S/PV.1212 Security Council

As we agreed at the 1211th meeting, we shall first take up the item conceïwing complaints by Senegal against Portugal, SO that vre may vote on Le draft resolution submitted by the Ivory Coast, Jordan and Malaysia [S/6366/Rev.l], 2. In accordance with the previous decisions ofthe Council, 1 propose to invite the representatives of Senegal, Portugal and the Congo (Brazzaville) to take seats at the Cou&l table. At the invitation ofthe President, Mr. Diop @enegal), MI-. de Miraoda (Portugal) sud Mr. Mouanza (Congo, Brazzaville) toak places at the Co~ncti table.

The Council Will now consider the draft resolution. Three members bave expressed the desire to expIain their votes before the voting.

B&ore I discuss the draft resolution, 1 should like ta say a few words about tlte question of courtesy whlch 5. My delegation has listened carefully to the statements of the representatives of Senegsl and Portugal, as well as to those of the memhers of the Council, on the item before us. It is profoundly disturblng that friction alongthe border of Senegal and Portuguese Guinea should once more bave led to the accusations and responses which have occupied the Council’s attention again. The charges of violations of air space and territorial integrity brought by Senegal are serious both in number and in gravity, as are the counter-allegations. The charges are the more serious since they were made scarcely two years after the Council unanlmously passed a resolution deploring similar border incidents behveen Senegal and Portuguese Guinea. 6. When the Council met in April 1963, it adopted a resolution [178 (1963)] deplorlng any incursion Mo Senegalese territory and expressed the hope that the tension which existed hetween Senegal and Portugal would be eliminated in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. The sentiments embodied in that resolution were those of tny delegation, and we had expected that. with its adoption, there would be a reduction, if not an elimination, of the Causes of friction and of tension existing along the border between Senegal and Portuguese Guinea. 7. Evldently this is not the case. We have been informed by’the representative of Senegal of anumber of incidents between the Senegalese and the security forces of Portuguese Guinea. Thus, instead of there belng a reduction or elimination of the tensions, as was requested by the resolution of 1963, there bave been continued Lensions, increasing charges of attack and reprisais resulting apparently from anincreasing number of incidents. The representative of Senegal enumerated seventeen violations since the adoption of resolution 178 (1963). 8. We have also heard the representative of Portugal reject the charges of violation of Senegalese territory and state categorically that the Portuguese forces are under strict instructions to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Senegal. This assurance had already been given to the Security Council by Portugal in its letter of 16 February 1965 (S/6192].L/ 10. It would seem to my delegation that the spirit and the letter of the draft resolution before the Council provide such a formula: and we earnestly hope that both parties Will adbere to its prOViSiOnS this time. 11. Let me add that we still feel as we did in 1963: that the provisions of Article 33 of thecharter should be resorted to in order to avoid a recurrence of incidents which could aggravate the situation. And, in this connexion, perhaps the proposai of the representative of Portugal for an investigating commission should be given further examination. We believe that, should further border incursions take place, the establishment of such a commission would be highly useful-indeed, perhaps necessary. 12. Turning now to the draft resolution that is before us, my delegation intends to cast its vote for it. We are not, however, without some reservations as to the terms in which it is drafted. We had hoped for more balanced langaage. For instance, in the first paragraph of the preamble some reference to the letters from the representative of Portugal to the President of the Council might have been included, and in the operative part the Council’s concsrn over the general tension existing all along theborder might have been emphasized. 13. In its operative paragraphs, the draft resolution very closely resembles resolution 176 (1963) adopted by the Council on 24 April 1963, to which 1 referred when 1 stated that, in the view of my delegation, adherence to the spirit and the letter of that resolution could provide the basis for attainment of relaxationof tensions hi the area. However, no mention is made of possible incursions into Portuguese Guinea from Senegal, and we foresee continuing difficulties if such incursions should occur, even though the Govermnent of Senegal may not itself be involved. Indeed, we welcome the assurances of the representative of Senegal chat his Government has taken firm measures to avoid any such involvement or, indeed, any use of its territory for hostile armed action again& its neighbour. 14. We are also gratified to hear the assurances of the representative of Portugal mat Portuguese forces are under strict instructions to respect the sovere&FtY and the territorial integrity of Senegal, and 15. My Government deplores-as. 1 am sure, the other members of the Council do-incursions from either side across this border. 16. Despite these reservations, my delegation 1s prepared to support the draft resolution in the same spirit in which we supported resolution 178 (1963). NO~, just as in April 1963, we are convinced that bath parties wish to see an end to the tensions existing along this border. 1 am sure that the utilization of the peaceful approaches and machinery of the Charter, to help provide assurances against further border incidents and the tightenlng of tensions, is bath a proper and a constructive approach to the problem, and we urge the parties concerned to view the draft resolution in this light.

My delegation did not take part in the debate up to now, because it had certain reservations on some earlier versions of the draft resolution which were being considered. I sbould, therefore, now like to explaln my delegation’s vote with regard to the draft resolution as it is before us. 18. The Council has been dealing with a series of border conflicts between Senegal and Portuguese Guinea for the second time since 1963, when Senegal brought a complaint of a similar nature. We regret that, in spite of the resolution which was at that time adopted unanimously by the Security Council, border tension between the two countries has apparently continued and, recently, even seems tohave increased. 19. My delegation has listened with great attentionto the statements of both the parties concerned. The representative of Senegal, on his part, has enumerated a detailed list of seventeen violations of its territory and of its air space, stretching over a long period of time. The complaint of Senegal is serious and merits the fullest attention of this Council, a11 the more SO since the complaint was brought by the Government of Senegal, which has always show-n great responsibility and restraint in the United Nations and which would certainly not have brought such a complaint if it had not had grounds for doing SC. 29. On the other hand. the representative Of POrtU@ has categorically denied a11 the charges brought against his country, and he has given a different version of some of them. 21. Thus, the Council was confronted With two squarely opposed pleas by two Members of the United Nations. 22. In such circumstances-that is to say, in a case where the facts are disputed by the parties concernedin the opinion of my delegation, the natural course for the Council to take in accordance withthe Charter would be to invite the parties to settle their dispute 24. My delegation, which has often, on previous occasions, insisted on tbe importance of fact-findlng for tbe solution of international disputes, would bave preferred such a course of action, but several members of the Council considered that it would have been too cumbersome and tbat, at any rate, it would have been impossible to verify ail the facts relevant to the incidents. 26. Consequently, we have heard only the statements of the parties to the conflict, and we now have before us, based on those statements, the draft resolution submitted by the Ivory Coast. Jordan and Malaysia. 26. In the opinion of my delegation, the ti ?ft reSOhtion, in its present form, is moderate in :anguage; it adheres closely to the resolution adopted .‘n 1963: it does not pronounce judgement on the question of whether speclfic allegations have been proven or net; and it does not pronounce a condemnation. 27. This, we believe, is in accordance witb the requirements of fairness and justice. A condemnation would have been unwarranted when basùd exclusively on the conflicting statements of the parties, and without an attempt at an investigation of tbe facts. It would have been contrary to the rule which prevails in practically a11 countries of the world: that no man stands condemned until proven guilty. 28. My delegation is, of course. fully aware of the political background of these border incidents between Senegal and Portugal-a background to which the representatives of Senegal, the Ivory Coast and the Congo (Brazzaville) have clearly referred during tbe debate. That background is the policy followed by Portugal wlth regard to its African territories, and the strong opposition which it has raised among African countries. 29. My delegation has made it amply clear, on occasions when Portugal% colonial policy was under discussion, that it does not support that policy. Bowever, that policy is not the subject under discussion by the Council in this case, and disagreement or agreement with that policy should not influence cuI judgement about the merits of the complaints before us. I should like to repeat: we feel tbat in a case like this, where the facts are disputed and not fully kn0w1-1 or investigated, the Council is well advised to do as it intends to do in the draft resolution, that is,

The Security Council is concluding its discussion of the question of Portugal% aggressive intrigues against an African country, Senegal. 30. listes s&urit6 menées le S&&al. 31. AS yOU know, the Soviet delegation bas presented in detail the Soviet Union!s position on the substance of the question and has urged the need for effective measures to curb Portuguese colonialism. The importance of speedy action by the Councll against Portugal, which is trying by force of arm.s to uold the peoples of Mozambique, Angola 2nd so-called Portugues Guinea in colonial subjection, is made especially obvious by the fact that the Portuguese 12presentative conducted himself even here in the Security Council in a most defiant manner, trying by any means to avert the charges justly brought by Senegal and other African countries. 31. expliqué tion; des portugais. part s’efforce colonial et 6vidente plein faisant formulées pays 32. satisfaction bres catégoriques provocation SBnégal peuples 32. On the other hand, we must expressoursatisfaction at hearing almost ail the members of the Security Council emphatically condemn the Lisbon regime for its provocative actions ag2inst Senegal and for its crime= against African peoples. a appuyer etlt préfér6 le Portugal. portugais. tiendra par 33. The Soviet delegation is prepared to support the draft resolution submitted by the Ivory Coast, Jordsn and Malaysia, although we would have preferred a more strongly worded condemnation of Portugal. In our view, the most drastic action agalnst the Portuguese colonialists is necessary. The Soviet delegation hopes that the Council will not turn a deaf ear to the warning given by the representative of the IVOQ’ Coast: chat the patience of African countries is practically at an end. Note should llkewlse be taken of the statement by the representative of the IvOrY Coast that the most concrete suggestion the Security Council could make would be to invite the Organization of African Unity to intervene inthe PortugueSe Colonies with a view to liberating the peoples still under colonial rule. 34. Not only the Salazar régime, but those giving it military, economic and moral assistance, shoulddraw the necessary conclusions from thesecurity Council’s deliberations. It is high time to cal1 to order a11 who are contributing to the criminal actions of the Portuguese colonialists, especially those permanent members of the Security Council-the Unlted States and the United Kingdom-without whose generous support 35. The Soviet Union, for its part, stands firmly and consistsntly for the immediate granting of independence to all countries and peoples under colonial domination. There cari be no doubt tbat tbe just cause of pwples struggling for tbeir freedom axai independence against colonialism and racism will ultimately triumph. ckspite the manoeuvres of colonialism and its protectors. 36. Allow me to waive tbe consecutive inte-nretathn of my statement, on the ususl understanding. 37. The PWESIDEBIT: As there are nootbermembers who wish to expIain +hir votes Jxfore the voting, aow put to the vote tbe draft resolution subnaitted -by the Ivory Coast, Jordan and Malaysia ~S~6366~~ev.~~. 38. The PRESrDEh’T: I give the ffoor to tbe reprcsentative of the United Kingdom, who wisbes to e@ain s de. 39. Xr. NOPE (United in this question the C unanimous conclusion, and we es ially appreciated draft resolution s restit. Certainly we do not wish to detract in any way na tbe purposes wbich tbe resolution serves. Neve less, in explanation ofour vote. i should like r back to &e suggestion which my delegation put forward in tbe course of 46. We reoognize tbat inparagraph 4 of the resolution, provisma is made for the Secretary-General to we wekonx Bat. But we believe that. in ail matters for a solution cari be found companied by an impartial investigation.

1 glve the iloor to the representative of Portugal. 42. r. DE MIRANDA (Portugal): The resolution which bas fust been adopted does not correspond to any realiiy, and also we cannot belp but regard it as dlscriminating against Portugal. 43. My delegation stated its position from every relevant point of view, and in proof of our gxxad faith we went so far as to propose the appointment of an fnquiry team to investigate the allegations of our opponents. The one-sided character of this resolution is evident from tbe fact tbat it does not include any reference to our proposal to establish the truth by impartial investigation, nor to tbe other points raised by us. 3 Sec resolution 204 (1965). s, namely, documents S/6192 tbe second preammar paragrapb, the de against us are rot giventheirproper 47. Comment’ on resolution 1’78 (1963) of 24 ApriI 1963, whlcb is mentioned in thepresentresolutlon, tbe representative of PortugaI made tbe foIIowiugobservatiens, whicb 1 also find appropriate to tbe present occasion. “It is disappointing tbat besides indulging In wbat are by now certain routine excesses of language, tbe draft resolution makes clear that out of two contradictory versions, the one presented by the delegation of Senegal has been preferred witbout any valid proof. It rejects tbe offer of my Government for a commission of inquiry, made in ail good faith. Obviously. those wbo drafted tbe resolution accept at once the Word of some Goveraments as lndlsputabIe, and other Governments, equally sovereign. are assigned lesser importance, and their word chsappears and fades away wben faced wlththe former.@ [1033rd meeting, para. 12l.l 48. In conclusion, my delegation wishes to place on record its formal reservations to tbe resolution which has Just been adopted and it also reiterates bere the reservations contained in the letter addressed by us on 2 January 1965 to tbe President of the General Assembly.

1 give the floor to the representative of Senegal.

le it thanks the Security Counoil, the Senegalese delegation considers that the resolution that has been adopted is a weah resolution, in view of tk fact that Portugal is now a recidivlst, havlng committed, despite the call to order issued in resolution 176 (1963) sixteen furtter violations in two years. 1 pass over some violations in silence, for we bave mentioned bere only those of wbich we have tangible and irrefutable proof. For example, despite the murder of a Senegalese and the kldnapping of two other Senegalese, we bave not submitted proof of the arrest of a Po,rtuguese officer, accompanied by four Portuguesc soldiers, because after an investigation we had not sufficient proof that these unarmed sokliers intended to commit reprehensible acts on our territory. We tnerefore released Stern. 51. We tbank the Security CouncIl for havlng considered Senegal’s complalnt. Wetbankr-llits membera 52. Tliroughont this debate, Portugal% attacks on the Senegelese brief have been characterized by the same sempiternal leit-motiv which they have tried to substantiate by facile and gratuitous statements. Portugal repeated ad nauseam that the Senegalese brief was vague, unrealistic and artificial. But iftbere 1s anything vague, artificial, unrealistic or mystifying, it is to be found in the Portuguese brief, above alI in tbe general argument in justification of Portuguese sovereignty over the African territories of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique. Portugal is cherisbing an illusion. It believes that these African territories of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique are part of its national territory. It considers these Guineans, these Angolans, these indigenous inhabitants of Mozambique t0 be Portuguese citizens. But let us examine the situation closely. While it is true that there are certain citizens of these African territories called assimilados, who have been granted political and social equality on tolerance, it must aIso be recognized that tbe overwhelming ma.&rity of the indigenous inbabitants of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique are third-class Portuguese citizens, harassed, exploited, and slaughtered-yes, slaughtered. As proof 1 need only mention the tragiz incident in Cabinda, the province to which the representative of the Congo (Brazzaville) referred yesterday. Bere, in brief, is the story. 53. One day, some inhabitants of Cabinda, aproviice bordering on the Congo (Brazzaville;, drew up a petition requesting a sort of interna1 autonomy, the rigbt to handle their own small, local, com.mural affairs. They submitted this petition to the local Portuguese authorities. And then tragedy struck, as to some extent it strikes everywhere in the territory where there is the slightest movement on the part of the nationalists. It was a ferocious, brutal, rapid tragedy, perpetrated without pity or remorse: that night the people who had signed the petition were dragged out of bed and thrown naked into prison. The next morning their relatives very naively went t0 the prison gate to take them some clothes. They were told that the prisoners would no longer need clothes. And in fact, a few days later these unfortunate petitioners were tied up in sacks, loaded into aircraft, and tossed into the sea. A few days Iater, their bound corpses were found on the shore. 54. That is what it means to be a third-class Portuguese Citizen, as far as the great majority of Africans of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique are concerned. 55. If, therefore, the assimilados, these citizens by toleration who are granted political and social equality, are SO content with their lot that they are wiIling to defend Portuguese colonialism before the highest international bodies, let them at least show a little sense of justice; let them understand that these third-class citizens, despised, harassed, exploited ican territories foornn t5 understand tbat e faced with all these troubles and se tragedies, and we denounce represents in Afriea, fi& of aU n for àntematia sigbt of reply. intention to speak a points whieh tbe Fepresentative of Senegal made, 1 C se tbe last only for a brief comment. And my comment is tbat it seems that there is refuses to be laid to r haunts certain persans in of my beloved borneland, Goa. 60. Tbe PRESIDENT: 1 give the floor to the representative of the Congo (Brazzavilb), w wiSll@S to exercise bis rigbt of ieply.

1 did not ask for the floor in order to exercise my rigbt of reply, sinOe the Portuguese representative did not mention tbe events in Cabinda in bis statement, doubtless preferring t0 pass over tbem in silence and to stress only the events in bis homeland, Goa. 62. 1 ssked for the floor in order to extend sincere tbanks, on bebalf of my Government, to a11 the members of the Secuiity Council for tbe efforts they bave exerted and for the common stand they bave adopted with regard to Portugal. We sincerely hope tbat Portugal Will take into account a11 the recommendations in tire resolution for, as the representative of the Kvory Coast bas said, we shall never bow before Portugal% threats and if it forces us to take 64. Waving been adopted, the resolution now belongs to the Security Council and each member of the Council may, of course, interpret it according to hls understanding of it. My delegation, which was one of the sponsors of the draft resolution, wishes to state, however, that its interpretation of eachparagraph and each provision of tbe text is to be found in the statement wbich we made when iatroducing tbe draft resolution and which appears in the verbatim record of tbe 1210th meeting. 65. In paragraph 4 of the resolution, the Couacil requests tbe Secretary-General to follow the development of the situation. We hold tbat it is for the Secretary-General to determine the met by which he Will keep the situation under review. We bave already stated that we considered tbis to be the onIy formula whlch would satisfy the African States and tbat the investigation proposed by Portugal and favoured by certain delegations was unacceptable. We already know that infiltrations into Senegalese territory occur but we also know that the effect of this familiar type of proposa1 may very well be to make espionage officia1 and that tbis could not really be tolerated by Senegal. 66. It will be remembered tbat in our statement we placed special emphasis on our request that tbe Council sbould never lose sight of tbe generalproblem created by Portuguese colonialism in Africa. I am bringing tbis up because 1 think 1 have heard it said tbat we should not take this problem into consideration in making our decision. Some delegations whi~h support the idea of an investigation were of the opinion that we had condemned Portugal witbout having first observed the rule of justice. I think it bas been said that we are not a court of law. What appears to me somewbat surprising, however, is that wbile it is maintaiued tbat we ougbt not to condemn Portugal without a preliminary investigation, as in legal proceedings, it is at the same time held to be improper for us to take the problem of Portuguese colonialism into account in makingour decisions. We, for our part, feel that if we are to be a court of law this problem must be taken into account, for if, in legal proceedings, the facts are judged by reference to their proximate cause, everyone knows that the judge also takes into account what is called tbe remote cause and that the remote cause may aggravate or extenuate the offence. 1 am certain that tbis bas not been overlooked by the members of the Council. 67. In conclusion, 1 should like to say that my delegation is glad to note that the party primarily concerned. the one to which the foregoing is directed, namely Portugal, has understood the meaning of our resolution. Yet in spite of understanding it-indeed, because eaten Senegal, to violate Senegalese addecl is tbat if Senegal its citizens, it Will no be alone. ï am sure 75. Tbe PRESPDENT: T r. ~hisb): VELAZQUEZ (Uruguay) (traaslated fsom At the 1211th meeting, my delegation stated tbat we would vote for the ori French and English texts of the cbaft resolution, and net for tic Spanish text, because we considered tlnat, perbaps because latter did not wording of the on therefore bas 1t0 reservations regardàng the text adopte&

This coacludes the Couacil% debate on the second item on our agenda for Fhis afterncon. Before proceediag to tbe third item, 1 would suggest that those representatives whom we e shouid now should be re, bave a brief recess. The meeting was suspendedat4.2Op.m. aadresumed at 4.25 p.m. f 1 May 1965 frorn the Permanent Reprethe Union of Soviet Saciolist Repuhlics to the President of the Security Chb~il

The Security Cou&l will now resume discussion of the item relating to the Dominican Republic. 74. In accordaace with the previous decision of the CounciI, 1 propos invite the representative of Cuba to take a pIace at Council table. 76. This morning, just before 11 o’clock, I received a telepbone cal1 from Washington from the President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation o inisters of Foreign Affairs of the Organisation American States. the Ambassador of Nicaragua. Me told me that a report of the OAS Special Committee w5s being sent to the Security Counoil, and tb5t the Council migbt consider it appropriate to study th5t document before continuing its proceedings. I told him tbat if his report were sent 5s soon 5s possible, the Security Council, which had been convened to meet at 3 o’clock thls afternoon, should be able to bave it before its meeting and could then deoide whether it wished to study the report. Rowever, up to this moment no such report bas been received by the Secretariat. 1 therefore suggest t%5t the meeting proceed in the way decided upon last Friday. 77. Before 1 invite Mr. Bracbe to makehis statement, 1 give the floor to the Seoretary-General, wbo h5s 5 statement to m5ke.

Further to my reports of 15 May [S/6358]g and 18 I m5y inform the Council that my ~e~~ese5t~t~ve in the Dominlcan Republic, arrived at Santa Domingo on 18 5y 5t 0946 hws local time. Shortly alter his arrivai, lie me leaders of the two factions eng5ged in the fi and conveyed to them the appeal referred to in my report of 18 May. They, in turn, gave him tbeir vlews on the situation in the D~minican Republic, as summarized below. 79. Colonel Francisco Caamailo complained about the support given by tbe United States to tbe forces of General Wessin y Wessin and of General Imbert Barreras by the creation of tbe security zone and tbe United States-controlledcorridor. IIe assertedthat tbe United States was givlng concrete military and logistical support to those forces and w5s affording them sanctuary from which they were attacking his forces. 80 Colonel Caamaiio also stated that the United States had “legalizedw its intervention witb the help of the Organieation of American States andin violation of tbe OAS Charter. The OAS had been trying ta get the Ca5rmüio Government to negotiate with ‘he other side, but this had been rejected because it would bave to deal with a group created by the United S&es. The OAS was told chat tbe ~Constitutional Government?, which had the support of 99 per cent of the Dominican people, would negotiate only with the United States since tbe latter had intervened and, by its intervention, had brought about presemt situation. With r y officia1 Records of the Secu-ity CWncfl, T%entiethY@ar, Supplement for April. May md .June 1965. 81. General Imbert Barreras, on the other hand, blamed tlae rebel forces for the present crisis. Ne said that tbe juuta forces wanted a cesse-fire but that the Caamailo forces used it to attack and extend the territory under their control. That situation could not continue, and the “Government of National Reconstruction” had decided to conduct a mopping-up operation in the northern section of the City. Re stated tilt his Government had the control of all tbe couutry and tbat it was bis Govermnent’s duty to restore order, snd that it would continue its operation until success kad been achieved. We appreciated tbe interest of the OAS, the United Nations, and a11 other, in the Dominican situation, but asserted tbat tbe problem should be solved by tbe Dominicans tbemselves. 82. On the question of observing tbe strict cesse-fire called for by the Security Council, General Imbert replied that the situation would be simplified if Mr. Mayobre could arrange for a meeting between bim and Colonel Caamaiïo, but that sofar, despite repeated attempts, Colonel Caamailo had refused to meet witb bim. Talks could take place, General Kmbert said, wbile tbe fighting was uncler way. 83. For the purposeof gatheringallpossible information, Mr. Mayobre also bas met with tbe Secretary- General of tbe OAS, Mr. José Mors, the Papal Nuncio, other members of the diplomatie corps, and with Mr. McGeorge Bundy and other United States officiais. The Unlted States officiais indicated that th@ principal objective of the United States was to find a permanent solution of a difficult political crisis by tbe establishment of a government wbich would be trusted by the people. According to these officiais, there were indications that tbe Caamafio position was more ilexible. They emphasized the difficulties faced by tbe United States forces in the Dominican Republic, pointing out that tbose forces could not enforce a solution as they had no authority to do SO. They were not at ail optimistic about tbe possibility of stopping tbe fighting because of the bitterness and ill-feeling existing among tbe contending forces. 84. Mr. Mayobre drew tbe attention of the United States offieials to the unavoidable implication of United States mvolvement because of tbe inaction of me United States forces during the offensive of the Imbert forces. Mr. Mayobre pointed out to them that the securi@ corridor controlled by the United States forces does, in fact, split the areas controlled 86. In tbe light of the situation described by Mr. Mayobre as “extremely grave”, and as recommended by him on the telephone, 1 conveyed the above to tbe United States Government, tbrougb its Permanent Mission to the United Nations, at 2300 bours on 18 May-tbat was 11 o’clock last nigbt-and requested that the United States Government use its goodoffices to urge the opposing forces to heed tbe cal1 of the Security Council for a strict cesse-fire. 87. It is my intention to submit to the Council brief information reports su& as this whenever information of importance is received from Mr. Mayobre.

The representative ofthe USSR has asked to make a statement now, before we hear the statements of Mr. Brache and Mr. Velklquez. If there is no objection, 1 will now glve the floor to tbe representative of the USSR.

The Soviet delegation thought it necessary to speak at this juncture particularly since the Security Council fias just now heard a report from Secretary-General U Thant presenting information on a highly serious and disturbing situation. 90. Today, the Soviet delegation again wishes to draw the attention of members of the Security Council to tbe following. The urgent question of the armed intervention by the United States in the domsstic affairs of the Dominican Republic has been on tbe Council’s agenda for more than two weeks. This question, submitted by the Soviet Union, requires decisive and speedy action by the Security Council. 91. As you know, the situation has been aggravated by the fact that the invading army sent by tbe United States Government against a small Latin American Country has grown to astoundingproportions. According to the Press, these bordes now total 22,800 soldiers actually landed on the territory of a sovereign State, and 10,500 men on United States warships standing off the Dominican Republic. Thus United States imperialism has thrown fully 33,300 soldiers to 0Eicial Utited States lecl itself witb 93. Tlae cynical excuses of ~~~~t~~~srn~, ïeseue missionw, winterests of civilization”, bave turned OQ the mvere it undermines oples and bow brazealy Charter of our Or niste”. 94. It bas now become dear to everyone tbat tbe United States interventionist troops. in flagrantviolation of tbe basic principles of the United Nations, iate~e~t~~~~stes grante des brutale pleasing and profitable to Uaited States imperialism. 95. The interventionists, cotironted w sal condemnation of ail peace-loviug now resortiug to new manoeuvres. They are trying to matters as though aIl the difficulties . an Republic stem from the interna1 st the country’s opposing factions. But ho will tbe United States go on trying to delude the Security Council? How long will the whole world bave tc, watch whiletheUnitedStates shamelesslycanvasses one pretext after another to ju; li_. its aggression? the pst few days the United States, clearly tbe side of tbe military jun:a, bas helped the n every way to develop an offensive against the rebeel forces. Were we see a uew manifestation of the intolerable, outrageous intervention by the Unit& States in the domestic affairs of the Dominican Republie. 97. From the information in today’s report by the Secsetary-General which we heard just now, it is abondant interferi clear that the United States is grossly in domesttc matters by giving practical is common knowledge that before the invasion Dominican Republic by tbe Wnited States internists, tbe military junta bad reacbed the last lmurs of its life and was on tbe point of disappearing altogether, yet now it is suddenly able to go over to tbe offensive. cari we explain tbis new lease of life of th reaction, wbkh is support among tbe in fact rose up against it? unexpected revival of tbis s injection administered by the Uuited Statesoccupation forces. 161. Even the Department of State has now achnowledged tbat the junta was recently given $766,660 by United States. Furtber, United States correspondents in the Dominfcan Republic report tbat tbe junta has brougbt reinforcements for its anti-rebel offensive from areas controlled by the United States occupation forces across the Ozama River in This was reported, in particular, by Tm on 16 May. And on 17 May an editorial in that newspaper stated: ‘Correspondents in Santo Domingo have called attention to the fact tbat troop movements by the forces supporting General Imbert bave taken place witbin the United States security zone and through American checkpoints. No such Ieeway is aRowed the Caamafïo forces.” 102. We are constantly presenting information from tbe United States Press. We do tbis because tbe officia1 representative of the UnitedStates. throu the discussion of this item in the Council, has told us notbing that is intelligible or clear, apart from tales of a11 kinds of visions and pbantoms. Ifhe agrees or disagrees with what is written in the United States Press, he should either confirm or refute it with information wbich is obviously available to bim through officia1 channels. 103. TO continue, a characteristic report may be found in yesterday’s issue of Le Monde from that newspaper’s correspondent at Santo Domingo. We present information from French newspapers here hoping in that way to demonstrate tbat our assessment of the situation is objective. After visiting tbe area held by the constitutionalist forces, the correspondent of Le Monde reported: “1 found calm and determined men who were bitter about the hypocrisy of the ‘gringos’. They told me: ‘What they want is to wipe us out before the United Nations intervenes. Tbe Americans do not dare to do the job themselves. They have given tbe green éme face ofthe xllission. T is the amy of S s?rdsssion. an r Word& e united m Americam: Tou set vernment. n T 106. As we meet bere tbe in the exc?lùsively domesti ic continues to take re. and we see tbat United F&ates no respect for the opinion of Cauncil but in general disregards tbe actians tahen by tbis principal organ of tbe United Nations. 107. A few days ago tbe Security Council adopted resolution 263 (1965) under wbich, amon~o~er representatives of the United Nations were sninican Republic. But before tbe Secretaryeral% eavoy could even get to Santa Domingo, White House in a frenay dispatched its own sion to tbe Dominican Republic. The world was treated to spectacle of tbe President’s Speoial Assistant eorge Bundy, Deputy Secretzay of Defense C R. Vance, Under Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann and otbers, urgently flying to the Dominican Republic. eason for tbis descent on Santa tic emissaries ami United States of seeondcomingfs tbis? Perbaps tbey went to Santo Domingo on a friendly visit, to give lectures on courtesy, an activity at wbich some representatives in the Security Council bave tried tbeir band. Or perbaps these self-styled emissaries burried to Santo Domingo to see that the evacuation of United States citizens from the DominicanRepublic was sucressfully completed. But in fact it fs unnecessary to spell out tbe real purposes of the trip by 110. One may legitimately ask: by what right have emissaries of the White House and Pentagon usu tbe prerogatives of others and assnmed the role of master of the Dominican people’s destinies? who gave them permission to act in the role of legislators and to knock together a Dominican government according to their whim? Perhaps the United States representative Will rise to a point of order and answer the question we have raised. 111. The oubageous United States policy of dictatfon cannot be tolerated, and that country% intervention in the domestic affairs of a small Latin American country must be stopped immediately. 112. The extremely tense situation in the Domimcan Republic is the direct result of UnitedStates intervention and armed invasion. This is precisely tbe main cause and the gist of the matter. Any attempts ta settle the question by means of appeals to the opposing aides to compose their differences, and the like, are unlikely t.o help the situation. What is necessary is to remove tbe original cause of the present situation in the Dominican Republic, not to concentrate on its effects. 113. The question of the interna1 structure of tbe Dominican Republic, its Government and the settlement of differences within that country cari and must be decided by the Dominican people themselves without any kind of outside interference, sud witbout the generals and emissaries of the Peutagon and of tbe State Department. It may be stated witb complete certainty that if the United States armed intervention had mot occnrred the Dominican people would have successfully settled their own problems long since and blood would not be flowing today on the streets of Santa Domingo. 114. Even the United States Press openly says this. The New York Times, for example, stated in an editorial yesterday that solely because of United States intervention “a revolt that might have ended quickly has dragged out for weeks andhas been getting fiercer and more bitter every day”. 115. The de facto militâry occupation of the CountrY by United States troops iswhat ispreventinga SOiUtiOn of the problem in the Dominican Republic and fs the cause of the tragedy being played out in that smaR Latin American country. This is precisely why it is the duty and the clear responsibility of the %XritY Council, in the first instance, to give specialand very careful consideration to thenecessity for the expulsion sues GoQe offices to persuade tbe tlle security CotmciPs We d0 net hn0w aR tbe demils and circums fky instructive Russia~ fable about tbe 118. h-h! > laow c%aa Mie ask tlae iate~eat~oaist, tbe oecupier. to rest c0Antfwhicla às 8 victim of 8 occupation? Tbere is oaae approacb tbat Sb0uld be made to tbe United States-a decisi~e demand for the awnl of ils ~~~~tio~ fcrrces from UbliC. PEI. h tlae circumstmaces it is essential tbat tbe e decisive steps tates occupatima FS of the Security Cknuacil now bear a particuhxrly grave responsibility ha the face of the need to bah the ana @ais small country from Un imm. And those members of t wllo t yeé macle sufficiently clear tbeis position in ar a beawy burd~n of respn aaican peopaQ maa au lmmmai 121. The Secmàty Comacil must demand tùe immediate witbdrawal d United States tr00ps from tbe Dominican Republic. P22. 1 waive tbe c0nsecutive iuterpretation of my statement. 123. The PRESIDENTz Tbe representative of tbe unit States has indicated a desire to speah, but tbe representative of France bad asked to speak Nowever, if the representative of the s is raising a p0int of order. 1 now give 1%. Ms. STEVENSON (United Skates of America): I In view of the seriousness of the charges that bave jtast been articulated by the representative of the %WiQt Union, I mUSt askfor consecutive interpretation of bis remarks into EngRsb. 1 1. SEmQUX (France) (transPated from FEneW: We bave ail listened most attentively to 126. The Secretary-General has coafirmed that the situation is as grave as the international Press describes it to be. Every hour tbat passes increases the number of lives lost and the horror of the battles which General Imbert, speaking to the Secretary- General’s representative, did not hesitate to describ as na mopping-up operatlon”. 127. There is one matter which we consider to be of compelling urgency: it is that the truce for which the International Red Cross and the Secretary-General’s representative have appealed, in order to enable tbe wounded to be evacuated and treated. should corne into effect without delay. 128. My delegation considers. without prejudice to any other conclusions the Council may reach, that the Secretary-General should instruct his representative at Santa Domingo to direct his efforts to this point first of a11 and that you, Mr. President, should, on behalf of the Security Council, launch an urgent appeal for a truce before the end of this meeting.

Mr. President, for our part, we appreciate the information tbat you have communicated to us from &Ir. Mayobre and we trust that indue course members of the Council Will be furnished with copies of his information, or such portions of it as may be made available to us for more carefol examination. 130. I also noted with interest our President’s report tbat he had been advised that a report of the Special Committee of the OAS was coming to the Council in the course of the day, 1 would hope likewlse tbat we shall have an opportunity to examine this report witb tbe tare that 1 suggest it may deserle. 131. 1 thought we had corne here this afternoon to hear the representatives of the two factions, who were invited at our last meeting to appear before the Council. We evidently have that still ahead of us. 132. Meanwhile, we have heard another speech from the representative of the Soviet Union. Tbis time, however, it includes a new accusation. IIe askr3 me why some high-level representatives of the United States Government went down to Santa Domingo. I think perbaps 1 cari enlighten him on that. They went down to help stop the fighting and to help reconcile the factions, if they possibly could. These special representative bave coIlaborated closely witb theOAS Committee. They have kept it informed of ail their conversations and their efforts. They bave also been in touch with Mr. Mayobre. tbe Secretary-General’s P . T ~~E~I~E~~ The representative of the S&et Union wisbes to mise a d Soviet §oeiaIist S&&es representative representatives of the State ~@~~~e~t and the Pentagon. Smce tbis was meant to Soviet representative, I sbouhl lie tlle e: what justification what mandate do your representatives bave for being there?

Point of 0 r, Mr. President. sentative of tbe Soviet Union tbat. if he has other estions. he a& them in due time. so mat the of the United States may take his own Lime to answer them at the end of bis speech. The repxesentative of the Unikd States may now pmceed. r. STEVENSON (United States of America): Qf American States, by the United States. or by bothto restore peace to the Dominican Repu?&e. 139. The allegation has been made again-I suspect for the seventb or eigbth time-that the United States aid to the Imbert forces and the Oovernment aî National Reconstruction, as it is called. 146). 1 repeat ébat tbe Wnited States bas avoided scmpu~ously giving military assistance either to the forces af tbe Govermnentof NationaI Reconstructionor to the ConstitutionaI Government of Colonel Caamaiio. Not only bas the Wnited States refrained from giving aid to eitber side in this conflict, but it bas prohibited the armed forces of eitber Imbert or Caamafio from using the zone of safety established under the OAS resolution as a refuge or sanctuary, or from us@ or closing tbe line of communication which c0nnteets tbe zone with the Duarte Bridge. 141. It is important, I thinak, ta note that the United States forces are neither present at nor in sontrol ol tbe area autside of the zone and of the line of comm-mication. The present activity of the Imbert forces is reported to be in the nortbern part of the City north of bath the zone and the line of commuoication. It is reported also that the Imbert forces cross& 143. New with regard to tbe San Isiclro airfleld; tbis field is not controlled by the United States, but by the Dominican Air Force. The United States is a user nation of this airfield. exactly like otber contingQnts from Latin American armed forces earmarkedforuse of the Inter-American Force. Rowever. WQ bave repeatedly urged the Domlnican Air Force not to undertake any combat missions from this airfieldand, with the exception of the attack on 13 May, we ~AQQ been successful in dissuading them from using the airfield for that purpose. 144. Let me repeat that the Unite.l States forces axe not taking sides in this conflict, but are functioning within the framework of OAS actions, whicb were dirQCtQd t0 aSSiSting in the eVaC%atiOn Of persans in danger-wblch has been accomplisbed; to establishing a zone of safety; to assisting in humanitarian efforts related to the tare and emergency feeding of the people in tbe cities. And we have carried out these latter servicea without regardto the factions support~d by individuals who are in need. As Ibave said earlier, we bave no mandate to do more, and I thlnk tbat it is important. if I may say SO, for the Conncil to realize Es. 145. We have been accused both of using force and of not using it. The fOrCeS of thQ United States do not have a general peace-keeping role or a mandate to enforce a cesse-fire. The resolutions of the OAS deal only with the creation of an international neutral zone and tbe lines of communication, and we are operating in that context alone. We have stated that we are net occupylng the country, nor do WQ have any wish to do SO. and we have stated it repeatedly. Who wants to occupy the country or to have any continuing responsibilities there? 146. Finally, let me repeat a few of the facts which 1 have already previously explained clearly time and again, but 1 think not as often as Mr. Fedorenko has seen fit to repeat the distortions. the calculated falsehoods, within the worst tradition of the cold war, which latterly seems to have becorne his constant habit. 147. First, on 28 April, 1 repeat, in the absence of any governmental authority, the law enforcement and the military officiais then exercising suchauthority as there was in the Dominican Republic informed us that the safety of foreign nationals could net be guaranteed any longer and that an immediate dispatch of forces was necessary to safeguard their lives. United States forces were sent onIy afterthat request, dom fighers”. were actively penetr coup under the guise of a sa-called %novement of national liberation”. 14S. Third, the purpose of the United States actionin miean Republic was to prote& the lives of nationals and to give tbe inter-Ameriean a chance to deal witb the situation iu the Dominican Republic, which Is witbin its competence, if it could do so. 150. Fourth, the United States forces are not asserting any authority to govern any part of the Dominican Republic an& as I bave said, are not taking sides in tbe conflict. 151. Fifth, tbe Wnited States fuRy supports the action whicb the OAS has taken to deal situation, incl.uding the cal1 for -4+-e, offices commission, the establi of the international security zone and the establishment of the Inter-American Force. 152. Sixth, the United States forces willbe witbdrawn from the Dominican Republic when tbe OAS Command of the Inter-Amerlcan Force determines chat they are not needed. The sooner that is. the better it will be for us. 153. Seventb, we believe that tbe people of the Domini,oan Republic-again, as Ihave said repeatedlyshould have a government of their own choosing. Our action has the purpose of preserving tbat rigbt, a choice which would have been denied, perhaps irretrievably, if the forces at work at the outset of tbe revolution had sncceeded. 154. We cari go on here indefinitely excbanging accusations and responding to them. I think it is apparent to all members that the situation in the Dominican Republic is extremely dangerous and that it bas been impossible up to this point to reconcile tbe conflieting factions, to bring about a coalition govermnent. to restore peace and orcler, to stop the figbting. I think that perhaps there is littfe appreciation-or possibly toc little appreciation wouldbe more correct-of the fact that in the Dominican Republic there is a depth of bitterness and hostility engendered by the figbting, not only between the opposingmilitary leaders but within the population; that the roots of this bitterness and this hostility are old and deep, that they are ancestral indeed, and that they affect women and children; that Trujillo is dead, but that the legacy of his long dictatorship lives on. And tbis ereates an ugly situation. 155. The fundamental question as to whether any stable government cari he formed in the Dominican

I should like to ask the United States representative whether he has any comments to make on the suggestion of the representative of France. 1 recall that the representative of Franceand 1 shall ask him to correct me if I bave not understood his suggestion aright-referred to the following statement in the Secretary-General’s report: n . . . It had not been possible to persuade General Imbert to agree to 2 cesse-fire. sX&wgh he ecpressed willingness to agree to a suspension of hostilities some time on 19 M2y to facilitate :be work of the Red Cross in searchii for the dead and wounded.n [S/6369, para. ll.]g The representative of France suggested that anurgent appeal should go out from the President of the Security Council as the unanimous wish of the Secnrity Council, that this humanitarian work shoold beundertaken immediately. and that instructions should be given to Mr. Mayobre to approach General Imbert for the limited purpose of carrying out that humanitarian task. 157. It would be very helpful to know what the United States representative feels about that su by the representative of France.

It is my impression that this was indeed already done earlier in the day. 1 am, however, unable to respond to the President’s question without making inquiries. I shall be very happy to do that and to report back to the Council later in the meeting.

1 am obliged to tbe representative of the United States. 160. Mr. RIFA’I (Jordan): 1 wish to add my voiCe, if 1 may, to that of the representative of France, and to support the suggestion which he made. 1 wisb to take this opportunity to thauk the Secretary-General for his prompt report and for the speedy manner in which he carried out his responsibility under resoIution 203 (1965) adopted by the Security Council on 14 May. The immediate requirement facing the Council is how to stop the fierce fighting which is taking place up to this very moment in the Dominican Republic and causing tragic events and death and destruction. 161. Members of the Council Will surely review the report of the Secretary-General with the utmost seriousness 2nd urgency and will no doubt make every effort ta enable the Conncil to adopt practical and immediate measures to meet the present situation in the Dominican Republic. 5J Ibid. - 163. We trust t h the immediate future the Coumil rmed 0f the restits of the President's appeaE on its belA%. 164. r. USHER (Ivory Coast) (translated from Fren : At an g called to discuss tbis ~~bKern we sp d an interim resolution capling for a cesse-fire and earnestly requesting the cwtending factions to try to settle the dispute bu peaceful means. 165. The Secretary-General~s representative informs us that it has not been possible to obtain General Robert% agreement to tbe cesse-fire. Tbe figbting is, in fact, continuing and he informs us of tbe need to secure an immediate truce in order to enable tbe dead and wounded to be evacuated. 166. Tiae hory Coast is extremely worried about tbe present situation in tbe D0minican Republlic and above ail about tbe aims wbicb not only the contending parties but also tbose who are at present in tbat country appear to be pursuing, since tbose aims seem to be difficult to reconcile witb a peacefu~ settlement of the problem. In 0ur general statement of 7 May [1203rd meetingl. we made it clear that we other institutions are on the spot trying to seeze tbe suspension sf hostilities and to obviate resort to tbe formula “let tbe strongest win” in the settlement of the problem in the Dominfcan Republic. 167. We also said in our statement that we were impressed by tbe bumanitsrian aspect of tbeproblem, but just now we are asking ourselves wbat purpose tbere is in distr~butin~ provisions if those for wbom tbe provisions are intended are to be left to die. 166. It is for tbis reason that the delegation of the Ivory Coast feels impelled to support the proposa1 of tbe French representative that you, Mr. President, sb0uld Iaunch an appeal on behalf of the Counctl for an immediate truce. We think that at this &mcture, wben tbe international press agencies report tbat more t 300 people have been killed in the three yS Since bostilities were resumed and that the amer of deaths increases with every day tbat d tak.? immediate steps to thtS Loss of buman Rves, because we t mari cornes first and we value mari more higbly thon any ideology.

1 cal1 on the representativeof the DS9.R in the exercise of his right of reply. Refore

First of a& allow me to draw your attention, Mr. President. to the psychology. SO to speak, underlying certain fac&. 171. When United States imperialism undertcokarmed intervention in the Dominican Republic and sent to that small country an armada with its armed forces, it did not ask the Security Councilfor its authorization cither in fact or in name. But now, when the President of the Security Council asks the United States representative a simple, direct question about bis position on the taking of urgent measures to stop the bloodshed, the United States representative suddenly finds be needs time and the agreement and authorization of the State Department. 172. This is strange logic and a strangepbenomenon. After this, what are we to tbinkof bis lengtby explanation that the United States is pursuing some peaceful and noble obectives in the Dominican Republic? One must really have lost a11 sense of proportion and sense of humour to say tbat tbe United States invaded tbe Dominican Republic-in order to restore peace. And who, lt may be asked. is disturbing the peace tbere? What irony! Tbe main culprit is the United States itself, together with its puppets. 1’73. What monstrous cynicism one must have tc assert that the United States occupation of a small Latin American country is really a blessing and a charitable action, and that the United States interventionists are a11 but the guardian angels of the Dominican people! However, what we see tbere are net angels but the tanks, bombs and bayonets of the United States interventionists. The United States is acting there as if this were not the twentieth century but the Dark Ages, when the whim of brigands ruled the world. 174. After this, they even have the audacity to set conditions for the withdrawal of United States occupation forces from the Dominican Republic, a Member of our Organization. 175. The United States representative has asked why the Soviet representative opposes any efforts by the United States to restore peace in the Dominican Republic. But who asked the United States to busy itself with this question? Who sent UnitedStates armed forces into the Dominican Republic? Whose Will was that? 176. The question of the relations hetween the opposing factions in the Dominican Republic is a matter exclusively for the Dominicans themselves: it is tbe primiple of soverei lie. In 0v.r vi cti-e steeps te stop the md of ieso &ubt of @lis. ust point out. ben? minican RepnPic is tim of a 181. In view of tlie lateness of the hour and of tbe need to continue with tbe examination of the item on nda. 1 do not insist on consecutive interpretation of my statement. 132. Tbe PRESIDENT: 1 am grateful to the representative Ot’ tbe Soviet Union ior giving an answer ta t estion I venéured to ask him. 133. r. VELAZQFJEZ (Uruguay) (translated from Spanlsh): 1 ‘bave asked for the floor for the sole ding my delegation’s voice to those ations which have expressed their support tion just made by tbe representative of explained. bis s is based on onsiderations. wh eartedty we 185. I should llke to point out that we should decide thls matter without delay. In the report wbich tbe Secretary-General has just circulated [S/63691. it 1s said that. according to General Imbert, a suspension of hostilities might be possible some time on 19 It is 19 May today. and Santo Domingo time presumably coincides approxlmately with New York time. ‘l’bere is therefore scarcely flve hours left durin suspension of hostilities might take place and tbe Council’s appeal might meet with some response. Consequently. 1 in my turn would venture to suggest that, if the Council has no objection to the suggestion made by the representative of France, you should be authorised to make the appeal lmmediately witbout having to wait until the end of thls meeting. 186. Tbe PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Uruguay. 1 am very conscious of tbe urgency of tba matter. Tbe representative of Uruguay Will probably recall that the representative of France said that the appeal should be made at the end of this meeting. I bave other speakers on my list. and they may or may not react to the suggestion. That is wby, even as 1 give the floor to every one of these speakers, I am asking them specifically to react to the su tbat bas been made, SO that it Will not sppear necessary for me afterwards to obtain a consensus once again. 187. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): I should like to comment on the suggestion tbat was put forward by the representative of France and to respond to the President’s request that we should express our views on that suggestion. 188. 1 may not bave followed exactly the wording of the suggestion made by the representative of France. 1 have no doubt that he was extremely clear in wbat he said, but 1 would like to be clear in my mind whetber he was referring to the temporary suspension of hostilities, which is spoken of in paragraph 11 of the report of the Secretary-General, or wbether be was referring to a cesse-fire more generally. 189. It seems to me that our efforts in the Security Council bave been from the first directed to achieving a cesse-fire and then to enforcing a cesse-fire. Tbis from the first has been the effort of the OAS and it has been confirmed in our own resolution wbich was adopted unanimously. 190. Unfortunately I was not present wben the Secretary-General gave his report, but I have read it. 1 have been struck, as other members of tbe Council have been, by the fact that, in spite of the efforts of the OAS and in spite of the resolution whicb was net be a limited cessation of b0stilities but should be a cease-fire wbich would enable all of us wbo are concerne@ in tbis matter to go forward to seek tbe solution we wish. namely a solution which is wboP1y acceptable to tbe peopb of tbe Dominican Repubiic in establisbing a free government of tàneir own choosing. pr&xcupe la sohution 192. I tberefore su rt wboletaeartedly the su tien of tbe representative of France, and P take it merely of a temporary cessation speaking in fulp reinforcement of tbe unanimous decision Whicb tbis Council bas previously taken. hosmit&. marne et des 194. My delegation was tberefore shocked to learn from tbe report of the Secretary-General that tbe suspension of hostilities wbtch had already been 194. par sion denx en earried out reason bas not corne into effect. pour circnmstances, I should lie, on behalf tion, to support tbe suggestion made by the representative of France, and supported by other representatives. that the representative of the ominican Repubblic shouhi, Security Council. urgently appeal to both parties to put into effect and observe tbe immediate suspension of bostifities in order to enabb the Red Cross to carry out its humanitarian tasks. With respect to whetber tbat appeal is worded as a suspension of hostilities or as a permanent cesse-fire, it seems to me we should not relinquish tbe cease-fire on which we decided at OUI’ 1208th meeting. However. in fact it will corne down to the same thing. namely. that the parties cesse hostilities immediately. which is OUI main abject. 1 would therefore suggest that tbe wording be left to the President or to the representative of the Secretary-General. d&l&ation. diate Rouge concerne la forme ou de cessez-le-feu ne devons Fi reviendra demander hosttlites. gérerai soit du Seer&aire B96. Mr. ORTIZ SANS (Solf~ia) (transiated from Spanishp: 1 shaf1 support tbe French renresentative’s stion very warmly. In fact, when the Security Councif first began to discuss this probbm, 1 expressed my country’s view tinat thématter should be referred to the Organisation of American States. and H tben said: 196. C’est du reprdsentant debats apres devait am&ricains. w . . . f should like to suggest, without submitting a formai proposai, that it would be desirable to 197. i am very happy that my modest suggestion, after lying dormant for nearly twenty days, has been taken up by the representative of France and is receiving the support and sympatby of the Council.

Lest my silence be taken for absence of consent, 1 just want to make it quite clear that my delegation supports the proposa1 that the President should meke a humanitarianappeal. I think the Council may safely leave the formulation of the appeal to the President’s discretion.

As all members have spoken, 1 d like to speak as the representative of M SIA. 200. 1 understood the suggestionof the rcoresentative of France in the following context. The report from Mr. Mayobre, which the Secretary-General conveyed to us, makes it absolutely clear that he finds it very difficult to obtain the consent of bothsides to a ceasefire. But he points out that GeneralImbert was willing to suspend hostilities for the purpose of carrying out the work of the Red Cross. 201. I assume that. in terms of law, if not in terms of politics, you cannot have a cesse-fire without a suspension of hostilities. Once the hostilities are suspended and the snipers are silenced. the Security Council and its representatives there Will have tbe required tlme to exploit that suspension of hostilities and to make it into a more permanent cesse-fire. I tberefore understand the suggestion of the representative of France as being a little toehold given to us at the threshhold. 202. Here is General Imbert, who is SO stiff and rigid. willing to accept a cesse-fire, for gcod or bad, and willing to concede this little indulgence for tbe benefit of the Red Cross and for the sake of hls own people. XVe ought to tske advantage of that. 1 think. without going back on the cesse-fire resolution or asking for the cesse-fire at the same time. Any appeal from the President, as 1 gather the consensus at this table, would undoubtedly mean that he has to carry on the cesse-fie resolution, whicb obligation has been conferred upon hlm. But, in the meantime, be must tske immediate advantage of the consent willingly given by one of the difficult parties, andmake the best use of it to proceed forward-to tske the next step towards a cesse-fire. 203. It is in that sense that 1 understood the su stion of the representative of France; and. as the representative of MALAYSIA, it appeals to me verymuchnot only because it is a humanitarian task that has at once. SO tbat there me, a recess 5% a few s to be made. %100x to tbe re entative 0% tbe United Sta wishes to make a st~te~e~t. ited States of erica): to be able to rm tbe Couacil whether there in fact any unrecovered dead and wounded in tbe streete of Santa Domi but we have en unable to in order to find out. But it is apparent from rt tbat General hmbert is willi 208. Tbe PRES NT: me report made to security couacil the cretary-General on situatioorn in Saato Domin cbaawcter. In connexion [S/6369] is 0% a g th resolution 203 (1965) cordance tith tbe uumiamus desire 0fthe of the Security Council. I rsquest tbe -General t0 convey to hts representative ngQ that tbe Security ColIncil desrres nt efforts sbould be devoted to the of a suspension of hostilities 5-o anitasian work of the Wed Cross to dead a wouaded may be facilitated. 209. The aext business, or fndeed tbe only business OIL wbicb the Security Council met this afternoon, was Rub&n Brache der. t0 supply nican matters. the Council, 1 * one a%ter tbe ble and mahe a Af fhe invitation of fhe Presidenf, iWr. Rubén Brache fook a place af fhe CounciI fable. 210. Tbe PRESIDENT: This is the opportunity. Mr. Brache, that you asked for to make a statement to the Security Council in connexion with matters in the Dominican Republic; you may now make any statement you wish.

I am grateful for the opportunity granted to me by tbis distinguisbed body to corne here and to speak, not in the name of the Dominican people. but in tbe name of justice, truth and what millions of us simple men and women had supposed tobe the morallaw of nations. 212. In the particular case of Latin America. tbis moral law was codified in the Charter of Bogot@ whicb was approved and ratified by tbe United States Senate and was therefore acontract freelyenteredinto by the United States Government before tbe world aad history: tbis means also tbat it is binding on ali tbe citizens of the United States, siace international treaties freely entered into are binding on Governments and peoples 213. Article 15 of the ogota Charter reads as follows: “NO State or group of States bas the rigbt to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever. in the interna1 or external affairs of any otber State . , .n Pet, by a unilatcral decision, witbout consuitfng tbe members of the Organieation of American States. on the pretext tbat it was acting to save ican lives, and later on the pretext that the unists had taken political control of the constitutionalist revolution. tbe United States Government carried out a military invasion of the Dominican RepubRc, despite tbe fact tbat such an act was expressly probibited by the charter establishing the Organization of American States. 214. As you a11 know and the whole world knows. and as cari be read in a11 the reports sent to their newspapers by the independent journalists of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany. Venezuela. Mexico, Chile and other countries, at no time was the life of any foreign Citizen threatened in tbe Dominican Republic and at no time was there communist control-not in any sector of the revolution. Not a single Dominican was shot. And now. in order to whitewash his Government, Ambassador Averell Warriman asserts that the Communists who took part in the Dominican events have left my COuntQJaltbough he failed to say at what place they were allowed out by the United States armed forces, since those forces have exclusive control of air and sea communications with the Dominican Republic. 116. I must ont out tbat tlae mm laatergentionwas i~te~~tio~: 1 must ominican is a s witb an ardent and holy love and will never let it fa18 under the sway of alien forces. 218. 1 shall not add another word. 1 do not need to provide any proof. There is proof enougb and to spare in ‘IXe New York Times and the New York Herald Tribune of 11 to 18 May. Nor do I ask for justice. The world conscience bas alreadypronounced ment. Nothing cari ever cause mankind to witbdraw tbe tremendous condemnation summed up in tbe verdict tbat the Government of tbe United States of America bas Iost its self-respect and has lest the ri@ to spesk in tbe name of democracy and truth. 219. Tbe PRESIDENT: 1 thank lk. Bracbe for bis on b-ebalf 0f tbe Council, 1 would saq ;eful to him for tbe information which ered. Brache wifhdrew. Af fhe invifafiotz of fhe Presidenf> lkfr. Guaros V%!I fook a place af tic Cormoif fable.

In response to your request es, for an ~~r~~ to make a statemenl bave been made to @v faction% election ofC0 tbe Republic is in acc provisions of tbe 1963 Constitution. Rven if we accept the absurd supposition tbat the 1963 Consitution is st in force, the fact is that, nnder its provisions, Colonel Caamaiio could not be appointed President. since article 133 of tbat Constitution specifies tbat “the person elected must fulfil the conditions set forth at the end of article 126 of the present Constitution”; article 126 states tbat “the elec t by tbe Na of the polit =I in otber Revolutionary Party of the Dominican RepubIic. the Pwty tbat elected the President of tbe Republic in tbe 1962 elections. Colonel Caamafio is nrohibited t Constitution from belonging to ani poïitical party, since article 16I of Elie Constitution provides that tbe armed forces are essentially apolitical. 228. 1 shall not go into the otber Iegal reasons wbich invalidate an action clesigned to disguise wbat is as much a de facto situation as any other. 229. The éventent of National Reconstruction is determined tbat peace. order and stability shall be established ~~~rna~ontIy in the Dominican Republic and that the circumstances wbich are keeping tbe Dominican people in their present state of anxiety e junte 1 be abIe to embark on a truly democratic course, to wbich end it Will be necessary to bold eiections as soon as conditions permit. 236. The Goverament of National Reconstruction has stated pnblicly that its existence is nurelv provisional, depending upon the achievement-of its objectives. Consequently, it bas always beenprepared ta corne to an agreement and to make arrangements with the rebel faction. directly or through intermediaries. with a view to arriving at a realistic formula which would enable the contending parties to corne togetber. with honour for a11 and for tbe good of tbe- Republic, a formula that would lead to reement and to the establishment of a régime of true national unity capable of dealing effectively with the serious problems which face the Republic and wbicb bave been aggravated by the present crisis. 231. The problem implicit in su& a formula is an e~~ao~di~~iIy complex one, since full account must f ail the factors involved, including the itary situation and tbe ideologicalpositions been adonted and wbich appear tobe rigid. If tbis problem is not faced and settled satisfactorily. 233. In thls connexion, 1 thlnk that it would be appropriate for me to read out the text of a telegram sent to the Secretary-General of tbe Unlted Nations by Mr. Noracio Vicioso Soto. the Secretary of State for Foreign Affalrs of the Dominican Republlc. It reads as follows: “1 have the honour to lnform you, for the information of the Security Council. tbat yesterday afternoon, af ter repeated attacks by the rebel forces on buildings of the administrative department and the Transport Division of the National Army, as also on various industrial btildings, in particular tbe only factory producing cooking oil and hence of primary importance for feeding the Dominican people, and in tbe face of tbe insidlous propaganda campaign carried out by the Santo Domingo radio and television station inciting the people to rise up in arms against the Government of National Reconstruction. ail these acts being commited in flagrant violation of tbe cesse-fire agreed to under the Act of Santo Domingo, wblch we have at a11 times respected. we protested vlgorously against these violations to the Secretary General of the Organization of American States. adding that these violations must cesse immediately in order to avoid further attacks reaching more serious proportions. Exolusively Dominican armed forces were obliged to aot in self-defence toprotect tbe Dominican people against these attacks, to defend these installations and to silence tbe radio station, whlch is State property. The abovementioned military and industrial installations are outside the rebel-occupied zone. The rebels are trylng to submit this matter directly to the Security Council, claiming that the efforts of the Organization of American States have been ineffective and using the same dilatory tactics which they used with tbe OAS Committee. They refuse to continue the conversations whlch the Presidentof theGovernment of National Reconstruction bas repeatedly advocated in order to bring about a peaceful agreement that would put an end to the desperate situation created by the rebels to tbe prejudlce of the tr ilIity and calm of the Dominican pecple. In this respect. the Government of National Reconstruction considers that the Organization of American States is taklng effective steps to settle the conflict and that botb parties should glve it their full CO-Operation so 234. The anomalous situation prevailing in the Dominican Republic Carnot be aliowed to continue. It is urgent and necessary. it is imperative tbat the bloodsbed shoulci be stopped and tbat the order and illity disrupted by tbe insurrection of 24 April be restored. Kt is essential that this fratricidal strife should be brought to an end and that tbere should be no further exacerbation of passions and building up of batred wbich make it even more difficult to achieve the understanding needed in order to reach a satisfactory solution. 235. We are confident tbat Dominican patriotism will prevail over partisan. sectarian or aay other oonsidemtions, because at this crucial moment of its history the immediate and primary concern of the Dominican Republic is to salve this problem of maintaining civil peace and human coexistence and preserving its republican democratic institutions which are in peril. 236. A struggle is being waged on Dominican soi1 ta prevent communism from taking over a country which is determined to live in accordance with democratic and liberal ideas. It bas been proved that ideologically alien forces bave tried to intervene in tbe drama tbat is tsking place in the Dominican Republic. 237. Tbe situation created in the DominicanRepublic was brought before the Organization of American States. wbioh has adopted measures to remedy the situation in ail its aspects and restore normal conditions. The Dominicans have welcomed and placed their hepes in the steps tbat are being taken and are confident that tbe problem whtch SO vitally affects tbe present and future of the Dominican Republic wiR be solved once and for ail in that forum, which iS tbe appropriate regional organisation to deal with the matter. 238. Those of us who spent long years in exile, constantly opposed to tbe tyranny of Trujillo, oannot t the decisive action tahen by the Organization of American States prior to the overthrow of the dictator, an action wbich undoubtedly was the most instrumental in restoring to the Dominican Republic the atmosphere of freedom necessary for the establishment of democracy. We also saw the Organization Of American States intervene during tbe confused period of the Council of State. giving its ca-operation and support in the process which culminated in tbe free elections of 1962. In view of a11 that, we are canfident that if our people are allowed to worh under the auspices of the Organization of American States, they will find. with the help of OUT sister Repubiics Of this bemisphere, the appropriate solution for our serious problems . 239. Tbe Security Council has autborized the Secretary-General to send bis representative to tbe Do- 240. Rtie 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council provides that members of tbe Secretariat or other persons may be invited to supply the Council with information or to give assistance in examining matters within its competence. I hope tbat, within these limitations and to the extent Of my ability, 1 have served the purpose of the invitation extended to me to appear here.

On behalf of the Security Council, 1 wish to express my thanks to Mr. Vel5zquez for his statement, the contents of which will be carefully noted in the further consideration of the Dominican problem as the Security Council continues to deal with it. Mr. Gmroa Vekkquez wifhdrew.

1 should like to invite the attention of the members of the Council to the document that has just been received from tbe President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, to which 1 made reference earlier this afternoon when this debate was resumed. That document has just becn delivered by a special messenger from Washington, and it Will be distributed to a11 the members of the Council. 243. That concludes what we had specifically intended to do thls afternoon. If no member of the Counoil wisbes to make any statement at this stage, 1 would suggest to the members of the Council that, the Secretary- General% message having already been despatched, we should be in a position. probably late tomorrow, to get some sort of report from the Secretary- General% representative as to the effeot of the message which he has been asked to convey to the appropriate authorities in Santo Domingo. 244. Subject to the convenlence of members, we cari do one of two things. The Council may permit me to keep in touch wlth the Secretary-General and, as soon as some report is received, to cal1 a meeting of the Council at once. On theotherhand, of course, if at any time any member of the Conncil, havl regard to the importance and the urgency of the matter, wishes to have the Council meet, he is always at liberty to make such a request, ancl we shall meet on that basis. We might either adjourn now and Ieave it to me, in consultation with the Secretary- General, to fix a date for the continuation ofthis discussion, or we might, if the members of tbe Council SO desire. fix Friday morning as tbe date of our next meeting on the matter, by wbich time we may hope to have received some sort of report.

I bave asked to speak because I must confess that 1 am somewhat confused. It 1s mY delegation’s understanding that the subject which 248. ENT: If it is any con-dort to the seatative is CO Presicient 16 a150 atioaof American cb bas just been dis e other members of tbe Cowcil-that ‘6s report should be examinedby Councll, wbicb woukl tben draw the anpropriate tbis document 252. 1 bave ventured to su you should consult the because tbe decision to Conti this matter will of course require tbeir consent.

I must co quite understand what the Fepresentative of U means by speaking of anotber report wbieh be formally approved before being considered. Tlme OAS is obliged to make reports to the Seeurity Cotmoil er the Charter. The Secretary-CeneF Fequested that he obtain an immediate report it. We are able to deb as we wish to. However, I the representative of woukl be grateful if he would ola by asking for it to be approved; at least, wbat 1 beard in tbe Englisb interpretation.

1 thought 1 used vconsidered’ and not the word n comments referred to the Secretary-Cener wbich was submitted to us in pursuance of Fesolution 203 (1965). 255. I suggested tbat the President sbould conau% tbe members of the Council to ascertain they wisb the Council to continue its exami tbe Seoretary-General’s report in order tc necessary decision. 256. Tbe PRESIDENT: 1 am obliged to the representative. of Uruguay. We are now in tbe process of consultation.

The proposa1 made by tbe represe tive of Uruguay seems to me a very simple oae. Today’s meeting was eonvened for the purpose of beari two perscjns who had asked to be allowed to address the Council. Uuring the meeting the Secretary- General submitted a report. 258. 1n view of the urgent nature of certain parts of this report. we have launced an urgent appoal. Tbe Secretary-Ceneral’s report has not yet been examined by the Council, however, since the purpose of ouF meeting today was only to grant a beari persons. The representative of Uruguay that our meeting should continue SO tbat we may examine the report submitted tcday by tbe Secretary- General. 259. Hence 1 formally proposed that the Council should meet tomorrow sfternoon to consider tbe Secretary-Ceneral’s report.

1 understand tbeproblemnow. 1 was suggesting that we should, if necessary, meet tomorrow morning rather than tomorrow afternocn which, for certain reasons. particularly witb re to the Secretary-CeneraPs convenience. wcnld be unsuitable. Of course, I am in tbe bands Oftbe members of the Security Co?mcil. If the COUncil iS ration of American States 263. tbat has arisen in tbe Do blique arm%es résolution. bien mettra question. s. 7% Security Courkcil h edaresolution. we a11 realize that s resolution is net bring us to a just a final solution of the 264. Today we bave taken yet anotber step, but 264. sure indispensable parfaitement cette trbs sbould refuse to rest content with tbe very 265. Still less cari tbe Security Council surrenderthe fate of a nation to tbe arbitrary Will of a militaiy jmta, OP sit idly by and wait for wbatever tbe general of this military junta sees fit to decide. 2%. 1 do not wlsb to repeat wbat tbesovlet dele eady stated in tbe Securi& Council, or the measures it has proposeci to bring tbe situation normal and to lead us to the correct solution. ition is well known. Bowever, I must draw tbe s attention to the fact tbat, in considering tbe documents before us, we sbould not ovexlook 267. The reports, especiallythatoftbe ~~~te~~a~i~~ Secretary-General, deserve consideration. We should give our full and conscientious attention to this report. but the main thing is the situation which this report describes and which exlsts in reality. The report shows how necessary it is for the Security Council to continue its work, and we think tbere is no reason to postpone the next meeting of the Council to such a distant date as Friday. We think that the best course would be to adopt the proposa1 just madeby the representative of the Ivory Coast, Mr. Usber, and schedule tbe uext meeting for tomorrow afternoon. 269. Mr. RIFA’I (Jordan): 1 understand tbat a formal proposa1 has beenput before us for a meeting tomorrow afternoon to consider the report of the Secretary- General. 1 feel that that proposa1 is well merited and therefore 1 support it. There is anotber important point which could be served if we meet tomorrow afternoon. We may be in a position to find out from you. Mr. President, whether our appeal which bas been transmitted through you has been beeded by the parties there in Santo Domingo. That is an important and urgent matter and it should be given priority. tn the light of the information we might obtain from you, Mr. President, we might consider the situation a

If the members of the Council wish to meet tomorrow afternoon, I have no objection. But surely we Will consider not only the report of Mr. Mayobre that we bave before us now; we Will also consider the report of the Organization of American States, whichactually deals with the problem of restoring peace in the Dominican Republic. Whether we meet tomorrow or the next day. this document. together with anotber one to follow, represents the refledions of the organization which now is actually seized of the responsibility of restoring peace and order to tbe Dominican Republic. Therefore 1 would assume that, in vlew of what the representative of Jordan bas just said, we should consider this document along with the preliminary report made by Mr. Mayobre on the basis of his first observations.

1 am afraid that possibly 1 bave not made myself very clear when suggesting the adjournment until Friday. 1 think I must make myself a little plainer now. I did say that we must continue with this consideration. 1 did point out that tbe Secretary-General at our request has already dispatched the message to Mr. Mayobre. It is already aimost 8.30 p.m. 1 do not know whether tbe time in the Dominican Republic is ahead or behind ours. In any case Mr. Mayobre wonld have to activate himself a4 wmk on it probably by tomorrow morning or tomorrow afternoon. Ravlngthat inmind, I suggested that by Friday we should definitely have had some opportunity of having a report from Mr. Mayobre on whether there has been any heed at a11 to the appeal or whether the hostilities are still going on and rs of the We shall therefore adjourn e maethg rose af 8.25 p.m. TAIN UNITED United Nations publications may be obtained distributors thrcughout the world. write to: United Nations, Sales CO ENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS Les publications des Nations Unies sont agences dépositaires du monde entier. ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, Section COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidos casas distribuidoros en todos partes dirijase a: Nociones Unidas, Seccibn Litho in U.N. Price: $US. 1.00 (or equivalent in orher