S/PV.1197 Security Council

In accordance with the decision taken at the 1194th meeting on 30 April. 1 shall now, At the invitation of the President. Mr. Bouteflika (AlgertaJ ad Mr. Vaudou Thiam (Senegal), took places at the Couacil table.

The subject of Rhodesia which is before the Council is obviously one of great importance, in the first place for Africa and for the British Commonwealth, but, in a wider sense, for the world as a whole, because of the principles involved and because of the inherent dangers. My delegation shares the deep concern of the African countries with the serious developments in Rhodesia, a concern which has been SO clearly voiced here by thc Foreign Ministsrs of Senegal and A@ria 11194th meeting], and we fully understand their decision to bring this question before the Council. 3. When the question of Southern Rhodesia wasunder consideration in the Fourth Committee at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly inthe autumnof 1963. the Netherlands delegation had occasion to state its views on the matter. At that time my delegation said that the state of sffairs in the territory. characterized as it was by the rule of a amall minority over a vast majority, was at variante with the principles and purposes of the Charter, with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and with the jnst demands of ail-out and speedy decolonization as embodied in General Assembly resolution 1514 (KV). The right to selfdetermination of the people of touthern Rhodesia, my delegation then said, was parümount and should be implemented as soon as possible. The Netherlands delegation went on to say that it could not acoept a situation in which the large indigenous majority of a colonial territory was deprived of a number of fundamental human rights. 4. Furthermore, we stressed the ultimate international responsibility of the United Kingdom for the future of the territory, the details of thn constitutional situation being, in our opinion, of a secondary nature. In this connexion, my delegation then stated: matever its present status and its position in relation to the United Kingdom Government, the Territory could not become independent without the consent of the United Kingdom Government and Parliament. *Y Finally, we said that we trusted that the United Kingdom Government would use a11 its moral and political influence in order to bring about a truly non-racial and democratic independent African State into being as soon as possible. 6. We still beliere that the United Kingdom Government not only has the ultimate, constitutional responsibility of decision on the question of independence but also the moral and political responsibility and duty aotively to work for a solution of this problem acceptable to all the parties concerned. 7. The United Kingdom Government has never shirked these responsibilities and in this respect 1 wish in particular to stress the important announcement of the United Kingdom Government of 27 October 1964$f which has been quoted several times in this debate. In that statement the United Kingdom Government stated again its conditions for granting independence to the territory and it warned in strongand unmistakably clear terms of the disastrous consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence, which it characterized as “an act of defiance and rebellion’ and, SO the announcement continues, “it would be treasonable to take steps to give effect to iV. Certainly it would be difficult to put one’s point of view across more unambiguously. In describing the consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence. the announcement further states Yhe reactions of foreign governments would likewise be Sharp and immediate. With one or two exceptions, they are Rkely to refuse to racognize Southern Rhodesia’s independence.oito enter into relations with her”. 9. Last Friday (1194th meeting] my delegation was heartened by listenlng to the representative of the United Kingdom who then quoted in full a new statement made on 29 April4/ by the Brltish Prime Minister in the House of Gommons. This statement refutes the tenets of the Rhodesia White Paper and expresses renewed strong adherence to the United Kingdom Government’s statement of 27 October 1964. Mr. Wilson also stated quite clearly that: “There cari be no justification for the Rhodesian Government or people to nurse the delusion that they would receive widespread international support”, in case they should unilaterally declare independence. Britain’s Prime Mlnister stressed again that Rhodesia could “nothope to defy Britain, the whole of the Commonwealth, nearly the whole of Africa and the United Nations”. Mr. Wilson went on to declare that the answer lay in an agreed solution and that his Government stood ready to carry forward its negotiations with the Government of Rhodesia after the elections in order to achieve this objective. 10. My delegation welcomes and supports the strong stand which the United Kingdom Government took and, as is apparent from the statements in th& Council. still takes with regard to the dapger of a unilateral declaration of independence. Much as we cari understand the desire of some African countries for stronger actionwhichwasvoicedhere SO eloquently by the Foreign Ministers of Senegal and Algeria. we must at the same time recognize the legal and practical limits within which the United Kingdom Government will have to operate. 1 doubt whether it would be of much use if the Council were to pass judgement upon the legal possibilities which would have been open or are still open to the United Kingdom under British constitutional law to prevent the forthcoming elections from taking place. lf they cari still be concelled or postponed, SO much the better. My delegation would greatly welcome this. 11. If they csnnot be concelled. then. as is apparent from the statements in this Council, the main point on which we should concentrate is that their outcome should not in any way preoipitate any dangerous further developments, such as. in particular, a unilateral declaration of independence. The Government of Rbodesia has, in paragraph 6 of the statement of its Prime Minister of 31 March 1965.Y given assurances that no such declaration would take place pending negotiations with the United KingdomGovernment. The key. therefore, lies in these negotiations. y &g.. epI%dIx VI. -/ lgg., appodlx VII. s/ -0. appendIx v. 12. In order to achieve a result acceptable to the majority of the population, such constitutional discussions should, however, take into account the desires and iuterests of all sections of the population, and certainly of the majority. We trust that the United Klngdom Will use all possible means at its disposai to achieve the aims which it has itself SO clearly set out. We also strongly hope that the white population and Government of Rhodesia Will be wlse enough to adhere to law and legality and, above ail, to common sense. Indeed, we note from the report of the Sub- Committee that taere is among the whlte electorate and. in particular, in business ciroles in Rhodesia considerable opposition to the idea of a unilateral declaration of independence. It is also interesting to note that that opposition is implicitly recognised by the Government of Rhcdesia in its White Paper of 26 April, since that White Paper strives to prove that the fears of tbese circlcs are completely unfounded. 13. Having listened tc the different interventions here, 1 should like to point out one important fact which has again emerged from our debate, and that is that basically there is not much difference Of opinion in this Council or among the African States on the ultimate objective to be achieved in Scuthern Rhodesia. namely, a truly independent and democratic African State under majority rule with adequate democratic safeguards for the minority. That, 1 would submit to the Council, is a hopeful fact and Ohe on which the Council should base itself in possible action. The differences, wide as they may have seemed in this debate, limit themselves to the methods the United Elngdom Government might follow in order to achieve that common objective. 14. From the statement made hy the United Kingdom representative at the 1194th meeting and from the statement made by the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons on 29 April, it has once again bscome clear that his Government fully adheres tc the objective I bave just mentiOh&. That Govemment ha given the assurance that it Will not grant independence to Rhodesia except on a basis which is acceptable to the peopie of the country as a whole. 15. It has given proof of its determination to persist lti negotiations tc achieve the independence of Rhcdesia on this basis, and it has given clear warning of the disastrous consequences, including the application of economic measures, which would flow from an Unconstltutional one-sided declaration of lndependence. 16. Tbat. we believe. is the maximum one cari ask of any country. TO apply force of arms. in our opinion, would net achieve any useful results. The 17. Nor do we think that such use of force is necessary to achieve the aim. The mesns of negotiation which the United Kingdom Government has spelledout should, if successful, be able to achleve the results which a11 those around this table and a11 the African nations desire, namely, an independent Rhodesia under a majority Government. 18. What then cari this Council do to further this aim. which is SO ardently and SO rightly desired by the African States and supported, we believe, by practicaIly the whole oi the United Nations? 19. In order to get away from generalities, 1 should like to try to sum up what 1 have said by indicating in broad outline what constructive action the Security Council could. in the opinion of my delegation. take. 20. My delegation believes that the Council should first of a11 reaffirm the right of the Rhodesian people to self-determination and to independence uncler a majority Government. 21. Furthermore, the Council cari make it clear that it deplores the fact that elections will be held in Rhodesia on 7 May on a basis which runs counter to the principles of the Charter and to human rights and also tbat their results cannot be considered as representative of Rhodesia as a whole. 22. At the same time, the Councll might appeal to the United Kingdom Government to stand fast in its determinatlon not to grant independence except on a basis acceptable to the people of the country as a whole, and to do everything in its power to prevent a unilateral declaration of independence. 23. The Council might furthermore emphasize the dangers to Rbodesia as well as to it neighbours and to peace in Africa of such a unilateral declaration. The Council might in this respect endorse the statements of the British Prime Minister of 27 October and 29 April on the consequences of a possible unilateral declaration. 24. The Council furthermore might urge the United Kingdom actively to pursue and broaden-andbroadening is important-the constitutional talks in order to achieve the independence of Rhodesia on the basis 1 have mentioned. Finally, the Security Council might keep open the possibility of taking up the matter again if the situation should further deteriorate. 25. Tbese are some common points & which we would hope the main interested parties around this table could agree. By taking such action, the Cauncil would strengthen the hand of the United Kingdom Government for future negotiations and would thus. we

Tbe Bollvian delegation has listcnsd impartiaIIy aad sympatbeticaliy and with tl= same spirit of freedom tbat motivates ail the etierglng nations botb to the statemonts of concern expressed by tbe Foreign i’vlinisters ci Scnegal and Algeria speaking on bebalf of the African States on the problem before us aad to tbe opinions of various representatives. Our delegation has rùso llstened attentively tc the United Kingdom representative’s statement, which shows the interest of Her Majeety’s Government in brlnglng to the Southern Rhodesia prcblem a constitutional solution, based on negctiations. which Will benefit the entire population of Suuthern Rhcdes!a. 28. The polltical maturity and lnstitutionalexperienca of the United Kin@om Government as well as the fa& that the problem lnvolves tbe threat of an imminent explosion give us reascn to belleve that that Government Will sec the need to adopt measures to avcid a ccaflict of unforeseeable ccnsequences, and tbat it Will do SC urgently and in tbe speclfic form dictated by circumstances. in accordance witb tbe pollcy of a firm assurance. a clear warning and perststent negotiation, to whlch referenz has been made by the Unlted Kh@om representative in tbis Council. In the opinion of my delegation, tbe implementation of the statement of 27 October 1964 is anurgent necessily. 29. Lord CARAFON (United Kingdcm): I tbou this mi *ht be a conveiient opportunity tc comment on some of the points whlch have been raised durlng the debate to which we have been listenlng. I shculd llks to say, at the outset. that we start from the commcn gronnd, which we all share, of concern and anxlety about the situation whlch we are discussing. As I bave said, we have never scught to underestimate the pctential difficulties of the situation. On the contrary. we have been at pains. repeatedly, tc emphasize them, 30. 1 thlnk 1 might turn for a moment first to the speech of the representative of the Ivcry Coast who spoke particularly about constitutional matters. Rspeatedly in other places and in cther Committees we have made our position very plain on all aspects of the constitutional position as we ncw see it, and 1 certainly do net wish tc enter into a full review of these constitutiona matters now. 1 have. hcwever, cne or two points which 1 would wish tc put to my 33. I sbould like for a moment ta spe caf tbe statements, charges and accu hawe b.een made with regard tothe situati essenlial factoï, to whicb we bave conetantl~ tbe attention of the Council, tbat Rhodesi; is se&-goveraing in its interna1 affairs and bave beel 34. 1 think, however, that having made that general statement, 1 would, in reply to the representative of the lvory Coast. make one comment. He spoke as a lawyer and he spoke of the legal aspects of the question which we discuss. 1 think that it might be well to say at this time that, with regard to the judiciary of Rhodesia, 1 believe it is generally recognized that the standards which have been maintained by the judiciary of Rhodesia are such as tc attract the favourable comment, indeed the praise, of people far bsyond the boundaries of Rhodesia itself. Indeed, comment has been made on those hlgh. standards by the African leaders themselves, and I was struck by the generous comment which was made by a petitioner at the 325th meeting of the Special CommitteeY Mr. Shamuyarira, in answer to a question in that Committee, said: “The judiciary in Rhodesia has played a verJi useful role indeed in these difficult years. The judges have been fair . . .“z/ 1 do not wish in &y way to misrepresent what Mr. Shamuyarira said, and the full record of his reply with respect to .the judiciary, with certain reservations that he made and also with reference to the powers and functions of the Privy Cwncil in the United Kingdom, are set out in the Verbatim record. Nevertheless, since the representative Of tbe Ivory Coast raised the question of the administration of justice in Rhodesia, 1 am sure he would welcome the comment that 1 have made. 35. The representative of Jordan made a Speech [1195th meeting], to which we listened with special attention, and he spoke of the different objectives which may etist in my own country and in Rhodesia itself. He spoke of the fact that although we may state our aims and give our assurances and our warnings and may he prepared to set out on negotiation, those who exercise authority in Rhodesia may have oery different purposes. 1 thllk that may well be SO. 36. As 1 said earlier 11194th meeting], opposlng views in Rhodesia in many respects could not be further apart. We do not underestimate the difficulties. But the existence of the difficulties does net. in our opinion, justify an abandonment of peacefulnegotiation. !?l3pecisl Comm*aee on tihe siruadop wirh regard to rhe Implememdon of me Déclaration on the Grandng of Indepr?odence ~0 Colomlal Couniries and Peoples. g Sec document A/AC.109/PV.3% (mimeographed). 42. 1 would remind the Council of the words I.used when 1 spoke here last Friday, and 1 make no excuse for repeating them, 1 believe they go to the essence of the question which is before us now. This is what 1 said: “It was right. in spite of rebuffs and set-backs. t0 pursue negotiation. And wbile tbere is any boIxa or any prospect of negotiation avoiding or preventing disaster. negotiation should be pressed to the very end. TO abandon negotiation now would surely be an act of irresponsibility. TO do anything in thts Council or anywhere else to make negotiation more difficult, to wreck what hopes there are of peaceful progress, to take any action here which migbt contribute to the very disaster we most want to prevent-surely that would be a course to be universally condemued.” [1194thmeeting,para. 1091. 43. As I say, 1 used those words a few days ago in this Council. Nothing that 1 have heard, and none of the long discussions which 1 have had with individual members of this Council, has led me to alter my opinion. 44. There may be people who wish to ses conflict in Africa; there may be those who are working to achieve that purpose. But 1 do net believe that the Africans themselves wish to cause such a result. 1 believe that the Africans themselves are as anzious as is my Government to find a waypeacefully towards a successful negotiation. 45. 1 again emphasize the difficulties. Never bave we underestimated them. But, in all my ezperience, I have found that, whether you are dealingwith economic matters or industrial matters or politioal matters. where there is any hopé or any prospect of achieving a result by continuing discussion and negotiation, it must be continued to the very end. And a caII for action which would, indeed, bring conflict as the arbiter of the events which we now Influence, rather than proceeding along the course of negotiation based on the assurance and on the warning which we have given, would, in my opinion, be a very grave errer. 46. Finally. if 1 may, 1 would say one wo’rd personally. My coIIeague from the Soviet Union made a referenoe to my own personal position. We are not interested in personal positions; we are net interested In pursuing. 1 am sure, any persona1 altercation here. IIe spoke, if 1 may respectfully say SO. with a diplomatie if deceptive charm and with a frequent use of Japanese proverbs-and 1 welcome the spirit in whicb he to a widespread feeling cdesiais seriously t the Govemment 49. lt 1s belie t tbe elections wbich are ay 1965 BF& intended ttentbn to the statements the re~resenta~~s of tlx SQ 1iEtemd carefully to tlle ~epreeentative of the Utited Kingcbm, of hls Government. 1 and det5il of tnlose e w-o& of the Council, ail, let me say that my delegation is 52. The effectiveness, however, of the BritishPrime kIinister% warnings has been questioned. lloubtsbave been expressed in tbis Council whether Mr. Ian Smith, who has brought the independeuce issue to a boil ever since bis assumption of power, would hsed the voice of reason. None tbe less, my delegationbelieves that. intransigent as he is, Mr. Smith cannot be oblivious to the grave consequences tbat Will Sure$ flow from a unilateral declaration of independence. He cannot be SO heedless of the disastrous results as to bring the issue to tbe point of no return. This is not the first time that he bas tbreatened to take unilateral action. Last year, it may bs recalled, he publicly proclaimed tbat he would break off relationship with tbe United Kingdom by Christmas. It was in tbe face of this threat that Prime IvIinister Wilson issued his warnings of 27 October. Cbristmas bas corne and gone, and Mr. Smith has failed to mske good bis tbreat. It would, of comme, be rash to assert that Prime Minister Wilson% Stern admonitions were solely responsible for Mr. Smith% change of mind; but it would be equally rash to say that they had nothing to do with it. 53. Economically, Southern Bhodesia is partictdarly vulnerable.. The principal source of foreign exchange is tbe sale of tobacco on the London market. Most informed observer5 believe tbat Southern Rhodesta% economy cannot long witbstand an economic siege in the event of aunilateral declaration of independence. In spite of assertions to the contrary by Mr. Ian Smith, there is reason to believe tbat the poweriùl business interests witbin Soutbern Bhodesia cannot allow tbis to corne to pass. 54. As has been noted, the broad objectives of the British Government and of the African States wlth African âates, as is aIso to be e@ 56. ~~~rnUC~ as tb,e electicms, ch may weu be a prelude tc a ~~~~~teEa~ deckmation of independenee, are scheduled to take @ace on 7 time to Iose. In the view of my mnerete measures of positive action advooated the African Stages deserve serious consideration. I CQ~~~ently lx@e any comtmctive and practical ~~Qmrne~dat~ff~ Cotmd may see fit to make at tlle caaclusio cm discussions wiU bave the y shocked at lais saying do nottbinktbathecan statement, in which, in ed questions. I used tbe States were gaioing their independence. His reply did nat relate to tbat question. Was net to be foflowed in Rbodesia. 61. I really do net u~derstand~w~eu~tod~in~~rn rspresentative cm construe the various questions I asked a6 attacke on his ccuntry. If the answer to my first question is, in fa&, tbat the sole aim of the 1961 titution was the rapid establishment of wlaite in Sauthem Rhodesia, then he may consider 63. 1 did, indeed, mention the 1361 Constitution, but the United Kingdom representative is well aware tbat 1 was not alone in doing SO and that all tbe organs of the United Nations bave eapressed tbeir viens on it; they are a11 represented in tbe General Assembly, wbich has adopted resolutions on the subject by a two-thirds majority. In tbe Specia? Committee tbis Constitution has always been considered a bad one. 64. 1 did, however, make one specific comment on tbis Constitution and tbe United Kingdom representative did not reply to it. 1 said that, defective aS it was, it at least reserved oertain powers to the United Kingdom, and in this connexion I mentioned the prerogatîve of mercy. I said that the United Kingdom had tbese powerS 5:: maintained that it was net in a position to exercise tbem because there was an unwritten agreement not to intervene in the internal affairs of Kbodesia. This is the specific aspect of the Constitution that 1 spoke about, as the officia1 record shows. 65. 1 did, of course, say-but 1 net consider taxis an attack-that, as a jurist, I found it hard to tmderstand bow, wben a constitutional document granted a certain power, it could be argued that an unwritten agreement prevented it being exercised. I ciid say tbis and 1 am sorry that the United Kingdom regresentative took it as an attack, but 1 must honestly admit that I still do not understand. My French training is perlaaps to blame: 1 also addressed myself to my Prench colleague and said tbat the education I had, received in his country made it impossible for me to understand an argument of this nature, but 1 do not think that anyone could construe tbis as an attack by me. 66. 1 now corne to the changes in tbe Constitution mentioned by the United Kingdom representative. Since they would adversely effect certainprerogatives of the communities, they would be the subject of a speoial referendum in the separate ComnumitieS. As it happens, I am acquainted witb this part oftbe Constitution; indeed, 1 bave had the honour of discussing it in the Fourth Committee with a former Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Ivlr. Whitehead, wl% if 1 remember correotly. was at the time aoting as a petitioner. 1 told him that 1 did not tbink the COnStitntion was a very effective one or tbat it represented a safeguard for the Africans. Have we any a6suranoe that the referendum in question Will apply t0 the 4 million Africans? We know that tbere have been other referendums, as 1 mentioned in my statement yesters wbich tbe Wnited Kingdom and I congratulate it on ess. I shculd like to point to tbe represefative of that couutry tbat none of e States bas imdted tbe W~tedKi~~am SO deeply as Brime Minister M-8 Smith bas done. Some of tbe leaders of %?Se coxntries wbkb tbe Wnited Kin bave bac! to pass tbsou over tbe xeim of ~vor~me~t. Of tbe judiciary but I bave never criticized ry of Soutbern Rbodesia. I said tbat Mr. 0 s.5ci tbe Rev. Sitbole were in prison: in fact, to residence restriction aad entbougbtbe fudiciary legaI. 1 paid a tribute Rbodesia; 1 did not m rspresentative said rlynear tbe truth. and 70. In conclusion, 1 should like to appeal to tbe Wnited Kingdom representative not to see in my statement attacks which were in no way intended. Since 1 came to tbe Security Couacil and to the Imiteci Nations itself. I’ have never attacked any Statea, with the exception of Portugal and Soutb Africa. If I attacked these two States. it was because of their colonialist obstinacy, but the United Kingdom representative must not consider my statement yesterday as any kind of attack. I make every constructive. 1 am aware of the United problems and 1 endeavour to take them i in seaking a compromise 6olutioawbich~~safe~ard s of the 4 million Afrieans in Soutbern 1 am convlnced that in thi points of view are identical and tbattbe U representative agrees witb me that tbeae 4 million Africans, theae 4 mil1 inbabitanta. must be upbold. In ~ocirc~sta~es-Ann the United Kingdom representative knows this as well as we do-must these 4 million Africans be left at the mercy of 200,000 settlers. On this question we speak from experience. These settlers caanot ba expected to consent peacefully ami willingly to lead tbe 4 million indigenous inhabitants of the country to independence and to return power to them. Tbere is no way of convincing Mr. Jan Smith that he must voluntarily hand power over to Mr. Nkomo or to the Rev. Sithole. Mr. Ian Smith is a settler; he bas tbe settler’s mentality. The United Ki om, on tbe other hand, cari do something to ensure tbat power, wlthout any distinction of race, in accorchnce witb democratic principles, whlcb are tbose of tbe United Kingdom itself, is handed over to tbe Africans because tbey number 4 million, wbereas there are onIy 200.000 settlers. 1 am certain that the Africans wlll not pursue a racist policy. Africans are not racists. 1 am sure that if the 200,000’ Wbites in Soutbern Rhodesia are prspared to consider themselves as men and nothing more, brotherly coexistence is possible. I am convinoed tbat the Africans ami the Wbites oan togetber furtber tbeir country’s progress, as otber African States. sucb as mine, bave done. by practising tbe brotberbood of races, without distinction. This is possible. but tbey must be bel ; tbe settlers cannot do it alone and in saying tbis. I speak from experience.

I now cal1 on tbe Minister for Foreign Affairs of Senagal. 12. Mr. Doudou TRIA%I (Senegal) (translated from Frenohl: First of all, Mr. President, 1 should like to us with some a re. %Ca who prepa constihabion is is a ukai?&atera?4 be abPe to do october 1964. this statement does net e talke about it, but has atei08-3 Will ix? a rehtions with S0a~ern Rhodesba would be en Qff-tbat, of cowse, 1s tbe leastwecan expeee; 77. This is not what we expect from the United Kingdom. What we expect is that it Will take steps to prevent the secession SO long as a minority government is in power in Southern Rhodesia. We stumchly support independence and have proved it on many occasions. Eut cari we really believe that independence for Southern Rhodesia, obtamed in circumstances which Will place the overwhelming majority of Africans under the iron rule of aEuropeanminorityof settlers, is really independence? If that is independence, we do not want it. And if consequences are to flow from this independence, those consequences must be to reduce by force, we say, anon-representative Government which has seceded. We want the United Kingdom to tel1 us clearly what its intentions areand we repeat that the 1964 statement does not satisfy us; quite the contrary. You cannot say to a country about to seceded: “Go ahead, we Will ignore you.” That is not what we have corne to ask you and as long as you do not give an assurance that you are ready to use a11 means to prevent secession, we shall remain concerned. 78. Of course, we are not against negotiations provided they cari succeed, but there are different stages in the application of such methods. YOU negotiate: very well. But if the negotiations fail and Mr. Smith takes it upon himself to make a unilateral declaratton of independence, what are you going to do? You tel1 us that you are going to ignore him completely. you are going to break off relations with him. We say that this does net satisfy us, and as long as the Onited Kingdom stands bythat positiom 1 do net think we cari find any common ground. Perhaps economic threats? 1 spoke of them the other day, and 1 return to them now. We African countries have been unanimous in consistently asking for the implementation of economic sanctions ag%nst a number of countries who deliberately violate the United Nations Charter. Those countries are well kno-xn, they are South Africa and Portugal: they do not seem to be any the worse for it. 79. If you simply wish to put Southern Rhodesia in the same position as South Africa, i.e., in the position of a country which manages very well. despite what is said about it, then 1 must say t0 the United Kingdom representative that the position of his Government is still bighly suspect. That is why we ask you to understand the concern whicb we feel. We bave not corne here to stir up trouble in the Council. We have corne with an open mind. with the again ag2=ee BO that situation tinent. Wmteves the pràce. we 82. me 1 antbe repwsentat of the u ex@r@ise Qf bis ri of reply. is COrnCil he carriea ar otherwise. or agai ecmcernecl vdth tic present aad the fuhrre a& 1 bave trieu ail dhe tinte to dig-ect my atbntion to what we slxmlci do in pfesezt ciramstames. taking kmwledge of the facts as they exist. 86. Haweve~, on two OF tln-ee points that the repres+ntative of the Ivory Coast raised just mw, 1 should like. if he wII1 permit me. ta report to him the exact Pegal psitioo as we see it, and inpaxticula~ with referewe to the prerogative of mercy. which is a complieated legal matter on which 1, but net he, w~uld need to take legaI advice. I &ou.ld also be @ad to communicate ta him exactly the provisions the Constitotim in regard to the referendum. eh is one of the means for a change iiz tke ‘aasic provisions of the Constitt~tian. 1 shsl1 make it my

1 now cal1 on the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria.

Mr. President, 1 should be particularly grateful if you would allow the Algerian delegation to refer at somewhat greater length at a later sta to the important statements we have heard today. in particular, the statement made by the UnitedKingdom representative. 90. 1 should like to say. however. that the very sineere esteem in which we hold the distinguisbed and honourable Lord Caradon, the representative of the United Ringdom-an esteem objectively based on bis remarkable views. particularly on this specific problem of Southern Rhodesia-cannot makc us forget at present that somewhere in Africa the fate of 4 million men is at stake. It is true that the United Kingdom representative has already glven us reason for placing unlimited trust in him, and his courageous resignation over the question of Southern Rhodesia is a source of pride and glory for him and a most reassuring factor for us. That is why we should bave wished to have seen him join our ranks today as he did yesterday in order to ensure tbe triumph of the principles of peace, justice and freedom. 91. We were very pleased tc, note this morning the suggestion by the United Kingdom representative tbat we all started from common ground, and that we shared the same concern but that we were nevertheless approaching the problem iu differentways.Therefore, it is without hatred or passion tbat we bave sought in our statements much less to put the United Kingdom in the dook than to bring out the many contradictions that exist between officia1 and unofficia1 statements, on tlie one hand, and the clear and repeated examples of a policy of complacency towards tbe reglme of Mr. Smith, on the other. 92. It therefore seems to me tbat we are asking for nothing more or less than the.appBcation Of what is contained in these British statements of faith. The whole of Africa looks today to the wlsdom of tbis ed do-es mt seem to us to o%%er solution of tke problem or s 0% A%ricans in Soutkern to act in a w af the 4 million inkabitants of Soutkern of tke population of tke Africa le or 0% a41 men 0% go& Will 95. Some kave felt tkemselves entitled to empkasize that there are delegations tkat preack violence for tke sahe of violence; otkers kave also felt entitled to say tbat it was net possible to ask a colonial Power to take more measures tkan those already taken or tkan tkose wkich it had declared tkat it intended to take. 96. Tke Algerian delegation, botk for objective and ective reasons, sees many similarities between situation in Soutkern Rkodesia and that fan problem in its final years. It is very metimes even painful, to psy a trtbute to a former colonial Power. But, skould tke occasion arise, 1 would say tkat the Frenck Government assumed a kistoric responsibility in brïngfng into Pine wkat was. in any case, only a kandful of rebelsand I say advisedly, only a kandful of rebels. 97. In its statements tke UnitedKin does net kesitate today practically to outlaw tke PFeS@Qt Government of Soutkern Rhodesta. Tke United 98. My friend and colleague, the Minister for Fore@ Affairs of Senegal, has drawn the Council’s attention to the fact that only two days remain before the elections scheduled to takeplace inSouthernRhodesia. A tragedy is impendtng, and it seems to us tbat we are prolonging our discussions indefinitely. Hence, we should be particularly happy to see before us as soon as possible resolutions that would enable us to clarify the question and conclude the debate with the adoption of specific and prompt decisions. SS. May 1 ask you once more, Mr. President. to allow me to comment at a later stage on the statements that bave been made today. Havlng said thls. 1 apologize for having taken the floor at thls late heur.

1 have no other speakers for this mornlng. 1 should like to lnform the two distinguished Foreign Mini&ers and my colleagues that a draft resolution is taking shape, and we expect and hope that by tomorrow morning it Will be ready to he tabled for discussion. The discussion that is flled for this afternoon, at 3.30, is the one reIating to the Dominican Republic. The Council Will therefore resume discussion of the problem of Southern Rhodesia tomorrow morning at 10.30. The meeting rose af 1.40 p.m. OW TO OBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications may istributors throughout the world. write to: United Nations, Sales ENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS Les publications des Nations Unies sont agences dépositaires du monde entier. ou adressez-vous 0: Nations Unies, Section COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas casas distribuidoras en todas partes diriiase a: Naciones Unidas, Secci& Litho in U.N. Price: $US. 0.50 (or eqtivalent in other