S/PV.1194 Security Council

Another pleasant duty which 1 know you a11 would like me to fulfil is to express to Ambassador Seydoux how pleased we a11 feel at seeing him back wlth us assuming his duties in the best of health and with the notable distinction for which he is known. 4. Mr, SEWOUX (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, 1 am deeply touched by the very kind and friendly words whlch you bave just spoken about me. 1 oan assure you that the tokens of friendshlp that 1 have received from you and from several of my colleagues durlng my enforced absence from tbe United Nations have greatly contributed to my recovery, whlch 1s yet another roason for expressing my gratitude to you publioly. Adoption of the agenda

Turulng now to our business, the provisional agenda for this morning’s meeting is before the Securi& Council in document S/Agenda/ 1194/Rev.l. If 1 hear no objection, 1 shall consider it adopted. 6. Lord CARADON (Utdted Kingdom): Mr. President, 1 wlsh at this stage to enter a general reservation about the competence of tbls Council to dlscuss the question of Rhodesia on the basis of the material contained in the letter addressed tn you by the representatives of tbirty-five African States. and reproduced in document S/6294 and Add.1. The grounds for tbls reservation bave been stated before in this Council by the United Klngdom representative, and 1 shall not go into them again at thls stage. 1 clearly restate and reaffirm that reservation now. but, while maintaining in full the position of my Covernment in this regard. 1 shall not contest the adoption of the agenda on the understandiug that the terms of the reservation which I have pst made Will be duly recorded.

Tke position of the representative of the United Kingdom shall be stated in the records. The agenda was adopted. Question concerning ,he situation in Southern Rhodesia: letiers doted 2 and 30 August 1963 addressed to the President of the Security Council on behalf of the representalives of thirty-two Member Stales (S/5382 and S/5409): Latter dated 21 April 1965 oddressad to the President of the Security Council from the representatives of Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Cenh-a1 African Republic, Ch& Congo (Brozzoville), Dahomey, Democratic Repubfic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guineo, Ivory Coost, Kenya. Liberia, Libyo, Modagascar,Malawi,Mali,Mauritonio, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwonda, Senegal, Sierra Lecna, Somalis, Sudan, Togo, Tunkia, Ugondo, Unit& Arob Republic, United Republie of

1 bave received requests from Senegal [S/6297] and A@ria [S/6304] that thelr representatives be invited to participate without vote in the Council’s consideration of the question just placed on the agenda. If there is no objection. 1 propose to invite the representatives of Algeria and Senegal to participate in our discussion of this question. At the invitation of tbe President. Mr. Lbudou TZ&m (Sertegal) md Mr. Eouteflika (Alger+ tooZc places at the Council table.

This meeting bas beenconvened in response to a request made on 21April 1965 by tbe representatives of thlrty-five Member States from Africa that the Council examine the situation in Southern Rhodesia. 19. I should llhe to recall that the Security Council considered the matter previously at six meetings held in September 1963.y Slnce tbat time the Council bas received resolutions and reports on the questionfrom the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declsration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The Special Committee’s most recent resolution. adopted on 22 April 1965, was transmitted by its Chalrman to the Council and appears in doçument S/6300. 11. The first speaker on my llst for thls meeting is the Mlnister for Fore@ Affalrs of Senegal. 12. Mr. Doudou THIAM (Senegal) (translated from French): 1 should llhe first to thank all the members of the Security Council for allowing Senegal to participate in the Counoil’s debates. 1 am spesklng on behalf of my country. but 1 am also speaking on behalf of a11 the States members of the Organisation of African Unlty. At tbe Conference held in July 1964 at Caire. the Heads of State or Government of the Organisation of African Unlty appointed Algeria snd Senegal to bring the question of Southern Rhodesia before the Security Council. Thls. of course, is net the first time that this matter bas been raised in the Security Council. as you bave just been reminded. But now there is a new and clearly important fact: the mandate glven to our hvo countries by the Organlzatien of African Unity to brlng thls matbr before the SeCurity Council in the name and on behalf cf that Organization as a whole. In tsking tb.is course, the Organization of AfricanUnitywantedto stressAfrlca% unanimlty in the face of the graveproblemof Southern Rhodesia. 13. The situation in Southern Rhodesia indisputably constitutes a threat to internationalpeace and security. It thereforeindlsputablyconcerns theSeourityCounci1, and although at the present time 1 do net wish to dlscuss 15. 1 &now that the United Kingdom would bave preferred A@ria and Senegal to use a different procedure; it would have preferredus just to send a letter to the President of the Security Councilinforminghim of our concern. But we have been glven a mandate by Africa to bring this question before the Security Council and we shall net fail in our duty. We refuse to fold our arms and stand by naively until it is too late to turn the tide and we are presented with an accomplished faot tbrough a unilateral declaration of independence by the Government of Mr. Ian Smith. His statement of 31 March 1965 [see A/AC.109/L.137, annex 1. appendix IV] is snough in itself to show that the Rhodesian Government’s objective is to obtain a comfortable majority in the elections set for ‘l May SO that it cari then proclaim independence. 16. The statements by the rulers of Rhodesia and their actions since Mr. Smith came to power in Aprill964 prove that Southern Rhodesia is followinga dangerous course towards a situation that cannot be reversed. 17. That 1s why we cannot and must net wait any longer. Indeed, we have already waited too long. The 2/ Ibid.. Eighteenth Year. Supplement for July, August and September 1963. document S/5425/~ev.l. 18. Today we would like to bave assurances from the United Kingdom and a clarification of its attttude. because the time bas corne to put an end to equivccatlon. 19. 1 myself bad the feeling at one point that the Unlted Kingdom bad decided tc adopt a clear-sighted policy. when 1 stated on 25 September 1963 in the general debate at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly: “. . . For in tbis part of Africa. where favourable climatic conditions bave made possible a bigh rate of European settlement, there is a danger of seeing other non-self-gcverning territcries go the same way as South Africa. “1” that connexion we must give special attention to Southern Rhodesia and we should llke the administertng Power to ponder the example of Algeria. TO allow less than 300.000 Europeans to govern more than 3 million Africans. whatever the prccedural tricks employed-such as establlshlng aconstitution endowing the territory wlth a purely forma1 selfgovernment wbich does net. in any case, meet the criteria set out in the Charter of theunited Nations, and the refusal to introduce universal.suffrage-to allow such a situation to arise in Rhodesia is neither courageous nor realistic. France accepted its responsibillties in A@ria by restoring peace there in dlfficult. and it must be admitted, meritorious conditions, particularly by overcoming forcibly the opposition of the settlers to that oountry’s independence. We believe tbat any attempt to apply a different policy in Southern Rhodesia could only increase the instability in that part of Afrlca and in the end undermlne Africa’s gcod relations wlth the West. We hope that tbe Unlted Kingdom. a great Power full of common sense and realism, will understand that it is not tc its lnterest to withdraw from that part of Africa on tiptoe. leavlng bebind a situation damaging to its world reputalion wlthout even deriving the advantage of acquitting itself of the direct and indirect responsibilities whlch it still has in that part of the continent.“?/ 20. Tbat is what 1 said in September 1963 to the United Nations General Assembly. I tbink the languag 1 used was reasonable and realistic, but the Unit& Kingdom was unabb or unwilling to appreciate it a1 “The members of the Sub-Committee had been disagreeably surprised by the fact that during the London talks the United Kingdom Ministers had shown constant concern for the possible reactions of the white settlers if an attempt were made to implement United Nations resolutions. whereas they were not in the laast conoerned about the Possible reaction of the 3 million Africans in Southern Rhodesia if they oontinued to be denied the most elementary rights.‘Y 21. Accordingly, you willunderstandthatourpatience is beginning to wear thtn. We can wait no longer. Besides, the examples of the past have given us a clear enough lesson. 22. A so-oalled “self-government’ is granted to a handful of settlers and then we are told that the provisions 6f C%apter XI of the Charter are not applicable to Southern Rhodesia because it is a “self-governing” colony. A constitution is grantedto that same minority. enabling it to oppress and dominate the majority of the population of that country, in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions condemning the 1961 Constitution, and then we are told that the administering Power cari no longer convene a constitutional conference and that the Africans should have accepted the 1961 Constitution which would have enabled them to influence political life in Rhodesia. That is what we are told. But how, in a House of sixty-five members. could fifteen members-even supposing that those fifteen members reaRy represented the African population-how do you expect that those fifteen members oould manage to bave any legislation adopted? This is indeed pure hypocrisy. 23. The minority of settlers has been given the power to legislate and to decide the destiny of the African majority, specifioally by adopting racist and repressive legislation such as the Land Apportionment Act, then in August 1964, by banning the two main African parties, byarbitrarilydetainingthe nationalist leaders contrary to the opinion of the Supreme Court at Bulawayo, and lastly. by muzsling the press, Particularly the Daily News. whioh was the newspaper 24. After the Labour Government came to power in tbe United K:@$orn we saw a glimmer of hope. particularly when wa remembered the policy statements and declarations of Mr. Wilson’s Shadow Cabinet. Unforhmately. experience teaches us that promises or statements made by a party in opposition are not always translated into reality wben that party cornez to power. The statement of 27 October 1964, which we coasidered a strong one at the time.did not induce ebe settlers to abandon their intention of proclaiming independence unilaterally. On the contrary, tb.eUnited Kin m Press shows the suppcrb Mr. Smith is re- Par to havs reoeived from abroad. The New Statesman of 12 February 1965 wrote: Ve [ME. Smith] has been advised by Afrikaaner Lawyers of Pretoria University that the Southern Bbodesiaa parliament cari pull the countq into legitimate independence by its own Iegislative motstraps, and he intenas to try it. The British Government could and would fight it in the High Court, the Lords aad tbe Privy Counoil, but in the lengtby interim a de facto independence would have struck rod.” And we read in the Manchester Guanüan Weaklyof 8 April 1965: “Tbey [most white Rbodesiana] believe that.wbatever Mr. Harold Wilson may bave said in Octohsr, when it cornes to the point the British Will never do anytbing nasty to them. Even if they were to take their independence. they tend to tbink, Britainwould not go SO fax as banning tobacco sales-and any military action against tbem is, in their eyes, almost inconceivable.n 25. But it is net only thePress. Mrs. Barbara Ca&le. the United Kingdom Minister for Overseas Development, stated on 22 April. upon ber arriva1 at Dar es Salaam: ‘The United Kingdom would meet with a setback if it trisd to use force to settle the Bhodesian question.w 26. Yau see, thorefore. that we have reason to bs concernsd: articles in the Press. particularly the Unitad Kingdom Press, and statemants by political leaders are evidenoe that t&e Government of Mr. Smith is resolvsd to proolaim independence and i6 not afraid Ire United Kingdom Government Will prevent its SO. It is not only Mr. Smith% statsments but s. too, tbat show that this is SO. 27. In December 1964 Mr. Smith stated tbat Southern Rhodesia and Portugal had reacked complete agreement on a commercial treaty. On 24 February 1965 ed for a period of five years. On 30 Eiovember 1964 a new trade agreement was concluded batween Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and will remain in force until 31 December 1969. ly serioris llature. statement by the Unit. Ki statement by the Unit. Ki oister tister cm 27 October 1964. and desp 01% 27 O~t&er 1964. and desp Sewrity Cou&l% duty to face the Sewrity Cou&l% duty to face the s vested in it by tbe Charter. We think s vested in it by tbe Charter. We think bas bas corne corne for tk Security Council to for tk Security Council to nsibilities under tbe charter. nsibilities under tbe charter. General Assembly, md to shaw tbat it CP.I General AssembIy, md to shaw tbat it CP.I At atl events. At atl events. we bave corne we bave corne re to ask t CQuncil. on States. to undertake ake its respo its resnonsibtlities. of a11 tbe African ties. 31. In a broadoast statement in 25 Juoe 1964. Mr. 31. In a broadoast statement in 25 Juoe 1964. A&?. Smith said: Smith said: ‘0ur first ta& is to reoognize the real st ta& is to reoognize the real enemy,n At enemy,n At bead Qf tbe Bst of enemies he plaoed Qf tbe Bst of enemies he plaoed tbe commuaists. followed by tbe Afro-Asian nations tbe commuaists. followed by tbe Afro-Asian nations at be calls tbe Pan-African “And”, be added, “6 Ste Ssim Of e cateries is to create tbe impression that an explosive situation exists in Sou& Africa.” 32. However, we bave m need to make an effort to create that impressfon. Tbe whole world kn~ws that tbe situation in Soutb Africa is explosive and tbat the African countries as a wbole. iuaving de two countries to lay the matter before t Counofl, Pntend to assume their responsibilities wben tbe. moment cornes. 33. bat statement by Mr. Smith on the problema of ind ndence. which bas been widely discussed both iris aad outside thecountrJr.al>artfmmcrystallizing the dffferences of opinion between the Bhodesian FrQnt the National Bbodesian Party brougbt an immediate reaction from certain people su& as Mr. Todd, the former Prime Minister, On 30 June 1964 he stated at Bnlawayo, before the National A%irs Assooiatioo: “We live in Africa and Africa is black. If we want to see everytbing from a European point of view, tben we shauld go to Europe. Let us not impose our o Afriüa. Those of us who wish to remain in Afrioa cao do SQ, but no longer in accordance with our owo ideas.” 34. Tbat is realistic language which might havs formed tbe basis for a compromise if it had been heard and understood by the majority of the settlers and of tbose who support them. But to treat a11 tire African countries and tbe communist countries as enemies is certainly not the way to salve the probltm. 36. It is because the United Nations embodies forus, the Young countries. an ideal of justice and peace that we have corne before it to ask it to take the steps that are urgently required. 37. ln adopting resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, the United Nations embarked on the course of liberating the still dependent peoples. There is no need to recall that in resolutions 1747 (XVI), 1760 (XVII), 1883 (XVIII) and 1889 (XVlII) the General Assembly. conscious of the grave nature of the situation in Southern Rhodesia, requested the administering Power of that Territory to take a number of steps to restore security within the country. It is therefore high time for Her Majesty’s Government to show, through specific action, that it is determined to frustrate the plans of Mr. Smith% Government and to act in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. 38. In his statement on 27 October 1964, to which 1 have already referred, Mr. Wilson spoke of an economic and diplomatie boycott and the severance of all relations with the Crown and the Commonwealth in the event of a rinilateral declaration of independence on the part of the Southern Rhodesian Government. 1 wonder. however, if th.at is net just what the Government of Southern Rhodesia wants. After a unilateral declaration of independence. whichwouldbe tantamount to an act of secession, that Government could net hope to remain in the Commonwealth group of nations; consequently, to threcten it simply with separation from the British Crown is to offer it precisely what it already desires. As for economic measures. We are bound to say that, for our part, we do net think Mat they are really effective. We have already had good examples of economic sanctions which have been taken against certain countries. but how effective have tbey been? When an eoonomic measure is decided upon, are we really sure that it is applied by every one of the States Members of the United Nations? We are indeed absolutely sure that the contrary 1s tbe case. We do not think that mere tbreats. which are still verbal Ihreats uttered by the Government of Mr. Wilson, oan do anything to rectify the Situation. what we expect of the United Kingdom is that it should propose speeific measures and positive action in advance of any unilateral declaration of independence. As far as we areconcerned, theaposteriori measures that are threatened cannot satisfy us and we should not llke the United Kingdom to be credited one day with having been the accomplice of the GOVernment of Southern Rhodesia. BI%S~ 6Fown mm& taday take refuge alibi of non-inte wuld be tc recogof accession for a colony wbicb does 1 tbe conditions for normal accession to General de Gaulle brought to naugbt all the attempts at secession on the part of tb.e settlers. Tbat is an tbe adminisin the interest f settlers who tbe admloistering Power. 41. A number of urgent measures are tberefore imperative. and tbey are set forth in tbe draft resolutlon drawn up by tbe Speclal Committee [S/6300]. 1 sw14mere1y wcall them. 42, First. tbe eleotions called for 7 May sbouldbe cancelled, or. to ba more exact, tbese eleotions should be prevented from tahing place, for they are based on tbe I%I Constitution, wbich 1s raoist. dlscriminatory ami fowded on property qualifications and has been rejected by tbe Fepresentatives of the African majority. As we bave said. tbe alm of Mr. Smith% Government is to ensnre a majority for hlmselfin the Rbodesian Leglslatlve Assembly wblch would approve bis declaration of independence. 43. Secondly, it is essential that a11 arbitrarily arrested persons should be released. This. moreover, w H only be confirmlng tbe opinion of the Bulawayo Court. wbich considered tbat tbe detentions and residence restrictions imposed under tbe Law and Order (Maintenance) Aot were arbitrary. 1 need not remind you tbat on 16 February 1965 the Rev. N. Sitbole, appealing before the High Court. obtained an ammlment Of tbe sentence imposed on bim in 1964 for publisldng a pamphlet but tbat be is still servlng a sentence of twelve montbs’ imprisonment whloh was lmposed on bim in Blay 1964. Iff. tberefore, conditions for gennine independence are to be created for Rbodesia, it is imperative that a11 tbe discriminatory laws whlch have unfortunately been promulgated 45. We ask the Unlted Kingdom to suspend the 1961 Constitution immediately; it Will not bs the first time it has suspended a constitution, as is shown by many examples. 46. It is after a11 these steps have been taken and when security has been restored in Rhodesia that the United Kingdom Will be able to negotiate independence -as 1 have said-with a government fully representative of the whole of Rhodesia. 47. We are here to extend the hand of brotherhood and friendshlp to the United Kiugdom, SO that it may understand that the Rhodesian problem is of the most profound ooncern to us Africans. We think that it understands that it bears primary responsibility before hlstory and that it bas not yet forgotten the consequences of its conduct in South Africa in 1910. We hope that it Will not disappoint the African countries for whom we speak and where it still has many friends. It is nevertheless curlous that in 1961 the United Kingdom embarked on the prooess which is meant to become irreversible. .Ayearearller,in1960. several African countries gained national independence. We do net see why Southern Rhodesia should be an exception. A dlfferent procedure was resorted to in that case. for the simple reason that there is a settler minority and that the country borders on South Africa; we know perfectly well that what is in preparation is the creation of a situation in Rhodesia similar to that in South Africa. The Ccuncil understands perfectly well that such a situation is danprous for Afrioa. is likely to threaten peace in that part of our continent and may. in short, be fraugbt wlth great danger for world peace. 46. It is really an appeal that we are msklng to the United Kingdom to understand the danger of this situation, in the face of which it is impossible for the Africans to remain inactive: in SO far as any attempt to create an irreversible situation in Southern Rhodesia is made. 1 cari assure the Cou&l that the Africans Will be unanimous in their vigorous. firm and determined stand to prevent the WorSt. In spite of everylhlng. 1 tblnk that the statements made by Mr. Wilson will be followed by actions and that we leave it to my colleague froc A@ria to supplement my statement and Z naturally reserve tbe right to reply. if neoessary. after the United Kingdom representative bas spoken.

I now invite tbe Minister for Foreiga Affairs of A&ria to take tbe flcor.

Mr. hesident. may I first associate myself with my mm2 eloqueut collea and friend. tbe Minister for Fore@ Affairs of Senegal, and thank you and aH the members of the Seourity Council for having acceded SO promptly to tbe request submftted by tbe African group. Tbe duty of bringing the grave prcblem of S’outbern Rbcdesia before tbfs bigh Council was asslgned to Senegal and A&?ria in pursuance of a decision of tbe Org+zation of African Unity, taken at tbe meeting of African Heads of State or Gk?rnment at Cairo in July 1964 and reaffirmed by the Counoil of Ministers during the February/March 1965 session hefd at Nairobi. 62. It is not the first time tbat thisproblem has been submitted to tbe Security Council. In September 1963 tbe attention of tbis distinguisbed body was drawn to the tense situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesis, where a mfnorfty of white settlers was holding sway over the African population and subjecting it to the loathsome practioes of racial segregation and tbe inhuman barassmeuts of a r&$me of brutal terrer. Since 1962 the General Assembly of theUnitedNations has reguiarly discussed this question and bas passed a number of resolutions designed to save the indigenous people frcm the tyranny of a minority Government. A sub-committeewas evenestablishedto discuss m Government the implementation of tbe resolutions and tc try to arrive at a solution in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter. 53. By thus attaching suoh importance tc the develcpment of tbe situation in Southern Rhodesia, the General Assembly and tbe Security Council confirmed the gravity of the problem and recognised the danger it represented for equilibrium and stability in Africa and for the maintenance of peace in the world. Acting on behalf of a11 the African States. we bring thîs matter before the Security Council again because the situation is deteriorating ever faster and may, in the very near future. result in tbe creation of circumstances whose consequenoes Will be tragio. That threat booms large today. and it is our duty to alert the highest international authorities before irreparable harm is done and violence with unforeseeable repertussions. erupts. Responsibilities must be clearly 54. The Government of Mr. Ian Smith, which in fact represents only the interests of the European settler minority, has never concealed its desire to escape, once and for all, from United Kingdom control and to secure a form of independence which would leave the country entirely under the domination of some 225.000 Whites. It is against this repugnant and unacceptable demand, which ignores the legitimate rights of 4 million Africans, that the vigorous protests Of the African countries have been raised. We shall never agree to Rhodesia becoming a second South Africa, where the odious régime of apartheidcontinues in open defiance of international disapproval. 55. Faced with the uncompromising attitude of the African leaders, the United Kingdom declared its opposition to anyunilateraldeclaratiooof independe.xe by Rhodesia; and it threatened recourse to particularly severe sanctions should the Government of Mr. Ian Smith, disregarding that opposition. implement its criminal plan. Did that suffice tc mske the Salisbury Government change its mind and see reason? Not in the least. The United Kingdom’s attitude was no more effective than the recommendations of the United Nations and the warnings of the Organisation of African Unity in overcoming Mr. Ian Smith% obstiiaoy. and his audacity was soon to break a11 bounds. After a visit to South Africa in July 1964 and to Portugal in September 1964, lie decided to force the paoe of events: he dissolved the Rhodesian Parliament at the end of March 1965 and named 7 May as the date for the holding of new elections whicb, in his view, shauld enable the Constitution to be amended and independence to be unilaterally proclaimed. 56. During this frantio excitement on the part of the representatives of the fore@ minority, what is the position of the African inhabitants whose fate is being decided without consultation with them and against their interests? Subjected to a battery of discriminatory laws, deprived of the most elementaryfreedoms. shackled with the most degrading obligations and delivered over to arbitrary police action, they are to a11 intents and purposes muesled and are systematically deprived of any responsibility in thecountry’s affairs. The Native Affairs Act restricts movement by the indigenous people, who are required ho carry a pas& and leaves the authorities entirely free to proceed to the arbitrary arrest of any African charpd, on consistently false grounds. with criticising the 57. Wken tke National Democratic Party (NDP) was estakllsksd in January 1960, it set itself tke airs of . tke sovereignty of the people of Soutkern and called for tke immediate convening of conference wlth a vlew to transfer 0f power to tke majority. Tkat w-as tke startiig-point for tb.e powerful agitation wkick, on 10 Detiember 1961, compelled tke Government of Sir Edgar Whitehead to ban NDP. Nevertkeless, tke struggle continued and. a week later. Joskua Nkom~ founded the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU). wkich was to carry Qn the work of NDP. On 10 September 1962, tke new party was banned in its turn and most of its leaders were imprisoned. Al1 tkese repressive measures dld not prevent tke people from conrageously demonstrating tkeir opposition to tke Constitution. since out of ~O*OOO Africans OP. tke rolls only 1,5OO-andI quote tke officiai figures-to0k part in tke elections of 14 December 1962. The minority Government at Salisbury tken began to intensify its policy of repression aad to employ tke most brutal metkods in order to break tke izddipnQUS people’s resistance-mass arrests. smamaxy executions. persecution. and tke creation of an atmospkere of terror. Nkomo was driven underground. In hole formed a new party nalUnion (ZANU)-which sougkt by agreeing to negotiate with tke settlers, to eason. The new party was no more its predecessors. andtheRev. Sithole, in kis turn. was arrested togetker witk several of hls e present time over 10.0130 nationalists in tke concentration camps of Wha as and Sengwe; twenty-tkree patriots Limier sentence of deatk are awaitmg execution at any moment; and tke terroriaed African population 1s deprived of all legal means of mahing its voice heard and asserting its rights. It is in thls atmospkere of tension and police QppreSSiQn tkat the Government of Mr. Ian Smith proposes to hold new elections and declare tke country’s independence. 59. IIe does net intend to break the ohains of an enslaved people and to invest it with the responsibilities of free men; he does not propose to enable a people freely to choose its own destlny, or to restore to lt the power of reaping the benefirs of its wealth and of attaining to a better and worthler llfe. The independence demandecl by the Salisbury Government means full freedom for the white minority. whlch it represents, to exploit the African inhabitants, hold them at its meroy aud use them as a docile and cheap source of labour. It means resounding confirmation of the privlleges of the settlers. who Will thereafter be masters of the oountry and its resources. building their prosperity upon the misery of the millions of indigenous inhabitants. Such is the paradise promised hy Mr. Ian Smith to hls white compatriots. and the hell which he ‘is preparing for the African population. 60. But the time bas gone hy when peoples could be robbed with impunity of their freedom and their wealth. In hls oalculations. Mr. Ian Smith bas not reckoned with the reawakenlng’ of the peoples. wlth the new developments in the Afrioan continent or wlth the reactions of international opinion. It would be futile to thlnk that the people of Southern Rhodesia Will resign themselves to accepting their lot and that. bowing to force, they Will renounce their rights and submit in perpetulty to domination by a minority of exploiters. The merciless repression to which they are subjected has not suoceeded in crushing their determlnation to be free. Their fierce and desperate struggle Will continue: it Will spread throughout the country, Will knot together ever greater sectors of tac population. Will assume the most terrible forms. and Will not oease until it has made an end of tyranny and exploitation. 61. The people of Southern Rhodesia Will not be fightlng in isolation. The whole of Africa Will rise up heside them and join in the struggle-whlch is that of Africa. since it is the struggle for the freedom and dignity of ail Afrioans. The Organisation of African Unity Will spare no effort to assist and support the action of the Southern Rhodssian patriots against a r6gime of racial segregation and colonial domination. That is why it today addresses an appeal to the Security Counoil, SO as to draw the attention of this high international authority once more to the tragedy which is in the making in Southern Rhodesia and to urge that everything possible be done to avoid irreparable developments. It is time to stop the eruption of hatred: it is time to prevent violence and to preserve peace. We hope that tbls cry of alarm Will ail rigbts d the non-European population. and to grant amnesty to ail pditical prisoners. 63. In G%ober 1962, during its seventeenth session, tbe General Assembly adopted resolution 1755 (XV@, in wbich it urged tbe Government of tbe United Kingdom of Great Britain and Nortbern Ireland to refease Joshua Nhomo and ail Other imprisoned nationalist leaders and to Rft tbe km on ZAPU. In ils resolution affirmed tbe previous resolutions Lementation. and noted with inistering Power bad not yet taken steps to carry out tbe request contained in resohktioQ 1741 ( At its eighteenth session, in resolution 1883 (X it invited tbe United Kingdcm Government not to transfer to its colony of Soutbern &OdeSia. as tben governed. any Of the powers or attrihutes of sovereignty, in particular control of the armed forces and aircraft. In resolution 1889 (KVIIB. tbe General Assembly reaffirmed the inalienabie right of tbe people of Soutbern Rhodesia to selfdetermimation, and expressed deep regret that the Government of the Wnited Kingdom had not implemented the various resoiutions on Southern Rbodesia; it calLd on tbat Government net to accede to tbe request of the present minority of Southern Rhodesia for independence until majority rule based on universa1 suffrage was established in tbe territory; and it once more invited the Government of the United Kingdom to hold without delay a conaiitutional conference in wbich representatives of a11 p0litica.I parties of tbe territory would take part with a view to mahing constitutional arrangements for independence, on tbe basis of universslsuffrage,including tbe fixing of the earliest possible date for independence. That was in November 1964. 64. There cari be no doubt that in adopting these various resolutions, the General Assembly and the Security Council were fully aware of t I ,vavity of the situation in Southern Rhodesia. But we tiz forced to recogniae that the United Kingdom has not given their wpeated appeals the consideration they csserve. 65. It has been explained to us that the granting of the 1923 Constitution by letters patent of Ris Britannio Majesty implied that the United Kingdom Government was surrendering some of its prerogatives to the Salisbury authorities. Iiowever. it would doubtless be worth wbile to recall that the Parliament at Westminister reserved the right to legislate on ali questions affecting the status of African nationals. 67. African and international opinion was net alone in opposing such measures. A broad range of political opinion voiced its disapproval in the United Kingdom. Thus, a number of Members of Parliament rejected the arguments in faveur of theConstih#tionputforward by the Secretary of StateforCommonwealthRelations. 68. The firm stand by the opposition kept alive the hop6 of a new and falr reappraisal. We were made optimistic by statements reflecting a common viewpoint wlth the movement to independence and justice in the world: “The Africans. therefore, cannot be expscted eo accept this new Constitution as satisfaotorybecause they bave no effective means of ohanging it. We cannot ask them. while the wind of change blows furiously down through Africa. to wait for the sweet by and by. Everywhere else they see rapid advance. They see everywhere else that it is possible . . . for white men and Africans to accept as their best safeguard the good Will of the majority. Theycannot understand-1 do net blame them; Idonotunderstand why this proved experiment cannot be tried in Southern Rhodesia.“6/ That was in a speech made on 8 November 1961 by a member of the House of Gommons. 69. 1 now quote from a statement by Mr. Harold Wilson of 23 March 1963: “We bave stated that any Constilution which does net grant the inhabitants of the Territory control over their own destiny is untenable. That is why we bitterly attacked the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia and why a Labour Government would consequently abrogate it. We bave made that quite clear. But we could go further. When these questions are debated at the United Nations. we sballnot associate ourselves with those who support the imperialist powers, whlch bave been somcwbat discredited.” ~~u’liamentaxy D&ates (Hansard), House of Cammons. Officia1 B Fifth Serfes, vol. 618, col. 110% Session 1961-62. Lyndon. H.M. stertonery QffIce. sia coin kecome a sovereign ts would Wcewise be s ~~rn~Qt. sQUtk&rn HP esia’s extesnal tr ndence in Soutbem Rhode& wwld bring d relationskips between her and Britain. wauld tut her ofàfr~mtherestdtl Commonweaith, Gover~ments and from mterns, would inflict disastrouseccker, zmd would leave ker iso- Med and virtually frlendless in a Iargely hostile contient.” [Sec A/AC.109/L.l87, annex 1. appendix 1.j 71. Cur optimism was turning into confidence, as evidenced by the attitude of tke Africac States. Unfortunately, tke events which were to follow forced us to take a more realistic view. In thls connexion, it wculd be worth wkile to analyse tke correspondence between Mr. Smith and Mr. Harold Wilson. It shows how often Mr. Smith% demands were repeated an.d kow tb United Kingdom Government howed to the Will of the minority. In tkis regard. Mr. Bottomley’s and Lord Gardiner’s jaurney to Soutkern Rkodesia merits cur particular attention. 72. Speaking on 28 C&her 1964 before the Special Committee on tke Situation with regard to tke Implementaticn of tke Declaration on the Granting of Icdependence to Colonial Ccuntries and Peoples [295th meeting], tke United Kingdom representative stated tkat the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations had been intending to go to Southern Rhodesia 73. An examination of the results of that visit brings OUt the passive attitude of the Labour Government. Mr. Bottomley clearly indicated that the United Kingdom was net prepared to use the necessary means. which the law has placed at its disposai, to prevent irreparable harm and to attain the objectives which he himself had proclaimed: “Does the . . . statement mean that Her Majesty’s Government have now dropped their previous idea of calling a constitutional conference of a11 races in order to modify the 1961 Constitution? Can ws draw from that the inference tbat Her Majesty’s Government Will support the 1961 Constitution . ..3”-/ That question is not put by me; it was asked by a Conservative member in the House of Commons on 8 March 1965. Mr. Smith, for bis part. felt that the most important result of that mission was that the African nationalists must now understand that their demands would not be met. Tbis enabled the process to take place whereby the white minority has established a r5gime based on racial supremaoy. 74, The dissolution of the Rhodesian Parliament. decided upon following Mr. Wilson’6 message of 30 March 1965, and the cahing of elections for 7 May. marked the last phase of a process whichmust necessarily end in a declaration of independence in the present constitutional framework. Mr. Smithremoved any doubts in stating categorically on 31 March 1965: “Rhodesia’s destiny demands decisive and urgent measures to be taken for the protection of a11 the ideals of Western civilisation. . . . 1 am therffore calling an election asking Ïor and hoping for a twothtrds majority in Parliament. whichwiflstrengthen our hand, not only for the passing of important parliamentary legislation, but also in our negotiations for independence withtheBriti6hGovernment.v [Sec A/AC.109/L.187.annexI.appendixIV.para.11.] 75. Iiere is what is meant by the passing of important legislation, made possible because of the two-thirds majority which has been virtuallyensured. That legislation is designed to achieve two aims: theelimination of cross voting in order to restrict the choice of 2 u>ià. vol. 703, COL 39. Session 1964-65. London. RM. Sfatione~ office. eleetors on Iist B may. under tbe Constitution. elect ee members V&Q appear on list A. and tbe Africans s bave a minima? influence on the otberfiity members Qf Parliaxreent. If cross VQtiag PS eliminated. tbe infkence of tbe .African eIectors becomes p.racticalIy nil. Thi,s mass tbat any elector ap.pearing on list B Will vote only for tbe fifteen members of tbat list and will bave no influence on lest A, wbich is tbe decisive one. That is a basic fsatme of ths 1961 tution. Mr. WiIIiam Hirsch. a member of tbe tion, who drafted tbe 1961 Colastitation. has tbat liminated. the whoPe eonstitutto bermme. Ml?. smitb C%W&W@S lcan seats wiU be progressively replaced by an Africaa Council bavimg no influence be Legislative Assembly. Tbus tbe wil depriveved of cdl paver. even symer. tbis PS strangely reminiscent of the policy of apartbeid, 76, Tbe political responsibiity of the Administering Poser is absolutely clear. It bas now been clea.rIy establisbed tbat since P923 tbe Wnited Kin ernments bave refused to assume their respoasibilitles. They bave tried to take sbelter bebind legal COl%S aiming that these do not allow them tc di obligations towards the Africans. 77. Devonsbire Declaration of i923.3 wbich psrticulsrly conceraed Central Africa. proclaimed tbe principles later affirmed in Article 73 of the United Nations Charter, namely. tbat tbe interests of the Africans sbould tahe precedence over races and sbould determine any solution in the event of a conflict. It was on tbe basis of that deelaration tbat Soutbern Rhodesla was granted a Constitution in 1923, Tbe Constitution carried witb it an obIigation to put into effeot tbe spirit and principles of tbe Devonshlre Declaration. Tbese principles are clear$ more importantaad much more fundamental tban a constitutional convention. 18. The position of the Wnited Kingdom Government. wbieh considers itself not competent to impose the majority system on the pretext that this is legally impossible. convinces no one. The position is, moreover, diffioult to uphold. Bow, iu fact, cari the IJnited m Government consider itself obliged to respect lously tbe Constitution of 1961, without at tbe same time denying tbe principles solemnly affirmed in tbe Devonshire Declaration? 79. Tbe position is even less tenable when we conslder tbat tbe United Kingdom Government could apply tirs provisions of the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865. which give it the power to invalidate the present Constitution. Wow ca* anyone claim tbat the Wnited Kingdom cannot intervene without the consent of tbe Salisbury authorities? 81. If we approach the problem in the ligbt of the principles whioh guide our Organisation. there cari be no douht that the United Kingdom. by failing to assume its responsibilities in Southern Rhodesia. is challenging and weakening the authority of tbe United Nations. 82. In this connexion, 1 should like to reoall the statement of the United Kingdom representative in memorable oircumstances at the 1330th meeting of the General Assemb1y.y 1 quote: n . . . we never beiieved that we should pay by the erosion or the expenditure of the clauses of the Charter. We never believed that it was right that a great Power could decide whether it should observe the provisions of the Charter or net.” Later on. he added: “Whatever the rules of procedure. which we support, or the customs or the traditions or the precedents that may exist, the purpose of any body such as this. or any other body in the world which is a representative body. is to glve effect to tbe overwhelmlng wish of that representative body.” 83. Thirteen years have elapsed since the General Assembly adopted its resolution 637 A (VII), in which it affirmed that the right of peoples and nations to self-determination was a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of a11 fundamental human rights. In the same resolution, the General Assemblyrecommended that the States Members of the United Nations should recognize and promote the realization of that right and should take praotical steps to that end. One might wonder whether it is possible for the Unlted Kingdom to hide behind the fact that in 1946 it did not include Southern Rhodesia among the Non-Self-Covernlng Territories under its administration, although the reallties of the situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia are SO very clear. 84. The United Kingdom bas reached the moment of decision. If it allows Mr. Smith to establish a r6gime based on white supremacy, we are convinced that a situation similar to that in South Africa Will be created. That is where the threat to international peace and security lies. The United Kingdom Will bear full responsibility for the serious consequences whlch Will evitably result from such an attitude. 85. On behalf of a11 the African States and the Organization of African Unity, on behalf of a11 the African peoples whose dignity and freedom are threatened. we appeal once more to wisdom and reason. We cal1 for the application of the principles of the United Nations Charter in the case of a people fighting against oppression. We ask that justice should be lution would involue a return to normal pollticad life sud tbe restoration of tbe right Of freedom of action of nationalist movements. Tbe release of all political psisoaers and leaders is an ~a~s~nsa~Ie prerequisite to any positive development. Such a search for ways to meet the wisbes of tbe Rhodesiaa people admits of no arbitrary laws and cannot be carried 0ut while tbe state of emergeacy aad the massacres by tbs merceaaries of colonial exploitation continue. Su& are, in oar view. the measures wbich wouBd 0pen tbe way to a political solution, a solution wbicb cari be attaiued only by means of a constitutioaal coaference leading to n ependence and the establishment of the S of élis people on tbe basis of uaiversal S 87. We are canviaced that the Waited Kiigdom Government, assisted by a11 men of good Will and by tbe aut international public opinion confers ble body. is in a position to satisfy of the African peoples. 88. We are equally convinced that if the Uoited rament continues to tolsrate the danlicy of Mr. Ian Smith. that Will be clear proof that the United Kingd~m is objectively pursuing an imperialist policy in tbat part of the African coatiaeat for the sole beneflt of the colonial interests of yet lest hope of perpetuating the tien and racial segregation in 89. I slmuld like to thank you, Mr. President, for alhxving me to spesk aad 1 wish to reserve my rigbt to reply. essary, after the statement whlch the United Ki representative is about to make. 90. Lord CARADQN (United Kingdom): Mr. President, may I first for a moment say how grateful we were to you for your reference at the start of our prcceedings to ths recovery of the Ambassador of France, Mr. Seydoux. We were ail greatly dlstressed when we heard of hls illness. and we a11 warmly rejoice at hls recovery and return. 9P. I do net propose tcday to dea? in nny detail with tbe opening speeches by the two Foreign Ministers. t0 whicb we bave listened with close attention. 1 shall welcome an opportunity later to comment on what bas been said already when 1 bave heard the views of otber members of ttm Council. It is sufficient for the moment to say that there was a great deal in what was said this morning wbich we could not possibly accept. There were many statements, and indeed there were misconceptions, to which 1 look forward to having the opportunity to reply. and 1 shall do SO 92. First let me say that 1 fully respect the sense of amdety with which the %oreign Ministers of Algeria and Senegal have spoken. The situation in Southern Rhodesia is indeed full of potentlal difficulties. My Government has never sought to minimise them. On the contrary, we have emphasised them. 93. Amongst the first acts of my Government on assuming office in October 1964 was, as has been stated here this mornlng, to make a forthright public statement of the disastrous consequences whichwould result from a unilateral declaration of independence. No member of this Council, nor anyone else, cari Speak more plainly or more candldly than my Government has already spoken. In tbls situation there is no room for comfort or complacency. The problems for a11 the people of Rhodesia, and indeed beyond Rhodesia, are too serious for anything except plain speaking and straight speaking. 94. Witbin a day or two of the formation of the new Government in my country last October, the Government embarked on the policy which it haspersistently pursued in the past six months. It is a polioy based on three principles. 95. The first principle is that the British Government. wblch alone has the authority to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia. must be satisfied that any basis on wblch it is proposed that independence should be granted is acceptable to the people of the people of the country as a whole. 96. The second prlnciple is that it is net by unconstitutional or illegal action that a way forward must be sought, but by negotiation. 97. The third principle is that no one must be left in any doubt of the truc constitutional position or of the political and economic consequences wbich would flow from an illegal declaration of independence. 98. The tbree principles stand together; they are oomplementary and interdependeut. TO state an aim wlthout showlng how it should he pursued would bave been inadequate. TO advocate cegotiation wlthout at the same time clearly stating the consequences of illegal action would have been misleading. TO glve a grave warning without showing a readiness to search by patient negotiation for a peaceful outcome would have been negative. 99. SO it was that the British Government at once set abont the positive task of putting this three.fold policy into effect. No one oan say that action was not urgently put in hand. No one cari say that it has not been consistently and perslstently pursued. 101. No one cari suggest tbat the Brltish Government did net act with speed and witb frankness and with flrmness. And no one, I think. has any doubt that the statement of 27 Cctober 1964 had a steadying and salutary effect. 1 need not repeat to the Council the terms of the statement. The Fore@ Minlster of Algeria has quoted part of it. The terms of the statement are well known. 102. Tbe aim of seeing Rhodesia take its place as an independent sovereign State in the Commonwealth on a basis acceptable to the people of the country as a whole was reaffirmed. The constitutional position was restated. Tbe disastrous consequences, political and economic. of anillegaldeclarationof independence were set out in tbe clearest language. 103. Tbe statement concluded with the words, as the Foreign Minister of Algeria has told us, and it is worth repeating them: “In short, an illegal declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia would bring to an end relationships between her and Britain, would tut her off from the rest of the Commonwealth. from most fore@ governments and from international organisations, wouId inflict disastrous economic damage upon her. and would leave her isolated and virtnally friendleSS in a largely hostile continent.” [See A/ AC.109/L.l87, annex I. appendix 1. para. 8.1 It is not possible, 1 suggest. to speak more clearly tban tbat. 104. But the warning statement. so promptly and plainly made, was not left alone. It was only part of the triple policy I have described. It was equally important to embark at once on the second purpose -the purpose of negotiation. 105. Even before the statement was made on 27 Cctober. as I have said, the invitation to begin discussions had been made. And then there followed a long, patient endeavour to get the negotiatlon started. 106. First it was thought that the Commonwealth Secretary. Mr. Bottomley, might visit Rhodesia when he attended the independence celebrations in Zambia, 107. The statements made by the Commonwealth Secretary following his visit have been circulated in the report of the Special Committee and 1 do not need to repeat them now, The Commonwealth Secretary and the Lord Chancellor found, in short, that there had been a hardening of attitudes on a11 sides ami that there was a lack of willingness to discuss atid compromise, but nevertheless there was a wide desire to find a way forward in peace. As Mr. Bottomley said in the House of Commons on 8 March 1965: “Illegal action from any quarter would be calamitous. The problem must be resolved by negotiation.” 108. No one underestimates the difficulties. Opposing views in Rhodesia are strungly held, and could scarcely be further apart. 1 certainly do not wish to minimise the difficulties any more than the dangers. 109. But the argument 1 wish to put to the Security Counoil is that it was right to endeavour to negotiate. It was right. in spite of rebuffs and setbacks, to pursue negotiation. And while there is any hope or any prospect of negctiationavoidingorpreventingdisaster. negotiation should be pressed to the very end. TO abandon negotiation now would surely be an aot of irresponsibility. TO do anything in tbis Council or anywhere else to make negotiation more difficult. t.c wreck what hopes there are of peaceful progress, to take any action here which might oontribute to the very disaster we most want toprevent-surely thatwouldhe a course to be universally condemned. 110. 1 turn to speak shortly of the long discussions whioh have taken place in the United Nations on the constitutiona and legal aspects of the problems of Rhodesia. 1 do net need to go over a11 the ground that has been SO exhaustively covered. Nor do 1 believe that at this critical stage legal and constitutional arguments Will get us any further. The members of this Council well know the reservations repeatedly expressed by my delegation regarding the competence of the United Nations to deal with Rhode&. We have made it plain throughout that. while the responsibility for bringing Rhodesia forward to independence rests 111. These legal and cons~tutional questions bave, as p say, been repeatedly explained. They bave been stated again in tbe past week or two in the Special Committee. But, in spite of ou* reservations on competence and responsibility. my delegation bas consisteutly shown our understanding of the general conce-m over the Rbodesian problem by the contributions we have made to the discussions here and elsewbere. We persist in tbe belief tbat it is by the methods of discussion and consultation and not by the metbods of threat aod conflict that we cari hope to contribute at this critical stage to a peaceful solution in the direction we ail wish to see. 112. Three times, representatives of the Special Committee bave been received in London for discussions wlth British Ministers. Since 1 came back to the United Nations last October, 1 myself initiated discussions with representatives of that Committee. Su& exchaoges cari, 1 am sure, be valuable. 1 hope they cari continue. They may well be even more valuable in the future. 113. I kave given an account of the aims and policies of my Government. 1 have spoken of the action which we have taken over the past six months. 1 have confirmed my delegation’s readiness to make ourcontribution to discussion of these problems here and elsewbere. I bave urged that in spite of a11 the dlfficulties the only sound course at this time is to pursue negotiation. it is my own strong perscnal conviction that the policy we have followed has been right. If negotiation fails the results will be disastrous for a11 the people of Rhodesis and the repercussions beyond Rhodesia Will be grave indeed. 114. Having explained the policy we follow, 1 think that it Will be helpful in bringing the Council up to date if 1 quote in full an important statement made by my Prime Minister in the House of Gommons yesterday afternoon. 29 April: AThe Rhodesia Government have issued a White Paper setting out their views on the economic effects of a unilateral declaration of independence. “Her Majesty’s Government have no desire tc trY to influence the voters of Rhcdesia in the General Election due to take place on 7 May, and for this reason have not hitherto commented or what is being said by spokesmen of either the Rhoksian Government or Gpposition parties during “The Rhodesia Government White Paper. after referring to t1.e statement issued from No. 10 Downing Street on 2’7 October says, ‘It has been assumed in some quarters, that the proposals referred to in the statement would be applied by the British Government with a degree of severity designed to collapse the economy of Rhodesia within a relatively short period.’ It then purports to ‘evaluate’ whether, in fact, Britain could or would implement in full what it calls the ‘sanctions’ suggested after a unilateral declaration. By this means the Rhodesia Government are seeking to convey the impression that they and net Hér Majesty’sGovernment are the best judges of what action Her Majesty’s Government would take in the event of a unilateral declaration. “Her Majesty’s Government adhere to the statement issued on 27 October 1964. It expressed the view that the economic effects of a unilateraldeclaration would be dlsastrous to the prosperity and prospects of the people of Rhodesia and that Rhodesia’s external trade would be disrupted. Nothing that has happened in the last six months has sfforded reasons for modifylng this judgement in any way. “The White Paper states that a great proportion of Rhodesia’s experts could be marketed in countries other than Britain with whom Rhodesia has trading relations, and it discusses in particular tobacco, which is Rhodesia’s chief expert. Britain is by far the biggest buyer of Rhodesian tobacco and if Rritain were to stop buying it the effect upon the tobacco growers and upon the whole economy of Rhodesia would be particularly severe. The Rhodesian Tobacco Association is itself reported to have reached the conclusion that the imposition of embargoes would be disastrous to the industry. There would be no difficulty in procurlng British tobacco requirements from other countrles. “The White Paper seeks to reassure Rhodesians that after a unilateral declaration money Will be forthcoming for investment in Rhodesia from what it terms ‘countries not unfriendly’ towards her. Rrltain has hitherto been the chief external source of capital for Rhodesia’s economic development. A unilateral declaration would put a stop t0 thiS “Other Governments inside and outside the Commonwealth Will no doubt make kuown tbeir own vlews on tbe White Paper. Commonwealth Prime Miulsters. in their communiquué of 15 JuIy 1964, noted witb approval the statement of the Britlsh Government ffiat they would not recognlse anyunilateraldeclaration of independence, and tbe other Prime Mlnisters made it clear that they would be unable to recognlze any such declaration. Moreover the entire Commonwealtb expressed their approval < f the declaration of 27 Octobsr. There cari be no justification for the Rhodesia Government or people to nurse the delusion that they would receive widespread internatlo.nal support. The Rhodesian vlew of events elsewhere in Africa and their effect on thinking in the West is profoundly mistaken and it would bs an error to assume that this view could affect Ner Majesty’s Government’s policy towards an act of rebellion in Rhodesia. nThe Whlte Paper argues that the adverse consequences of a unilateral declaration would be the responsibility of Brltain alone. It is not Brltain, however, which is contemplating unconstimtlonal action. If such action were to be taken, responsibility for the consequences wouldlie squarely on the shoulders of those who took it. The Whlte Paper appears to assume that it would be improper for Brltaln to react in any way if Rhodesia chose to put herself in the position of a colony in rebellion, whereas Rhodesia would he entitled totakewhatever measures she chose agalnst Malawi, Zambia or any other country in retaliation against the inevitable consequences of her own action. No Government outside Rhodesia is llkely to sbare this view. “Rer Majesty’s Government remain firmly convinced that lhe only route by which Rhodesia cari aehieve independence witbout grave consequences to herself is by the process of constimtional negotiations. She cannot hope to defy Britain, the whole of tbe Commonwealtb, nearly the whole of Africa and the Unlted Nations. IIer Majesty’s Governmenl therefore profoundly hope that Rhodesia Will not h misled into thinking that she could escape disaster if sbe were to fly in the face of world opinion. As 1 That is the end of the quotation of the statement by Mr. Harold Wilson yesterday. 115. ’ Let me finally say that my training is that when there are dlfficulties and dangers, the urgent necessity is to decide not what should be said but what should be done. 116. When 1 accepted my present post. we had to consider what should be done in the matter wbich we discuss today. The difficulties had greatly increased since 1 last spoke on this subject in the Fourth Committee at the General Assembly’s seventeenth session in 1962.w But the difficulties made it a11 the more necessary to consider what should be done. It seemed to me that the right and, indeed, the only policy to pursue was the policy which 1 have today summarized: the policy of a firm assurance and a clear warning and a persistent negotiation. The assurance was, as 1 have stated, that independence would not be granted until and unless it was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. The warning was tbat an illegal declaration of independence would have disastrous consequences. The negotiation was at once initiated and vigorously pursued. 117. 1 do not for a moment discount or underrate the strong feelings wbich the Fore@ Ministers have expressed today nor the strong feelings expresseà in the Special Committee. Indeed, 1 share their anxiety and 1 share their deep concern. But when we corne to consider net what should be said but what should be done, let me respectfully say that no good but only harm could corne from calling for unconstituXona1 action, which my Government Will not take. No good but only harm could corne from a legal wrangle or a constitutional dispute here in this Council. 118. My Government carries a great responsibility in Rhodesia. We do not seek to shirk or to share that responsibility. It is a responsibility recognized. 1 thlnk. by everyone. It was emphasized by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers when they met last year. It is our responsibility, and we shall constantly and faithfully strive to carry it out. 1 have described what we have done SO far. by assurance, by warning, by negotiation. 119. We shall pursue that course. 1 think that we have the right to expect tbat members of this Council Will not make our task more difficult. 121, 1 sbould like to express. first of aIl, my regret tbat ome agaln the unitea Ki tbe Secwity Couacil is net tbe problem before us. If we remember tbat this matter armes out of a Constitution rejected by tbe majo~gy of Africans ami leading. therefore, to the se~ious crisis ad tbe disorders in the eountry wbicb we bave observed; if we draw a paraBel between tbis Constitution and aaother 1ikewLse drafted in London-r the C~nstLt~~tion Or Cypms, an independent State, whicb was also the source of certainproblems leadlng to clashes between minorities; and if we realiae that this latter issue was brought before the Security Council on the initiative of tbe Wnited Klngdom, 1 do not see how tbe Security Council cari be competent to deal with a problem resulting from the application of a constitution to Cyprus but net competent todeal with a like problem arising in Southern Rbcdesia. 122. 1 must admit that thls is somewhat dlsturbing to tbe African delegatlons. and particularly to my own. which bas the bonaur to speak for tbcse delegalions in the SecurLty Council. But If I say that we are talking at cross purposes. I do SO because thls is wbat emerges from tbe statements of theMlnLsters wbo bave now stressed the dise of Africa about the situation in hereas importancedoesnot seem to be clearly attached to this factor in the statements made in London. We have of course been told that, if the Government of Soutbern Rhcdesia unilaterally declares its indeperdence, tbere will be economic sanctions. WhLle the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Senegaal has saLd that we bave doubts regardlng economic sanctLons. Lt is the United Kingdom itselfwhich reveals to us that economic sanctions are ineffective. In tbe case of South Africa. for example, we know the saltent position of tbe IJnited Kingdom. which tries to prove to US that economic sanctions are ineffective. Row cari they be ineffective in South AfrLca and yet be e in Southern Rhodesia? 1 think the UnLted P;in epresentative Will agree that some doubts 6ki t er, on our part, are justifled. 123. oreover. our colleague from Senegal has very clearly shown that. if the United Kingdom says that a unilateral declaration of independence means the ending of relationships, the Government of Southern Rbodesia Ls certainly aware that. if it breaks off the negotiations in order to declare independence unilaterally. Lt Will be a case of what, in familiar language and Lu the process that lias brought us former colonial countries to independence, is called “independence by secessionW; that, in the French language 125. 1 have felt bound to make this prellminary statement before speaking on the substance of this debate. SO as to avoid discuesion at cross purposes between us Africans and ourfriend. the representative of the United Kingdom. 126. Lord CARADON (United Wngdom): I do not wish to detain the Council, but 1 thought that I would like to say three things in reply to what has just been said. 127. 1 do not think that there is anyuseful comparison to be made either between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia or between Cyprus and Southern Rhodesia. as the representative of the Ivory Coast has just suggested. 128. Secondly, 1 would say that the reservationwhioh 1 inchcated at the beghming of our proceedings is, as / he knows, net new, and has not impeded us in our deli.berations today. 129. As for the Vlear statement” which he calls for from my Government, 1 hope that he Will studr the original statement of 27 October. and the statement now made by my Prime Minister which 1 have reported to him today. 1 Will see that he has both statements in ml1 and 1 believe that when he sees those statements again he Will understandboth their purpose and their content and Will recognire that they could not be more forceful or more effective.

1 have no more speakers on my list for today. 1 assume that the representatives would like to bave some time to read the statements made this morning. After consultingwith the President of the Council for the month of Mayand with the other representatives, 1 propose to schedule the next meeting of the Council on this subject for next Monday. 3 Mzy, at 3 p.m. 131. Mr. Doudou THIAM (Seaegal) (translated from French): 1 merely wish to ask you, Mr. President, whether there would be any objection to the Council meeting at 10.30 a.m. on Monday ramer than at 3 p.m. that day. We must net forget that elections Will be held in Southern Rhodesia on 7 May and that Cauneil bas just beeald hilinister of Senegal tbat y moming at 10.30 rather s 1 said, tbis matter faPls he President of tbe Council tu imite blm ta comment on AEII (imhysiaj: As the Fresident of the Secnrity Council witb whom ep1 in wmsuRatim are avare, the intmtiw was tbat, after having; beard the smtements made Qn of &he mit Governhe Security Coun d consult la decide preeisely wbat tbe r tbe very puqmse me~~o~ed by of senegaal. 134. ~~~~~n~t~~~, the meeting of tbe Cou&l that .bad been scbeduled for Wednesday was postponed mtil today. at tbe request of the Governments of Senegal md Algeria. Since we are net in a position b ensure the aQailability over the weekend of aIl the represematiws wqmm we shoukl like to consult, we think that it WQ b.e ujiaer for us ta bave tbe eonsullations an M ay marning an13 to bave a meeting of tbe Council Xonday afternoon-for the very purpose tbat the Foreign Minister of Senegal bas in tiew.

Without wishing to raise the sligbtest objection ta a deeision by tbe Security Council on the date and time of its next meeting, 1 must say that the Minis . of Senegal bas put fmws R is truc tbat the meeti sday was postponed unti1 . tbe reason was that some of the Ministers had a long distance to travel. Everyone knows tbat the Ministers for Foreign Affalrs bave a very heax-y workload and wonld llke to conclude their work here and return to their countries. In the Security Council it has always been eustomary to bear in mind the convenience of Mini&ers wbo honour us by takingpart in our discussions. I tbink we sbould continue to show them that courtesy. 136. Tbe PRESIDENT: In the llght of the suggestion that bas beer. made by the Foreign Minister of Senegal, I would make the followlng proposal. If it is found tbat any members are prepared to address the Council on Monday morning on tbis subject, ameeting Will be called for Monday at 10.30 o..m.. with the approval of members of the Council. Otherwise, the President of the Counci: for the month of May Will inform members of the time of the next meeting. 1t was SO decided. 2% meeting rose at 2.25 p.m. UNITED ns may be obtained istribators throughout the world. write tc: United Nations, Sales CURER LES PUBLICATIONS Les publications des Nations Unies x>nt agences dépositaires du monde entier. ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, Section LICACIONES las publicacicnes de las Nacioner casas di~~i~~ido~as en todas partes dirijase a: Noeiones Unidas, Secci6n FJrice: $LE 0.75 (or eqtivalent