S/PV.1195 Security Council

Wednesday, April 21, 1965 — Session None, Meeting 1195 — UN Document ↗ OCR ✓ 5 unattributed speechs
This meeting at a glance
10
Speeches
2
Countries
0
Resolutions
Topics
General statements and positions General debate rhetoric Security Council deliberations Southern Africa and apartheid Diplomatic expressions and remarks UN membership and Cold War

The President unattributed #121059
Before we turn our attentior to the business of the day, 1 should like to occupé a little of your time in expressing to our friend, thc representative of Jordan, Ambassador Rifall, OUI thanks for the very able manne+ in which he discharged the duties of the office of President during the mcnth chat hae just ended. This may appear 2 rather curious statement to make, looking bac& on the public activity or inactivity of the Securitj Council in the month of April. 2. The unpredictable accidents of circumstance tha govern the public functioning of the Security Counci bave prevented the outside world from observiq ad appreciattig the qualities of head and heart whicl are SO necessary for a President and with whicl Ambassador Rifa’i is so generously endowed. Bu 3. On your behalf and on my own. 1 wish to tender to him our congratulations and our grateful thanks for a duty well and truly done. 4. Mr. RIFA’I (Jordan): Allow me, Mr. President, to thank you most sincerely for your very klld and very generous words regarding me. Among the great privlleges which 1 enjoyed last month was the valuable benefit which 1 gained fmm my consultation with you personally and from the wise advice which you gave me. As 1 congratulate you now on your assumption of the Presidency of the Council for this month, I feel certain that your high quallfications Will contribute substantially to the progress of the important and urgent work before us. Adoption of the agenda
On the instructions of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. the USSR delegation ha6 askedfor anurgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the question of the armed intervention by the United States in the interna1 affairs of the Domican Republic. A letter on this subject dated 1 May 1966 from the Permanent Representathe of the’ USSR was sent to the President of the Council [S/6316].1/ 6. Despite the steps taken on 1 and 2 May hy the President of the Seourity Cout~il himself and by the 8. In accordance with the wlshes of the African countries, both members and non-members of the Security Council, the USSR delegation is prepared to agree that this morning’s meeting should be devoted to a continuation of the discussion of the question of Scuthern Rhodesia. We agree to this, however, on the nnderstanding that at its meeting this afternoon the Security Council Will proceed to consider the urgent question whichwe bave raisedthe question of the armed intervention by the United States of America in the internai affairs of the Dominicari Republio.
The President unattributed #121065
1 am very grateful to the representative of the Soviet Union for the helpful attitude he has taken. If there is no further objection, 1 shall now declare the agenda, as modified, adopted. ’ The agenda was adopted. .Question concerning the situation in Southsrn Rhodesia: letters doted 2 and 30 August 1963 oddressed ta the- President of the Security Council on behalf of the representatives of thirty-two Member States (S/ 5382 and S/5409): Letter dated 21 April1965addressed tothe President of the Security Council from the representatives of Algeria, Burundi, Comeroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Democratic Republic of thecongo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Mcdogoscar, Malawi, Mali, Mouritanio, Morccco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalie, Sudon, Togo, Tunisio, Uganda, United Artib Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta and Zcmbia (S/6294 and Add.1)
The President unattributed #121066
In accordance with the decision taken at the 1194th meeting, 1 propose now, with the consent of the Council, to invite the Mini&ers for Foreign Affairs of A&ria and Senegal to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. At the invitation of the Presfdent, ix&. Bouteflika (Algeria) and Mr. Doudou Thiam (Senegal), Cook places at tbe Council fable.
In a preliminary statement 1 said that the Council had very properly taken up the serious problem of Southeri; Rhcdesia. 1 noted with some 13. Although the problem has been brought before the Council, on the initiative of the Organization of African Unity, through the African representatives .at the United Nations, there is no doubt whatsoever that the concern of the African States is shared by most nations of the world and by the experts, as is shown by the resolution of the Special Committee whioh has been transmitted to the Security Council.3/ 12. l’initiative l’intermédiaire par 14. The source of the conflict is in this detestable Constitution. No one in Africa or anywhere else-not even some distinguished members of the House of Commons-cari understand why the experiment whioh was SO successful in India. Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Tanaania, Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, Malawi, etc. cannot be attempted in Rhodesia. There is, of course, the disastrous example of South Africa; but it is too late to repeat that sort of solution, and to try to do SO would be to disregard present-day facts in Africa, to go against the stream and to ignore the lessons of history. 15. It is indeed curious that it is at the very moment when African States bave achieved their independence that such a constitution-a refined codification of racial discrimination-has beendrawnup. This instrument, SO far as representation is concerned, provides at the most only fifteen seats for 4 million Africans, as against fifty seats for 200,000 Wbites. What is more, the voting qualifications established, based as they are on assessment, are of an out-of-date, feudal type. In addition, SO as to prevent Young Africans who meet the educational requirements from being entered on the electoral rolls, the cunning framers of the Constitution bave imposed land-owning conditions and fixed at thirty the voting agefor this class of African. Of course, these puritans did not wish 16. It is no less disturbing to note that the United Kingdom, despite the censure of world opinion and the machinations of the settlers in Algeria at tbat time, abandoned the powers whicb it held under the 1923 Constitution-the power tc legislate on all matters involving the status of African nationals, and the power to oppose any lawdiscriminatii against the Africans. 17. Tcday we realize, alas, the tragic implications of the surrender of these powers. Four million Africans bave been delivered in bondage to a Government of white settlers armed tc the teeth, a Government which, under the watchful eye of itsnew masters in South Africa, passe& such measures as the Land Apportionment Act, the Public Order Act andthè Law and Order (Maintenance) Act-all of them immoral laws worthy of Mr. Verwoerd’s school of apartheid. 18. The whole design is clearly the work of eminent jurists who bave been asked to salve the problem of how to bring about white domination in Southern Rbodesia. 19. Louis-Philippe, King of the French, said: “Men are subject to their Governments because their Governments protect them; to ask them to be subject to them against their own interests is tc ask the impossible.” 20. The Afrioans have rejected the Constitution of 1961; they bave declared that they recognise neither tbe Government nor tbe organs born of tbat Constitution. They bave consequently been thrown into prison, and their leaders, the Rev. N. Sithole and Mr. Joshua Nkomo, bave been deprived of their libertyeven though the courts have declared their arrest to be illegal. Thousands of nationalists are rotting in the racist jails. The repressive strength of the Government has been increased by the incorporation of elements left over from the dissolution of the Federation of Rbodesia and Nyasaland. Military forces are being deployed at this very moment along the frontier of Zambia and in the regions of Lake Karyba and Wankfean act of provocation and intimidation. Soutb African military personnel, disguised as experts, range throughout Rhcdesia. AR this is done within the framework of a series of discriminatory, harassing and humiliating laws which run ccunter to morality and to human rights. 21. Jean-Paul Sartre, in bis hymn to negritude entitled “Black Orpheus”, said: “What did you expect when You removed Ste gag from tbose black mouths? That they would sing your praises?” 23. Mr. Ian Smith did not fail to take advantage of that, when he broadcast the following statement: “It is clear that what the Secretary has told the African nationalists is that Great Britain has no intention of suspending the Constitution and thereby enabling them to corne to power.” It is therefore clear that the Africans have no chance whatsoever of being able to govern Southern Rhodesia in the foreseeable future. 24. If the Secretary’s remark really reflects United Kingdom policy in Rhodesia, it makes one dlszy to think of what will happen in that unfortunate country. The same Secretary took the precaution of warning the Africans against the use of violence for the enforcement of their just and honourable claims. But is it net well known that violence breeds violence and that, if this régime continues, one Will reap what one has sown? 25. Such is the tragic situation imposed on 4 million of our brothers in Southern Rhodesia, who only ask, as equal citizens, to share the responsibilities of their country with the settlers, whom they accept as their fellow-citizens. 26. At last Friday’s meeting 11194th meeting] we expressed-with a certain passion, it is truc, but a passion which in no way diminished our sincerityoui apprehensions and fears to our friend, the United Kingdom representative. He asked me to read carefully the statements of his Government, and 1 shall corne back to them. 27. 1 was educated as a Cartesian and as a jurist; and 1 pay tributs to my friend and colleague, te representative of France, and through him to the France which gave me such an education. Unfortunately, however, that education does not enable me to undersland a great many tbings in the relationship between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia. 28. Even under this same detestable Constitution, the United Kingdom shares with the Rhodesian Legislative Assembly the powers of legislation. Chapter IV, section 49, of the Constitution-Prerogative of Mercygives the United Kingdom the power of pardon, the power to free prisoners or reduce their sentences: yet many Africans have been sentenced to death and others have been arbitrarily arrested. The United Nations has adopted a number of resolutions calling for their release, but those resolutions have had no effect. 29. The United Kingdom replies that, over and above the constitutional powers which it still holds, there is a tacit, a moral agreement forbldding it to intervene in what it calls the interna1 affairs of Rhodesia. 31. From 21 to 26 OctoJx?r 1964, the Government of the white minority assembled the tribal chiefs and headmen and asked them to give their opinion on a break witb the United Kingdom and on trie maintenance of awJiteGovernment in Rhodesia. On 21 October 1964, the Army and the Air Force dropped paratroopers into the area where chiefs appointed and paid by the Gcvernment, chiefs already on the Gcvernment’s payroll, were assembled-and the competent authorities say that these paratroupers were part of the entertainment. Perhaps those who had the prisilege of being invited to that masquerede could teJl us whether these choir-boy parachutiv& were really page-boys who brotight in the princely tom-toms by air. 32. The truth is quite different. Mr. Nkomo consi2ers that we should only feel sadness for those chiefs, and that they are bcing exploited by their paymasters. Sir Edgar Whitehead, who told us in the Fourth Committee that an African Government was not likely for another t~fty years, admitted that the opinions of the chiefs were not necessarily those of tJneir :eople. Mr. Gondo, an African member of the Legislative Assembly who has no connexion with the nationalists, says that the chiefs do net refresent African opinion. Mr. Peter Gray, who attended the meeting of the chiefs, states that no value cari be placed on their opinions. 33. Mr. Smith was no more fortÿnate with his referendum of 5 November 1964. There were 6,096 votes against his ambigucus draft declaration of independence, while all Africans boyootted the referendum completely. The African members of the Legislative Assembly who at the time did not take part in the boycotting decreed by the nationalists of thc 1961 Constitution declared that they opposed the idea of independence under the present Constitution. Mr. Smith% reaction to these difficulties and legal obstacles was to dissolve the Assemb!y and to fix the next election for 7 May 1965. 34. The avowed ,fm of thishastilyorganizedelection, hased on a Constitution which gives the vote to 89,886 of the 200,000 Whites and to 12,729 of the 4 million Africans, is to obtain two thirds of the seats in the .4ssembly in order to pass amendments to a Constitution which is already unacceptable and to strengthen white domination once agaiby ejecting the few African members of the Legisl.!tive Assembly and replacing them with the chiefs of the notorious indaba. The unavowed aim of these oonstit~~tional trickerings is tc legalize aunilateralproclamat:on of independence on the advice of the South AfricxJ lawyers. For Mr. Verwoerd, the prime racist of South Africa, is advising Mr. Smith, “tc resist interference from the United Kingdom and tc determine hisowndestinyW, and is promising to assist him. R . . . A declaration of independence would be an act d defiance and rebellion and it wouldbe treasonable to take steps to give effect to it. Ip . . . No Commonwealth Goverment would be able ize a unilateral declaratlon. VQ.. . The Britisb Government would be bound to swer relations witb tbose resnonsible for sucb a ckclaration. 0 . . . Al1 financial and trade relations between Britain and Southern Bbodesia would be ieopardized.R4/ 36. The Security Coumil sbculd certaiily net reject tbe statement made by the United Kingdom Government on 27 October 1964, but should, indeed, tahe note or ii and encourage the United Kingdom to translate it’ into action, even inviting the l%embers of tbe United Nations to facilitate su& action-in tbe event of such measures bmoming necessary. 3’1. Tbe real problem is not to decide wbat wlll happen if Mr. Ian Smith% Govermnent proclaims unllateral independence. Everyone knows that it has already made arrangements witb Soutb Afrlca and Portugal and tbat, from tbe outset. it Will join South Africa. South Africa is not a member of tbe Commomvealth. yet it daes not seem to be suffering from that circnmséance; moreover, its economic relations with the United Kingdom are far more extensive than the economic relations of tbe United Kingdom with all tbe African Commonweabb countries combined. 38. As for economic sanctions, apart from tbe fact that tbe United Kingdom itself does net, generally speaking, believe in their effectiveness, transactions tiPB be made via South Africa; thus the trick Will be played and Rhodesia’s economy Will net be affected. 39. The United Kingdom has considerable interests in that country. but it also has rights and duties. It must ensure tbat those rights are net jeopardised by a minority. It holds those rigbts on behalf of the wbole population and cannot transfer them to a small fraction of .it; it cannot and must not alPow those rigbts to be usuqmd. E must assert them. if necessary by force. And we must be sure tbat such is really its intention. 40. Mowever, above ail, there is anessentiallymoral problem wbich transcends tbe tacit agreement linking tbe United Kingdom to Mr. Smith% Government: the United Kingdom’s duty not to deliver 4 million Africans whom it has colonized, as in Zambia and 41. TO fulfil the solemn duty of satisfying itself, before granting independence that the decision to grant independence Will be acceptable to the people of the country as a whole. the United Kigdom cari use three methods: 42. First, it csn ensure tbat the local government consults the population. We know the results of that method: an ambiguous referendum, a festival of the chiefs called an w. the dissolution of the Assembly, and the threat to proclaim independence without consulting the people. 43. Secondly, the United Kingdom Government. with the strength of its power to grant independence, csr consult the people itself by tahingthe place of the local government; it has the right and the power to do SO. 44. Thirdly. it cari convene a national convention or conference of a11 elements and parties In Rhodesia to disouss the conditions for independence andthenew structures for an independent Rhodesian Skate. 45. The United Kingdom has used the la& method in the case of a11 the countries which it has peacefully led to independence. Why should this method not be applied in the case of Southern Rhodesia? The Council should request the United Kingdom to convene such a conference; it would matter little whether it was called a national convention or a constitutional conference. 46. The Government of the ivory Coast is sure that the members of the Counoil fully realise the implications of this danse macabre which Mr. Smith and bis acolytes are executmg and whioh may jeopardise both the harmonious relations between Africa and its friends and the balance throughout the world. Mr. Smith’s method is preparing the way for a future disaster, which Will be both cruel and blind. Southern Rhodesia is enclosing itself in an infernal cycle which leads inevitably to explosion and which Alan Paton calls vthe fear of slavery and the slavery of fear”. At the end of that road lies bloody revolution. 47. Aocordingly, the Council should ‘suggest that the United Ktng.dom intervene in order that it may be possible to liberate political prisoners, to prevent or suspend any measures which might lead to a unilateral declaration of independence, to prevent such a unilateral declaration of independence.by allavailable means. and to convene a conference of a11 parties and groups in Southern Rhodesia for its discussion, with them, of the conditions for Rhodesia’s accession to independence and of the administrative audgovernmental structures for an independent Rhodesia. based t such a government. SacIl are tbe stions wbich my delegatiou felt tbat it sboul to tbe council. consideratim. Tbe re the African contiment in its ncemed at an explosive situation wbicb might lead to extensive troubles and hostili- #es if it is neglected. Therefore 1 wish to pay a tribute to the Member States which bave brougbt tbe question of Soutbern Rhadesia at tbis stage to the attention of the Coumil, for by SO doing tbey bave demonstrated a sense of international responsibility and peaceful intention their faitb in tbe anthority of tbe s prim task international peace and security. 51. Fnrtbermore. Re important statements of the Fore@ Ministers of Senegal and A@ria to which we listened Past Friday [1194th meetii] demonstrated a high degree of statesmansbip and responsibility. it is time the Security Council intervened ely in the question of Soutbern Rbodesia. Tbe intervention is not witbiu tbe oomterme of tbe United Nations has been disposed of by rsd pronouncements of tbe General Assembly previcus consideration of the question in the 52. Political conditions in Southern Rbodesia are ao terme that tbey constitnte a real threat to international peace. Tbat fact was recognised in General Assembty resolution 1889 (XVUR and is illustrated in the repressive measnres which the minority government in Southern Rhodesia takes against the indigenous population. It is also reported in the news, on tbe pages of the leading newspapers of tbe world. Tbirty-five African States-and 1 am sure many more couM bave joined them-tel1 us in their memorsndum of 21 April 1965 fS/6294 and Add.l]:?/ Wur Govemments are profoundly disturbsd at the con.- tinuing deterioration of the situation in the Territory.” 53. Resides the political tension in Southern Rbodesia. human rights are heing grossly violated These rigbts, of which the vast majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia are deprived, .are human rights which should penetrate the frontiers of any people, any territory, any State. The United Rations is the guardian of these rights. They should be protscted, as the preamble to the Declaration states: _ n.. . if man is not to be compelleà to bave recourse. as a last resort, to rebellion agalnst tyranny snd oppressiona. 54. The question of Southern Rhodesia is a product of imperialism of the old type, the complications of whioh have multiplied. It is a case in which colonialism has given birtb in the coloniaed territories to an ugly form more serious sud more oppressive thau the original. This form is seen in Smith Africa, where the whits settlers are suppressing the indigenous population to a sub-human level. It is seen in Palestine, where foreign immigrants have been able within twenty-five years to drive out the rightful people of the country, to oocupy the native soi1 of those people and to turn them into scattered refugees. It is seen today in Southern Rhodesia, where the wbtte settlers, 6 percent of the population, possess the pcwer to determine the destiny of the African population. Given the government. the authority. the armed forces, the law and the finance, these settlers seem to bs able to claimthat the government, the country and the future are theirs; and they move boldly and openly in the face of any opposition to declare their intention to bs independeut. masters of the land in which they have settled and rulers of thepeople whom they exploit. ‘55. They declare this in contravention of the resolutions of the United Nations, in contravention of the decisions of the Organisation of African Unity and in contravention of the clear attitude of the British Government, the source of their authority. In the statement of the British Government of 21 October 1964, addressed to the head of the white settler’s government in Southern Rhodesia, we read the following: “A declaration of independence would be an act of defiance and rebellion and it would bs treasonable to take steps to give effect to it.” This is a clear sud firm statement which warns against a unilateral declaration of independence and against steps to give effect to it. But in the face of tels warning, Mr. Ian Smith, the Prime Minister of the Southern Rhodesian minority stated the following on 31 March 1965. and 1 quote what was cited earlier in this debate: vRhodesia% destiny demands decisive and urgent steps to be tahen for the protection of all the ideals of Western civilisation in which we believe . . . 1 am therefore calling an election asking for the hoping for a two-thirds majority in Parliament which Will strengthen our hand, net only for tbe a result of the kite Rhcdesian the Rk5desian front is victorious, its party be, wkatever the Prime Minister may say, pusk tke Government inexorably towards a ~~a~~~ declaration of independence.,~ tkat the elections were tkerefore unread in tke report of the S9eciaI Como kelieved. accordlng to reports, that the regarded by the Southern as a referenhm on the quesolaration of independem3.Y 68. Tke latest 1 have read to express these intentions of a unilateral declaration of independence is a statement by Ms. Clifford Dupont, tke minority Prime Minister of Soutkern Rkodesia, in a tele- 1 speech wkkh he made in Salisbury on 26 April 1965 last. as pub1 d in The Times d London on 27 April 1965. Mr. ont stated: w . . . A unilateral declaiation would not be made as a East resort if tke very existence of ia was at stake. let us be very clear about this-if that situation does arise, if all negotiations fail, and if the ckoice is between freedom as Rhodesians know it and a hand-over to black extremism-then it Will happez. n 59. I fully realize that the warning of the British Government of 27 October 1964was a strong expression inst a unilateral declaration of independence; and tkat tkis attitude has been reaffirmed in the new statement of the British Prime Minister made on 29 Aprif 1865.8/ 66. We also were told emphatfoally by the United Ringdom representative that with regard to the present situation in Soutkern Rhodesia IIer Majesty’sGovernment is following a three-headed policy-assurance, warning and negotlation. Rut with all due respect to Government. While the assurance of the United Kingdom is to oppose a unilateral declaration of independence, the assurance of Mr. lan Smith is to demand independence with a strong hand. In his statement of 31 March 1965, when referrlng to a unilateral declaration of independence, he said: n . . . 1 reiterate. however, my Government’s assurance that thia latter step”-he means independencevis not contemplated while my negotiations wlth the British Prime Minister are in progress.“% , 61. This statement, innocent as it seems, implies that as soon as Mr. Smith feels that his negotiations with the British Government are no longer inprogress, he Will be free to declare unilateral independence. For he seems to assume that he is the one to decide whether his negotiations with the British Government are in progress or not. His intention, his commitment and his determination is to achieve independence. He fears the trend of affairs in Africa, as he mentions that in his statement of 31 March 1965. He therefore, and 1 am quoting from his statement, cannot allow matters “tc drlft”. He demands decisive and urgent steps to be taken for the protection of’ all the ideals of Western civilisation in which he and his community believe. 62. It is important to note that these declarations in the statement of Mr. Ian Smith came long after the issuance of the British warning of 270ctober 1964 and sfter the visit of the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to Rhodesia. 63. However, the British Gcvernment has warned of the measures, particularly economic, it wculd take if independence was unilaterally declared hy Mr. Ian Smith. But it seems that Mr. Smith also is making his preparations to face such a possibility. 64. An important story was carried in The Dailp Telegraph of London of 1 April 1965, which implied that the Southern Rhodesian Government, at least unofficially, was giving very careful thought to the timing of a unilateral declaration of lndependence. The most favoured period is found to be between July and November 1965, as the tobacco trop willbe mainly sold by July and funds Will be flowing intc Rhodesia : to support such a move, 65. Other speculation suggests that the Government of Southern Rhodesia is calculating all the necesaary precautions that it Will have to take to ensure markets for its tobacco. sugar and emeralds. Among these calculations is that the Government of Southern Hhodesia might retaliate, if independence is opposed, by trylng to hurt British industry by hitting back at the copper mines in Zambia, which depend on Ylw&. applldlx Y. ARkodssia would never tahe tke initiative as aggressor towards any other country, but should any couutry initiate action against Rhodes& the Governmeut would kave no option but to tahe the strongest counter-measures available to it.’ 66. The third fundamental pillar on which British policy regarding Southern Rkodesia rests is negotia- Lion. Nere we skould ask: wkat could the nature of these negotiations ke? Wkat are tke common grounds on wkick they are conducted, since the intentions and tbe programme of tke Southern RkodesiauGovernment kave been made clear? We tkerefore believe tkat, if effective measures are to be tahen to avoid future complications and to prevent a unilateral pro= clamation of independence, such meaaures should ke tahen right now, without delay. 67. It 1s indeed interesting to note that, against the British assurances, the minority Gaverament in Southern Rhodesia kas couiner-assurances; agains! tke British warniug, the Sautkern Rhodesian Government kas issued an opposiug warning; against tke Britisk objective of negotiations, the-Southern Rhodesiau Government kas different objectives. 68. In standing by passively inthe face of the declareE intention of Mr. Smith to kold tke election. wkick ir my view constitutes a stop toward a unilateral proclamation of independence. tke British Government contends that it cannot impose unilaterally z solution whiok wonld violate tke 1961 Constitutior and tke establisked convention that tke Parllameni at Westminster does not legislate on matters withir tbe competence of tke Legislative Assembly of Rhodesia except witk tke agreement of the Rhodesiar Government. 69. We hate to assume that tke British Government wkich declares that it shares the concern at tk deterioration of tke situation in Southern Rhode& iS attempting to resort to constitutional interpreta tiens tkat would serve to explain its inaction wit! regard to tke defiant attitude of the settlers’ govern ment. Any interpretation of tke Constitution in thi: respect is open to reasonable debate. Therefore tke Britisk interpretation skould not be tahen a decisive in tkis matter. British spokesmen sa tkat it is witkin the autkority of the minority Govern mert~ in Southern Rkadesia to hold elections unde tke preSant Constitution. Otkers say tkat tke koldin, of the elections on 7 May in the mariner propose, bY MS. hn Smith Will cause a change in tke weigh of the votes of the registered voters and thus wil upset the voting pracess established in that sam Constitution, an act wkich skould in itself be rule a violation. 71. The General Assembly of the United Nations and the Special Committee bave repeatedly invited the United Ki@om Government ta abrogate the Southern Rhodesia Constitution of 1961, whicb was denounced and rejected by the overwhelming majority of the people of Southern Rbodesia. When a Constitution is contrary to the fundamentaldemocraticprinciples of the British Constitution ttself, whsn a Constt- (tution establishes the rule of tbe minority over the overwhslming majority, when a Constitution bas been, rejected by the indigenous. population of the country. when a Constitution bas been repeatedly ’ denounced by the international community as represented in the General Assembly of the UnitedNations, and when a Constitntton becomes the cause of a disturbance of international peace and security, we may ask: should such a Constitution be allowed to apply? We hope that the British Govermuent will move without delay to suspend the 1961 Constitution aud to cal1 for the convening of a constitutional eonference to meet the requirements of the situation, which conference should have the participation of a11 the political leaders of the people of Southern Rhodesia, whether they are in their homeland or beyond its borders or behind iron gates. 72. Wbat is fundamentally required in the case of Southern, Rbodesia is the removal of past errors which, if left uncorrected, Will produce îùrther complications and serious dangers. A continuation of the present situation would go against African pride, African dignity and African rights. 73. The United Kingdom. wltb its great heritage of democratic rule and with its recent contributions in Africa to the process of decolonization, Will, 1 trust, refuse to be inconsistent with its traditions in the case of Southern Rhodesia. 74. The white minority Government of Soutbern Rhodesia is toc small to oppose the new awakening of the African peoples backed by all those who believe in right and justice aud the worth of man. Unless it listens to reason, that Government Will stand as a small island whioh Will continue to be pounded by the rising waves of a furious ocean.
The wboh of independent Africa-thirty-five African St.ates-bas once again addreseed a reo.uest to the SecurRy Council, the principal organ of the United Nations responsible for maintaining international peace and security, that urgent steps sbould be taken to put an end to the dangerous developments in Southern Rhodesia. This one fa& alone is clear evidence of the enormous danger to the entire African continent which is inherent in the inoreased activity of 77. The crux of the problem; as bas been pointed out in tbe Security Couucil, is tbat the colonialists and a bandful of racists are striving to deprive millions of Africans in Southern Rbodesia of what is theirs by rightz freedom, independence, and their native land. wbich tbe colonialists bave robbed even of its proud name, Zimbabwe. 78. There is no doubt that the criminal activities of tbe colonialists and racists in Southern Rhodesia are creating a threat not only to peaoe in Africa. but to international peace and security. The attention of the Security Counoil is drawn to this fact in the memorandum of the thirty-five African countries. Attention has also been drawn to it by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Senegal and Algeria 11194th meeting] and by the representatives of the Ivory Coast and Jordan in their impressive statements to tbe Council, statements in which the indignant voice of Africa rang out loud and clear. 79. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, stressed, inter alia, the enormous importance of ensuring tbat the whole world was fully informed of %he crime which is being planned against a people, a continent and mankind as awbole’, andthe necessity of preventing “a tragic blood-bath’ while there was yet time. 80. The responsibility of the United Kingdom for ths situation in Southern Rhodesia is self-evident. As Mr. Boudon Thiam, the Minister for Fore@ Affairs of =- !egal, said: ‘jt the United Kingdom had said ‘no’ to the Rhodesian settlers on 13September 1963byagreeing to vote for the draft resolution submitted at thal time by Ghana, Morocco and the Philippines, inviting ‘the Government of Great Britain and Northerr Ireland net to tramàfer to its colony of Southem Rhodesia . . . any powers or attributes of sovereignt> until the establishment of a government fully representatfve of a11 the inhabitants of the colony; if thc United Kingdom had accepted that resolution anc had decided not to transfer either armed forces or aircraft to Southern Hhodesia as envisaged a~ the Victoria Falls Conference in July 1963; ifthc United Kingdom Government had been willingtotak It is quite true that if the United Kingdom had not prevented the Securiiy Council from adopting resolutions in 1‘ :.3, if the United Kingdom Government had corne to the defence of the legltimate aspirations of the African people in Southern Rhodesia, the Security Council would net now be faced with a more serious and dangerous situation than that which prevailed in September 1963. 81. The basic factors in this aggravated situation are clearly evident from the explanatory memorandum of the representatives of the thirty-five African countries and also from the statements of :he representatives of African countries in the Security Coun ‘11. 82. First of all, there is the deterioration of the situation in Southern Rhodesia itself, which is developing into a threat to international peace and security. This deterioration is shown by the fact that, ,ince the racist Smith Government came to power a year ago, reprisals against the African nationalist leaders have been intensified. It is shown by the growing strength of the white racist rdgime in Southern Rhodesia, which has deprived the overwhelming majority of the African population of the territory of the right to vote. Lastly, the deterioration of the situation. is reflected in the fact that a hsndful of settlers is threatening to usurp power and proclaim the socalled vindependencev of Southern Rhodesia, utilising to this end the elections to be held on ‘7 May on the basis of the racist Constitution of 1961, and is openly endeavouring to establish another bastion of racism in the African continent, a second editlon of the Republic of South Africa. 83. The United Kingdom has, as we a11 know, transferred to the Southern Rhodesian regime the armed forces of the former Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, thus placing a “weapon of mass terror” m the hands of the Southern Rhodesian racists. 84. Having obtained these armed forces and having strengthened its military position, the Southern Rhodesian racist régime, by enforcing dozens of harsh discriminatory laws, has placed the indigenous inhabitants of the territory in a debased position in a11 spheres of political, economic and social life. Mr. J. R. D. Chikerema, the Deputy President of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union, for example, has described the situation in Southern Rhodesia as follows: vThe situation in Zimbabwe is critical. Never hefore has our people suffered as it is suffering now under the yoke of the racist Smith Government. The country has been turned into a concentration camp. Gver 10,000 patriots have been arrested and 50,000 bave been sentenced to hard labour in retbat tbe Soutbern Rbodesian racists have in this case simply borrowed a practice of tbe racists in tbe Republic of Soutb Africa.. 66. Cne of tbe manifestations of this anti-democratic polioy WBS the arrest of Mr. Josbua Nkomo, leader of tb8 Zimbabwe Afriean People’s Union. and of tbe -t E&V. N. Sitbole, leader of the Zimbabwe Afrioau National Wnicm. Tbese arrests cannot be described as anything otber tban reprisa& against political workers wbo are figbting for tbe democratic rights of th8 mdigenous population of Seutbern Rhodesia. 67. Ian Smith, the leader of the Soutbern Rbodesian racists, cynically stated in 1964 that he did not intend to see in his Rfetime an African government in a. In May 1964 he explained, just the basic palicy of tbe government wbicb be head8d consisted of tsking matters into its own hands. 66. Tbe representative of the Zimbabwe African National Wnion, Mr. Shamuyarira, recently informed the Special Committee at its 325th meeting of a statement issued by the Cbairman of the Rhodesian Front whicb is in fact an instruction for the racist party organiners for use in thepreparationsfor theelections to be held on 7 May 1965. This is what that instruction says: I i- * . . . tbe vote is a privilege gîven to a civilized adult to enable him to express his wishes. But wbat appears to bave happ8ned is that h a liberalminded trusting way we have given the unciviliaed Afriean tbe vote and laws too. This he is using. net as a privilege, but as a deadly and dangerous weapon to overtbrow our white r&gimes.. . .Iu self-defence, we must disarm him of this weapon and tben use oui vote as a weapon too to keep and maintain a white Government in power until such time as the danger passes.“% 69. It is’well known what tbe parouy of a Constitution vgrantedv by tbe IJnited Kingdom to Southern Rhcd8sia in 1961 is like. This document, which ir anti-democratic from beginning to end and which is aimed at consolidating and perpetuating the white racist r6gime in Southern Rhodesta, makes no provision citer for the creation of any genuine organs Of government, or for the introduction of universal equal suffrage. 90. The so-called modem vdemocracyv, Southern Rhodesfan style, which was incidentally, deliberately implated by the United Kingdom. takes the following la Sec documenr AfAC.109/PV.325 (ndmeo~ephsd). 91. 1s it not evident that bis notorious Constitution is in flagrant contradiction with the principles of the United Nations Charter and of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples? Yet it is on the basis of this racist Constitution that elections are to be held in Southern Rhodesia. 92. The United Kingdom representative, in his statement to the Council on 30 April 11194th meeting], attempted to create the impression that the holding of elections in Southern I!!odesia had no partisular significaxxe, that in essence nothingwouldbe changed. and SO on and 60 forth. Tbat is a deliberate misrepresentation and distortion of thr.truth. The Smith Govenlment has aiready officially ann tunced that it intends to use the two-thirds majority in Parliament which it hopes to receive on 7 May to introduce into the 1961 Constitution amendmonts giving evsn greater power to the Whites in Southern Rhodesia. 93. One of the amendments in ouestion willeliminate from the Constitution even the iheoretical possibility of African candidates contesting the seats of white members of Parliament Under the second amendment, the number of seats reserved for white representatives in the Southern Rhodesian Parliament Will be increased from fifty to sixty or sixty-two, while the Africans Will retain their fifteen seats. This means that under these amendments the white settlers Will have a representation in Parliament net sixty times greater than the Africans, as is now the case, but almost eighty times greater, and in addition this staggering disproportion Will be firmly entrenched. That is one way inwhich the white racists are planning to make use of the elections. 94. The representatives of the people of Southern Rhodesia have repeatedly exposed the aims which the racists are pursuing in organizing their parody of an election. Mr. Shamuyarira, whom 1 have already mentioned, in laying bare the intentions of the racists in Southern Rhodesia, observed: at the 325th meeting of the Special Committee: *If the Government wantedtodeclareindependence under the present Constitution, they really couldn’t do it legally or constitutionally. They cari only do it illegally. However, if they get a two-thirds majority in Parliament anci they push the resolution through Parliament, . . . tbis would be de facto independence, .b.scausa, in the first place, the Governor would not refuse to sign ‘a resolution or an act that has been passed by two-thirds of the House and, in tbe second place, two-thirds of tbe House of Parliameht in any CaQe represents tbe 95. Events in tiuthern Bhcdesia bave serious consequences net only for tbeeenslavedindigenouspapulation of the territory, but for peace ancl security in tbe wbole African continent. 96. ~he representatives of African countries bave repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that the imperiaiist Powers are striving to preserrre strongholds of cdonialism in Africa south of tbe equator as bases for c0unter-attaoks on independent African Skates. Southern Rbdesia occupies a prominentplaceinthose plans as an important linh in tbe cbain with which colanialism still biids the southern part of Africa. 97. We have only to recall who rushed to the assistance of the Smith régime in Southern Bhodeeia in order to understand that the strengthening of that regime is tbe abject of joint efforts by c0lonialists of every stripe, that it is a matter for the most reactionary forces of colonialism. Smith% predecessor. Weld, in answer to the question whether closer relations were to be established between Southern Bhadesia and South Africa, was already able to reply: “They cari soarcely be closer than they already are.” 99. The fa& show tbat iately the relations between the Fiepublic of South Africa and Southern Bhodesia bave become noticeably closer. lu November 1964 the two countries signed a new trade agreement which, as tbe British newspaper The Daily Telegraph wrote. opens tbe way for the creation of a common marhet between these two countries of southern AfriOa whlcb are rukd by R%ites. In March 1965, the rscist authorities in Pretoria announced the sla of an interest-free 99. Moreover. on 25 Pebruary 1955, Portugal signed a fiQe-year trade pact witb Southern Bhodesia. This pact provides for appreciable reductione in tariffs Mween the two countries. This may be termed the second step towards the creation of a colonialist ‘common market’ in tbe heart of Afrioa. U% I’c is net merely economic assistance that the ~~t~e~‘~~es~~ racists receive from these weBlm onlalist Powers, even tbcmgh this in itself CO SOlid support for the Smith regime. Even mm@ serious matters are involved, namely. the realisatfon Of plans for the creation of a military-cc!onialist Çonsistmg of the Repubfic of South Africa, al, Spain and Southern Bbodesia, the aim of whfch Would be t0 combat the national liberation movement in central and southern Africa and tc exert PSessuEe on the African States which have embarhed on the course of independent development. 101. The Southern Rhodesian racists’ contribution to this military “pool” of the colonialists is the armed force% including the air force, whioh have been turned over to them by the United Elngdam Government. In that connexion, it is not out of place to recall the warning once made by Ghana, Guinea, Morocco and the United Arab Republic which, ln the memorandum attached to their letter of 2 August 1963 [S/5362]-/said, inter alia, that the transfer of these forces to Southern Rhodesia would constitute a most serious threat to the security of the African continent. lt is truc, as everybody now knows, that Portuguese and South African units already take part in the military manoeuvres carried out in Southern Rhodesia. 102. We must point out that the circle of the Smith Government’s closest friends is by no means limited to the above-mentioned States, and the United Eingdom Government is doing nothing to prevent it from broadening its foreign relations. The range of these relations is also significant. According to an African Yearbook for 1965, the Smith Government is represented net only in the United Eingdom, the Republic of South Africa and Portugal. but also in the United States of America and in West Germany. 103. lt is also significant that the great majority of the nineteen foreign countries with representation in Salisbury are from the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, including the United States of America, the UnitedKingdomofGreat Britain and Northern lreland. the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Italy. Canada and Portugal, and also the Republic of South Africa, Australia and a few other countries. 104. But this is only one facet of the truth that the main support of the Smith regime is to be found outside of Africa in the capitals of the colonialist Powers. The other side of the coin is that in Southern Rhcdesia itself Smith and his ministers are no more tban representatives of the foreign monopolies. which have long been entrenched in Southern Rho; desia and have spread their tentacles allover southern Africa. 105. Rare are the names of the largest foreign monopolies in Scuthern Rhodesia: the companies dcminated by British capital are the Anglo American Corporation of Smith Afrlca, Shell, Rio Tinto Zinc, PQ6. It is easy to see $& this is basically a list of tbe very companies aad bmks which bave branches f South Africa. Hence. tbe activities rn Rhodesia are part of tbe same ified system 0f imperialist m0nap0lies wbichbave a deatb grip on Africa’s minera1 wealtb in the ~l~l~st preseme. 107. The ence whieh these foreign monopolies have an tbe policies of tbe Smith Government is skwn by the fact that wben Smith arrived in Londan for a visit in September 1964, tbe representatives of tbe monopolies having interests in Soutbern Rbodesia went to meet bim on an equal footing with members of the United Kiigdom Government. 106. At a diier given in Smttb’s fionour at 10 Downing Straet. according to The Observer, tbe guest list included names of several representatives of big basiaess. Among tbose present were Mr. Cale, tbe Ckairman of Unilever, Mr. Richardson, the Vice- Cbaairmaa of Lloyd% Bar&, and Mr, O’Brien, ~eputy Governor of the Bar& of Enghand. On the foRowing day Mr. Smith visited the main offices ofthe Standard Bank in tbe City. 109. AU tbis took place in the context of the openiy express& apprehension tbat W. as The Observer put it. Smith really did issus a unilateral declaration of independence, the City would guarantee him its fiicial support’. 110. The influence and power of these fore@ monopolies in Soutbern Rhodesia itself is a180 shovm by thm fa& that tbey are setting up their ovin private mikitia to protect business in tbe event of disorders. Ill. Such is tbe tight circle of imperialist forces wbicb are supporting Smith’s racist regime b0th instde and outside Soutbern Rhodesia. 112. We must again draw the Council’s attention to tbe primary responsibiiity for the course of events in Southern Rbodesia wbich is borne by the Un.ited Kingdom as tbe administering Power. 113. Tbere is bardly any need to recount in detail tbe bistory of tbis question or tbe numerous resolutions adopted by tbe General Assembly and thespecial Committee. I sbaD merely mention tbe following amental recommendations contained in various resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee and addressed directly to the United Kingdom as tbs administesing Power. 115. Secondly, the Unlted Kingdom was called upon to repeal ail, repressive and discriminatory legislatlon. ami, in particular. the Law and Order (Maintenance) Aot and the Land Annortlonment Act. 116. Thlrdly, the United Kingdom was asked to remove ail restrictions on Afrloan political activlty and to establish full democratic freedom and equality of political rights. 117. Fourthly, the United Kingdom Government was recommended to suspend the 1961 Constitution and to hold without delay a constitutional conference in which the representatives of a11 political parties would take part with a view to making constitutional arrangements for independence, on the basis of universal adult suffrage, including the fixlng of the earliest possible date for independence. 118. How did the United Kingdom respond to a11 these appeals. recommendations and warnings? As weknow, the United Kingdom simply ignored them. 119. Meanwhile, at the meetings of the Security Council in September 1963 and the meetings of the Special Committee, it was proved beyond douht that the United Kingdom possessed all the necessary means-political, constitutional. economic and military-of applying pressure and using its influence. But the whole point is that the United Kingdom is not wllling to use any of them. Its reluctance stems from the fact that a deal was made between the ruling circles of the United Kingdom and the Southern Rhodesian racists, the purpose of which is to hoodwlnk world public opinion. The specific purpose of thls deal is to wbitewash the United Kingdom and to make it appear that the “intransigent” Smith and his colleagues bave the final say. 120. At the Council’s 1194th meeting, Lord Caradon. the United Kingdom representative, tried. wlth many pious phrases, to justify hls Government’s policy towards Southern Rhodesia. In particular, heenumerated the principles upon whioh that policy is based. But it is impossible not to see that the most important prinoiple is missing, namely, a clear and firm statement of a resolve not to permit a crime to be perpetrated inSouthern Rhodesia and to prevent the racists from holding their so-called elections and from usurping power in violation of the legîtimate rights of the indigenous population. This is what is missing. It must be admitted that the tone and formulation of the United Kingdom representative’s statements bave changed; but the United Kingdom’s position remains basically the same. Lord Caradon’s whole point was that negotiations with the racist Smith should be patiently pursued and that the Security Councll should not hinder the Unlted Kingdom Government. But what are these negotiations? With whom are they being conducted? question tberefo azed at tbe truly stra belpless5ess. tbe asousness and spimnelessness whicb the m Oovernrment is displayi used mt pious words and exhortations, but brute armed force. 123. en. bowever. the question arises of using BMish troops to prevent tbe wbite racists inSoutbern bening their position. in the interests of tbe Africanpopulation, the United 5t once loses a11 desire to act. A ve episode is described by Sir Roy Welensky. the r Prime Minister of tbe Federation of Rhoand Nyasaland, in his mernoirs. IIe relates lmw. in 1961, be gained the impression that tbe British troops tben assembled at Nairobi were there to restrain tbe white racists. Some time after tbat on had occurred to him. he met II, tben Prime Minister of the United complained to bim about it. The result ail expectations. This is how Sir Roy Welenshy describes Mr. MacmilIan% reaction in bis memoirs: The mars rolfed down Macmillan’s cheeks. ‘Roy. do you believe that I . . . would bave tolerated a situation in which Britishers would have been sbo&ing down Britishers, their brothers. alongside wbom tbey had fought on many a battlefield?‘” Mr. Macmillan ent on to say, according to Sir Roy Welenslcy, a again I quote: vWe are collecting them [the British troons] in case you needed help. and we sbould have bai them there ready for you.“o/ NO Comment is needed in this case. 124. Lastly, witb regardtotheUnitedKingdomrepresentative’s assertions that it is impossible for bis CoUntrY to revoke or even amend the Southern Rhode- -- 5 W-mkYb 4col DaYS (London. COIti, 1964). p. 305. 125. My distinguished colleague from the Uuited Kiagdom, Lord Caradon. quoted extensively at the 1194th meeting from the Labour Government’s statements containing exhortations addressed to the racist authorities in Southern Rhodesia and announcing the measures it intends to take in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence. He spoke of economic sanctions and of how “an illegal declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia would bring to an end relationships between her and Britain”, etc. 126. But does it really matter what measures the United Kingdom Will take after the racists insouthern Rhodesia have usurped power once and for all? 1s there really any point in shutting the stable door after the horse has been stolen? 1s it not olear that the United Kingdom has a duty not to allow events to Lake such a course but to take now the necessary steps to prevent the racists in Southern Rhodesia from carrying out their criminal designs. Tbat is what is expected of the United Kingdom Labour Government. If the United Kin@lom were really interested in defending the rights of the African people, it would only welcome the adoption of appropriate measures by the Security Counoil. 127. In fact, however, we see that such action by the United Kingdom Government as the dispatch of two of its Ministers, Mr. Bottomley and Lord Gardiner, to Southern Rhodesia has produced negative results. As we know, in the course of meetings wlth these Ministers, Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Takawir, the leaders of Afrioan political parties, demanded that the United Kingdom Government should cal1 a constitutiona conference at once. release political prisoaers, introduoe immediate universal suffrage and impose majority rule, if aecessary by force, Mr. Bottomley’s aaswer clearly showed that the Unlted Kingdom Government had no intention of taklng such action. Aad when Mr. Bottomley was asked in Parliamentwhether he meant that the Government did aot intead to introduce majority rule in Southera Rhodesia by means of legislation his answer was: “SO long as there is no constitutional action this Government Will respect the convention.” 123. That was the reply of the same man who. on 11 July 1963, had stated in that same Unlted Kiagdom Parliament: “. ..if the present Administration of Southern Rbodesia are not prepared in their own iaterests to advance at a rate whicb will give a11 sections of /. 129. abat is what the representative of tbe Labour id, that is how cietermined he bad is the reason for such a strihing me~mo~bosis in the position of a Minister of Her Majestyvs Government? Tbat is the question. 139. It must be stressed tbat the situationinSouthern Rbodesia bas never been as teI%ve or as explosive as it fs at present. We are approacbing 7 May, the day of the so-caBed elections, whicb are fraught witb such serious consequences. If these elections are bel& no one bas any doubt about their outcome. lt is a foregone conclusion b-ecause of tbe way in wbich this of an election fs being engineered. lb&-. Smith to obtain a two-thirds majority from an eledorate specially selected by him. in order to bave an entirely free band to proclaim wbat be oalhs independence in conditions of complete supremaoy of tbe white minority. and thereby consolidate tbe poer of the white racists in the country. ffect tbat tbese elections Will peals by the representatives the United States of Amerîca tries-sucb as were heard in when the question of Southern er consideration-for *confidence,v “patiencew, wcommon seme* etc., cari only. in this bour of tension, be regarded as an encouragement to the Soutbern Rbodesian racists and as a means of be~ping tbem to realfae their sinfster plans. 131. The Security Couucil caonot remain indiierent in tbe face of a situation wbich is such a danger o world peace. Ht cannot ignore tbe fact that tbis licy. wbich is a tbreat to peace and security. rightly considered by the whole of independent Africa to be a challenge to the African peoples and s wbicb, at the Summit Conference of Afrioan Skates at Addis Ababa, proir determination to eliminate colonialism and racism from the Africancontinent. Thisdetermination was reaffirmed by the Heads of State or Gavement of the Nondligned Countries at Cairo, and more recently by the Couucil of Mini&ers of tlle Or n of African Unity at Nairobi. The Special ttee, in its resolutfon adopted on 22 April 1965. f%pressed its deep concern at tbe further deterioration of the situation in Southern Rhode& re6ulting from recent developments and mwticularly tbe decision of the minority Governt to bold elections baseci on the 1961 Constitution the thfeats of thfs Government unilaterally to declare wbat it calls independence. 132. Tbe USSR ckslegation fully shares the legitimate Conaern of tbe African States and supports their just deman&. We whole-heartedly ~ugport the demands wmcb bave been made on behalf of all tbe African Statea b.v the Mini&ers for Foreign Affairs of Algerfa anci Senegal at meetings of the Seourity coun~il. 134. The Security Council must, inter alia, demand that the United Kingdom Covernment should take the necessary steps to cencel the elections scheduled to be held in Southern Rhodesia on ‘7 May on the basis of the racist Constitution and to repeal the Constitution and at once convene a constitutional conference, in which representatives of all the political parties in Southern Rhodesia would take part, in order to draw up a new Constitution based on full equality of rights for the indigenous population and to settle forthwith the question of the country’s independence. 135. The people of Zimbabwe bave a right to expect the United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, to take steps to obtain for them the freeciom and independence for which they have long waited. The spearhead of the struggle for national liberation in Southern Rhodesia is directed not only against interna1 reactionaries. the handful of wbite racist settlers and their Covernment, but also against externa1 forces, the forces of imperialism. This struggle, as in any other territory in Southern Africa-in Angola, Mozambique. South West Africa and South Africa-extends beyond the border6 of the oouutry and takes the form of a struggle betwen ail the peoples still living under colonial rule and all the forces of colonialism. 136. We do not want to predict whether the Security‘ Council will be in a position this time to take into account the just demands of the whole of independent Africa. But we consider it our duty to state as clearly as possible that, whatever may be the result of the consideration of this problem in the Security Council on this occasion, the colonialists must at la& realize that tbeir plans to save colonialism are built on quicksand. The Bastille of colonialism is about to be razed to the ground. Marx. with his scientific genius. once spoke of “the gigantic broom” of the French Revolution. We now have every reason tn speak of the great purifying storm of ami-colonialism wbich Will sweep away the last colonial strongholds. That is why we bslieve that the freedom-loving people of Zimbabwe Will triumph in their legitimate stru for genuine freedom and independence. AR freedom-loving peoples of the world are inside, and that is a guarantee that their etr WilIbe crowned with complete and final victory and that the country of Zimbabwe Will occupy a worthy place in the family of the United Nations. 137. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): 1 had boped to bave time this morning to reply to tbe three speeches to which we have listened. but, in view of the lateness of tbe heur, 1 do not propose to do so. 1 would reserve my right to do 60 at a subsequent meeting. 138. Al1 1 would wieh to do this morning is to reply in a few sentences to the speech towhich we bave juet pays a propos X39. Tbe representative oftbesoviet Unionusedsome very strong Ianguage and built a pyramidof adjectives kdnarkable evsn for him, and 1 should like to make some answer to the very gener.u accusations which he made against my country. speaking as he did in terms of misrepresentation auo conspiracy. 1 speak, as 1 say. in regard to his general ami sweeping accusations against my country in the whole field of what be called colonialism. 140. It is odd to hear a representative of the Soviet Union speaking in this Council as a representative of free democracy, because we a11 know that, while bis country has been engaged in the past. two decades ou bringing and keeping peoples and couutries uuder the ruthless domination of the neoslavery of the Soviet rystem, my country bas been engaged in those two decades ou the oppositeprooess. We are experts, not in subjugation. butineufranchlsement. and we are proud to say tbat now. out of the 700 million people in my Commonwealth, a11 but some 1 per cent are living in self-governingand independent countries. ami to be able to iemind the representr:ive of the Soviet Union that in less than twenty years we in the Commonwealth bave enfranchised and brougbt into the councils of the world nearly three Urnes tbe wbole population of the Soviet Union. I remind him of those facts; 1 rebut the charges that be has made against my country. No country in tbe world has a record of enfranchisement, and of bringing peoples forward ta self-government and iudependence, to compare with mine. 1 therefore wish to takc this opportunity of answeriug the charges of conspiracy ami malice which he has brought against my Covernment. 141. Speaking in those general terms, I Will leave tbe matter for the present and Will return on another occasion to the other and much more constructive speeches to which we bave listened today.
The President unattributed #121074
1 now cal1 on the represenmtive of the USSR in exercise of the right cf reply.
The Soviet delegation considers it necessary to exeroise its right of reply. 144. Tbe position which 1 have just outlined provoked a very obvious reaction from the representative of the United Kingdom. His Lordship reacted in the same way as, according to the Japanese proverb, a sleepy person acts when he bas been glven hot water to drink. His Lordship tried to make a joke 146. We leave it to the conscience of the United Kingdom representative to reconcile the consideratiens which guide him as the representative of a Labour Government with the fact that he is justifyina; Conservative polioies in this regard. 141. 1 should like to remind the United Kingdom representative of a simple precept: one should not hoast or praise one’s own virtues. In the East they say that “Buddha does not adorn himself wltb gold” . However, the United Kingdom representative wanted to have more truth. With your permission that is something 1 shall be very pleased to provide. 148. Lord Caradon was in no hurry to reply net only to my questions but also to the question put by other speakers, in particular the representative of the Ivory Coast. whether the United Kingdom Government is prepared to state categorically that it Will not a&W a unilateral proclamation of independenoe on the part of Southern Rhodesia. Now tbat 1 am on the subject, 1 should like to make a brief excursion into the very recent past. 149. 1 should like to recall that at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly sometbing oocurred that gave rise to very lively comments on the part of delegations, the Press, etc. 1 am referring to the resignation of Sir Hugh Foot. who must be well known to Lord Caradon, since he was the United Kingdom representative in the Trusteeship Council. the Fourth Committee and the Special Committee. Sir Hugh resigned because he did not agree with the United Kingdom’s policy concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia-the same question which is today on the Security Counoil’s agenda. 150. Some time later. Sir Hugh Foot published a book entitled A Start in Freedom. The author devoted a considerable part of his book to the question of Southern Rhodesia and to the reasons for bis resignation. 1 should like to quote some passages from this memorable book. Sir Hugh writes: “1 had made it plain in London that if no new initiative were to be taken 1 could not continue to speak on Southern Rhodesia in theUnitedNations, and when 1 returned to New York 1 wrote this to the Head of my Mission: 1( *It is tbe question of Southern Rhodesian wbich. as far as we are concerned, must dominate the vcolonialn debates during this Assembly . . e Vonsequently I should at this time be preparing to take my full part in that defence, both in the Fourth Committee and elsewbere. I havs most anxiously considered this prospect, and my conclusion is, I do net feel able to speak in the UN or elsewhere we call them ‘emotional’. When they urge some positive polfcy of liberation we dl them lreckless’. When resolutlons are passed in the United Nations witb the overwhelmfug he whole world responsibility’ irs we become of the termdly. sterile. .* “Tbe mucb more serious. It is that we bave very means and at every opportunity a the United Nations.“m 151. Tbat is what Sir Hugh Foot used to be like. 1 say %sed to be” because we are not likely to meet him again. We now have Lord Caradon before us. What is important is not the fact that he bas become a Peer, but tbat the change in title bas been accompanied by a metamorphosis in bis convictions. We do not know wbat oaused that deplorable metamorphosis: we are merely recording a fact. 152. 1s it not true that the United Kingdom Government regards as reckfess the demands for a firm policy of liberatmg the millions of Africans in Soutbern Rhodesia from subjogation by a handful of racists? Is the United Kingdom Covernment really str hening the Wnited Nations at present when it mpts to prevent the Security Council from settling tbe situation in Southern Rhodesia. a situation that endangers world peace? 1s not the United om displaying the very sterility anci cowardice oed by Sir Hugb Foot when it tries to appease tbe racist leaders in Southern Rhodesia who, eucouraged by this forbearanoe on tbe part of the United Kiugdom, become more aud more arrogant aad defiant? The importance of the United Kfngdom Covernment is particularly striking when we recall the speed and determination witb which it acts whenever there 3s the sllgbtest suspicionof a threat to British nationals in other countries. We need only point to the case of the Congo, wbere Belgiau paratroopers were immediately flown from the British island of Ascension, for the alleged purpose of protecting the Pives of a ~&a 1 of Wbftes. When ft is a question, however. of proteoting the lives, the freedom; and tbe legitimate rights of 4 million Africans insouthern Rhodesia, then God forbid that oue should touch the racists. o/ A Sitart in Freedom (London. Hodder and Stoughron. 1964). p. 222. 3 Ibid. w. 231 and 232. --
The President unattributed #121080
1 uow cal1 on the representative of the United Kiugdom in exercise of bis right of reply. 155. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): 1 am sure it is net the wish of the Council to delay any longer on what has become a matter of persona1 accusation, but 1 should certaiuly like to say with regard to the actions 1 took and the words 1 used when 1 was previously in the United Nations. in 1962, in the circumstances that then existed. that 1 do not wish to retract a single word or to retreat from any action that 1 bave previously takzn. 156. 1 am fiattered to know that sections of my book have been brought to the notice of the repre- Sentative of the Soviet Union. 1 should be very happy if he would read the whole book. If he does SO, he Will enter into a field whioh, SO far as he is concerned, is a virgin field-the whole process of eufranohisement and of brin-g people towards selfgovermnent and to full independenoe. As to the cost of the book, it cari be purchased in the market at $4.95: but if the representative of,the Soviet Union, followhrg past praotice, finds that that is too substantial a voluntary contribution, 1 should be very happy to present him with the book on the understanding and with the agreement between us that he Will read it all. 1 have pleasure in presenting this copy to him. 15’7. The PRESIDENT: 1 now cal1 on the representative of the Soviet Union in exercise of his right of reply.
1 should 1Ike to exercise my right of reply in connexion with Lord Caradon’s remarks, if ouIy out of common courtesy, in order to thank him for his gift. 159. However. if my distinguished colleague’s perspicacity has not failed him he will have observed that the quotations from his book were made in complete confcrmity bothwith the requirements of scholarship and with the courtesy due to the author. However, since the United Kingdom representative wlshes to have more truth, 1 shall endeavour onlater occasions to meet his wishes aud to make further use of his book, which 1 have carefully studied, because it was my duiy and because I was interestedinthis extreme- Iy frank work. 1 have of course mentioned only a few of the many points that arose in my mind as 1 read tbe book. 1 shall do my utmost to express more fully a reader’s gratitude to the author for his very frank and uncompromising statements. meeting me af 1.16 p.m. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS United Notions publications moy be obtained distributors throughout the world. write to: United Notions, Sales Section, COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS Les publications des Notions Unies sont agences dépositaires du monde entier. Informer-vous ou adressez-vous h: Notions Unies, Section COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidos cosos distribuidoros en todos portes del dirijase CI: Nociones Unidos, SecciOn de Litho in U.N. Price: $U.S. 0.75 (or quivalent in other
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UN Project. “S/PV.1195.” UN Project, https://un-project.org/meeting/S-PV-1195/. Accessed .