S/PV.1199 Security Council

In acoordance wlth the deciaion taken on 30 April. I shall now, with the consent of the Af fhe iavifafion of fhe Presideaf. Mr. Boufeflika (Mgerie) and Mr. Lhmdou Thiam (Senegal) fook places af fhe Couacil fable.

There are three names on my list of speakers. The flrst 1s that of Malaysia; and 1 aak leave to addreas the Cou&l as the representative of MALAYSIA. 3. The principal questions facingtheSecurityCcunci1 wlth regard to Southern Rhodesla are: firatIy. what ln fact cari be done wlthln the competence of thla Council to prevent what is being threatened by the Gcvernment in Salisbury, and secondIy. on whom sanctions cari be imposed iu order to avert lt. 4. There are two distinct aspects to this problemthe Political anà the constitution& On the polltical aspect, a11 membera of tbe Councll, includlng, if I understand correctly , the United Kingdom, are agreed that, in embarklng on what clearly ia its objectivethat is te say, the unilateral declaration of lndependence-the Salisbury Gcvernment has carefully plotted for ltself a course that is bound to lead to disaater. If tbat Covernment refuses to realize this, it is not for lack of adequate warnlng from friends and fces alike. 5. On the latter aspect, the constitutional one, moat membera of the Councll appear to be agreed-as are the thlrty-five independent States of Africa-that it ia withln the power of the Unlted Kingdom Covernment, extermdly and by compulsion, to prevent thla dlsaater from occurring. The UnitedKingdom Covernment, on the other hand, claima to be convinced beyond doubt that it bas no authority to calI in question the Southern Rhodeaian Covernment’s attitude, much less the legal means t0 compel that Covernment to change its course, except through a gentle touchandaoft handling and byperauaslon and negotiation. Thls the United Kiugdom Government protests it has beenundertakingmore forthrightly tban ever before; lt says that lt Will continue to do 80, and that its hopes of achlevlng reaulta remaln undimlnlshed. Indeed, it claims that no other course 1s open or even concelvable. 6. In effect, whlle condemnlngtheSoutbernRhcdesian Government for lta intransigent polltical stance in ternis juat as forceful as thoae that bave ever been uaed by anyone, the United Klngdom Government feels powerlesa to impose lts viewa on the Southern Rhodeslan Covermnent. In the meantime, the fate of 4 million Africans la hanglng in the balance. 7. Wlth regard to the polltlcal aspect, the Malayalan Government stands solidly wlth a11 the Afro-Asian Statea ln lts attitude towarda the Southern Rhcdesian Gcvernment and what lt is attemptlngto do in a devfoua and underhanded mariner. ” ‘My Government wishes to state that aunilateral declaration wbich rules out Africanmajorily Covernment is unacceptable, and reiterates in conjunction with other Commonwealth oountries its support for the basis of Southern Rhodesian independence as laid down in the final communique of the recent Prime Mini&ers Conference.’ “We may therefore look forward to oui African brothers in Southern Rhodesia achievlng their freedom sooner than we had dared to hope.“l/ 9. That 1s what 1 said on behalf of my Covernment on 17 December 1964. 80011 after the famous statement by Prime Minister Wilson. Today my Government feals utterly oonvinced that the United Kiiom Covermnent bas all the legal authority that it may need to enforce its political judgement on the Southern Rhodesiao Government. 10. In this statement of mine, therefore. 1 propose to confine myself to anexamination of the coustitutional position between theUnitedKingdomandSouthernRhodesia over wbich there hangs a dense mist of misunderstanding and mystery. I am afraid 1 must firmly but politely disregardthefriendly warningof the representative of the United Kingdom that we should net permit ourselves to get into a legal wrangle, as 1 do not wish to be trapped into silence when the occasion cries for utterence. 11. In a world in which nation-St&% invariably develop the delusion of power. the United Kingdom Government alone-at all events, in respect of Southern Rhodesia-appears, rather astonishingly. to have fallen a victim to an illusion of powerlessness. This is an illusion of its ovm creation. carefully nurtured by constant repetition and crystallized intoconvictiou, 60 that ultimately the United Kingdom Government seems happy to remain cribbed. cabined and coufined in au intellectual prison it has built for itself. and is sedulously adding brick upon brick to its confining walls. SO complete is its conviction that at any time and on any occasian when the question of Southern Rhodesia cornes up for debate, whether inthe Security Council, the Speeial Committeeg or the General Aseembly, its spokesmen present a picture of baffled - 12. 1 am therefore anxious tbat tbe fallacy of lts reasoning should he laid bare, if only for its own benefit. 1 do not claim to be a jurisr; but as one who for neariy forty long years has heen a close student of British constitutionai law, its scope, its bistory. its traditions and its practices, 1 may be permitted to ciaim. wltb due modesty, some acquaintance with its workings. 13. 1 should like first to clear the decks of irrelevant impediments. It bas heen claimed tbat the United Kingdom position was fully explained during the 1963 debates ln tbis Counoil and tbat the last word was tben said on this matter. 1 bave, of course, great respect for Sir Patrick Dean as a lawyer; but may 1 point out tbat bis elucidation of tbe constitutional position of Southern Rhcdesia by way of demonstrating the non-competence of the Security Council todiscuss the problems relattng to tbe dissolution of tbe Rhodesian Federatlon and tbe return to its constitutional unlts. tbe material assets. and tbe reversion of tbe Constitutional rights and privileges tbat had been brought into tbe common pool. involved a wbolly different situation. Sir Patrick Dean migbt bave heen entirely rigbt then that tbat was not a Security Council problem, nor could the United Nations interfere in the internai affairs of a State. But that situation bears no compariscn whatever with the situation in the present debate, sud 1 submit, with due deference, tbat no conclusions may properly he drawn from tbe United Kingdom Government’s attitude taken earlier on the constitutional position. 14. The pith and substance of the present situation is tbls: are 4 million Africans to be permitted to be sold into political and economic siavery in a threatened unilateral seisure of independence for which every attribute of legality is being actively sought in support of the do-nothing attitude of the United Kingdom Government? This. to use a colloquiaiism. is a far different, cup of tea. 15. It is claimed that for forty long years and more, from 1923, to be exact, Southern Rhodesia has been a self-governtng territory; tbat there bas heen uniformly observed over tbe decades a convention that the Unlted Kingdom Parliament wiil not iegiSiate for it and over it; that the convention is nota newly invented excuse of the United Kingdom Government; that conventions, under British constitutional practice, are as binding as statutes and that to break any of tbem is to act unconstitutionally, and that therefore the United Kingdom canuot he expected to do anything tbat would militate against tbese conventions. That is the United Kingdom argument. 1 sball say at once tbat 1 do not accept tbat thesis. But for my present purpose 1 do not need to quarrel witb that line of argument. O@ on those to whom they apply and chat they are net even laws that British courts would enforce if the matter should corne before them. But this iS the fundamental fact, that here in the United Nations we are in the sphere of international obligations. TO state the correct legal position succ~~tly, 1 say, and say it with coniidence, that it is no answer to a Charter obligation freely and solemnly undertaken by the United Kingdom Government, tc say that, as between itself and Southern Rhodesiathere is aprivate arrangement, a convention, if you please. which effectively ties the United Kingdom’s hands behind its back. That is the basic position. 17. The United Kingdom has undertsken the ohligation-and 1 use the Charter language-to respect the principle of equal rights and self-determinationof peoples; to priunote and encourage respect for human rights and for fimdamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. 18. Moreover, even though the United Kingdom has persistently claimed in the teeth of several General Assembly resolutions that it does not accept the obligation to transmit Information regarding Southern Rhodesia under Article 73 of the Charter, it cannot in reason disownor refuse tc recognize the principles- 1 again use the language of the Charter-of recognizing the interests of the inhabitants of a territory as paramount; of ensuring their political, economic, social and educational advancement, their just treatment, their Protection against abuses; of developing self-government; of assisting such pecples in the progressive development of their free political institutions; and many other principles that are the backhone of the Charter. 19. 1 think, therefore, that the United Kingdom Government must realize, genuinely and passionately, that it holds on tc the principle of observing the political convention vis-k-vis Southern Rhodesia lest the breath of unconstitutionality should sully its constitutional seul, that the world at large is bound, more likely than net, to regard such attitude as a piously prcclaimedandpropagatedbut ineffective alibi, a transparent effort to avoid inescapable international obligations. 20. Before I leave these conventions, 1 nhould like to add one word relating to a constitutional fact 01 undoubted authenticity. 21. After the Imperial Conferences of 1926 and1930, at the request and to meet the desires of the Governments of the older dominions-& Dominionof Canada, the Commcnwealth of Austral& the Dominion of New zealand. the Union of ScuthAfrica, the IrishFree Stats 22. As is well knowntoBritishconstitutional lawyers. the Colonial Laws Validlty Act, 1865, was by the Statute of ‘Westminister declarsd to be inoperative in the name domimons. By the same Statute the exssion holonyv was deolared to be inapplicable t0 tbem. Soutbern Rbodesia remained beyond tbepale. In spite of its iùll internai self-govervmient. even in ihe exlstl 1961 Constitution Soutbern Rhodesia was named in terms a colony. Thls demonstrates that constitutional status is not dependent on the extent of the autonomy enjoyeà by a territory. 23. Therefore, the question is no: how much internal self-government Southern Rbcdesla enjoyed, SO that the United Kingdom Government might or might not interfere in its pffairs; nor is it how tenuous are tbe strings that bina it to the UnitedKingdom Government. The true question and. in my view, the only question which is germane to this debate is this: whatever tbe relationship between the UnitedKingdom and Southern Phodesia and hOwever large or small tbe areas of leglslative and executive functions the Crown bad reserved to itself, is it competent to the m Government. is it permissible for it mtenurlrelationswithSouthernRhodesia ananswsr,oranadequate answer. to the m’s international obligations? 24. Tbat maternent may be illustratedby reference to domestic law. If a parent were minded t0 glve bis son wbo bas not attained bis majorlty, bat who is particularly precocious, rigbts and privlleges which naturally bekmg tc those of fidl age, he could hardly expect the world beyond his domestic domainto accept tbe minor as one who bas infaot attained his majority, SO as to give bim legal rlgbts and obligations wlth tbird parties. Tbe answer to my question. therefore, is quite obvlous. 25. 1 shall now demonstrate from ths provisions of the existing Constitution itself that, far fr0m being unable to enforce its wlll on Southern Rbodesia as the United Kingdom Government bas repeatedly claimed, that Government bas by that very Constitution reserved to itself suffioient power and authority to impose its Will, if only it wlll persuade itself to do SO. 2’7. However, 1 do Lot rest the case onthe theoretical sovereignty of Parliament alone. 1 now turn to the actuaI Constitution under whichtheSouthernRhodesian Covernment today functions. The 1961 Constitutionhas three essential characteristics. 28. First, Southern Rhodesia is in terms stated tobe a colony. In the context of the exeroise of parliamen- ‘tary control and authority over thc colony, it mskes not the slightest dlfference how full or feeble are the attributes of autonomy and inter& sovereignty it is reputed to bave. Incidentally, it is significant that throughout tbls Constitution of 117 sections the Territory is referred to simply as %‘outberu Rhodesiav. A clear maternent of lts status as that of a colony is carefully mcked away in the interpretation section, botb in the Order in Councll snd in the Constitution: 1 refer to section 19 of tbe former and section 116 of tbe latter. It is in these terms: “Southern Rhodesia means the Colony of Southern Rhodeaiav. Why tbls lnterpretation clause was felt 29. The second eharacteristic to be noticed is thts. Legislative power and anthcrity are reserved for Her ajesty to legislate for SouthernRhodesia. Section 111 of tbe Constitutions0states.R is extremelyinteresting to find that during the Constitutional Conference held in Salisbury In February 1961 whlch finally produced the 1961 constitutioon, ttiere occurs tbe followlng very significant paragraph: “3-i. Tbe Soutkern Rhodesia Government asked tbat tbe United Kingdom Government should inltiate legislation to provide tbat, in future, Parlinment at Westminster would net legislate for Soutbern Rhodes& except d the request of the Government of Soukhem Phodesia, in regard to any matter witbin tbe competence of the Legislative Assembly. The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations took note of tbis request without commitment.‘~ ‘FI&, despite tbis, tbe United Ringdom Government sbould besitate to control the Legislature of Southern Rhodes& passes anyone’s understandlng. 30. The tblrd characteristic is tbis: Her Majesty’s power includes the power of what is known as disallowance, wbicb is notoriously tbe badge oi colonial status, and this is to l$? found in section 32 to which 1 shall ïeturn it a few moments. 31. Simllarly, the executive authority of Southern Rbodesia is vested in Her Majesty and is exercised on her bebalf by tbe Governor who is appointed by her. The Governor exercises powers inthree separate areas. First, he acts ln accordance with the advlce tendered to blm by the Ciovernor’s Council wbich Consists of the Prime Minister and other minlsters. It is signlficant that the word “Cabllet” is not used at aI1. Second, there are certain powers whlch he is reqnired to exercise in his own discretion. Thlrd, he has certain other powers wbich Her Majesty, directly and wlthout recourse to the legislature may from time to time assign to him. 32. In tbe exercise of bis powers under the first category he acts in accordance with the tradltional practice of being bound by the ministerial advice he receives. However, in the second category the dlscretion that he is requlrrdto exercise is net his arbitrary discretion as an indlvldual but that of the delegate and appoiutee of the Queen. Hls discretion is therefore that of bis principal the Queen, and the Queen acts in her relations wlth her colonial governors in accordance with the advlce of her Cabinet in England. It , à-dire 33. The present crisis vis-~-vis me African States and Southern Rhodesia ha8 arisen as the result of t.he dissolution of the Legislative Assembly on 30 March and the Call for fresh elections on 7 May. It should be borne in mind that the right to dissolve the Assembly by Proclamation is that of the Governor. NO doubt the Governor received advice from his COUnCii, but hi coming to a decision the Governor 1s required by the Constitution toact inhis discretion. Thés 1s set up in section 34 (2) of the Constitution, an0 with permission 1 shall read it. “The Governor, acting in bis discretion, in the manner described by section 45, may at any time by pmclamation in the Gazette dissolvethelegislative Assembly.” It goes on ta say: “(3) The Governor shall dissolve the Legislative Assembly at the expiration of five years from the date when the Legislative Assembly first meets after any general election unless it has been sonner disso1ved.s 34. This discretion, as 1 pointed out, bas to be exercieed in accordance wlth the directions of Her Majesly’s Govermnent in the United Kingdom. The British Government, tlkrefore, not taken by surprise and knowlng the reasons for the dissolution andthe election of a new Assembly, could bave and should bave instructed the Governor in a way that would bave hindered the deep-laid schemes of the Southern Rhodesian Government. For reaeons for whloh we are net aware, this the United Kingdom Government did net do. That Government is therefore in the tragic position Of having been caught in a situation of its own creation whether actively created or passively permitted to happen. Having left the stable dOor open and allowed the herse to be stolen, it is in the pathetic position of admonishing the home thief that he is heading for disaster. However, at least the home thief cari be caught and the. home recovered; but in Southern Rhodeeia the United Kingdom Government bas lent itself to a position which is slmOSt irretrievable. 35. The attitude of the United Kingdom Government, as it bas been stated time and again and repeated by chat Government’s representative at the 1194th and 1197th meetings-that bis Government would not take any unconetitutional actions-i5 the well-known posture of “the splrlt is willing but the fIesh is weak”. 1 am noii concerned to point out that a careful examination of the constitutional position would seem rather to demonstrate tbat indeed the flesh bas at its arm the strength it needs if only the SPirit will show a willingness to grasp and exercise chat strength. Iwillomits aragrapbs (a) and (b) and corne to (9): m(c) TO be inconsistent with any obligation imposed on Her Majesty in relation to Southern Rbodesia by any treaty. convention, agreement or arrangement relating to any country or international or similsr organization, may be dissllowed by Rer Majesty within six months from the date of the Governor’s assent thereto. “(2) Whenever any such law has been disallowed by Ber Majesty, the Governor shall cause notice of su& disallowance to be published in the Gazette. “(3) Every law SO dissllowed shall cesse to bave effect as soon as notice of such disallowance is published.. . .” 37. Will the United Kingdom Government tell Southern Rbodesia in no uncertain terms that any legislation that is directly or indirectly contrived to abridge or deny tbe undoubted rights of the African population wiH be disallowed by Her Majesty’s Govermnent? Tbis is the least that it cari do in making the world believe that it has not forgotten tbe obligation it has undertaken for the majority populationof Southern Rbodesia and tbat it will act effectively for the discharge of those obligations. 38. The United Kingdom Government as a party to tbe multilateral treaty which is the Charter bas clearly undertaken some primary obligations, and to these 1 referred earlier. The Southern Rhodesiar Government is on the threshold of the most consummate political trickery of attempting to stop the flow of all progress within its territory snd deny to the vast majority of its people the blessings oj freedom. This “Rake’s Progress” has begun, haï been permitted to begin. No one is in any doubt as to the motives of the Southern Rhodesian Government in embarking on tbis course: that Governmenl bas been as patently plain snd as brutally frank abou! itS intentions as any Government could be. 39. The otber day tbe representative of the Unitec JSingdom referred to and quoted his Prime MinisterV statement in Parliament. This was in answer to thc Wbite Pape& -that was white in more sens.88 thru one-issued by tire Southern Rhodesian GovermIIen on 26 April entitled “Economie Aspects of a Declara, tien of Independence”. Animadverting on the no\ famous statement of Prime Minister Wilson o 27 G&ober 1964,6/ this White Paper camasses al srcuments to meet the threats in that statemeni 40. But what is significant about this White Paper is, primarily, that this exercise should have been undertaken at all and, secondly, that the publication of tbe Paper was tiied tc take place ten days hefore tbe election. One may therefore assume without a possibility of doubt tbat tbese elections are in fact.and in trutb designed as tbe first essential step for a unilaterial declaration of independence. Mr. Smith% desire to negotiate and to negotiate from strength, which is a modem tradition-and 1 intact say 1 have seen no evidence of such a desire-appears to be wbolly incidental, a polite gesture to the United Kingdom of no consequence, on the roadtoaunilateral declaration of independence. In the face of that attitude, ths United Kingdom Government’s passionate desire and declared purpose to continue negotiations does great justice to its heart, but pays a poor compliment to its head. 41. Wbat, then, cari the United Kingdom in fact do? It cari and must do more than merely utter warnings in thundering terms. Hard words break no bones, and Mr. Smith knows it. The spectres of economic disaster and political isolationthattheUnitedKi.ngdom Government continually conjures up before bis eyesail tbese and otber things leave bim cold, as the Rhodesian Government White Paper demonstrates. Will the United Kingdom Government s-on tbe courage tbat lies dormant in its soul and use tbe undoubted legislative power tbat it bas at band and threaten him with extinction of tbe Constitution, leading to a resumption of the holding of ail power and autbority for the Government of Rhodesia by tbe Crown, SO that he may no longer trample on the Constitution and strut before the world like a pocket colossus? No mari is law-abiding because be learned his moral code at bis mother’s knee or was taugbt tbe Commandments at his church. IIe keeps within tbe law because of tbe fear of personal punisbment. The sanction bebind tbe Commandment “Thou sbalt not kill’ is the fear of being hanged or electrocuted if one does. If tbe only fear were vThou sbalt go to perdition”. killing would continue with impunity and the world would move towards chaos. 42. The United Kingdom Government owes a duty tc itself, to tbe United Nations and to tbe 4 million Africans that it seeks to protect inSouthernRbodesia. That duty is to read Mr. Smith a perSOnai leSsOn: Wms fa, Mr. Smit& no further”. Tbe ‘Jnited Kingdom GovernmenVs duty is plain. Does it bave the courage to carry out that duty? It is the answer to tbat question-tbat question of questions-that all Africa, all Asia and much of me tbinking world i3. :n Afrique gentiment, fans les colonnes lans le monde entier, pi, ;ouvernement n&luctable. Livre blanc, puis il continue 43. Lest it 8 tbat we of Africa snd case in emotional terms, editorial comment that world-renownedBritish libera~ newspaper, the Manchester Gual-aisn weekly 3s issue of 29 Anrïl 1965. nresents the m Government &b its inescapable &ty. de refers to the publication of tbe White cm also be seen as oonintention to seize ishmeasures would given notice tbat, trade. tbe Rhodetake its revenge ou its two ws. T&e speoific threat ia made *The blackmail is not disguised. IfBritafuopposes an aot of r Ilion bv white Rbodesia. the white esians Will see toit tbat innocent third parties are made to suffer. SO mu may think, for the civikation which white ans claim to be upbokiing. “Tbe waming given on 27 October by Mr. Wilson, and reinforced on Sunday by tbe Colonial Seoretary. Mr. Bottomley, is a measure of Britaiu’s responsibility to the unenfranchisedmajority of tbe Rbodesiau people. Before any British colony fa Africabasbeen grsnted iudependence, Britain bas insisted upon government, there is no cause to an exception because its present 6 white. Britain is just as entitled to vfH&hold independence from Rhodesia until its Government becomes representative as she is from British Guiana until its racial tensions abate. Uaving decided to protect the rights of the majority, is again entitled, and indeed obliged, to use I force is necessary to dissuade Rfaodesians from a rebellious act. It would be distasteful to use pbysicd force: but, as in British Guiana, tbat mi@& be necessmy. %efore chat disastrous stage is reached, there is still time for tbeRhodesianGovernmeutaudele&orate to take a oalm look at wbat is proposed. First a unilateral declaration of independenqe. Then a British embargo on all trade. Then Rhodesian measures againat Zambia snd Malawi. But Malawi and Zambia are fellow-members of tbe Commonwealtb md their appeal for help would certainly be

Ever since February 1962the UnitedNations, through its various bodies-particularly the General Assembly, the Special Committee and ad hoc committees, including suoh committees of the &x Council itself-bas been deallug with the problem of Southern Rhodesia. 45. Althougb the results bave not been encouraging when one considers the number of co’untries that bave attained thelr independence during the same period, this is at least an indication tbat the international community is not prepared to cesse its efforts to restore to a people now deprived of its dignity the full exercise of its rights. And we ail hnow tbat tbis persistent, tenacious and-where circumstances demand-patient effort will in the long run acbieve tbe I&d of lasting results that we are seeking. 46. It is not my intention-nor would it serve any practical purpose in this debate-to examine once again the arguments which, in the view of my delegation clearly indlcate the UnitedKingdom% responsibilities and obligations as tbe administering Power for that Territory. 4’7. Since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1747 (WI), which might be cslled the parent or basic resolution, no possible doubt cari remain. The routine wordiog of operative paragraph 1 of that resolution-We Territory of Southern Rhodesia is a Non-Self-Governing Territory within the meaniog of Cbapter KI of the Charter of the United Nation~~- contains, if you Will, a tremendous explosive force, the logical, political and legal consequenoes of which are inescapable. It means, translated into the terms of the Charter and of United Nations resolutions. that the United Kingdom, wbich was declared the administering Power, assumed from that moment the sacred mission of leading tbat unhappy Territory towards a full measure of self-government. 1 wish to recall that tbat mission is, at the same Lime, an international obligation in the strict sense of the term. 48. A full measure of self-goveroment includes, as we know, a number of possibilities wbicb are referred to in various General Assembly resolutions, particularly resolution 1541 (KV). But first and forernom, tsking priority over any of the alternatives offered in tbat resolution, a full measure of self-government ed Nations cari be orne timeofcourse-attaia emise of its pwers tbr certain comconstitutional provisions already iu force 0retioaUy offer su& a possibility. tems. formulas wbicb are less rigid and more in keeping witb the sociological realities of eachcouatry may he employed. Ail these possibilities are iu no way irrecoucilable titi democracy. provided that tbe exceptlQns of tbe prino of “one maa, O&s vote; one vote, one equal s in representation’ bave a rational justifi6ation and are desigaed to improve the orderiag of public affairs. 51. W~~~~~e~y, this is net Une case in Soutie~n esia tarse, we confise ourselves to tbe and fictions. Tbe denial of that hasic principle of democracy in Southera Rlmdesia is 1pased. net OQ tic common good aad the satisfaction of its needs, but .on the most absurd and irrations: beresy of the modem world: tbe beresy of the senseles5 mytb of racial superiority. 52. V&s bave spoken of the nature of responsibility assumecl by the admhistering Power for the Territory. ebates in the Committee at session of the national persodity, even if fnco d be exactly tbe same by virtue cd 53. R%at we are i1ow asking of the United is. therefore, the same as was asked of Port$? witb tbe support of the United Kingdom, the same as was asked of 3outh Africa with the support of the ( United IGngdom. And if worldopinionrefuses toacoeptj as valid tbe familiar argument concerning tbe 1323 convention, it is for tbe same reason-I repeat, for the same reason-for whlcb it also refuses to accept as vslid Portugal% argument concerning Overseas provinces or Soutb Africa’s concerning ihe expiry of the Mandate. Tbe line of reasoning and the sincerity of approach are exaotly the same. 54. Turning to practical mattars. 1 feel it myduty to state that, in the vlew of my delegation tbe United, Kingdom representative’s statement contains, ifnot the kind of positive elements sought bytbeUnitedNations, at least certain basic assurances concerning certain events which must not take place or which, if tbey sbould take place, would entail very serious conseqnences. This is certain@ an encouraging sign. 55. It is truc that the statements made by the tleoretary of 3tate for CommonwesItb Relations, wbicb which appear in the report of the 3peciaICommittee~ are somewhat disappointing, in tbat tbe greatest emphasis is placed on wbat is not poing to be done and on wbat measures are not going to be tien. Bowever, tbere is, 1 believe, no reason to tbiak that this may imply a retreat in relation to other officiai statements, which we regard as ranking more higbly because of the rat& of tbose who made tbem. I am referring net only to the United Kingdom Prime Mix&te??s statement of 27 October 1964 and his more recent one, but also to that made in tbs liouse of Commons on 12 November 1363 by the former Prime Minister, Lord Home, wbich is summarised in paragraph 28 of tbe report of the 3pecial Committee% and wbose positive signifioanoe my delegation pointed out at the time. 56. If we cari agree tbat the final objectives of the United Nations and the United Kingdom are tbe same, namely, tbe establishment of a r&ime truly representative of the majority of the Rhodesian people, aR that needs to be done-and I am now discussing tbe possibilities of practical action-istofmdcommon ground for agreement onthe most appropriate metlmds and procedures for acbievlng tbose objectives. 51. My delegation believes tbat even in tbe field of possible action, and without of course retreatingfrom 59. In his statement of 39 April, tbe AlgerianMinister for Foreign A%irs quoted tbe vmrds of Mr. Smith, as foUows: n sia’s destiny demands dscisive ami urgent steps to be tahen for the protection of mith seems to be unaware of Assembly in June 1962. 59. I said at tbat time tbat for us, who are a part of Western civilization, tbe genemus attitude of until recently had b-en the masters-@ tben wi..h to discuss-of the md the of vast regions of the world attitude, butperhaps the decisive attitude on wbi future of tbe freeworld depended, because wbenever tbe free world was untrue to itself, wbenever the West betrayed the great principles which habeen the cernent and tbe greatness of its cuhure, it lest a bettle. and tbat each battle lost by the West-and I ask my colleagues to understand that I am speahing as a Citizen of the West-was a hattle lest by mankind, because the legitimate values of the hue West. the liberty that was our bsritage from Grsece, tbe eense of justice that was our legacy fmm Rome, and tbe cbsrity with which Christianity transformed tlm meaning Of OUI! lives, were in one way or anotber the values Of manhi@; tbat if the West uuderstood that, it bad notbing tQ fear, but that if it failed to understand, tbat la& of ~derst~~g-ad not nuclear warfarewould be tbe real catastrophe. 69. AS the text of a draft resolution submitted @Y tbe WOry Coast. Yordan and Malaysia was dis-

1 have asked to speak for tbe sole purpose of introducing. on bebalf of the delegations of the Ivory Coast, Jordan and Malaysia, the draft resolution contained in d&ument S/6329 of 5 May 1965. Si. This draft resolution, asyouyourself, Mr. President. stated yesterday, has been the subject of much discussion among the parties, among the members of the Security Council, and we. believe mat-as is the custom Of the Security Council when it is considering serious problems that might bave great repercussions-it is appropriate to submit a compromise draft resolutionto which, of course, sll contribute but which nevertheless cannot express the exact position of all the parties. 1 should like to read out the draft resolution as it is submitted: “Tbe Security Council, Waving examined tbe situation in Southern Rbodesia, *Recalling General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of I4 December 1960, 1’747 (XVI) of 28 June 1962, 1760 (XVIIj of 31 Octobsr 1962.1883 (XVIII) of 14 October 1963 and 1889 (XVIU) of 6 November 1963 and the resolutions of the Special Committee on tbe Situation witb regard to the Supplementation of the Declaration on tbe Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, especially its resolution of 22 April 1965 (A/AC.109/112), WEndorsing tbe requestswbichtheGeneral Assembly and the Special Committee bave many times addressed to the United Xingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for: “(a) The release of all political prisoners, detainees and restrictees; “(b) The repeal of a11 repressive and discriminatory legislation, and in particular the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and tbe Land Apportionment Act; “(9) The removal of all restrictions on political activity and the establishment of full democratic freedom and equality of political rights, mm that the Special Committee bas drawn tbe attention of the Security Council to the grave situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia and, in particular, to tbe serious implications of the elections announced to take place on 7 May 1965 under a constitution whicb has been rejected by tbe majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia and the abrogation of wbich bas repeatedly been called for by tbe General Assembly and tbe Specisl Committee since 1962, Weeply dlsturbed at tbe further woraenlng of tbe situation in tbe Territory due to the applica- 9. N&e.3 United ment 73-E ootober 1 m60vexnmentts statethe conditi0as Càovexmnent net 5 to ita coloay of at present governed. any 0, “6. United m Govemment to enter into consultations withall concerned WitiaV&WtOCO a conferameof all political parties in ordex new constitutiomIl provis to the majorily of the people of t the eaxlfest possible date may be Set for independence; “7. Decides to hep tbe question of Southern Rho- 63. As I said, this draft resolution i5 a compromise. ntirely meet the wishes of the African wkw bave sp0ken in tbe Council o* butwefelttbat, inview of the sericusblem, each of us mut make an effmt Lo fiad common ground, so that we couRI arrive at a deoision reSectinS tbe vicws of tbfs importsnt ourity Councü, on tbe problem of sia. 64. Uou wiU note tbat in view of tk fact that Unfted 1 tbo aolutionstbc committees cre speolfically, we note arawn tbe attention of t 66. We also endorse the humanitarianrequests which those bodies bave made for the release of a11 pclitical prisoners. the repeal of a11 discriminatory legislation, and the removal of a11 restrictions onpolitical activity in the country. 67. Furthermore we express our concern atasituatien flhich is deterioratmg daily as a result of the application of this constitutionand the rulingminority’s threat of a unilateral declaration of indepeudence. 68. In the operative part of the draft resolution, we take note of the United Kingdom Government’s statement of 27 Cctober 1964, in wbich theUuited Kingdom affirmed that it alone could decide to graut independence, that it had a solemn duty to be satisfied that any such decision would be acceptable to the people of the country as a whole, that it considered that any unilateral declaration of independence would he an act Uf rebellion, and tbatitwould te treasonahle to take steps to give effect to it. 69. We further take note of the opinion, which the najority of the population of Southern Rhodesia bave often expressed, that the United Kingdom should convene a constitutional conference. Al1 organs of the United Nations bave endorsed this opinion sud bave felt that only a constitutional conference could lead to a peaceful and agreed solution of the problem. We believe that, in taking note of this opimon, the Security Couucil should endorse it. 70. We request the United Kingdom and a11 States Members of the United Nations not to accept a unilateral declaration of independence for Southern Rhodesia by the minority Government. Weparticularly request the United Kingdom not only to reject such a decleration, but to take a11 necess ary action toprevent it. 71. We request the Unibsd Kingdom not to transfer to the minority Cmvernment of Southern Rhodesia the attributes of sovereignty. but to promote the country’s attainment of independence under a democratically elerted government in accordance with the aspirations of the people of Southern Rhodesia. 72. Finally, we request the United Kintglom Government to enter into consultations, not only with the white population, but with a11 concerned. with a view to -0nvening a oonference of a11 political parties in order to adopt newconstitutionalprovisionsacceptable to the majority. to the whole of the people of Rhodesia without distinction, and not merely to a fractic.. of the population. We regard the people of Rhodesia as a whole. 73. Cur draft resolution decides-as is customary in a11 cases where the development of the situation 74. We feel tbat. if new developments in the situation in tbe days foollowing 7 Yay so require, the Security @oun& should meet immediateiy to take whatever emergency measures SUC~ developments may cal1 fOF. 75. This 1s the geueral outhe of our draft resolutien. TEî Security Council wilIweigbtheconsequences ive stand on its g >zt. We bave done all we ap tbe couacil net to take SO tragic a stand. tbe eonsequeuces of whicb would be incalculable. ébat is wbywe~veweï~bedeve~word, retaining only the nom-~e~tiab~e essentlals and avoiding tbe use of terms OF expressims which migbt cause emrassment to some. ita view of eheir positions of principle. For the same reasan, we bave endeavoured to respect tbe principles tbey bave invoked. even if we do net agree witb them. 76. We tberefore urge tbe Secusity Council to adopt this îlmft sesoktion, if net perhaps unanimously, a& least-we hope-by an overwhelming majority. 77. Mr. RIFA’I (Jordan): The representative of the Ivo~y CO& has just Mroduced the draft resolu- éion contained indocumentS/6329, wbichmy delegation bad tbe honour to co-sponsor with bis delegation and the delegation of Malaysia. 1 bave notblng to add to wbat be bas ve~ab~ye~la~~@d, excepttbatI associate myself witb his statement. AIl tbat I hope for and urge is that the wisdom. the objectivlty. the feeling of responsibIi$ and the effort at compromise refleeted in the draft resolution may ensure aunanimous vote in the Cowil in support of it. 78. e attitude on the part of the United Kh be viewed with sp@cial regard. and any *E?s tude will be eontrary to our expectations. Wben adopte& tbis draft resolution Will be the least ébat tbe Council cari offer to oup African brothers in Soutbern Rbodesia in tbeir present grave situation and their jus& cause. 79. Tbe PRESIDENT: I bave no other speakers on my list this morning. 1 believe several members of tbe Coupleil would like a little time to consider the terms of the draft resolution. As time is of the essence in tbis maiter. and as some sort of a decision sboudd be taken if possible hefore tonight, it has suggested tbat we might bave a meeting later evening. It bas been proposed tbat, if it is sot too inconverdent, we should meet again at 8.30 p.m. 60. Lord CARAWN (UnitedKingdom): Mr. President, mtorally my debgation would wisb to meet tbe WiSheS Of yourself and of the Council as regards tirnia?& However , we Will nowhave some opportunity to shdy Ihe draft resolution which has just been brought before US. P wonder if it might possibly be agreed tM YOW suggestion would he subject to further consuktion and any other decision wbich you might reach after su& further negotiation. .82. For that reason we believe that, if members of the Council have no objection, we should agree in principle to meet this evening. As the United Kingdom representative requested. the time of the meetingcould be the subject of consultations, but we should agree in principle to meet tbis evening for a vote on the resolution. 83. Mr. RIFA’I (Jordan): 1 hops 1 shall net be putting any sort of pressure on the representative of the United Kingdom with regard to the usefulness of a meeting this evening. 1 wish to add to what the representative of the Ivo~y Coast has said. There is one point wbich, 1 am sure, Will be courteously accepted by the representative of the UnitedKingdom. It is my understanding that the Foreign Ministers of A@ria and Senegal are here on a tight schedule. Perhaps they themselves, out of courtesy to the Council, would net wlsh to mention it. but we cari do SO on their behalf. They tee1 that they must return to their Important duties. If we CM sfford them the opportunity of completing the consideration of thts item today, 1 am sure it Will be appreoiated by them. as well as by my own delegation which is fully associated with this case since it concerns the regton to whicb we belong.

1 did net understaud the United Kingdom representative as objecting to the time. 1 understood that the time was acceptable ta him. but that if anything should happen in the meantime he would get in touch with those conoerned ahout the draft resolution. Therefore. if it is acceptable to the members of the Council. 1 think it would be best to arrange for a meeting at X.30 p.m.. and 1 shall keep in touch with the other members of the Council. Should there be auy development, 1 shall briug in to their notice. But 1 believe it is understood by a11 the members, including the United Kingdom representative, that some decision shoulcl be taken by this evening. 85. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): 1 wishmerely to say that I greatly appreciate the way that the representatives of tbe Ivory Coast and Jordan have spoken in this mstter and the way you, Mr. President, have led us. It Will be the purpose of my delegation to meet the wishes of the Council.