsUnies?Deuxiemement, je voudrais envisager cet, ameudement sous l'angle des pretendv..s droit.s du Japon et de l'autorite et du P0!1voir effectit: des vainql1eurs du Japon. El1 troisie.rile lieu, je voudrais iridiquer que1le est, sur le terrain juridique, l'attitude des Etats-Unisa l'egardde cette proposition qui tend aposer une condition prealable a la mise en vigueur d'un accord ... Le PRESIDENT (trcduit de l'anglais) ~ Permettez-moi de vousinterrompre. A men avis, la meilleure fa~on de conduirea present nos deb!tts est ti'inviter les autres pays interessesa yparticiner. • J'invite donc.les representants du Canadaj •de rlndc, de la NouvelIe-zelande, desPays-Baset de la RepubIique.des Philippines avenir prendre place a la table du Conseil pour participer anos debats1" ' Les representantsdu 'Canada, de l'Inae3 'de la Nouvelle-Zelande,. des· Pays-Basetdcla Republique des Philippines prennent place ala table du Conseil. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de lSanglais): Au nom du Conseil, je souhaite la bienvenue aux representant') qui viennent de prendre place parmi nous. ' J'espere que le representant des Etats-Unis,' voudra bien m'excuser de l'avoir interrompu, et je le prie de poursuivre SOli ,exp()s€. M. AUSTIN (Eta~-Unis d'Amenque) (tratluit ae l'anglais): Je vous remercie, Monsieur le President. La deIegationdes Etats-Unis est heureuse de saluer a cette table Ies representants de cesGouvemements et elle se rejouitde voir une question aussi importante quela tutelle, independamment du contenu II1@me del'accord,examiiLeedirectementpar tousceuxqu'elle touche de pres ou de I loin. '. .' le vais d?abord examiner la propositiondu Take the second phrase: Cl••• it being understood that by such treaty Japan shall be requirc.d to surrender all its rights, if any, relating to the control and administration of the present territories, and such territories shall be formally detached from any form of control by Japan". Imagine a situation wherein these victorious countries might have other ideas, and held that Japan should not be required to surrender an its rights "relating to the control and administration of the present territories", and that such territories should not be "formally detached from any form of control by Japan". That is not an mconceivable idea, but even if it werer it is enough to show clearly that this amendment has the effect of precluding, or attempts to preclude, the action of the victorious Powers. That is strictly in violation of the language as well as the spirit of the Chart-;r. Indeed, Article 107 states: "Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any State which during the S~cond World War has been an enemy of any· signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Govemments having responsibility for such action." Every line of this amendment is in direct opposition to the Charter. In the first phrase of this .amendment, we undertake to take away from the United Nations its very functions. The United Nations has t.he sole, exclusive, and supreme authority over trusteeship. No other authority equals it. Moreover, Article 83, paragraph 1, states: . "All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trustp.eship agreements and of their alteration Of amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council." We have a responsibility regarding the first phrase of the proposed amendment. We b1.ve.~ sacred trust to look after the jurisdiction of tbe United Nations. We are the Security Council~ On the other hand~ the second phrase of this amendment is a gross assumption of authority. The United Nations has no authority under the Charter to make the peace terms. It is not given . any commitment with respect to the treat:)f peace between Japan and the victorious Powers. What an absurd assumption it is for the Security Council of the United Nations to ,come forward with a resolution which says: "it being understood •.•", that is, by us, of course; that understanding is the result of our action in. the adoption of this amendment. In other words, we of the Security Council undertake this power to say that this treaty,' hereafter to be made~,if anyone is made with Japan, shall contain certain terms. We say"that by this treaty, "Jflpan shall be required to surrender all its rights, if any, relating . to the control and administration of the present territories, and such territories shall be formally detached from any form of control by Japan." Have we any right to do that? The allusion to article 16 is a very fortunate one from our point of view. Artkle 16 is a part of the agreement between two parties, the United States being the administering State on the one llide, and the United Nations on the other side. Why should that agreement on the part of ,one of the parties not have the' validity which is required by the Constitution of that State? The proposal made here is that the particular time at which this agreement is to become effective shall be in the hands of cOl:ntries some of-which were not among the Allies to whom these lands were ceded as a result of the First World War. According to the amendment, the determination of that date is to be in the hands of all of those countries, and of States which were victorious in the war against Japan-strangers to the title, introduced here with no connexion, no relation, with nothing whatever to do with the subject matter. Is there not any difference in reason between a provision by the administering authority and the United Nations that the agr~ement s,hall come into effect when the constitutional method has been followed for giving effect to it, and the proposal that the agreement shall only come into effect if and when a certam undetermined number of nations come to an undetermined agreement at an undetermined time? Is there any analogy whatever between the two provisions? We say there is not. . We have seen that, from the point of view of the United Nations, there is an unconstitutional D'autre part, dans h seconde phrase de cet anlendement, nous nous arrogeons abusivement une autorite que nous n'avons pas. La Charte n'autorise pas l'Orga..usatioll des Nations Bnies aetablir les termes des traites de paix. L'Organisation n'a regu aucune mission speciale t".D ce .qui concerne le traite de paix entre le Japon et les PuisSances victorieuses. n serait absurde, de la part du Conseil de securite, de venir presenter une resolution 011 il est dit: '~etant entendu que ..•", etant entendu, evidemment, entre nous, membres du Conseil de se..:urite; cette entente decoule de I'adoption de l'amendement. En d'autres termes, nous, membres du Conseil de securite, nous nou'3 attribuons le pouvoir de declarer que le futur traite avec le Japon, si traite il y a, contlendra certaines conditions. Nous dec1arons que "ce traite exigera du Japon qu;il renonce a. tous les moits qu'il peut eventuellement possedel' en matiere de controle et d'administration des territoires dont il s'agit et affranchira fonnellement ces territoires de toute forme de controle de la part du Japon". De quel droit pouvons-nous agir ainsi? L'allusion fcite al'article 16 est, a notre avis, tres heureuseo L'article 16 a trait al'accord entre deux parties, d'une part, les Etats-Unis en tant qu'autorite chargee de l'administration et, d'autre part, les Nations Unies. Pourquoi cet accord de la part de l'une des parties n'aurait-il pas la validite qu'exige la Constitp.tion des Etats- Unis? La proposition faite ici est que la date d'entree en vigueur de l'accord doit dependre des pays a qui ces territoires ont ete cedes ala suite de la premiere guerre mondiale, et dont certains ne se trouvaient pas, a.l'epoque, au nombre des Allies. D'apres l'amendement, la fixation de cette date devrait dependre de tous ces pays et des Etats qui ont participe ala victoire sw-le Japon, ceux-la memes qui n'ont aucun titre et qu'on introduit id sans 'qu'ils aient rien a voir a cette question. N'y ?- t-il pas urie difference d'intention entre ces deux dispositions: celle. par laquelle l'autorite chargee de l'administration et les Nations Unies prevoient que l'accord entrera en vigueur quand on aura agi confonne,ment a la procedure constitutionnelle pour lui donner effet; .et celle prevoyant que l'accord n'entrera en vigueur que si, et quand un nombre indetermine de nations auront conclu. un accord indetermin6 a un moment indtStermin6?'Y a-t-il (rQelqu~ chose de commun entre ces deux dispositions? Elles n'ont rien de commun, vous dis-je. Nous avons vu qu'en ce qui concerne les Nations Unies, la premiere partie du. paragraphe vise, au mepris des textes constitutionnels,.3o.·remer awe Nations Unies l'autorlte qu'e1!es detien- In presenting this agreement for your consideration, these and other facts of history were cited as grOUT -~'S for claiming that Japan has nothing left in the islands in the form referred to in this amendment. Have you noted that this amendment says nothing about title? Indeed, it states that "Japan shall be required to surrender all its rights, if any, relating to the control and administration of ~e present territories, and such territories shall be formally detached from any form of control by Japan." I Of course, if we were speaking about title, the claim would be too small and too in~ignificant to be considered. You would have to divide, literally spe~g, an undivided one-fifth interest in the residue after the expiration of a mandate. If anyone of the interested countries referred to in this amendment took its interest, what would it amount to? This equity comes after a mandate for which there is no time limit. Could you appraise its value at a dollar? Moreover, Japan's one-fifth interest" would have to be di'l-rided among all Powers victorious over Japan in this war. It would be perhaps one-sixth of one-fifth, or one-tenth of one-fifth of that residue. It is a mere diffused infection of an equity and nothing more, if you were talking about title. All the countries which are contending before the Security Council that Japan has certain mandatory rights, of which it has not yet been formally deprived, signed the surrender terms, and therefore participated in the·act by which Japan formally renounced all her rights 'in these 'islands. Does it not' seem peculiar that'the coun~ tries which signed the surrenCler document, of which I have a photostatic copy, should be making any claim whatever here ,in that respect? r~ce1ts. En premier lieu, le Japan a deja. ete dechu, a. la fois en fait et de fa~on officielle, de tous ses titres de Puissance malldataire sur les fies en question, pour avoir fonait a. ses devoirs. C'est la l'objet de l'amendement present!! par la Pologne et deja accepte par les Etats-Unis. Ce1a fait partie maintenant de l'instrument soumis a l'examen du Conseil de securite. En second lieu, le Japon a ete prive de ses droits de Puissance mandataire par suite de roccupation de ces fies par les Etats-Uilis au cours de la guerre et, en ttQisieme lieu7en cc>nsequence des conditions de capitulation. Votrc temps est trap precieux poUf que je repete ce que je vons ai deja declare en soumettant le present accord a votre examen, mais j'en fais mention id pour bim mettre les choses au point1• Lorsque j'ai soumis cc projet d'accord a votre • examC11, les faits historiques dont je viens de parler furent mis en avant, ainsi que d'autres, pour justifier la these selon laquelle le Japan ne possede plus, sur ces nes, aucun des droits vises dans le present amendement. Avez-vous note que cet amendement ne parle pas de titre? En fait, il est dit que "ce traite exigera du Japon qu'il renonce a tous les droits qu'il peut eventuellement posseder 'en matiere de contr8le et d'admistration des territoires dont il s'agit et affranchira formeliement ces territoires de toute forme de contr8le de la part du Japan". NatUre1lement, si nous parliom de titre,l'objet de la revendication serait trop faible et trop insignifiant pour meriter examen. n faudrait diviser, litteralement parlant, une part indivise d'un cinquieme dans 108 droits demeurant apres l'expiration d'un mandat. Si l'un quelconque des pays interesses vises par cet amendement prenait alors sa part, aquoi se monterait-elle? Elle serait prise sur ce qui reste d'un m~datauquel on n'a pas assigne de limite dans le temps. Pourrait-on meme en estimer la valeur aun dollar? En outre, la part d'un cinquieme revenant au Japan devrait etre repartie entre toutes les Puissances qui l'ont vaincu dans cette guerre. Elles auraient .peut-etre le sooeme d'un cinquieme ou le dixieme d'un cinquieme du reliquat en q'lestion. Si l'on parle de titre, la part de chacun deviendra pratiquement inexistante. Tous Ies pays qui soutiennent devant le Conseil de securite que le Japan a certains droits de Puissance mandataire dont il n'a pas encore ete officielIement prive, ant signe les conditions de capitulation du Japon et sont, par consequent, parties a l'acte par lequel le Japon a offidellement renonce a. tous ses droits sur ces nes. Ne vous semble-t-il pas singulier que les pays qui ont signe l'acte de capitulation, dQnt j'ai la reproduction phol:ostatique, fassent id une semblable The very first act in the instrument of surrender is: ~~We, acting by command of, and in behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Government and the Japanese Imperial Head" qUal'ters, hereby accept the p,rovisions set forth in the declaration issutd by the heads of the Governments of the United States, China and Great Britain on 26 July 1945" at Potsdam, and subsequently. adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which four Powers are hereafter referred to as the Allied Powers." "Agissant par ordrc et au nQm de l'Empereur, du Gouvernement japonais et du quartier general imperial Japonais, nous declarons, par ctS presentes, accepter les conditions posces dans la declaration qui a 6t6 publiee par les chefs des Gouvernements des Etats-Unis d'AmCrique, de la Chine et de la Grande- Bretagne, le 26 juillet 1945, a Potsdam, et a laquelle a adhere, par la suite, rUnion des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, lesquelles quatre Puissances sont ci-apres designees sous le nom de Puissances alli6es." I notice that Admiral C. E. L. HelfIlch signed Je note que l'amiral C. E. L. Helfrich a sign6 for the Netherlands, Air Vice-Mars.r.'uu Leonard pour les Pays-Bas, le general d'aviation Leonard M. Isitt for New Zealand, and General Sir M. Isitt pour la Nouvelle-Z.eIande et le general Thomas Blamey for Australia. An other countries Sir Thomas Blamey pour l'Austral,ie. Tous les which participated in the war against Japan also autres pays qui ont pris part ala guerre contre signed those terms of surrender. If any countries le Japon ont egalement signe les termes de la were left out, they were covered by the signature capitulation japonaise. S'il y a eu des omissions, of General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Comelles sont couvertes par la signature apposee par . mander of the Allied Powers, in the interest of le general Douglas MacArthur, Chef, supreme the United Nations at war with Japan. des Puissa.."1ces alliees, au nom des Nations Unies . en guerre contre le Japon. The Japanese offer of surrender was made on Les Japonais prestmterent leur offre de capitu- 10 August 1945. The document of surrender was lation le 10 aoo.t 1945. L'acte de capitulation est dated 2 September 1945. But in the Japanese etabli en date du 2 septembre 1945. Toutefois, offer we find that l'offre japonaise, nous indique que: "The Japanese Government is ready to accept "Le Gouvemement japonais est pret a acthe terms enumerated'in the Joint Declaration cepter les conditions enumerees dans la declawhich was issued at Potsdam on 26 July 1945, ration commune publiee le 26 juillet 1945, a by the heads of the Goyernments of the United Potsdam, par les chefs des Gouvernements des States, Great Britain, and China, and later Etats-Unis d'Amerique, de la Grande-Bretagne subscribed to by the Soviet Government, with ,et de la Chine, et signee, par la suite, par the understanding that the said declaration rUnion sovietique, declaration qU'il croit <;omdoes not comprise any demand which prejuprendre comme ne contenant aucUIl<: exigatce dices the prerogatives of HiS Majesty as a qui porte atteinte aux prerogatives de Sa Sovereign Ruler." Majest6·en' tant que Souverain regnant •••" Section 8 of the Proclamation Defining Terms L'article 8 de la Proclamation fixant les condi- For Japanese Surrender, issued at Potsdam on tions de la capitulation du Japon, publiee aPots- 26 July 1945 reads: dam le 26 juillet 1945, estainsi redig6: "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall "Les conditions enoncees dans la Declarabe'carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall tion du Cake seront executees, et la souvebe limited to the Islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, ramete japonaise sera limitee aux fits de Hon- Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as chou, Hokkaido, Kiou-Siou, Sikok et a telles we determine." 'autres petites lies que noUB determinerons." Let us go back to the original Cairo statement Reportons-nous a la declaration originale du released on 1 December 1943, which reads in Caire publiee le 1er decembre 1943, et dont void part: , ., tine partie: . ~". • . The Three Great Allies are fighting this ". • • Les trois Grands.Allies menent cette war to restrain and punish the aggression ofguerre en vue de reprimeret de chatier l'agres- Jap3fl. They covet no gain for themselves and sion commise par le Japon; ils ne convoi~ have no thought of territoJial expansion. It is tent aucun avantage pour eux-memes et n'ont their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of pas la moindre pensee d'expansion territoriale. all the islands 'in the Pacific which she has Ds se proposent d'enlever au. Japon toutes les seized or occupied since the beginning o! the iles du Pacifique qU'il a prises et QCcupees F~t World War in 1914, and that all the depuisledebutdelapremiereguerrernondiale territorie$ Japan has stolen from the Chinese, de 1914,et de'restituer ala Republique chisuch as :Manchuria, ~ormosa; and the Pescanoise tous les territoires, teIs que la M~dchour'lItn' c:krfl!l·.m~f;Q,~I-f."""do..."""IIIIIiJI"''''''''''''I!IIIII_--_''''''_IIMIl!_ilb '' '''' ''' If we were bold enough to pass that resolution and undertake to dictate to the victors what they should put into the treaty af peace, in view of the surrender already made, what effect would the resolution have? There is only one other point to call to your attention. The United States, if it sho~ld accept this trust, would have to do so according t<? its constitutional process. It could not do this in any other way. The United States is the only State which se~ willing to take on the responsibility and expense of this great trust, for the. sake of peace and security in the world, certainly not for commercial advantage. You are all aware of the position of these islands in the world commercially, and you know that commercially, they are a liability and not an asset. But the United States CaIl\lot act unless Congress, either by a joint resolution authorizing the President to sign this agreement, or through the treaty powers of the Senate by a two-thirds vote of all the Senators present, accepts the agreement approved by the Security Council. , You have all deaitwith similar situations. I am sure there is not any' body of exp~rts more qualified than yourselves to judge what a legislative body, and particularly a large one, would do, if it ,were presented with a proposed agreement which could not come into effect until the date the treaty of peace with Japan had been agreed to and become binding. What action would your legislative bodies take regarding that kind of inchoate agreement, with the most important factor in it, namely the time of its effectiveness, conditioned by the subsequent judgment and decision of several countries, in this case, nine? We must be realistic. Do you'thjnk it reaso~­ able to ask the United States to take on a trustee- . ship resphnsibility in this matter, on an agreement containing the provision that the agreement shall not go into effect until after adate "on which the interim or final treaty of peace between Japan-and the Allied Powel'Svicto~ous , ..,,In..... the war against Japan becomes binding on 1apan"? Are we in earnest, or are we just debating something that is interesting for· the sake of debating? Look at the matter realistically. Put. ' yC/ur own' counay in the condition and attitude of the United State."!, confronted.with such a prOa posal, and take your -position here accordingly. nabl~ de demander aux Etats-Unis d'assumer la responsabilite d'un regime de tutelle aIors que I'accord de tutelle en question ne sera pas effectif avant ''la date a laquelle le traite de paix, provisoire ou definitif, qui interviendra entre le Japon et les Puissances alliees victorieuses dans la, guerre contre le Japon.deviendra obligatoire pour le Japon'~? Prenons-nous des detisl;:l1JS serieuses, ou bien DOUS livrons-noUs icia tin debat . d'ordre academique? Envisagez la question d'une maniere realiste. Imaginez que votre pays soit saisi de la proposition a laquelle lesEtats-Unis doivent faire face .et prenez id votre decision en consequence. . ______.._ ...........__IiIIIliIIIiiI·.' ..;:..:;~~~.:..:iIiiIL~ ~_- __' ~..,....~ Soyons' realistes. Pensez-vous qu'il soit raison- We cannot leave our agreement in that form, subject" to elements which are not in our hanqs or 'within our authority. I notice that this proposal is similar to the first remarks made by the ,Australian .representative when we started our discussion. At that time, he tried to raise legal objections to the conclusion of such an agreement, since Japan had certain rights accorded to her by the mandate conferred by the League of Nations. He also believed that the Security Cou;ncil would not have the full right to deal with this subject, unless Japan g~ve up or withdrew that right, or recognized that it had nothing to do with it. Other members of the Security Qouncil made that same remark, stating, however, that they would be ready to accept this agreement in case the Security Council found it proper to do so now. " Therefore, it would seem from this propo~al that we are not sure of our authority to conclude this trusteeship agreement now,. as if we were trying to preserve for Japan a certain form of rights which would suspend the execution of the agreement. Dans la seconde proposition, la mise en vigueur de l'accord de tutelle est subordonnee ala ratification future du Gouvernement japonais, apres la reunion de la Conference de la paix et' la conclusion du traite de paix. Le represenv.ult de l'Australie n'a pasdit exactement 0l",e le Japon devrait accepter cette condition, mais il a dit que 1'0n devrait exiger du Japon qU'ill'accepte. Cette exigence signifie que l'accord devrait etre impose au Japon par la force. En premier lieu, il ne serait pas tres opportun que le Conseil de securite declare ouvertement que ces conditions et stipulations seront imposees au Japan ou que 1'0n 6cigera de ce pays qu'il s'y conforme. Dne te1le declaration serait contraire a l'esprlt des traites de paix, qui sont censes etre conclus librement et en toute sincerite par·les deux parties contractan.tes. L'accord qui 7.l0US est soumis est un accord bilateral, redige en application del'Article 79 de la Charte. L'une des parties est la Puissance chargee de ·l'administration, a savoir les Etats- . Unis, l'autre est le Ct\nseil de securite.La proposition de la delegation australienne met en cause une troisieme pame qui ne participe pas a la conclusion de l'accord e.n question, et subordonne ainsi l'execution et la mise en vigueurde cet accord a des evenements qui ne dependent ou qui ne relevent pas de la competence des parties en cause. . Nous ne pouvons permettre que notre accord soit ainsi subordonne a des facteurs qui ne dependent pas de nollS, ou qui ne relevent pas de notre autorite. Cette proposition, remarquez-Ie, a ete faite dans 1~ meme esprit que les premieres observations presentees par le representant de l'Australie, au commencement de nos debats~ A ce moment, il avait tente de s'opposer, pour des motifs d'ordre juridique, ala conclusion de cet accord, en disant. que le Japon avait certains .droitsqui Iui avaient 'ete conferes par le mandat dont l'avait charge la Societe des Nations. I1 estimait, egalement, que le Conseil de securite n'aurai'i:.pas pleinement le droit de traiter cette . question, si le Japon ne se desistait pas, ou ne ren ~c,ait pas ases droits, ou ne reconnaissait pas etre _..Jl'S de cause. D'autres membres du Conseil de'securite ont presente la meme observation, en . precisant toutefois qu'ils seraient.disposes a ac- ~eptercet accord si le Conseil'de securite et~t pret al'accepter tout de suite. TIsemble donc ressortir de cette proposition que nous ne, sommes pas certains d'avoir toute l'autorite necessaire pour· conclure des maintenant cet accord de tutelle. Il semble que nous voulionscontinuer .afaire beneficier le.Japon de certains droitsqui suspendraient l'execution de l'accord. ,. I propose that the following point should be . settled :first: have we the right· to conclude this trusteeship agreement. now, or should we wait? Since the agreement would not enter into force,' according to the Australian proposal, until after the peace conference, why make such an agreement now? We would propose to postpone it until that time, if it cannot.enter into force immediately. On the other hand, if we have the right to conclude the agreement now, we should do so, and consider that Japan has no rights in this mandate or any control of these t>lands. Mr. HASLUCK (Australia): Mr. President, if I understand the position correctly, the Australian amendment is considered to have been received ap.d to be open for general discussion on its merits. If that is sO; I should like to take this opportunity of.putting forward those arguments, in favoUr of the amendment, which I· refrained from producing when I was speaking solely on the questionof its admissibility. At the outset, I should like to suggest that there would be very little profit for the Council in discussing matters which are really not in dispute. I would suggest that there is no difference of opinion whatever, regarding the proposal that the United States' should have t1ie administration of these islands. I have not heard any objection raised in that respect, and, as·far . as I know, that point is not contest~d in any . way, nor is there any suggestion that anyone else has any claim to the administration of these islandS. All the members of the Council who M. !lASLuCK (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Monsieur le President, si je comprends bien, l'amendement australien est considere comme etant re~u et la discussion generale est ouverte sur le fond de cet amendement. Si tel est le cas, j'aimerais saisir l'occasion d'exposer, a l'appui de cet amendement, les arguments que je ~e suis abstenu de presenter Iorsque j'ai pade umquement de la question de sa recevabilite. Tout d'abord, je voudrais dire que le Conseil n'a que peu a gagner a discuter de questions qui ne sont pas ree1lement en litige. PerSonne ne s'oppose, je pense, a ce que les Etats-Unis soient charges de l'administration de cesnes. Je n'ai entendu allcune objection a cet egard et, pour autant que je sache, ce point n'est aucunement conteste. Nul n'a suggere que quelqu'un d'autre avait des droits a l'administration de ces iles. Tous les .membres du ConseiI qui. ont pris la parole-et ceux qui n'ont pas pris la parole semblent, par leur silence, avoir accepte tacitement cette opinion-eonviennent que les Etats- .Unis doivent etre charges de l'adrilinistration de cesnes et sont profondement convaincus que la sage administration de ces nes, comme zone strategique, par les Etats-Unis,contribuera a' maintenir la paix et la securitemondiales. h~ye spoken-and those who have not spoken seem,.·by their silence, to have given tacit consent to that view-agree that the United States should have· the administration of these islands, and that .there is complete' confidence that the wise administration of these islands as a Our delegation says that these islands came into the hands of the United Nations as a result of the war in the Pacific. We recognize the predominant roleplayed by the United States in that war; indeed" no country can have a better appreciation than Australia of the exact meaning of the United States effort in the Pacific. However, we know, and Council members will readily agree, that there were other Powers fighting in the Pacific and sharing in the ardours of conquest. Om: argument is that it is doubtful whether the islands can be disposed of legally except as part of the peace settlement, and that, in fairness to all belligerents, the latter should take part in the eventual decision. On the legal side, even if the Security Council approves of a strategic area and of the terms of trusteeship over t.'1at area, even if the de facto administration of the United States is recognized, the question still remains: is it legally necessary that the formal act of detaching these islands from Japan should be part of the peace settlement? Again, making the same premises and allowing the same conditions, would it not be a graceful recognition of the efforts of the beJ.1igerents that formal detachment should take place as part of the Peace settlement? IS it enough that the Security Council should close the matter once and for all? That seems to us.to be the only question raised by the Australian amendrilent. It certainly was the only matter that the Australian amendment was intended to ,raise. We would hope that the Council :r:mght te· I should also like to take the opportunity of. passing rapidly over one or two of the specific points made' by the representative of the United States. He expressed some doubt as to what might happen if there were no peace treaty,if Japan would not agree to a peace treaty becoming binding, or if the conclusion of that treaty were long .delayed. In our .opinion, those questions are, perhaps, more fully within the control of the United States than of any other single nation. It seems to us inconceivable, either in the course of United States policy, or in the course of any\ policy supported by the Australian.Government, that the peace settlement should not be binding or that it should be long delayed.. An' early and binding peace settlement seems to be fundamental, as far as "Ne can 'interpret it,. from the thoughts of the United States and Australian delegations, and all those other delegations which are particularly interested in this matter. The United States m.1JS1;recognize that its influence, as a principal party to that peace settlem.ent,will I be exceptionally powerful. Passing reference was also made to Article _ ana egaIemcnt fait allusion a l'Article 107. 107.It was sugg~ed ina way which, lconfess, On a suggere, d'une m,aniere que, je l'avoue, je I did not fully follow1 that the action which we n'ai pas bien comprise, que l'action proposee par_ were proposing in.. some'·way precluded .action la delegation" australienne interdisait,dans une taken or authoriZed as a resUlt·of the Second certaine mesure" une action entreprise -ou auto- . On nous a demande si nous defendions les droits du Japon.Les droits du Japon en la matiere, si droits il y a, sont "egalement regIes par l'instrument de capitulation, et le Japon n'a plus d'autres droits que ceux que lui laisse cet instrument, s'illui en laisse ... Voila aquoi se borne notre opinion sur la question. Nous n'essayons pas de defendre les droits du Japan, mais ceux des nations qui ont pris part a la guerre dans le PacifIque. Je voudrais aussi saisir l'occasion d'examiner rapidement un ou de~ des points particuliers souleves par le representant des Etats-Unis. n s'est demande ce qui arriverait s'il n'y avait pas de traitede paix, si le Japan refusait d'accepter un traite de paix qui le lierait ou si la conclusion de ce,traite se faisait longtemps attendre. A notre ~iis, ces questions dependent peut-etre ' beaucoup plus des Etats-Unis que d'aucun'autre pays. n nollS semble inconcevable,' etant donne la politique des Etats-Unls ou celle que peut soutenir le Gouveme~ent austr.alien; que le traite de. paix n'ait pas un caractere obligatoire, ou qu'on en retarde longtemps la conclusion. Il semble que la conclusion, a bref delai, d'un trciite de paix ayant force, obligatoire, soit-a la. base de la politique des delegations des Etats-Unis, de l'Australieet de toutes les autres delegations particuliereinent interesseesala question. Les Etats- Unis doivent reconnaltre que Ieur influence, en tant que principale pamea ce traite de paix, sera d'une P?ids exceptionnel. - , There was also another suggestion that some infringement of the Security Council's powers had been made, and that the j;urisdiction of the Council had not been upheld. I spoke on that point when referring to the constitutional objection. I should like to repeat what I then said: namely, that. nothing that we are proposing, nothing that is in our purpose, is to remove or impair in any way the jurisdiction of the Secu- , rity Council. The Security Council has one definite function which cannot be taken from it, namely, the approval of this agreement. Noone else can exercise that function. The Security Council will also have in the future a function in regard to the manner in which this territory is administered. Again, we are not proposing that anyone should impair or lessen the discharge of that function. f In suggesting reference to the peace. conference, we do not propose that it should do anything besides what a peace conference may properly do in the matter. Moreover, after being attacked by one side on the basis that we are not allowing the Security Council to do· all it should do, from the other side comes another charge that .we are asking the United Nations to do something it cannot do. H I may qu()te the,United States representative, he said that "the United Nations has no authority to make the peace terms". That is precisely. the kernel of our proposal: we. do not want the Security Council to make the peace terms, but, we .suggest that the peace terms. be m,ade by the only appropriate body; namely, the peace conference. Some comparison was also made bern.reen the Security Council and the United States. Senate. .I would be the last one to attempt to discuss the internal government of another member of the Security Council, but it does seem to me that there is an exact parallel there. In article 16, we say that this agreement will not come into force -and I. paraphrase the article to express the political fact-until it has been ratified by the United States Senate. I think I interpret the con- .. .0 l~artic1e·16, nous disons que cet accord entrera en vigueur - je paraphrasel'articlepoui en exprimer la realite politique--quand it aura .ete approuve par le Senat des Etats-Unis. Je pense I should like to state the three positive arguments in support of our amendment. In the firnt place,.we suggest that our amendment recognizes the principle of common justice that we should' acknowledge that this matter is of interest to all belligerents in the war against Japan.

After having heard the representatives who have just spoken, I think it would be useful to make clear the position· of the Chair. The constitutional objection I· rais~d against the Australian amendment was due to the phrase "~ubject to confirmation" etc., wl;rlch appeared to me unacceptable, in view of the exclusive powers of the Security Council in these matters. The deletion of the phrase automatically removed my constitutional objection, because the ne~ wording upholds the sole authoIity of this Counru. . It might be that the revised Australian amendment has grave inconveniences, but thest; concern the subs~ance of the amendInent, of which I shatJ. eventually ~{leak. as representativ~ of Brazil. The only opfuionwhich I express now is that, whereas the first version of the Australian amendment was, to my mind, clearly unconstitutional, its revised wording does not appear to be so. I repeat that I did not express any opinion on the ~ubstanceof the Australian amendment, namely, whether if would be advisable or not to include it in the agreement before us·. In reply to the representative of Australia, who asked whether we were still discussing the constitutional aspect of his amendment, I will answer in the affirmative, because I did not rule on this point; it is apparent that at least· some representatives, especially the representatives of the United States and Syria, do not share my opinion to consider this amendment together With the other amendments presented, after the close of the general debate. Sir Alexander CAnOGAN (United Kingdom): As we shall presumably, sooner or later, come to a ,'ote on the proposed amendment in its pres- Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Apres avoir entendu les represe.ntants qui viennent de prendre la parole, j'e..1im'~ qu'il serait utile d'etabfu clairement la position du President. L'objection d'ordre constitutionnel que j'ai elevee contre l'amendement australien provient . de la phrase "subordonne a sa confirmation •.•" etc., qui me semblait inacceptable etant donne les .pouvoirs exclusifs du Conseil de securite en la matiere. La suppressio.:l deces mots a e1imine automatiquement man objection d'ordreconstitutionneI, car la nouvelie redaction .affirme la seule et unique autoritede ce Conseil. , n est possible que l'amendement australien revise presente de graves inconvements, mais ceux-ciconcernent le fond de l'amendement dont je parlerai tout a I'heure en ma qmilite de representant-du Br6sil. Je me contenteraide dire, pour l'instant, que si la premiere version de l'amendement australien·etait, a mpn avis, nettement incOllil'titutionnelle, la redaction revisee ne me semble pas l'etre. Je repete. que je n'ai exprime aucune opinion sur le fond de l'amendement australien, c'est-a-dire sur le· pomt de savoir sJil est souhaitable ou non de l'inclure dans I'accord qui noilS est soumis. - Au representant de l'Australie, qui a demande si nous discutions toujours s·")Iiamendement sous l'angle constitutionneI, je repondrai par l'affinnative, parce qu'il n'y a pas t;u de decision presi. dentielle sur cepoint; mais il semble' qutil y. a plusieurs representants, nota.nuilent ceux des Etats-Unis et de la Syne, qui ne partagent pas mon op~on suivant laquelle il faudrait exami. ner cet amendement en meme temps que les autres. ~endements presentesici, apres la fin de la discussion generale. . Sir Alexander CAfiOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de.. l'anf!lais): Comme nousen· vien.. drons probablement, -tat ou tard,· a mettre aux Governmen~which I have just described. The Australian proposal has been attacked on constitution~l grounds as being inadmissible. In particular, the representative of the United ~tates has attaCked it on two grounds. The first, I think, was that it is not legitimate for the Council to take a decision on the understanding that something shall happen at a date over which it has no control. I am not convinced of that. I should have thought that the Council was master of its own proceedings. As far as I am concerned, I can say that with good conscience, because in my country I think th~ legislature has, on various occasions, passed legislation pro· I viding for things to happen in circumstances 0 i' conditions over which it has no control, such tUl for certain orders to come into force or to ce~t: upon the termination of hostilities or at the aid of the war, or in such other conditions and circumstances as it cannot itself determine. There~ fore, I should have thought tha~ it would be possible for the Council to exercise its own sov~ ereignty in that matt~r and say that an agree~ ment should come into force under certain con~ ditions. The representative of the United States made a great point of the fact that the terms of sur~ render constituted a final renunciation by· Japan of all its rights concerning these islands. I wonder whether that is quite so. I think that terms of surrender or· armistice are never.entirely final. In the case of Japan, we look forwardto the terms of sWTender being drawn up in their final form in the peace treaty, and it may be that the peace treaty will not be identical with the terms of surrender-;-it does happen sometimes. I think even Mr. Austin himself said that it was not inconceivable that, when the ~eaty came to be signed and ratified, i~ might not require Japan to surrender all the rights relating to the control and administration of the present territories. That, I think, illustrates my point; I think it is in the highest degree improbable tha~ when the treaty comes to be signed md ratified, it will not cont~ such provisions. But if you concede the possibility that this might happen, what would be the position of the Council? What WGuld be the status of the trusteeship agreemen.t and the position pf .the United States Govern ment itself?,Therefore, I think there is something more thlUl a purely legalistic point of view in the ~ttitudetakenby my Goven;ttnent in this-matter. The Au~aIianproposal was also attacked on the basis th~t, as it were, it dictated the terms of peace to those who have. the responsibility of Le representant des Etats-Unis a beaucoup insiste sur le fait que les t~es de la capitula~ tion constituaient pour le Japon une renonciation definitive a tous ses droits sur ces lles. Je me demande si c'est_bien le cas. J'estime que les termes d'une capitulation ou d'un armistice ne sont jamais absolument nefinitifs. Dans le cas du Japon, noils voulons voir le traite de paix donner une forme finale aux eonditions de la capitula~ tion, et il se peut que le traite de paix ne soit pas identiqu~ aux termes de la capitulation; cela arrive que1quefois. Je crois que M. Austin luimeme a dit qu'il n'etait pas iIilpossible que, lorsque le moment de signer et de ratifier le traite serait venu, on ne demande pas au Japon de renoncer a taus ses droits enmatiere de contr81e et d'administrationdes territoires en question. Ceci vient, je crois, al'appui de ma these;il est, a mon avis, extremement peu probable que le traite qui sera signe et ratifie ne contienne pas de teJIes dispositions. Mais, si vous adm.ettez qu'une telle chose soit possibles quelle sera la position du Conseil? Quel sera le statut de l'al, cord de tutelle et la position du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis? J'estimedonc qu'il y a quelque chose de plus qu'un point de vue de pure forme juridique dans l'attitude adoptee par mon Gouvernement. La proposition australienne a ete egalement attaqnee sous pretexte qu'elle dictait en quelque sorte les· conditions du traite de paix a ceux qui treaty~ Japan will be required •••" etc.~ showing, that what we are doing~ we do on the understanding that this· is what will happen in the future. The words "shall be required" do look rather like an instruction to those governments which are going to draft the peace treaty. The change I have suggested might make it easier for some to accept it. I think I have shown why I support this proposal. It is in line with the thought of my Government, which I had already explained in the Council, and does not, in my view, detract in any way from the powers of the Council or the rights of the United States Government, nor does it encroach in any way on the rights of the ()ovemments which.wiJl ultimately negotiate the peace treaty with Japan. Mr. LANGE (Poland): I just wish to register my opposition to the proposed ~dditional article 17. I have already had the opportunity of explaining that, in the view of the Polish delegation, Japan lost all legal claims to the mandated tF.mtOries at the. moment of committing its war of aggression against China, through its withdrawal from ,the League of Nations, and also through other violations of the mandate en.' trusted to it. Consequently, we consider it rather inappropriate now to ask Japan to surrender its .rights to those territories. We consider that such rights no longer exist, and that this disposes of article 17. I also wish to point out that article 17 is actually in contradiction with the preceding , article 16, which says that the agreement shall come into force when approved by the Security Council and by the Government of the United States. Mr. Quo Tai-chi (China): I also wish to make a brief observation on the proposed Australian amendment. I confess that I aIr,l no more convinced of the necessity.than of the constitutionality of this proposal. The Chinese delegation, at the one hundred , and sixteenth meeting on 7 March 1947, stated that Japan never had sovereignty over those mandated islands in the Pacific, had forfeited her legal claim to the mandate by having violated the terms thereof, and had lost any effective control over those islands as a result of the Second World War.1 Now that the League of Nations has ceased to exist, it seems to me the Security Council is clearly competent to dispose of the Pacific Islands~ or to transfer and place them under the trusteeship system in the hands of an administering Power. I do not really see the point, as regards the analogy between the United States Senate ratification of the proposed trusteeship agreement, in accordance with article 16 of the United M. LANGE (Pologne) (traduit de fangIais): Je voudrais seulement formuler mon opposition au nouvel article 17 qui a ete propose. J'ai deja eu l'occasion de faire valoir qu'aux yeux de la delegation de la Pologne, le Japon a juridiquement perdu tous droits sur les territoires sous son mandat, au moment OU il s'est livre aune guerre d'agression contre la Chine, s'est retire de la Societe des Nations, et a commis d'autres violations des engagements resultant du mandat qui lui etait confie.En consequence, nous estimons qu'il ne convient pas de demander au Japon de renoncer a ses "droits sur ces territoires. A notre avis, ces droits n'existent plus; l'article 17 est donc inutile. Je veux egalement souligner que l'article 17 est en realite en contradiction avec l'article 16 qui prevoit que l'accor-cl entrera en vigueurquand il aura ete approuve par le Conseil de securite et par le Gouvemement des Etats-Unis. M. Quo Tai-chi (Chine) (traduit de I'anglais): Je veux, moi, aussi, presenter quelques breves observations sur l'amendement propose par la delegation australierine. J'avoue que je n'en vois pas plus la necessite que la conformite constitutionnelIe. La delegation de la Chine ,a declare, au..cours de la cent-seizieme seance qui a eu lieu le 7 mars 194'.7, que le Japon n'a jamais possede de SC'~a­ veralirL1et~ sur les lIes du Pacifique placees sous son mandat; il a ete dechu de Ban mandat du fai..: qu'il n'en a pas respecte les termes; de plus, il a perdu tout controle reel sur ces lIes par suite de la deuxieme guerre mondiale1• La Societe des Nations ayant cesse d'exister,il me semble evident que le Conseil de securite· est competent pour disposer a son gre de ces lies, et les confier, en vertu du systeme de tutelIe, a une PUJ:lSance chargee de les administrer. Je ne voispas tres bien comment on peutetablir une analogie entre, d'une part, la ratification du proj~t d'accord de tutelIe par le Senat des Etats-Unis, coriformement al'article 1.6 du projet Th~ Australian representative has clearly recognized, together with other members of the Council, that the Security Council has sole competence with respect to making a trusteeship agreement of this nature; however, to make the date of its coming into force dependent upon another body, in this case upon the Peace Conference of Japan, it seems to me, places an important limitation on the function and competence of the Security Council. I think it is a dangerous precedent to establish. I believe we are all agreed as to the point about common justice to the Allies in the Pacific war against Japan, mentioned by the Australian representative. I am sure tha~ we want to see justice done to our allies. The Council, in deciding to invite all the countries interested in these islands to sit at this table, has amply demonstrated its desire to hear all the views which these countries may have to present. I am sure we are all glad to have the representatives of those interested countries wi.th us this afternoon. cre~ait ainsi un precedent dangereux. Nous reconnak.sons tous, je crois, que les pays allies dans la guerre du Paci:6que contre le Japon doivent Stre traites avec equite, ainsi que l'a declare le representant de l'Australie. Je suis convaincu que nous desirons tous que l'on rende justice anos allies. En decidant d'inviter tous les pays interesses au sort de ces lies a. prendre part a. ses deliberations, le Consei1 de securite a manifeste clairement son desir d'entendre tous le$ points de vue que ces pays pourraient .iuget' opportun d'exposer. Je suis sUr que tous le membres du ConseiI sont heureux de voir les repr~. sentants de ces pays sieger parmi nous cd apres. midi. , . M. HasIuck a declare, d'autre .part, que per· sonne, ni au sein du ConseiI, ID en dehors de ce ConseiI, ne s'est oppose a. ce que'ce mandat.soit confie aux Etats·Unis. Pans ces conditions, je ne vois pas la'necessite ou l'utiIite de l'amendement propose par I'AustraIie; C'est pourquoi, lorsque cet amendement sera mis a'uX voix, je nel'ap. . puierai pas. Je voudrais ajouter quelques mots sur la date. de I'cmtree en vigueur de eet accord. A mon avis, la question de savoir si cet accord entrera en vigueurprochainement, ouseulement au cC'urs de la prochaine session de l'AssembIee generale, n'a pas une grande importance; la n'est pas le point essentieI. Par contre,il importe eSsentie1Iement de ne passubordonner cette date a un facteur ou aun organe qui echappe a. la competence du ConseiI de securite.; ce qui ne serait pas conforme a la Charte. La question qui nous interesse n'estpas de'savoirsi l'accord entrera en vigueur plus tot ouplus' tard; cela est a cote du S"oljet.· Le vrai probleme est que si I'on fait dependre la determination de cette date de queIque organe eXterieur, on fixe une llinite ou l'on parte atteinte aux prerogatives du Conseil de securlte dans ce,domaine. Tel est le point qui noUB interesse reellement. . Moreover, Mr. HasIuck has said that nobody, either inside or outside the Council, has expressed any opposition to granting this mandate to the lTnited States. That seems to' obviate any . necessity or usefulness of the Australian amendment.Therefore, when we come to a vote, I shall not support it.- ,I just wiSh.to add one word as regards the date on which the agreement will come into force. I do not believe it to be a matter of very great concern whether the agreement becomp~ effective in the near future or during the next . session of the General Assembly; I do not think that is the point. The point is not to make that date dependent upon something or some body outside the Security Council-which would not be in conformity with the Charter. The question we are concerned with is not whether such a date comes sooner or later; that is beside the point, butthe point is·that to rnake that date der?~ndent upon some outside body would constitute a limitation or an impainnent upon the rights ofthe Security Council in this matter. That is the point ,which really cont;ernsus. Gov~....mnent had at first considered this the most normal procedure.1 In our view, it would have been entirely in order for this qVestion tohe dealt with :first by the peace conference, and subsequently in accordance with the procedure pre-: scribed in Articles 79 and following of the Charter. I also made it clear that my Government considered the other course proposed to be equaIly acceptable. In other words, we agreed that a question, . which would otherwise have been within the jurisdiction of the peace conference, could be settled by a simplified procedure. We did not consider there was anything' wrong in that, since all the States which will take part in the peace conference are represented here or are able to make their opinion known here, either on invitation, or because the fact that the question was placed on our agenda induced them to offer some comments. Moreover,. it has been unanimously agreed here that the United States should be given the mandate over the islands in question. Further, the peace conference is not an organ of international law protected by its own peculiar rules or the provisions of a charter. It is not for us to protect the conference against such· GOncessions regarding its jurisdiction as participating Governments might make. , . Finally, I should like to add that, as has already been emphasized, Japan. forfeited her mandate over the Pacific' islands because she violated her obligations. As the League of Nations no longer exists, it is the duty of the United Nations to declare the mandate forfeited. The French delegation therefore considers that the procedure of directly seizing the Security Council of this question is in no way contrary to the agreed rules, and is therefore acceptable. If you took the opposite view, the Australian amendment would seem not to go far enough. In that case, the question"'would have to be re- Lorsque, au cours d'une precedente seance, j'ai precise la position de la delegation ~e, j'ai indique que le Gouvern~entde mon pays avait tout d'abord considere cette procedure comme la plus.normale1• Il aurait ete, selon nollS, tout a fait nature! que cette question ffit d'abord regIee par la Conference de la paix, et fit ensuite l'objet de la procedure des Articles 79 et suivants de la Charte. Une autre procedure ayant ete proposee, j'ai precise que mon Gouvemement l'estimait egaiement acceptable. Cela revient a dire que nous admettions qu'une question qui, par ailleurs, aurait releve de la Conference de lapaix, pouvait @tre regIee par une procedure simplifiec. Celle-ci ne nous paraissait pas incorrecte, puisque tous les Etats qui participeront a la.Conference de la . paix sont representes ici ou ont la possibiIite de se faire entendre par nous, soit qu'ils ment etcS invites, soit que, la question ayant eteportee a notre ordre du jour, ils aient ete amenes a pre- :senter des observations. , D'autre: part, un a,ccord a ete unamm.;;.-nf":1t exprime id sur l'attribution aux Etats-Unis du ~andatsur les lies en question. La Conference de la paix n'est d'ailleurs pas un organisme de droit international protege par des regles inberentes a une institution ou decoulant d'une charte. Nous n'avons pas a proteger cette Conference contre des concessions que'les Gouvernements qui y prennent part pourraient faire t01Icnant sapropre competence. Enfin, je voudrais ajouter que la decheancc du mandat du Japon sur les iles du Pacifique est, ainsi qu'on l'a deja souligne,une consequence de la viplation par ce paysdes obligations qui etaient les siennes. Puisque la Societe des Nations n'existe plus, c'est a l'Organisation des' Nations Unies qu'nappartient de prononcer cette decheance. La delegation fran~aise considere done qu'il n'y a, en definitive, rien qui soit contraire aux regles admises, dans la procedure, consistant a saisir directement le Conseil de securit6 de cctte question et que, par consequent, cette procedure est acceptable. Si l'on estimait le contraire, l'amendement australien paraitrait ne pas aller assezloin. Dans ce cas, il fauClrait rayer la question de nOtte ordre

I think the time has come to adjourn our proceedings, but before adjourning I call upon the representative of Poland, who has asked to speakon a question not connected with today's agenda. , ' Mr. LANGE (Poland): I only wanted to draw your attention to the fact that this Council resolved on 13 February 1947 to'set up a Commission to work on the 'problem of disarmament.I The resolution then adopted s,tates that this Commission sb-ouId submit proposals to the Security Council within not nlorethan three months. More than one month has already passed, and the Commission has not JIlet as yet. I am personally in rather an embarrassing situation, since my Government has asked'me to ·~mh. mit a report on the :first month's work of the Commission: I can ohly state that it has not begun. , I therefore ,Vis~ to appeal to you to use your power WJ President to ensure that the Commission embarks upon, its duties v..ithout further delay. .ILa ~solution etablissant la Commission des' armements de type classique a ete adoptee Rla cent-cinqui~me seance du Conseil de securite. Voir les Proces-verbaux offidels du Conseil de securite, Deuxieme Annee. No 13. "raw.' """' 2.' ...1... ' ........... ......_ ...... ~~~_~ ..,.._""',.........._.o.>o'_......~-.~,... ,_,~~.,_ ...._-"_ ....._..__ .~"~ Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): L'heure est ve;lUe d'ajourner nos debats, mais, avant de le faire, je vais Jonner la parole au representant de la Pologne qui a demande a dire quelques mots sur une question qui ne figure pas a notre ordre du jour•. M. LANGE (Pologn~) (traduit de l'anglais): Je voudrais simplement attirer l'attention sur le fait que, le 13fevner 1947, le Conseil de securite a decide de creer une Commission chargee d'&udier le probleme du desarmement1• La resolution adoptee acette date prevoit oue cette Commissiondevra soumettre dans ies trois mois des propositions au Conseil desecurite. Un peu plus d'un roois s'est ecoule depuis cette date et la ' Commission ne s'est. pas encore reunie. Personnellement, je me trouve dans une situation assez embarrassante, car mon Gouvernement m'a demand€ de presenter un rapport sur le travail ac~ compli par cette Commission au cours du premier mois de son fonctionnement: je devrai me bomer a dire que les travaux n'ont pas encore commence. Je desire. done vous demander, Monsieur le President, de bien vouIoir user de votre influence aupres de cette Commission afin qu'ellc entreprenne ses travaux sans autre delai. I suggest that we should meet again on Wednesday, 19 March 1947, at 11 a.m., to consider the report of the Sub-Committee on inciden~in the Corfu Channel. The following day at 3 p.m., we shmI come back to the consideration of the question now before us. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, it is true that". the meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission on Wednesday has been fixed for 3 p.m. and not for 11 a.m. Neyerthe- . less, it is not convenient for all ~e members of the Council to attend two meetings on the s~e day. Would it not be better, therefore, to hold the next meeting of the Council on Thursday? It 'Would be more convenient for me. The PRESIDENT: If there are no objections, it is agreed that we shall meet again on Thursday, 20 March 1947, to consider the report of the Sub-Committee on theinciden~ in the' Corfu Charinel, and on Friday, 21 March 1947, at 3' p.m., to continue the discussion of the draft trusteeship agreement. • L~ seance est levee a18 h. 40. UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES Security Council Publications Publications du Conseil de securite Journal of the Security Council 08-JanuarY-l1 July 1946), bilinguaJ.: English-F.rench, 42 issues, 868 pages, the set $4.20 Officiai Records of the Security Council, First Year, Second Series, bilingual: English-French. 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