S/PV.1217 Security Council

In accordance with the previous decision of the Council. 1 now propose to invite the representative of Cuba to take a Seat at the Council table. Af fhe imitation of fhe President, Mr. Alvarez TabTo @fbs) fook a place at the Coumil faWe.

The Cou&l Will now proceed with its consideration of the item relating to the Dominican Republic. 1 glve the floor to thesecretary- General.

1 submit a further report on the situation in Santa Domingo based on the information rsceived at 1244 heurs, New York time, from my representative, Mr. Jo& Antonio Mayobre. 4. During the morning of 22 May-that is. todayrumours circulated in Santo Domingo that the “high militaIy commaud” of the “Government of Reconstruction” would not accept the prolongation of the cessation of hostilities. At 1000 heurs, Rastern Standard Time, my representative. accompanled by General Rikhye, the President of the Dominican Red Cross and the representatke of the International Committee of the Red Cross, met with the members of the ‘Government of Reconstructionv, as had been agreed upon yesterday. in order to obtain a reply as to whether they would agree to the extension of the 5. General Imbert began by stating that he alone was not the Wovernment of Reconstruction’ whioh consisted of the junta as a whole. He then stated that the truce could be maintained in the northern son8 of the city. My representative drew the attention of General Imbert to the fact that the request of the Security Council had been for a cessation of hostilities covering the City in its entirety and net only a part of it. and that it was necessary to obtain a definite reply from hin. in thés respeot. General Imbert then replied that the Wovernment of Reconstruction” did not approve the prolongation of the truce for an additional twenty-four heurs. 6. My representative informed General Imbert that the Securi$ Council had called for a strictcease-fire and that. in Hne with the Security Council’s decision, he had requested an extensionforanadditional L%ent+ four heurs. My representative also informed General Imbert that, since Colonel Caamafïo had aoceptedboth the cesse-tire and the extension of the truce, tbe full responsibility for the 108s of Hfe and destruction that might occur thereafter would fall on the “Government of Reconstruction” and that he would bave to inform the Secretary-General to this effect immediately. General Imbert replied that he accepted this responsibility. 7. The ominous implications of General Imbert’s refusa1 to extend the truce and to observe the strict cesse-fire called for by the Security Cou&l are very clear. 8. After the meeting with General Imbert. my representative was visited by Mr. José A. Mors. Secretary General of the Organisation of American States and representative of that organisation in Santa Domingo. Mr. Mors informed Mr. Mayobre tbat the United States Embassy had advised him that theUnitedStates forces would net permit General Imbert’s armed forces to use their aircraft and “other facilities that were under the control of the United States forces”. 9. Tbs represeutatives of the Red Cross expressed their grave concern to my representative and requested tbat an aooeal should be made in ordrr to obtain from bath fac&8 a11 facilities for the accomplishment of their humanitarian task. 10. My representative ha8 also informed me tbat, with the exception of some shots fired during the night, the cesse-fire was being obaerved at the time of bis report, that is, just prier to the expiry of the tienty-four-heur truce. colonel Cavalcantl, who is General Rikhye’s assistant, had just returned frOm a visit to the north-east part of the city and had reported that the area was quiet. The only aerfous violation reported to my representntive was the reinforcement at 0430 heurs, local time, today-that is, 22 May-of the Imbert forces in the National Palace enclave. The United States representatives in Santa Domingo. however. have stated that no military peiToMe Or vebicles from either faction had been permithed t0 “The Government of National Reconstructionmust bave its hands free to repel any warlike action. Our troops Will continue to occupy the positions which we now hold. We seek peace, we wish to avoid bloodshed, we do net plan to initiate any warlike action. but we wish-1 repeat. we wish-to be free to repel adequately any warlike action which may be undertaken against us. For these reasons. the Government of National Reconstruction will abstain from resumptioa of fire, unless it is provoked, wblle discussions with the Secretary General of the Organisation of American States continue for the purpose of finding a definitive solution tc the confiict.”

1 should like, first of all. to invite the attention of the Cou&l to the tests of two draft resolutions, one introduced by the representative of the United Kingdom [S/6.375] y and the other by the representative of France [S/6376].2/

The Security Couucil bas just heard the report of Mr. JC& Mayobre. the Secretary-General’8 representative in Santa Domingo. One incontrovertible faot emerges from what we bave just heard: the situation is becomlng more and more ominous. It also bas to be noted that the dialogue in which the Security Council is taking part in Santa Domingo is proceeding at a level which is degrading to the authority and dignity of our Organieatien. Visits are made to General Imbert. the leader of tbe military junta; and in his talks with the United Nations representatives General Imbert adopts a tone of defiance. IIe not only ignores the Security Council, but virtually defies curappeals, made tbrough our duly appolnted representatlves. for steps to be taken for a cesse-fire and an end to military operations. 14. The Soviet dslegation would like to stress once more the point which we bave already emphasized in our previous statements. including that of yesterday: that talks shculd net be held with a puppet. Imbert 1s merely a servant, and visits and talks in the servants’ 3 Idem., paras. 122 *Ml 137. 15. The Soviet delegation considers it its duty to point out once more that the Security Council is net doing what it should be doing. The Security Council must first of a11 demand the immediate withdrawal, without any delay, of United States occupation forces from the Dominioan Republic. Without thatnonormalization of the situation in the country Will be possible. That is where the start must be made: in this situation no half-measures will help. 16. We bave felt it necessary to stress the pravity of the situation, and the need to take effective measures instead of bypnotizing ourselves êna closing our eyes io the cruel facts. We cal1 upon the Security Council to take immediately the steps which the traglo situation in the Dominican Republic demands.

If there are no other representatives who wish to make any statements. Iassume it is the desire of the Cou&l to proceed with the voting on the draft resolutions that wereplacedbefore us this morning. 18. LORD CARADON (United Kingdom): 1 had waited to see what comment might arise on the draft resolution wbich 1 submitted this morning [S/63?5] and the draft resolution which was submitted by the representative of France [S/6376]. Bath draft resolutions are short and 1 would like to confirm the purposes which my delegation had in mind in submitting the draft resolution this morning. 19. We noted at that time. withuniversalsatisfaction, 1 am sure, that a start had been made. at Ieast, in the suspension of hostilities on 21 May. There cari be no doubt anywhere in the Council about that. The second proposition in the preambular part of OtIr text is tbat we welcome the decisions of the Organization of American States taken on 20 and 21 May. 1 do not believe that there is anydoubt-there fs certainly no doubt in my mind-that a11 of those decisions are fully in accordance with the purposes which we in the Council bave had in mind in the course of Our debate. 1 bave no reason whatsoever to vary the view expressed in the second preambular paragraph of tbe draft resolution which 1 put forward. 20. Then, coming to the two operative paragraphs of the draft resolueion, 1 first proposed that we should cal1 for a oontinued and complete cessation of hostilities. And that, 1 believe. is the universal deslre. As a natural consequence of that statement, 1 then proposed that we should also cal1 on a11 concerned to intensify efforts to this end and to do nothing to prejudice tbe achievement of this immediate and urgent aim. Indeed. 1 think that this last proposa1 follows natUralIy from the first. 1 would go further and say that if we were net to cdl on a11 concerned to co-operate in the end 22. Subsequently the representative of France put forward s draft resolution whlch was shorter still and which. in effect. limited its purpose to requesting that the suspension of hostilities ln Santa Domingo be transformed into a permanent cesse-fire. There is nothing in thu draft resolution of the representative of France inconsistent wltb what 1 bave propose& on the contrary. it is. as wlll be readily seen, a confirmation of the main proposai that 1 bave put forward. since his draft resolution is shorter than mine and goes to the oore of the question. goes to the essential need at tbis time to ensure by every possible means that the cesse-fire be made permanent, then 1, on my part, amperfectIycontenttoallowthedraft resolutien of the representative of Franc~t to take precedence over mine.

The news that we bave received from the Secretary- General about the suspension of hostilities is not as ominous as some feared tbis mornlng. In view of the present dispositionof the forces of the two factions, north and soutb of the line of communication, the action which Unlted Suites forces are taklng to prevent auy attacks across the Une of communication or thrcugh the safety zone or by air or by sea is, of course. the most effective possible assurance against further fighting on any large scale. Al1 of us here, 1 am sure, are determined that the hostilities must oease. The cessation of hostilities is, of course, ultimately a question of fact, net a question of agreement. The truth of the matter is that the truce or the agreement for suspension of hostilities was immedlately checked yesterday afternoon and found to be in effc zt. It is the fact of hostilities that conceins us. An agreement, as an indication of intent, is greatly to be desired, but it is no guarantee of an absence of fighting. That is a question of fact. 24. We now bave the statement of General Imbert that he does net intend to resume hostilities unless he is fired upon. But 1 am sot sure that Colonel Caamaflo takes the same position. If we bave further information available as to that. it would be very welcome. There are now no hostilities, to the best of our knowledge. 1 hope there Will be none. Furthsrmore, we now bave the complete information on the factual situation as conveyed by Mr. José Mora Secretary General of the Organisation of American states. I should like to quot, again the last paragraph of the statement that he transmitted to our Seoretary- General through Mr. Mayobre in which it is stated: “For these reasons, the Government of National Reconstruction Will abstain from resumption of fire, Mess it 1s provoked, while discussions with the 25. In the circumstances the urgency has dfminished. but other implications of the texts before us, presented fi& by the United Kingdom and then by France, become more important. We were prepared to vote for the resolutian presented hy the representative of the United Kfngdom. which welcomes the recent decisfons of the OAS and calls for a complete cessation of hostilities. We consider that such a reference to the OAS decisions is the minimum necessazy to reofprooate the express desire of the OAS to work in co-operation with the Council. We were surprised that immediately after the presentation of the United Kingdom te& the representative of France submitted another text, the maindivergence of which was to eliminate any reference to the OAS. We would, of course, bave preferred to seethe United Kingdom draft resolutio? retain Es priority because we believe it more aocurately reflected both the normal coufiesies between agencies of the United Nations and the truc feelings of the majority of the members of the Cou&l. who are anxious to get along with the conclusions of this work. not to mention the truc feelings of ths majority of the members of the OAS. 25. att&nu& r5solution le d’importance. projet satisfaction L’OEA Nous faire coopérer NOUS aprbs nique, autre a celui de 1’OEA. projet notre ordinairement Nations majoritê mener sentiments 1’OEA. 26. The appropriate relationship between the United Nations and regional organisations such as this one, the Organisation of American States, cari be summarized, 1 think, in terms of the following prfnciples. l’Organisation Caine. 27. First, the Members of, the United Nations, pursuant to Articles 33 and 52 of the Charter of the United Nations, should seek to deal with threats to the peaoe witbin a geographical region through arrangements before coming to the United Nations. This is preclsely what the members of the OAS bave done in the Dominican case. rggfonaux, 28. Second, regional organisations should net, of course, take enforcement actionwithouttheauthoriaation of the Security Cooncfl. But in the Dominican Republic case the Organisation of Amerîcan States did net take the kind of action tbst would require Security Counoil approval. 29. Third, action taken by regional organizations muSt be consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. This is obviously the case with the actions of the Organization of American StateS in the case of the Dominican Republic. 30. Fourth, the Security Council should at a11 times be kept fully informed of actions undertaken by regfonal organisations. The OAS iskeepingtheSecurityCo~ci1 fully informe& witness the report you bave just had from Mr. Mora througb Mr. Mayobre this afternoon. And the Counoil has also arranged to keep itself informed through a representative of the Secretary- General. 31. The Security Counoil ha8 the oompetence to deal wfth any situation whfch might threaten international 32. As a mattor of sound practice and the wiss use of discretion, the Security Conncil should. under present conditions, keep itself fully informad but should net undertake any activity. either diplomatie or on the scene. which would hinder the efforts and tbe responsibilities of the competent organisation. It Will serve the purposes of the United Nations Charter baSt if the Organisation of American States accomplishes what it has set out to accomplish-and that is to restore peace and acbieve -econciliation so that the Drminicsn people cari develop their own democratic institutions. 33. In tbecircumstances, we hadconsideredintroduoing an amendment to the French draft resoltion in order to restore appropriate references to the work now under way hy the Organisation of American States-references which the delegation of Francebas eliminated. We bave not done SO only because the Soviet Union’s negative vote this morning on the Uruguayan draft resolution made it clear that the Soviet Union would veto any reference whatsoever to the Organisation of American Smtes, for its own purposes. 34.. We do agree, however, that the more forma1 extension of the temporary cessationof hostilities into a permanent cesse-fire is desirable, in spite of the fact that the fighting has stopped. As I bave already said, the Secretary General of the Organisation of American States is actively at work. as are representatives of the UnIteU States and others, to achieve that purpose. Our decision to interpose our forces is the most practical possible way to achleve that objective. 35. Since the draft resolution presented by the delegation of France does not even encourage the reglonal aotivity which Article 52. paragraph 3, of the Charter enjoins the Council to encourage, we cannot vote in favonr of it. However, because the draft resolution does not impede the Organlzation of American States in the exercise of its functions. because of the desirabiliq of further stepz ta entend the truce in a forma1 fashion, and because ~11 concerned in restoring peace to the Dominican Republic are, perforce, in fact working in consultation, the United States wil! not seek to prevent the adoption of this draft resolution; we shall abstain from the vote,

1 dld net intend to ask for the floor and 1 should not have done SO if1 had not been moved by Lord Caradon’s very courteous gesture. first. to thank him and to tel1 him how much my delegation appreciates the attitude which he was kind enough to take towards the French 37. sbould bave said tbat my delegation bei unabIe to support the ikaft reso%ution s by tke Vnited Ki m delegation: for littIe-400 muck, if it Ps me& to be an emergency resobation for tbe purpose of coping immediately, tkrougk a unmimous stamd by the Counoil, witb tbe pave situation pmxn3iling at Saut0 F3omm Wbich, a@cording to the Secretary-General’s Iatest report, is siill esa3eme%y preearioüs; Me, if it is meant to ke a resolution for the e of concluding the Coumil’s debate. 38. My delegation bas. in partictiar, some resematiens with regard to operative paragrap% 2 of tbis draft resolutian, which we do net feel cari be interpreted as dearly requesting a11 tbe States concerned to refrain from aiding tbe contendiig factions, as wotid be essentiaI in tbe contez& of a resolution of this km. 39. P bave no fwther comments to make on the draft resoluti~ n submi’cted by the French delegation; 1 made my comments tbis morning. ht is a very short text, wkich simply renews ow previous appeal and makes it even more urgent, anc? in conclusion I would simply express the hope that this text may become a manifestation of unanimiiy on tbe part of tbe SecuriQ Council. 40. Tke PRESIDRNT: Before I put to tbe vote tbe draft resolution submitted by tbe delegatbnof France. on the basis of tbe precedence accorded to it by tbe representative of tke United Kingdom, I would point out, in strict conformity witb tbe rules, tbat tbe Council sbould rememher tbat tbere are tbree draft resolulions sti%l before it. Tbe first is the one intrcduced yesterday by the Wnited States delegation [S/6373],3/ and the two others are the draft resolutions of France [S/6376] and the United Kingdom [S/6375]. Since tbe draft resolution introduced by tbe United States representative de& with the whole matter. on tbe basis, as it were. of a conclusion of tbe debate, 1 assume tbat tbe United Kingdom representative’s statement tbat be was prepared to give precedence to tbe draft resolution introduced by tbe representative of France was intended to mean that. of these two draft reSolutions. the draft resoiution of France sbould bave precedence over that of the United Kingdom. 41. I should like to ask the United States representative whetber he has any objection to giving pre- Cedence to the draft resolution submittedby tbe delegatien of France SO tbat it may be voted upon now.

The position is now clear and the Council cari proceed to 7ote onthe draft resolution introduced by ; rance. 44. 1 understand that the representative of Bolivh? wishes to make a statement.

My delegation is not entirely gratified that the draft resolution submltted by the representative of France makes no mention of the competence and the beneficial services ofthe Organisation of American States. However, since we are deallmg with an emergency situation, in whioh the Security Council must make an effort to display unanimity, my delegation Will vote, with those reservations, in faveur of the Frenoh draft resolution.

1 shall now put the French draft resolution [S/6376] to the vote. A Vote Was takm by show of hmds. In faveur: Bolivia, China, France, Ivory Coast, Jordan. Malaysia, Netherlands, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay. Ageinst: None. /rbsfainiazt United States of America. The draft resolufion was adopted by 10 votes fo aone, wifh 1 absfenfion.g

1 take itthat it is the wish of the Council that 1 should formally request the Secretary- General immediately to convey the text of this resolution to bis representative at Santo Domingo. If that accords with the wish of the Council. 1 shall do SO at once. 48. The immediate and urgent matter having been disposed of, 1 bave no other speakers on my list. 1 am in the hands of tbe Council with regard to the next step which it wlshes to take.

First of all, 1 thank the Council for the vote which it has now cast almost unanimously. However, with regard to your reference a moment ago to the draft resolution which is still to be votedupon.1 should like to know whether the Wnited States representative would be prepared to have us vote immediately on his draft resolution. 1 know he told us yesterday [121Mh meeting] that he considered such a vote premature. 1 do net think that that is SO today, and since this text was formally submitted yesterday morning 1 suggest that we should now proceed to 4/ sec resahdo” 205 (1965). 62. 1 belleve coapIe#e work ch bas been some ri aad, as P that Ille pr5pQsa~s ah-e sematire of Uruguay in mmy respects a use basis for ow work. 53. 1 woald propose that the Couacil should meet mxt. 24 Nay, and contimte its work-wab, 1 lwpe, swb a draft resolutioa prepared by tilen.

Afeer wbat bas just been said by our colleague, Lord Caradon. 1 should like to ask the United S&&es delegation wbetber it regards its draft resolution as bating been withdram. or on what date-ne& week, for example-it would like to aDow it to be put to tbe vote.

B&ore givlng tbe floor to the representative of tbe United States, 1 would say that 1 tlmugbt that we ail beard tbe representative of tbe Uaibd States say tbat be did not wish his draft resolution to be voted upon today. but at the next meeting, whenever that may be; we may meet later tbis evening, perhaps, but that is wbat 1 heard. 66. Mr. STEVENSON: (Unitad States of America): Yoo heard preeisely what I said, Sir.

As Iunderst&d ft. tbe French representative’s questionwas addressed not to the President of the Security Council but to a nmnber of the Cooncil. of course, if a member of tbe Council is not in a position to answer a question, tben th@ need for further steps of some kind clearly armes. The step just proposed by the United Kingdom representative oan hardly be regsrded as a very effective one.

If there are no other speakers, 1 should like to invite comments on whether there is an acoeptanoe of the suggestion made by the representative of the United Kingdom that we meet again on Monday.

As we bave already pointed out, the events t@king place in the Dominican Republic hardly justii the Security Council in relegating a future meeting to some indefinite date. It would seem to us to be more reasonable to agree in principle on the date of the Security Council’s next meeting, with the definite proviso that the Seourity Council may be convened immediately if the course of events in the Dominioan Republio SO requires.

That is precisely wbat 1 was going to suggest. We a11 koow that the situation is very dangerous and critical and that the Secretary- General is receiving reports periodically, from day to day; undoubtedly he Will be in touch witb me and I with him over the weekend. If any occasion arises wbich requires an immediate meeting of the Security Council, ï &a11 not hesitate to call one. On that understanding, if it is acceptable to the Conncil. tbis meetmg Will he adjourned until Monday afternoon at 3 p.m. Toc meefing rose af 4.45p.m. IN UNITED United Nations publications may be obtained distributors throughout the world. writa to; United Nations, Sales Section, ENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS publications des Notions Unies sont nees dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous ou adresser-vous b: Nations Unies, Section PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidos casas distribuidoras en todas partes del dirijase a: Naciones Unidas, Secci6n LithO in U.N. Price: $US. 0.50 (or‘ equtvalenc in other