S/PV.120 Security Council

I now invite the representative of Albania to sIt at the Council table. 1 Sec Official Recprds of the Security Council, Second Year. Supplement No. 3. Annex 8. • Ibid., Supplement No. 3, Annex 9. . • Ibid., Supplement No. 10, Annex 22. CENT-VINGTIEME SEANCE Tenue aLake Success, New-York, le jeudi 20 mars 1947, a15 heures. President: M. O. ARANHA (Bresil). Presents: Les representants des pays suivants~ Australie, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, Etats-Unis d'Amerique, France, Pologne, Royaume-Uni, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. 99. _Ordre du iour provisoire (document 5/305) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. Incidents survenus dans le detroit de Corfoll. a) Lettre en date du 10 janvier 1947 adressee au Secretaire general par le representant du Royaume-Uni au Conseil de securite et pieces jointes (document S/247) 1. b) Communications du Gouvernement albanais relatives aux incidents survenus dans le detroit de Corfou (document S/250) 2. c) Rapport de la Sous-Commission du Conseil de securite chargee d'enqueter sur les incidents survenus dans le detroit de Clorfou (document S/300)3. 100. Adoption de I'ordre du iour 101. Suite de la discussion de la plainte ponee par le Royaume-Uni contre l'Albanie Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): J'invite . le reprtsentant de l'Albanie a-prendre place a- la table du Conseil. 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securiM, Deuxieme Annee, Supplement No 3, Annexe 8. oIbid., Supplement No 3, Annexe 9. aIbid., Supplement No 10, Annexe 22. M. ZULETA ANGEL (Colombie): La Sous- Commission constituee par le Conseil de securite pou\' etudier les incidents survenus dans le de- troit de Corfou1 ne revient pas devaut le Conseil, son etude faite, avec des recommar~dations pre- cises sur les mesures a prendre; elle ne lui pre- sente meme pas de conclusions sur les preuves avancees ou sur les faits qui doivent etre tenus pour etablis, car elle a considere que sa fanction etait plutot celle d'un rapporteur que celle d'une commission d?enquete. Mr. ZULETA ANGEL (Colombia) (translated from French): The Sub-Committee set up by the Security Council to study the incidents which took place in the Corfu Channel1 is not referring the matter back to the Council with formal rec- ommendations on the measures to be taken and is not submitting any conciusions on the evi- dence given or on facts to be taken as proved, because it felt llat its function was rather that of a rapporteH than of a commission of inquiry. But the Sub-Committee performed two tasks which, in my view, are of. some value to the Council and will undoubtedly help it in the dis- charge of its duties. It carefully analysed and studied the allega- tions and counter-allegations of the parties con- cerned 110 as to introduce order, method and system into the study of the subject, distinguish- ing relevant from irrelevant data and indicating which of the former should be considered first and which might be anaiysed later. As a result of this analysis, the Sub-Committee suggests that the Security CoUilcil should, for the time being, concentrate its attention on the following tWQ questions. Mais la Sous-Commission a accompli deu~ t~ches qui sont, amon avis, d'um. certaine utilite pour le Conseil et qui vont indiscutablement faciliter son travail. Elle a analyse et etudie attentivement lea alle- gations et les contre-allegations des parties en presence, afin de proceder d'une fa~on metho- dique et systematique a l'etude de l'affaire, en separant lea donnees pertinentes de celles.qui ne le sont pas, et en indiquant quelles sont, parmi lell premieres, celles qui doivent faire l'objet d'un e.xamen immediat et cenes qui peuvent etre ana- lysees plus tard. A la suite de cette analyse, la Sous-Commission suggere au Conseil de securite de concentrer, pour I'instant, son attention sur les deux questions suivantes: - (1) Did a minefield exist in the swept chan- nel opposite Saranda Bay on 22 October, or did it not? 1) Existait-il, oui ou non, le 22 octobre, un champ de mines en face de la baie de Sarandu, dans le chenal drague? (2) Was this minefield laid by Albania or with the connivance of the Albanian Govern- ment, or was it not? The Sub-Commitee also obtained additional evidence and documents, which, together with those already available, will enable each mem- ber of the Council to decide, on the basis of more complete data, what the reply to those two questions should be. 2) Ce chan;lp de mines a-t-il ete, oui ou non, mcuille par l'Albanie ou de connivence avec le Gouvernement albanais? La Sous-Comnllssion a egalement obtenu des temoignages et des documents suppIementaires qui, ajoutes a ceux qui existaient deja, permet- tront a chacun des membresdu Conseil de de- cider, grace a des elements d'appreciation plus complets, de la reponse adonner aux deux ques- tions ci-dessus. En· d'autres termes, la Sous-Commission a estime que son role consistait, en premier lieu, adeblayer le champ d'etude du Conseil, en fai- sant la distinction qui convient entre l'essentiel et le secondaire, entre les questions prealables et fondamentales et les questions a examiner ulte- rieurement, afin de concentrer l'attention du Conseil sur les premieres, et a lui indiquer, d'autre part, quels sont exactement Ies elements d'appreciation dont on dispose a ce jour pour decider s'il existait, en fait, le 22 octobre, un champ de mines dans le chenal drague en face de la baie de Saranda, et si ce champ a ete pose par le Gouvernement albanais ou de connivence avec lui. In other words, the Sub-Committee consid- ered that its primary task was to clear the CO':.ll1- cil's field of study, making the necessary distinc- tionbetween what is essential and what is sec- ondary, between preliminary and fundament,,] questions and those remaining for possible later consideration, with a view to concentrating the Council's attention on the former and also to show the Council exactly what evidence is avail- able to date for determining wheth/:?r in fact a minefield existed on 22 October in the swept channel opposite Saranda Bay and whether this minefield was laid by the Albanian Government or with its connivance. . This evidence and information also leave no doubt concerning two further circumstances- namely, that these m\nes had been laid recently, certainly not more than six months before the incidents occurred; and that this was the mine- field which, on 22 October, caused serious dam- age to two ships of the Brithlh Navy and some loss of human life. As a matter of fact, the full and detailed in- formation submitted by the United Kingdom delegation regarding the discovery of 22 German Y type mines-no signs of rust or marine growth could be found on these mines; there was still grease on the mooring wires, and identification marks were perfectly visible-is not only sup- ported by the report of Captain Mestre of the French Navy,S who was present at these opera- tions as an observer, but is also illustrated by a collection of photographs submitted by the United Kingdom delegation and by a chart (Exhibit VII)' showing the location of the minefield and the exact position of the mines detected. Since I could not on any account accept the hypothesis that the British Navy, with the sup- port of His Majesty's Government and with the complicity of an officer in t.he French Navy, could have plotted the. iniquitous farce of find- ing a minefield, and faking photography, charts and all sorts of circumstantial detail for the sake of obtaining a sum of money from Albania; and since, furthermore,there is no evidence that this information is incorrect, I cannot help regarding it as an absolutely and definitely established fact that this minefield was discovered on 13 Novem- p~u de temps auparavant, six mois au plus avant la date des incidents, et que c'est ce champ de mines qui a cause, le 22 octobre, des degats importants a deux batiments de la marine bri- ta!'..Dique et fait de nombreuses victimes. En effet, les renseignements complets et de- tailIes fournis par la deIegationdu Royaume-Uni sur la decouverte de 22 mines allemande's du type Y - mines qui ne portaient aucune trace d'oxydation, qui n'etaient recouvertes d'aucune vegetation sous-marine, qui etaient fixees par des cables encore graisses et qui ont pu etre identi- fiees par leurs marques encure parfaitement visibles - sont non seulement conmmes dans le rapport d'un officier de la marine fran~aise, le capitaine de fregate MestreS, qui a assiste aux operations en qualite d'observateur, mais se trou- vent egalement illustres par une collection de photographies qu'a presentees la delegation du Royaume-Uni, et par une carte (piece VII) ~ qui indique l'emplacement du champ de mines et signale la position exacte des mines decou- vertes. Comme je ne saurais, sous aucun pretexte, accepter l'hypothese selon laquelle la marine bri- tannique, avec l'appui du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste et avec la complicite d'un officier de la marine fran~aise, aurait machine, afin d'extor- quer une somme d'argent al'Albanie, une hon- teuse comedie de decouverte de champ de mines, en fabriquant pour cela des photographies et des cartes et en inventant toute espece de details et de circonstances; comme, d'autre part, aucun indice ne permet ere supposer qu~ ces renseigne- ments soient inexacts, je ne puis faire autrement 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de sBcurite, Deuxieme Annee, No 15. oIbid., Supplement No 10, Annexe 22. aIbid., Supplement No 6, Annexe 15, piece V. . • Ibid., Supplement No 6, Annexe 15, pieces II, VI et VII. As regards the question of whether the mine- field discovered on 13 November was the same as that"which caused the damage on 22 Octo- ber. the following considerations do not, I think, leave any doubt that they were infact identical. Immediately after the explosions had occurred on 22 October, the incident was brought to the knowledge of the Mediterranean Zone Board of the International Mine Clearance Organization. When the Board had been informed of the facts, it unanimously recommended on 28 October a check sweep of Medri Routes 18/32 and 18/34.1 The Mediterranean Zone Board's rec- ommendation was subw.itted to the Central Board, which has its headquarters in London. On 1 November, the latter unanimously decided that the north channel in the Straits of Corfu should be.reswept at the first favourable oppor- tunity. It was on the basis of this decision that the Allied Naval Corinnander-in-Chief ordered the mine-sweeping of the Corfu Channel. On 26 October, the Government of the United Kingdom informed the Albanian Gov- ernment that, in view of the incidents of 22 Oc- tober, the cleared channel would shortly be reswept. On 31 October, the Albanian Govern- ment replied by protesting against the alleged vlolation of its tenitorial waters by British ves- sels. The Albanian note went on to say that its Government had no objection to mine-sweeping in. the Channel, provided that this was carried out outside its territorial waters and that it would consider any mine clearance operations within its territorial waters as a flagrant violation of the integrity and sovereignty of its territory.2 On 10 November, the Government of the United Kingdom sent .a fUrther note to the Al- banian Government informing it that mine- sweeping would starton 12 November..Thi/3 was followed by a fresh protest on the part of the Albanian Government against what it called the unilateral decision of His Majesty's Goverriment. In the same note, Albania· proposed the estab- lishment of a joint commission, to decide what area of the sea should be considered the navi- gable channel. The whole of this diplomatic correspondence was submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom as Exhibit IV.3 As is apparent, during the twenty days that .--elapseacbefween ..the explosions suffered by the British ships and the mine-clearing operations, not only was there consideralille activity in Euro- pean waters by" the International Mine Clear- ~ce Organization," but there was also active diplomatic correspondence between the United 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officieEs du Conseil de securite, Deuxieme Annee, No 15, pages 295, 296. • Ibid., Supplement No 3, Annexe 8, pages 38 et 39. "The Albanian Government has always been advised when other ships were entering Albanian waters. This notification enabled the Albanian authorities to assist shipping during darkness by means of light signals along the c)ast and guide the ships into port. UNRRA and Yugoslav ships were assisted in this manner. Other .,ldps avoided the mines, not because they knew ,,,here they were, but because the Albanian coastal authori- ties were able to assist them." The Albanian representative later explained that he had meant to say that the Albanian authorities had facilitated the entry into Al- banian ports of Yugoslav and UNRRA ships by means of ordinary signals. It is evident, however, that this whole combination of circumstances. discredits the theory that between 22 October and 13 November any Power could have had the audacity ana taken the risk of sending its ships to within a few hundred yards of the Al- banian coast in order to lay a minefield tl!PIe, when not only the International Mine Clearance Organization was studying the incidents of 22 October, but, in addition, the Albanian Gov- ernment was defending its prerogatives with re- gard to territorial waters with.unusual insistence. If we add to all this that there is proof that the navigable channel was in fact swept in 1944; that there is not the slightest indication that a third Power laid the mine8; that it is absurd to suppose that the United Kingdom, in order to obtain .compensation from Albania, conceived the farce of laying the mines herself; and that the replies given by the Greek repre- sentative on the Sub-Committee were complete and in my opinion satisfactory, it then becomes evident that no doubt can exist that the mine- field found on 13 November is the same as that which caused the damage on 22 October. My Polish colle~zue thought that he could find, in certain" facts mentioned in his minority repo!t, sufficient evidence to show either that no mines were found on 13 November or that those that were found were laid during the period be~ tween 22 October and 13 November. vembre.~(:lnt iclentiques acellesqui ont cause les ciegats du 22 ()ctobrt::.. Mon collegue poIOJ:J.am-s'esteru en droit de considerer quecertains faits, qu'il enumereq~ns son rapport minoritaire, Iui permettaient de conclure ou bien qu'auclme mine n'a ete decou- verte le 13 novembre, uU bien que les mines de- couvertes' avaient et(: posces entre le 22 octobre et le 13 novembre. Nor can such conclusions be drawn from the observations made IJnder Nos. 14, 15 and 18, or from the facts described under Nos. 16, 17 and 19. As regards the facts which appear under Nos. 1, 2 and 3, it is sufficient to point out that the existence of a Gel'Inan minefield in the vicinity of the navigable and swept channel was .de- scribed in great .detail by the United Kingdom representative himself, and that there appears to be no doubt regarding the clearing opera- tions carried out in the navigable channel in . 1944. Nor do I understand how the combination of all these facts can serve as a basis for the theory that the United Kingdom .invented the finding of. the mines on 13 November, or .the ·theory that a third Power audaciously laid the . i fran~aise, ait ourdi toute une machination pOUf extorquer de l'argent a l'Albanie; eUe me parrot plus raisonnable, aussi, que cellequi consiste a supposer que, dans ces vingt jours de grande activite internationale a propos des incidents du detroit de Corfou, une tierce. Puissance ait eu l'audace de s'approcher des cotes albanaises pour y poser un champ de 22 mines a seule fin de troubler les relations du Royaume-Uni avec l'Albanie, lesqueIles etaient deja suffisamment troublees depuis les incidents du mois de mai, et a supposer aussi que le mouillage ait pu se faire sans que personne s'en soit aper~u. En ce qui concerne les faits Nos 9, 10, 11,12 et 13, il me semble que le plus qu'on en pulsse deduire est qu'il y a ~u des oublis lors des pre- paratifs des operations de deminage du 13 no- vembre. On pourrait encore admettre que l'on n'a pas observe les dispositions prises par l'Or- ganisation internationale de deminage, ou, si l'qn veut, qu'il y a eu des irreguL"ites. Mais on ne pourrait a mon sens deduire de tels faits, ni que la marine britannique a invente de toutes pieces l'existence. d'-m champ de mines, ni qu'elle l'a pose, ni qu'une tierce Puissance l'a pose subrepticement. . On ne saurait non plus tirer de conclusions identiques des observations portant les numeros 14, 15 et 18, ni des faits portant les numeros 16, 1.7 et 19. Quant aux faitsportant les numeros 1, 2 et 3, il suffit de faire observer que "I'existence d'un champ de mines allemand, a proximite duchenal navigable drague, a ete expliquee d'une maniere tres detaillee par le representant du Royaume- Dui lui-meme, et qu'il semble hors de doute que des operations de dragage aient ete effectuees dans le chenal navigable enJ944. Je ne vois pas non plus comment l'ensemble de tous ces'faits pourrait servir d'appui a l'hypo- these selon laquelle le Royaume-Uni aurait imagine la decouverte de rrfules du 13 novembre, ni l'hypothese selon laquelle une tierce Puissance. . . 1 Les .faits designes dans cette page par des numeros sont tires du rapport suppIementaire soumis par le repre- sentant de la Polggne pour faire suite au rapport de la Sous-Commission chargee d'enqueter sur les incidents sur~ venus dans le detroit de Corfou; voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, Deuxieme Annee,.SuppIe- ment No 10, Annexe 22, Appendice I. rapi~ operation. But this hypothesis raises a further question: how could the mines have been laid 50 close to the coast without Albania's knowledge when that country, especially in view of the incidents which took place in May, had shown such jeal- ous concern for all mai:ters connected with her sovereignty over territorial waters? I consider the presumption that the Il'inefield could not have been laid in the Corfu Channel without Albania's knowledge so strong, that I should have no objection to voting in favour of a finding in that sense if the majority of the members of the Council are of the same opinion. But it is one thing to say that the mines could not have been laid without Albania's consent, and another to say that the Albanian Govern- ment actually laid them. I should not feel justi- fied in making an assertion.of that nature. If the majority ofthe Council do not consider themselves sufficiently informed to state that the mines could not have been laid without Alba- nia's knowledge, I should be inclined tosug'gest that, in that case, the Council should recom- mend that the two parties bring their dispute before the Internationai Court of Justice. In conclusion, I would merely explain a point which I may not have made sufficiently clear- namely, that the Appendix I contained in this report was prepared by the Polish representa- tive on the Sub-<:1ommittee, who accepts all re- sponsibility for it. Mr. HASLUCK (Australia): The Australian delegation was a member of this Sub-Committee and would thus like to take the opportunity of indicating its views on two or three points which have been raised. , " . In the first place, we feel bound to express some surprise at the actual Jorm of the report. This was undoubtedly due to the haste with which it was put together; document S/300 ap- san~ comlivence de la part de l'Albanie ou sans participation directe du Gouvernement albanais? Il reste evidemment une autre possibilite th~o­ rique. C'est qu'rme autre Puissance. ait mouille ces mines des semaines ou de;; mois avant le 22 octobre, puisque cette operation semble etre assez facile et assez rapide. Mais, dans la mesure ou l'on peut cmettre cette hypothese, la question suivante se pose: comment aurait-on pu moulier les mines si pres de la cote al'ffisu de l'Albanie~ alors que ce pays, a cause surtout des incidents de mai, s'ctait montre tres jaloux de ses prerogatives en tout ce qui touchait sa souverainete dans ses eaux terri- toriales? Il y a, a mon avis, de si fortes presomptions que le champ de mines n'a pu etre pose dans le detroit de Corfou a l'insu dei'Albanie, que, sila majorite des membres d'l Conseil desirait se pro- noncer dans ce sens" je ne verrais pas d'incon- yenient a me joindre aeIle. Mais affirmel' que 1'on n'a pas pu placer les mines sans le consentement de l'Albanie est une cho~e. Dire que c'est le Gouvernement albanais qui les a placees en est une au.tre. Et je ne_me sens pas autorise a emettre une affirmation de ce genre-la. Si la majorite du Conseil' ne crait pas disposer d'elements d'appreciation suffiSants pour declarer que les mines n'ont pas pu etre mouillees a l'insu de l'Albanie, j'inclinerais a suggerer que, dans ces conditions, le Conseil recommande aux par- ties de porter le litige devant la Cour interna- tionale de Justice. Pour terminer, je tiens a preciser, pour qu'il n'y aitplus le moindre doute, que l'Appendice I du rapport a ete soumis par le representant de la .Pologne a la Sous-Commission sous sa seule responsabilite. M. HASLUCK (Australie) (traduit de f an- glais): Comme l'Australie'etait membre de la Sous-Commission, je voudrais exposer les vues de rna delegation sur deux OU trois points que l'on a souleves. En premier lieu, je suis oblige de dire que la forme meme du rapport nollS a quelque peu etonnes. Cela est du, sans aucun doute, ala hate avec laquelle il a ete elabore. Toutefois, le docu- Section VII of the report states that at various meetings of the Sub-Committee, the Polish rep- resentative drew attention to various facts which he considered to be especially significant, since they tended to establish certain conclusions. As it was not considered to be the function of the Sub-Committee to draw such conclusions, the Polish representative agreed to present this selec- tion of facts to the Security Council in an addi- tional report on his own responsibility. The Australian delegation thoroughly ap- proves the description of the Sub-Committee's functions given by the Chairman, and particu- larly his reference to the view that the Sub-Com- mittee might have carried out functions similar to those usually performed by a rapporteur.2 We did not think that a function of that body was ':0 attempt to present conclusions or to make positive findings on this matter, but rather to examine the evidence, to try to clarify and ana- lyse the case, and present the matter more clearly to the Security Council. That interpre- tation is supported by the statements which we made in this Council when we originally pro- posed the creation of the Sub-Committee. The following explicit statement was made by the Australian representative during the hun- dred and fourteenth meeting of the Security Council. Mter urging that the Sub-Committee should be set up, I st::lted: ". .. I repeat that it is intended only as a preliminary step in order to analyse the case, to establish the facts that can be established from • 1 The first nine pages of the Ir:in.eographed document 8/300, to which reference is made, constitute the main body of the report; Appendix I begins on page 10. La section VII du rapport declare qu'au cours de plusieurs seances de la Sous-Commission, le representant de la Pologne a attire l'attention sur di:ff'erents faits qU'il considere comme par- 'jculierement importmlts, parce que susceptibles d'amener a certaines conclusions, et que, comme il ne rentrait pas dans les attributions de la Sous- Commission de tirer des conclusions, le repre- sentant de la Polqgne fut convenu de soumettre cet ensemble de faits au Conseil de securite, dans un rapport compIementatire, et sous sa propre responsabilite. La delegation australienne approuve entiere- ment l'expose que vient de faire le President sur les attributions de la Sous-Commission et pense, comme lw, que la Sous-Commission a rempli des fonctions analogues a celles qu'exerce generale- ment un rapporteur2• Nous n'estimons pas qu'il entrait dans les attributions de cet organisme d'essayer de presenter des conclusions, ou de se prononcer d'une maniere formelle; la Sous- Commission devait plutot examiner les faits, es- sayer de faire la lumiere sur cette affaire, l'ana- lyser et la presenter avec plus de clarte au Conseil de securite. I1 suffit d'ailleurs de se re- porter aux declarations que j'ai faites au Conseil de securite, lorsque j'ai pris l'initiative de pro- poser la creation d'une Sous-Commission. Apres, avoir demande avec insistance la crea- tion de cette Sous-Commission, j'ai declare for- mellement, au cours de la cent-quatorzieme seance du Conseil de securite. "... Ce n'est la, je le repete, qu'une decision preliminaire, mais eIle nous permettra d'analyser le differend, de verifier les faits d'apres les docu- 1 Les neuf premieres pages du d'Jcwnent mimeographi6 8/300, dont il est fait mention, constituent la partie prin- cipale du rapport; l'Appenc1ice I commence ala page 10. However, as the Chairman of the Sub-Com- mittee has remarked, the members of that body naturally reserve the right to have opinions on this subject. We attempted to keep our opinions aside while we were acting in the service of the Council, but that function having been per- formed, we certainly have opinions as members of the Security Council. Briefly, I should like to say that, in general, the Australian delegation supports the opinions set forth by the Chairman of the Sub-Commit- tee regarding the nature of the evidence and the conclusions to be reached therefrom. We share the Chairman's opinion that there is no doubt whatever that 22 mines were found on 13 No- vember 1946 in the swept channel opposite Saranda Bay, and that the explosion of two mines on 22 October teok place in this identical minefield. We also agree that there is no direct evidence as to who laid the mines; yet, in the absence of any other reasonable explanation, and having regard to the detailed evidence con- cerning the condition of the mines, the nature of mine-laying operations and the places in which the mines were found, we think the Council is justified in finding that the mines must have been laid with the knowledge of Albania, while there is a strong probability that they were also laid with the connivance of Albania. I repeat that while we do not necessarily sub- scribe to every textual detail of the statement made by the. Chairman of the Sub-Committee, for we have not had the opportunity of previous examination of that statement, we do concur in the general observations and in the opinions ex- pressed by the Chairman. Mr. LANGE (Polanrl) : The report of the Sub- Committee which is before us was unanimously accepted by all the members of the Sub-Com- mittee; I wish to underline the fact that it was also accepted by the representative of Poland. I am very glad that the Sub-Committee has been able to arrive at unanimity rather than, as very frequently occurs, present two reports, submitted respectively by the majority and the minority. I think that the Sub-Committee has achieved cer- tain positive results which are set forth in this report: it has first 'clearly defined the problem and formulated the questions which are before us. M. LANGE (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais): Le present rapport a ete accepte a I'unanimite par tous les membres de la Sous-Commission; je tiens a souligner le fgUt que le representant de la Pologne y a egalement souscrit. Je suis heu- reux que la Sous-Commission ait pu se mettre d'accord sur un rapport, plutot que de presenter, comme cela arrive frequemment, deux rapports, I'un de la majorite et I'autre de la minorite. Je pense que la Sous-Commission a atteint certains resultats concrets que si trouvent consignes dans ce rapport: eIle a clairement defini le probleme et formule les questions auxquelles le Conseil doit repondre. The second question is whether a minefield existed in the Channel on 22 Octob:l'.r 1946 and whether this mineficld was unnotified. The third question is whether this minefield was laid by Albania or with the connivance of the Albanian Government. These last two ques- tions, as formulated by the Sub-Committee, are to be decided upon by the Council. Before formulating these two questiops, the Sub-Committee compiled and classified the al- legations made by the representative of the United Kingdom, as 'well as the denials and counter-allegations made by the representative of Albania. It also exalnined a number of wit- nesses, as well as several experts who had studied facts which were brought to the attention of the Sub-Committee. On that basis, the Sub- Committee formulated the two questions to be decided by the Council. That alone is quite an achievement, because, from now on, we shall be able to confine our discussion to two clearly formulated questions, and to avoid bringing all kinds of extraneous, secondary, and unimportant issues into future debate. In that sense, I think that the Sub- Committee has performed a valuable service. There was some difference of opinion between the majority of the Sub-Committee and the Pol- ish representative as to the utilization in the report of certain facts which came to light in the course of the Sub-Cornmittee's meetings. 1be representa;tive of Poland on the Sub-Committee thought that all such facts should be included in the report. He thought so, because he con- sidered the inclusion of such facts to be in ac- cordance 'with L'te terms of reference of the Sub-Committee. The resolution of 27 February '1947, which established this Sub-Committee, says dearly that the Sub-Committee is "to examine all the avail- able evidence concerning the above-mentioned incidents, and to make a report to the Security Council . . . on the facts of the case as disclosed by such evidence".l Accordingly, the Polish representative took the view that a certain number of facts which ap- peared important to him should be included in the report. Moreover, he proposed that all facts which other members of the Sub-Committee considered relevant. should also be included. I want to make it quite clear that the pro- _posal of the Polish representative on the Sub- Committee was to include facts which appea! relevant in answering the questions. The Polish Ce resultat, a lui seul, est tres important. En effet, la discussion pourra desormais se circons- crire a deux questions formulees avec p:r-ecision, et nous pourrons ainsi eviter d'aborder dans nos debats toutes sortes de points d'importance secon- 'daire, qui n'ont aucun rapport avec cette af- faire. C'est pourquoi je pense que la Sous-Com- Inission a rendu un service appreciable. Certaines divergences de vues se sont mani- festees entre la majorite des membres de la Sous- Commission et le representant de la Pologne sur la question de savoir si, dans le rapport, on tien- drait compte de divers faits mis en lumiere au cours des seances de la Sous-Commission. Le representant de la Pologne ala Sous-Commission a estime que tous ces faits devaient etre inclus dans le rapport de la Sous-ComInission. Selon lui, la necessite d'inelure ces faits decoulait du mandat meme de la Sous-Commission. La resolution du 27 fevrier 1947, qui porte creation de cette Sous-Commission, precise que la Sous-Commission doit "examiner tous les te- moignages dont on dispose, relativement aux incidents precites, et de faire rapport au Conseil de securite ... sur les faits de la' cause tels qu'ils ressortiront de ces temoignages1". En consequence, le representant de la Fologne a estime qu'un certain nombre de faits qui lui semblaient importants devaient etre· inclus dans le rapport. Il a propose egalement de consigner tous les faits que d'autres membres de la Sous- Commission considereraient comme pertinents. Je desire preciser que le representant de la Pologne a la Sous-Commission a propose d'in- elure dans le rapport des faits q'tli semblent im- portants, etant donne les questions posees. I1 n'a There are two questions before us. The first is whether there was a minefield. The second is, if there was such a minefield, who laid the mines and with whose connivance were they laid? On the basis of the facts contained in the ad~ ditional report of the Polish representative, I should like to make the folIo wiJ:,1g observations. They represent my own personal conclusions, and are not contained in the additional report presented by the representative of Poland. The latter contains only a list of facts. We know with certainty that there were some mines, since they exploded and damaged tWo ships of His Majesty's Navy. There is no possible denial of that fact. The question is, what was the character of the mines, what was their origin, and was there actually a minefield? As regards, the existence of a minefield, we have the reports of the mine-sweeping operations on 13 Novem~ ber 1946. Certain statements were made by Captain Mestre of the French Navy, who was present during the operations.1 Moreover, the representative of the United Kingdom has nuw submitted for our consideration the report of the commander of the mine-sweeping flotilla which undertook those operations.2 The Polish representative' in the Sub-Com- mittee has given certain reasons why the state- ments of Captain Mestre seemed to him rather weak evidenc~; they were full of internal contra~ dictions both as to the number of mines he had seen and as to their nature. We therefore have to use as our basis the re- port of the commander of the British mine- sweeping flotilla, and we are certainly ready to . accept it in good faith. We must then admit that a number of mines certainly were fomid during the mine-sweeping operations of 13 No- vember 1946. The crucial question before us is whether there is any evidence that these mines were laid by the Albanian Government or with its C('l1ni- vance. In our opinion, no such evidenc,,- has been brought forward. All kinds of conjectures can be made, all kinds of theories and hypoth- e ,.:1 entreprls ces operations . Le representant de 1cl Pologne ala Sous~Com­ mission a indique dans le rapport le~ diverSe! raisons pour lesquelIes il estime que les declara- tions du capitaine Mestre ne constituent qu'un temoignage peu probant. Ces declarations lui ont paru pleines de contradictions inter~es en ce qui concerne tant le nombre des mines qu'il a vue! que la nature de ces mines. , Nous devons done nous fonder sur le rapport du commandant de la flotille britannique 'de deminage et nous sommes disposes a l'aecepter en toute benne foi. Nous admettons done qu'au cours des operations de demiIiage effectuees le 13 novembre 1946, on a decouvert effectivement un certain nombre de mines. ' La question capitale est de savoir s'il existe des preuves quelconques que ces mines ont ete mouilIees par le Gouvemement albanais oude connivence avec lui. J'estime qu'on n'a fourni aucune preuve de ce genre. Bien entendu, il est possible de hire toutes sortes de conjectures. On 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de secu- riM, Deuxieme Annee, Supplement No 6, Annexe 15, piece V. • Ibid., Supplement No 10, Annexe 23. Before I go into the details of the facts, I want to make quite clear one fundamental point of principle. If a party brings an accusation against another party, the complainant has to substantiate his allegation by producing evidence to support it. Therefore, it is not sufficient, in our view, that there is no evidence to the con" trary. In this case, it is not sufficient that there is no evidence that the mines were not laid by Albania or with Albania's connivance. Accord- ing to the generally accepted legal procedure- and I think all modern, civilized legal systems agree on tIns point-the accusation, rather than the innocence of the accused, must be :mbstan- tiated by evidence. Basing ourselves on this principle, we must say that the necessary evidence to implicate the Government of Albania h,as not been produced. There are a number of possible explanations which can be deduced from the facts brought to light during the work of the Sub-Committee, and which are contained in the additional report of the Polish representative. I shall mention them only for illustration, because I really do not attach any great importance to any such ex- planations. Here is one posl'ib1e e:'tplanation. There seems to be evidence, a~, shown in fact 1 contained in the additional report of the representative of Poland,l that there existed a German minefield designated as CiP-8 in the vicinity of the explo- sions. I wish to make it clear that this minefield, which is mentbned in the source quoted in the additional report (Mine Information Mediter- ranean, dated 17 August 1945), is not the one to wInch the Chairman recently referred in con" nexion with maps presented by the delegation of the United Kingdom. Facts 4 and 51 indicate the possibility that the lighter destroyers might have been swept by the wind into remnants of tIlls minefield, thus caus- ing the first explosion. The second explosion might have taken place while the other ships were coming to the aid of the damaged de- stroyers. On the other hand, the heavy cruisers wIllch passed were not swept into the minefield and thus escaped damage. I may add, of course, that I am aware that previous mine-sweeping took place in the area, but tIlls does not necessarily mean that no mines remained. I want to refer to the report by the com- mander of the mine-sweeping flotilla presented to us today concerning the operations of 13 No- vember 1946. In its conclusions, under para- graph (c) the report states that "more mines Avant d'entrer dans les details, je voudrais poser avec nettete un principe fondamental. Celui qui porte une accusation contre autrui doit foumir des preuves a. l'appui de cette accusation. J'estime que l'absence de preuves contraires ne suffit pas. Dans le cas qui nous occupe, il ne suffit pas de dire que rien ne prouve que les mines n'ont pas ete mouillees par I'Albanie ou de connivence avec le Gouvernement albanais. Sui- vant la procedure judiciaire generalement ac- ceptee - je pense que dans les pays civilises tous les systemes judiciaires modernes sont. d'accord sur ce point - il faut faire la preuve de la culpa- bilite et non cene de l'innocence. En me fondant sur ce principe, je dois dire que 1'0n n'a pas fourni les preuves necessaires pour inculper le Gouvernement de l'Albanie. Les faits mis en lumiere au cours des travaux de la Sous-Commission, et qui figurent dans le rapport supplementaire du representant de la Pologne, permettent plusieurs explications. Je n'en ferai mention qu'a titre d'illustration, car je n'attache pas beaucoup d'importance a des explications de ce genre. Voici rune des explications possibles: il semble, comme le montre le premier fait cite dans le rapport du representant de la Pologne\ qu'il y avait un champ de mines allemand du type CP-8 au voisinage du lieu de l'explosion. Je precise que ce champ de mines, dont l'exis- tence est signaIee dans la source citee dans le rapport suppIementaire (Mine b.,formation Mediterranean, 17 aout 1945), n'est pas le champ de mines alIemand dont il a ete question lorsque le President de la Sous-Commission a fait allusion aux cartes presentees par le repre- sentant du Royaume-Uni. Les faits Nos 4 et 51 montrent que le vent a pu pousser les contre-torpilleurs legers vel'S ce qui restait de ce champ de mines; 1a premiere explo- sion se serait alors produite; la deuxieme explo- sion aurait eu lieu pendant que les autres navires se portaient au secours des contre-torpilleurs endommages. Au contraire, les croiseurs lourds ,qui ant traverse le chenal, n'ayant pas ete pousses \ vel'S ce champ de mines, seraient ainsi restes indemnes. Je sais bien que des operations de deminage avaient deja ete effectuees dans ces parages; mais ('ela ne prouve pas necessairement qu'il ne restait plus aucune mine. ' Si nous consultons le rapport que le com- mandant de la flotille de dragage a redige a la suite des operations de deminage effectuees le 13 novembre 1946, et que 1'0n nous a presente aujo.urd'hui, nous lisons dans les conclusions du 1 Voir Ies Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securiU, Deuxieme Annce, Supplement No 10, Annexe 22, Ap- pendice I r ' , . , Moreover, some mines might have been laid later, some time between 22 October and 13 November 1946, and rather close to the latter d~~ . The question may be asked: was this possi- ble without the knowledge of the Albanian Gov- ernment? In the additional report, there is a statement of the Albanian representative,2 listed as fact No. 14, which allows for the possibility that mines could have been laid under cover of darkness without the knowledge of the Al- banian coastal authorities. I do not know how much importance to attach to this statement, but I want to point out that during the war there were attempts, which sometimes succeeded, by the belligerents to lay mines clandestinely along the coasts of enemy countries. I am not an expert in this field. I should like the repre- sentative of the United Kingdom to challenge me if I am wrong. However, if I remember cor- rectly, mines were successfully laid, for instance, by His Maje~ty's Navy on the coasts of France and Norway during the war. In any case, the technical experiences of the war do not seem to us to exclude the possibility of laying mines near the shore of a country without the knowledge of that country's authori- ties. In this case, I think that we have reason to believe that the vigilance of the German a"- thorities on the coasts of Norway or France Vt probably much greater or more successful·than that of the Albanian authorities. I say this with- out any intention of disparaging the Albanian Government. There are other possibilities. Again, I do not maintain that any of these conjectures is correct. On the basis of tIle material which we have before us, we must say that we simply do not know. exer~aient, le long des cotes de France et de Nor- vege, une vigilance probablement bien plus active et plus efficace que celle que pouvaient exercer les autorites albanaises. En disant cela, je n'ai aucune intention desobligeante a l'egard du Gouvernement albanais. Il y a d'autres explications possibles. Je ne pretends pa&, je le repete, que l'une ou l'autre d'entre dIes soit la bonne. Nous devons simple- ment, sur la base des faits connus, dire que nous n'en savons rien. However, we believe that there is little that the Security Council can do in this field. We should therefore like to refer to Article 33 of the Charter, the first paragraph of which states: "The parties to any dispute, the continu- ance of which is likely to endanger the main- tenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotia- _ tion, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitra- tion, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements,.or other peaceful means of their own choice." ;Paragraph 2 of the same Article reads: «The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means." En consequence, voici les conclusions que je dois presenter au nom de ma delegation. Les faits connus permettent de formuler, a propas des incidents, diverses explications et hypotheses, mais il n'est pas du tout prouve qu'ils soient dus a des mesures prises par le Gouvernement alba~ nais ou de connivence avec lui. Nous estimons donc qu'avant de prendre une decision qui condamnerait le Gouvernement albanais, le Conseil de securite doit ctre a meme de faire la preuve de cette accusation. Faute de cette preuve, j'estime que le Conseil ne peut prendre aucune decision de ce genre. Il me semble que la procedure normale, en pareil cas, serait de clore les debats faute de preuves suffisantes. Toutefois je n'ai pas l'intention d'aller jusque la, parce que mon pays et mon Gouvernement tiennent la marine de Sa'Majeste en haute estime et reconnaissent le role important qu'elle a joue au cours de la guerre. Nous avons ete allies pen- dant la guerre. Notre marine a collabore etroite- ment avec la marine britannique; nous regret- tons profondement, bien entendu, que cet accident malheureux ait cause des degats et des pertes en vies humaines. Nous estimons donc que la marine britannique a droit aux plus grands eg¥ds et qu'il convient d'examiner l'affaire de fa~on approfondie. A notre avis, la Sous-Commission n'a pas reuni toutes les preuves existantes. Ce n'etait pas son role. Peut-etre serait-il possible de reunir des preuves supplementaires, de proceder par exem- pIe a l'audition d'experts, a l'audition des mem- bres des equipages qui ont assiste aux incidents, d'etudier les journaux de bord, de faire proceder a l'inspection des lieux par des experts, d'en- tendre et d'interroger les autorites locales, etc. Si l'on peut recueillir d'autres preuves, j'estime qu'il convient de les produire et de les examiner serieusement. Cependant, nous croyons que le Conseil de securite ne peut pas faire grand'chose dans cet ordre d'idees. C'est pourquoi nous invoquons l'Article 33 de la Charte, dont le paragraphe 1 stipule: "Les parties a tout differend dont la pro- longation est susceptible de menacer le main- tien de la paix et de la securite internationales, doivent en rechercher la solution, avant tout, par voie de negociation, d'enquete, de media- tion, de conciliation, d'arbitrage, de reglement judiciaire, de recours aux organismes ou ac- cords regionaux, ou par d'autres moyens paci- fiques de leur choix." Le paragraphe 2 du meine Article est ainsi con~u: "Le Oonsejl de securite, s'il le juge n~ces­ saire, invite les parties a regler leur differend par de tels moyens." We also hope that such action may serve an- other purpose. By bringing together the Gov- ernments of the United Kingdom and Albania for direct negotiations, it may help to clear the atmosphere of distrust which, undoubtedly, ex- ists at present between those two Governments. ~To our great regret the earlier discussions at the plenary sessions of the Security Councp. showed much distrust between the two countries. There- fore, I sincerely hope that an attempt will be made to settle the issue through direct negotia- tions or other means, the choice of which should be left open to the two Governments. Moreover, I hope that an attempt to settle this matter di- rectly will help to overcome mutual distrust, mutual misunderstandings, whatever their na- ture, and thus lead to an improvement of the relations between the two countries. I should like to add, in the name of my Gov- ernment, that there is nothing which my Gov- ernment desires more than good relations be- tween two nations which we consider both as allies and friends. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : In general, the questions which were put to me when I appeared before the Sub-Committee, and the points made in the Sub-Committee's report and in the Polish representative's paper, relate to matters which I have dealt with at various times in the Security Council. I do not propose, therefore, to deal with all of them again, except perhaps in cases where my expla- nations have been ignored and the charge has been repeated. The report of the Sub-Committee, which we have before us, does not, it must be admitted, advance matters very much. It establishes only one fact; the damage and loss of life suffered by British ships. In regard to the other aspects of the case, it draws no conclusion at all. It does not express an opinion as to whether an undeclared mine- field was laid in the Corfu Channel less than six months prior to the incident. It does not express an opinion as to whetller such minefield was laid by the Albanian Government, or with the connivance or knowledge thereof. This in- conclusiveness, of course, is not very surprising; indeed, if the Sub-Committee was not convinced of the existence of a minefield, it could hardly submit any conclusion as to who laid it. Nous esperons egalement que cette d.;cision pourra Stre utile pour une autre raison. En invi- tant les Gouvernemerlts du Royaume-Uni et de l'Albanie a entreprendre des negociations di- rectes, elle contribuera peut-etre a dissiper le sentiment de mefiance qui, sans aucun doute, divise, a l'heure actuelle, ces deux Gouverne- ments. Au COUl'S des d6bats al"1terieurs qui se deroulerent aux seances plenieres du Conseil de securite, les deux pays firent preuve, a notre grand regret, d'une grande mefiance rt;ciproque. J'espere donc sincerement que 1'0n tentera de regler la question par voie de negociation directe ou par tout autre moyen au choix des deux Gouvernements interesses. J'espere egalement qu'une tentative en vue d'aplanir le differend par des contacts directs permettra a ces Gau- vernements de vaincre leur mefiance reciproque .et de dissiper tous les malentendus, quels qu'ils soient; et contribuera ainsi a nmeliorer les rela- tions entre les deux pays. Je voudrais ajouter, au nom de mon Gou- vernement, que notre plus grand desir est de voir s'etablir de bonnes relations entre deux pays que nous considerons tous deux comme des allies et des amis. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Les questions qui m'ont ete posees au sein de la Sous-Commission, ainsi que les faits consignes dans le rapport de la Sous-Commission et dans le document prepare par le representant de la Pologne, se rapportent pour la plupart a des problemes que j'ai traites a differentes reprises au Conseil de securit6. Je n'ai donc pas l'intention de reprendre l'examen de toutes ces questions, sauf peut-Stre dans les cas ou, sans tenir compte de mes explications, on a renollveIe certaines accusations. Le rapport de la Sous-Commission n'eclaircit guere la situation, il faut bien l'avouer. n etablit un seuI fait: des batirnents britanniques ont subi des degats et des pertes en vies humaines. Quant allX autres aspects du probleme, le rap- port ne presente aucune conclusion. Il n'emet pas d'avis sur le point de savoir si un champ de mines non signaIe a ete pose dans le detroit de Corfou moins de six mois avant I'incident, ni sur la question de savpir si un cp.amp de mines a ete pose par le Gouvernement albanais, ou de connivence avec lui, ou asa connaissance. Cette carence n'a Tien de tres surprenant: en effet, si la Sous-Commission n'etait pas convaincue de l'existence d'un champ de mines, illui etait du- ficile de decider qui pouvait Stre coupable. Je n'ai pas l'intention de faire une critique detaillee de ses travaux. Toutefois, je ne com- prends pas tres bien la forme actuelle de ce rap- port; je veux parler des neuf premieres page,:; du document S/300 que le Conseil a sous les yeux. Est-ce un rapport prepare en commun par les trois representants? Le representant de la Pologne l'a-t-il accepte? I ask those questions because on the one hand the next to the last paragraph of Section V states that ", . , no agreement could be reached as to whether the mines which damaged the British destroyers on 22 October 1946 were part of the minefield which was located in sweeping opera- tions on 13 November",l However, section VI of the Polish document states on the other hand that ", , , no evidence is available as to the exist- ence of the minefield on 13 November 1946".2 Je pose ces questions parce que l'avant-dernier paragraphe de la section V declare qu' ". , . il n'a pas ete possible de se mettre d'accord sur le fait de savoir si les mmes qui, le 22 octobre 1946,• ont endommage les destroyers britanniques faisaient partie du champ de mines decouvert au cours des operations de nettoyage du 13 no- vembre1". D'autre part, on lit, lorsqu'on arrive ala section VI du rapport polonais: ".. , on ne dispose d'aucune preuve de l'existence du champ de mines ala date du 13 novembre 19462. Does the Polish representative accept the phrase which., I have quoted from the report, or does he stand by the statement in the Polish ad. ditional report that there is no evidence to prove the existence of a minefield on 13 November? That seems rather contradictory to me. How- ever, perhaps it is not essential. Le representant de la Pologne accepte-t-il la phrase du rapport que je viens de citer, ou s'en tient-il ala declaration contenue dans le rapport suppIementaire qu'il a soumis, et aux termes de laquelle on ne dispose d,aucun temoignage rela- tif a l'e...astence d'un champ de mines a la date du 13 novembre? Il me semble que les deux phrases se contredisent. Mais peut-etre ce point n'a-t-il pas une importance primordiale, Le 'PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le representant de la Pologne desire-t-il repondre acette question? .

Does the Polish representative wish to reply? Mr, LANGE (Poland): I think it is better to answer the question now. We subscribe to the report. We have before us a report adopted unanimously by the Sub-Committee, plus an additional report by the representative of Poland. Section IV of the additional report states: "The Polish representative had no objections to the main parts of the report; however, he could not accept it as such. , . ,"2 He considered that it did not contain all that could really be introduced, and he therefore submitted the additional statement. M. LANGE (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je crois qu'il est preferable que je reponde immediatement. Nous souscrivons au rapport. Nous avons sous les yeux un rapport adopte a l'unanimite par la Sous-Commission, ainsi qu'un rapport suppIementaire du representant de la Pologne. A la section IV, le rapport supplementaire precise: "Bien que le representant de la Pologne n'eleve aucune objection contre les principales parties du rapport, il ne peut l'admettre sous sa forme actuelle2 •••" Le representant de la Pologne a estime qu'il ne contenait pas tous le~ faits dont on pouvait tenir compte et c'est pour cette raison qu'il a soumis un rapport suppIementaire. . . Quant a la deuxieme question du representant du Royaume-Uni, la section VI du rapport With regard to the second question put by the United Kingdom representative, Section VI of the additional statement reads as follows: "The Polish representative stated at various meetings of the Sub-Committee that no evidence is available as to the existence of the minefield on 13 November 1946, There is only a British statement in this respect, and as the United Kingdom is a party to the dispute this statement cannot be accepted as evidence".2 supplem~ntaire est redigee comme suit: "Au cours de diverses seances de la Sous-Commission, 1ft representant de la Pologne a declare qu,on ne dispose d'aucun temoignage relatif a l'existence du champ de min~s a la date du 13 novembre. On ne possede en la matiere qu'une declaration du Royaume-Uni. Ce pays etant partie au differend, cette declaration ne peut etre admise comme temoignage2'" 1 See Official'Records of the Security Council, Second Year, Supplement No. 10, Annex 22. • Ibid., Supplement No. 10, Annex 22, Appendix I. 1 Voir les Proces-veroaux officiels du Conseil de' SBCUrite, Deuxieme Annee, Supplement No 10, Annexe 22. aIbid., Supplement No 10, Almexe 22, Appendice I. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): I thank the Polish representative for the explanation he has given. I am glad to hear he is now satisfied that there were mines found on 13 November. I am sure the Council will understand the difficulty I faced in reconciling the statement in the report, which the Polish representative said he had accepted, with the statement which originally appeared in the separate Polish document. I think I und.erstand now. If I may discuss the Polish document a little more in detail, there are one or two points in it that are not clear to me, and I have one or two questions to put and comments to make. There are also certain points made by the Polish representative which, in my view, call for correction. He explained to us that he had list~d a number of facts on which he thought the Council might be able to reach a decision; therefore it is rather important to give careful consideration to those ~letS. S~cti":m II of the Polish document states that there is no evidence as to whether a minefield existed in the Channel on 22 October 1946.2 I should like to know to what the Polish representative attributes the admitted explosions on board the British ships, the damage to those ships, and death and injury to the crews. Does he suggest that. they were caused by a floating mine, or by a ground mine, .or by a displaced moored mine? I think those are pertinent questions. If he says that a minefie1ddid not exist on 22 October, when admittedly two British ships were blown up, I want to know the cause of the e~plosion. Mr. LANGE (Poland): I shall be glad to answer the question. On the basis of the evidence, we know definitely that two mines existed because two mines exploded. Everything else is merely conjecture. As I indicated in my previous speech, we can make many conjectures, all of which are equally unsubstantiated. As I have mentioned, the explosions may have been caused by remnants of the German minefield CP.;.8 which had not been thoroughly cleared. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de f anglais): Je remercie le -representant de la Pologne de nous avoir donne cette explication. Je suis heureux d'apprendre qu'll admet maintenant qu'on a trouve des mines le 13 novembre. Le Conseil cpmprendra, j'en suis certain, qu'il m'etait difficile de concilier la dtklaration contenue dans le rapport que le representant de la Pologne avait declare accepter, avec la declaration qui figure dans le rapport prepare par la delegation de la Pologne. Je crois cornprendre maintenant. Permettez-moi de discuter le rapport du representant de la Pologne un peu plus en detail; il contient que1ques points qui me paraissent obscurs. Je voudrais poser une question ou deux et presenter quelques observations. Certaines des declarations du representant de la Pologne demandent, je crois, a etre rectifiees. n nous a' explique qu'il avait enumere un certain nombre de faits dont le Conseil pourrait, a son avis, tirer des conclusions; II est done assez important de les examiner soigneusement. "",,;, D'apres la section II du tlticument polonais, il n'y a pas de preuve de I'existence d'un champ de mines a la date du 22 octobre 19462• Dans ce cas, je voudrais savoir comment le representant de la Pologne expIique les explosions qui, comme on l'a admis, se sont produites a bord des navires britanniques, les degats subis par ces navires, les morts et les blesses parmi les membres de I'equipage. Pense-t-il que ces explosions ont ete provoquees par une mine fIottante, par une mine de fond ou par une mine acrapaud qui se serait deplacee? Je crois que ce sont la. des questions pertinentes. S'il declare qu'il n'existait pas de champ de mines a la date du 22 octobre, aIors qu'll est indeniable que deux navires britan-· niques ont saute, je voudrais connaitre les causes de I'explosion. M. LANGE (Pologne) (traduit de lJanglais): Je suis tout pret a repondre a la question. Nous avons la preuve qu'il y avait deux mines, puisque deux mines ont explose. Tout le reste est du domaine des conjectures. Or, comme je l'ai deja signale dans ma declaration precedente, nons pouvons nous Iivrer a toutes sortes de conjectures; aucune d'entre eIles n'est confirmee. Comme je I'ai deja dit, les explosions ont pu etre provoquees par ce qui restait du champ de mines allemand CP-8 qui a ete insuffisamment drague. 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels d1t Conseil de securite, Demueme Annee,Supplement No 10, Annexe 23. Mais, en toute franch,1se; je dois dire que j'ignore s'il existait un champ de mines. Je ne crois pas que l'existence du champ de !nines soit prouvee. Tout ce que nous savons est que deux mines ont explose. But, frankly, I shall say that I do not know whether a minefield existed. I do not think it is proved that one existed. All we know is that two mines exploded. sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : I share the difficulty of my Polish colleague in accounting for these explosions. They !night perhaps have been caused by floating mines. That is a first explanation. However, I think we can rule that out; the' weather was clear and the ships were moving slowly-at ten knots-and a floating mine is very easily spotted. It !night be suggested that the explosions were caused by ground mines. That possibility is equally unacceptable, because actually, the water at tJlis point is too deep-thirty fathomsand no ground mine, necessarily actuated by magnetism Of sound, will operate at that depth. The third possible expl~nation,· apparently selected by the Polish representative, maintains that somehow the mines were left adrift from an old Ger!Jlan minefield. Now it is quite impossible for mines to drift that distance with sinker, cable, and other gear. If they had broken loose, they would have come to the surface and become floating mines. Moreover, this, channel was·originally swept by the Germans at the end of 1944, by the Allies in the same year and again on 13 November 1946, and no other German mine has been found. Therefore, it would have been the most miraculous coincidence if two mines got into the Channel by some unknown means @d happened to blow up two of our ships. Some mathematician can work out the odds against that. I cannot. They are too overwhelming. I shall now consider a few other points in the Polish dociIment. In pa,rticular, section V, paragraph A, concerning the facts relating to the situation prior to the explosion.1 I have already dealt with fact 1, which states that ". . . the incident could have been caused by .floating mines Of· mines .remaining ftom a previously swept field". Fact 2 concerns the old story about General Hodgson's warning. I have 1 See Official. Records of the Security Council, Second Year, Supplement No. 10, Annex 22, Appendix I. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): 11 m'est tout aussi difficile qu'a mon collegue polonais d'expliquer ces explosions. Elles pourraient etre attribuees a des mim;s flottantes; c'est la une premiere explication. Toutefois, je crois que cette possibilite est exclue: le temps etait clair et les navires avan- ~aient lentement, a la vitesse de 10 nreuds; de plus, il est tres facile de reperer une mine flottante. On dira peut-etre que ces explosions ont ete provoquees par des mines de fond. Cette hypothese ~t egalement a repousser, la profondeur de l'eau etant, a cet endroit, de trente brasses environ; aucune mine de fond, qu'elle soit du type magnetique ou du type acoustique, ne peut produire d'effet a cette profondeur. n y aurait bien une troisieme explication, celle que le representant de la Pologne semble avoir adoptee: des mines se seraient detachees d'un ancien champ de mines allemand et seraient alIees a la derive. Or, il est absolument impossible que des !nines soient entrainees aussi loin avec leurs crapauds de mouillage, leurs cables et autres dispositifs. Si elles s'6taient detachees, elles seraient montees a la surface et seraient devenues des mines flottantes. En outre, ce detroit a ete drague une pre!niere fois a la fin de 1944 par les Allemands, ensuite par les Allies dans la meme annee et une derniere fois le 13 novembre 1946; on n'a trouve aucune autre de ces mines allemandes. Il aurait fallu une coincidence miraculeuse pour que deux mines aient penetre dans le chenal par un moyen inconnu et aient fait sauter, par hasard, deux de nos naviI'es. Un mathematicien pourrait peut-etre calculel'la probabilite cl'un td evenement; pour moi, je suis incapable de le faire. Les chances pour qu'un accident de ce genre se produise sont infinitesimaies. Je passe a certains autres points du document polonais, notamment a la section V, paragraphe A, Oll il est question d'evenements anterieurs a l'explosion1. J'ai deja parM du fait No 1, selon lequel " .. l'incident a pu etre cause par des mines flottantes. ou des mines demeurees dans un endroit precedemment demine". Le fait No 2 est le rappel d'une vieille histoire, l'avertisseinent 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, Deuxieme Annee, Supplement No 10, Annexe 22, Appendice I. . It is not immediately clear to me what bearing that note has on whether a minefield existed in the Corfu Channel or whether the minefield was laid -by Albania or with the connivance of the Albanian Government, unless one should wish to infer from it that on that date, 29 May, the Albanian Government laid or decided to lay this minefield. I cannot see any other connexion. Let us now study paragraph B. I am not quite sure what fact 4 is intended to imply. It reads as follows: "The heavy British cruisers passed through the alleged rather dense rnh"1efield without being damaged, while lighter ships struck the mines." That might happen, as I explained to the Sub-Corrmrittee. I do not see what inference is to be drawn from it, nor do I see that it affects the case. In his reply to me, the Polish representative referred to that point. However, I cannot see the relation of the density of the. minefield to the problem of accounting for the explosions if, in fact, there was no minefield. I cannot see the inference to be drawn from fact 5: "A west wind of 15' to 20 miles per hour - was blowing the ships toward the Albanian shore." I do not know if that fact is intended to imply that some of our warships were blown out of the swept channel and therefore ran on to a mine. In'the first place, modern warships are not likely to be deflected seriously from their course by a 15 to 20 miles per hour wind. But even if they were, even if they were so .deflected as to be blown right out of the channel. eastward, nobody has ever suggested or pretended that there were ever German mines east of the swept channel. They were placed to the west of the channel. Fact 6 has also been referred to by the Polish' representative ~ his last reply. He referred to the hour and 'a quarter during which time'the vessels were manoeuvring in the alleged minefield. The hour and a· quarter was the time which elapsed between the :first and second explosions. What I have to say in that respect is Fact 7 states: "On 29 October 1946, three UNRRA barges passed through the alleged minefield undamaged." ! do not deny that. This fact was intended to show that the minefield did not exist. As a matter of fact, the barges might have passed through undamaged, even though they were of hr:avy draft. Actually, I believe they were of sufficiently shallow draft to pass over the mines. I do not intend to deal with fact 8, unless it is requested. I consider facts 9 to 13 inclusive irrelevant for reasons which i have already explained to the Security Council. Let us consider fact 14. I must remind you that these facts were marshalled in order that the Council might take a decision on whether a minefield existed, and whether that minefield was laid by Albania, or with the connivance of the Albanian Government. Fact 14 is the statement of the Albanian representative allowing the possibility that mines could be laid under cover of darkness without the knowledge of the Albanian coastal authorities. I should like to ask the Polish representative whether he attaches any weight ·whatever to that statement. Lastly, in section VI, I read the following: "The Polish representative stated at various meetings of the Sub-Committee that no evidence is available as to the existence of the minefield on 13 November ·1946. There is only a British statement in this respect, and as the United Kingdom is a party to the dispute this statement cannot be accepted as evidence." Is Albanianot a party to the dispute?

I shall ask the r~presenta­ tive of Poland to reply, and I shall also ask the representative of Albania if he wishes to reply. Mr. LANGE (Poland): The questions are essentially addressed to me, so I shall "(~ply to them quite briefly. First, I want to point out that this list of nineteen facts is simply a list of the facts which we thought important in connexion with.the problem, The facts were merely written down, and are not intended to mppo:rt any particular conclusion. W~ did not intend in this respect to present a conclusion, but rather a list of facts. repr~sentant de l'Albanie, aux termes de laquelle il est possible que les mines aient ete posees a la faveur de l'obscurite et a l'insu des autorites cotieres albanais~s. J'aimerais demander .u representant de la Pologne s'il attache llne importance que1conque a cette declaration. Enfin, je vois que plus loin, a la section VI, le rapport dit: "Au cours de diverses seances de la Sous-Commission, le representant de la Pologne a declare qu'on ne dispose d'aucun'e preuve de l'existence du champ de mines a la date du 13 novembre 1946. On ne ppssede en la matiere qu'une dec~aration du Royaume-Uni. Ce pays etant partie au differend, cette declaration ne peut etre admise comme moyc.u de preuve." Mais l'Albanie n'est-elle pas, elle aussi, partie au differend? Le PRESIDENT (traduit de f anglais): Le representant de la Pologne desire-t-il repondre a ces questions? Je demanderai egalement au representant de l'Albanie s'il desire donner une reponse. M. LANGE (Polagne) (traduit de l'anglais): Ces questions s'adressent essentiellement a moi, et j'y repondrai brievement. D'abord, je VOllS ferai remarquer qu'il s'agit simplement ici d'une liste de dix-neuf faits qui se rapportent a notre affaire et que nous avons juges importants. Nous nous sommes contentes de les consigner; nous ne les avans cites a l'appui d'aucune conclusion en particulier. Dans ce rapport, notre intention n'etait pas de presenter des conclusions, mais bien une liste de faits. However, I think it would be very difficult to draw from this a conclusion as to the existence of a minefield. The mines which were found on 13 November (fact 16 in our list) were brand new and could not have been in the water mOle than two months. The same is stated in Exhibit XII which was submitted to us today< Consequently, this point can have no relation to the note sent by the Albanian Government. The latter is to be interpreted as simply a matter of protecting, so to speak, its territorial w~.ters. I do not see any connexion'between this note and the question of the minefield. As to ·the type of mines which could have caused the explosions, I just wish to mention that there is a possibility, a mere possibility, that it was the remnant of the German minefield CP-8, whether we call it a minefield or not. We I do not know how many mines there were and whether or not they were floating; but it is a fact, according to my· information-I do not have the source here at present, but I can produce it if necessary-that this field was in the eastern part of the Channel. Consequently, winds might actually have deflected ships in that direction. With regard to fact 6, I accept the correction that there was no special manoeuvring in the interval between the explosions of the two mines. However, I want to point out that in his statement to the Security Council when the question was discussed here, Sir Alexander declared: "The crew. struggled to keep their ships afloat and to make their slow and dangerous passage back to Corfu. In this they were successful. Mter nearly twelve hours of hard endeavour, both ships made the few miles of passage back to CorfU."l Certainly, there was some manoeuvring after the explosions. However, nothing more occurred, which would seem to argue against a dense minefield. I do not think that further conclusions can be drawn. With regard to section VI of the additional report, and fact 14-the·assertion of the Albanian representative that there was a possibility that mines could be laid without the knowledge of the Albanian'coastal authorities-I have already partly explained those points. We fully accept the fact that the mines were found on Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): I thank the representative of Poland for his reply. I am not quite sure why the statement of the Albanian representative is included in the list of facts, while the British statement cannot be accepted as evidence because the United Kingdom is a party to the dispute. I will not keep the Council longer than I can help; therefore, I shall not deal with facts 14 to 19, partly because I have dealt with them previously at various times, and partly because it appears that they are not very important. However, there is one fact to which I wish to reply: fact 17, which states: "Exhibit VIII presented by the representative of the United Kingdom2 shows that the mine nearest to the Albanian shore, allegedly found on 13 November, was 525 yards from the shore, while the British statement places the mine only 300 yards from the shore." There is a discrepancy here which may be considered important. I have gone over thic; as carefully as I can. I find that Exhibit VIII, which was a rather rough reproduction of the chart, might be interpreted as showing that the nearest mine was 525 yards from the shore. However, as the members of the Sub-Committee know and, I think by now, the members of the Security Council itself, we submitted an actual tracing of the. chart which accompanied the report of the mine-sweepers. I admit there was an error in my statement. Making all the allowances I can, I will grant the Polish representative 450 yards, instead of ~OO. I do not think that this is of decisive importance, but I think it is necessary to be clear on that p::-mt. There is one other point in the Polish paper which I feel bound to deal with. In section VII of the Polish document there is·an attempt made to discredit the evidence of Captain Mestre of the French Navy. This attempt is based on the fact that "in his statement of 16 November"- and I quote from the Polish document-"he says that two mines were brought ashore, one of which he examined, while the other could not be examined because of the darkness. On 23 No- 1 Exhibit XII. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de I'anglais): Je remercie le representant de la Pologne d'avoir repondu a mes questions. Je ne comprends pas bien pourquoi la declaration du representant de I'Albanie figure dans la liste des faits, alors que la declaration britannique est irrecevable sous pretexte que le Royaume-Uni est partie au differend. Je ne veux pas retenir l'attention du Conseil plus longtemps qu'il n'est indispensable, et, pour cette raison, je ne parlerai pas des faits Nos 14 a 19, d'abord, parce que je vous ai deja fait connaitre, a differentes reprises, mon avis a ce sujet et, ensuite, parce que ces faits ne me paraissent pas tres importants. . 11 y a cependant un fait que je voudrais commenter, le fait No 17. Void ce que je lis: "La piece VIII, soumise par le representant du Roraume-Uni2, montre que la mine la plus . proche de la cote albanaise, qui aurait ete trouvee le 13 novembre, etait a 525 yards de la cote, alors que, d'apres la declaration britannique, cette mine n'etait qu'a 300 yards de la cote." 11 y a ici une contradiction que 1'0n pourrait juger importante. J'ai etudie cette question avec le plus grand soin possible. Je trouve que, sur la piece VIII qui n'est qu'une reproduction assez grossiere de la carte, il est possible d'evaluer a 525 yards la distance entre le rivage et la mine la plus proche de la cote. Toutefois, les membres de la Sous-Commission savent, et je crois qu'a cette heure tout le Conseil de securite sait egale~ ment, que nous avons presente le decalque de la carte qui accompagnait le -rapport du commandant de la flotille de dragage. J'admets qu'il y avait une erreur dans ma declaration. Tout bien considere, faccorde au representant de la Pologne qu'il y avait 450 yards au lieu de 300. Je ne crois pas que ce fait soit d'une importance decisive, mais je reconnais qu'il convenait d'eclaircir ce point. 11 y a un autre point du document polonais dont je suis oblige de parler. La section VII de ce document cherche a contester la validite dll temoignage du capitaine de fregate Mestre, de la marine fran~aise, sous pretexte que "da..T1S sa declaration du. 16 novembre" - je cite le document polonais - "il dit que deux mines ont ete d6barquees et qu'il en a examine une, alors que l'autre n'a pu etre examinee, a cause de 1'0bscurite. Le 23 novembre, il declare: "par suite de 1 Piece XII. I Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite. Deuxieme Annee, Supplement No 6, Anney-e 15, piece VIII. The Polish representative knows better than that) because, when I appeared before the Sub- Committee with my naval assistant, we gave him the mine-sweeping chart. He was shown the position of the ship which Captain Mestre was aboard, and Captain Mestre's subsequent movements were explained to him. Therefore, he knows exactly where Captain Mestre went, and exactly where the mine-sweeping took place. I felt bound to say what I have said on this point, partly in defence of that naval officer, and partly to show that this contradiction in the evidence of Captain Mestre is apparent, and not real. I shall not, unless I am questioned, develop any of the other detailed points. To conclude, I should like, if I may, to repeat what I have already said, I am afraid, more than once, and state the case as I see it. This time I shall do it simply and shortly'in these terms. On 22 October 1946, two of our ships were blown up by moored mines while navigating a previously swept channel. Mine-sweeping operations on 13 November revealed a moored minefield consisting of at least 22 mines stretching across a course followed by those ships. These mines could not have been in sea-water longer than six months-our naval experts 'say two months. Since the mines were as close to the shore as 450 yards, and assuming that the Albanians did not lay them, we find it impossible to believe, for the reasons which I hCl.ve explained both to the Security Council and to the Sub-Committee, that the mines could have been laid .without the knowledge of the Albanian Government. I have already admitted that we can produce no eye-witnessof the laying of the mines. To that extent, we are making deductions from established facts. I subniit that while the chain of events which I have just outlined does not lead to a one hundred percent certainty of the Albanian guilt, it at least establishes a percentage of certainty in the very high nineties. m~mbres du Conseil pourront s'en rendre compte eux-memes, d'apres le rapport du commandant de la flotille de dragage) que je leur ai fait lfis.. tribuer - qU'il n'a eff'ectivement pas debarque. A la fin de la section VII) le document polonais declare: "Le capitaine Mestre ne precise pas OU se trouvaient les mines) et OU a eu lieu l'operation de dragage, se bomant a indiquer, d'une maniere generale) que l'operation a eu lieu dans le detroit de Corfou." Le representant de la Pologne sait pourtant bien quels sont les faits. Lorsque je me suis presente devant la Sous-Commission, accompagne de mon conseiller naval, nous lui avons remis la carte des operations de dragage. Nous lui avons montre la position du navire a bord du:quel se trouvait le capitaine de fregate Mestre; nous lui avons explique les faits et gestes du capitaine aprcs les operations de deminage. n sait donc exactement ou s'est rendu le capitaine de fregate Mestre, et a quel endrciit exact les operations de dragage ont eu lieu. Je me suis cm oblige de presenter ces observations, d'une part, pour prendre la defense de cet officier et, d'autre part) pour prouver que les contradictions qui se trouveraient dans son tl~moignage sont apparentes et non reelles. Je n'entrerai pas dans d'autres details, amoins qu'on ne me questionne. Je voudrais, pour conclure, repeter ce que j'ai deja dit a plus d'une reprise, et resumer l'affaire telle qu'elle m'apparalt. Cette fois, je m'exprimerai en termes trcs simples et trcs concis. Le 22 octobre 1946, des mines a crapaud ont fait sauter deux de nos navires naviguant dans un chenal precedemment dragu~. Les operations de dragage du 13 novembre ont reveIe l'existence d'un champ d'au moins 22 mines a crapaud sur la route suivie par ces bateaux. Ces mines avaient ete immergees depuis six mois au plus, nos experts navaIs disent deux mois. Elles se trouvaient a 450 yards de la cote. Si le Gouvernement albanais ne les a pas mouillees luimeme, il nous est impossible de croire, pour les raisons que j'ai exposees devant le Conseil de securite et devant la Sous-Commission, que' l'operation se soit faite a son insu. J'ai deja reconnu que nous ne pouvions presenter aucun temoin oculaire du mouillage des mines. Nous devons done tirer ties deductions a partir des faits etablis et j'ose affirmer que si la serie d'evenements que je viens de resumer ne demontre pas avec une certitude absolue la culpabilite de l'Albanie, elle prouve cependant que nous avons tout prcs de cent chances sur cent de ne pas nous tromper. The Polish representative, as I understand him, has been trying to construct a different chain of events, which runs something like this. On 22 October our ships were blown up by stray mines. Obviously, we have not been able to get any very definite idea of how that occurred, but it must have been effected either by old moored mines from the German minefield, or by floating mines, or by ground mines. I think I have eliminated floating mines and ground mines by the explanation which I gave earlier. These old German mines must have transferred themselves somehow to the spots marked on the chart showing where our ships blew up. It really is impossible-I need not go over the arguments-to believe that these two stray German mines-and nobody can suggest how they could have ~trayed-hit these two particular ships. It is quite incredible. However, that is the contention of the Polish representative. He even expressed doubt as to whether there was any minefield at all on 22 October. I think originally the Polish document attempted to prove that there was no minefield. I think the Polish representative has moved slightly from that position, for he now expresses doubt as to its existence on 22 October. If you express doubt as to the existence of the minefield on 22 October, you are then faced with the difficulty of accounting for the mines found on 13 November. But there again, if I understand correctly, the Polish representative is taking no chances. He has two explanations: first, these mines were laid in the interval between 22 October and 13 November by a third party; secondly, simpler still, they really were not there at all. However, I think the Polish representative has moved a little bit from that last position. I now ask: what degree of probability is there in this Polish fantasy? The chaIn of events suggested by the Polish representative is highly improbable in every aspect, whereas, although you I!1ay not be convinced one hundred percent of my suggested chain of events, I am confident that most members of the Council will agree that it is rational, and at all points, a probable story. The only point which might have raised I submit that nothing has come to light in the discussions of the Security Council or of the Sub- Committee which can shake our case on any material point. Therefore, I have the honour to submit the following resolution embodying the proposals I made in my opening statement to the Security Council on 18 February. I shall read the text of the resolution. In the copy which I circulated to the members of the Council, the first word of paragraph 2 appears as "directs"; it should be "recommends". "The Security Council, ((Having considered statements of representatives of the United Kingdom and of Albania, concerning a dispute between the United Kingdom and Albania arising out of an incident on 22 October 1946 in the Strait of Corfu, in which two British ships were damaged by mines with resulting loss 'Of life and injury to their crews, "1. Finds that an unnotified minefield was laid in the Corfu Channel by the .Albanian Government or with its connivance, resulting in serious injury to His Majesty's ships and loss of life and injury to their crews; "2. Recommends that the United Kingdom and Albanian Governments should settle the disput~ on the basis of the Council's finding in paragraph 1 above, and that, in the event of failure to settle, either party may apply to the Council for further consideration of the matter; "3. Resolves to retain this dispute on its agenda until both parties certify that it has been settled to their satisfaction; "And since the laying of mines in peacetime withou.t notification is unjustified and an offence against humanity, and since it is the duty of Governments to remove promptly mines laid in time of war, "4. Reminds all States, whether Members of the United Nations or not, that it is incumbent on them to sweep or permit to be swept all parts of their territorial waters where there is reason to suspect the presence of mines." In conclusion, may I say a word about the concluding remarks of the Polish representative. He suggested that the Council should take no "1. Constate qu'un champ de mines non signale a ete mouille dans le detroit de Corfou par le Gouvernement albanais ou de connivence avec lui, a cause de graves dommages a des navires de Sa Majeste et tue Oll blesse des mem- bres de leurs equipages; "2. Recommande aux Gouvernements du Royaume-Uni et de l'Albanie de regler ce dif- ferend sur la base des constatations du para- graphe 1 ci-dessus et, si ces negociations n'abou- tissent pas a un reglement, autorise l'une et l'autre partie a faire appel au Conseil en vue d'un nouvel examen de l'affaire; "3. Decide de maintenirce differend a son ordre du jour jusqu'au moment ou les deux parties en cause lui auront fait savoir qu'un reglement est intervenu a lear satisfaction mu- tuelle; "Et attendu que le mouillage de mines en temps de paix et sans notification prealable ne se justifie pas et comtitue un crime contre l'hu- manite; et attendu qu'il est du devoir des Gou- vernements de relever sans retard. les mines mouillees en temps de guerre, "Le Conseil de securiU, "4. Rappelle a tous les Etats, qu'ils soient ou non Membres des Nations Unies, l'obligation qui leur est faite de draguer, ou de laisser draguer, toutes parties de leurs eaux territoriales ou l'on a des raisons de croire a la presence de ces mines." En conclusion, permettez-ll1oi de dire un mot sur Ies observations finales du representant de la Pologne. lla propose que le Conseil ne prenne If the Council, after all this discussion, finds itself unabl~ to take action and, makes no re- port or recommendation, and thinks that the Albanian Government might now be in a better mood to negotiate with us, I feel it is quite use- less to suggest that the Council would be help- ing by asking us to try once more to negotiate a settlement directly with the Albanian Govern- ment.

It is getting late, and it is apparent that we cannot complete consideration of this matter today. I think that the best course is to adjourn now. We can take up this matter again tomorrow at 11 a.m. Do we agre.e on that? Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): Mr. President, it would be more convenient for me if our meeting were held tomorrow at 3 p.m. instead of at 11 a.m.

I think we can meet at 11 a.m. as well as at 3 p.m., because I do not think we shall finish our work in the morning. I shall . reconcile the suggestions I have received, for that is my function. We will meet at 11 a.m., and we will probably agree to meet again at 3 p.m. M. EL-KHOURI (Syria): Mr. President, since the views of the members of the Sub-Committee have only been presented today, it would be better to wait until the verbatim record of the Council meeting has been distributed and read by the memb~rs of the Council, before taking decisions on the subject. I do not think that the record of the meeting will be ready and distributed by 1~ a.m. tomorrow. I even thought that tomorrDW would not be a convenient day to discuss this subject. The long discussions which took place today ought to be studied, and in particular the views of the members of the Sub- Committee, which were only presented· today. Therefore, I think it would be better to postpone further debate on this subject until next week. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : Mr. President, may I ask if you can give us any indication as to the Council's agenda for the re~uel. Elle vous convaincra, j'en suis certain, que, meme a ce' moment-la, en decembre 1946, il semblait n'y avoir aueun espoir de reglcr la question par negociations avec le Gouvernement albanais. Si, Et l'issuc de ces longs debats, le Conseil n'est pas en mesure de prendre une decision; s'il ne fait pas un rapport ou des recommandations, mais juge que l'Albanie sera plus disposee maintenant a negocier avec nous, j'estime qu'il serait padaitement inutile de suggerer au Conseil qU'il pourrait faire reuvre utile en se contentant de nous demander de tenter un nouvel effort en vue d'aboutir a un reglement par la voie de negociations directes avec le Gouvernement albanais. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Il se fait tard et il est ~vicient que nous ne pouvons epuiser cette question aujourd'hui. A mon avis, il serait preferable d'ajourner la seance. Nous pouvons reprendre l'examen de cette affaire demain a 11 heures. Les membres du Conseil sont-ils d'accord a ce sujet? M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit de l'anglais): Monsieur le President, je prefererais que la seance eut lieu demain a 15 heures au lieu de 11 heures. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): A mon avis, nous'pouvons nous reunir une premiere fois a 11 heures et de nouveau a 15 heures, car je ne crois pas que nous puissions terminer nOE travaux le matin. Je voudrais concilier les suggestions que j'ai re~ues, car c'est la mon role. Nous nous reunirons done a 11 heures et nous nous mettrons sans doute d'accord pour nous reunir de nouveau a15 heures. M. EL-KHOURI (Syrie) (traduit de fanglais): Etant donne que les membres de la Commission n'ont exprime leurs vues qu'aujourd'hui, il serait preferable d'attendre la distribution du compte rendu stenographique de la seance, pour que les membres du Conseil puissent le lire avant de prendre une decision en toute connaissance de cause. Je ne crois pas que le compte rendu de la seance puisse etre distribue avant 11 heures du matin. Je ne crois meme pas qu'il serait bon de discuter cette question demain.· Nous devons etiIdier les longues discussions qui ont eu lieu aujourd'hui, et examiner notamment les vues des membres de la Sous-Commission, qui n'ont ete portees a notre connaissance qu'aujourd'hui. Je pense qu'il serait donc preferable de remettre la suite de la discussion a la semaine prochaine. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais) : Permettez-moi, Monsieur le President, de vous demander si vous pouvez

I think that Tuesday of next week is free, and we could meet then. However, I recognize that the objection of the representative of Syria also deserves some special consideration; we shall be receiving a copy of the verbatim record at 10 a.m. tomorrow and would have to meet at 11 a.m. Therefore, as I do not want to prevent the representatives from studying the matter at leisure, I shall be happy to convene the Council for 3 p.m. tomorrow. The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : La journee de mardi est disponible et nollS pourrions reprendre l'examen de l'affaire ce jour-la. Je reconnais que !'objection soulevee par le representant de la Sync merite egalement une attention speciale, car nous allons recevoir le compte rendu sb~nographique demain a 10 heures et nous devrions nollS reunir a 11 heures. Comme je ne veux pas vous empt:cher d'etudier eette question a loisir, je fixerai done la proehaine seance du Conseil a demain, 15 heures. 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