S/PV.123 Security Council

Are there any other comments? If there is no other objection, I take it that the agenda is adopted. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, I do not quite understand your question. I have no objection to the inclusion of this question in the agenda, not however as the question of incidents along the Greek border, as specified in the letter from the representative of the United States, but as an independent question, which in fact it is. I should like to know the opinion of the members of the Council. It seems to me that such a decision would be more correct.

Mter the representative of the Soviet Union made his observations, I asked the Council if there were any comments. I did not receive any comments. That is why I asked if there were or were not objections to the adoption of the agenda. Whether the' matters inscribed on the agenda are old or new, the representatives will be frte to talk about the old incidents or the new problems created by the , 1 The following is the text of the report by the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council concerning the credentials of the representative of Australia on the Security Council (document 8/312): [Original text: English] "Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, I wish to report that I have received a letter dated 27 March 1947 signed by Mr. Paul Hasluck, Counsellor-in-Charge of the Australian Mission to the United Nations, stating that in accordance with instructions received from the Right Honourable H. V. Evatt, A~stralian Minister for External Mfairs, the representative of Australia on the Security Council from 28- March 1947 will be Colonel W. R. Hodgson. "In my opinion, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials." 1 Voici le texte du rapport du Secretaire general au President du Conseil de securite concernant les pouvoirs du representant de I'Australie au Conseil de securite (document 8/312) : [Texte original en anglais] "Conformement a. I'article 15 du reglement interieur provisoire du Conseil de securite, je desire faire connaltre que j'ai re~u de M. Paul Hasluck, Conseiller - charge par interim de la direction de la delegation australienne aupres des Nations Unies, une lettre en date du 27 mars 1947, par laquelle ce dernier declare que, suivant les instructions de M. H. V. Evatt, Ministre des affaires exterieures d'Australie, le colonel W. R. Hodgson representera l'Australie au Conscil de securite a. dater du 28 mars 1947. "A mon avis, cette lettre constitue des pouvoirs provisoires suflisants." Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): I greatly appreciate the kindness of my colleagues in permitting ...

Excuse me. The representative of the Soviet Umon asked to speak on a point of order. I thought you were going to speak on a point of order, and that is why I have to interrupt you and give him the floor. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): Excuse me. I thought the point of order had been decided.

Mr. Gromyko raised it before I asked you to speak. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of. Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I should like to ask the representative of the United States of America whether he insists on this question being considered as the old question relating to incidents along the Greek frontier, or whether he agrees that it should be considered as a new . question. I should 1ik~ to know the opinion of the representative of the United States. At all events, I shall not in any circumstances consider this question as being merely the old question restricted to the border incidents.

The Chair decided this matter, and I do not think I have to, ask the representative of the United States for his interpretation of it. The interpretation was given by the Chair. We have the broadest way of considering new or old matters and of discussing the Greek problem in this Council. 111 . Letter from the deputy representa- tive of the United States to the Secretary-General on the Greek question

I shall now call upon the representative of the United States. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): I greatly appreciate the kindness of my colleagues in permitting the brief postponement of our consideration of the business to be taken up today, in order that I might have a few days in Washington. The United States asked that item 7 of the summary statement .. of matters of which the Security Council is seized, date 21 March,l that is, the Greek question, be placed on the agenda of this meeting.in order that I might make a M. AUSTIN (Etats-Unis d'Arnerique) (traduit de l'anglais): Je suis reconnaissant a mes collegues d'avoir permis ... Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Excusezmoi. Le representant de l'Union sovietique a demande a prendre la parole sur un point d'ordre. Je pensais que vous alliez parler d'un point d'ordre, et c'est pourquoi je dois VOllS interrompre et lui donner la parole. M. AUSTIN (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais):.Je vous prie de m'excuser. Je pen- Sa1f:i que le point d'ordre avait ete regIe. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : M. Gromyko a souleve ce point avant que je vous aie donne la parole. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe) : Je voudrais demander au representant des Etats-Unis d'Amerique s'il insiste pour que l'on examine cette affaire en tant que question ancienne portant sur les incidents a la frontiere grecque, ou si, au contraire, il serait d'accord pour l'examiner en tant que question nouvelle. Je voudrais connaitre l'opinion du representant des Nations-Unis. En tout cas, queUes que soient les circonstances, je ne considererai pas cette affaire uniquement comme l'ancienne question se limitant awe incidents de frontiere. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Il s'agit ici d'une decision presidentielle, et je ne pense pas que je doive demander au representant des Etats-Unis d'Amerique comment il interprete ce point. L'interpretation a ete donnee par le President. Nous avons toute latitude pour examiner les questions anciennes ou nouvel1es, et discuter la question grecque devant ce Conseil. L'ordre du jour est adopte. 111. Lettre sur la question grecque adressee au Secretaire general par le representant adioint des Etats- Unis Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): J'invite maintenant le representant des Etats-Unis a prendre la parole. M. AUSTIN (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): Je suis tres reconnaissant a mes collegues d'avoir autorise un bref ajournement de la discussion qui doit nous occuper aujourd'hui, afin de me permettre de passer quelques jours a Washington. Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis avait demande que le point 7 de l'expose succinct des questions dont le Conseil de securite etait saisi a la date du 21 mars\ a savoir la question grecque, flit inscrit a l'ordre du jour de la pre- My main concern is that the Commission should continue its work, including its investigations along the northern Greek border, until the Security Council itself has disposed of the Greek case. It is aL'So necessary that the members of the Commission, following the preparation of its first report, should come to the seat of the United Nations in order to be available to the Security Council until the termination of our consideration of the Greek complaint. The Commission should be available to prepare such supplementary reports as we may need. It should be ready . to undertake additional investigations, if those are required. The Commission has already been directed by the resolution of the Security Council of 19 December 1946 to "submit to the Security Council at the earliest possible date a report of the facts disclosed by its investigation.m The United States hopes that the first report of the Commission will be prepared and forwarded with all possible speed, following the completion of its present schedule of investigations. Under the Commission's present schedule, it will start preparing this report·in Geneva on 7 April. In northern Greece the snows are melting and winter is giving way to spring. It is reasonable to expect an intensification of the activities of guerrilla bands operating in this area. In this situation the danger of border violations is obviously increased. In these circumstances, the United States believes that it is of the utmost importance that the Commission should leave representatives in the border area, during the time of the preparation of its report in Gene~a and of the Security Council's consideration of its report here in New York. Theserepresentatives would be able to report immediately any violatior... of the border and to furnish the Commission and Security Council with any additional information which might come to light or be needed in dealing with the case.. The presence of representatives of the United Nations on the spot would also inevitably have the effect of stabilizing the situation pending Security Council action. 11 est egalement necessaire qu'apres I'elaboration de leur premier rapport, les membres de la Commission se rendent au siege de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour etre a la disposition du Conseil de securite jusqu'a ce que nous ayons termine l'examen de la plainte presentee par la Grece. La Commission devra se tenir a notre disposition afin de preparer les rapports supplementaires dont nous pourrions avoir besoin. Elle devra etre prete a entreprendre des enquetes suppIementaires, si celles-ci s'averent necessaires. La Commission a deja ete chargee, par la resolution du Conseilde securite en date du 19 decembre 1946, de "presenter au Conseil de seeurite, a la date la plus rapprochee possible, un 1 f · , '1' At '01 rapport sur es alts reve es par son enque e . Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis espere que le premier rapport de la Commission sera acheve et transmis aussi rapidement que possible, sitot terminee son enquete actuelle. Selon son programme 11r-t •• ...1- " actuel, la uomrrllSSlOn uOlt conlInencer a preparer son rapport a Geneve le 7 avril. Dans le nord de la Grece, les neiges fondent et I'hiver fait place au prlntemps. I1 est normal de s'attendre a une intensification de I'activite des guerillas qui operent dans cette region. I1 est evident que ces conditions augmentent les risques de violation de frontiere. C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement des Etats- Unis estime qu'il est de la plus haute importance que la commission maintienne des representants dans la region frontiere pendant le temps necessaire a la preparation de son rapport a Geneve et a l'examen de ce1ui'-ci par le Conseil de securite ici meme, a New-York. Ces representants seraient en mesure de signaler immediatement toute violation de frontiere, et de foumir a la Commission et au Conseil de securite toutes informations supplementaires qui pourraient s'etre fait jour ou qui pourraient apparaitre necessaires pour l'examen de cette affaire. La presence de representants de l'Organisation des Nations Unies sur les lieux aurait aussi pour effet certain de stabiliser la situation en attendant la decision duConseil de securite. 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, Premiere Annee, Seconde Sene, No 28, quatre-vingtseptieme seance. The Government of the United States has a very special and pressing interest in effective action by the Security Council in the Greek case. I do not need to recall to the Security Council the desperate plight of Greece and of the Greek people or the great concern of the United States in preventing its collapse. The story of its tragedy and its danger has been heard three times by this Council. One aspect of the tragedy that threatens ~:::J destroy its freedom and independence is now under active investigation by the Security Council's Com.mi:ssion in northern Greece. Another aspect of the tragedy of Greece, the destruction wrought by the Germans on its economy and its society, has also received the attention of Members and agencies of the United Nations. Without the assistance of UNRRA, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the people of Greece would not have been able to survive after its liberation more than two years ago. UNRRA has furnished Greece with 362,000,- 000 dollars' worth of food and other relief and rehabilitation assistance.. Of this amount, the Unit~d States, upon whose initiative, UNRRA was first brought into existence in November 1943, suppliedsEventy-tw0 per cent, or 260,- 640,000 dollars. In addition, since the liberation, the United States has authorized 181,500,000 dollars in other economic and financial assistance, including Lend-Lease, surplus property; Export-Import Bank loans, and ships and shipping services by the United States Maritime Commission. Most of this amount has been spent or committed. As UNRRA is going out of existence, it will make no further shipments after 31 March. Last month, the United Kingdom Government informed the United States that it would be obliged to discontinue its financial, economic, and advisory assistance to both Greece and Turkey on 31 March. The aid that Greece has received until now has kept the Greek people alive and little more. Greece is still prostrate because the damage to its economy, its system of law and order, and its whole society wrought by the Nazi occupa- Le Gouvemement des Etats-Unis a un interet tout particulier et tres pressant a ce que le Conseil de securite prenne des mesures efficaces en ce qui concerne l'affaire grecque. Je n'ai pas besoin de rappeler au Conseil de securite la situation desesperee de la Grece et du peuple grec, ni le grand interet qu'ont les Etatspuis a empecher son effondrement. Le Conseil a entendu a trois reprises l'histoire de la tragedie de ce pays et des dangers qu'il court. Un des aspects de cette tragedie·qui menace de detruire son independance et sa liberte fait actuellement l'objet d'une enquete par la Commission d'enquete sur les incidents survenus clans le nord de la Grece, nommee par le Conseil de securite. Un autre aspect de la tragedie de la Grece, a savoir les destructions que les Allemands ont infligees a son systeme economique et social, a egalement fait I'ohjet de l'attention des ~.1:embres et des institutions de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Sans l'aide de l'UNRRA, du Royaume-Uni et des Etats-Unis, le peuple grec n'aurait pu survi;rre au lendemain de sa liberation, il y a de cela plus de deux ans. L'UNRRA a fourni a la Grece une somme de 362.000.000 de dollars sous forme de produits alilnentaires et autres secours destines a son re- Ievement. Les Etats-Unis, sur l'initiative desquels l'UNRRA a ete creee en novembre 1943, ont fourni soiXante-douze pour cent de cette somme, soit 260.640.000 dollars. En outre, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis a autorise, depuis la liberation, l'allocation d'une somme de 181,500.000 dollars sous forme d'as- -sistance econornique et financihe, englobant le Pret-Bail, les stocks excedentaires, Ies prets de l'Export Import Bank, les navires et les transports assures par la Commission maritime des Etats- Unis. La_majeure partie de cette somme a ete depensee ou fait l'objet d'engagements. L'UNRRA, qui est sur le point de disparaitre, ne fera plus d'envois apres le 31 mars. Le mois dernier, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni a informe les Etats-Unis qu'il serait contraint de fairc cesser, a partir du 31 mars, son aicle financiere, economique et consultative a la Grece camme a la Turquie. L'aide que la Grece a re~ue jusqu'ici a permis au peuple grec de survivre, mais guere davantage. La Grece est encore dans un etat de prostration dli a la gravite des dommages infliges par I'occupation nazie a son economie~ a son Turkey has asked the United States for financial assistance at various times during the months preceding the notification by the United Kingdom that it would be forced to discontinue its economic and advisory assistance on 31 March. "The United States provided Turkey with 95,- 000,000 dollars in Lend-Lease assistance during and immediately after the war, but has been unable to act upon the recent requests. On 12 March 1947, the President of the United States proposed to Congress a programme of assistance which he believed would result in meeting the immediate requirements of Greece and would materially contribute to that country's economic and political recovery. It would also pemrit the extension of financial and - advisory assistance to help meet the needs of Turkey. On 18 March 1947, legislatic was introduced in the Congress of the United States whit-h, if approved, may give legislative sanction to .speci..4Je proposals based upon the recommendations of the President. The Congress of the Urnted States now has the proposed legislation under active consideration. The Government of the United States, as the President and Congress have fully demonstrated, believes that the whole world should be fully 1.'rlfonned of the acts, motives, and purposes of the United States. The proposed programme has been presented in public. The COIl11'r~tteesof Congress are hold.. ing public hearings~ during whkh the proposals are being submitted t·] the most close and careful examination. The programme will have been fully and exhaustively debated by Congress and the whole American people, before Congress takes final action. Congress must m...ke the decision. In accordance with Article 102 of the Charter, the United States Government will immediately register with the United Nations for publication by the Secretary-General copies of agreements connected with the execution of this programme which may be entered into between Greece and the United States or between Turkey and the United States. The proposed programme of assistance has a specific and direct bearing upon the central objectives of the La Turquie a demande, a diverses reprises, l'aide financiere des Etats-Unis au cours des mois qui ont precede l'av~rtissement par lequel le Royaume-Uni se declarait contraint d'interrompre son assistance economique et consultative a. la date du 31 mars. Les Etats-Unis ont faurni 95.000.000 de dollars a. la Turquie sous forme de Pret-Bail pendant la guerre, et immediatement apres la fin des hostilites, mais ils n'ont pu acceder aux recentes demandes de ce pays. Le 12 mars 1947, le President des Etats-Unis a propose au Congres un programme d'assistance qui, a son avis, permettrait de subvenir aux besoins immediats de la Grece et contribuerait sensiblement au relevement economique et p"olitique de ce pays. Ce programme permettrait egalement d'etendre a. la Turquie l'assistance financiere et consultative pour raider a. faire face ases besoins. Le 18 mars. 1947, le Congres des Etats-Unis a ete saisi d'un projet de loi qui, s'il est approuve, donnera une sanction legislative aux propositions concretes fondees su.r les recommandations du President. Les mesures Iegislatives proposees font actuellement l'objet de l'examen du Congres des Etats- Unis. Comme le President et le Congres l'ont c1airement montre, le Gouvernement des Etats- Unis estime que lemonde entier devrait etre pleinement infonne des actes, motifs et objectifs dt'-'3 Etats-Unis. Le programme propose a ete presente en seance publique. Les Commissions du Congres tiennent des seances publiques au cours desquelles ces propositions sont soumises al'examen le plus approfondi et le· plus attentif. Le programme aura ete discute d'une tnaniere complete et detaillee par le Congres et par le peuple arnericam tout entier avant que le Congres ne prenne des mesures definitives. C'est au Congres qu'il appartient de prendre la dec~ion. Conformement al'Article 102 de la Charte, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis communiquera immediatement a I'Organisation des Nations Unies, aux fins de publication par le Secretaire general, la copie des accords qu'il pourra conclure avec la Grece ou avec la Turquie pOilr mettre ce programme a execution. Le programme cl'assistance envisage est lie de fa~on directe et precise a1'0bjectif essentiel de la poHtique exterieure des Etats-Unis: renfo:rcer 1'0:r- The proposed programme of assistance by the United States is directly related to the act of the United Nations in creating a Commission of Investigation. Armed bands are defying authority in northern Greece and threatening the integrity of the State. On the one hand, the activities of these bands have helped to make the threat of economic chaos and political anarchy throughout Greece so grievous and imminent that Greece has found it necessary to call upon the United States for immediate economic and advisory assistance, in order to maintain the very e.xistence of the Greek State. On the other hand, the situation on the frontiers' is made far more dangerous by the economic paralysis and weakness inside Greece. The United States believes that it is of the highest importance that the United Nations should take further action towards meeting the urgent problems confronting Greece, as it ghould for any other country that may find itself in similar circumstances. I have already indicated certain methods of operation which, in our opinion, would make the work of the Commission of Investigation more effective. I do not anticipate in any way the substance of the report of the Commission. Yet it is apparent that the Security Council may wish to conSider, after receipt of the report, such further action as recommending that Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania agree on a system of border control regulations, and that a continuing commission made up of representatives of mf.mbers of the Security Council be established. This commission could employ neutral observers to keep constant watch for any violations of frontier regulation agreed upon. The commission could be authorized to act under Article 33 as an agency for the peaceful settlement of those disputes among the four countries arising from border difficulties. Action along these lines by the Security Council, combined with the proposed emergency programme ol. assistance by the United· States, would advance the prospects of peace and security in that part of the world. Neither action would be as effective if taken alone, for these are complementary, not conflicting proposals: one to keep watch over areas where actual disturbances occur, the other to strengthen Greece sufficiently to maintain internal order, and to :restore to its people hope and confidence in its future· as a free people. Without such measures, Le programme d'assistance propose par les Etats-Unis est directement lie a la creation, par 1'0rganisation des Nations Unies, d'une Commission d'enquete. Des bandes armees defient l'autorite dans le nord de la Grece et menacent l'integrite de l'Etat. D'une part, l'activite de ces bandes a contribue a donner un caractere si grave et si urgent a la menace de chaos economique et d'anarchie pnlitique suspendue sur toute la Grece que ce pays a estime necessaire de demander aux Etats-Unis une aide economique et consultative immediate en vue de maintenir l'existence meme de l'Etat grec. D'autre part, la paralysie et la faiblesse economiques a l'interieur de la Grece rendent beaucoup plus dangereuse la situation sur les frontieres. Les Etats-Unis estiment qu'il est de la plus haute importance que 1'0rganisation des Nations Unies prenne de nouveUes mesures pour resoudre les problemes urgents auxquels la Grece doit faire face, comme elle devrait le faire a l'egard de tout autre pays qui se trouverait en pareille situation. J'ai deja indique certaines methodes de fonctionnement qui, a notre avis, donneraient plus d'efficacite aux travaux de la Commission d'enquete. Je n'anticipe nullement sur le fond du rapport de la Commission. Toutefois, il semble que le Conseil de securite voudra peut-etre, quand il aura re~!lle rapport, recommander que la Grece, la Yougoslavie, la Bulgarie et l'Albanie se metten.t cl'accord sur un system~ de surveillan.ce des fronticres, et qu'une commission permanente, composee de representants des membres du Conseil de securite, soit creee. Cette commission pourrait faire appel a des observateurs neutres charges de veiller a ce qU'il ne se produise aucune violation des regIes de surveillance des frontieres qui auraient ete adoptees. La commissionpourrait etfe autorisee aagir, en application de l'Article 33, en qualite d'institution char- . gee du reglement pacifique des differends entre ces quatre pays, provoques par les incidents de frontieres. . Une action en ce sens du Conseil de securite, s'inserant dans le programme d'assistance.urgente propose par lesEtats-Unis, favoriserait l'etablissement de la paix et de' la securite dans cette region. Aucune de ces mesures n'aurait la meme efficacite si elle etait prise seule, car'il s'agit de propositions compIementaires, et honcontradictoire~: rune a pour objet de surveiller les regions ou ~.:: produisent les incidents, l'autre, de donner a. la Grece la.puissance suffisante pour maintenir son ordre interieur et rendre a son peuple confiance et espoir en son avenir de peuple libre. The United States desires to collaborate in peace and equality with all nations. It does not desire to dominate, intimidate, or threaten the security of any nation, large or small. The United States will SUppOlt collective security for all nations, large as well as small. The United States respects, of course, the right of all Members of the United Nations to follow whatever way of life or system of government they choose, so long as the choice is freely made without intimidation, and so long as such nations do not interfere with the rights of other countries or the liberties of other peoples. The foregoing aspects of the situation in Greece and their bearing on collective seLurity are of special interest to the Security Council. There are other aspects of the situation of equal importance to the maintenance of peace in this area, which are the special concern of other organs of the United Nations and its related specialized agencies. The programme of economic assistance contemplated by the United States is of an emergency and temporary character. The United States believes that the United Nations and its related agencies should assume the principal responsibility, within their capabilities, for the long-range task of assistance required for the reconstruction of Greece. The United States gave its full support to the emergency relief programme conducted by UNRRA, to which I have already referred. United States officials also participated fully in drawing up 6e recommendations for long-range assistance to Greece made by the mission to Greece of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Among the recommendations made by the Food and Agriculture Organization was the following: "It is recommended that the Greek lLes aspects de la situation en Grece que je viens de rappeler et leur repercussion sur la securite: collective presentent un interet particulier pour le Conseil de stcurite. La situation presente d'autres aspects d'importance egale pour le maintien de la paix dans cette region, mais qui relevent specifiquement d'autres organes de 1'01'- ganisation des Nations Unies, et des institutions specialisees qui s'y rattachent. lle programme d'assistance economique qu'envisagent les Etats-Unis a un caractere provisoire et repond a un cas d'urgence. Les Etats-Unis estiment que l'Organisation des Nations Unies et ses institutions connexes devraient, dans la lirnite de leur competence, assumer la principale responsabilite en ce qui concerne le programme d'assistance a longue echeance que necessite !a reconstruction de la Grece. Les Etats-Unis ant accorde un appui sans reserve au programme de secours d'urgence, mis sur pied par l'UNRRA, dont j'ai deja parle. D'autre part, les autorites americaines ont pleinement participe a I'elaboration des recommandations relatives a un programme d'assistance a longue echeance a la Grece, presentees par la mission envoyee dans ce pays par 1'0rganisation l'alhnentation et pour l'agriculture des Nations Unies. Au nombre des recommandations presentees par l'Organisation l'alimentation et pOUf l'agriculture figure la recommandation suivante: "Il A further recommendation is that the Greek Government apply to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or to other public financial agencies for a loan of at least a hundred million dollars for reconstruction and development purposes.2 The International Bank is not yet. ready to begin its loan programme, but it soon will be. Greece has not yet appealed to the United Nations for financial assistance. There is a reason for this. Greece may now be in 'such a bad financial and economic condition that it could not qualify as a good credit risk for bank loans. However, Greece has indicated that it will apply later on. Emergency and temporary economic assistance of the kind the United States is considering may improve its economic and financial condition sufficiently to qualify Greece for reconstruction and development loans, such as recommended in the FAO report. These loans could be for the financing of such projects as irrigation and power development, the rehabilitation of transport, the modernization and development of agriculture, and the reconstruction and development of industry. The United States strongly supports the use of United Nations machinery for such purposes. The FAO report also suggests that the Greek Government request the Economic and Social Council to arrange for a continuing United Nations advisory mission to Greece, in connexion with such a long-range programme. The creation of such a mission, if requested by the Greek Government, would be a constructive step for the United Nations to undertake. The United States attaches particular importance to the establishment this week by the" Economic and Social Council of the Economic Commission for Europe. The United States has given the fullest support to the establishment of such a commission ever since it was first con- I See "Report of the FAD Mission for Greece", March 1947, Recommendation 3. page 5. Il est egalement recommande que le Gouvernement hellenique demance it. la Banque internationale pour la reconstruction et le developpement, ou it. toute autre institution financiere publique, un pret de cent millions de dollars au minimum, destine a la reconstruction et au developpement2• La Banque internationale n'est pas encore prete a entreprendre l'execution de son programme de prets, mais le sera bientot. La Grece n'a pas encore demande l'assistance financiere de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Il y a une raison pour cela. La Grece peut se trouver actuellcment dans une situation economique et financiere si mauvaise qu'elle ne puisse presenter de garanties suffuantes pour obtenir des emprunts bancaires. Toutefois, la Grece a indique qu'elle presenterait une demande en ce sens it. une date ulterieure. Une assistance economique exceptionnelle et temporaire telle que celle qu'envisagent actuellement les Etats-Unis ameliorera peut-etre suffisamment la situation economique et financiere de la Grece pour que ce pays presente les garanties suffisantes pour obteni" les prets de reconstruction et de developpement envisages dans les recommandations qui figurent dans le rapport de rOAA. Ces prets pourraient etre affectes au financement des plans de developpement du systeme d'irrigation et de la production d'energie, de reorganisation des transports, de modernisation et de developpement de l'agriculture, de rt:construction et de developpement ,de l'industrie. Les Etats-Unis sont nettement favorables a l'idee d'utiliser le mecanisme de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour atteindre ces fins. Le rapport de l'OAA suggere egalement que le Gouvernement hellenique demande au ConseJI economique et social de maintenir en Grece une mission consultative de l'Organisation des Nations Unies qui assurerait l'execution de ce pro-. gramme alongue echeance. En creant cette mis. sion, si le Gouvernement hellenique en demande la creation, l'Organisation des Nations Unies prendrait une mesure vraiment constructive. Le Gouvernement d("~ Etats-Unis attache une importance particuliere Cl. la creation par le Conseil economique et social, cette semainede la Commission economique pour l'Europe.'Lt'.8 Etats-Unis ont accorde un appui sans reserve a l'etablissement d'une telle commission des le These, however, are long-range programmes. They cannot meet the present emergency. It is by combining national and international action of both immediate a.'ld long-range character, and aimed both at the security and economic aspects of the problem, that the Members of the United Nations can advance the cause of collective security. President Truman's message to Congress comprehended more than Greece and Turkey, when he spoke of conditions in the world affecting the security of the United States through the insecurity of the world. He declared the situation in Greece and Turkey to be one of the factors of insecurity, and pointed out the various requirements for restoration of stability. Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis donne, par sa politique actuelle, une impulsion aI'Organisation des Nations Unies, et le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis ainlerait voir d'autres Membres de I'Organisation manifester un interet analogue, et donner leur appui a cette politique. Nous serons . heureux quand viendra le moment ou l'Organisation des Nations Unies pourra assumer ces charges. C'est pourquoi il est important que l'Organisation s'interesse activement a toutes ks mesures necessaires pour retablir la stabilite, pour decourager et prevenir les menaces d'agression de toutes sortes ou les menaces contre l'independance de l'un de ses Membres, et pour permettre aux peuples d'accroitre ieur bien-etre et de rehausser leur dignite. The United States is giving momentum to the United Nations by its present policy, and it desires and welcomes corresponding interest and support from other Members of the United Nations. We look forward to the time when such burdens may be carried through the United Nations. Therefore, it is important that tlle United Nations should take an active interest in all that is required for the re-establishment of stability, to discourage and prevent threats of aggression of any kind, or threats to the independence of a fellow Member, and to afford its people an opportunity to enhance its welfare and dignity. I have discussed the matter in the broadest terms, Mr. President, because of the deep interest which the Government and people of the United States have shown in the Greek problem. Since you live among us, you are of course awa.re of the intensity of our democratic debate and the keen desire of our people to see the United Nations grow in authority and confidence. We now have directly before us in the Security Council one aspect of the problem. I am certain that my colleagues will agree that it is of the greatest importance that we make proper use of our Commission of Investigation·and take the steps most likely to result in a rapid and impartial consideration of its findings and recommendations. Il s'agit la, cependant, de programmes de longue haleine, qui ne peuvent repondre a ce cas d'urgence. C'est en combinant une action nationale et une action internationale, a la fois immediate et a longue echeance, portant en meme temps StU' les deux cotes du probleme, le cote securite et le cote economique, que les Membres de l'Organisation poun-ont faire progresser la cause de la securite collective. Dans le message qu'il a adresse au Congres, le President Truman visait plus que la Grece et la Turquie quand il a parle des conditions dans le monde qui, du fait de l'insecurite generale, affectent la securite des Etats-Unis. n a declare que la situation en Grece et en Turquie etait l'un des facteurs d'insecurite, et indique les diverses conditions requises pour retablir la stabilite. J'ai discute la question de la fac,;on la plus large, Monsieur le President, en raison du profond interet que le Gouvernement et le peuple des Etats-Unis manifestent a l'egard de la question grecque. Vivant parmi nous, vous vous rendez pleinement compte du caractere intense de nos debats dem.ocratiques et du vif desir de notre peuple de voir se developper l'autorite de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et la confiance qu'elle inspire. A l'heure actuelle, le Conseil de securite est saisi d'un des aspects du probleme. Mes collegues, fen sum certain, conviendront qu'il est de la plus haute importance que nous tirions le meilleur parti de notre Commission d'enquete, et que nous prenions les mesures les plus susceptibles d'aboutir rapidement a l'examen impartial de ses conclusions et recommandations. My colleagues may prefer to study the views I have expressed, before any further discussion of the Greek question. I am willing to resume now the consideration of the ite.lll on trusteeship. However, a meeting for discussion relating to the work of the Council's Commission of Investigation in northern Greece should be held at an early date. T'ne PRESIDENT: If there is no other speaker on this point, we will pass on to item 3 of our agenda. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) : We have heard the statement of the representative of the United States of America on an impctant question. For my part, as the representative of the Soviet Union, I should like to study that statement further and to touch upon the question raised in that statement at the next meeting of the Security Council devoted to the discussion of this question. I think it would be a good idea to decide when we shall meet again to discuss this question.

With regard to the suggestion of the Soviet Union representative, I have consulted the new President whom we shall have next Monday. I think we can hold that meeting next Wednesday at 3 p.m. Mr. PARODI (France) (translated from French): In view of the importance of the statement made by the United States representative, I should be glad if we could have a little longer to study it; I would suggest that we might leave· next week free for that purpose, postponing our next meeting to the beginning of the following week. •

I am in a very difficult position, for I am called upon to give a ruling on a date which conceI'Iis the next President. However, I do not believe that there will be any objection to hplding that meeting on Wednesday, because we shall have many speakers and shall require more than one meeting in order to give every speaker an opportunity to speak. Mter the meeting on Wednesday, the new President will set another date. Mr. LANGE (Poland): If the majority of the Council feels that we should take up this item on Wednesday, I shall not object. However, in principle, I should like to associate myself with the representative of France, who has requested that this question should be taken up at a somewhat later date, because I think that the state- Mes collegues prefereront peut-etre etudier les vues que j'ai exprimees, avant de poursuivre plus avant la discussion de la question grecque. Je suis pret a reprendre maintenant l'examen du point relatif a la tutelle. Toutefois, il faudrait tenir, a une date rapprochee, une seance pour discuter des travaux de la Commission d'enquete sur les incidents survenus dans le nord de la Grcce. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Si aucun autre orateur ne desire prendre la parole sur cette question, nous passerons au point "3 de notre ordre du jour. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe) : Nous avons entendu la declaration du representant des Etats- Unis d'Amerique sur une question importante. Quant a moi, en ma quaIite de representant de l'Union sovietique, je voudrais etudier cette declaration de plus prcs, et c'est au cours de la prochaine seance du Conseil de securite consacree ala question soulevee dans cette declaration, que je voudrais en discuter. Il serait bon, me semblet-il, de fixer la date a laquelle nous nous reunirons pour discuter de nouveau cette question. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): A propos de la suggestion du representant de l'Union sovietique, j'ai consulte le President qui doit entrer en fonctions lundi prochain. Je pense que nous pourrions tenir cette seance mercredi prochain a 15 p.eures. M. PARODI (France): En raison de l'importance de la declaration qui a ete faite par le representant des Etats-Unis, je souhaiterais que nous ayons un delai un peu plus long pour l'etudier et que nous disposions de la semaine prochaine, la seance etant remise au debut de la semaine qui suivra. Le PRESIDENT (traduit del'anglais): Je me trouve dans une situation tresdifficile, car j'ai a prendre une decision sur une date alaquelle mon successeur m'aura remplace a la presidence. Toutefois, je crois que personne ne s'opposera a ce que cette seance ait lieu mercredi, parce que plusieurs membres voudront prendre la parole et qu'il nous faudra tenir plus d'une seance afin de donner a chacun la possibilite d'exprimer spn avis. Apres la seance de mercredi, le nouveau President fixera une autre date. M. LANGE (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais): Si la majorite des membres du Conseil estiment que nous devons examiner cette question mercredi, je ne m'y opposerai pas. Mais, en principe, je me rallie a l'opinion du representant de la France qui a demande que l'examen de cette question soit repris un peu plus tard,car, a mon

The Chair does not want to force the representatives to meet on Wednesday and to speak on the same day. I merely wish to suit the convenience of all the representatives. I shall ask the next President if he will agree to the postponement of this matter for a week. Mr. Quo Tai-chi (China) : Yes.

The representative of China, who will be the President of the Security Council next week, agrees to po.stpone the meeting on this question planned for Wednesday; another date will be fixed. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Would not Friday of next week suit the representatives of France and Poland? If not, and if this does not allow sufficient time, I am prepared to agree to our returning to this matter the following week. Would Friday perhaps be a convenient day for them? Might not a week be considered a sufficiently long period for the study of this question? Colonel HODGSON (Australia): Mr. President, I should prefer your original ruling which was to leave the matt;::r to the next President. As I see it, there is a request for consideration of this statement by the various representatives, because it raises very important questions which have to be considered by our Governments. I, for one, want to telegraph this fully al1.d obtain the views of my Government. For that reason, I should prefer that the next discussion on this should take place not next Friday but the week after.

With the concurrence of the new President, I shall set a date for the next meeting on this question by taking an average of all the suggestions which have been made. I shall set the date of that meeting for one week from Monday. I wish to say that I could not agree that we should meet next Friday, because of the respect I have for the religion of many countries and many people in this country who observe next Friday as Good Friday. We shall now pass on to the next item on our agenda. 112. Continuation of the discussion of the draft trusteeship agreement for the former Japanese mandated islands

I now invite the representatives of Canada, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the Philippine Republic to sit at the Council table. . Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): n n'est pas dans mes intentions d'imposer aux representants de se reunir mercredi et de prendre tous la parole ce jour-la. Je desire simplement adopter la solution qui convient le mieux a tous les membres du Conseil. Je vais demander au nouveau President s'i! accepterait de remettre a huitaine l'examen de cette affaire. M. Quo Tai-chi (Chine) : J'accepte. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le representant de la Chine, qui sera President du Conseil de securite la semaine prochaine, accepte de differer la seance qui avait ete prevue pour mercredi et une autre date sera fixee. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du fusse) : La date de vendredi prochain ne conviendrait-elle pas aux representants fran~ais et polonais? S'ils estiment ce delai trop court, je suis pret a accepter que nous revenions a l'etude de cette question la semaine suivante. Peut-etre vendredi leur conviendrait-il? Peut-etre une semaine leur suffirait-elle pour etudier la question? Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Monsieur le President, je prefererais votre premiere decision qui laissait au nouveau President le soin de regler cette question. Si je comprends bien, on demande que les differents representants puissent etudier cette declaration, parce qu'elle fait surgir des problemes tres importants qui doivent etre examines par nos Gouvernements. Pour ma part, je veux envoyer a mon Gouvernement un telegramme detaille et connaitre son~avis sur la question. C'est pourquoi je prefererais que la discussion reprenne, non pas vendredi prochain, mais la semaine suivante. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): D'accord avec le nouveau President, je fixerai la date de la prochaine seance alaquelle sera poursuivre l'examen de cette question, en tenant compte de toutes les suggestions presentees. J'en fixerai done la date alundi en huit. Je tiens adire que je ne saurais accepter que nous nous reunissions vendredi prochain, par respect pour la religion de nombreux pays et d'une grande partie de la population des Etats-Unis pOUl" lesquels vendredi prochain est Vendredi Saint. Nous allons maintenant passer au point suivant de notre ordre du jour. 112. Suite de la discussion du proiet d',accord de tutelle sur les iles anterieurement sous mandat iaponais Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : J'invite maintenant les representants du Canada, de l'Inde, de la Nouvelle-Zelande, des Pays-Bas et de la Republique des Philippines a prendre place a la table du Conseil. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): Since the question of the future of Japanese mandates first arose in the Security Council,l the Australian Government has desired to make certain that the proposal of the United States to assume strategic trusteeship of these islands is endorsed by the nations which have made substantial contributions to victory over Japan. On the merits of the question, the attitude of Australia has Llever been in doubt. Over and over again, the Australian Minister for External Affairs, the Right Honourab~e H. V. Eva,tt, has indicated that Australia supports the proposal to make the United States the sole and exclusive trustee over these island territories, which were gained at such sacrifice by the United States and its Allies. I want to make it clear at the outset that the Australian Government, for its part, has consistently supported and now warmly supports, in the interests of peace and security, the control and administration by the United States of the Japanese mandated islands, and is in accord with the view that the United States should continue de facto administration. The method of securing the United States objective which was proposed to the Security Council by Australia as most just and democratic, was to approve the proposed agreement, but to postpone its operation. until the successful belligerent nations had met together formally for the making of a peace settlement with Japan. This attitude was adopted by Australia, not for the purpose of delaying the question of disposing of the islands, but solely for that of maintaining the vital principle that all terms of what may fairly be called "the final settlement with Japan" should be approved not by a few nations only, but by all the nations which contributed to the overthrow of this enemy with substa.ntial military forces. These nations included some which are not members of the Security Council. The position has been materially altered since the proposal was first made by the Australian Government. The Security Council has agreed to Ausl:ralia's suggestion that the nations which fought against Japan should be admitted to the Security Council itself, for the purpose of stating their views on the United States trusteeship proposal. The result of this will be to expand the Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Depuis que le Conseil de securite a ete saisi de la question des lles anterieurement placees sous mandat japonais1, le Gouvernement australien a voulu s'assurer que les pays qui ont largement contribue a la victoire sur le Japon approuvent la proposition par laquelle les Etats- Unis demandent a etre charges de la tutelle sur ces lles pour raison d'interet strategique. En ce qui concerne le fond de la question, I'attitude de I'Australie n'a jamais prete aaucune equivoque. A maintes reprises, le Ministre australien des Affaires exterieures, M. H. V. Evatt, a indique que l'Australic appuie la proposition visant aplacer sous la tu.telle exclusive des Etats- Unis ces territoires que les Etats-Unis et leurs allies ont conquis au prix de si grands sacrifices. Je desire preciser des l'abord que le Gouvemement australien a toujours soutenu, et continue a appuyer chaleureusemennt la these selon laquelle, dans I'interet de la paix et de la securite, les Etats-Unis doivent avoir le droit exclusif du controle et de l'administration des lles anterieurement sous mandat japonais; il partage egalement l'opinion que les Etats-Unis doivent continuer de facto aadministrer ces territoires. Suivant la methode que l'Australie avait propose au Conseil de securite d'adopter, comme etant parfaitement equitable et democratique, pour realiser I'objectif des Etats-Unis, on devait approuver le projet d'accord mais attendre,' avant de I'appliquer, que les pays belligerants qui ont participe a la victoire se soient officielIement reunis pour etablir le traite de paix avec le Japon. L'Australie avait adopte cette formule, non pour retarder toute decision sur le sort de ces lles, mais uniquement pour faire respecter le principe fondamental selon leque! tous les pays qui ont contribue ala defaite de cet ennemi avec des forces armees importantes, et non·pas seulement un petit nombre de nations, doivent approuver toutes les dispositions de ce qu'on peut appeler a juste titre "le traite definitif avec le Japon". Or, certains de ces pays ne sont pas represerttes au Conseil de securite. La situation a sensiblement change depuis le jour ou le Gouvernement australien a presente sa proposition. Le Conseil de securite a accepte la proposition de l'Australie demandllllt que les pays qui ont participe ala Iutte contre le Japon soient admis au Conseil afin d'exposer leursvues sur la proposition des Etats-Unis relative a la tutelle des lles. Cette decision a pour consequence This being so, the Security Council is now in a position to ascertain whether it would be in accordance with the wishes of the belligerents against Japan that the proposal of the United States should, in principle, be adopted. For these reasons, and in the interestn of a unanimous decision, Australia has decided not to press the proposal to amend the draft agreement by adding an article 17. Therefore, having regard tl) the Security Council's approval of Australia's desire to widen the representation of nations before this Council so as to include all the nations which contributed with military forces in the war against Japan, and also to the belief that the Council so enlarged and broadened will fully endorse the United States proposal, my instructions are to support it. Pour ces raisons, et afin de permettre au Conseil de prendre une decision unanime, l'Australie a decide de ne pas insister pour que l'on adopte la proposition tendant a. modifier le projet d'accord en y ajoutant un article 17. C'est pourquoi, tenant comp~e du fait que le Conseil de securite a accede au desir de l'Australie d'elargir la composition du Conseil, afin que tous les pays qui avaient engage des effectifs militaires dans la guerre contre le Japon. y soient representes, et convaincu, d'autre part, que le Conseil ainsi elargi acceptera sans reserve la proposition des Etats-Unis, fai re~u l'ordre d'appuyer cette proposition. M. AUSTIN (Etats-Unis d'~1Jlerique) (traduit de l'anglais) : Les Etats-Unis sont tres sensibles a. la bienveillance dont fait preuve a. notre egard le Gouvernement de l'Australie; nous sommes particulierement heureux qu'en retirant l'amendement propose, il declare genereusement appuyer notre proposition, et renouvelle une affirmation dont les Etats-Unis Iui ont toujours ete reconnaissants, bien que la discussion ait ete parfois vive entre nous, a. 'savoir que, pour sa part, le Gouvernement australien n'a pas cesse de preconiser que, dans l'interet de la paix et de la securite, les Etats-Unis soient charges de la tutelle des iles anterieurement placees sous mandat japonais, et a repete a. plusieurs reprises qu'il desirait voir les Etats-Unis continueI' a. administrer ces lies de facto. Voila. un exemple"de la force de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Cette declaration a ete faite a. un moment particulierement bien choisi pour inspirer confiance en l'Organisation. Le geste de l'Australie· est bien conforme aux principes et aux objectifs de l'Organisation. C'est ainsi qu'on fait du bon travail. Apres une longue discussion tres animee, ouchacun s'est exprime libre!llent, une declaration comme celle du representant de l'Australie devrait sans aucun doute susciter un renouveau de confiance chez ceux qui ont eprouve certaines inquietudes au sujet de 1'01'- ganisation des Nations Unies, et leur prouver qu'elle peut prendre des decisions unanimes. Je desire remercier le Gouvernenient austra- . lien pour les services rendus par M. Hasluck ql.Ji a constamment defettdu sa cause avec beaucoup de ~ompetence, de courtoisie, et d'efficacite. Je pourrais en dire bien davantage, mais il me semble que ces paroles suffisent pour prouver que les Etats~Unis sont reconnaissants au Gouvernement australien d'avoir retire son amendement. M. VAN KLEFFENS (Pays-Bas) (traduit de l'anglais): Maintenant que tous les pays qui ont Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): The United States greatly appreciates the good will of the Australian Government, and is especially gratified that the withdrawal of the proposed amendment is accompanied by such a generous statement of support and a repetition or something which, though the debate has at times been heated, the United States has never failed to appreciate: namely, that the Australian Government, for its part, has consistently supported, in the interests of peace and security, the administration by the United States of the Japanese mandated islands as trustee, and that it has repeatedly said it wished to have the United States continue the de facto administration of those islands. This is the type of strength which exists in the United Nations. This declaration comes at a uniquely appropriate time to lend confidence to the United Nations. This act is one consistent with the policies and principles of the United Nations. This is doing things. Mter a full, free, and rather warm debate, to hear such a declaration" as that which was mfl.de by the Australian representative should certainly give anyone who has been a~ious about the United Nations renewed faith in its ability to reach unanimous agreement. I wish to thank"the Australian Government for the very distinguished services of Mr. Hasluck, who constantly advocated its cause with great ability, courtesy, and efficiency. I could say much more, but it seems to me that I have said enough to show that the United States appreciates the act of the Australian Government 1..11 withdrawing this amendment. Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Nethedands): Now that all the nations which fought against Japan I should like to say that we are very glad to see recognition so readily given to the right of my country to take part in the discussion of a question in which it has a vital interest. In its narrower sense, this is a discussion on the future of the islands formerly administered by Japan under the League of Nations mandate; but in a broader sense, it is one of the several aspects of the much wider problem of assuring peace 'in the Pacific. From both points of view, the Netherlands is vitally interested. We cannot forget that we were attacked in the Indies by Japanese forces operating from the Mandated Islands, in flagrant contradiction of the tern1S of the mandate. Moreover, we know now from cruel experience what it meant to us when the peace of the Pacific was first disturbed. We take a broad view of this matter, and far from confining ourselves to the immediate future, we also wish to take into account the longterm aspect of the great problem of·.avoiding war in the Pacific. In both respects, the proposal that trusteeship of the islands formerly under Japanese mandate should be conferred upon the United States of America has our unreserved approval. If there is any country which may be deemed immune from aggressive tendencies in the real sense of that term, in the light both of the past and of the present, it is the United States, and we feel completely certain that the United States will for ever deserve the trust we are ready to give it. With regard to certain amendments that are still, I understand, on the table, I hope to be given an opportuIlity to state our view when the time comes, should there be any need to do so. Sir Carl BERENDsEN (New Zealand): Mr. President, I wish in the first place to express to you, and through you to the members of the Council, the New Zealand Government's very warm appreciation of the invitation to be represented at this meeting which has been extended to it in application of the principle established in Article 31 of the Charter, not only because of geographical continguity, but, in particular, by reason of our full participation in that great struggle for freedom, order, and justice which has just been concluded. We in New Zealand regard ourselves as directly concerned in all consequent territorial dispositions, especially those in the Pacific area, Je tiens a ajouter que nous sommes tres heureux que 1'0n ait reconnu aussi rapidement aux Pays-Bas le droit de participer a la discussion d'une question qqi presente pour eux un interet vital. D'un point de vue restreint, la presente discussion porte sur le sort des lies administrees autrefois par le Japon en vertu d'un mandat de la Societe des Nations; mais, d'un point de vue plus large, cette question n'est qu'un des nombreux aspects du probleme infiniment plus vaste qui consiste a assurer la paix dans le Pacifique. A quelque point de vue que 1'0n se place, la question touche aux interets vitaux des Pays-Bas. Nous ne pouvons oublier qu'en contradiction flagrante avec les termes de leur mandat, les forces japonaises nous ont attaques aux Indes neerlandaises, en prenant les TIes sous mandat comme bases d'operations. De plus, une cruelle experience nOU8 a maintenant appris la signification que revetait pour nous la premiere .violation de la paix dans le Pacifique. Nous envisageons cette question sous un angle tres large et, ~oin de nous en tenir al'avenir immediat, nous desirons tenir compte egalement de l'aspect lointain du probleme important qui consiste a eviter la guerre dans le Pacifique. De ces deux POiiltS de vue, nous approuvons sans reserve la proposition tendant a confier aux Etats-Unis d'Amerique la tutelledes lies precedemment placees sous mandat japonais. S'il y a un pays que 1'0n ne peut accuser d'avoir des tendances agressives au sens veritable du mot, en raison ala fois de son passe et de son attitude actuelle, ce sont bienles Etats- "[Jnis, et nous sommes 'parfaitement convaincus qUl'ils se montreront toujours dignes de la confiance que nous sommes prets aleur accorder. En ce qui concerne certains amendements dont, je pense, le Conseil est toujours saisi, j'espere qu'il nous sera permis, si le besoin en apparait, de formuler notre point de vue au moment opportun. Sir Carl BERENDsEN (Nouvelle-Zelande) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je voudrais d'abord, vous exprimer, Monsieur le President, et par V0i:£e intermediaire exprimer aux membres du Corlseil, les remerciements chaleureux du Gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Zelande pour l'avoir invite ase faire representer a cette seance en vertu du principe etabli al'Article 31 de la Charte, non seulement a cause de sa position geographique, mais en raison sortout de l'entiere participation de mon pays a la grande lutte pour la liberte, l'ordre et la justice, qui vient de se terminer. La Nouvelle-ZClande estime qu'elle est directement interessee a toutes les modifications territoriales qui en resultent, particulierement dans la region du Pacifique, et qu'elle a le droit de I wish to make it very clear, at the outset, that the New Zealand Government has no thought of opposing, or indeed of obstructing the substance of the United States proposal now under consideration by the Security Council. On the contrary, we fully and cordially ena 'rse the principle that the administration of the former Japanese mandated islands should be entrusted to the United States. But the New Zealand Government considers that the disposition of these islands is an essential part of the plan for the control of Japan, an essential part of the peace settlement for that country, and that it is th.erefore a matter of interest to all those States which took an active part in the war against Japan, States which, in our view, should be adequately consulted in all phases. It is the view of the New Zealand Government that no disposition of these islands can be final until it is endorsed by the terms of the peace settlement~ It is our desire to have the United Nations continue the association establish~d by the League of Nations with the ex- Japanese mandates, :md to see the United States installed as the administering Power in those islands. We explicitly take no objection to the action of the United States Government in submitting draft terms to the Security Council, or to the conclusion of a trusteeship agreement with respect to those islands in advance of the peace treaty. At ,the same time, while any arrangements thus made will no doubt remain undisturbed, they cannot, in the view of the New Zealand Government, become final until the formal completion of a peace treaty in which Japan renounces any rights in those islands which it may still consider itself to possess, either as one of the principal allied and associated Powers in the First World War to which Germany renounced the islands, or as exercising on behalf of the League of Nations a mandate in terms defined by the Council of that League. Those are the facts as they are seen by the New Zealand Govemment; I state them as such, and am making no issue of the matter whatever. Turning now to the text of the draft trusteeship agreement for this area as propounded by the United States Government, I desire in the first place to express the New Zealand Government's appreciation of the courtesy extended to it by the Government of the United States in . communicating to it the text _of the Ucited States proposals, in connexion with which I am instructed to make the following very brief corn- ~ents. _ In article ~, we should prefer to see the deletion of the words as an integral part of the ~ant au nom de la Societe des Nations un mandat defini par le Conseil de cette derniere. Voila le point de vue du Gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Zelande. J'expose les faits tels qu'ils sont, et je ne cherche pas du tout a en faire une question pretant a discussion. En ce qui conceme.le texte du projet d'accord de tutelle relatif a cette region, tel que l'a propose le Gouvemement des Etats-Unis, je desire, d'abord, au nom du Gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Zelande, remercier le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'avoir eu la courtoisie de lui communiquer le texte des propositions des Etats- Unis, au sujet desquelles je suis charge de faire quelques brefs commentaires. Al'article 3, nous prefel'erions que l'on supprimat les mots comme partie integrante des During the discussion of this matter in the Fourth Committee,2 the representative of the United States, Mr. Dulles, expressed his dislike for this phrase, which was then, as now, included in the proposals made in respect of the Japanese mandated islands by the United States Government. But I understand from press reports, since I have not had the advantage of attending earlier discussions on this subject by this Council, that the United States Government has now agreed to withdraw this phrase. If that is the case, I have nothing more to say on this aspect, except to explain that I have raised the matter generally in order to express the views of my Government. In article 6, we would in general support a proposal, which I understand has already been made, to insert after the term "self-government" the words i1~ accordance with Article 76 b of the Charter of the United Nations. We are not clear as to the exact implications of the words "local government" in that draft article, and should prefer a wording similar to that contained in article 5 of the Western Samoan Agreement; namely, the government of the territory. In paragraph 1 of article 8, we gravely doubt the desirability of retaining the phrase except the administering authority, which appears to us to go too far and to provide for the administering authority an unnecessarily privileged position in the Trust Territory. We have some apprehension also regarding the effect of the provisions of article 13 as now proposed, which again seem to us to go unnecessa.rily far. In this connexion, it would be our sugg-estion that the Security Council should be notified and, if possible, given reasons whenever any area is closed. I thank you, sir, and the members of the Council for the opportunity of presenting these views on behalf of the New Zealand Government. ~nres avoir examine les declarations faites a. ce propos, le Gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Zelande a accepte de supprimer ces mots de l'accord relatif au Samoa accidental, tout en soulignant qu'il serait peut-etre necessaire de les maintenir pour d'autres territoires differemment situes - point de vue ulterieurement adopte par l'AssembIee generale1, quand elle a approuve certains accords de tutelle dans lesquds figurait ce membre de phrase. . Au cours du debat qui s'est derouIe sur cette qut',stion au sein de la Quatrieme Commission2, le representant des Etats-Unis, M. Dulles, a declare qu'il n'aimait pas cette expression qui figurait clors, comme maintenant, dans les propositions du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis relatives aux lies anterieurement placees sous mandat japonais. J'apprends par des communiques de presse, car je n'ai pas eu l'avantage d'assister aux discussions qui se sont prtkedemment deroulees au Conseil a. ce sujet, que le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis a maintenant accepte de supprimer ce membre de phrase. S'il en est ainsi, je n'ai plus rien adire acet egard, sinon que j'ai simplement souleve cette question pour exprimer les vues de mon Gouvernement. Pour l'article 6, nous appuierions, en principe, une proposition qui, semble-t-il, a deja. ete faite, tendant a. inserer apres les termes "la capacite a s'administrer eux-memes", les mots conformement al'Article 76 b de [a Charte des Nations Unies. Nous ne comprenons pas tres bien la portee exacte des mots "gauvernement local" dans ce projet d'article, et nous prefererions une redaction semblable a. celle de l'article 5 de l'Accord relatif au Samoa Occidental, a. savoir, le gouvernement du territoire. Nous doutons fortement qu'il sait u~ile de mamtenir, au paragraphe 1 de l'article 8, I'expression autr-e que l'autorite chargee de ['administration qui, a. notre avis, va trop loin. et semble accorder des privileges non justifies a l'autorite chargee de l'adtninistration dans le Territoire sous tutelle. Nous eprouvons aussi ouelques craintes au sujet des consequences que peuvent avoir les dispositions de I'article 13 actuel qui nous semblent egalemer..t aller trop loin. A ce propos, nous estimons que chaque fois qu'une region est interdite; on devrait avertir le Conseil de securite et, si c'est possible, lui en indiquer les raisons. Je vous remercie, Monsieur le President, ainsi que les membres du Conseil, de m'avoir permis de vous presenter les vues du Gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Zelande. 1 Voir les Documents officiels de la deuxidme partie de la premiere session de l'Assemblee generale, soixante et unierne et soixante-deuxieme seances plenieres. • Ibid., Quatrieme Commission, vingt-sixie~e et vingtsett~~ent in the Pacific, even though they may not all be intimately famTar with the details of all phases of that settleme1:.~_ The Canadian Government is satisfied that Japan did not properly fulfil the terms of the mandate which was assigned to it. As a cor!Sequence of the war, Japan no longer exercises its mandatory authority. The Canadian Government is further of the opinion that no country could more fully and appropriately discharge the responsibilities involved in the administration of the former Japanese mandated islands than the United States. The Canadian Government is also confident that the adminintration of these islands by the United States will promote peace and security in the Pacific area. The action of the United States, as the de fiu:to administering Power in the islands, in placing this draft trusteeship agreement before the Security Council, is welcomed as an evidence of the growing strength of the structure of international co-operation provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. In the light cf its general interest in this subject, the Canadian Government has also examined the text of the Ucited States draft trusteeship agreement. It considers that this agreement is adequate in the present circumstances for protecting the interests both of the United Nations and of the inhabitants of the islands. However, we are hopeful that, as the system of trusteeship agreements develops and possibly more articles are added in the present agreement, wider provision will he made for international supervision under th~ trusteeship clal.;lses of the Charter. Finally, the Canadian Government is pleased to observe the general measure of approval the agreement has received, and, b th~ light of the present situation, it wannly shares in this iilpproval. T~l.ltefois, au fur et amesure que le systeme d'accords de tutdle se developpera (et pent-ctre alors sera-t-Orl ;J;:)'l ~ne a ajouter de nouvelles clauses au pres~~n' ",,\;co;,J.), nous esperons que ron fera une ph ,3 grande place it la surveillance int~L'­ nation.:l.le prevue par les dispositions de la Charte concernant 'le regime de tuteIle. Le Gouvernement du Ca!1ada est heureux de constater que le projet d'accord a ete generalement bien re~u et, dans les circonsta!lces at:tuelles, il est pret it lui donner? lui aussi, son appui chale1Jre~, . I understand that, this afternoon, the Australian delegation has withdrawn the amendment that it proposed, with regard to subjecting this draft agreement also to the consideration or approval of the peace conference which will deal with the questions relating to Japan. Notwithstanding that, and particularly having regard to the observations made by the representative of New Zealand this afternoon, I feel that I Should make a few observations regarding this question on behalf of my Government. During the debates on this question at previous meetings which I had the honour of attending, the proposal was put forward that, even though this agreement may be approved by the Security Council, effect should not be given to the agreement unt1l the peace conference regarding Japanese territories had taken place and until that question had been settled. There are two arguments put ferward to support this_view. I shall dispose of the first argument, which is related to a possible approval or concurrence by Japan that the territories under mandate should be transferred with its approval. It was suggested that under international law, though Japan had been defeated and these territories were under the de facto possession ot another Member State, there were implications in the acceptance of the mandate by the Allied Powers which necessitated Japan's concurrence in the transfer of the mandate. I do not want to enter into any elaborate Je ne veux pas examiner dans le detail les discussion of the law involved in the subject. points de droit que souleve cette question. Mon My Govel1lIhent does not feel that international Gouvernement ne pense pas que le droit interlaw calls for such a course. Taking th(: view that national requiere une semblable procedure. n Japan had certainly violated the mandate many estime que le Japon a certainement viole le manyears ago, that it fortified and mad'~ strategic dat depuis de nombreuses annees, qu'il a fortifie positions of these islands, contrary to the proles lies et en a fait des positionSstrategiques, visions of the mandate which it accepted at the contrairement aux dispositions du mandat qu'il time, my Government has no hesitation in comavait accepte a l'epoque; eest pourquoi mon ing to the conclusion ~nat, de jure, Japan has Gouvernement n'hesite pas a conc1ure qu'en lost control of the mandated territories. There droit, le Japon a cesse d'exercer son autorite sur is no question that, de facto, it has lost control les territoires sous mandat. n est incontestable of the mandated territories. But, apart from que, de facto, il n'exerce plus son autorite sur ces these questions wmch parties to international territoires. Mais en dehors de ces questions que law may raise, I feel that law can be very pepeuvent soulever des Etats auxquels s'applique le dantic, and that this very pedantry can somedroit international, je crois que le droit peut times bring law into contempt. I feel that this tomber dans le pedantisme academique, ce qui is one ofthe cases where any such interpreta~on •. risque parfois de le discrediter. A mon avis, nous of international law, and pcuticularly the appliavons la un des cas ou, en interpretant le droit cation of that interpretation to obtain the posiinternational de cette maniere, et 5Urtout en mettive consent of Japan to the relinquishment of tant en pratique une telle interpretation pour who:.tever rights it, may have over these manobtenir du Japan qu'i! consente expressement a dated territories, would be so contrary to cornabandonner les droits qu'il pr-ut detenir sur les . Le representant de rAustralie a, cet apresmidi, retire son amendement visant a soumettre egalement le projet d'accord en question a l'examen ou a l'approbation de la conference de la paix qui s'occupera des problemes re1atifs au Japon. Malgre le retrait de cet amendement, et surt'Out apres les observations que vient de faire le representant de la ~ouve1le-Z61ande,j'estime qu'il y a lieu pour moi de formuler, au nom de mon Q.ouvernement, quelques remarques sur la question. Au cours des debats qui ont eu lieu a ce propos lors des seances precedentes auxquelles j'ai eu l'honneur d'assister, il a ete propose de ne pas mettre l'accord en vigueur, meme s'il etait approuve par le Conseil de securite, tant que la conference de la paix relative aux territoires japonais ne se serait pas reunie et que !a question n'am3it pas ete reglee. Deux arguments ont ete presentes a l'appui de cette these. J'ecarterai le premier, qui a trait a l'eventualite de l'approbation ou du consentement du Japon au transfert des territoires sous mandat. On a fait remarquer qu'en vert'u du droit internation?II, bien que le Japon ait ete vaincu et que k" territoires en question soient devenus la possession de facto d'un autre Etat ]/i~inbre,le fait pour les PlUssances alliees d'avoir accepte le mandat les l)blige a obtenir l'accord du Japon pour efl'ectuer le transfert de ces territaires. We are members of the peace conference. India is represented there; India has the right of discussion there, and more than that, it has the right of vote. At this table we are here by courtesy, the Council having granted our request to allow lis to be present and to take part in the discussions under Article 31 of the Charter. But we are very conscious of the fact that we have no right to vote, that only our observations can be advanced at this table, and that the decision must ultimately rest with the eleven members of the Security Council. Notwithstanding that fact, my Government has no hesitation whatsover in coming to the conclusion that, the matter having been brought before the Security Council, it would not be either right or proper that any agreement approved by the Security Council should either be further approved by the peace conference or that its coming into force should be deferred until the peace conference has decided on this question. The proposal that the operative part of this agreement should not come into effect until tile peace conference has looked into it virtually means that the peace conference should sit in judgment on what has been accepted by tIle Security Council. Theoretically--and I believe the representative of the United Kingdom was forced to admit that fact-the peace conference has the right to say that it does not approve of this agreement. But I cannot conceive of such an anomalous situation as one in which any group of Powers, however big or strong, should have the right to say that they do not approve of an agre;ment after an organ of the United . Naltions, and such an important one ag the Security Council, has come to ;';, conch-lSion. It is a derogation of the United NaticIDl a:nd a derogation of the Security Council in particula.r • My Government fully intends to f\u.PPI)!t the United Nations in every respect, belieTJing that Man vouvernernent a l'intention de donner tout son appui a l'Organisation des Nations On behalf of my Government, I want to say distinctly that, though we have a vote in the peace conference whereas we have no vote here, our interest in the United Nations, our respect for the dignity, strength and power of the United Nations is such that we have no intention of accepting that proposal. Indeed, we are happy that the United States delegation has brought this question before the Security Council, and we fully support the proposal that this draft agreement should be approved by the Council. I have only a few remarks to make at this, stage with regard to the various articles of the draft agreement. I do not follow the precedent set by the Netherlands representative, and I ven- . ture to make these observations here and now, for two reasons:· first, because I do not want to have my voice heard at this table on more occasions than I can help; and secondly, because my voice has to be heard elsewhere more frequently. I turn again to article 3, to which the representative of New Zealand referred, and to the words "as an integral part of the United States". I understood at the last meeting of the Council that the United States representative was agreeable to having those words de1eted.1 I should like to congratulate the United States representative and to thank hLTIl for readily accepting the deletion of those words. In coming to article 6, I l1nderstand also that the suggestion that was made by the Soviet delegation that the words "or independence" should be inserted after the word "self-government" was accepted by the representative of the United States. Therefore, I have no comment, except to thank the representative of tLe United States for accepting those words. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): Mr. President, permit me to make clear the position of the United States on that. Those words were conditionally accepted. That is, they were qualified by some such language as: "in accordance with Article 76 b of the Charter of the United Nations". Another method of han- Au nom de mon Gouvernement, je tiens a declarer nettement que, bien que nous ayons le droit de vote a la conference de la paix alors que nous ne l'avons pas ici, l'interet que nous prenOllS a I'Organisation des Nations Unies et notre respect pour la dignite, la force et la puissance de cette Organisation sont tels que nous n'avons pas la moindre intention d'accepter cette proposition. Nous sommes heureux que la delegation des Etats-Unis ait porte cette question devant le Conseil de securite, et nous appuyons vivement la proposition tendant a faire approuver par le Conseille projet d'accord en question. Je n'ai, pour le moment, que quelques remarques a presenter sur lq;s differents articles du projet d'accord. Je ne suivrai pas le precedent cree par le representant des Pays-Bas, et prendrai la liberte de presenter ces observations des maintenant pour deux raisons: d'abord, je ne tiens pas a me faire entendre a cette table plus sou~ ~...ent qu'il n'est necessaire, et, ensuite, je suis appele a prendre la parole plus frequemment ailleurs. En ce qui concerne l'article 3, mentionne par le representant de la Nouvelle-Zelande, et en particulier les mots "comme partie integrante des Etats-Unis", j'ai cru comprendre qu'ala derniere seance du Conseil\ le representant des Etats-Unis avait consenti ales supprimer. Je voudrais le f6liciter et le remercier d'avoir accepte si volontiers la ~uppressionde ces mots. Passant a l'article 6, je crois egalement que le representant des Etats-Unis a accepte la proposition du representant de rUnion sovietique, tendant a inserer les mots "ou l'independance" apres les mots "capacite a s'administrer eux-memes". Je n'ai donc rien a dire a ce propas, sinon que je remercie le representant des Etats-Unis d'accepter cette insertion. . M. AUSTIN (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): Monsieur le President, permettezmoi de preciseI' la position des Etats-Unis sur ce point. L ... yts que nous a cites le representant de I'In6, :»?:.t ete acceptes sous condition, a savoir, que leur signification soit defurie par une expression. comme: ."conformement a l'Article As regards paragraph 1 of article 6, my Government also shares the difficulty t.~at the representative of New Zealand mentioned regarding its understanding of the words "in local government". Local government sometimes means only municipal government. This is so in many countries. I do not know whether the intention of the United States representative is to emphasize that participation will be permitted only in municipal government. I hope that all !hat is intended is that palticipation will be' permitted and development thereof will be brought about in the government of the territories concerned. I wbuld suggest, therefore, that the word local might be deleted in that paragraph of article 6. We now come to article 8. This article suggests that no discrimination should be made among Members of the United Nations, regarding commercial or other matters dealt with in connexion with this Trust Territory, but it ends with the words "except the administering authority": That is I to say that, except for the administering authority, all Members should be treated equally. I "am quite aware that, in the commentary which it has furnished, the United States Government has said that there is no intention of taking advantage for its own benefit of such meagre and almost non-existing resources and oppOltunities as may be found in these scattered and barren islands. We are quite aware that these scattered and barren islands have no resources at all; at any rate, no known resources. I do not see any insidious intention in the suggestion advanced by the United States delegation that an exception might be made in its own favour. But I should like to point out very' earnestly that this would be a very bad precedent for other trusteeship agreements. 'Ne are fu:ily. accepting the position that the. United States has not the least intention of exploiting these territories; in fact, there is nothing to exploit in these territories and it would be ridiculous to think of any exploitation of mineral .or any other resources in a land which is so poorly populated, so barren, and otherwise so badly situated, and which is of value purely for strategic reasons. But I venture to En ce qui conceme le paragraphe 1 de l'article 6, mon Gouvernement, comme le representant de la Nouvelle-Zelande, eprouve qudque difficulte a comprendre les mots "au gouvemement local". Le gouvernement local ne designe parfois que l'administration municipale. C'est le cas dans de nombreux pays. Je ne sais pas si le representant des Etats-Unis a voulu souligner que les habitants ne pourront participer qu'a l'administration municipale. J'espere qu'on se propose seulement de permettre aux habitants de participer de maniere croissante au gouvernement des territoires en question. Je suggere done de supprimer le mot local dans ce paragraphe de l'article 6. Pas-sons maintenant a 1'a.-rticle 8. Cet article indique qt"'il ne faut faire aucune distinction entre,Ie'3 Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en ce qui conceme les questions commerciales ou autres qui se posent apropos du terntoire sous tutelle. Il se termine toutefois par leli mots: "autre que l'autorite chargee de l'administration". Cela signifie qu'en dehors de l'autorite chargee de l'administration, tous les Etats Membres devront etre traites sur un pied d'egalite. Je sais tres bien que, dans le commentaire qu'il a presente, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis a declare n'avoir nullement l'intention de se reserver les re.~ources et les possibilites tres faibles, presque inexistantes, qui peuvent se trouver dans ces lIes dispersees et arides. Nous savons parfaitement que ces lIes ne possedent aucunes ressources; du moins, pas de ressources connues. Je ne vois, dans la proposition des Etats-Unis, aucune intention insiclieuse d'obtenir qu'une exception soit faite en leur faveur. Mais je tiens beaucollp a souligner qu'une telle excep" tion constituerait un tres facheux precedent pour d'autres aeem'ds de tutelle. Nous reconnaissons pleinem,~);.t qu~ les Etats-Unis ne se proposent nullemc!): d\:xpki;~r ces territoires: en fait, il n'y a rkxJ ? exploiter dans ces territoires, et il serait ridi(\lk <~,; penser a exploiter des ressources minieres ou autres dans un territoire aussi peu peupIe, aussi aride, et, d'autre part, auS!i mal situe et sans aucune valeur autre que strategique. Mais, a mon avis, le cas present constituerait un precedent facheux pour les accords de tutelle a venir et, si un pareil privilege est accorde da.ns le I therefore join in the appeal which has been made by other representatives that this phrase should be deleted from article 8. There is one other article to which I should like to make referenc~, article 13. We welcome the inclusion of this article, and we feel sure that the provision regarding the exclusion of strategic areas will not unduly limit the operation of Articles 87 and 88 of the Charter, which have been specially referred to in this article. Finally, I should like to state that we welcome the lead that the United States delegation has taken in this matter in bringing forward this proposal and in suggesting that this territory might be treated as a Trust Territory. This marks -and I do not know whether it has been sufficiently emphasized-a change brought about by the war. This marks the vindication of the principle, which was laid down in the Atlantic Charter, that the war should not benefit any particular Allied Power, that no question of aggression, acquisition of territory, or spoils of war, normal for all belligerent nations in the past, should arise in the future. This is the first occasion when a Power, drawn into the war against its will, having conquered by force in a war fairly fought and having captured the territory, says that it shall treat it as a Trust Territory and bring it under the suzerainty or supervision of the Un.ited Nations.. I wish to record that this precedent is a historic one, and I congratulate the United States delegation on the step which it has taken. Mr. LOPEz (Philippine Republic): I shall be brief. I wish, first, to express the appreciation of the Philippine Government for the invitation of the Security Council to participate in the discussion of the terms of the trusteeship agreement proposed by the United States for the former Japanese mandated islands. As a victim of Japanese aggression during the last war, the Philippines are vitally interested that the islands wrested from Japan shall be used henceforth to maintain the peace and security in the Pacific. The Philippine Government is satisfied that the United States trusteeship proposal conforms to this objective. It is particularly gratified that the strategic uses to which. the administering authority will put the islands, in accordance with the terms of the trusteeship agreement, will immeasurably strengthen the guarantee of Philippine security. The Philippine Government is also pleased to note that the United States has accepted, or is ready to accept, certain amendments proposed before this Council, which are intended to clarify, without altering the main prh..ciples on Je me joins par consequent aux autres representants qui ont demande la suppression de ce membre de phrase dans l'article 8. Je voudrais encore mentionner un autre article, a savoir l'article 13. Nous approuvons cet article, et nous sommes certainsque les dispositions relatives a l'exclusion des territoires strategiques ne restreindront pas indfiment l'application des Articles 87 et 88 de la Charte, auxquels cet article se rMere specialement. Enfin, je suis heureux de declarer que nous nous rejouissons de l'initiative que la delegation des Etats-Unis a prise a cette occasion en presentant cette proposition, et en demandant que ce territoire soit traite comme Territoire sous tutelle. Ce geste (et je ne sais si l'on a suffisamment souligne le fait) marque un changement qui est la consequence de la guerre. Il marque le succes du prlncipe expose dans la Charte de l'Atlantique, d'apres lequel aucune Puissance alliee ne doit tirer profit de la guerre, et aucune des questions d'agression, d'acquisition de territoire et de butin qui, dans le passe, etaient de regIe entre les nations belligerantes ne devra se poser al'avenir. C'es~ la premiere fois qu'une Puissance entrainee malgTe elle dans un" conflit declare, apres avoir conquis un territoire par la force des armes au cours d'une guerre menee loyalement, qu'elle le traitera comme Territoire sous tutelle et le pIacera sous la souverainete ou le contrOle de 1'01'- ganisation des Nations Unies. C'est la, notons-Ie, un precedent historique, et je felicite la delegation des Etats-Unis de la mesure qu'elle a prise. M. LOPEz (Republique des Philippines) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je serai bref. Je desire d'abord exprimer la satisfaction du Gouvernement des Philippines d'avoir ete invite par le Conseil de securite a participer a la discussion des clauses de l'accord de tutelle propose par les Etats-Unis pour les lIes anterieurement placees sous mandat japonais. Les Philippine~, ayant ete victimes de l'agression japonaise au cours de la derniere guerre, ant un interet vital a ce que les lies arrachees au Japon servent dorenavant au maintien de la paix et de la securite dans le Pacifique. Le Gouvernement des Philippines estcertain que J'accord de tutelle propose parIes Etats-Unis tend au meme but. Il est particulierement heureux de voir que l'autorite chargee de l'administration fera de ces lIes des territoires strategiques, conformement aux clauses de l'accord de tutelle, et renforcera ainsi considerablement la secclrite des Philippines. Le Gouvernement des Philippines est egalement heureux de noter que les Etats;.Unis ant accepte, ou sont disposes a accepter certains amendements proposes au seinde cc Conseil; en vue d'eclaircir~ sans les modifier. les prindpes The Philippine Government notes with special satisfaction the provisions of articles 6 and 7, which are intended to secure for the inhabitants of the Trust Territories the social, educational, and political opportunities guaranteed under the United Nations Charter. As the object of generous treatment by the United States over a forty-year period of voluntary trusteeship, the population of the Philippines entertains no doubt that the inhabitants of these Pacific islands will receive due consideration for their welfare and their aspirations during the period that the trusteeship agreement is in force. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): The representative of India, in his closing remarks, stated that this was the fiTht time in history that a victorious Power, having captured territory by force of arms, had placed it under trusteeship. and that this was, therefore, a historic act and a historic occasion. That is a very fine and complimentary statement, but unfortunately it is not true, as I reminded him just as he was leaving the room; and he recognized it as such. In fact, during the First WorId Wal', my country was one of the allied and associated Powers, and was solely responsible for the capture of New Guinea from Germany. That territory was immediately brought into trusteeship, and Australia was given the mandate. Australia, under the present system, was one of the first countries to enter into a trusteeship agreement; namely, ,for New Guinea.1 Moreover, the representative of India was not very complimentary to his own country, since Indian forces were largely responsible for the I;;apture from Turkey of Iraq and Palestine, which were brought into trusteeship. I have no doubt that the United Kingdom representative will recall that his country was in a similar position with regard to much of the te~ritory in East Africa, and also in Palestine and Iraq. En outre, le representant de I'Inde n'a pas ete tres flatteur pour son propre pays, car les forces de l'Inde ont largement contribue aarracher ala Turquie l'Irak et la Palestine, qui ont ete places ensuite sous .tutelle. Le representant du Royaume-Uni doit certainement se rappeler que son propre pays s'est trouve dans la meme situation en ce qui concerne une grande partie de l'Mrique orientale, ainsi que la Palestine et l'Irak. I merely wish these remarks to go into the record. It is not that I resent the statement of the Indian representative, but I think a thing like that may create a wrong impression. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je crois que le moment est venu de lever la· seance. S'il m'est permis de pader au nom du prochain President, je propose que le Conseil se reunisse pour reprendre cette question mercredi prochain, a15 heures.

I think the time has come for us to adjourn. If I may speak for the next President, I propose that the Council should meet again to take up this matter on Wednesday at 3 p.m. 1 Mandat pour les possessions al,lemandes du Pacifique situecs au sud de l'Equateur al~tr(:s que le Samoa allemand et Nauru, signe a Geneve le 17 decembre 1920. Voir les Textes des mandats de la Societe des Nations republies par les Nations Unies en octobre 1946 (dOCllment A/70). 1 Mandate for the German possessions in the Pacific ocean situated south of the Equator other than German Samoa and Nauru signed at Geneva on 17 December 1920. See Terms of League of Nations mandates republ!shed in October 1946 by the United Nations (document A/70). . Le Gouvernement des Philippines note avec une satisfaction particuliere les dispositions des articles 6 et 7 destines a assurer aux habitants des Territoires. sous tutelle les avantages sociaux, culturels et politiques garantis par la Charte des Nations Unies. Ayant beneficie elle-meme de l'administration genereuse des Etats-Unis pendant quarante ans de tutelle volontaire, la population des Phi!ippines est persuadee que le bien-etre et les aspirations des habitants de ces lies du Pacifique feront l'objet de la plus grande sollicitude, tant que l'accord de tutelle sera en vigueur. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Le representant de l'Inde, ala fin de son expose, a declare que c'etait la premiere fois au cours de l'histoire qu'une Puissance victorieuse, apres avoir conquis un territoire par la force des armes, l'a place sous tutelle, et que ce geste constituait un evenement historique. C'est la une declaration fort belle et tres flatteuse, mais, malheureusement, inexacte. Je l'ai rappele a son auteur au moment all il quittait cette salle, et lui-meme l'a reconnu. En efIet, au cours de la premiere guerre moncliale, mon pays etait l'une des Puissances alIiees et associees, et il a conquis seul la Nouvelle-Guinee sur l'Allema~i.le. Ce territoire a ete immediatement place sous tutelle, et I'Australie en a re<;u le mandat. L'Australie a ete, sous le present systeme, l'un des premiers pays aet....1:-Er HU accord de tutelle, en l'occurrence, pour la NouveJ.le-Guineel, Je serais heureux que ces observations figurent au proces-verbal. Ce n'est pas que la declaration du representant de l'Inde m'ait oIfense, mais je crains qu'elle ne cree une impression inexacte.

I confess to the Council that, had I known that the eminent representative of the United States was going to make such eloquent remarks about the period during which I had the honour to preside over this Council, I should have done as I have in the past: I should have stopped him ~rom speaking, because I .must confess that he put me in a very difficult situ2t:i.on, since there is nothing more difficult for me than to hear him say such nice things. I wish to thank him and all the representatives for the real help that I received from them. All have co-operated, and, if I have accomplished anything, I owe it all to the members of the Council. Thank you very much. The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Je vous avouerai que si j'avais su que l'eminent rep!"esentant des Etats-Unis allait prononcer de ;si eloquentes paroles au sujet de la periode pendant laquelle j'ai eu l'honneur de presider ce Conseil, jC'1'aurais (comme je l'ai deja fait dans le passe) interrompu des le debut, car je dois avouer ma gene, rien ne m'etant plus penible que de recevoir de,sa part de pareils compliments. Je desire le remercier, et avec lui tous les repre- S~~1tants, de l'aide efficace qu'ils m'ont apportee. Tous ont collabore, et si j'ai obtenu quelque resultat, je le dois entierement aux membres du Conseil. Encore une fois, merci. La seance est levee a18 h. 15. UNUTED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS PUIUaCATIONS DES NATIONS UNliS Security Council Pub'ications Publications du Conseil de securite Journal of the Security Council (18 January - 11 July lC}46), bilingual~ English-French, 42 issues, 868 pages, the set $4.20 The Journal of the Security Council, issues 1-42, 'contains the records of the first 49 meetings of the Security Council in their provisional form. These records are now being re-edited aud will later appear as Security Council OfJicial Records,. First Year,. First Series; Publication of the Journal of the Security Council was discontinued on 11 July 1946. SuppUemen"s to the Security Council Offieial Records, First Yea 'r, SecoruJSerie~,bilingual: English-French. Supplements Nos. 1 to 10. 190 pages. the set.. $1.95 . Special Supplement: Report of the Sub-Committee 011 the Spani~h Question. 104 pages. English edition $ .90 Provisional Rules of Procedure .9f the Security Council, English edition.... .. $ .20 .1 Journal du Conseil de securite (18 ianvier-ll iuillet 1946),bilingue: anglais-fran~ais,42 numeros, 868 pages, la serie $4,20 . Les numeros 1 a 42 dn Journ'al du Conseil de securite contiennent sous forme provisoire, 1es pracesve:rbaux des 49 premieres seances du Conseil de securite. Ces proces-verbaux sont actuellement reedites et paraltront ulterieurement sous le titre: Proces- "'- verbaux ofJiciels du Conseil de securite, Premiere Annee, Premiere Se-rie. La publication c;lu Journal du Conseil de securite a et~ interrompue le 11 juillet 1946. Proces -verbaux officieis du Conseil ~e securitev . Premiere Annee~ Serronde Serie, bilingue: anglais- £ran~. Proces-verbaux officiels Nos 1 a29. cinquantiem.e seance a quatre.vingt.huitiem.e seance. 702 pages. la serie $4.90 \ Supplements GUX proces-verbaux pfficiell& ~u Conzeil de' securite, Premiere Annee, Seconde Serie, bilingue: anglais-fran~is. Supplements Nos 1 a10. 190 pages. la serie , ,.;.$1.95 . . Supplement special: Rapport duSous-Cornite <charge. d'e la question espagnole. 104 pages. edition iran~aise...:.:....$0,90 Les Proces-verbaux c)Hiciels d~ Conseil de se:illrihi, 'De.uxieme Annee.• ainsi que les SuppMments,sont en COurS de publication. Une liste de ceux qui sont deja livrables peut elXe obtenue sur demana.e adressee aux agentS de vente. . . .Ritglemenf interieur provisc1ir8uu C:onseilde skurilei edition fran~j.se . ,:· $0,20 l'''ETBERLANDS PAYS·BAS N. V. Martinus Nijhoff Lange .VooJ'hout 9 . s'Gravenhage DOMINICAN REPUBLIC REPUBLIQUE . ARGENTINA-ARGENTINE Editorial Sudamericma S.A.. Calle Alaina 500 BuenolAiru ( AUSTRALIA-:AUSTRALIB B. A.. Goddard Pty.Lt<L 255il GeorgeSireet Sy«lney I DOMINICAINE Libreria Dominicana Calle Mercedea No. 49 ,Apartado 656 Ciudad Trujillo ECUADOR-EQUATEUR Muiioz Bermanos y Cia. Nueve de Octubre 103 Casilla 10·24. Guayaquil . FlNLAND-FINLANDE Akateeminen Kirjakauppa , 2,Keskauskatu - Helsinki , FRANCE-FRANCE Editions A.. Pedon8 13, nie SoufHot ParlsV- GREECE..-,..GRECE .uEleftheroudakia" Librairie ~temationale Place dela Constitution - Athenes NEW ZEALAND NOUVELLE.ZELANDB Gordon & C:otch Waring Taylor Street Wellington NORWAY-NORVEGE . Norsk BokimportA/5 Edv. Storms Gate 1 Oslo SWEDEN-5UEDE .AB C~ E. Fritzes Kungl Ho.fhokhandel , . Fredsgatan2 . . BELGlUM-BELGIQUE . .AgenceetMessageries de la .. Presse 14·22 rue dll PersU Bruxelle. rOLIVIA-.BOLIVIE Libreria Cientffica y Literaria Avenida 16 de.Julio, 216 Casilla972 . LaPaz S~ockho1m SWITZER.L.ANIJ-.,,-SUISSB 'Ubrairie Payot S. A. Lausanne CANA,DA--CANADA TheRyeraonPreQ. 299 Qqeen StreetWe_ -.Toronto •••••.e ••••• e • fI •• g ..... Bans Raunhardt ',Kirchgasse 17 Zurich1 SYRIA-5YRIE Librairie'universene Damascus GUATEMALA. GUATEMALA JoaeGoubaud Coubaud & Cia. Ltda. CBIL~HILl ·Echntindo Pizmo Merced846 Santiago S~ces()r 5a Av. Sur No. 6 y 9a' C. P.· UNIONOF SOUTH AFRICA Guatemala·' .. UNION SUD·AFRlCAINB C'entralNew8AgencyLtcL BAI~HAITl Commissioner & Rissm St•• Max Bouchereau JohannesJ,>nrg \ Librairie "A la Caravelle" Boite postale.111.B . tooTED KINGDOM Port.ari.Prince ROYAUME.UNI H.M. Stafi:onery OOice INDIA-INDE P.O~ Box 569 OxfordBook& Stationery LdS E 1 C on ,on, ••. .o. SciDdiaHouse'UNITED STATES OF New Delhi AMERICA IR.AN--lRAN ETATS·UNlS .D~MERIQUE . Banll'ahe Piaderow International Doc:tunen.t. j ~ Service i 731 Shah Avenue Columb.. ia Univ~rs.ity•.Preu .J. Teh~raJl I 2960Broadway! mAQ-lRAK . New York 27, N. Y. j Mackenzie &Mackenzie YUGOSLAVIA The Bookshop YOUGOSLAVIE Baghdad~ Dr~aVDo Pre(Iuzece ·LEBANON-Ll.BAN JugoslovenskaKnjiga 0 , Librame univer.eUe Moskovska Ul. 86 ..' CBINA-CHINE The CommorcialPressLtcL 211 Bonan Road Shanghai ' COSTA RICA ·,,····COSTA.RICA ··TrejosBermanol A:partado 1313 SanJose CUBA--CUBA LaCasaBelga' :Rone deSmedt O'Reilly455 La Habana <:ZECHOSLOVAlOA >TCH.ECOSLOVAQUIE :F. Topi., . . Narodni Trida-9 .... Praha1 . ··J>ENl!ARK--DANEMARK Einar l\Iunskgaard )lon-eg~de 6 KjoheDhaYJl J