S/PV.1202 Security Council

1 speak as the representative of a country whlch maintains friendly relations with the Dominican Republic. It is the earnest hope oi my Government tbat the Dominican people, who bave suffered SO much from tyranny and civil strife in tbeir cbequered bistory, Will soon acbleve political stability and Will be able to develop their country in peace and security. 15. It is unnecessary for me to revlew the events that bave led to United States involvement in the Dominican Republic. 1 bave no doubt that the United States has acted with both its own vital interests and those of the whole Western hemisphere in view. 18. The Soviet Union and Cuba bave asked tbe Council to condemn the American action as a naked aggression against the Dominican Republic. 1 do not intend to go into an examination of the Soviet and Cuban charges. Mr. Stevenson, the United States representative, bas already done SO with his customary eloquence. 1 wish merely to set forth in a few words the views of my delegation with regard to intervention andaggression, 17. It seems to my delegation that intervention and aggression are not necessarily synonymous or interchangeable terms. In recent world history. most flagrant acts of aggression bave been committed without involving overt and direct acts of intervention. In our day this type of concealed, indirect, but carefully calibrated aggression, usually carried out through the familiar tactics of infiltration, subversion and the use of proxies, has been developed, at the hands of the Communists, into a fine art. Indeed, it has become the most favoured, as well as the most effective, tool of communist fore@ policy. 18. Yet that type of aggression bas not received careful consideration in the textbooks of international law. But it is a faot of the contemporary world which the Council, in considering any situation involving peace and security, cannot overlook. 19. The United States action in the Dominican crisis is admittedly an act of intervention. The UnitedStates Government has never concealed that fact.Admittedly, too, the intervention that has taken place. far from being an act of aggression. was intended toaccomplish the dual purpose of proteoting American lives and forestalling a communist take-over of a sister Republit. We may thus conclude, if we bave a11 the faots before us-and my delegation is satisfied with those 2Q. MU& bas been said atilt tbe -ight of a sovereign people to cboose their rulers or their form of government. There is no question but tbat the principle of self-determination must be upheld. It is one of the cardinal principles ensbrined in the Charter of the United Nations. It should be remembered. however, tbat the right of self-determination cari be properly exercised only in unfettered freedom. There is no instance witbin myknowledge whereacommunist form of government bas been freely chosen by a free people. Such a form of government is invariably imposed on the people by a smala minority acting under the instigation and in the interests of anather communist Power. 21. In tbe present case, there bas been ample evldenca that oommunlst conspirators, blgbly trained in subversive and terrorist tactics. were seeking to exploit the chaos and confusion that occurred in Santa Domingo. It would be a mockery of the principle of self-determination if the Dominican people were left at the mercy of these communist adventurers. 22. Whether United States action is allowable under the existing treaties and agreements between tbe Americao States. only tbose States cari decide. 1 listened witb special attention to tbe learned statement made at L!ie 1138th meeting by tbe rqresentative of Uruguay, end 1 bave great respect for hls juridical analysis. 1 zn only t& well aware of tbe importance attached to tbe pïitmiple of the inviolabillty of a State’s territory. But. wbile a regional organization such as tbe Organisation of American States bas tbe paramount duty of ensuring respect for the political independence and territorial integrity of its members. it must in SO doing take into accotant tbe common intereets of the region. in order to ensure peace and justice among the Rates. In this sense. the purposes and functlons of a regional body. in respect of the region concerned. coincide with those of tbe Unlted Nations. 23. If I may spesk in the lighter vein in wbich the Security Council bas lately allowed itself to indulge, 1 am reminded of an incident in a certain capital in which I was stattoned some years ago. One day fire broke out in a certain embassy. It happened to be a boliday and tbe ambassador was away. Tige officerin-b.arge refused to admit tbe firemen wb~ bad rushed to tbe scene. on the grounds that the embassy pronerty was inviolate under international law. Tbe result was that irreparable damage was done to tbe embassy building, involving at the ssme time considerable danger to life and property in tlae entire neigbbourbood. 24. Surely. an organisation like the Organisation of American States cannot allow itself to stand aside 26. The efforts made by the Organisationof American States should receive tbe full endorsement of tbe Security Council That does net, of course. derogate from the authority of tbis Council, wbicb bas tbe responsibility of maintaining international d security. But a regional body su& a5 tbe OAS is apt to be better suited to a situation in which the interests of its members are directly concerned. The Charter of the United Nations clearly provides for ras013 to regional agencies and arrangements. Tb.e Prccedure suggssted by tbe representative of Bolivia is definitely consistent with the practices uf tbis Council and bas my delegation’s suPPort. 26. americains le Conseil porter Investi de la paix un organisme pour cause les intér&ts Nation5 organismes qui a été sugg&ée est parfaitement v6es l’appuyer.

During tbe last few days. since the question of the o~en armed intervention by the United States of America in tbe interna1 affairs of tbe Dominican Republic was placed on out agenda, United States aggressicn bas assumed even more dangerous proportions. In violation of tbe basic principles of the United Nations Charter and the universalIy recognised rules of international law. tbe United States imperialists are continuing to extend tbeir armed intervention in the Dominican Republic in pursuit o; their undisguisedly predatory and imperialistic objectives. 27. listes niers, des Etats-Unis Républiqv? l’agressic,n dangereuse de la Charte sellement rialisme armée de domination. 28. In the few days which have elapsed since tbe beginning of United States intervention, the United States naval forces taking part in the invasion operatiens bave been increased more tban five tiies. and its armed forces in the Domintcan Republic almost twenty times. The country bas bsen virtually talcen over by Unlted States occupation troops. The Unlted States imPerialistsre taking cruel reprisals against the people of a sover i \ T who have risen np against a bloody dictatorsbi . 28. depuis forces operations forces caine est pratiquement des Etats-Unis, de façon barbare s’est souleve 29. République de nouveau nisation longtemps leurs les Etats-Unis militaire nisatlon 29. In order to disguise its armed%itervention in tbe Dominican Republic, tbe United States is trying once in to hide behind the Organization of American States which it bas long used to serve its own imperialistlc schemes and objectives. With brazen cynicism, the United States imperialists are striving t6 perpetuate their military occupation of a sovereign country. a Member of the United Nations, tbrough a so-called joint action by tbe Organization of Americas States. ~U%S des Etats américains. Tke said resolution requests the American f3cmmments and the General Secretsriat of tbe Organination of American States to extend their fuli co-o?eration tO facilitate tbe work of tbs Committee. “Tbe formation of an inter-American force Will signffy ipso facto the transformation Of forces piesently in Dommican territory Into anotber force tbat Will net be tbat of one State or of a group of States but tbat of tbe Organisation of American States, wbich Organisation is cbarged witb the responsibility of interpreting tbe democratic Will of its members, “Tbe American States betng under tbe obligation to provide reciprocal assistance to eacb other, tbe ~r~~~a~~Qn is under obligation to safeguard tbe principles of tbe and to do everytbing possible SO tiit in situations such as thatprevailtng in tke Dominican Republic appropriate measures may be taken leading to tbe re-establishment of peace and normal democratic conditions, “The Organization of American States being competent to assist the mem-ber States in the preservation of peace and the re-establishment of normai democratic conditions, it is also competent to provide the means tbat reality and circumstancas require and that prudence counsels as adequate for tbe accomplisbment of such purposes, and V%s Committee of tbe Organization of American States tbat proceedsd to tbe DOMnican Republic. in its second report to tbis Meeting. advises tbe formation of an inter-American force to achieve tbe objectives determined by the Meeting of Consultation, *Res01ves: “1. To request Governments of memher Statef tbat are willing and capable of doing SO to makr contingents of their land, naval, air Or policeforcer available to the Organizatton of American States witbin tbeir capabilities and to the extent. tbey car do SO. to form an inter-American force tbat wil operate under the authority of Ibis Tenth Meeting of Consultation; “2. Tiat this Force Will hsve as its solepurpcse in a spirit of democratic impartiality, that of CO- Operating in the restoration of normal conditions ir tbe Dominican Republic. in maintaining the securit! of its inbabitants and tbe inviolability of humar rights. and in the establishment of an atmospbert Of peace and conciliation thst Will permit the func tioning of democratic institutions; “4. That at sucb tlmes as tbe OAL Unified Command shall bave determined that the Inter-American Force is adequate for the purposes contemplated by the resolution adopted by this Meeting on 1 May 1965. tbe full responsibllity of meetingtbese purposes shall be assumed %y that Force; “5. That tbe wltbdrawal of the Inter-American Force from the Dominican Republic shall be determined by this Meeting; “6. TO continue in session in order to keep the situation under revlew. to receire the report and recommendation of the Committee, and in the llgbt thereof to take the necessary steps to facilitate the prompt restoration of democratic order in the Dominican Republic:. “7. TO inform the Security Council of the United Nations of the text of this reso1ution.v 37. The adoption of this action by the Organisation of American Statss Will be a step forward in the development of tbe inter-American system. Indeed, it was to these very terms that our represestative to t’le OAS, Ambassador Ellswortb Bunker. referred on this occasion when be made the followlngstatement: ‘With reference to paragraph 4,I am authorized by the President of the United States to state that when the Unlfied Command of the OAS determines that the Inter-American Armed Force is adequate for tbe purpose contemplated by the resolution adopted by tbis body on IvIay 1 and that WnitedStates forces are not needed as part of the Inter-American Armed Forces, tbey Will be withdrawn from the Dominican Repubbc. v

The representative of Cuba has asked to speak. Since he is perbaps aware that we decided la& night that at noon today we would continue consideration of the next item on the agenda, namely, “Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia”, 1 should like to inquire from the representative of Cuba how long he Will take in making bis statement?

1 shall be very bricf. 4n. The PRESIDENT: I cal1 on the representative of Cuba.

1 do not intend to persist in discussing the actions taking place in the Dominican Republic, which are very clear. Nor sball 1 engage in a monotonous repetition of precepts of the Chnrter of the United

Tbe United States representative t wbo bas jus1 read the so-called “resolution” of the Organisation of American States regardtng the situation in the Dominican Republic, has moreover seen fit to lavish pi-aise on tbat organisation for ils action. 44. The United States representative appears io bave used oui meeting as a sort of platform from whtch to read out instructions and directives which bave been adopted by someone else and whtch the Security Council must follow. 45. 1 should like to ask Mr. Stevenson: since when has the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security become the prerogative of the WMte House rather than of the Security Council of the Untted Nations? By what right do others adopt decisions and resolutions on matters which fa11 exclusively within the competence of the highest organ of the United Nations. the Security Council? 46. The contention of the United States representattve that the question of United States armed intervention in the interna1 affairs of the Dominican Republic is entirely the concern of the Organization of American States is absolutely untenable and represents a direct challenge to the United Nations. Tbat is in flagrant contradiction with the Charter of onr Organisation and undermines its basic principles. 47. Tbe United States representative. on an earlier occasion, gave his own interpretation of Article 53 of tbe United Nations Charter, an interpretation wbtch was as far removed from reality as a11 the otber arguments advanced here in the Security Council by tbe United States of America. With no hesitation, tbe United States representative said tbat neither the United Statea nor the Organlzation of AmericanStates was taking any enforcement action within the meaning of Article 53 of the Charter. 48. We should like to ask the United States representative: wbat, then, are tbe United States invaders, 49. We consider it necessary to repeat that Article 53, paragraph 1, of the Charter states clearly and un. mistakably that no enforcement action may be tsken without the authorixation of the Security Cou&l. 50. We again ask, as we have repeatedly asked before: where is the requisite authorization from the Security Council? Where is its mandate for the carrying out of military operatlons and enforcement action against the Dominlcan Republic? 51. No machinations behind the scenes. no metamorphoses. no labels Will enable the United States t0 transform its interventionists into international or regional soldiers. As folklore has it, an ape with a crown on its head is still an ape. 52. The United States intervention is continuing. Not only has not a single United States soldie: ieen withdrawn from the Dominican Republic, but, on the contrary, United States troops are being concentrated in that country and in the surrounding region. 53. 1 spoke today, at the beglnning of the meeting, on the substance of the question. 1 ask tbat the Soviet Union% position with regard to the draft resolution which we have submitted should be tsken intoaccount.

Before putting the USSR draft resolution to the vote, 1 cal1 on the representative of Uruguay.

A few moments ago the Soviet Union representative asked that the Council should proceed to vote <rn bis draft resolutlon. After he had spoken. the United States representative informed the Council of certain developments since yesterday’s meeting, includlng the adoption by the Organisation of American States of a resolution which the United States representative read out but of which the text is net yet in the hands of the members oftbis Council. 1 tmderstand that it Will be circulated this morning. The importance of this document is, 1 believe, obvious and for that reason 1 consider that the Council should be acquainted with its contents before voting on tbe draft resolutlon. 66. I also understand that the investigatingcommittee sent to the Dominican Republic by the Organization of American States. tbe establisbment of which was reported in a document circulated at the time[S/6319].4J returned to the United States capital early this morning. As 1 bave already told tbe Council, my delegation voted in faveur of the appointment of tbat committee O/See Officfal Records of rhe SecurRy COUIC~~. Twentieth Year. Supplemenr for Aprll, May snd Jun% 1965. 57. As my country was among those wbich, at the OAS meeting early this morning. did net vote in faveur of the draft resolution adopted by the Organization of American States, the Security Council Will understand tbat, for purely individual reasons, 1 must carry out certain consultations with my Government on the meaning and the possible consequences of its vote. 58. I am sure that-the Soviet Union representative Will appreciate how difficult it is for my delegation to take a position on hls draft resolution at tbis moment. Moreover, there are still one or two speakers to participate in tbe debate. 59. For tbese reasons. I venture to request tbe Soviet Union representative to be good enough to agree to a postponement of the vote on hls draft resolution, which might be taken at 11 a.m. tomorrow at a meeting of the Council convened for tbat purpose.

We bave just listened to a request by tbe representative of Uruguay to postpone the vote on the Soviet draft resolution unlil tomorrow morning. if possible. My delegation would llke to support that request. and we hope that the representative of the Soviet Union Will be able to go along witb it. 61. In tbe cûürse of the meeting thîs morning. we have been informed of very important decisions taken by the Organization of American States which Will bave a very important bearing on the solution of tbe question under consideration, and my delegation would like to study the exact decisions of tbat organisation before we go on to a decision on the Soviet Union draft resolution. After studying the decisions of the OAS, my delegation would also like to participate in the general debate before the vote takes place. K sbould tberefore like to support the request of the delegation of Uruguay. 62. Mr. RIFA’I (Jordan): 1 only wish to add my voice to tbose of the representatives of Uruguay and the Netherlands. In fact, it was net clear in my mind that the request that the Soviet draft resolution be put to the vote meant that it should be put to the vote immediately, or before noon-a time that bas now past. 63. I certainly took note of tbe reference in the statement of tbe United States representative to the measures taken by Lhe Organizalion of -4merican States. However. whatever measures were taken. tbat is a question which belongs to the regional organization. separate!y and independeatly. It has notbing to do wlth our work here. and it cannot affect OUI responsibilities as members of tbe Security Cou&l. Tbe task of maintaining international peace irnd security rests witb tbis Council, and wben we take action we take it directly, with ail our blessings on 65. On the other hand, as was indicatedby the representative of Uruguay, we bave not yet heard the views of some members at thls table, and 1 feel that the discussion has not yet been completed. Perbaps some more efforts, some more ideas and some more suggestions might be put forward in order to enable us to reaoh a positive conclusion in our present debate. 66. The members of the Council are also contacting their respective Governments. and we are not yet in a position to take a finalstandonthe important matter before us. The Security Council is seized of the problem. Perhaps we cari prejudge the fat? and destiny of any proposa1 that might be put forward. but what I tare for more than the fate of any proposa1 is to keep thls principal organ of the United Nations inoperation and in the picture and to let it continue to seek way i and means of assumlngits responsibilities. Thereforc 1 would address myself to the representative of the Soviet Union and ask him to allow these thoughts to be formulated and to enable us to meet again some time tomorrow. either. as the Uruguayan representative suggested, at 11 a.m., or at any time which might be found convenient to you. Mr. President. 1 would respectfully refer to what you SO rightly said a few minutes ago. indicating that it was tlme we turned to the draft resolutlon whlch has been submitted on the item relating to Southern Rhodesia. 6’7. Mr. FEDORRNKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): 1 have Hstened with attention to the vlews expressed by my colleague from Uruguay, Mr. Vehicques, and I consider tbem reasonable. 1 bave also taken into account the support expressed by our colleague from the Netherlands. Mr. de Beus, and have noted the gravity and urgency of the remarks which bave just been made by our colleagne from Jordan, Mr. Rifa’i. 68. 1 consider tbat all these statements deserve attention and 1 bave therefore taken them into account.

We tbank the representative of tbe Soviet Union for having agreed to a deferment of the consideration of tbis item to a later date, some L&@b% 2 ad 30 August 1963 addressed to the President of the Security Cou&l on behalf of the rooresentoiives of thirty-twoMember States (S&i382 21 April 1965 addressed to the President of the Secu’kty Council from the representotives of Algeria, Burundi, Cameraat~, Central Africon Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopio. Gabon, Ghaana, Guinea, Ivory Coost, rio, Libyo, M~agascar,Malawi,Moli, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sene&, Sierra Leone, Sondia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United ~eF~lic of Bonzania, Upper Volta ond Zambia (S,‘4294 cd Add.1) TO. The PRESlDENT: In accordance with the decision taken on 30 April [1194th meeting], 1 shall now. wltb tbe consent of tbe Council. invite the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Algeria and Senegal to tske part in the consideaation of the question before us. At the invitation of Il?e Presidenf, il&. BouteflJka (Algerh) md II&. Doudou Thiam @ecegeZ) tcok p&ces af fbe Catmcil table. 71. r. USHRR (Ivory Coast) (translated from Frencb): Before ws proceed to vote on the joint draft resolution [S/6329] and on tbe various amendments [S/6332] wbicb bave been submitted to us. tbe Ivory Coast delegation feels tbat it must explain some of its difficulties and also express its conc,eru wlth regard to tbe possible consequences of the interpretation of tbe amendments. It also wishes to prevent any confusion as to tbe meaning of the positions wbich the Ivory Coast delegation may be led to take on tbose amendments. 72. Tbe Ivory Coast delegation, wbich had the honour ot introducing the draft resolution. indlcated how far it fell short of giving complete satisfaction to the African delegations and explained why those delegations-wblch drafted and discussed the draft resolutien--bad submltéed that text. 73. Tbe first of the amendments submltted tous asks us ta delete operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of the draft resolution and to replace tbem with a new paragraph 3. Paragraph 3 of OUI draft reads as follows: WRequests the United Kingdom Government andall States Members of the United Nations not toaccept a unilateral declaration. . . n. Tbe interpretation given to us when the Soviet Union representative submitted the amendments referred to the words “net to recogniae”. However, :Je did not use tbe words “net to recognize” here: we said “net to acceptw, wbich is quite dlfferent: a.. . net to accept a unilateral declaration of independence for Soutbern “Requests the United Kingdom to tske a11 necessary action to prevent the unllateral deolaration of independence.” 74. We explained ourpositionon these twoparagraphs at length during the debate. We specified that we would net be content if the UnitedKingdommerely took uecisions after the event, but that we would like it to take measures for the sole purpose of preventing a unilateral declaration of independence. Consequently, this paragraph is very important to us, and tbis is why it is extremely difficult for us to agree to the outright replacement of our paragraphs 3 and 4 with a new paragraph 3 which would read as follows: “Requests the United Kingdom Government to cancel the elections set bv the Government of Southern Rhodesia for 7 May on the basis of the Constitution of 1961.” 75. The Ivory Coast delegation voted in favour of the resolution of the Special Committees/andparagraph3 of the amendment appears in that Committee’s resolution. 76. We must bear in mind that today is 6 May and that the elections Will be held on 7 May; at this moment, it is almost nightfall at Salisbury: in view of the tiie which the Secretary-General officially requires in order to transmit to the United Kingdom the resolution adopted by us. wlth an amendment of that kind. and the time needed to communicate it to Salisbury, this would bring us to 10. 12 or 15 May. and the elections would already have tsken place. The Ivory Coast delegation does not thlnk, therefore, that in this context it would really be wise to replace paragraphs 3 and 4, to which we attach great importance and on which we have spoken at length in our general statement, with a new paragraph 3. 77. With regard to the second amendment, whlch requests the United Kingdom to take the necessary measures for the immediate granting to Southern Rhodesia of independence by a democratic system of government in accordance with the aspirations of the majority of the population. there is no doubt that thls is the wish of all Africans and we shodd. of course, have wlshed that such independence might be proclaimed on those terms. However, we fear very much the confusion which that might create in Southern Rhodesia at this election time. As you are aware, the Europeans in Southern Rhodesia, andmore particularly those who differ somewhat from Mr. Smith in their ideas. consider, at best. that the constitution whioh we have rejected contains the seeds of a majority government, but in time to corne. We must avoid creating confusion. 79. We tberefore find ourselves in diffiCI.tRy, for if ths Security Council wcre to accept this amendment we do net know what would happen to oup draft resolution. Paragraph 5, which it is sought to amend, is taken almost verbatii from the draft resolution submittecl by our Afro-Asian friends. Ghana.Morocco and tbe Philippines [S/5425/Rev.l].6/who at the time were members of the CoonciI. 1 repeat that this paragraph is taken from paragraph 1 of theirdraft resolution whicb, at tbe lime, was vetoed by the United Kingdom representative. As one of the sponsors of the draft ~resolution. 1 confess tbat vfe bave slmply copied tbis paragraph. Frankly. should the Security Council not adopt any resolution. should it reject ours and conclude its discussions without agreeing on any resolution, the situation would be just as catastrophic as before. 80. That is why, before proceeding to vote, we would ask the Security Council to take a11 these points and a11 lbese circumstances into account, and would also ask our colleague from the Soviet Union whether lie cari do somethlng to prevent such confusiou, or even the possibüity of confusion. 81. Mf. FEDORRNKO (Union of Soviet Sacialist Republics) (translated from Russian): At the 1201st meeting. the USSR delegation explained in detail its position on the question of Southern Rhodesia. There is tberefore hardly any need for us to repeat what we have already stated at earlier meetings of the Security Couocil. 82. Guided by the USSR’s position of principle. namely, that the shameful colonial system must be abolished forthwith, we consider it essential that the draft resolution shauld state clearly and explicitly the necessity for the grantlng of immediate independence to the people of Southern Rhodesia, on tbe basis of full equality of rights for the indigenous population of that country, and through the establishment of a democratic system of pverm-nent in accordance with the wishes of the majarity of the population. 63. In this belief, we consider that one essential step is tbat the Unitrd Kin@lom Government shauld cancel the elections scheduled by the Government of Soutbern Rbodesia for 7 May on the basiskof the 1961 Constitution. In this context, and taking the position that we do. we consider that no other interpretation is possible; everything is crystal clear and there cari be no misunderstandings or doubts on that score. 84. The USSR delegatian believes that the amendments it bas introduced are fully in accordance with

The Council Will now proceed to the vote. 1 would draw the attention of members to the revlsed text of the USSR amendments [S/6332/ Rev.11 that has just been circulated. As members Will observe, the only change is in the first amendment, whlch provides for a new text for paragraph 3 of the draft resolution. In that new text the word “revoke” bas been replaced by the word “cancel”. 86. I now put to the vote the amendments introduced by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [S/6332/Rev.l]. A vote was taken by show ofhands. In f’avour: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Against: Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Absfaining: Bolivia, China, France, Ivory Coast. Jordan, Malaysia, United States of America, Uruguay. The restit of the vote was 1 in faveur, 2 aga.inst and 8 abstenentions. The amendments were net adopfed, having ftied to obtain fhe affirmative votes of seven members.

The Council Will now vote on the joint draft resolution [S/6329/Rev.l]. A vofe was taken by show of hands. In favouc Bollvia, China, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia. Netherlands. Uruguay. Against: None. Abstaining: France. Union of Soviet Sociallst Republits, Unlted Kingdom of Great Britaln and Northern Ireland, Unlted States of Ame ica. The. draf? resolution was adopted by 7 votes fo oone, with 4 abslentions.

Five members of the Council have asked to speak in explanation of vote. 1 sball now cal1 on them. 89. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): Inexplanatlon of vote 1 do not wish to raise any new subject or argument, but there are certain important considerations on which I have already spoken and which should be restated and re-emphasized. 90. First, on the basic question of COmpetenCe lt is essential that 1 should reaffirm the reservatlon wbich has been repeatedly explained by my delegation in the past. Indeed, the position of my GOVernment in this matter bas been made SO clear and repeated SO often 91. Seconcily. 1 sborrld repeat what 1 said in tbls Council m 4 Rilay (1197th meetind regarding tbe situation in Rbodesia itself. Tbese are tbe words wbicb 1 used when S spoke at that meeting: WR is an essential factor. to wbicb we bave constaatly invited tbe attention of the Council. tbat Rbodesia is self-governing in its internal affaiss aad bas been for decades past. I know that thcre are those wbo wish to disregard tbis fact. but it is t in the situation. As I bave said, and accusations bave e tahen in Rbodesia. Rut e hese matters Rhodes 1 therefore do not subjects wbich are not wlthln the authority of my Covernment. Rut I must make it quite plain at tbe sanie tlle tbat tbe fact that I do net do SO must certainly not be construed as acceptance in any way of the charges or tiens wbich have been made.” [ 1197th meetra. 33.1 I must specifically reserve tbe positionof myGovernment on the allegations or assumptions regardlng tbe internal affalrs of Rbodesia that bave been made in the course of the debate. and particularly in tbe preamble to thc resolution. 92. Tbirdly, with regard to the operative part of the resolution. my Government is of course in faveur of consultation and negotiation. This bas beeu the main trend of tbe argument wblch 1 have put forward in this Council. Rut the question how consultation and aeptiation cari best be pursued must remaln amatter within the responsibllity of my Covernment. My Covernmeat must retain freedom of action and exercise its best judgement in deciding bow such consultation and negctiation can best be carried forward with expectations of success. 93. On the subjeot of our debate there bave been, and there still are, intense feelings felt andexpressed in this Council. There have been inthepast. and there still remain, wlde differences of view and conflicts of opinion. We recognise the reasons for the intense feeling. We respect the opinions of tbose who do not agree wlth us. On the otber hand. there has been in tbis Council. and in the consultations wbich have proceeded outside tbe Council. a readiness to hear and uaderstand our arguments and a recognition of cur desire, in the interests of all the people of Rhodesia, to advance towards agreed aims witbout confllct. 94. In particular tbere is. 1 believe. a wide recognilion that the responsibility for bringing Rhodesia 95. Although members of this Council disagree on many other matters. 1 feel encouraged by the attitude which they have brought to our deliberations to conclude that they recognize our responeibility and sincerely wish us well in discharging it.

The position of my delegation on the legal aspect of the problem of Southern Rhodesia has not Changed. We consider, as 1 stated in the Council on 13 September 1963 (1068th meeting], that that country 1s net a Non-Self-Governing Territory within the meaning of Article 73 and that, under the terms of the Charter, the United Nations is not competent to make rulings on the questions posed by its political development. That, essentially, is the reason for the abstaining vote which 1 have now cast. 97. On the other hand. if one considers the substance of the matter. need1 repeat the views of France on the kind of development which it consfders appropriate in such situations as that inSouthernRhodesia7 My Government is convinced-and has shown by its actions-that no consideration cari outweigh, in any country. the people’s right to acquire the international status and the domestic régime of their choice. Now. that choice must be made by means of elections organized on as wide a basis as possible and. in any event, involving no discrimination against a given section of the population, particularly that section which constitutes the vast majority. The Ivory Coast representative quoted one Southern Rhodesian figure as saying that the advent of a system in whlch tbe majority would make the laws could be envisaged in fifty years’ time. If such were really the views of those now in power at Salisbury, the discussions in this Council would suffice to show how shocking to the Members of thls Organisation and how devoid of the most elementary common sense such views are. 98. My Government fully shares the concern voiced here. particularly by the Ministers for ForeignAffairs of Senegal and Algeria [ 1194th meeting], at the measures tsken and the intentions expressed at Salisbury. We disagree on the competence of this Organization, but not on the need to have done with delaying tactics. dissimulations and half measures which cari only mask the true problem, which iS to prevent, as desired by the United Kingdom Ccvernment itself, the confirmation in Southern Rhodesia of a reprehensible minority régime and to ensure that a new African country may take its destiny into its own hands as soon as possible and tnus be enabled t0 add its contribution to the community of nations. realistically the truc m vis-a-vis swtbem esoluti~ns either in tbe Genera s ben refuse& 1 l3WSt FaCi& bQWQVQX, t&it ebeartediy endorse the objectives involved that if tbme objectives cou&3 ‘be achieved we sbould be well on tbe way to seefng a peaceful resolution of the situation in Rbodesia. 103. Mowever. our difficulties with ti;at paragraph relate to oertain major difficulties we bave with the resolution as a wbole. En tbe view of tbe United States, tbe resolution is somewhat unbalanced in tbat it fwuses entirely on the United Kingdom. We achowledge tbe and profound responsibility of trie United tbis question. but, as 1 said in an em-lier (1201st meeting], tbe most critical factor at this point is the attitude of tbe Govermnent of Southern Rhodesia. We do not believe tbat a resolution dealing with tbis issue cari ignore tlais crucial factor. This tendency towards imbalance led my deiegation to abstain on tbe resolution. 104. Beiore closing, 1 sbould lie to express the appreciation of my dekgation to those wbo drafted and sponsored tbis resolution. I thinh that it is a PQS e step. and I am confident tbat tbe United Min m will do what lies within its power to aohieve tbe objectives set forth in the resolution and we sincereiy hope, of course, that the Government of Soutbern Rbodesia Will heed its content and Will be guided by its purposes. 105. Mr. QRTIZ SAN’2 (Bolivia) (translated from SpanisbI: When tbe substance of thfs matter was dis- 106. The resolution we bave justadopted is adecisive contribution to tbe achievement of those ends. We bave taken into aocount the legitimate aspirations for freedcm of the great majority of the indfgenous population of Southern Rhodesia, and also the Security Council’s bounden duty to contribute witheverymeans in its power to the preservation of peaoe. 107. For these reasons. Bolivia, altbough not fully in agreement with some points expressed in the preamble. was very pleased to vote in faveur of thfs resolution.

At previous meetings of the Security Council on the question of Southern Rhodesia, the USSR delegation bas stated its position fully and in detail. We abstained in the vote taken today, and we had our reasons. 109. We consider that the draft resolution which was put to the vote was obviously inadequate, although it contained some positive elements. We bave explained that in detail in OUI statements. 110. The principal amendment introduced by the USSR delegation called for the immediate granting of independence to the people of Soutinern Rhodesia, and in this connexion we note that it was no accident that the United Kingdom representative voted against this amendment. In 80 doing, the United Kingdom Minister raised bis hand against the immediate abolition of the colonial r6gime in Southern Rhodesia and thus revealed the real intentions of the United Kingdom colonialists in that country. 111. Our amendment ccntained another extremely important provision. namely, tbat the United Kingdom Government shculd cancel the elections set by the Southern Rhodesian régime for 7 May on the basis of the 1961 Constitution. 112. The USSR delegation considers that it is incumbent upon it to stress once again that it is the duty of the United Nations immediately and without any delay to abolish colonialism in a11 its forms and manifestations and to put an end to this shameful legacy of the past. If events in Southern Rhodesia continue tofollow their present course, the question Will have to be tsken up again.

The two Foreigu Ministers present have asked to address the Council. The first on my list is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria. 115. I also indicated, bowever. tbat if the UnitedKingdom did net do sU inits power to prevent the unilateral declaration of independence tbus condoning the crimina1 intrigues of Ian Smi Government. it would mean that tbe United Kin was in fact refusmg to give satisfaction to Afri inion and would show tbat it intendsd to pursue an imefialist policy devoted to protecting the iaterests of none but tbe white settlers and foreigners. because of tbe negative attitude of the on?, wbich has been followed-and we éterly-bv some members of the Security Council. tbe draft resolution submltted to pu has not been adopted unanimously. althougb it represented of what we were entitled to expect rnational orpn. 117. Despite tbe spirit of understanding which we displayed, despite our desire to compromise for tbe sole reason tbat, we wished to obtainfrom the Security Council a resolution to show our brothers in Southern Rhodesia tbat they are not alone and that they have the unanimous support of our international Organisation in the pursuit of tbeir quite legitiiate aspirations, the elections Will be hemeld in Southern Rhodesia tomorrow. Everyoae is aware that tbey might lead to a unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith% partyindepeadence based on the most abject racial discrimination. 116. It is easy to foresee what the reaction of the 4 million Africans in Southern Rhodesia would then be. It oan only be compoundeC of disappointment and deep resentment presaglng storms. The outer Rmits of patience migbt be reaohed in Southern Rhodesia aadd. if the nationalists resort to violent means whlch they aad the other peoples of Africa would bave wlshed t0 avoid, wbo could blame them? Who could complain if, baving exhausted a11 peaceful means including recourse to this organ, tbey turn to other ways to tbe fulfilment of tbeir legltimate aspirations? case, could we, the independent countries of refrain from meeting th.e wishes of the Southern Rbodesian nationalists. and supplying them with a11 tbe necessary aid, material or other, whioh is now le and to tbe attainment of their sacred goal? II9: OnCe more. we might bave regretted bitterly that the Security Council dld not bear ail tbat in mlnd 120. These considerations aside, the Security Council has nevertheless now approved the resolution submitted on behalf of the Ivory Coast, Jordanand Malaysia. thus concluding a debate whlch marks one moment in the history of the people of Southern Rhodesia. 121. Need we say that this text which we were led to support does not fully satisfy our deepest desires? Our concern for effectiveness and, it must be said. for an awawness of the imminent danger. led us. despite the painful realities. to mobilize what remains of our confidence in the British authorities who. if only they Will. cari continue to be the unyielding barrier to the insane pretensions of Ian Smith. Once again. this is a gesture of good faith. perhaps the last. from an Africa which is anxious but resolved. if no other way is opened.to it. to use appropriatemeans to wrest this portion of its soi1 from the occupier. 122. In truth, the deoisions taken today by the Security Council contain lessons which it would be futile to attempt to dissemble. 123. On a problem of such gravity-whether viewed from the politioal. the moral or tbe legal standpointa laborious debate has ended in the approval, by thQ principal United Nations organ responsible for safeguarding peace, of a number of considerations and requests which, we fear. are hardly commensurate with the expectations of African opinion. much less with the acuteness of the situation. 124. Thus, the Security Council assumes increased responsibilities. In offering the administering Power a further opportunity to act and to balt a process of degradation, this supreme organ cannot refuse to undertake its rightful mission and cannot disappoint the millions of waiting Africans. 125. The illusion cari in no way be entertained that the dialogue witb Ian Smith oan restdt in anythi but independence on the South African model, or at the very most, t’-.e status quo. 126. Consequently, it must be established beyond question that the conclusion now endorsed by this debate, far from lightening the previously heavy responsibilities of the United Kingdom, bas distinctly increased them. 127. What we wanted. we indicated. 128. Wbat we now want is that London should take advantage of the Council’s decision in order to restore to the people of Southern Rhadesia their legitimate rights to popular sovereignty, democracy and national independence. 129. Viewed in this way. the vigilance of the African people Will not falter. It is the oulminatlon of a long history marked by disappointments and sufferings. 130. I bave just received. as bas my colleague > a Mter from President Ka a expressiog to perfection the intensity wlth wblch ail Africains are followlng tbe grievous problem of Southern Rhodesia. K hope tbat he may interpret to you wbat ail the African peoples, and all the African leaders, are feellng at tbls precise moment. X quote: 130. coll%gue qui exprime tous de la Rhodésie de vous 19nterprète tains, moment “Intervention would mean that Rhodesia had becorne an outlawed country internationally and would ruin the Smith Government. No country would dare to ally itself witb Rhodesla if it was a member of fnternational organizations. But 1 must add that our provisionai plans do not exclude the possibllity of a suicide programme developing in Rhodesia. 1 must also add tbat, if Rhodesia tries to strangle us. to cut off our vital resources by illegal actions. then we are prepared to figbt and to sacrifice ourselves. We have the will ami, wltb the support of almost every State in the world. we have the means to survive. If tbe law of retaliation is to be applled we &a11 not besitate. even if that should mean difficulties for us, ami we sball ensure tbat there Will be not two graves but only one. Rhodesia’s.w Tbese few passages from a heart-rending statement prove. if pncof is needed. how serious is the situation in Soutbern Rbodesia. That 1s wby. once again. we thank the countries which have piven us unconditional support before tbis international organ at thls tlme of decision. We sbould llle to make one last appeal to the adminlstering Power not only to become truly conscious of its responsibilities. but also to translate tbem into actions and deeds. Ces prouvent, en Rhodésie fois apporté instance voudrions nistrante tablement faits. 131. Mr. Doudou THIAM (Senegal) (translatedfrom Prench): My delegation notes the decision now tahen by t Security Council. and 1 should lihe first to express my thanhs to the representatives of tbe Ivory Coast. dordan and Malaysia and to a11 the ions which were g0od euougb to support our action in the Councll. As has already been said, tbe decision now taken by the Council fails short of what we bad ashed for. However, we hqe that it Will be a warning to those who might be. tempted to encourage the Government of Southern Rbadesia to continue the sinister policy on wbich it has embarked. acte de la cldcision de s&uritS, remerciements de la Jordanie les notre dit, situe pour le Gouvernement la politique 132. In any event, since the question remains on tbe agenda, we reserve the right to request an immediate meeting of tbe Security Council at any demander 134. We have followed the debate with great interest and have noted a genuine awareness of the dangers we are courting in that part of Africa. That is why we reaffirm our confidence in the Seourity Counoil, in the hope that if we should have to bring the problem before the Council again-which we hope will not be the case-the Council would then give us its unanimous support. If with the help of this supreme organ we found no peaceful solution, 1 greatly fear that Africa would take the dangerous path of violence, for we cari in no way allow what happened in South Africa a few deoades ago to be repeated in Rhodesia.

1, too. should like to thank a11 the delegations which have supported this minimum request of ours to the Council. In asking for this minimum. vn? demonstrated that we were seeking peaceful cooperation in order to salve the problem of Southern Rhodesia in a peaoeful mariner. Four great Powers abstained, each of them glving a reason which could be reduced to this: competence for some, lack of competence for others. In any event. we do not beiieve that this difficult problem. which may have very serious consequenoes in Africaandperhaps throughout the world, cari be reduced to simple juridlcal notions of competence or lack of competenoe. 136. Two elements emerge from our resolution: first, that the whole world-the United Kingdom as well as the rest of the States Members of the United Nations-should use every means topreveatunilate%al independence; secondly, that the United Kingdom should grant independence to Southern Rhodesia by setting up a democrntic government representative of the majority of the population as a whole. Our resolution is very moderate, but it contains what is essential. It requests only a minimum, but we realise that. in the Security Council, this minimum is a maximum. 137. Everyone is aware of the difficulties we encountered before finally having to be content with this minimum. Tbe difficulties arise from the utional crisis smaRer Powers oppose the idea of ooncentrating all er in the bands of the Security Council. since ws e just seen the kind of resolutions we may expect bat case. 138. T%e SIDENT: The Council bas now concluded Pts scussion of item 3 of today’s agenda cerning tbe situation in Soutbern Rhodesfa. It to return to item 2 of the agenda concerning the stion of the Dominican Republic. It was agreed earlîer tbis morning, for the reasons adduced by various representatives. tbat we should continue tb consideration of tbis question tomorrow. Rowever, II bave since been informed by the tbree representatives who asked for this deferment that. instead of the meeting being held in the morning. they would prefer. and indeed that it wotdd help them more, to the meeting take place in the afternoon. If it the convenience of ail members. that we adjourn now until 3 o’clock tomorrow afternoon. T&e meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.