S/PV.1224 Security Council

The Council Will now resume the consideration of tbe question relating to Cyprus and examine the latest report by tbe Secretary- General on tbe United Nati@ns operation in Cyprus (S/6426 and Coxr.l).g 3. The first speaker inscribed on my list for today is the representative of Cyprus, to whom x now Gide the floor. 5. But before doing that, it is zny pleasant duty to pay tribute once agatn to tbe Secretary-General for his untiring and continuous efforts in connexion with the Cyprus problem. His patience, objectivlty, integrity, and high sens8 of duty bave won bim the respect of a11 of us. The Seoretary-General bas many serious and urgent problems on his hands, some of which bave only reoently been added to hls list of priorities, IIe faces, however, all the problems that require his aersonal attention bv virtue of his office. witb eoual ieal, tnterest and sense of responsibility. Thearlslng of a new paoblem does not reduoe bis tnterest in another. The Secretary-General is entitled to our gratitude for all that he is doing for the cause of the United Nations, not only in respect of the Cyprus problem but in respect of dl the problems whioh today endanger peace in the world. une fois queStiOii.3 qu’il 6. Tribute is also due to a11 United Nations officials connected with the mission of the Unlted Nations in Cyprus, and, in partioular, the Commander of the UNFICYP, General Thtmayya, and the Special Represontative OftheSecretary-General inCyprus, Mr. Bernardes, for their contribution in the effort to secure peaoe and normality in pursuanoe of the resolutions of the Security Council. It is also proper to reiterate tny Government’s appreciation to all countries whose contribution, whether in the form of military contingents, or police, or medtcal unlts, or finance, bave made it possible for the Urited Nations Force in Cyprus to funotion for a much longer period than it had originally been envisaged. 7. Last, but not least, 1 would lihe to express my GovernmenVs gratitude to the Untted Nations Mediator, Mr. Galo Plaza, for the exemplary manner in whioh he has been discharging the mission entrusted to him. The objeotivity, sens8 of responsibility and integrity of Mr. Plaza are beyond any question, at least to a11 those who believe in the United Nations and who are ftrmly committed to the principles of the Charter. 8. Turning now to the report of the Secretary- General [S/6426 and Corr.11, 1 should lihe to state at the outset that tny Government has accepted the Secretary-General% proposa1 to the effeot that the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP should this time be for a six-month, instead of the usual three-month, period-subject, of course, to the understanding contained in paragraph 184 of the report. 9. The situation in Cyprus during the past three months has been one of relative quiet. There have been a few incidents, soi-ne of which are referred to in detail by the Secretary-General in bis report, 10. In contrast to the attitude and actions of the Turkish Cypriot terrorists, directed from outside, my Govermnent has persistently So@t, in cooperation with the United Nations, to bring about the full pacification and normalisation of the situation in Cyprus. That is a matter of record, which no objective observer cari deny or dispute. A careiid study of the report of the Secretary-General that is before the Council today Will confirm what 1 bave just stated concerning the intentions and actions of my Govermnent in this respect. Some believe that we could bave done more and some believe tbat we should bave done less under the circumstances. The fact is. however, tbat we bave done a lot in our sincere desire to see peace and normality fully restored in cypNs. 11. 1 need net remind members of the Council of the measures that my Government has taken in the past, such as the proposais of September 1964 by the President of Cyprus for the pacification and normaliaation of the situation, which were welcomed SO warmly by the Secret~-General and by this Council. Everyone around this table may remember how those proposais were received by the so-called Turkish Cypriot leaders. 1 shall not weary the Council by repeatll facts whlch are already on record and bave been enpounded upon in this Cou&l in the past. 1 shall confine myself on this occasion to mention what has transpired during the period covered by the Secretary-General% report. 12. On 21 Aprll 1965, the Government of Cyprus announced its decision to remove ail fortifications, except those relating to defences against external attack, in three out of the six districts of Cyprus. That measure was carried out unilateraIly, without my conditions, but the hope was expressed that this geStUre on the part of the Government would meet whh the appropriate response on the part of the Tmkish Cypriot leadership. Instead, however, of reactimg in any suoh positive way, the so-called Turkish Cypriot leadership, always dlrected from Ad-s-ad 1 au *ot revealing any secret when I say that-mtensified the provocations in an effort to undermine snd offset the Government’s pacification pmgramme-moved perhaps by apprehension that the partitionist schemes might be thwarted by the return to normal conditions. 13. Despite the provocations, my Govermnent has continued to demonstrate its good will. It has continued to strive for a return to normality and has consistently given concrete proof of its determined wlll to ensure the consolidation of peace, in co-operation with the United Nations Force. Notwithstanding the attitude of the Turkish Cypriot terrorist leaders, 14. Another example of my Government’s attitude tcwards the Turklsh Cypriots is in connexion with the cultivation of the land, and 1 wish in this respect to quote, without any comment of my own, paragraph 123 of the Secretary-General% report: “In general, the Government continued to follow the policy of avoiding any steps that might create unnecessary difficulties and adversely affect the cultivation of land by Turkish Cypriot5.n 15. In reference to the free flow of foodstnffs tc those Turkish Cypriots, who are forcibly isolated in small enclave5 by their so-called leaders, 1 cari only state that no restriction of any kind exists. 16. Regarding the grain trop grown by the Turkish Cypriot farmers and the Government’s attitude on the subject, 1 should like to quote paragraph 130 of the Seoretary-General’5 report, which again is, 1 think, self-explanatory: “At the beginning of May, the Turkish Cypriot leadership asked UNFICYP to ascertain whetherthe Grain Commission would firmly commit itself to buying at subsidised prices the 1965 grain trop grown by Turkish Cypriot farmers. After UNFICYP had discussed the question with the competent Government officiais, the Minister of Finance on 28 May informed the Special Representative ihat the Cyprus Government had authorized the Grain Commission to accept the grainproducedby Turkish Cypriot farmers. The arrangement5 were to be made by the Commission itself. UNFICYP ha5 sponsored discussion5 between the Commission and Turkish Cypriot representatives; as of the date of this report, the talks bave made gnod prcgress. If agreement is reached on the modalities for selling the Turkish Cypriots’ forthcoming wheat and barley crops to the Government at subsidized prices, this may involve Government payments to Turkish Cypriot farmers tctalling approximately 1 million Cyprus pounds. ” 1’7. The reply of the Minister of Finance, referred to by the Secretary-General, is further evidence of tbe wiIIingne5s of the Government of Cyprus to assist the Turkish Cypriot population as much a5 possible. 18. This case, however, serves also tc illustrate the peculiar attitude of the so-called Turkish Cypriot leader5 towards the Cyprus Government. Whenever they feel tbat some substantial benefit may be derived frcm tbe Government, then the Government and its organs are recognized by them. 26. These are but a few illustrations of the attitude of my Gcvernment towards the Turkish Cyprfots and in genersl of the policy followed consistently for a ~C&UIXI to normaiity. What, on the other hmd, bas been the attitude of the Turkish Cypriot leadership? Not only bave they refnsed positively to respond t0 any proposai or measure leading to a return tc normalily, but on the contrary they bave tried tc take advantage of the pacifymg geStureS of my GOvernment, in order to promote their political aims and improve their mflitary positions. A glarfng example is the case of tbe Greek-owned shops in tire Paphos Street, in Nicosia, on the so-cslled green Une. This is described in detail by the Secretary-General in his report. While the Government was engaged in implementing its unilateral military disengagement programme, the Turkish termrists advanced their positions in Nicosia by opening on the rear Of Greek-owned shops holes facing Paphos Street. When the United Nations Force, in tbe proper e!xerCiSe of its functions, attempted for a number of days to inspect those shops, the terrorist leadership resisted such inspection and even questioned UNFICYP’sfreedom of movement and inspection and sought to make this right the subject of conditions and negotiations; this is confiimed in paragraph 20 of the report of the Secretary-General. When tbat clandestine advance by the Turkish terrorists became known-and this happened when a Greek Cypriot shop owner went to visit his property sndwas fired at by a Turkish Cypriot terrorist who was inside that shop-the Govermuent felt obliged to take measures to meet the situation. A restriction on the movemeut in anA out of the socalled Turkish Cypriot sector of Nice .ia was put into effect; it was. however. made lcuowntb~t the restriction would be removed as soon as the UmredNations Force was allowed to move into those shops and as soon as the Turkish Cypriot armed termrists withdrew from those shops. When this was finally aohieved the restriction was immediately lifted. The Govermnent resorted to the measure 1 bave described, much to its regret, but under the circumstances, it bad no alternative than to take tbis action since it decided tc avoid the use of force. 21. A series of incidents in the Ambelikou-Le&s area. in which a number of National Guardsmen were killed or wounded, provide additional examples of the provocative attitude of the Turkish Cypriot terrorists duriig the period under review. The Secretary- General, in the part of his report dealing with these incidents, characteristically states: “The last sucl incident was particularly deplorable. inthat aNational Guardsman was killed on 24 May by a Turkish Cypriol alter tb? enta-Y int0 force of an UNFICYP-arrangec ceatie fim. . . .” [S/6426, para. 77.1 23. The policy of division and self-segregation pursued by the Turkish Cypriot leadership causing great hardships upon the innocent Turldsh Cypriot population has oontinued to tske oonorete expression in the restriction of the freedom of movement of the Turkish Cypriot population by their so-called leaders. The Seoretary-General in his report states: “The Turkish Cypriot leaders bave adhered to a rigid stand against any measures whioh might involve having members of the two communities live and work together. or which might place Turkish Cypriotg in situations where they would bave to acknowledge the authority of Government agents. Indeed, since the TurkishCypriot leadership is committed tophysioal and geographical separation of the communities as a political goal. it is not likely to encourage aotivities by Turkish Cypriots whioh may be interpreted as demonstrating the merits of an alternative policy. The result has been a seemingly deliberate policy of self-segregatien by the Turkish Cypriots. . . .v (IbIb, para. 106.) 24. Tbis statement by the Secretary-General provides, in iny submission, in a few words. the truc picture of the situation in Cyprus today. It provides the answer to the question as to who is responsible for the present situation in Cyprus. Itfurtherprovides the answer to the question as to who is responsible for the sufferings and hardships of a section of the Turkish Cypriot minority. It also provides the answer to the question as to who is responsible for the inabilitv of the United Nations Force to imnlement fully it8 mandate with regard to a return to normality. It provides the answer to the question as to who is responsible for the tension a’iioh prevails from time to thne in Cyprus and especially near the areas controlled by the Turkish Cypriot terrorists. This 26. The Tiirklsh Cypriot leadershlp. in their effort to justify thk? imposition of measures of self-segregation and isolation upon a sesction of the Turkish Cypriot minority, argue that the Turkish Cypricts are sfraid to return to their villages or corne in contact with the Greek Cypriots. But over half of the Turkish Cypriot population live in areas net controlled by the Turkish Cypriot terrorists and they bave no &ar. There is no fear in the minds of those Turkish Cypriots who do not live under the immediate control or “protection” of their leaders. 1s this not something to ponder about? There was no fear for the Turkish Cypriots of the village of Mallia who were welcomed back by the Greek Cypriots in the area wten they returned to their village to harvest their trop. It was alter theyhadcompletedthe harvest that some of them discovered fear in their minds and left their village again. On th’s specific point the Sroretary-General states in his rr>port: “. . . adistinct lack of encouragement by their leadership is prohably net unrelated to the lurkish Cypriots’ failure to resettle in MaIlia” (ibid., para. 155). 26. On the question of the freedcm of movement of the Turkish Cypriots living within the terroristcontrolled enclave of Nicosia, 1 cari again do no better than to quote from the report of the Secretary- General, whioh reads as follows: “Turkish Cypriot leaders continue to exercise effective control over the free movement of memb-ers of their own community. Permits bave to h=s obtained hy Turkish Cypriots who wlsh to travel outside the Waled City of Nicosis, osten&Jcly as a check against abductions by Greek Cypriots. It is reported that Turkish Cypriots are likely to ftnd themselves iz serious difficulty with members of their community if they fail to confine contacts with their Greek Cypriot zompatriots to a strict minimum. Those who obtain permits are expected to retprn to the Turkish quarter immediately upon completing their stated business on the other side. . . .” [m., para. 115.1 27. Intimidation, murder, torture and detention bsve been the methods used for some time now by the Turkish Cypriot leadershtp upon the innocent members of the Turkish Cypriot minority in Cyprus, This bas been done in an effort to pursue the goal of division and in an effort to prove to the. world that Greeks and Turks cannot live together. 1 bave, Urne and time again, stated before this Counci! that Greeks and Tu&s in Cyprus cap. iive together in peace andin barmony, as they bave done in the past and before the partitionist policy of Turkey fostered the notion Of division and hatred. That Greeks and Turks cari live together is more than obvious from alI the reports of tlle Secretary-General submitted to this 25. Turkey, by means of a combination of interna1 sub~eisio~ tbmogb its agents in Cyprus and continueci threats of aggression and invasion. systematically aad continuously undestines ail efforts for a return to r,ormality and frustrates tke possibilities for a peaceful solution. Thés attitude on tbe part of Turkey net only eonstitutes a permanent source of tension and a tbreat to international peaoe, but it ;ilso uad@rmines tb@ possibilities for a peaceful solution. Those uha are undm the impression tbat threats of invasion cotid be useful or effective as a negotiating weapoa, in the particula~ case of Cyprus at least. are completely mistaken. Neither threats, nor force. uiolexme ~OF terrosism could decide tbe issue. The issue of Cypius çan be decided ooly through the United Nations and on the basis of the principles of the United Nations Charter. The criteria for a just and lastiag solution to the pmblem of Cyprus cm be only those which are in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. Tbey are those criteria which are enumerated by the UNted Nations Mediator in bis report. 29. The Utited N~&~S csiteria are the only criteria which cm be applied in the case of Cyprus for ail tbose wbo wish to sec a lasting solution, who wish to see a United Nations solution, who would like to see permanent peace, based on justice, prevail. 30. It is not my intention at the present juncture t0 p into the report of the United Nations Mediator. Dr. Galo Plaza. who. according to the report of the Secretary-General *. . . nmains at the disposa1 of the parties for the continuation of the mediation effort in accordance with the provisions of the Security CoitnCil ITSOlutiOn of 4 March 1964.” [5/64X, para. 181.] 31. My Government’s positive reaction to the report of the United Nations Mediator bas been made kao~n by the relevant statement issued on 8 April 1965. Idy Govenunent. in spite of some reservations it maintains with regard to certain of the views expressed in the report. considers that report as being most constructive aad useful. 32. In conc1usion.I wishto reiterate my Govermnent’s position with regard to the Cyprus problem in a few words. We are determined to continue withourefforts for the preservatioir of peace and the restoration of acmiIality in full CO-operation with the United Nations Force. The solution of the problem of Cyprus oan be based only upon ihe principles of the Charter of the United Nations. T&e future of Cyprus must be left in the hands of the people of Cyprus, who alone cao ProVide, through the free enpression of their Will. a IaSting solution to the Cyprus problem in the interests Of international peace and justice. 35. They bave been conceived and are being beld in the spirit of two neighbours conscious of their responsibilities to each other and to the peaoe of the area in which they live, as well as to the peace of the world. They may help to break the ice and lead to a heginning of understanding and an environment of sanity in whlch, in the words of Shakespeare, “Out of this nettle,” distord. “we pluck this flouer, safety”. 36. It is oui‘ fervent hope that, once a basis of agreement ca” be reached between Greece and Turkey, the same basis oan be extended wtth general consent to bring in all parties concerned SO that a “peaceful solution and an agreed settlement”, as envisaged by the Council in paragraph 7 of its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March. may be realized. 37. It is unfortunate, however. that this faim glimmer of hope is being dimmed by a growing intransigence on the part of the Greek Cypriot Government; we bave just heard an example of this in the words of the Fore@ Minister of the Greek Cypriot régime. Up to now there bad been no shortage of solemn statements by Archbishop Mskarios as to hls unflinchingcoursenamely enosis-in tbe problem of Cyprus. But as a result of political manœuvring, each time he made a declaration of his true intentions, there were those who assumed that such statements were made for home consumption and imputed motives to the author of those declarations which took no account of an overwhelming fanatioal urge. In order to bave a clear record of those intentions and to dispel any doubts as to the meaning of what was facetiously called “unfettered independence” for Cyprus. we put into print a compilation of Archbishop Makarios’ statements on enosis, whioh we shall distribute, if we may. But it has become oot of date even heforepublication, because in the meantime the mask has been discarded and the Archbishop bas corne out into the open with bis expansionist aims. You Will recall the classical statement in which he said-and 1 quote from the Christian Science Monitor of 3 August 1964: “We are not prepared to accept any compromise or make any concession . . . 1 do not believe in the 36. After ‘naving thus spurned any call oftbeSecurity COUD~~~ for an agreed settlement. lie bas now openly made a de&ration abat wkich Tke New York Times of 27 rote the following: ‘In a fiery SWb, rios toM villagers in nortkeastern Cyprus today that the island’s alternatives were union of all1CypmswithGreece ‘ora holocaust’.’ 39. Again from the Christian Science Monitor. of 28 av 1965: “Presideat akarios declared bere eiber all 6yprus is united with Greece. or ths whole island will be bumed in a hoIocaust.x 40. Nevertkeless, we shah continue to hope that these naked threats. these rumblings of thunder. wili mat deafen 0x2 cars of the negotiators wko are exp~oring the patks of peace. 41. The purpose of this meeting of the Council is to pro~oag tke ma e of the Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus. Tke etary-General bas suggested tkat tkis time the prolongation migbt be for six ad of the usual tbree. We bave agreed stion with the prospect that within that t we may see th@ end of tbis menace to to international machinery which t by the reckless venture of the Greek Cypriot leader&@. 42. That being the purpose of this meeting, we had hop& to be spared the usualvituperations,distortions and the double talk about the so-called “terrorists”, wbose activities. it bas agaio just been alleged, are direoted from abroad. Net only the Council but by now the wkole of world public opinion knows who are b b-w krrorists in 6ypms. But 1 suppose tbat was too muck to hope for. Nevertheless. in comnaenting ent report of the Secretary-General, I net bu sentiment but by objectivity. 43. h tke first place. 1 would like to dismiss witb a VS+y few words tke reference which kas ben made to the report of the Mediator. Theposition of my Government with regard to the report of the Ivlediator bas been made quite clear in two communications addressed to the Secretary-General on 31 March and 6 April 1965, which bave beencirculatedas documents S/6267 and Add.ly respectively. Tbat position is not aad camot, under aay circomstanoes, be changed. I should like to reiterate, bowever, thatmy Government continue to support the mediation efforts of the Unit& Nations a8 envisaged under paragrapb 7 of the Security Coumil resolution of 4 March 1964. 44. The Secretary-General% report, in paragraph 2, states that “earlier fears of external attack bave net materialisedR. This non-materialisation of an imay ma.. SuPPkmemenr for npw. May and ,une 1965. “There is no legal or actual foundation for any claim by the Greek Cypriot leadership to be the sole agent responsfble for the defence of the island against an external attack because legally tbis is a question of joint ooncern to both communities. “The Greek Cypriot leaders, while pretending to concern themselves wlth meastires to defend our Republio against imaglnary threats from abroad, bave placed our country under actual forefgn milltary occupation with the expresspurposeofdestroyfng ow independence. . . .‘a [S/6428, para. 2.]5J 45. The report makes it clear that this frequent and indiscriminate invocation of external threat has been seriously curtailing UNFICYP in its efforts to reduce tensions on the island and effectively to prevent the reourrenoe of fighting between tbe two communities. Indeed, the Force Commander and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General bave repeatedly complained, as mentioned in paragraph 16 of the Secretary-General% report, that the Greek Cypriots’ interpretation of “its requirements for external defente was 60 far-reaching as to oover virtually any military measures [they] might choose to tske.” There cari be no doubt that tbis aretext is being exploited by the Greek Cypriots as a convenfent means of furthering their political aims tbrough mflitary measures contrary to the Council’s resolutions. 46. The Council Will recall that early in March 1965, the Greek Cypriots, wfth the same excuse, occupied the territory surrounding the ail Turklsh villages of Lefka and Ambelikou after havinp forcibly brought about the withdrawal of the UNFIBYP unit deployed in that area. The report indicates that the confrontation in this region is such as to make it impossible for UNFICYP to guarantee the prevention of a recurrente of fighting. But in spite of repeated efforts on the part of the UNFICYP Commander within the last three months, the Greek Cypriots bave persistently refused to accept any United Nations recommendation calculated to improve the tense situation. 47. A simflar illegalencroachment onTurkishCypriot rights by the Greek Cypriots is unfortunately shaping very tense and da ous situation Will be created Turlrish CyQriot villagers e made known 50. Another indication tbat les& us to suspect tbat tbe Greek Cypriots are not futerested in a peaceful settleraent and an agrsed solution of tbe problem is tbe steady build-up of Greek Cypriot armedpersonnel on tbe islaud. Tbe information provided in successive reports of the Secretary-General is bath revealing and alaming. In Deoember 1964. tbe number of Greek Cypriot armed personnel organised uuder the name of tbe “Natfonal Guard” stood at 11,200. Tbis figure rose to 14. in March 1965. aud now in June we are beiug told. in paragraph 23 of the Secretary- General% report. that tbe total uumber of conscripts in the BNational Guardn is estiiated at approxbnately 16.000. Tbfs figure is of course supplemented by about 5.000 ful~y armed police and au undetermined nmnber of militia. fn fact, it would uot be iuaccurate to conclude that every Greek Cypriot who oan haudle a fire-arm bas been provided with a guu.irrespective of wbetber be is iuducted in some sort of orgauieed force or not. 51. Perhaps more important than mere numbers is the degres of proficiency and effectivenessattained by the Greek Cypriot armedpersonnel. Tbis extremely important aspect of the military situation on the island is brought to light in a very striking mariner in paragraph 25 wbich 1 find appropriate to quote: “Kt is felt tbat with the acquisition of certain modem -weapons, including armour, and with the g of tbs personnel in tbeir use. the National ha6 acquired a substantial striking power, Wbicb is contiuuously growing in effectiveness. Moreover. the large-soale acquisition of military 52. In oui opinion, this situation constitutes a real setback to the efforts of the United Nations in finding a peaceful solution to the problem. There cari be no doubt that the effectiveness of UNFICYP bas necessarily been reduced in the face of such a force. We bave witnessed examples of thls in the situationaround Lefka-Ambelikou where United Nations forces felt obliged to abandon their positions in view of aggressive deployments of Greek Cypriot forces. Greek positions in this area are in such proximity to the villages that it is physically impossible for UNFICYP units to interpose themselves between the confronting opponents. The natural tendency in such cases, where no authority can be exerted on the strong, is to seek concession from the weak. However, as the Turkish villages in thls region are properly surrounded and there is no place to which the Turkish Cypriot cari withdraw, the situation around Lefka-Ambelikou remains what it was-tense and dangerous. 53. The situation bas not been different in questions concerning the freedom of movement of UNFICYP forces. Several frictions and misunde~standings appear to bave arisen between UNFICYP and the Greek Cvnriots in thls connexion. These bave been cleared up*through patient negotiations, but it is impossible to isnore the fact that each time the Greek Cvnriots bave been able to wrest concessions not enzsaged in the Status of Forces agreement. 54. It .is. we believe. in the light of tbls military and political posture of the Greek Cypriots that the prospects for achieving satisfactory results from UNFICYP’s activities toward a return to normal conditions in the island cari be assessed with some degree of accuracy. It goes without saying that the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriot community would wholeheartedly lend their support to the measures recommended for the reduction of tension, provided an appropriate atmosphere could be created for the enforcement of these measures with reasonable safety and security for the Turkish community. In this connexion. it would be prudent to bear in mind the mobility and strength of the striking force at the disposa1 of the Greek Cypriots, wbich has been SO poignantly described in paragraph 25 of the report. It is obvious that, unless UNFICYP has the capacity to contain effectively any military move that the Greek Cypriots might, at their Will, make in the island, the Turkish community cannot be expeoted to slacken its vigilance. in what we cari describe as their last line of defence. The latest military siege of Nicosia and the present aggressive military designs of the Greek Cypriots on theTurkish village of Mandria provide alarming examples in support of this point. In both these instances, the Greek Cypriots did not feel the slighteatcompunction, in spite of the UNFICYP presence. from takingadvantage of contrived incidents or excuses in order to attempt to extend their lllegal authority over the island. Unilateral measures. while they may afford some temporary relief, cannot be depended upon to 56. Anotber wcrd about tbe incident of the uufcrtuante assassination of Mr. Gavasoglcu, a Turkish Cyprict whc bad been at ail times at tbs mercy of bis Greek Cypriot carnpatriots. Capital hasbeenmade out of that incidant. but I tbink it cari be summed up in a very few words with a reference to the report of the Seoretary-Generaf. in Paragraph 99. wbere it is stated ébat: “it has net been possible to identify tbs perpetrators of this crime, whc remain free from the sanctions of ths law”. 57. In that connexion. may 1 refer the Council to a letter dated 27 April 1965, wblch I addressed to the Secretary-General. enclcsing a communication from r. Kiiçiik, Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus. witb reference tc the Gavazcglcu incident. 1 am net gping to read it, but in it lie suggssts tbat tbere is a police unit attached to UNFICYP and that this unit could be asked to carry out an impartial investigation into the incident. IIe gces cn to say: “The fact is tbat there is no evidence whatsoever as to who is responsible for this killing. but thcse who know the conditions of siege under which tbe Turks live in Cyprus. and thcse wbc bave studied tbe clrcumstances of the incident, wculd bave no difficulty in reacbing the conclusion tbat prcbably the whcle cold-blccded murder was the wcrk of the Greek Cyprict rightist extremists. whc are nctcriously skilled in using violence as an instrument of policy and who are kncwn tc bave kilbd many members of tbeir cwn community in the past for thsir political and ideclcgical views.” [S/6306.]6/ 66. As for the more general question of a return to ncrmal conditions in Cyprus. we believe that there is SocPe for scme prcgress outside the military dePlcyments of tbe two communities, which, for a11 intents and purposes, should at least be frozen in their PreSent situations ncw that bilateral talks between Grssoe and Turkey bave been initiated for thepurpose gPb4d. - 59. The Secretary-General’s report shows that it is the Turkish community that continues to be subject to hardships of a11 kinds. The report is not sparlng in its language when it refers to these onerous hardships-unnecessarily minute searches, confiscations, indelicacy in searching, an economy rendered stagnant, people in Kokkina living in caves without water or electricity, and 80 forth. IL is, therefore, quite natural to expect the Greek Cypriots to match the goodwill of the Turkish community and, in a similar gesture, agree to the institution of freedom of movement on other highways and relax its economic restrictions, which, in most cases, bave been found to be excessivly severe, even according to UNFICYP estimations. 60. A Word must be said about the oft-repeated Greek Cypriot allegation that members of the Turkish community are restricted by their own leaders in their movement in the island. The fact that more than 900 Turkish visitors were trapped in Nicosia when the unexpected siege was clamped down upon the City by the Greek Cypriots on 16 April 1965 should suffice to refute that allegation. The Council Will also recalI the case of Mr. Irfan Suleyman, the Director-General of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance, which was adduced by Fore& Minister Kyprianou in support of this fslse Greek allegation. The members of the Conncil might wish to know that Mr. Suleyman has been penalieed by the Greek Cypriot administration for havlng spoken the truth and embarrassed Foreign Minister Kyprianou before the Council. He was dismissed from the Government Civil Service when ha, like any honourable mari, refused to collaborate with the present unlawful Greek Cypriot administration against the legltimate interests ofhiscommunity. The pressure brought to bear uponMr. IrfanSuleyman in London by the Greek Cypriot administration is related in a communjcation circulated in Security Council document S/6402.u purcb5e.e them locally. is. Greek Cypriots bave notbeen aihw an of certain items undertheparadoxic bey are available in tbe local market. of the Turkish Govemment UNFICPP presence on the icious for tbe consolidation of peacefiA conditions in Cypms and for the creation of càrmmstances mder which an agreed solution to tlm prob~em cari be earnestIy pursued andfound. However, it is bardly possible forme topas6 witbout mentioning tbat already in the course of the last few weeks. we hav& been witwssing the seeds of a very grave criais beiug SO~IR in the Greek Cypriot new~- papers. Frequent reports appearing in the Greek riot bave been urging the present Greek biot istmtian to hold a g.;’ :.-a1 election b&b reek aad Turkiah commun;:ies under a unifi& electoral roll. The term of office of the Br~~ident and Vice-President of the Repubiic as separate cmmnunal electoral rolls. This is the basis of the structure of the Republic of Cyprus and of tbe partnership of the two communities on which the State itSelf is built. It is inconceivable for the Turkish 64. The contents of parsgraph 187 of the report deseme special attention, because of the prominent position it has been given in the “Observations” section of the report. The so-called disengagement programme, cleclared unilaterally by Archbishep Makarios on 21 April, cannot. in our view, be taken as a starting point for any return to normal conditions in view of the realities of the present day military situation in the island. In fact, it cari hardly be said that there was any actual relaxation of the military grip of the Greek Cypriots over Turklsh Cypriot positions, even in the relatively more peaceful40 per Cent area in the south of the island. where the disengagement programme was supposediy put into effect. The contents of paragraphs 51-57 of the report bear this out. It is truc that Archbishop Makarios had declared as the heralù of a mach publicized peace offensive that the Greek Cypriot fortifications in the Paphos, Limasol and Larnaca districts wculd be dismantled. Bowever, this declaration was in fact nuver put into effect and the military encirclement of the Turkish Cypriots in these sectors has nowhere been actually relaxed. On the contrary, the danger posed by a limited number of sand bag fortifications, which had been removed ostentatiously, was replaced, in a greater degree, by the assigoment for permanent duty of mobile armoured patrol units to these areas. 65. ance the outbreak of the hostilities, the Greeks bave practically never bad to maintain any defensive positions anywhere in the island. With a strongmobile striklng force, which they bave built up through the illegal importation of all sorts of armaments, they might not feel in need of fixed ground fortifications. Under these circumstances, a reciprocal dismantling of fortifications would inevitably result in the removal of the Turkish Cypriot defensive positions wlth the consequence that the Torkish Cypriots would be Ieft defenceless and at the mercy of this mobile Greek force supplied with heavy weapons and armaments. In view of the existing imbalance in militazypersonnel and weapons of the two communities. it would be foolhardy for the Turkish Cypriots to think of such mutual disengagement. 66. Real disengagement between the two communities cari only be conceived after a balance in military power is first established through disarmamentunder effective control, As apre-requisite for such abalance. it would be necessary to reduce the armed personnel and the armaments of the Greek Cypriots to the level existing before their December 1963 attackagainst the Turkish oommunity. 67. Another important point to be constantly borne in mind in any disengagement programme is the fact that it was the Greek Cypriots who had embarked upon aggression against the Turkish community for the purpose of depriving it of its legitimate rights and that the Turkish Cypriots had to take measures 68. Nations dant, ment ne peuvent ment dispositif tursue. 69. concerne Sacr&&e Le entretiens Chypre” turoue. nistres et de de de intégrante donc signifie r&mir qui Rtat. été prises, officielles Nous propositions ot commmity. The ‘IMkish Vice- Turkish Cypriot Mnisters of and HeaIth, alto. togetber with Turkish Communal Cbamber. fo~m tbe leadersbip of tlm Türkisb community of Cypms. are an inseparab8e part of the Government n in fwour of appmaches for tbe convening of su& tbe Gaverament. TO mr nnderstanding. tbeir position in this respect as welI as tbeirproposais still SM valid. TO. Before 1 terminate my remarks. 1 would lie to express; on bebalb of my Gwerment, our sineere 6 to the Secretalry-Gemieral andhis collaborators, to tbe ~~rn~~~e~ of the WNFICYP ati to the Special Repmxentatlve of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, as welP as to thoae countries that are contributing to this peace-heeping operation, in human endeavour 8.d financially, for all they bave done and are doing for its succ&ss. 70. voudrais. sinc&rement teurs, et Chypre. l’op&ation hommes et de cette 71. In conclusion, the past ternis of tbe UNFICYP bave proved the failure of tbe Greek Cypriot r&@ne in its persistent attempts to use the peace-heeping force as an instrument in breaking tbe d 7l. mandats mont& faire moyen mimaut est rapport d’une avons Chypriotes ,a the Turlcish community to im . The presmt repart of the Secretaryratifyimg account of that failure. We to the prolongation of the mandate of the ce in full confidence tbat such sinister Greek Cypriot designs Will continue to be foiled.

1 call on the representative of Greece. 72. sentant

As a newcorner to the ty Cwnoil K feel net a little handicapped and rassed in the midst of so many expert col- 72. un nouveau quelque 74. There may. however, be some advantage to a neophyte’s position. For one thing, 1 feel no drawback owing tc past unpleasant verbal exchanges and clashes, nor any sense of disappointment engendered thereby. 1 arn thus inclined to be rather optimistic, and, to be quite frank, my optimism stems primarily from my persona1 recollections of Cyprus, the earliest dating back to the time when 1 was a senior high school student in Nicosis. And these reminiscences. I must add, make it quite difficult for me to grasp the situation obtaining in that lovely island in thepast eighteen months. 1 often wonder how the things we hear cari possibly be truc. 1 keep wondering to what extent certain unfortunate and denlorable incidents bave been and are being exaggeraied. 1 am wondering, too, tbrough what sort of fictitious malevolence thIs untoward situation is still belng kept alive. instead of having conditions revert to normalcy, as one would bave long e%pected and wished. 75. TO be sure, 1 bave the answers to these queries. But 1 think 1 should refrain from setting them fort& as 7 would not wish to glve rise to any lengthy and futile disputation with my old friend and colleague from Turkey, Mr. Orhan Eralp. 1 shall, therefore. confine myself to such remarks as may be useful and constructive at the present stage of the problem. 76. The Security Council is meeting today in a somewhat better atmosphere and with somewhatmore encouraging prospects for the future. Two basic factors bave brought about this new outlook, 77. In the first place, the situation in Cyprus shows signs of improvement. Peace and tranquillity bave generally prevailed in and around the island durhig the quarter covered by the latest report of the Secretary-General [S/6426 and Corr.11. Thanks to the presence of the United Nations Peace-keeplng Force and the continued efforts of the C-prusGovernment, serious incidents bave been circumscribed, tensions are on the decrease, and more or Iess normal conditions bave returned to the greatest pafi of the island Republic. 18. It is regrettable though that the Turkish-Cypriot leadership has net deemed fit to reSpOnd to the Government’s pacification offers and measures. Such a positive attitude would have meant a great deal more progress, as indicated in paragraph 102 of the Secretary-General’s report and in subsequent paragra>hs. This is the more regrettable since it is evident that normalisation is not a one-way affair. TO patch up a difference and restore confidence, a mutual effort by the opposing sides is required and expected, if both are equally conscious of their respective responsibilities. 79. TO give but a strikingexample, it is indeed strange to note that while, as a rule, theTurkish Cypriots are free to move about in the Government-controlled ch queer conditions, it is even nmre of the Nicosia Govermnent tbat it bas accomplisb as rnUCh as it bas in tkle istfng adversities and the limitations e~~~~r~ in the exereise of its autbority. 81. The otber benefificial factor is sn extraneous on@, namely tbe dialogue just ïnitiated betwe@n tbe Governments of Greece ad rkey, and which Will caver wbob? speetmm of Greek-mlrkish relations, il+- problem. Tb.is new Gr cmsistent with the of tbe United Natio ding remarks of bis report [EV6253 and eorr.1~. su sts that a series of meetings be initiat@d, si~~lta~eo~s~y or cmsecutively, atdiierent hvels and among diffewnt groups of the parties concernea. 82, 1 do not intend to discuss Ml-. Galo Plaza% report as it lies ontside tbe agenda of tbis meeting. H camot, bowever, let this occasion pass witbout paying our Mediatar a well-deserved tribute for bis untiring efforts in investigating. analysing and evahating tbe basic eleruents of the problem, and bis courage in stating bis conclusions. Irrespective of our reservations on certain of bis fiudings and viewpoints, Mr. Plaza has our deep gratitude sud appreciation for bis higbly conscientious and hefpful work, and we maintain full confidence and trust in him. 83. In tbe spirit of tbe braad suggestions outlined in bis report, tbe Greek Government, disregarding a series of previoos and r@cent contrarieties and frustrations. agreed witb the Turkish Government to enter intc discussions at the diplomatie level. in order tn review ail aspects of Greek-‘Turkish heMions which bave been adversely affect@d by tbe Cyprus cri&. 84. We approach these discussions in al! good faith sud sincerity and gcodwill, and trust that they Will pave the way to an improvernent of the situation in the whole area and wiD thus promote our ultimate aim wbich is to help ftnd a peaceful solution to the Cyprus question. 85. @ur policy. as clearly defined ou mauyoccasions by my Gcvemment, is based on peace and understandii and co-operation. Our earnest desire is to do our best and contribute our utmost towards a final and lasting settlement of the problem which bas now been pending hefore the Council for almost a year and a half. And we hope and trust that with a similar attitude on the part of our Turkish interlocutors. we may well advance more than halfway towards this goal. May 1 reciprocate, in respect of tbe Turkish representative’s Shakespearisnquotation, by reminding him that “All’s well that ends wellw. 87. It is this noxious outgrowth which is really complicating matters and renders our task difficult. The essentials are ratber simple and easy to tackle, provided one sees them and concentrates on them. May 1, with your indulgence, Mr. President. appeal to the members of the Council. as well as to ail the Members of our Organization who want to see this matter through, to please concentrate on the real merits of the problem. By SO doing, they willbe able to offer concrete and valuable assistance to ail concerned. 88. The essence of the matter is indeedofparamount importance if we are to reach, as we are anxious to, a viable and lasting solution. Past errors and fallacies are still fresh in our minds to guard us against any impractical, inapplicable and unacceptable concoction which is liable to cause more barm than good. After all, anythlng devised or worked out aa a solution must be acceptable to those primarily concerned, the Cypriots themselves, both Greek and Turkish. 89. The task lying before us-and 1 now mean ail of us. including the Cyprus üovernment and the Turkish Cypriots-is still a difficult one. A new impuise must be given to pacification and to a comprehensive return to normalcy, andfurther complementary steps must be taken if the talks in Athens and Ankara are to succeed. SO. On the other hand. it is to be hoped that the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community Will see their way to departing from their present negative sud barren position, and establish contacts with their Greek fellow-islanders with a view to holding meetings and discussions with the Government. Such meetings and talks are absolutely essential and should be started as soon as possible. Localproblems cari best be solved locally, and they will certaiiy find their solution if animosities and antagonisms are set aside and goodwill and co-operation prevail. 91. The very nature of things renders suchadevelopment urgently necessary in Cyprus, and no one needs to be reminded that this is also the normal course of action in democratic experience. Democratic processes usually develop from the bottom upwards and are graphioally represented in the form of a pyramid, tbe apex ‘of which marks the culminalion of joint efforts originating from its base. That is what we should all, 1 am sure, like to see happen in Cyprus soon. 92. Al1 that will require time. On the other hand, from the assessment of latest developments contained 93. It has been the consistent policy of tbe Greek Government ever sine? the Cyprus crisis erupted to put its trust in tbe United Nations. We bave active@ supported aR United Nations initiatives. such as tbe setting up of tbe peace-keeping force and the mediatien maclduery, the appointment of the Secretary- General% Personal Repressntative, and SO forth, h keeping with that policy. my Govemment bas given financial support to UNFICYP in amounts which are far beyond what oould be expected from a small cwntrjr. heavily burdened by the protracted crisis, and greatly exceediig the contribution of another allegedly equally interested, andfarwealthier. w*. 94. In concluding, 1 wish to convsy my Government’s appreoiation to tbe members of the Security Counoil for their continued mtersst in the Cyprus problem and their efforts to heelp tbe cause of order and peace in the islam%. 95. 1 shouhi also ltke to express once again our gratitude to the Secretary-General for his untiring efforts to implement tbe resolutions of tbe Security Council in the interests of international peace and seourity. In that connexion, warm thanks go to his close collaborators. both here and in Cyprus, who bave SO ably discharged tbeir dtfficult and delicate tasks. 96. A particular tribute should, of course. be paid to tbe international Force in Cyprus and to the countries whicb bave made its establishment and maintenance possible by providing military or police units, logistical support and financial contributions. By their attitude and their deeds, these countries bave offered fresh proof of their dedication to the lofty principle of international solidarity. They are aC6Odb3gly entitled to the gratitude net only of my Government but also, I believe. of ail peace-loving nations in the world. 97. Lord CARADQN (United Kingdom): For the reasons set ont in the Secretary-General’s report, my Government accepts the proposa1 that the Cyprus ForCe must continue. Subject to the agreement of tbe other Governments ooncerned, the UnitedKingdom Government supports tbe extension of the mandate. And I ~III glad to be able to say that if so required we Shafl continue to provide our contingent at its eresent strength, and to meet all its costs. Gver and above that, we shall make a further vohmtaq Contribution of $1 million towards the expenses of the Force. 98. We bave noted the Secretary-General’s proposai tbat the mandate might on this occasion bs extended for six months, until 26 Decemher 1965. If the other 99. That is tbe Britisb position in this matter. and tbat is wbat the United Kingdom Government is ready to do to help tbe Secretary-General and the United Nations in carrying out tbis task. We are here today for a limited but essential purpose. It is not the time to deal witb wider issues. But in pledging our further support to tbe United Nations operation in Cyprus 1 wish to make two general comments. 100. A final settlement of the Cyprus problem is still to be fonnd. We trust that tbe United Nations Will continue to play an essential part in tbat urgent quest for understanding and co-operation and peace. We pray tbat tbat effort may succeed and that, in the end, C&rus Will emerge from cwiflict as an example of Concord. The complex diffbulties, and the serious dangers too, persist; but already it is possible to claim that United Nations ad ion, in pursuance of the unanimous decisions of this Council, has been invaluable. 101. TO stand between tbe living and the dead and stay tbe plague: tbat has from ancient times been tbe duty of leadersbip. Tbat has been the bonourable role of the United Nations in Cyprus. And bow well tbat role bas been played. As we see day by day the reports from Cypnis, we see how tbose serving under tbe United Nations flag bave steadily striven by persuasion and conciliation to keep tbe precarious peace tbroughout the island. Tbey bave sbown ontstanding restraint and patience, determination and perseverance, ski11 and courage. We salute a11 tbose participating in tbis enterprise of international endeavour. Tbey have earned the gratitude and tbe admiration of us all. 102. If anyone asks wbat the United Nations can do, if we want an example of bow well tbe United Nations mn act to keep tbe peace, if anyone questions tbe motives and the capacity of international peace-keeping action, the United Nations Cyprns Force provides the answer. 103. My country is proud to be the first to pledge continued support for this United Nations adventnre in peace keeping. 104. The PRES~ENT: The Foreign Minister of Cyprus has asked for the floor for a rigbt of reply. 1 give bim the floor before we proceed to hear tbe next speaker.

1 realize how valuable tbe time of this Council is. otherwise, perhaps, it would have taken heurs for me to reply to the statement made by the representative of Turkey because it seems to me that every single line he has uttered requires aome correction. He has surpassed bis 101. Second, the Turkisb representative said that of tbe report of on. net in Nicosia. but near the I> . . . While UNFICYP has bsen able to keep the CmP r surveillance frcm neigbbourIng hills, wnited ans troops attemptlugto visit the camp”- tbat is to say. the Turkisb Cypriot camp-Whave smce &Iarcb 1965 met with obstruction and threats. h spite of strong pmtests on a numberof occasions t by the Force Commander to Kopbinou. ch he vras assured that the situationwould , tbe fmxlom of movement of tbe Force has from time to tlme continued to be impaired in tbe area.” [S/6426. gara. U.] No further comment is needed on this subject. 108. The Turkish representative took exception to the Cyps Government is dolng its best the defences of the country. but in the experlence of the past the least be could bis view, a conmon affair, and , in part, it lies WIth the Turkish Cypriot leadership aIso, tbat is to say. respcnsibility with regard to the defence of tbe country against external attack. But it is very pecuIiar for the Turklsh representative to corne bere before the Council and indirectly sugg’est tbat the responsibiliiy for the defence of Cyprus, In the Iigbt of a threat of attack from Turkey, should be given. at least in part. to the agent of Turkey in QPrUS. 109. Third, the ‘I’urkish representative spoke of defence fortifications near the village of Ma&ria. IIe told us how serlous the situation is and how the Turkish villa@ of Mandria is in danger. 1 cari assure yotx that no Turkish village in Cyprus is In danger. Tbe fortification in that area is purely for defensive purposes. It would not be proper, 1 think. to say the least, for the Turkish representative to soggest where tbe defence fortifications shculd be erectedin Cyprus. II& Fourth, the Turkish representative objected to the Ides tbat tbe strength of the National Guard in 111. The Turklsh representative spoke of the fortifications and of the disengagement programme of the Government in Cyprus. May 1 quote what he said: “The so-called disengagement programme declared unilaterally by Archbishop Makarios on 21 April cannot. in our view, be taken as a startlngpoint for any return to normal conditions. . ..” Then he. went on to say: “However, this declaration was in fact never put into effect and the military enclrclement of the Turklsh Cypriots in these sectors has nowhere been actually re1axed.v 112. As a reply to this maternent, 1 should like to quote from a paragraph in the report of the Secretary- General: aFollowing the President’s announcement, the majority of National Guard postswereevacuatedand dismantled either immedlately or within a fewdays. The Turklsh Cypriot leader in the town.“-thls was in the case of Larnaca-“unhappily. was unwllllng to reciprocate by dismantllng any fortlfiedpositions around the Turklsh Cypriot quarters. . . .” (S/6426. para. 50.) 113. If you look atthe report of the Seoretary-General in connexion with the other two districts, you Will see again the same story, that tbe dlsmantling took place. But the Turkish representative cornes before you and says that a11 the things that the President has stated. and ail the things that we ail know bave happened in Cyprus, are not trne. What is worse, he says, in fa&, that what the Secretary-General says in his report is not truc. 114. He spoke again of the intention of the Cyprus Government to eliminate sslice by slicev-if 1 took down hls expression correctly-the Turklsh life of the island. We repeatedly bave stated before thls Councll that our intention-l do net think it is proper even to comment upon this remark-is to assist as much as nossible the Turkish aonulation of Cvcrus to live in*peaoe and harmony as ihey did in thepast with their Greek Cypriot compatriots. We are prepared to guarantee huran rights in a mariner in which 1 am sure the Turklsh Government Will not be prepared to do in the case of the minorities in Turkey. We are prepared to bave a United Nations presence in Cyprus, a team of observers to look into this problem and have the right to report to the Security Council. This klud of international guarantee 1 do not think would be acceptable to many CotmtrieS in the world. Cor policy is to prove to the world something in which we believe, something which we 1x8. ~he ~urkish repressntative tried to put the blame of the Kavazoglou mattsr upon tbe sboulders, ~~b~~~y-to be exact in wbat he said-probably. of titi! c&~k eypriiots. NOW. would tbe Greek cypriots kW ~vazcglou. who was working hard for cotbe Mame on somebody else. 116. Mr. Zralp spoke of tbe fresdom of movement of the Turkish Cypriots andallegedtbat ttwas restricted. s are free to move about. position and confirm his as an instance the case of a temporary restriction. about tbat restriction myself before he dtd. The Turks in Cyprus bave freedom of movement. But wbat abwt the Greeks? Ceuld tbe Turkish representative guarantee tbat if tomorrow morning only five Greek Qpriots were to go into the Turkish sector of Nicosia, they uould he safe? Could he guarantee that Government officiais would be able to go into the Turktsh sector of Nicosiaand discharge their functions with regard to land registry and other administrative matters? Could he guarantes that they would be allowed to go into that area? Could he guarantee that any Turkish Cypriot wishing to leave that area could leave it without specific licence from tbe leaders of tbe terrorists? 1 do net think he could guarautee tbat, uor even allege that it could be done; otberwise, again. it would amount to alleging that the Secretary-General is lying in his report. 117. The representative of Turkey spoke of disarmament, and net simply of disengagement and defortification. 1 do not know whether he bas recently attended the meetings of the Disarmament Commission. We are a11 for disarmament. But would Turkey be prepared to bave disarmameut? We cannothavedisarmameut in Cyprus aloue. Wcadd Turkey agree to disarm? Furtlm-more. would Turkey agree to bave the United Nations guarantee tbe integrity of Cyprue, so tbat no Qne might attack Cyprus? No further comment is required on that. either. 118. Be spoke of the Turkish Cypriot leaders, of ‘fCf.%% GAR? and others, as forming part of the le@ nt of tbe country, sud. addressinghimself to a remark by the Sacretary-General, he tried to put this CmWPt into the words of tbe relevant part of 119. “Return to normality” does not mean return to the pre-December 1963 pexiod. A return to normality means a return to normal conditions of llfe in the country. After ail. the Security Council, in its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964,called for a uew solution to the Cyprus problem in accordance withthe Charter of the United Nations. SO, to be quite clear about that, there is no question of the leaders who have started a rebellion against the State comingback into the Government. That is quite definite. 120. The Turkish representative spoke of the intransigence of the leadership, a5 he called it, of the Greek Cypriots in Cyprus, and he referred to my speech as a proof of that intransigence. IIe was speaking in connexion with the possibility of a solution to the Cyprus problem. NO~. what did 1 say? 1 said that the solution tc the Cyprus problem must be basedupon the principles of the United Nations Charter, and 1 said that if the soiution of the Cyprus problem is to be a lasting one. it cari corne about only through the expression of the free Will of the people of Cyprus. 1 do net read any intransigence in that, and 1 do not believe that anyone else at this table would. 121. Finally, the Turkish representative said that the aim of Archbishon Makarios was clear: it is enosis, and the Turkish Government does not like that. 1s it because the Turkish Government dces not Iike the idea of enosis, or is it because the Turkish Government does not like the idea of the union of the whole of Cyprus with Greece? My impression, based upon the most reliable klnd of information a11 through these past eighteen months, is that Turkey would not be against the union of Cyprus with Greece, provided Turkey also gets something out of it. 122. But when we speak of enosis-and we are not attempting to hide anything nor are we afraid to mention anything-we mean that if enosis is the result of the free Will of the people of Cyprus a5 a whole, on the basis of democratic rule accepted everywhere in the world, then enosis is the solution. 1 do not think that anyone cari suggest here that self-determination is good and practical provided that certain solutions are excluded. That is not self-determination. 123. 1 am sorry to have taken your time, Mr. President. 1 have tried to be as brief as possible, although long in a way. 1 could bave taken much more of your time, but 1 value it very much and 1 shall not take more. 124. In conclusion, 1 would say that we rely completely on the United Nations. There bave been and there are talks going on now between Greece and Turkey. If a result of those talke 1s a relaxation of tension in the area, such a result would be welcomsd by us. If, as a result of those talks. there is an immi. T& PRESIDENT: ~gi~thefloorto the representative of Urnguay. the last speaker on my list, who wishes to introduoe a draft resolution on bebaIf d six members of tbe Cwncil. 126. %Ir. VELAZQUEZ (Uruguay) (trauslated from Sptisb): My delegation has made a most carsfuI study of the Secretary-General% report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for tbe pericd Il Marcb to 10 Sune 1965 [S/6425 and Corr.11 especially the conclusions and recommendatlons in chapter VI. 127. We bave nlso listened attentively to the statements just made by the IvIinister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus and the representatives of Greece and Turkey. We bave also noted the statement by tbe Miuister of Cyprus tbat his Government the Secretary-General% suggestionregardii the extension of tbe mandate of the United Nations Force in Cuprus. 128. After consultation wltb other members of tbe Cou&l. tbe delegations of Rolivia, tbe Ivory Coast, Jordau, Malaysia and tbe Netberlands. together wltb my own delegation, bearing in mind wbat appears to be the consensus of tbe Council, bave decided to submit tbe draft resolution which has just been circulated [S/6440]. 129. There is very little chat need be said in introducing tbis draft. In meaning and in wording it is similar to the resolutions previously adopted by Cou&l whenever the question of extending tbe mandate for tlm United Nations Force was dealt with. 130. The draft in tbe preamble takes note of the recommendations in tbe Seoretary-General% report, particularly witb regard totbe advisibility of extending the mandate for a period of sixmontbs. Paragraph 184 of tho report gives sufficiently ciear reasons for granting a longerextensionthanonprevious occasions. I do net thinh 1 need add tbat this represents the maximum time period and tbat me Council would be extremely gratified if tbe objectives pursued by the Force were to be attained before tbe expiry of that period. 131. It also tahes note of eue particnlarly important point, namely, the consent of the Government of Cyprus to tbe continuing presence of UNFICYP in its country% territory. 132. Tbe preamble also repeats the observation in the Secretary-General% report regarding the present situation in tbe island and the significance of the UNFICYP presence. At the same time, the preamble expresses due appreciationoftbeSecretary-General% 133. The operative part of the draft resolutionreproduces tbe corresponding paragrapbs of resolution 201 (1965) of tbe Council. The sponsors bave endeavoured to adbere as far as possible to the text approved by the Council and to avoid reference to anything tbat at this time might give rise to objection or controversy. But, naturally, each of the CO-sponsoring delegations reserves its position regarding the substance of the problem and related matters. 134. The countries 1 bave mentioned which are cosponsoring the draft resolution bave done me the honour of authorizing me on their behalf to recommend this text for the Council% approval. A unanimous vote in its faveur Will be a step towards tbe solution of tbe pmblem, a small step perhaps, but ewrience has show-n that it is only through slow but patient and persevsring endeavour that any lasting results cari be achieved.

The representative of Uruguay has introduced, on behalf of six members oftbe Council, the draft resolution which is now before us, and he bas expressed the hope that tbat contains the consensus-and, ifpossible, theunanimous consensusof the members of the Council. May 1 ask whether any other member of tbe Council wishes to speak on the subject of this draft resolution?

We bave just heard statements by Mr. KyPrianou, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, and Mr. Eralp, the representative of Turkey. The views of the United Kingdom delegation bave been put before the Security Council, and Mr. Vel&zquea. tbe represenmtive of Uruguay, has submitted a draft resolution on tbis question for the Council’s consideration. 137. The position of tbe Soviet Union on the Cyprus question is known to ail. It has been expounded on many occasions in statements by the Soviet Government and its representatives. 1 should like to say that those statements are still valid. 138. We faveur the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and consider it essential to eneure genuine independence andsecurity for Cyprus. The Soviet Union is convlnced that the people of Cyprus, both Greeks and Tu&s, must tbemselves settle a11 their domestic affairs without any external interference. We are in faveur of a peacefui solution to the Cyprus question, and we believe that the implementation of tbe unanimous Security Councii resolution 186 (1964) is essential. extension of the presenoe s tiime for a perlod of Security Council wsolution of 4 Ev¶arcb de@isicn5 of tbe Cauncil on the Cyprus questicm. 143. In vlew of the lateness of tbe bour, 1 shall not insist oa consecutiw interpretatim.

If no other member of the il wlshes to the floor witb regard to tbe resohtion. I we csn pmceed to the vote at 145. If that is agreed, I shll n0w put to the vote the document S/6440, prooast, JOrdau, Malaysia, 146. 2% PRESIDENT: K mm give the floor to tbe representative of tbe United States in expIanation of mte. 147. ME. YOST (Unlted States of America): 1 wish ief comment. My delegation is been able to deal expeditiously ion of the mandate of the United Natims Force in Cyprus. We owe this to the sponsors of the resolution just adopted, who bave acted in timely fashion to express what is clearly the sentiment of tbe entire Council. We are also iudebtedtoday to the principal parties to tbe Cyprus question for their willingness tc accept tbe Secret~-General?3 recommendation t.hat the mandate of tbe Force be extended for a period of six mouths ratber tban tbree. 7.06 (t965). 149. As in the past, my Government is willing tc contribute to the support of the United Nations Force in Cyprus at approximately the level of our prevîous contributions. We hope that the countries which bave generously contributed to the maintenance of this Force in the past Will likewlse continue to do SO and will be joined by others which also wishto demonstrate their support of United Nations peace-leeping.

As no one else wis~.es to speak, we bave now concluded the discussion of this item on our agenda. The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m. HQW TO OBTAJN UNITED NATIONS United Nations publicafions may be obtained disfsibutors throughout the world. write tc: United Notions, Soies Section, ENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS Les publicotions des Notions Unies sont en agences dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous ou adressez-vous 0: Notions Unies, Section COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Los pubiicacioner de las Naciones Unidas cosos disfribuidoros en todas partes del dirijase a: Nociones Unidos, Secci& de IAbo in U.N. Price: $U.S. 0.75 (or equivalent in other