S/PV.12 Security Council

The second item on the agenda is the letter from the Head of the , delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Re- 1 invite the representative. of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to the table. The rcpresentative of the Ukrainian SSR~ Mr. Manuilsky, took his seat at the Council table. The PRESIDENT~ 1 presume that it will be the wish of the Council that 1 should invite the representative of the Ukrainian SSR to supplement bis letter by such oral statement as he may wish ta make? If so, then 1 will invite him to make such oral statement as he may wiSh, in regard to the letter that he has already forwarded to the Council. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (traf!.Slated trom Frencft): Sïn<:e the subject under consideration by the Security Council is very important and since my command of French is limited, permit me to make my statement in Russian.

If there is no objection from the Council tothe request of the representative of the Ukrainian SSR that he Sh01Ùd be permitted to express bis words in the Russian language, then permission is granted; 51. Statement by the representative of the UkrainianSSR Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Rêpublic) (translated trom Russian): In conformity'with instructions froIn thê Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Soqialist Republic, the Ukrainian delegation sent a letter to the President of the Security Council ~awing the Council's attention, in accordance with Article 34,of , the Charter. to the abnormal situation created in Indonesia. Asis known, on9 March 1942, the Netherlands troops surrendereù' to superior Japanese forces and the J~panese occupiedunarmed In- '," donesia. The occupa.tion régime 'established by Japan on Indonesian territory,in which there were about seventymillion inhabitants" did not, in fact, differ in any way fromthose established by, other' aggressors in territories,which they had occupied. Over a period of three and onehalf years, the peoplesof, Indonesia sufferedunder . this yoke"and-resisted the Japanese invaders by alLthemeans in. theirpower.As a result ofthe successes of the Allied ~armies,the Japanese troops-weref9rced to s~ender on 17 August 1945,. ' ,"-' -' ". .The defeat ,of Japanencouragedthelndo- ,,''nesians in the hope that their national ~pira- ----------_:~"- But the reality proved to be the reverse. Mter the surrender of Japan, the Japanese military authorities were entrusted with the maintenance of order pending the arrivaI of British troops. This decision provoked protests in the form of demonstrations and clashes with the Japanese troops, which ·did not hesitate to make use of tanks and artillery against the Indonesian pODUlation. . British and Indian troops arrived in Batavia on 29 September. Unfortunately, the arrivcl of British troops brought no tranquillity ta Iudonesia. Clashes and skirmishes continued. On 10 November, the landing of British and Indian troops was begun in the Sœrabaya aFea an.d the Indonesians offered resistance. The Daily M aü, a, newspaper which cannot be suspected of special sympathy towards the Indonesians, described the clashes between Indonesians and British and Indian troops at Sœrabaya on 12 November 1945 in the following terms: "In what is officiaIly described as 'fanatical charges;' hundreds of Indonesians hurled themselves against our tanks as they rounded street corners in the centre of the city. Many ~donesians were killed but the tanks pressed . relentlessly on. Thunderbolts had been standing by aIl day, bombed-up and ready for imm.ediate action. They were ordered ioto the air and saon after 4 p.m. they were given their targets: an Indonesian army HQ and three other buildings being used by Indonesians ta hold up our troops." The British local authorities began to employ ever more extensively aIl kinds of modern weapons, such as artillery, naval gons, and aircraft, including Mosquito rocket planes, against the poorly armed Indonesians. On 3 December, the Reuter correspondent reported from Batavia that Japanese tank and artillery units had joined the Indian troops in their military action against the Indonesian population. The official war communiqué issued by the local British Commandin Batavia on 3 September,mentiofiedthat clashes between "Indonesian police" and Japanese detachments had occurred in the central districts of the island of Sumatra. These clashes were the result of the Japanese beingentrusted with the.protection of Netherlands colonial troops, which had been sent· to Fort de Kock' upon instructions from the British Commando Every day the military operations became more extensive. Thus, on 11 December 1945 the DailyTelegraph reported as follows: , , "RAF planeS' carri~,i out the heaviest air lritttackJava has~own ina punitive raid to- This report was dated Il December. On 23 December the Observer reported: ·"There was a sharp fight yesterday in the northem sector of Bandoeng in' which artil- Iery, rocket-firing Mosquitoes and Thunderbolts with 500-pound bombs were used by the British". It is not surprising that the result of these military operations was a considerable loss of life. It was apparentIy on these grounds that the New York radio reported that by 20 November Indonesian losses amountedto between thirty and forty.thousand wounded. It is perfectly c1ear, therefore, that after the defeat of Japan and the end of the war, a situation was created in Indonesia which was characterized by The Times on 2 December 1945 as "aImost war", and whièb, in fact; did not in ariy way differ from. war. These events could not fail to attract public attention not only overseas but aIso. on tl.~continent of Europe and in England. Forexample, the Daily Express in an article on 8 Dctober 1945 wrote: "The Indonesians are .puzzled lllat the British, ,having won the war, are still, many weekS after the enemy surrendered, alloWing the Japs not only to carry on in. the same arrogant and luxurious· style as before, but empowering them to check .local people with tanks and armoured cars in a new rôle of protectors and order..;keepers on behalf of their .British conquerors." In View of the situation which had arisen, a movement started in many countries for tlie defence of the rights of the Indonesianpopulation. Thus, ,according to a·Reuter's report of 2 Dctober 1945,a demonstration took place in the city of Sydney, Australia, headed by members of the Australian Government, against the intolerable treatment of the Indonesian population and in defence of its basic rights. Again, Commander Stassen, an eminent statesman of tbe United States, who took part in the San Francisco COluerence as a representative of the United States, published anartic1e in the New York Times on 11 December 1945 in which he called for the cessation' of military operationsagainst·the Indonesians. Repeate~ questions in the' British Parliament , op. the subject of events in Indonesia testify aIso ·'t9 the uneasinéss of the Bqtish public in con- It is perfectIy evident, therefore, that following the defeat of Japan and the end of the war, we have a situation in Indonesia which in the wordsof Article 34 of the Charter of the United ·Nations endangerS "the maintenance of' international peace and secùrity". The .intervention of British and Indian troops in the internai affairs of Indonesia is, without any doubt, in direct contradiction to Articie 1, paragraph 2, of the United NationR Charter, which states that one of the purposes of the United Nations is "To develop friendly relations ·among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peopIes, and to take other appl'Opriate measures .to strengthen universal peace". This intervention, furthermore, is in contra~ diction to Article 73 of the United Nations Charter. It aISo contradicts the principle generally accepted by the United Nations that every nation shall choose on a democratic. basis the f~rm of government which it desires. It is perfectly obvious that the use of Japanese troops .against the Indonesian population, which has suffered under the tyrannical yoke of Japanese occupation for three and a half years, is in even more flagrant contradiction te the United Nations Charter. The Ukrainiandelegation recognizes that the presence of Allied armed forces in this or that· area can be dictated by strategic considerations. British trqops, with. the agl'l.dl1ent of the United Nations, remain in Indonesia with the object of accepting the surrender of the Japanese troops and of.disarming tt'1em. It does not however "follow that the operations of Britishtroops against the national democratic movement ·in Indonesia and the .use of Japanese detachments for thè same purpose have been going on with the agreement of the United Nations. The Ukrainian delegation knows that the Soviet Union did not an.d of course cannat agree ta this. The Ukrainian delegation does not raise the question of the withdrawal of British troops ·from Indonesia, The essence.of the Ukrainian delegation's .declaration on· the st;lbject of Indonesia is that the Ukrainian delegation considers that the use ofBritish troops for the suppression of .the national movement of the Indonesian people is inadmissible. The Ukrainian'delegation 52. Statement by the representative of the United Kingdom Mr. BEVIN (United Kingdom): 1 am· not q':lÏteexpected.toanswer. In aconcluding phrase by the Ukrainian representative, he said that he did not ask for the withdrawal of British troops. Therefore, 1 suppose that the presence of British troops in Indonesia is not a danger to security and peace. That seems to be the correct.deduction, so that 1 do not quite know what 1 am expected to answer. The newspaper cuttings that have 'been read and the questions in Parliament reveal only this fact, that in this country we have a free press and everybody can say what he likes. As 1 said _. the other day, what the journalists say is not always true. The journalists see something and communicate it from their point of view. Members of Parliament ask questions daily, but if the answerS are not read, 1 do not think you get the facts. It is quite easy to dig up all these cuttings, and 1 do congratulate. the Ukrainian representative on having asplendid file of newspaper cuttings from the British and American press. What are the facts? Those are what we have to deal with. 1 do not see that the British are .called upon totale any action at all, in view of o the statement which has been made. Thê question is, therefore, whether there should be a commission. Firstof all, this point ought to be cleared up. Who has sovereignauthority over the Indonesians? As 1 understand it, a decision· of the Allies restored the. territory taken by the enemy to its sovereign autllority.That was their definite " decision. The British were given this unpleasant task by General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander. 1 ought to give just the historic facts of what was happening at this time. We had mounted nearly as big an adventure as our contribution for D~Day on the Westem Front to attack the Japanese in Malaya and other places, with all the ships loaded-and everything ready. Then, just about the ÜIne it was to start, the atomic bomb was dropped and other events took place, with the American forces, and our, 1 think, brilliant effort in Burma, with the British Fourteenth Anny. The combination of these things defeated the Japanese. 1 am speak~ ing of these âlUll? becaüSe they nad bee..."1 in the war against the Japanese right through from the beginning. Our shipping, therefore, was aU W10~ cated for this great move. Then we were 0' ~ered, in what was called the South-East Asia Command, to break it up and to' proceed to deal with the surrender of the Japanese over a very wide area. We had to c1ear u~ Siam; we had to c1ear up Indo-China and take Japanese prisoners, and hold it in time for the French to arrive. As far as 1 know, in that territory there were similar events which took place for a time, until it was c1eared up. We were aIso told to take the prisoners in Indonesia. We did what we were told, and we never expected that there would be, nor did o..ur ·intelligence service warn \:IS that there was likely to be, any attack on the British when we went ta take the Japanese prisoners. So we sent a very limited force, just a few battalions, and it was delayed sorne few weeks, owing to the events which 1 have described. When we arrived at Java and Sœrabaya, the British, 1 would remind the IJkrainian representative, never fired a shot, but we were fired at and our soldieri; were killed. Now, what would the Ukrainian representative have done if he had gone there to rescue, first .Qf all, two hundred and fifty thousand in~ ternees, many of them white, some natives, all of whmn were anti~Japanese and were intemed, many of them intemedin the hinterland? W.e went in to rescue them, and get them to the Then General Mallaby arrived. General Mallaby actually got the leaders of the nationalist movement together and arranged a truce, so that he could proceed to carry out bis task. While he was signing the truce he was assassinated, and other officers were killed at the same time; one, 1 think, escaped. They had no protection; they did not have an army with them; they trusted the men they were talking to, and Mâllaby was assassinated. Yetyou accuse us and our military authorities of attacking the Indonesian movement, when our General goes in .and arranges a truce in arder not to interfere with it. We did not do anything of the sort. We did not have enough troops ta interfel'e with anybody. 1 do not think there were more than three thousand .ttQops-ofau..rs-t~ere. They had their-task te -do. Then Admiral Mountbatten, fearing and, 1 think, legitimately fearing, that it might hasten wholesale assassination throughout the country, held ..the people who had been ordered to surrender by the Emperor of Japan responsible for seeing that these things did not occur. It was rather by way of the hostage system that they were told to see that law and order were maintained, mainly in arder tostop wholesale murder throughout Indonesia. Anns had got in the hands of the wrong people, not of the respon- . sible Indonesians but of the young population, who had been trained in this nazi business. That was the great trouble. Indeed, 1 doubt very much now, if we did order our people ta withdraw, whether Sjahrir and the moderate leaders, who wanted to settle. this thing in Indonesia, would look with any great favour on the idea of being left without any protection at the moment, because our information isthat, if our troops· did go out, there would be a danger of a very bad disaster in Indonesia at the present moment. Then the charge of bombing people has been made against us. It is quite true that certain nests, properly fortllied with machine guns, vvere placed in houses; and many of our troops who went·up ta bring people down to the coast were ambushed.Some of the men werekilled on the road. Others are still missing; 1 suppose that theywere killed too. 1 must repeat: It is said that we are there to . attack the Indonesian nationalist movement. Have we? What have we done? We sent one of our best political advisers from the Foreign Office Mr. Dening, and he has assisted to the best of Îùs ability at the conferences. It is not bis busïness,- but the business between the sovereign Power &"1d the people. However, such experience as we have, we have placed at the disposal of the persons negotia:ting. . The Netherlands Government has considl7:red this matter and must speak for itself, but we know that it is ready to settle on honourable terros with the local inhabitants. It has aIso been suggested in much of the literature which 1 could read, which has been published against us, th,;,t we are there for an kinds of evil purposes, as an imperialist Power. It is again significant, and it makes me a little impatient, that when 1 went through thisbusiness in Moscow with Mr. Molotov, line by line, not a ward was said to me as to Britain's action at aIl. 1 do think it unfortunate, after 1 have taken the trouble, with great friendliness, voluntarily to ~xplain the whole of our position, that we are faced now with charges based upon newspaper cuttings and the rest. 1 am the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and 1 ha:ve to help to smooth out these things. Let me say in passing that whoever has the job of Foreign Secretary of a great Power has a few ,problems left on bis plate after six years.of war. It is not all cleared up with smoothness and perfection. In Moscow we had to discuss the problem of the troops in North China. lt was discussed briefly, and we came ta an arrangement; the troops in Manchuria were aIso discl1ssed, and that was aIso cleared up. 1 explained our troub~ein Indonesia, and 1 thought that was cleared up. None of the other items have come back on this agenda, .only tbis one affecting the British. _ 1 then suggested ta the Government here that we would send one of ,our leading men in the Foreign Office, who was well-known to the Soviet Government and to .the Ukrainian Gov- We had to go there because we could not give the shipping to the Netherlands troops. We had taken every ship in the world that we could lay hands on for mounting that great offensive against the Japanese. Therefore, we undertook fuis duty at the orders of the Commander-in- Chief, we undertook to do it until it is accomplished, until we get these people out, until we round up the Japanese troops as prisoners of war, until law and order are established there and many of thëse young nazis with guns are disarmed. Tlutt is what is needed for the sake of the local inhabitauts. 1 hope that, as a result of the conference that is going on at the moment, some constitutional arrangement may be arrived at which will at the same time settle fuis problem in. Indonesia. If the United Nations wants to help, 1 suggest it not be by sending another coIl'lttlÏi;sion there. The only way it could help would be to urge the people now in negotiatio'1 tobend their energies to effect a settlement, and to try to eliminate fuis difficulty altogether. Howover, if 1 am not asked to do anytbing-· and They say they are not chargingme with disturbing the peace, as the police say, or with obstructing Them in thèir duties, and 1 am. only ca.!'!'f~gû~ the directions of the Commander· in~Chief-I do not know that 1 have anytbing further to say. 1 leave it to the Council to judge. Under the arrangement with the Allies, the Dutch are regarded as the sovereign Power, and the question of commissions or taking part in anything eIse must be dealt with by them and not by me. 53. Statement of the Netherlands representative Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands) ~ It will have ·occ,urred to. all of.yôu, of course, that we , are in a particularly favourable position ta come ,'hereas a witness.The events of which complaint has been made took place in what is part of, In the fust place, 1 should like to recaIl in a little more detail perhaps than Mr. Bevin has given why British troops are there. The presence of British troops in for~gnterritory is, of course, somethîng in the nature of an anomaly. We used ta administer these territories; when 1 say "we", 1 mean the Indonesians and the Dutch together, before the war. We did not need troops, armies, ta keep arder there. We had for that purpose our police. 1 have here the statistical abstract of the Nether~ lands Indies for 1940; from this it appears that in this country, which, when you project it on a . 1llIap of Europe, stretches from the west of Ireland as far as well into the Caucasus, the number of police in aIl was 1,100 Eùropeans and sorne 28,000 Indonesians. That whole territory was, 1 think, a model of good arder, and that order was assured by the police, of whom the vast majority ~ere Indonesians. It must, therefore, have b~en some quite extraordinary factor that suddenly made this country into the country of unrest which it unfortunately is, in sorne parts (because it is chiefly Java and very few other parts of t.1}e Archipe1~gQ). When we entered the W2I, we placed at the disposal of the Allied cause our whole merchant navy, sOme three million tons; 1 leave it ta YOur imagination ta conjecture tû what extent that he1ped in winning the war. Be that as it may, the result was that, when we wanted ta seud our personnel back ta the Indies, we had no sh1.pping of our own available. We started discussions ta prepare for this in 1942. We were told, and we understood it fully, that there couldhe no question, at the moment when the war not orily against Japan .but aIso against Germany had still to be won, of placing tonnage at our disposal for that purpose, or of promising us that there would be tonnage available for that purpos~ when the time came. When, after September 1944, our three -sovereign provinces were freed, thanks ta· British, Polish, French, American, Canadian and Russian arms and the arms of many other Allies, we asked again, "Could we l~ûW start reeruiting a force not to subdue Indonesians but ta help in winning the Wll,r against Japan?" The answer was, "No, we have not enough tonnage, we have not enough equipment. Anyway, whom do you want tosend agâinst Japan? Underfred, ha1f~ . starved Dutch, who have just come. out of the period of· occupation by the Germans,. or well~ seasonedBritish or American !roops, who know how ta use modern weapons and have.had actual Then, after Germany's capitulation, our young menflocked by thousands to the recruiting offices and asked td be employed agairet Japan. Again" the reply was the same. We did not at that moment foresee that the atomie bomb wouid suddenly result in the collapse of Japan, butwhen it did, it was too late for us to start raising, equipping and sending overseas a Dutch force. Our Allies, guided by General Mac- Arthur's sound judgment, understood that was for them to step in, and with our full consent the task was allotted to British soldiers. What was that task? Mr. Manuilsky said that British troops went there to accept the surrender of the Japanese and to disarm them. In fact, that was only one part of theit task. The other, and to our view not the least important part of the task was to rescue prisoners of war' and sorne 200,000 Europeans who, when danger came, had not asked ta he evacuated, did not want to leave the population amongst whom t..lJ.ey had lived, to theirfete, t..~àt fate of a very harsh oppression à la Japonaise. They stayed there to try to see what they could do to help those people through the occupation. ,The Japanese understood sa weIl that that would have been to the benefit of these populations that they interned aIl the whites. Itis those whites and Europeans there who were in mortal danger, as events have proved, for it is unfortunately those who are amongst the unsung martyI:s of this war and for whom, even to this very dây, very little help has been forthcoming in spite of the exertions of the British troopsin Java. It is those people who have been killed by the hundreds and the atrocities whichhave been committed there are something terrible to read about. Far be it from me to identify the nationalist movement in Java with these atrocities. We know very well where to draw the line, and, althoughthis borders on the discussion of internai matters of the Netherlands Indies,I want to make it quite plain here .and now, in so far as that is still necessary, that we havenothing against nationalists as such, provided they play the game and do not use innocent women and .childrçn age. a pawn in a politicâl game. We accept nationaiism as a healthy, development. It would he an abnormal people, indeed, who did not at one time or another of their existence have the craving for autonomy and seIf-govemment. We want to reckon with that.to the full, as events, 1 hope, will show in a very few days. . When soldiers are provoked, when t.L~ey are fired' at, l should like to see the soldiers who do not take counteI"-:measures. Let us, for argument's sake, just think that this happened to Dutch troops in Australia, because we still have a very few in that hospitable country; let us think that it happened to American troops in areas which. they at present still occupy; in what to thelll are foreign lands; or let us think that it happened ta Ukrainian troops serving in the Red Army in the Danish island of· Bornholm. What would they do? Would theyjust stay put? Would they throw up their hands? Or would they do what any normal being would do, and that is take counter-measures? l leave the answer, with confidence, to you. Another point l want to l'aise is that, reaUy and truly, this action cannot be fairly deseribed as it hàs been described in the Ukrainian letter, as "military actions waged against the local population". Such action as there was was not the purpose for which British troops came to Java. You might just as well condemn a policeman, whose aim in life is to contribute towards keeping public order, when he locks up a man who has just tried to shoot him. Another aspect of this case to which l think l should dra,,,, attention, and very briefly sa, is that the situation which caused and justified New 1 quote at random, and 1 do not propose to follow Mr. Manuilsky in quoting from newspapers and the Iike, but let me quote from one official source. That is the official British communiqué of 30 January, which states that "Terrorists" that is not too strong a word-"in black unifonns and Japanese helmets used women and children to cover the advance of their troopsin an engagement wmch took place on the. road from Samârang to Bandoeng." 1 say again that 1 do not identify the nationaIist movement with these horrible deeds, but 1 say that the fact that these horrible deeds do occur justifies the continued presence of A1Iied troops, whom we shaII he glad to rf"Jieve as soon as. we possibly cano 1 think this is a fact which 1 do .not hesitate to calI unassailable. MI'. Manuilsky says, on the one hand, "1 do not ask for withdrawal"; and on the other, he says, "put an end to the existing situation." 1 have some difficulty in guessingwhat these British troops are then to do. Does he went them to stay there fcr a holiday? Does he want them there as lookers-on?'Does he think that it is in the nature of British troops ta remain inactive when they see, as has happened several times, that children's hands are cut off? 1 lea\Te that aIsoto the better judgment of the Council. Looking at this matter from the point of view. of the Charter-and that will be my last remark but one-I observe, tirst of all, that there ' is here no dispute. 1observe,'in the second place, that there is no situation threatening to endanger interI).~tionaipeace and security. Keeping an .eye on the language of the Charter, 1 observe, in the thirdplace,that there iSno international friction which may lead to infringement of thepeace. In the fourth place, 1 deny that there is an infringement of Article 1, in so far as that has anything togo :withthe continued . presence of British trogps in.. the Netherlands Indies, because apart from Article .1, paragraphs 2 and 3, there is aIso Chapter XI in the Charter; and we areatpresent engagedina sincere and, wholeheartedattempt to put thathouse in arder on averf IiberaI basis,as l hope everybody will saon be able tosee. Fifthly, and this ismy 'conclusion, there is, thereforè,.no case for the Security COlmcil ta deal with. About the suggestion that has been made of sehdinga commissionthel'e, Ibeg to ·remark

1 would like to suggest ta theCouncil that this might be an appropriate moment to adjourn the proceedings. If there is no objection, ! will take it that it is thewish of the Counci! that we shall now.adjourn. That is adopted. The next meeting of the Council, 1 would suggest, ~ght be on Saturday afternoon at 5 p.m. Is that approved by members of the Council? Adopted. The Council stands :\djourned. The meeting rose at 7.25 p.nt. 1 THIRTEENTH MEETING Held at Church Bouse, Westminstp.r, London, on Saturday, 9 February 1946, at 5 p.m. President: Mr. N. J. O. MAKIN (Australia). Present: The representatives of the following countries: .Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, France, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of·America. 54. Provisional agenda 1. Adoption of the agenda. . 2. Letter from the Head of the Ukrainian SSR delegation to. the Presîdent of the Security Council dated21 January 1946.1 3. Letter from the Head of the YugoSlav delegation to the Executive Secretary (undated).2 4. Letter from the He'ads of the Lebanese and Syrian delegations to the Secr~taryGeneral dated 4 February 1946 (document 8/5).8 ,5. Report by the Chairman of the Committee of Experts on the alterations made by the Committee in the proyisional rules of procedure of theSecurity Council (document ~/h\ 4 -{ - J' 55. Adoption of· the agenda 1 Ibid., Annex 5. . • Ibid., Ar.uex 9. •Ibid., Supplement No. 2, Annex1.