S/PV.1191 Security Council

Continuing the practice we bave followed in our previous discussions on thls snbject. 1 now propose, if the Conncil SO agrees. to invite the representatiws of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece to participate. without the rigbt to vote, in tbe debate on thls matter. At the invifation of fhe President. Mr. Spyms Kjprianou (Qpms), il&. Orhan Eralp (Turkey) and Mi-. Dimitri S. Bit&os (Greece) took places at tbe Cotmcil table.

The Security Conncil has been convened to consider the report by the Secretary-General on theUnltedNatlons Gperation in Cyprus for the period 13 December 1964 tc 10 March 1965. This report has been circnlated as document S/6228.Y 3. The first speaker on my list is the MInIster for Foreign Affalrs of Cyprus, on whom 1 now call.

A year has elapsed since tbe Security Conncil took its first decision with regard to Cyprus, in the light of the serious situation 6. After a long debate, the Security Council adopted. on 4 March 1964, a resolution [186 (1964)] recalling the obligations of Member States tcwards Cyprus. especially under Article 2, paragraphl, of the Charter, and calling, among other things, for the establishment of a United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, the purpose of which was, in the interest of preserving peac? and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and crder and a return to normal conditions. 7. Since then the Security Ccuncil has had to act more than once in the light of a sericus threat of aggression against Cyprus and actual aggression when. in August last. Cyprus became the victim of bombing unpreeedented in brutality. Against this background, and in the face of the continued anomaly in Cyprus created by the subversion carried cut by Turkey’s agents, the Security Ccuncil has had tc renew three times the mandate of the Force established by the rescluticn of 4 March 1964. The Security Ccuncil, acting wlth the agreement of the Government of Cyprus, had to extend the presence in Cyprus of the United Nations Force in June (192 (1964)], in September 1194 (1964)] and in Deeember [198 (1964)1-c” each occasion for a pericd of three mont&. Circumstances bave rendered necessary yet another extension of the mandate of the Force for a further pericd of three months, which the Sscurity Council is ncw being asked to approve. 8. Hcwever welcome the presence of the United Nations Farce in Cyprus is. my Gcvernment views the necessity for a new extension with disappcintment, arising from the fact that the task entrusted to the Force by the Security Council on 4 March 1964 has net yet been completely fulfilled. 1 do not wish to take the Urne of the Council by repeating the eveiïts and the develcpments of the past year, of which it has been kept fully informed. 1 wish. however, to recall that In my statement before this Ccuncil on 18 December 1964. in enpressing my Government’s consent to the renewal of the mandate of the UNFICYPfcr the pericd between December 1964 and March 1965, whlch is expiring now. 1 said: aMy Gcverment has accepted the extension for ancther three mcnths of the stationing of UNFICYP in Cyprus in tbe legitimate expectaticn that, during thls next pericd of three months, the UnIted Nations Peace-keeplng Force will be able to ccrtiplete the task entrusted tc it by the Securlty Ccuncll.” (1180th meeting, para. 69.1 10. In agreeing. once again, to this new extension, my Government cari only express that same hope. We strongly hope that the United Nations Force in Cyprus Will be ahle to complete its task. We helieve that the United Nations must succeed. Net only must the United Nations Force in Cyprus succeed because Security Council resolution 186 (1964). as reiterated by subsequent resolutions, should be fully, and not partly. implemented, but because we also believe that the Unlted Nations Force must succeed for the sake of peace and security in that area of the world. Furthermore. we feel strongly that the United Nations cannot afford to fall in the case of the peaoe-keeping operation in Cyprus. and il is easy to envisage the circumstances that would make such a failure certain. 11. The continuation of the present anomaly in Cyprus is. 1 am afraid, a definite pointer to failure. If the present conditions in Cyprus are perpetuated, the United Nations Will have, at some stage, to choose between two alternatives: either to thinkin terms of an indefinite stay in Cyprus df the United Nations Forcewhlch no one would look forward to, includlng ourselves. and least of a11 the Security Council itself-or to decide on a withdrawal of the Force leavlng behind it the present state of affairs, a factwhlch, it must he frankly acknowledged. would ma!<e probable a renewal of fighting. if we bear in mind the relevant factors in the situation. Neither of these two alternatives couldbe regarded as a success for the United Nations. 12. During the greater part of the year whlch has elapsed. the United Nations Force, it is truc, has concentrated its efforts on preventing a recurrence of fightlng, which is one of the mainelementsin its task. For some months now major incidents have been averted. Thls has undoubtedly been due, to a considerable extent. to the efforts of the United Nations Force in thls respect, but 1 must also emphasize that thls is malnly due to the fact that my Government, although inherently entitled as of right-and as alsorecognised by the Security Councll-to bear the main responsibility for the restoration of law and order, has shown the maximum possible degree of restraint in the face of extreme provocation-provocation against established law and order-in circumstances of delibsrate subversion directed against the unity and the integrity of the State. The fact that nomajor incidents occurred during the period between September and December 1964 prompted the Secretary-General to underline in his report to the Security Council of December last: “The fact that relative calm. bas prevailed in Cyprus during the period of this Report has placed UNFICYP in a better position in its efforts to implement the Security Council’s mandate concerning the return to normal condltions.~ [S/6102 para. 22.13 14. The Secretary-General in hls report now before the Security Council states: “There is no peace on the Island, but a tense and fragile trime. Tbis situation, moreover, is likely to continue as long as there is a hostile confrontation within the Island and as long as the territory of the Republic is tut up by front lines and fortifications whcse presence contributes to maintaining tension at high pitch.” [S/6228 para. 67.1 16. This remark of tbe Secretary-General refers to the few areas wblch the Turkish terrorists have for the time being under their control, and the total sise of which amounts to no more than 1.68 per cent of the area of Cyprus. It is because of division in certain small parts of Cyprus that the Secretary-General descrlbed the situation as one of a tense and fragile trime. It is hecause of the existence of a few small pockets under the control of agents of another country that a peaceful return to normality has not been possible. It is because of these few areas tbat the continuation of the presence of the United Nations Force in Cyprus is made necessary. If the whole area of the country had corne under the control of the Government. peace in Cyprus would have been secured and the possibility of a greater conflict would have been ahnost completely eliminated. This is the reality of the situation that no one cari ignore. 16. In most parts of Cyprus the situation has been good and relative calm prevails. Tbls is due to the absence of pockets of subversion and lines of division. Describing, for example, the situation in the District of Limassol the Secretary-General states in his report of 11 March 1965: “It is considered that the absence of any form of Green Line in the town is one of the most important factors in the maintenance of goodrelationsbetween the two communities.” [S/6228, para. 248.1 17. Indeed, if one takes as an example the District of Limassol and reads carefully the relevant paragraphs of the Seoretary-General’s report it Will clearly be seen that the situation in that area is normal. and that Greek and Turkish Cypriots live together in peace and harmony, because dividing lines and other forms of division are absent. Thls is, as 1 stated, the case in most parts of Cyprus. The Secretary-General, in paragraph 104 of bis report, states: “. . . dur@ most of the time by far the greater part of the Republic has been quiet, with Greek and Turklsh Cypriots going 19. It seems that the facts of life and the feelings of the people of Cyprua bave not yet awakened Turkey from its wild partitionist dreams, and the people of Cyprus still suffer. sud peace in Cyprus and arouud Cyprus is still at stake, because and only because of this wlld dream. 20. In my statement before thls Council on 18 December 1964 1 emphasised that the Turkish Cypriot terrorist organization. *acting on the directives of theTurkishGovernment, bave made it more than abundantly clear, by their attitude and actions, that law and order and a return to normal conditions are not for them auseful proposition, since by law and order and a return to normality the plans of division and partition would not be advanced’ [llEOth meetiug, para. 71. 21. It is indeed quite clear from the report of the Secretary-General of 11 March 1965 [S/6228], as it was qulte clear from the report of the Secretary- General of 12 December 1964 [S/6102)-as indeed it is beyond doubt clear to anyone in Cyprus-that the only obstacle to peace and the only reason for the anomaly which still persists in a few parts of Cyp~s is the policy of Turkey to promote strife and dlvlsion. 1 am sure that members Will agree that the policy of separation is net only contrary to the principles and a11 that thls Organisation stands for. is not only in diPeCt conflict with tbe resolutions adopted by this Cout~il and the terms of reference for the Force, but is also contrary to the task entrusted by the Security Couin to the Mediator whose mission is to find a solution in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of thepeople of Cyprus as a whole andthepreservation of international peace and security. 22. Having this picture before you, Mr. President, the question ariseS whether the United Nations Force 23. What we are now asking is not something novel. We are simply asking for the full implementation of the resolution of 4 March 1964. We are asklng for something which is the most essentialpre-requisite to securing peace; for otherwise, to allow the present anomaly to consolidate itself would amount to an encouragement to those who would like to promote further the idea of partition in one form or another. The United Nations Force in Cyprus should fully carry out its share of responsibility for a return to normality: for otherwise the Unlted Nations would have been contributing unwillingly to the consolidation of a situation that might. in the future, prove tobeprejudicial to the political solution-something which the Secretary- General SO strongly and sincerely wishes to avoid-as well as a probable cause of armed conflict. nouveau. œuvre Nous _ 24. 1 strongly believe that the United Nations cannot afford to have its name associated again with division and partition, especially after its gallant and successful effort to avoid that during the last phase of the Congo operation. 25. A return to normality in Cyprus, which would mean in actual essence the elimination of division and separation, cannot, in any circumstances, be made dependent upon the Will of those whose policy has been consistently toundermine normality in order to achieve division and separation. The fact that a handful of agents of Turkey in Cyprus do not approve of the idea of restoring normality in the country at the expense of peace, at tht expense of the security and happiness of the people of Cyprus as a whole, is no reason for not going abead with fulfilling the task entrusted to the Force hy the Security Council on 4 March 1964. It SO happens that part of the task of the United Nations Force and certain of the principles guiding its functions are in direct conflict with the interests and the policy of Turkey. it cannot. be argued seriously that the task of tbe United Nations and the principles guiding its mission in Cyprus should be altered in practice because, in implementing them, the interests of the aggressor are jeopardized. 26. The pockets of subversion controlled by the agents of Ankara in Cyprus, as 1 stated earlier, form altogether 1.66 per cent of the total area of Cyprus. While this percentage is very small to amount to any step to partition or federation, it is still enough to oonstitute a continuous threat to peace. This aspect of the situation also should always be seriously borne in mind. 27. Tbis policy of division is not only a continuous danger to peace in the area, but has also brought uPon , who, bfore the 38. Only the other day ayounggirl, nineteen-year-old Merife Irfan, was found unconscious in themiddleof a street in Lefka by members of the Irish contingent of the United Nations Force, andwhen she was taken to the hospital she wa6 found to have beenill-treatedand repeatedly raped. This unfortunate girl died later in hospital. She had committed suicide, and the reason was quite clearly stated in a letter that was found on her in which she described the sufferings she had undergone in the hands of the Turkish terrorists. 39. 1 oan cite a lot of other cases. Indeed, one day perhaps all of them must be placed before you. 1 cari cite cases of people who were unfortunate enough not to succeed when they tried to escape. 1 cari cite cases of many people who suffered because they refused to obey orders of the Turkish terrorists or becausethey refused to take up arms against the Government. 1 cari cite cases of people who suffered because they committed the crime of wading gcod relations and cooperation with their Greek Cypriot compatriots. 1 cari cite cases of people who managed to escape. 40. This is the situation in tbe pockets of subversion controlled by the Turkish terrcrists. 1s this a situation that will be allowed to continue? Apart from the political considerations and apart from the tbreat tc peace which the existence, the consolidation and the enlargement of these pockets constitute, are the humanitarian considerations alone net enoughto justii the termination of this situation? 41. The Government of Cyprus has pledged itself in this Council to do its utmost for the protection of all citizens of Cyprus, whether they be Greek or Turkish Cypriots; but we feel that under the present circumstances, it is the duty of the United Nations Force to assist the Gove&unent in this respect. The pockets illegally controlled by force by Turkish terrorists must be eliminated if inter& peace in Cyprus is to be secured on a permanent basis, if the UnitedNations is to succeed and if the bulk of the Turkish Cypriot population, who yearn for peace, are to be freed from tbe hands of the Turkish terrorists. 42. Dr. Ihsan Ali, the Turkish Cypriot leader, has, on many occasions, exposed the sufferings of the Tvrkish Cypriot population at the hands of the terrorists. Dr. Ali-and 1 am quite well aware of the faot .that the Turkish representative does net like him-in a recent letter he addressed to the President of the Republic, states again tbat thousands of Turks are being tortured by a small number of terrorists, and he wonders by what logio the Turkish Governrnent supports tbis terrcrism. The voice of tlds courageous mari is obviously not heard in Ankara. obstacles in the present iaaccessibility of the arsas TurldshGgprbts totbeGovernmet% law-enfore rities and officàals. Tbe f tic St& are thus pwerless in tkse aàmhister justice by pmtecting soeiety crimiaai elements.n key. ft is in tbis context events wbich leà recent imiàent in tbe area of Lefha. Ambel~oa, awther Turhish Cypriot village. ?Bis c%mnexioa also made it possible for them to gain easy axes.9 strategic heights and hills OVWlOQ controlling tbe shoreline. 46. In other words, a virtuslly contbnmus bridgehead was being establisbed, with the rebel forces at Lefha As nts the as psrticularly significant in on 5February 1965 a Turhish iimàtis dtoapproachthecoastnearthe area. On 3 March a ship was also observed to be approachbg tbe Limnitis area. On 5 b!k+.roh two sbips were seen to approach this area again at a Tbis bas been confirmeà ies by area. 0 tbat are Government forces were oncertainbeights bstween in accordance with their strict oràers, tbey àid peaoéfully at night between 11 and 12 Marcb, without incident. 48. On 12 March 1965 the National Guard i&rmed Commander of the United Nations Force that this 49. What is important, bowever, in this respect, is tc underline the faot that the aim bebind the Turlrish activities wbicb led to that incident was tbe intention to try to occupy alarger area for tbe purpose bath of promoting furtber tbe plans for separation, as well as creating such conditions as migbt better facilitate an invasion which 1s still, it seems, very muoh on tbe mind of the Turklsh Government. In this connexiontke Security Ccuncil may be interested tc know tbat the Chief of Staff of Turkey, General sunai, while on an inspection tour of tbe Turkish militaiy Aegean region, made clear on 12 Februa and I am now using his own words- Government bas taken ail tbe necessary stepa for the stre ening and more complets fortification of tbe Turkish positions in Cyprusa. 50. The violations of tbe territorial waters of Cyprus and the relevant actlvlties which 1 havs already mentioned are not tbe only evidenceoftbefact tbat the Turkish Government is still pursuing tbe same policy of a ession against Cyprus. Tbe threats continue, tbe Turkish leaders, the Turldsh radio andthe Turkish Press go on with the provocation and the threats against Cyprus, while tbe President of Turkey spoke again recently oftbepossibilityof bloodshedinCyprus. 51. The war of nerves, tco, gces on unabated. Tbe exercises of tbe Turkish Navy havs been renewed, and wbile exercises were held between 2 aud 5 March, the day before yesterday new large-scalemsnoeuvres of the Turkish Navy were ammunced betwsen Cyprus and tbe soutbern part of Turkey. This continuous tbreat is in itself, serious enougb, bscause it tends tc increase tension and encourage the Turkish terrorists in Cyprus to step up their subversive activlties. Tbe commentator of the Ankara Radio said the day before yesterday tbat if the Unlted Nations did not take tbe necessary action to remove Government positions in the Le503 area, Tnrkey would have to taks military action. Turkey threatens that it w-ill resume air attacks on Cyprus such as those of last August, unless tbe Government witbdraws from positions it now occupies near Lefka. In the meantiie the Turkish fleet started moving near Cyprus, and the Turkish Army was put on an alarm basis for possible actbn. Ail the armed forces of Turkey have been alerted-the air force, tbe navy and the army-because in Cyprus the Gcvernment forces occupy certain positions tc avoid afurtber worsening of the situation and to avert a further en- 53. Tbe PFl?sident 0% cypms, towhoasatten~ontiese ions were drawn, immediateliy sent a message tu the Secretary-Genexal [S/6M$gY stating that these ZLwgatiQns were compw?~y glwndless, alld tbat the Gaverment wa5 doing its utmost to preserve and promote peace aud normality in co-operation witl3 the United Nations Force and that it had no intention to sesart to any attack against 91llCkiSh Cypriots. 54. 1t PS a SQuFC@ of satisfaction to note that the Secretq-mnerd, in rehtion to tbis, categorically states: m . . . theFe bas been 60 fur no specific ëvidence of preparations for a large-seale attack on tbe Turkish Cyprriot c~mmunity~ [,Y/6228 para. Sd].1 shctuldliketo stress that the si came of this incident liesnot so mut% in the gmundlessness of the Turkish accusations e in its heing indicative of the attituck of the Turkish Government to create tensiontienever there is quiet and comparative cslmnesstiti a view tb giving rise ta incidents in preparatiot. perhaps for renewed Turkish aggression. This is an~ther token of the kind of contribution which the ~rkish Government makes to the retu3n of normal coditions in Cypms, as provided by tic Secwity Coxmoil’s iresolutions. 55. The same story of creating confusion throu baseks aUegatloxx3 bas been again repeated when we read in The New York Times of today the statemsut made by the Turkish representative, Mr. Eralp, tothe &fect thd II@ wotid Tokay accuse the Cyprus Government in the Security Council of preparations for 57. Likewise, 1 must stress that my Government, which cannot abandon its respcnsibilities to prote& ail the citizens, will net resign its role, and, wbtle fully co-operating with the United Nations Forceintbe proper dlscharge of the latter% functions, it will discharge its own responsibilities tc tbe full. Furthermore, my Government is not prepared tc abandon its responsibilities intbefieldof defence, sndwlllcontinue to take all apprcpriate measures in tbis respect witb firmness ancl determination. It is impossible tc argue tbat Cyprus should not strengtheu its defeuce when Cyprus is being continuously threatened with siou. 58. 1, also, consider it appropriate. in order to avoid any room for doubt or possibility for misunderstanding, to reaffirm that the Government of Cyprus, which is the legal Government of tlte country, and tbe vast majority of the population of Cyprus Will under no ciromnstances even consider any divisive aoIution envisaghig partition or federation. Cy-prus îs accuntry tbat cannot be divided. Tbere are certain principles and values in life that honourable pecple cannot compromise. We shall never compromise freedom sndwe shall never compromise tbe right of our people tc decide freely for themselves their ovm destiny. Tbese are the values for which many wars have bsen fougbt, much blood has been shed and millions of people bave lest tbeir lives. These are the values upon whtch tbe United Nations has been built. These are thevalues in the service of which the United Nations has pledged itself by virtue of its Charter. There may be subversion in Cyprus instigated by Turkey aiming at destroying the unity of Cyprus. There may be threats of invasion and aggression. There may be invasion. There may be aggression. There may be new bomblngs. There is one thing that the people of .Cyprus will never compromise or alter, and tbat is their determination to secure their complete freedom and decide freely for themselves. their own destiny. The people of Cyprus are confident that in their struggle their weakuess in size and in numbers 1s bslanced by the strong moral powèr which their just causerepresents and which is further strengthened by the support snd solidarity of ail freedom-lovlng pscples in the world. 59. Before concluding, 1 wish to reiterate once again our most sincere appreciation tc the Secretary- General and bis assistants, bcth in New York and in Cyprus, for their untirlng efforts in oarryingout thetr mission in the interests of peace. Cur appreciation RESIWWE (tran&md fsoIm Fr@n&): LCfl representative of Turkey. ERALP (Turkoy): As Usuat, 1 Shall reserVe t0 seply to the distortions and alkptions normal maxmer by Greek-Cypriot A st a year since tlae Security a recurrence of @st 0Ç the present report r a furtber peri.od of seem to be agreeable to it. we m uoh a prolongation 1 believe chat the Cowcil muid do well to Cook into the causes of this contmued aoute fNSkati0n. ace-keeping Force, its Commander, a. and the Speoial Representative of al, Mr. Bernardes,’ bave done der circumstances wbich bave and are becomïngmoreaudmore retary-General and his collaborators have exercissd tbeir customary wisdom, patience ond effective control. Tbose public-spirited oountries whicb bave generously contributed inmoney and kind for tbis peaoe-keeping effort have continued to do SO. And tbe Mediator, Mr. Galo Plaza, parallel to bis efforts to find a peaceful, agreed settlement, bas tried to bring bis considerable salutary influence t0 bear in order éo create an atmosphereof peace and quiet on the Island. To aB of these, my Government sud my delegation would Rke to express our sinoere . 66. In spite of tbis, tbe report of the Seoretaxy- General is a tragic admission of tbe fact tbat a reting on a mucb larger scale is stiR a return to normal condition5 is stiB fW from being achieved. Tbe Counoil, tberefore, is entitied to ask why tbese noble effort5 bave miscamied and who is reaponeible for tbis frustration. 68. The root of tbe trouble is, of course, the determination of the Greek-Cypriot r&ime to impose tbeir solution by force. Just as they have disregarded solemn treaty obligations and torn up the Constitution of the Republic, they have systematically reneged on agreements concluded for the maintenance of at least a tenuous peace, both before andafter the statloning of the UNFICYP in Cyprus. 69. They have violated tbe Green Line agreement between the two communlties by not evacuating the suburb of KUçUk Kahnskli and by fortifying buildings in that area. ‘70. The Paphos Agreement under which they were to wlthdraw from the “Phoni” qusrters in the Turkish sector has been disregarded. 71. Mr. Spinelli of the United Nations negotiated an agreement between the two sides as to the village of Ghaziveran regarding the dismantling of the Greek stronghold outside tbe village. This was of course never done. 72. The agreement concluded on 15 May 1964, under the auspices of General Gyanl, concerning the Greek fortifications around Famagusta has been violated without any compunction. The report, in its paragrapbs 71 through 76, is an eloquent account of tbe arrogant manner in which ail agreements are set aside. 73. The fate of tbe agreement reached between the Force Commander and the Greek régime inNovember 1964 is told indetail inparagraphs 19 through 28 of the report. It is indeed a sad account of the treatment to which a United Nations Force is subjected by tbe unlawful Govermnent of a Member of theUnitedNations. 1 shall not go into a repetition of the words of the report which speaks of instances of obstruction of UNFICYP vehldles, in some cases, involving threats of hostile action, where such vehicles were stnpped, threatened, forced off the road by National Guard veblcles, deliberately pushed or forced into collisions, of machine guns being trained on UNFICYP aircraft and such aircraft actually belng fired at from the ground. Al1 this in the face of agreements for the freedom of movement. 74. As for the freedom of movement for Turklsh Cypriots whlch had been SO grandiosely offered by Archbishop Makarios in bis table to the Secretary- General last September [S/595O/Add. 2, Annex] y, it has of c&rse remalned SO in tbeory only. In e.ffect, those TU&S who venture forth inta the Greek sectors ?f Ibid., Nineteenrh Year. Supplement for July, August and Sepremher *. soil, Tlte recent prohibitive licence fee on 5ctors is 5 case in pie. T&e Greek administr5tïon relaxed somewbat pressure is once again turned on titi increased intensity. ‘I%i6 is part of tbe typical tactics utiized by Greek Cy-priat &gime to mislead world public eek Cypriot lea6:+ship bas, from time to found it expedie1.l ‘a mak gestures yieldingtoUnitedN to relieve tbe Turkish comti& from pressura In reality, bmever, tbe economic blockade bas contitmed tith increased intensity. Even the Red Crescent relief s lies sent from Torkey in orderto pravide fQr tiae Turlcish community’s most elementary reqnirements are being subjected to arbitrary restricti~n~ and nnjustified obstruction. 79. What 1 bave just explained. and the evidence contained in the Secretary-General’s report on economic restrictions, provide unmistakable proof ‘chat the Greek Cypriot leadership continues to use economic blockade as a weapon to attain its political objectives of suppressing the constitutional rights of the Turklsh community and ultimately of uniting the island wlth Greece. It seems quite clear that, whenever it suits their purposes. the Greek Cypriots, in the words of the Secretary-General’s report of 10 September. seek “to force a potential solution by economic pressure as a substitute for military action’ [5/5950, para. 22219 80. Resolution 136 (1964) called for a return to normal conditions in order that an agreed solution might be found to the question of Cyprus through negotiations. Archbishop Makarios has, however, paid no heed to this call. He bas pushed the Constitution into oblivion and, in the political vacuum thus created, launched bis de facto administration. He has proceeded to have laws enacted in contravention of the Constitution, such as the Municipalities Law, the Territorial Waters Law, the Administration of Justice Law and the Conscription Law. And now we have been told that the enactment, again contrary to the Constitution, of a new elections law is being contemplated. These laws are devoid of any validity. The adoption of a new elections law aims at destroying the principle of the existence andpartnership of the twocommunitles upon which the Republic of Cyprus is based. If the existing electoral system is altered, tbe Greek Cypriots Will have deliberately sown the seeds of separation in Cyprus themselves. since the Turkish community cannot be expected to take part in any election to be held under an unconstitutional elections law. R is indeed surprising how the Greek Cypriot .y &d. 81. Pn analy causes of tbe continuation and imrease of in tke area. we must not Sose of the I<PUS role played by a partmer. ps the partuer. in tke Greek Cypriot pt tu impose an . ible solution by force. Aad that fs the part by tke Go=mment of Greece. Greece kas i the island of Cyprus witk an army exceedPng 9Q.QQQ. St bas placed tkis fQr~dable force uncler tke direct comm t to tke Greeks or officers in tke Greek Cypriot armed forces, down to tbe level of company commanders. kave been sentfromGreece. Tbe report of tbe Secretary-General earries a fol1 accourt of tlrese activities. Al1 this is in clear defiance of tbe Security Council resolution calling for restraint ami asking tbe parties to refrain from any action likely to increase tension. Tbe fact emerges. tberefore. that tbe unlawful Grsek Cypriot r&gime is ae kand in glove with tbe Government of Greece about tkeir declrred intention of to Greece. In consequence. Greece 1 responsibility for a11 military action on the island. Again in consequence. any mtlltary aggression directed the Turks of Cyprus Will be considered a ession coming from Greece as weP1 as from Greek Cypriot r me. Unless and until tbe Greek invading force in Cyprus and the Greek offices in the Greek Cypriot forces leave the island, tbe greatest tbreat to peace in the area Will ever be present. avec le Gouvernement son intention la Grecce. pleine Pile. militaire deree du &gime sion grecque mandant pas quitté dans la r6gion. 82. The Council is now meetig under circmnstances wbicb are particularly significant for the future of a11 peace-keeping operations of the United Nations. Tbe Greek Cypriots, aided by the Government of Greece. bave armed themselves to the teeth snd are now beginning to feel their oats. Tkey hurl defiance aé the United Nattons and at its Peace-keeping Force. Tbe reply of Archbisbop Makarios, cited in annex 1 (c) of tke report. reflects the new tendency of the Greek insurgent rs f e to scoff at the attempts of t UNFICYP to maintain even an uneasy truce between the two hostile communities. The village of Ambelikou bas been surrounded, besieged and attacked since last Friday. Tke area around the village was under tbe direct responsibility of the UNFICYP. They bave driven tke UNFICYP personnel away from tkeir posts. This is a direct challenee to the authoritv of tbe United Nations, of the Sec&y Council and of the UNFICYP. 82. dans des circonstances pour de la paix aidés jusqu’aux envie Unies panse de l’archev@que vThe high ground between Lefka and these villages has been patrolled by UNFICYPunder the cesse-fire agreement, and it was understood that no milltary activity should take place and no fortifled positions be established there.” 84. The report says: *it was understoodn. In other words. there was an agreement. But off went the agreement, because the Greek Cypriot regimedecided that it had to occupy those positions in pursuance of its policy of gradua1 strangulation of the Turkish positions on the island. 85. Again, the last sentence of paragraph 4 of the supplementary report reads: “When the UNFICYP District Commander protested, the local National Guard Commander informed him that orders for thls move had corne from National Guard Headquarters in Nicosia.m Again. defiance of the United Nations. 86. If this attitude of defiance is allowed to go unchecked. it Will create a precedent that may be disastrous for the future of such peace-keeping operations. 1 submit this point, with a11 the emphasis that it deserves, to the consideration of the Security Council. 87. This meeting of the Council is also critical on account of the shameless Greek Cypriot sabre rattllng that is accompanying it as background noises. Only a few days ago, the President of Cyprus, who would normally be expected to speak and a& as a responsible statesman, solemnly declared that. if Turkey dared to exercise its treaty rights, the Turks of Cyprus would be neutralised. The word is well chosen. but there is no doubt as to what it means. If there were any doubts, they would be dispelled by the more explicit terms used, again a few days ago, by the Supreme Commander of a11 Greek and Greek Cyprlot forces, General Grivas, who said that in such an eventuality a11 Turks in Cyprus would be massacred. This is the same General Grivas, former EOEA leader, who once joined a Greek imperialistexpeditionaryforce todrive the Turks from their homes in Asia Miner, and now would like to drive the Turks of Cyprus from their homes on the island..This is the same General Grivas who has declared on many an occasion that, unless the Turks aocepted “enosis”. the guns would talk. These arrogant defiances of a11 the norms of the United Nations age have been made possible by the overwhelming arms build-up of theGreekCyprio!s.inutterdisregard of the Security Council resolution, to which the Secretary-General alarmingly alludes in his report. This delegation, on a number of previous occasions, also refers to tbe well-knovm e to camsider of the UNFICYP is clearly and has always mainst carry out its mandate order and a return to ail the ropids of Cypus. 92. Finally, Mr. President, 1 have tbis to say: we heartily weloome the appeal addressed to the parties by the Secretary-General in the aObservations” chapter of his report to make the most slncere and determined effort, by negotia!ions, to find an agreed basis for long-term solutions, Inspired by peaceful intentions, we have always heen prepared to negotiate, either directly or through the Mediator. But on one point there should be no mistake: we shall never accept for the question of Cyprus any solution-which it is attempted to impose by force in violation of the Charter and ‘in utter disregard of the resolution 186 (1964) of the Security Council. Any action based on a miscalculation on that point would inevltably lead to disaster.

I call on the next speaker on my list. the representative of Greece. 94. Mr. BIT%OS (Greece) (translated from French): The successive reports of the Secretary-General have enabled the members of the Council to follow the 95. Tbe report of 3.3. MarCb. wbieh PS n~w~er consiaemtioa. dmws our attention. more tlmn any of the prevlous reports, to the constant factors of the probbm; it informs us tbat tàe fact tbat it bas net been passible ta estab basis for amen settlement normal Con&tions. bas once a feeliag of measiness, tbUS ng the ta& of~e~~tea~att~s Force. ancl it wams us that only a fina ment of tbe gnoblem “Cari affmd reaI assu?an nst tlle mdisasb-ous 96. posent cirmmstames. H shaP1 net imitate the representative of Turkey in bis sterile policy af an dQtb protest too motive belùmd s of every Governcy is, in the fanal malysis, self-interest, tbe estion tbat arises is wbich of tbe tw sides. tbe Greek or the Turkisb. undermining and tbendestroytbe RepubMc of Cyprus ami in unrest sime December 1963. b&?SoC. we bave the Greek Cypriots. Cmstildig a majmity of 80 per cerit of tbe isbml% ~~~~at~~, to cari he a. the same idea pirations 2 per cent of Armenians, Maronit Cypriots. even during the pertod of colonial t-ration. contributed more than 92 per cent to naI prtiuct. 99. Against tbis impressive majority-bath in number and in economic activity-there is a minority of per cent of Turkish Cypriots. The 1959-1960 eements allowed tbem more than their due share pritileges in domestic and external matters. in the form of a series of veto rights on questions whicb nothing wbatever to do with tbeir spiritual or material welfare. These unprecedented privibges, wbïch wsre supposed to constitute aktndofprotection. were transformed by that minority into a weapon of attack. a means of pressure and blackmail iimed agatnst the majority. and they ended by paralysing tbe State. 100. It was obvicds. even to the moderate section of the minority. that tbis situationhad tobe corrected. 101. The Turkish leaders, however. incited by Ankara, opposed any negotiations or discussion likely 103. It is significant that, immedlately following the outbreak of incidents in December 1963, a strong Turkish Cypriot military force appeared on the scene, as if by maglc, ready for action; and the minority leader, Mr. Küçilk. hastened to declare the Republic defunct and the Constitution void. From the very first day, he asserted that partition was the only solution. Mr. KUçUk and those who prompt him are consistent in their thlnking. As early as 1957, a pamphlet was published under hls name with the title “The Cyprus Question: A Permanent Solution”. Its contents are summariaed in the map of Cyprus whlch appears inside the caver, advocating the partition of tbe island into two areas. Under this partitiçn scheme, Mr. Kiiçlik was generous enough to set aside for the minority of 18 per cent the best part of the island, including the capital, Nicosia, and the main port, Famagusta. By way of introduction, Mr. KUçUk wrote the following: [Tbe speaker continued in English.] vWe hope that the pages which follow wifl help tbe amdous peace-seeker to know his fa& on Cyprus. The above indication is made by the representatives of the Turks in Cyprus, who are the descendants of those who fought and died for Cyprus in 1571 and who ruled it thereafter.. . n [Tbe speaker resumed in FrencbJ 104. This recollection of the period of Ottoman expansioulsm was quite clearly intended to remind those countries which are today Turkey’s neighbours, that, in the Turkish vlew, the claims of the conqueror are still valid and that hls return is not altogether out of the question. Here is a theory which will delight all those peoples who have experienced colonial rule. beginning with those who have had a taste of Ottoman despotism! 105. It fs thls vid6e fixe” of partition, of Rtaximm as the Turks cal1 it. whlch explains the origin and cause of the events which led to bloodshed in the island of Cyprus in December 1963. At the root of the jumble of incidents and the vlcious cirele of reprisals and counter-reprisals lies the policy of dismemberment of the island, which has been doggedly followed by Ankara in various forms: instiiutional or territorial federation, cantonization, etc. 106. Since the objective remains the same. in spim of the rather contradictory variations accordlng to whether Turklsh diplomacy is carried out in public or in private, it is natural that the advocates of partition should use a11 possible means to prolong and aggravate the crisis. For who stands to gain from poisoning relations between the Greek Cypriot majority 107. There is no better way to express tbe spirit and the state of mind of the Greek Cypriots than to recall the proposais made by Archbishop Makarios last September for bringtng back peace, restoring confidence and re-establishing normal living conditions on the island, At that time, the Government of tbe Republic of Cyprus made an offer-which still f a generai amnesty. even for tbose who were orimes and offences committed during the The Gavernment also offered material assistance to tbose who tished to re tbeir homes and accepted in advance any stions which the United Nations migbt make concerning security measures that would help to restore peace on tbe island. In addition, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus was ready to procsed wtth the measure which the Secretary-General in the part of bis report entitled Wbservations~ qualifies as *a clear osedn, Le., tbe abolition of tbe armed posts “net essential for the defence of Cyprus against external attac@ , on condition, of caurse. tbat the armed Turkish bands do tbe ssme. 109. When he transmitted tbis message from the President of Cyprus to the Security Council at the meeting of 25 September. tbe Secretary-General said: II . . . I welcome President Makarios’ suggestion as an important step towards reducfng tensions in Cyprus and enabling IJRFICYP to carry aut its mandate effectfvely.A 11159th meeting, para. 50.1 109. The members of the Cou&l, for their part, bave praised the constructive value of these proposals. chat was the reacüon of the Turktsh side to thfs eminently constructive metbod of tacklingtheproblem of Cyprus? It was altogether negative. 110. The Turkish Government has shown its band by dfsparaging the initiative for peace taken by the President of Cyprus and even by opposing, as Will be recalled. any mention of it in the Security Commil resolution. The leaders of the minority, on orders from Ankara and assisted by tbe leaders oftbe armed bands, used threats and intimidation to prevent any iwlbnation to take advantage of these generous offers. AR those members of the minority who declared themSelveS in faveur of a return to normal conditions were called renegades. and some of them paid for their desire to return to their homes with their lives. Documents .to which the P&ister for Foreign Affairs bas referred are a striking testimony to this fact. 111. The policy of the Government of cyprus. as much tbrough self-interest as through conviction, aims 113. As indicated in paragraph 55 of the report [S/6226], the Turkish Cypriot leadership Viscourages the Turkish Cypriot population from engagtng in personal, commercial or other contacts with their Greek Cypriot compatriots. from applying to government offices in administrative matters, or from resettling in their home villages if they are refugeesm. And paragraph 17 of the same report further mentions that: “In fact. the Turkish Cypriot policy of selfisolation has led the community in the opposite direction from normality.” 114. The sole purpose of the green lines separating the quarters of certain large Cypriot towns is to prolong the distord. Even if they fade and become a neutral shade, they Will net cesse to constitute an obstacle to free communication and traffic. Ii& The maintenance of these barriers, just as the continued reinforcement of Turkish strongholds in various parts of the island, is net designed to protect the members of the Turkish Cypriot minority. The regions under Turkish military control form less than 2 per cent of the total area of the island [S/6102, para. 1431. Within this confined space-crowded together in wretched conditions-approximately one fifth of the Turkish Cypriot population lives. The other four fifths live peaceably in the remainder of tbe island, escaping the terrorist grip of the minority leaders. The Secretary-General% report tellsusthat: ” . . . it should be clear, however, . . . tbat, durtngmost of the time by far the greater part of the Republic has been quiet, with Greek and Turkish Cypriots going about their daily tasks” [S/6228. para. 1041. This is a fact which surely cannot escape the attention of the members of the Council, and particularly useful conclusions may be drawn from it. 116. The maintenance of strongholds garrisonedby armed Turkish bands, although on a small scale, serves a double pur-pose in tbe eyes of the leadership. First, it serves a political and psychologicalpurpose, by fostering uneasiness, by stirring up hatred and, as tbe report says, by maintaining the fighting spirit of the garrisons at its peak. Secondly, it serves a military purpose, the hope being chat these fortified strongholds cari serve as springboards for further attacks against Cyprus from outside. 117. Smce these are the aims of Turkish policy in Cyprus, the proposals made by Archbishop Makarios had to be nipped in the bud at all costs and, subsequently, beghming in the Security Cou&l, quibbling arguments were used to cast doubt on the good faith and sincerity of the President. The representative of Turkey stated that these proposals were not WOrthy of consideration. rot attempt tu see wbether we cari benefit fmm tbem, ancl if SO, to wbat extent; if we do not W+~XWS the112 in a spirit of co-operation. witb the co-operate and respand to tbese plans, tben ation in Qprus as we kmw it will continue 62 ]1153?A meeting, para. 61.1 Gomemement dsm solides. en tbe test of time and the y ofthe ent of Cyprus demonstrated tha was net case, every eEort vas made to sow seeds of dissension oam a n tbe atmospbere in rcbbisb0p Makarios ssibleb undermost sdid. last few weeks, there bas been intbe Turkish diplomatie service, a Security Couacil bas not 129. a d6ploy6 s&curit6 des dïff&entes tionales, Chypriotes taires psychose PnvitBs ils tiraient se dérob&rent. 121. That dfplomatic imbroglio had a definite aim: to prevent tbe situation from returning to normal and to prevent tbe several tlmusands of refugees wbo. as victims of tire Turkisbtbeory of segregation, havsbeen sbut up in tbe armed strongbolds ve not been allowed to return home. Tbe report Secretsry- General is very explicit on this point: 1 e quelques dans les réduits de la &grégation, rapport ce point: Wery few refugees returned to their homes . . . The frequent rumeurs . . . of impending attacks did net encourage progress in tlte solution of this important problem . . .I+ [S/622&, para. 1541. 122. But tbat is not ail. Tbis manoeuvre started with the letter, dated 9 February [S/6181], addressedtothe Seoretary-General, in wbich tbe permaiïent representative of Tnrkey expressed vague apprehensions concerning tbe situation in Cyprus and, without waiting for the matter to be examined or for a seply, hastened to renew tbe old tbreat of Turkish intervention in tbe iSlal%d. days later, President Makarios repliedby table to tbe Secretary-General [S/6188] formally stating tbat no offensive operation was contemplated. Tbat seemed to satisfy everyone except, of course, Turkey. Disregarding tbe statement by the Government of the Republic and the fact tbatcalmreigned tbroughaut tbe island, President GUrsel, on 9 March, predicted that much blood would flow in Cyprus and declared that, in that case, Turkey would not be content to play the role of passive observer. 122. débuta ad.res&e repr6sentant de vagues et, r6ponse. nace plus dép&cbe formellement envisagée. bien Gouvernement dans la pr&dsion Chypre contenterait 124. The distinguished representative of Turkey wlll shortly reply that any analysis of Turkish aims, su& as the one 1 have just made, is mere propaganda. I invite him here and now tc read witbme paragraph 57 of the report [S/6228], which states, with respect to the intentions of the milltant Turks in Cyprus, that ” . . . they Will SO far as may be withln their power strlve to achieve and enforce a condition akin to de facto partition”. 125. We wonder-and 1 maintain that we are entitled to wonder-what the United Nations Force thlnks of thls cyniral proclamation of Turkish intentions. Need 1 recall that it is not the taskof the Mediator to protect the integriiy and unity of Cyprus, as the report seems to suggest in the section entitled “Observations”, but rather the task of the United Nations Force? Need 1, to prove what 1 have just said, readall the statements made by the members of the Council during the discussion which resulted in the resolution of 4 March? We all remember vivldly how the representative of the Ivory Coast, an author of the text of that resolution, summed up the task of the Force in a few very clear and precise words. Speaking of the Force in Cyprus, Ambassador Usher said: “The directives should be drawn from the United Nations Charter and should stem from the obligation which we have, as Member Rates, to guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus. The sovereignty and territorial integriiy of a State Member of the Unlted Nations cannot be subordinated to any consideration. The United Nations intervened in the Congo in order to prevent secession; it cannot go into Cyprus in order tc sanction partition of the island . . .” [1097th meeting, para. 321. 126. 1 have attempted to outline tbe background of the present crisis, the elements which constitute the constant facto& in the problem of Cyprus, and it is within this context that the development of the crisis during the last flfteen months must be considered if we wish to grasp the real significance of the crisis, above and beyond the tragic events themselves. 12’7. The representative of Turkey cari concentrate ail his fire on particular episodes in the Cyprus situation. IIe cari draw on day-to-day events as much as he lüces in support of his polemics. No smokescreen cari obscure the essential facts of theproblem. 128. Instead of being driven tc fauaticism, the minority leaders should be encouraged to realize that the extreme solutions that bave been urged upon them are not feasible, because they run counterto the universaI sense of justice and to the determination of the overwhelming majority of the population. Consequently, their insistence oan only serve to prolong Bernent wbich would population do exist. occur, tbe minority wbich coaflict witb tbe rigbts and i majmlty snd cannot efore be carried out. For, all is said and 130. One tbing at least is clear: tbe Cypriots are no longer alone in believiag tbat peace wS1 return e0 ueuce or by tbe part 131. It is in this spirit that my Covernment views over-all problem a& supports the extension of international For~e~s mandate for an additional period of three montbs. 132. Tbe PRESU3ENT (translated from Frenoh): 1 xkow eau on ~e~~nisterfQE FOlTel rs of cyprus . 133. Mr. KUBRIANOU (Cyprusp: 1 do net intend to take up much of the time of tbe Council. 1 simply wish to mnhe a few comments upon certain of the remarks made by tbe representative of Tarkey. 134. He again described the Coveroment of Cyprus as tbe mdawful Coverament of a Nations. I do a& tbink I should tbe faot that the Security Counoil has accepted my s table is enough of a reply t0 MS insults are in fact insults to the 135. when dealing witb tbe situation witb regard to Lefka, the representative of Turhey made tbe remark that it was unforhmate that 1 gxa my report at the time wben the Addendum to tbe report of the Secretary- General was in the prooess of being circulated sud to bis judgement, rt. And as a conond part of paraof tbe Secretary- 8/Add.l. Andwhat tween Lefka andtbesevillages lled by UNFICYP under the cesse-fire agreement. and it was understood tbat no military activity should tahe place and no fortiied positions be establisbed tbere.W did 1 say? K ssid tbat the Covernment forces were obliged to move in in order to stop tbe militaiy activities whioh bave been carried out by me lu%i5h terrorists in tbat very area. 137. The representative of Turkey said that I mentianed same cases, using imaginary nsmes. I wonder st haw quickly his information services wark wben, anly a few minutes sfter 1 have put sll those cases ta yau. he autamaticslly discavers that I used imaginsry names. But he shauld have naticed fram thst list that ane of the nsmes 1 used was the name of the Director- General of the Ministry of Labour sndSocislInsurance of Cyprus wham, 1 sm sure, he has hesrd of befare. This one exists, and 1 csn assure him tbat sll these peaple exist except thase wha have been murdered. I cari assure him again that there are quite a number of Turks in Cyprus wha would like ta tslk to b.im if they had tbe apportunity ta do sa. 138. IIe tben went an to say tlmt the econamic restrictions are still being enfarced by the Gavernment of Cyprus. There is nathing further fram thQ trnth. There are na ecanamic restrictions of sny sort. Tbere are restrictions an wsr materisls or goods tbat may be used for militsry purpases, tbat is true; but there are na atlaer restrictions. In thls respect he tried to cite as an exsmple the very thing thst he should nat bnve cited. IIe said thst we are trying ta creste obstacles for the Red Crescent supplies sent ta Cyprus in sn attempt ta prave his point that ecanamic restrictions are still in farce. 139. As tbe Secretsry-Genersl is quite well aware, tbe Gavermnent of Gyprus has sllawed a great number of imparts of this nature, of Red Crescent supplies, withaut any restrictions and free of sny importduties. In fact. the Red Cross lias expressed its appreciatian ta the Government of Cyprus for its magnsnimity. 140. There is the case of a psrticulsr Red Crescent shipment. Our Government stated befare this present case srase that that practice cauld nat &o an because we could nat allow tbe Gyprus market to be dlsplsced by the Red Crescent. We cauld sllow certain things ta came in, but certain ather things wauld nat be sRawed and duty wauld be chsrged an same of tbem. Tbe Searetsry-General states in his reportwbenhespeaks of the appesl made by his Specisl Representative: “Tbe Specisl Representative, altbaugh ftdly appreciatingthe reasans which had guided the Gavermnentaf Cyprus in its decisian an the matter . . .n 15/6228, para. 1651. 141. As far as the new case which has came up naw is cancerned, the case of Ambelikau, the Turkisb 142. Tbe Turkisb representative said tbat tbe President of Cyprus spoke of the neutralisation of the Tu&s of Cyprus; tien he went on to quote also an alleged statement made by General Grivas that sll tbe Tu&s wonld be massacred. I really do not believe tbat he eU believes tlaat su& tbings bave been stated. the President of Cypms said was that in case of a Turkish attack of Cyprus, in caseof a bombing of Cypms, in caseof aninvasionof Cypnis, tbe pookets of ion and the pockets of tbe subversion and rorists wouId be neutralized. Ne didnot say the of Cyprus would be neutralised. 143. The representative of Turkey was very keen to put across the idea to tbe Council tbat disermament in th@? ligbt of the fact that Turkey continues with tbreats against Cyprus. It is a very peculiar wish that he expects the Government of Cyprus tofulfilfor him. 144. Tben he said tbat our view concerning the marime United Nations Force in Cyprus amounts he described as an attempt onour part to take with US tbe United Nations in an effort to victimise tbe TuAs in Cyprus. It is exactly tbe contrary wbicb we 145. Wben speaklng for a second time in relation to the resolution of 4 March 1964, the representative of Turkey tried tc put across the idea that, according t,c that resolution, it is simply that two communities bave been accepted as being in existence incyprus and that the Gcvernment are the rebels. If he reads the resolutien careiùlly, 1 thinkhe will see clearly that accordlng t0 that resolution the Government of Cyprus-and at chat time the Gcvernment of Cyprus was tire Government of Cyprus which is today the same Govermnent which was accepted by the Security Council at that time andis belng acceptedtoday-was recognizedunder that resolution as mainly responsible for the restoration of law and order. 146. The Turklsh representative tried to give a picture of Turks in Cyprus being surrounded almost everywhere by Greeks. That is the reason there is an anomaly, and this is the reason there 1s tension, according to bis vlews. Wby is there no tension in districts like the district of Limai-01 where there are Greeks and Turks living together in dlfferent parts? 1s the Government anywhere in positions, faclng tbe Turks, where the Turks have not themselves shut up themselves in self-isolated areas for the purpose of pursuing the policy of division? The only points where there is tension and where there is the possibility of strife are the areas where the Turks are enclaved ln smaI1 pockets of subversion, enclaved andlmprisoned by their own leaders for the sake of the Turkish policy. On many occasions 1 have stated that the majority of the Turkish population of Cyprus are the unfortunate pawns in a wider game. This is the reality of the situation. 147. Lastly, the representative of Turkey stated emphatically before thls Council: “We shall never accept for the question of Cyprus any solution which it is attempted to impose by force in violation of the Charter and in utter disregard of the resolution 186 (1964) of the Security CounclLR The one who bas been trying to impose solutions upon Cyprus is Turkey, through subversion and through threats. It would have been helpful if the Turkish representatlve could bave corne out in this CounciI and declared before you tbat Turkey absndoned the idea of partition, that Turkey abandoned the idea of federation, that Turkey abandoned the idea of imposing upon Cyprus solutions and that Turkey was prepared to accept the verdict of the vast majority of the people Of Cyprus on what the future of Cyprus abould be. 148. Finally, as far as the securily Of the Turks is concerned, 1 cari only repeat what 1 have often stated. Our Government has pledged itself before this Council and before the General Assembly to continue taking measures for the full respect of human rigbts for every single Citizen of Cyprus, irrespective of etlmic origin, colour, creed or religion. We should like t0 see a11 citizens equal. We camiot accept tbe idea chat some are privlleged and some are net. AU PecPle Of The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m. NOW TO QBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications moy be obtuined distribueors thrcughout the wcrld. writc to: United Nations, Sales CO ENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS Les publications des Nations Unies sont agences dépositaires du monde entier. ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, Section COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES LOS publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas casas distribuidoras en todas partes diriiase a: Naciones Unidas, Secci6n Litho in U.N. Ptice: $LU 0.50 (or equivalenc