S/PV.1237 Security Council

In convening this meeting of the Security Council and before saying a few words In deserved tribute to my predecessor as President of the Security Council, 1 would llhe to address myselfto the calling of this meeting. 2. For the past few days, the Secretary-General. I myself as President, and members of the Council bave been in consultation about how the United Nations could best exercise its responsibility to helpmaintain peace in Kashmir. where, as is well known, United Nations observers are on the ground, andwithrespect to which the Security Council has tahen action on numerous occasions in the past. 3. On 1 September, three days ago-i almost said three long days ago-the Secretary-General sent ta the Prime Minlster of Indla and the President 01 Pakistan an appeal for acease-fire[S/6647].Virtually cOnthn10US consultations since then bave revealed a general desire that the Council be convened urgently t0 tahe UP lts responsibility. The military news from the area. as 1s Wel hnown and as bas been report& in the world Press. continues to be grave, and the “Consultations by the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council with members of the Council bave revealed a general desire that the Security Council be convened promptly to consider, in the light of the Secretary-General% appeal for a cesse-fire, the serious conflict now taking place in Kashmir. “Since, under the circumstances. a meeting is necessary, 1 bave, as Security Council President. called a meeting of the Council for 3 p.m. today, 4 September.” 5. Rules 1 to 3 of our provisional rules of procedure provide that the Council can be convenedby the President under various circumstances: when issues are brought to it by the General Assembly, theSecretary- General or a Member State (rule 3); when a member of the Council requests a meeting (rule 2); and at any time that the President deems a meetingnecessary (rule 1). This was explained to the Council by the Cbairman of the Committee of Experts on the rules, in his report of 5 February 1946, almosttwenty years ago, as follows: ” . . . the Committee adopted a new and more flexible wording which does net expressly provide for ‘extraordinary’ meetings, while, however. leaving to the President of the Council the power to cal1 meetings: “(a) When he deems it necessary (rule 1); “(bJ At the request of any member of the Council (rule 2); “(9 When it is provided for hy the Charter (rule 3).kY 6. In addition, perhaps because of my jurlstic background, 1 bave researched the relevant precedents. A speclfic precedent for the convening of the Council in these or comparable circumFtances cari be found in its 84’7th meeting, on 7 September 1959, when the representative of Italy was the President of the councn. ‘7. In July 1965, in fact one day after the lamented death of my distinguished predecessor, Adlai E. Stevenson, the President of the Security Council, at that time the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Morozov, asked for the Council to be convened on the basis of a telegram from Mr. Jottin Cury, which was never transformed into a forma1 request for a meeting by any member of the United Nations or the Security Council. It would appear to me, therefore, in reading this background, thai the Presi- 6. The practice of the Conncil-although net the rules-is that the President consults members about the timing of the meeting. There bave, in tbis case, heen extensive consultations over the past three days-not only by myself, but by the Secretary- General as well-both about the desirability snd about the timing of the meeting. 1 knowthe Secretary- General has done everything possible, and 1 have tried to the best of my ahility in the present urgent circumstances, to keep all members informed of developments as they oocurred. TheSecretary-General, 1 believe, has seen all members of the Council; 1 bave been in touch personally with most members of the Council at various times over tbe past few days; and in addition, of course, we bave had the benefit of a flow of information about these consultations by the able and hard-working members of the UnitedNations Secretariat. 9. Members of the Council were informed yesterday that the tinte of a meeting might be announced then, and later were also informed that they should be available this week-end as it might be necessary to cal1 a meeting today. 10. This morning, as President of the Council, 1 set the time for the Council meeting at 3 p.m. today. 1 regret that, in the light of the emergenoy and the extraordinary circumstances which face us, time did net permit me t0 advise a11 members in advance of the exact heur of the meeting. 1 hope that, if this has inconvenienced any members, they Will bear with me in these serious times. and that we cari ail turn OUI attention promptly and substantively to helping restore peace in Kashmir. 1 wouldtendermyprfoundapologies to any member of the Council who was inconvenienced by my inability-and it was only a physical inability. due to lack of time-to cal1 each one early this morning in regard to the precise time of the meeting. 11. 1 bave made tbis preliminary statement to make clear the circumstances under which this meeting lus been called.

Thank you, Mr. President. By raising this highly important matter. which bas a general bearing on the proper organiaatien of the work of any meeting of the Council, regardless of the specific matter under discussion, you bave made my task very much easier. 13. Iiowever. 1 am bound to say that my expression of gratitude to you for bringing this general question before the Council-a question which is. 60 to steak. a common denominator of all the matters deaIt with 15. That is why my delegation has always insistsd net only on strict observance of the provisions of the Charter in matters relating to the work of the Council but also on strict observance of the rules of procedure, which are based on the Charter and were adopted by the Council, even though, by an irony of fate, these rules bave continued for two deoades to be referred to as “provisionai”. This designation does net diminish the significance of the rules. 1 do not think that any member of the Council would contend that the Council cari ignore the rules of procedure in one case and adhere strictly to them in another. 16. If we were to follow that course, our consideration of extremely important questions affecting the maintenance of international peace and security would be utterly chaotic. 17. Thus, the first point which 1 am trying to make is that the Council must conduct its work in strict accordance with the established rules, whether it is considering the question of Kashmir or some other question. 1 think it would be superfluous to say anything further in support of this point. 18. Turning to the question of the most unusual procedure-if the adjective “unusual” cari be applied to the word “procedurev-concerning which you bave just reported to the Council, 1 shall try to use the mildest possible ternis in demonstrating that it is essentially a violation of the established rules of procedure for preparing for and announcing a meeting of the Council. 19. Rules 1, 2 and 3 cannot be considered separately. Rules 2 and 3-I shall net read tbem out before this well-informed audience-establish the principle that meetings of the Council cannot be called as it were “anonymously ” . When a meeting of the Council is called, the request for a meeting cari Origin&e with a member of the Council, a Member of the United Nations or even, under certain circumstances, a%&? not a Member of the United Nations, assisted by a Member State. 20. Under certain circumstances, if the General Assembly-and here, of course, 1 am not referring 21. 1 need hardly dwell on the fact that the General Assembly and the Security Council, when they adopted the relevant mles, intended that a request for a meeting of the Security Council should imply a Certain assumption of political responsibility. 22. Not only today but on previous occasions we bave maintained, when these questions arose in the work of the Security Council, that rule 1, to which you, Mr. President. referred, must be taken in conjunction with rules 2 and 3, if we are not to make the provisions of those two rules meaningless. Thus, the words which you cited fmm rule 1 to the effect that the President may call a meeting of the Security Councll at any time he deems necessary cari be interpreted in only one way: it is the President who, by virtue of the discretionary powers vested in him, bas in the final analysis the exclusive right to decide the time when a meeting of the Council should be called. 23. If we take a different position and do net regard mle 1 as dealing solely with the right of the Prc sidont of the Council to decide the time when th- Council should be convened, then rules 2 and 3 lose their significance and we become involved in contradictions from which we Will be unable to extricate ourselves. 24. 1 shall clarify this with an illustration. If. let us say, delegation A considers that the Security Council should be convened in one hour’s time, delegation B considers that it should be convened in one month’s time. and delegation C considers that it should be convened in one week’s time. then rule 1 indicates the way out of the situation SO that the Council cari be convened. The rule authorizes ths President, acting alone on the basis of his discretionary powers, to decide that the Council shouh be convened at some time other than those requestec by delegations A, B and C. His decision may be criticized and various views may be expressed about it but it cannot be called into question. The Presidenl may decide to cal1 a meeting of the Council tel minutes after a request to that effect has been re. ceived, or after any other interval of time, bearinf in mind but net necessarily following the variouspro posais put forward. There would be no solution to tht problem if the President did not bave this power tc 26. Let us start with the precedent to which you referred when you were good enough to mention me as a recent President of the Security Council. This precedent actually proves nothing. and for a very simple reason. During the period to which you referred, each time that discussion of the Dominican question in the Security Council ended, it was agreed that the President would convene the Council whenever circumstances warranted or when any memher of the Couuzil SO requested. 27. The very fact that the Council adopted this formula and came to an agreement that the President would cal1 a meeting whenever circumstances warranted is the best possible confirmarton that rule 1 does net decide this question. 28. Moreover, it is quite clear that in the cas* in question the Council gave its President a free hand in advance on a specific matter. under specific circumstances and in a specific context. The Council authorized the President in advance to act in thés way on the Dominican quastion, which was before the Council. However. the whole point is that no such authorization was given to the President by the Council on the Kashmir question. 29. When the Council takes a similardecision, at this or any other meeting, and authorizes the President to act in this way, then and only then Will the President be able to do SO. 30. With regard to your secondargument, Mr. President, namely, your reference to the conclusion of the Chairman of the Committee of Experts which drew up the rules of procedure, 1 am bound to say that. generally speaking, when we bave to be guided by as strict and specific a document as a set of rules of procedure, we must follow the provisions of those rules and not some explanation which may bave been given after their adoption by one of rhose who drew them up. Therefore, from a legal point of view, the reference to the statement by the Chairman of the Committee which drafted the rules of procedure neither adds to the rules nor detracts from them. Thus. everything said in this regard remains valid. 31. There is a further matter on which 1 should like spesk, a matter regarding which, Mr. President, you offered an apology, namely, the fact that the Soviet delegation was net consulteri at all, even on the question of when the Council shouldbe convened. when you, as President of the Council, decided-in our view, wrongly-that, despite the fact that no one had requested it, you could cal1 a meeting of this COUnCil under rule 1. 1 am referrlng here only to officiai con- 32. I am bound to say that tbose consultations were net beld at ail before the meeting of the Council was opened. mite the contrary, since it was at about y~2 o’clock-I did not note the exact time-that I was informed that the President had decided to cal1 a meetii of the Counril for 3 p.m. 33. I profoundly regret, Mr. President, that as you entered upon your duties as President of the Cotincil, you felt that you could make such aflagrant departure from the accepted procedure for consultations, if only regaràmg ths time for convening the Cuuncil, to say rothing of the substance of this question. Your reference to the urgency of the question, to the neeà for an urgent decision, and yorr refercnce tc the fact that you bad been unable to consult a11 the delegations bave a discriminatory ring about them. As everyone knows. tbere are eleven delegations in the Council. The number of members of the United States delegation who could bave talked to tbe members of the Council is clearly more than eleven; thus. if you had wlshed, they could bave held consultations on your behalf with a11 members of the Council for five or ten minutes. 1 should therefore like to point out that your argument regarding the urgenoy of the situation proves nothing. Furthermore, it is merely acover-up for thedeplorablefactwhichyouyourselfacknowledged and for which you were forced to apologize. For my part, I would bave preferred not to hear those apologies but to corne to an agreement, at the very outset, that during this month of yohr Presidency we shall be guaranteed against any repetition of this situation and that you, Mr. President, Will bllow thepracticewhich was established here long before your arriva1 and is in keeping with the businesslike methods of communication between the President and the members of the Conncil whioh alone cari enable you successfuIly to carry out your duties in conducting OUI meetings. 34. 1 should like to point out that, under the rules of procedure and the Charter of our Organization, the President z&S no powers other than those relating to the conduct of our meetings. Outside those meetings, therefore, the President must be very carefnl not to adopt any course of action which might later necessitate apologies of tbe kind we bave heard here, which only emphasize the completely abnormal atmosphere 41. Therefore, quite clearly, rule 1 and rule 2, in my su~mission, are mutually exclusive. Rule 1 gives the authority and the power to the President; provided only he deems it necessary to convoke a meeting of the Security Council, he shall be at liberty tc do SO. Undoubtedly, Mr. President. your experience may be even shorter tban mine, but 1 do net believe that any President would want to call a meeting just on his own fiat; when he finds it necessary, that necessity would nndoubtedly bave to be fortified by opinions he would bave collected from his ten other colleagues. 42. New. going on to rule 2, it says: vThe President shall cal1 a meeting of the Security Council at the reqnest of any member of the Security Council.” It does not go on to say vthe date and time of the meeting being at the discretion of the President underrule 1”. 43. Therefore, rule 1 provides for the authority of the President which is inherent in his duty as President, and rule 2 prcvides for the calling of a meeting by any member of the Security Council. 1 should therefore think, with the utmost deference to the representative of the Soviet Union, that purely as a matter of interpretation of the English language in t1.n two rules appearing side by side, they are incapable of the interpretation put upon them by him.

The report we have in front of us by the Secretary- General on the current situation in Kashmir not only is a confirmation of the dispatches that bave reached ns on the deterioration of the situation in Kashmir, but also throws a harsh light on the disconcertlng events in that part of the world. It is the view of my Government that urgent circumstances exist that should be examined without delay by the Security Council. Therefore. Mr. President, my delegation supports ycur cal1 for this meeting and hopes that the Council will be able to discuss the matter that is brought to our attention without delay. 45. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): 1 wish to make a short comment on the procedural point that has been raised this afternoon. 46. We bave listened with great deference, as always, and also with a certain impatience, to the point which has been elaborately stated by the representative of the Soviet Union. Three points, perhaps, he raised. The first point, which he took some tin tir explain to us, was that we must observe the rules duly laid down for the conduct of affairs in this Council. 1 should scarcely bave thought that it was necessary. 47. l’essentiel articles juriste n%mimle atteinte aucune par gfznéral convocation le représentant veut Pr&isent dent articles pouvoir au Président 47. The second pomt, however. was the main point which he wished ta put to us, in relation to rules 1 and 2. NO~. whether we are lawyers or net lawyers. 1 think we must take it that rule 2 does not cancel rule 1, nor in fact detract from it or supersede it in any way. Bath rules stand on their own feet. Rule 1 establishes the general principle chat meetings of the Council shall be held at the call of tbe President at any time he deems necessary-and, as the representative of Malaysia says, that means what it says. Rules 2 and 3 are separate and distinct, and set out tbe circumstances in which the President is required or obliged to cal1 a meeting of the Council. These mIes are. of course, without prejudice tc the general discretionary powers which are SO clearly set out in role 1. 48. Then tbere was a thlrd point, which was a question of fact. Of course 1 do net know exactly the consultations which took place with the delegation of the Soviet Union. but 1 would say that we bave known for several days that a meeting of this Council might well become necessary. AU of us bave been in touch with the Secretary-General. and in tbe past dayortwo with the President himself. 1 received. and 1 wouldbe surprised if the delegation of the Soviet Union bad net also received, warnings that an early meeting of the Cotmcil might be required. It certalnly came as no surprise to me when 1 heard today that fiially a meeting had been called by the President in exercise of the powers which, it seems to us, are perfectly clear. 43. avait quelles gation dire déj?+ le Secrétaire

At this grave heur 1 really hesitate to take up any time of the Council by my intervention. After listening to tbe statement which the President gave at the beginning of the meeting, 1 should bave thought that reasons for convening the Council this afternoon were unchallengeable. whether considered from the point of view of rule 1. rule 2 or tie 3 of the provisional rules of procedure. 50. But 1 wish to advance another point. Even if we start from the premise that there is a relationship behveen these three rules. let us remember that the President of the Security Council is, at the same time. a member of the Council. In ordinary circumstances, if a member of the Council wants to request a meeting, he goes to the President. and then the President consul& with the other members. But when the member happens tc be the President himsslf, he has nobody to go to except himself. 51. May 1 say, Mr. President, that the consultations that you had with other members of the Council were extensive, and chat no President could bave done more, even if the request had corne from any other member 52. Mr. RIFA’I (Jordan): 1 feel tbat 1 should explain tbe position of my delegation wlth regard to the convening of the present meeting. 1 was included In the consultations whlch took place on the advisability of convening a meeting of the Security Council to consider the dangerous situation in Kashmir. 1 felt that such a meeting would be useful in meeting the immediate requirements of the present serious development% and 1 therefore supported the consensus in that regard. 53. As to the procedure followed in convening mis meeting, my delegation reserves its position wlth regard to the interpretation of the rules of procedure and their applicability in such cases. In the present instance, however, my delegation accepts the convening of this meeting in the mariner in which it was called.

1 believe that the views of the President and of the representatives of the Soviet Union and other Council members on the subject now before us bave been amply expounded. 1 would add just a few words. We have checked the records of the Council meeting prior to the one convened by Ambassador Morosov this summer to which reference has been made, and there is no record of any special authority being given to the President with regard to calling further meetings. 55. With respect to the question of consultation, 1 would hope that it is very clear that there was extensive consultation, and 1 think that that appears from a11 that has been said here. This morning, hecause of the urgency of the situation, 1 felt that If we were to meet today-which was our anticipation yesterday-word ought to go out immediately. for the convenience of the members of the Council. When 1 said that 1 apologize if 1 caused any inconvenience to any member, 1 meant it in those terms. 1 do net apologise for doing my duty, as President of the Council, in convening a meeting when it is necessary, as rule 1 provides. 56, On the other hand. 1 fully understand what the representative of the Soviet Union said because, under comparable circumstances. Mr. Zorin, as President of the Council. faced a similar complaint on the part of the United States representative. That was on 13’November 1961. On that occasion, the representative of the United States raised a question as to the notice he had received, just as Mr. Morozov has done today. Apparently the same circumstances existed which impelled me today to act as urgently as 1 did, without the President’s having the opportunity to consult with any member of the Council as to the precise heur of the meeting, vI feel that 1 acted reasonably. The representative of the United States, apparently. does net entirely agree with me. 1 ~III sorry he does net agree ~6th me, v-1 take tbat as a similar word of apology-“but 1 feel that everything which could bave been done on my part, by way of consultation with members of the Security Cou&l, was in fact done. 1 intend to continue in the future to consult a11 members of the Council on the calling of meetings of the Council, v-1 repeat that, for myself- %nd 1 think that ail members of tbe Securlty Cour& will co-operate with me in this matter.” I973rd meetl, para. 20.1 5’7. 1 intend to do the best 1 cari in this area hi the future, SO long as 1 sit in thls Seat.

Mr. President. 1 should like to point out that in your second statement you conceded that in the future you would avoid creatlmg a situation like that whlch resulted in my delegation’s not being consulted about the time of the Council’s meeting. 59. Although coming at this time, that is net enough to give me, as representative of the Soviet Union, full satisfaction, it is in any case considerably betterthan the statement made by my distinguished neighbour on the left. Reproaching me for trylng to lecture the Council-which 1 leave to his conscience-the United Kingdom representative expressed himself more or less as follows: “Oh. you were not informed? But 1 was informed, SO please be satisfied wlth that.” Of course, if we are going to act in that way. it Will hardly contribute to the success of our work. In any event, it has already resulted in the loss of time which we could have put to considerable better use. 69. My second observation is that we could. of course, continue at great length the discussion of the meaning of rules 1,2 and 3.1 wish to reaffirm the position which I stated initially in answer to your statement. Mr. President; 1 remain of that opinion. However, 1 am very grateful to the representative of the Netherlands. He did net. it is truc, support my point of view with regard to the interpretation of the extent of the President’s authority, but he did. in a highly practical way, corne to the rescue, 1 might say, of the whole Councilbotb you yourself, Mr. President, and ail thoseothers who, like you, bave until now heen considering what steps they should take to convene the Council. The representative of the Netherlands made two points in hls slatement. First of all. he said that his Government considered it essential to cal1 a meeting of the SecUritY CoUnCil. Weil, better late than never. It seems that this saying ha8 been translated into a11 lamguages. Thus, we bave a forma1 proposai to cal1 a meeting of tbe Council. And since we bave not yet started the meeting and bave not yet considered the 61. The Nethèrlands representative said further that since his Government considered it essential to calla meeting of the Council-that is how he began-he supported your decision, Mr. President. This is, as the French say, a mariner of speaking. However, if it pleased bim to state that the Government of the Netherlands considered it essential to cal1 a meeting of the Council on this question and to add something more, as 1 bave just pointed out, then, in view of the service which he has done us a11 by removing the necessity for continuing this particular discussion, 1 am prepared to forgo any comment on what he said. 62. LORD CARADON (United Kingdom): Before we leave this subject and proceed with our work, may 1, as one of tha most junior members of the class, and speaking with great respect and affection, say that we always enjoy a lecture from Headmaster Morozov.

1 bave no other speakersonmy list on this subject, and 1 take it that the sense is that the Council shall proceed with its work. 64. This is the first occasion on which 1 take a seat in the Security Council: and 1 hope, now that we are proceeding with the work of the Council, that you Will forgive me a personal Word. 1 should like to tel1 my colleagues around this table how privileged 1 feel in joining them in the important work of the Council, how privileged 1 feel to participate with the Secretary- General in the great work of the Organisation, and how much 1 bave already benefited from the fine work of the Secretariat, which serves a11 members impartially and with ability. It is not for me to say how many times meetings of the Council bave preserved the peace: this is reflected in the records of the Council and in the recollection of a11 people everywhere. 1 wish merely to record my own conviction that it has ocrurred time ancl time again, sufficiently to accord great significance to cur work. 65. 1 regret that the first time 1 meet with ycu formally must be a time of crisis, but1 am mindful of the fact that this great body, the Security Council, has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and that this is the task at hand. 1 bave, in other organs of the United Nations, taken the opportunity to say a few words about my late predecessor, Adlai E. Stevenson, and 1 hope you Will bear with me if, in this Security Council, where Expression of thanks to the retiring President

As 1 continue the work of my distinguished predecessor, 1 shouldlike, inmycapacity as President of the Council, as the Permanent Repre sentative of the United States of America to the United Nations, and personally and on behalf of OUI’ entire delegation, to express appreciationforthe work of the outgoing President. the representative of the United Elngdom, Lord Caradon. He hasdemonstrated, not only by words but by profound action, his commitment to the prlnciples of the United Nations snd his dedication to tbe Charter concept of the equalityof all nations and of alI peoples in the world in which we live. Ile has also demonstrated. from bis vast experience bath as representative of his own country and as President, a wealth of knowledge about our Organisation and a facility of speech an6 a delightful sense of humour that bave eased our burdens as members of the Council. 68. I should also like to pay a tribute to Lord Caradon’s Deputy. Sir Roger Jaokling. In the necessary absence of Lord Caradon, he spent many long heurs in consultations among the members onvarious iSsUes of which the Council was seised. Forthat work we owe him our thanks. 69. I know that 1 express the sentiments of every member of this Council when 1 express appreciation to Lord Caradon for his leadership of the Council during the past month. 70. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): 1 thank you, Mr. President. for what you bave just said, for the kind words that you u~ed about me. As far as 1 per- SontiY ~III concerned, they are undeoerved; but 1 and my delegation especially appreciate the reference that You made to Sir Roger Jackling, who conducted the af£airS of this Council in rny absence. He did SO, as 1 understsnd from all sides, as ably as we should hme Wm%d. 1 know that he tco very much appreciates what you bave been good enough to say. 71. And now, in wishing you well. Mr. President, in the heav duties that you are called upon to perfom, m*y I respectfully welcome you on this, the first occasion on which you join us In the Seonrlty 72. You took the earliest opporhmity of showingyour political sense. by being born in Illinois. You are a brilliant advocate, and good causes cari only gain from your gifts of exposition. You are a famous conciliator, and we confidently expect in this Council to be able to satisfy your appetite for conciliation by providing a sufficient diet of dispute. 73. As a distinguished Judge of the highest court in your country. you corne supremely well qualified to defend the rule of law in international affairs. In warmly welcoming you to this Council, 1 congratulate you on your courage in coming to join us-the kind of courage which Daniel showed in entering the lions’ den. May you, like Daniel, emerge unscathed, having similarly and spectacularlyandsuccessfullydtsplayed faith in the principles for which you stand. 74. The PRESDENT: 1 am deeply grateful to you, Lord Caradon, as our retiring President, for your more than gracious words. 1 appreciate what youhave said, and 1 shall take your words t0 heart. 1 indeed hope and, pray tbat 1 shall emerge unscathed. 1 bave some reservations and douhts ahout that, but 1 share the hope that you bave expressed. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopfed. The India-Pakistan question: Telegroms dated 1 September 1965 from the Secretary-General oddressed to the Prime Minister of India ond the President of Pakistan (5/6647); Report of the Secretary-General on the current situation in Koshmir with particular reference to the cease-fire q gréement, the cease-fire line and the functioning of the United Notions Military Observer Group in India ond Pakistan (S/6651).

In accordance with past practice in the discussions on this gestion and in accordance with the provisions of rule 37 of the provisional mIes of procedure of the Security Council, 1 propose to invite the representatives of h-,dia and Pakistan to participate without vote in the Council’s consideration of the question before it. As 1 hear no objection. 1 invite the representatives of India and Pakistan to take seats at the Council table. Af the invitation cd the President, Mr. Gopa.laswami Parthasarathi (India) and Mr. Amjad Ali (Pakistan) tockplaces af fhe Couacil table. 77. 1 gIve tke floor to the representative of lndia. 75. Mr. PARTHASARATHI @dia): Mr. President, as me newcorner to another. may 1 at the outset take tkIs opportunity to convey to you the warmest congrahdations of my Govemment and also my own on your appointment as your country’s chief representative to tke United Nations. My delegation Iooks forward to close and frlendly collaboration and co-operation witk you and tke United States delegation. You bring to your present post a record of hIgh and distlnguished services to your country and to your people, and my delegation is indeed very happy to see you here. NO~, to follow the advice of your very distinguished and famous predecessor. tke late Governor Stevenson, let us pet on with tke work tkat lies akead of us. 79. First of sll. 1 must express tke gratitude of my delegation to you, Mr. President, and totke members of the Council for inviting us to take part in tke pmceedings of the Council on tke serious situation that has arisen as a result of Pakistani aggression on the IndIan Stste of Jammu and Kaskmir. This meeting kas net been cslled at our instance, but since it has been called 1 owe it to tke members of the Council to present the related facts ta tke Council in as brief and concise a maxmer as possible. It shall be my endeavour to assist tke Council in arrivingat correct conclusions and takiog correct steps, in cooformity withthecharter of tke Uoited Nations and the generally accepted principles of international law. 60. As tke representatives are aware, the India- Pakistan question, as it is euphemistically called, has been on tke agenda of the Council for nearly eighteen years. It was in January 1946 that Jndia first brought tke gestion to tke Council on the issue of Pakistani aggression on tke Indien State of Jammu and Kashmir. Incidentally, it may interest tke members of the Council to know tbat it was my fatker who brought the issue here. NO~ it has fallen to me to bring to your attention tke second massive aggression :;..:qst Kashmir. 61. Since 1948, tke issue kas remained on tkeageoda witkout a satisfactory solution. Wky bas there beenno satisfactov solution? It is primsrily because the Council refuses to face the simple fact of aggression by Pakistan. It wvas deliberately sidetracked. coofused and befuddIed by Pskistan’s claims, which kave oo justification in law or even political exigency. Be that as it may. the Council has once agaIn the opportunity t0 do justice to itself and to India. It is tke kope of rke 475 million people of India tkat tkis time the 82. What has been the conduct of the two parties in relation to the agreement and the line? The cesse-fire agreement did net lead to the vacation of Pakistan’s aggression on the Indian State of Jammu andKashmir. In fa&, it allowed Pakistan to remain in occupation of two-fiiths of the State. Despite this continuing aggrsssion, the Government of India 1 is always endeavoured to respect the cesse-fire agreement. lt has spared no efforts to maintain peace and tranquillity a11 along the cesse-fire line. It has co-operated with theunited Nations Chief Military Observer, accepted every reasonable proposal made by General Nimmo and, what is more, the Government of India itself prepared a gentleman’s agreement to ensure respect for the cesse-fire line for discussion with Pakistan. What has heen Pakistan’s attitude towards the ceasefire agreement? 1 could quote to you innumerable extracts from statements by the leaders of Pakistan, the leaders of the so-called m Kashmir, whichis a euphemism for that part of the State which is under the illegal occupation of Pakistan, and thousands of inflammatory newspaper reports from Pakistan to prove that Pakistan did not wish to respect the sanctity of the line. Al1 this 1 could quote to you, but 1 shall not do SO at this time in extenso. It Will suffice to give you a few samples. 83. Here is an extra& from the Pskistani newspaper Dawn of 29 August 1961, which states: “President Ayub Khan emphasized that the people of Pakistan could not forget Kashmir because the present Cease-Fire Line was a constant source of danger to Pakistan rail, river and road system. and provided innumerahle defence problems.” The same newspaper in its edition of 23 March 1962 had the following: “President Ayub Khan, referring to the Cease- Fire Line, said: ‘1s it any rational line? What does it indicate? It is an outcome of war? What purpose does it serve? Does it serve any strategic or economit or other interests?‘” 84. Mr. Bhutto, the Minister for Fore@ AffairS of Pakistan, told a news conference on 19 May 1962 at Dacca: “Pakistan now realized that the Kashmir problem would bave to be settled by our intrinsic strength, “Pakistan would give sll possible assistance to the Aaad Gcvernment of Jamrnu and Kashmir to - meet fndmn aggressicn against Asad territory. The Cesse-Fire Agreement is a trüütween the two armies of Pakistan and Indta Bpd is no bar against the exercise of basic human rights by the people of Kashmir.n 86. The Moroing News of Dacca in its edition of 23 October 1963 had a story headiined: “Cesse-Fire Line net bmding on Kashmiris-Agreement was a bnce”. The newspaper quoted Mr. Khurshid. the erstwhile President of so-called Asad Kashmir. as saying: *. . . the Cease-Fire Line in Kashmir was not biiding on the people of Kashmir and that his Gcvernment did not recognize tire Cease-Fire Line of 1949 as a dividing line between Asad Kashmir and Indian - occupied Kashmir, a Mr. Kurshid went on to say that the freedom fighters in Kashmir State hadnothingto do with this Agreement. 87. In this very Council. on 7 February 1964, the Minister for Foreign A&irs said: “For India, the situation is simple. It is in possession of the major part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and would like nothing better than tc be left alone. But we. seeing our kith and kin. oui flesh and blood, suffer tyranny snd oppression, sball we remain silent spectators?” [1089thmeeting, para. SO.] “That it is the restraining hand of the Pakistan Gcvermnent alone which preserves peace in Kashmir-all the charges against us levelled by the Indian representative notwithsbanding-is apparent from the repeated demands made by the Aaad Kashmir Government, and the Al1 Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Ccnference for the abrogation of the cesse-fire agreement. These demands are net lightly made.” I-d., para. 114.1 88. Not only by their statements but alsc by their actions, the Gcvernment and the leaders of Pakistan bave shown scant regard for the cesse-fire agreement and tbe cesse-fire Une. Thousands of violations of the Une bave been brought to the notice of the United Nations Chief Military Observer, and he bas given a sufficient number of awards against Pakistan to establish clearly that that ccuntry felt no compunction in violating the line. What is more, on at least three occasions. the Chief Military Observer made some suggestions to the Government of Pakistan for improving conditions on the cesse-fire line. 90. In 1964, the Government of India itseif proposed an officiai-level conference with Pakistan for the purpose of restoring tranquillity along the ceasefire line and aiong India’s international border6 with Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan agreed to India’s request for the conference and fixed a date for it. The Ldian delegation was ready to leave for Karaohi when suddenly Pakistan called off the talks at the last moment. 91. Over the years, Pakistan has perfected the technique of sending armed troops across the cease-fire line in civilian disguise. These armed civilians were in most cases part of Pskistan’s regular or irregular troops. Even the so-called Mujahids-the so-called freedom fighters-were formed in June 1965 fnto a regularly constituted Pakistan Mujahid Force with commanding officers, junior commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers and other ranks. According to the decision of the Government of Pakistan, units were to be raised on the order of the Commander-ln- Chief and were normally to serve indistricts in which they were raised. For certain legal purposes, they were to be deemed part of the Pakistan Army. SO much for the so-called freedom fighters. 92. New there is another category of nrmed troops in Pakistan, which is called the Azad Kashmir Reserve Force. That this Force is in noÏÏ&ierseparate from the regular Pakistan Army is proved by the following extracts from the first interim report of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan: ca) “The Commission was repeatedly informed by you [tbe Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan] and by the representatives of the Pskistan Army that the Azad Kashmir forces were under the over-ail control of the Pakistan High Commanda [S/llOO,?/ para. 1081; (bJ ‘1. . . his [the Foreign Minister of Pakistan%] reply to a Commission questionnaire that a11 forces fighting on the Asad side were hmder the over-a11 command and tac=zdirection of the Pakistan army’v [s., 93. An additional point in tbis connexion may be emphasized: tbe cesse-fire agreement of 27 July 1949 is between the Goveraments of Indiaand Pakistan and tbe United Nations Commission. Wnited Nations observors will bear out the fact tbat posts on the Pakistan side of the south-east line in the west md in the north bave been manned by *Azad Kashmir’< battalions and Northera Scouts, all unme over-ai: control of theGeneralNeadquartersof the 12thInfantry Division of the Pakistan Army at Rawalpindi. 94. Let no member of tbis Couacil be underany illusion tbat wbatever bappens in Pakistan-occupied Kasbmir, be it in tbe milïtary or intbe civilian sphere. is net strictly under the control and direction and inspiration of the Govemment of Pakistan. The administration of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir is run by the Kashmir Affairs Joint Secretary and other Pakistani officials seconded to the so-called Azad Kashmir Administration. The periodical changes m tbe presideacy of the so-called Azad Kashmir take 7 place at the command of Rawalpindx. 95. This is the background of the invasion of Kashmir on 5 Augast 1965. On that daylargebodies of Pakistan troops in civilian disguise fully armed with automatic weapons, supplied with rations and huge amounts of Pndian currency, carrying transistors aad propaganda literature. becan to infiltrate âcross tbe cesse-fire line and ihe i&rnational border iato the Indian State of Jammu and Kasbmir. The infiltration took place across the cesse-fire line in several carefully selected sectors: up in the north, near Cbakaar, Keran aad TitiiwaL; on the western sector of the ïie. at Uri, Fuach, Iv¶endhar, Rajxori and Naoshera. The infiltrators also crossed into the Cbbamb and Samba sectors of the international border. The strength of the Pakistani troops who infiltrated across the cesse-fire lise in civîlian disguise is estimated at about 5.000. They came in parties varying in number, some of them in groups consisting of 100 or 200 men. Their immedïa.te abjects, according to the documents captared from them and statements made by prisoners, were to destroy bridges, police stations, pf!trol dumps and other important installations, and also to eut roads. Furtber, they were to capture the sommer capital of the State, Srinagar, especially the adjacent airfieid. Among their other objectives was the assassination of political and other leaders, 96. The weapons seized from the infiltrators consist of light machine-guns, rifles, Sten-guns, grenades, rockets, racket-launchers. and large qusntities of ammunition and explosives. The weapons, considerlng their range and the quantitieu of ammunition, couldbe supplied only by the Government of Pakistan. While some of the weapons carry markings to indicate their Pakistani origin, markings on others bave been erased, clearly in order to conceal their origin. The Indian Security Forces have captured infiltrators with uniforms uncontestably belonglng to the SO-called & Kashmir battalions, which. as 1 bave stated earlier, are part of the Pakistan Army. Some of these armed troops in civilian disguise have been captured with badges showing theirranks and battalion badges marked “AKRF”, that is, Aead Kashmir Reserve Force. Fmm the accounts giaythe captured prisoners, it is confirmed tbat the majority of the raiders belong to the regular MKashmir bnttaIions of the Pakistan Armv. 98. One of the objectives of these Pakistani troops in civllian disguise, as 1 bave stated earlier, was to tut mads and communications of vital and strateglc nature, In pursuance of this objective, between 5 and 16 Augnst 1965. Paklstani troops tried to tut the strateglc mad behveen Srinagar and Leh. They attempted to destroy bridges and lay mines on the roads and harass convoys of the Security Forces. As perhaps the members of the Conncil are avare, similar attempts were made earlier. and in May 1965 the Indian Army was forced to counter-attack the Pakistani troops in the Kargil sector, and captnred three of their posts. This was done in order to ensure the safety of the rcad from Srinagar to Leh. However, as is stated in the report of the Secretary-General, on being assured by the United Nations that military observers would be posted in the sector to ensure the safety of the mad, Indian forces withdrew from three posts at the end of June. During the course of the current invasion of the State. and for exactly the same reasons. Indian forces once again occnpied the three posts. On two other sectors of the ceassfire line also. Indian forces bave been forced. purely as a defensive measure, to cross the cesse-fire line and to occupy the strateglc points-strategic from the point of view of defence rather than of offence. These points are in the Tithwal and Uri sectcrs of the cease-fire llne. While the mopping-up operations were goinp on, it was learned that a large number of Paklstani troops in civilian disguise had begun to concentrate on or near the cesse-fire fine at certain points. The occupation by Indian forces of these points was therefore forced upon them, firstly. to seal off the routesof escape, and secondly, toprevent crossings of the cesse-fire line by additional troops in civilian disguise from the Pakistan side. 99. This is the action which Pakistan claims has led it tc cross the cesse-fire litre-the measures that we 100. When even this served no purpose and the troops in civilian disguise already within the State began to be killed or captured or even to surrender, in large numbers, to the Indian security forces, on 1 September 1965 Pakistan took the ultimate step. Pakistani troops in regular attack formation and in brigade strength supported by armoured regiments which contained Patton tanks crossed the cesse-fire line, indeed the international boundary, in the southwestern part of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. The strength of the Pakistani troops whohave crossed the cesse-fire line, the support provided by the armoured regiments and by fast modem aircraft-all this leaves no doubt that the attack was premeditated, well planned and in utter violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the generally accepted principles of international law and the cease-fire agreement. 101. In spite of this overwhelming evidence which clearly proves that the invasion was organized by Pakistan and is directly controlled and conducted by it, Pakistan denies tbat it has any hand in the matter. As soon as the Government of India became aware of the serious nature of the invasion, it instructed its High Commissioner in Pakistan immedlately to cal1 on President Ayub Khan to impress upon him the gravity of the situation. The High Commissioner was asked to tel1 the President of Pakistan of the grave consequences which would follow if immediate steps were net taken to withdraw the troops, that is the troops in civilian disguise. The appointment was fixed for him with the President of Pakistan and he arrived in Rawalpindi. However, he was unable to sec President Ayub Khan. Instead, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Bhutto, met him and told bim blandly that Pakistan knew nothing abcut massive aggression of the oease-fire line. It was an interna1 revoit of me people of the State against India, he said. This fiction continues to be maintained. 102. According to the Press release issued by the permanent mission of Pakistan to the United Nations on 1 September 1965, President Ayub Khan declared on that day, and 1 quote from the Press release: “Referring to the popular revoit which broke out in the occupied Kashmir on 8 August 1965, the President said: ‘The successes achieved by tbe freedom fighters bave been striking andtheirheroic 103. PresumabIy, tbe Field Marshal was referringto bis own tmops who are supposed to be freedom figbers. But on 18 August 1965. the cat had already ben bd out of tbe bag by Cbaudhuri AD Akbar, the Borne &Iinister of Pakistan, who said, and 1 quote from the Pakistan newspaper Dawn of 19 August 1965: DThe Minister said it was natural tbat the people of Azad Kashmir should bave the fullest sympatby for tbeir bretbren in occupied Kashmir: wbo cari question their rigbt to go to their help? They bave a rigbt to be there. n 104. Tbe same newspaper in its edition of 20 August 1965 attributed the following statement to the Pakistan Foreign Minister: “The cesse-fire line, he said, was drawn only temporsrily and it was there by an accident of history. It should bave been farther down in ocoupied Kashmir. ” 105. TO quote the newspaper Dawnagain, the Pakistan Fore@ Miuister, replying%-Indla’s charge of Pahistani aggression in Kashmir, said: “HO~ could Pakistancommit aggression against its own people? People living on the two sides of the cesse-fire line were indivisible. They are our own people.” 106. Finally, here is another statement attributed by the same paper to MI. Bhutto: “As a matter of fact, the State of Jammu and Kashmir was Pakistani territory which India has usurped.” 107. Pakistan claims that the people of the State are in revolt against India. This is such an absurd assertion and such a thin disguise for Pakistan% invasion that it cannot, and we are sure it will not, deceive the Council. Let us examine the facts. In the wahe of the invasion, many foreign correspondents bave travelled to Kashmir to report on the situationthere. They bave sent dispatches to their newspapers outside India, and I propose to quote only a few of such dispatches. 108. First, the correspondent of The Times of London, in his dispatch which appeared in th?.t paper on II Augwt 1965, wrote: “There is no indication of w amed revoit by people on the Indian side as announced by Pakistan radio.” 109. SecondlY, the Baltimore Sun of 10 August 1965 carried a report from its correspondent in Srinagar in the following words: to “There is no evidence visible in or near the City support the report from Pakistan of a popular uprising against India nor of repressive measures against the population.” 110. Thirdly, the correspondent of the Chicago Daily News, Mr. Paul Hurmuses, describing the Paklstani infiltrators as Vnarauding Pakistani guerrillas” in a dispatch on 12 August 1965, wrote: “Pakistanis bave infiltrated at several points along the 475 mile long, sixteen year-old cesse-fire line that is supposed to be supervised by United Nations military observers. ‘1. . . “The bold Pakistani tnoves climax a year of repeated military clashes and are by far the most serious since 1947, the year of independence for both India and Pakistan. Pakistan then sent waves of fierce Pathan fighters in a bid to seize a11 of the 86,000 square miles on the western flank of the Himalayas. ! I . “This week’s attacks were launched from ‘the Asad Kashmir’ of the Pakistan side of the ceasefire line. ” . . . “The United Nations observers on the scene bave established the existence of the heavily armed infiltrators and bave recorded a number of clashes between them and Indians.” 111. Fourthly, The New York Times of 14 August 1965 published the following dispatch from Srinagar: “On the basis of most reports thus far, the infiltrators appear to bave been recruited mainly among the people of Azad Kashmir rather than from among those of the Indian-held section of the disputed territory.” 112. 1s it surprising, therefore, that the only source from which glorified accounts of the revoit corne is Pakistan? 113. The people of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir are alleged to bave set up a revolutionary council. There is no such revolution=ry councll. The leaders of even those political parties who are opposed to the Government of the State bave testified to this. This figment of Pakistani imagination-the revolutionary council-is supposed to be calling for the liberation of the people frcm Indian rule over a 114. Did these Pakistani troops in civilian disguise, who infiltrated across the cesse-fire litre, beghming 5 August 1965, achieve their objective? They did net. Due to the prompt action taken by the security forces, with which tbere was wholehearted co-operation from the local population, the Pakistani troops, althougb they were able to penetrate into the State at some points in considerable depth, failed miserably in all their objectives. What is more, these so-calledliberators, net receiving any support from the local population, in fact being hunted by many brave Kashmiris, wreaked their vengeance on innocent people-men, women and children-on +hose who refused to cooperate, thereby proving themselves to be what they really are: marauders employed by Pakistan to commit looting, arson, murder and rape. 1s it necessary for my delegation to remind members of the Council of the close parallel between the invasionof 1947-1948 and that of 19651 1s it necessary to inform representatives that, as in 1947-1948, SO in 1965the heinous acts of rape, phmder, arson, lootiig and murder havebeen committed by Pakistan troops? For the benefit of those representatives who were net in this Counoil when this matter was considered from 1948 onwards, 1 shall cite a few instances. 115. On 10 August, in the village of Badgam,they set fire to two high schools. The inhabitants of the village who tried to put out the fire were fired upon by them. 116. On the night of 14 August, they started a fire in Baramula area on the outskirts of Srinagar, resulting in the destruction of 300 houses. 8ome of them, with incendllry material in their possession, were captured. A Pakistani radio broadcast admitted that this outrage was committed by Pakistani infiltrators. 117. Another typical incident: A group of Pakistani trooPs entered a village and started firing and looting. When the Idian security forces arrived on the soene, &eY fotmd chat eleven villagers had been kllled, four wounded and six houses burnt down. 118. Another ghastly incident: On 8 August, some girls from the village. Nangam in the north-west of the Kashmir valley went to a nearby forest to colle& firewood. They detected some Pakistani tmops in hiding there. The girls returned to the village and told their parents of this fact, who in their turn informed the authorities. A strong detachment of 119. The latest incident 1 know of occurred on Thursday last. Pakistani aircraft-Saber jets-attacked a village in the Chhamb sector of Jammu and Kashmir with machine-gun fire and bombed it, killing about fifty persons. During the course of the attack, the aircraft made a direct hit on a masque. The name of the village is Jaurian. 120. The facts which 1 have recounted above, sud which are amply supported by the document before the Council, cari lead to only one conclusion. It is that Pakistan is once again gullty of aggression against the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. In the earlier stages, it was a disguised invasion, although the disguise was very thin. Now Pakistani troops in regular attack formation, supported by armoured regiments and fast jets obtained from its military allies, are operating five to six miles on the Indian side of the cesse-fire line. The aggression is SO patent and deliberate that for it to be condoned by this Council would be tantamount to repudiating the obligations assumed by its members under the Charter of the United Nations, the generally accepted principles of international law and, what is more, the cesse-fire agreement which was arranged with the help of the United Nations itself. Through thls deliberate aggression, Pakistan has torn the cesse-fire agreement to shreds and reduced the cesse-fire line to shambles. The only part of the resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for Indla and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 [S/llOO, para. 751 which has ever been implemented, although fitfully by Pakistan, was part I relating to the cesse-fire. That agreement has now been denounced by Pakistan thmugh its conduct. By sending troops acioss the cesse-fire line in the thousands, Pakistan has nullified the line. The Security Council must therefore consider the facts of Pakistan aggression and now, at least, corne to the correct conclusion. The conclusion is that by condoning the aggression of 1947- 1948 the Council in fact, although unwittingly, gave some legal semblance to Paklstan’s armed presence in a part of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. In thls manner, Pakistan was given an excuse for continuing aggression and, what is more, for perpetrating further aggression.

Inacknowledgingthe statement made by the representative of India, may 1, first of all, on a personal note, thank him very much for his kmcl reference to me. In turn, may 1 welcome him on behalf of the Council. IIe has a distinguishedand noble record in tbe serviceof bis country inmany capacities, amd 1 am sure 1 express the sentiments of ail when 1 say that 1 bave no doubt that he will make an equally distinguished contribution to the great work of the United Nations. 123. 1 give the floor totherepresentativeof Pakistan. 124. Mr. Amjad AL1 (Pakistan): May 1 expresstoyou rny delegation’s felicitations, Mr. President, on presiding over this august body, the Security Council, for this month. 1 need net recount your great experience, ability and outstanding knowledge of law, as these are well known. 1 atn confident that you will prove a most wortby successor of a very famous predecessor. 125. May 1 also express my gratitude to you, Mr. President, and to the Council for inviting my delegation to participate in this meeting. As 1 bave net received sny instructions from my Government, 1 reserve the right of my delegation to express its viewpoint on this matter, of supreme consequence to us, at a subsequent meeting of the Cou&l. 126 1 would like to state that the appeal made by the Secretary-General to the President of Pakistan is receiving the earnest considerationof my Government. 127. In regard to the statement we bave just heard, for a minute 1 thought that India, having called the meeting, had inscribed its name as the first speaker. 1 Will be extremely brief ano Will say that 1 strongly and totally repudiate the allegations made by the representative of India. There is not a single statement made by him which is net based on deliberate fiction and cannot be controverted by facts. These facts-relating as much to lndia’s traditionnl contempt for the Security Council’s resolutions on Kashmir as to its contravention of the international agreement about the settlement of the Kashmir dispute, as to the more recent aggressive acts of lndia, the shelling of Awan Sharif, in West Pakistan itself; as to India’s being the first to cross the cesse-fire line in May, and as to the India air force% escalation of the Conflict-are overwhelming.

On behalf of the six sponsors-Bolivia, the Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Uruguay-I should like to introduce to the members of this Council the text of a draft resolution [S/6657]. 131. The text is self-explanatory, and 1 need not dwell on its contents; it is entirely andsolely designed to meet the present emergency in Kashmir. 132. 1 wish to emphasise that the draft resolution makes no findings; it produces no judgements on the distressing and tragic situation that has suddenly developed along and beyond the cesse-fire llne between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. 1 am sure either side has at its elbow a11 the valid reasons to explain, and perhaps also to justify, how this came about and also why it could not be avoided and had to occur. For the immediate present, 1 venture to think, we shouldavoid getting entangled in these reasons, having regard to the urgency which faces the Security Council thls afternoon. 133. Hardly thirty minutes ago, as herewe exchanged compliments, before proceeding to exchange arguments, a Reuters’ report received in New York at 4.28 p.m. disclosed that: “Pakistani forces pushed deeper mto Indian Kashmir today”-Saturday, 4 September-“as air fighting between the two countries intensified and the United Nations Security Council met to try to salve what the Secretary-General, U Thant, called an ‘ominous situation’” and so on. 1 have referred to this in passing by way of emphasizing the urgency of the problem with which the Security Council is faced at this very moment. 134. The Security Council has before it the report of the Secretary-General. It discloses a state of affairs of the gravest kind, with unpredictable potentialities net merely for India and Pakistan but for the wider world as a whole. Even the characteristic moderation of the Secretary-General in the use of language in a11 his reports has had to be exceeded in the language in which he has presented this report. It underlines the somber shades in the situation and emphasises the risks that the world would be consciously running if nothing were done tc moderate and modify the attitudes that created thls situation. 135. The Security Councll therefore is faced wlth an objective situation on the ground and in the air in on a disturbing Ecale, even in the normally unstable conditions that bave prevailed in Kashmii. 136. The Security Council therefore owes itself and the high purposes for whïch it has been called into being a duty: to cry a hait to this manifestation which, with every day that passes, is escalating towards a wider war. Limited objectives in a situation of such porential danger cannot for very long remaïn lïmited, posting the potentiel threat of a larger conflagration. 137. As 1 said, the draft resolution does no more than just cal1 a hait to this escalation. India and Pakistan, as two great world Powers, bave less a duty to themselves tban to the wider cause of world peace and world order. They bave been and should continue to be an example to the Afro-Asian world. Certainly neither of them, with the wealth of political talent and wisdom with which they bave been genemusly endowed, cari seriously believe-whatever the rationaliaed and articulated motivations behind theirrespective present stands-that the course inwhichtheyhave launched themselves, a course, if 1 may Eay SO, Eo utterly alien to their cultures and their manifest destiny in the world, cari in fact and in truth contribute towards a peaceful solution of their decadesold problems, to which they bath bave unreservedly committed themselves in the eyes of the world. 138. The draft resolution ~11s attention to the obligations already undertaken by the two States and just asks them to desist from pursuing their objectives through the dangerous paths of violence and injustice to theti duty to themselves, and in deference to the Charter of the United Nations and their duty to the world. 139. The world Press bas in recent days pressed on and presented to the Governments of India and Pakistan tbe anxieties of the Heads of States and Governments a11 over the world at the alarming drift of the situation in Kashmir, and all of them bave directly addressed appeals to the Heads of Government in India and Pakistan. Perhaps 1 may be permitted to mention specially the attitude of Mr. Lester Pearson of Canada, offering bis immediate and persona1 services to help to bring abxt a ceasefire, which brings to this problem its deserved measure of urgency. 140. 1 trust that this Council will suffer no delay, will act promptly andwithallpossiblespeedandaccept this draft resolution without a dissenting voice SO that the appeal of the Secretary-General may beendorsedwitb the unanimous strength of the whole of this Council.

The alarming reports of recent events on bath sides of the cesse-fire line in Kashmir bave filled the 142. At this particular moment, my delegation has no desire to enter into a detailed examination of the broader issue, for the obvlous urgency of the situation calls for few words but clear expressions. These clear expressions of the opinions of the mersbers of the Security Council should be an endorsement and an affirmation of the earnest appeals that bave already been made to the two parties engaged in this distressing conflict. 143. The message which the Secretary-General sent on 1 September to the President of the Republic of Pakistan and to the Prime Minister of the Republio of India represents the culmination of a series of steps which the Secretary-General undertook tocheck further deterioration of the situation. My delegation is appreciative of the unrelenting efforts of the Secretary-General and is all tbe more disappointed to note that thesn earnest appeals bave net as yet been heeded by the contending parties. 144. Likewise, the messages from a number of Governments, equally appalled at the breaches of the peace in Kashmir, altbough those messages were an obvious indication of general and deep concern with this frightening situation, bave SO far received no reassuring replies. 145. Where all these earnest and direct appeals bave produced no hopeful results, it is the opinion of my Government that the Security council cannot remain inactive with regard to acts which corne clearly within the purview of the provisions of chapter VII of the Charter. 146. It is the primary duty of the Security Council at this stage to cal1 for resoect for the cens+fire agreement >nd the cesse-f&e line freely agreed upon by both Pakistan and India on 27 July 1949. It is urgent that the parties be called upon to cesse forthwith a11 hostilities and to restore the ceasefire llne. 147. Force cannot settle the issue. However deeply rooted the differences may be, however strong the passions may flow, a solution cannot be reached as long as armed might is used to force an outcome. As Members of the United Nations, havlng subscribed to the Charter and to ihe words of the Preamble, “to practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours”, we are all obliged to act, in ail circumstances, in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the Charter. 148. At the present stage of our deliberations and of our dealing with the grave situation in Kashmir, Eo. Lord CARADON (United Kingdml): nay Government bas been following witb gave and growing caneerr. tbe recent yiolent anddangerous developments in Kasbmir. These devefo>me&ts are described in ffie Secreéary-General’s report wkh is before us toaay. 151. IVe bave n&sd tbe report made by General Nimmo, described in paragraph 6 of tbe Secretary- General% report, tbat tbe sexies of violations of tbe cesse-fire line tbat began on 5 August %ere to a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of axmed nzen, genernlly noé in unifoxm, crosshg the cesse-fire Iine from tbe Pakistan side forthepwpose of armed action on tbe Indian side”. 152. We bave also aoted the Secretary-C,eneral’s conclusion, set out in bic telegrams datedlseptember 1965 t0 the F?iPne Minister of India ay iine President of Pakistan, that, without any attempt to apportion blanxe, it may be said tbat acts ofviolence %XV corne fmm botb sides of tbe ltie, involve an ir,creasingly large number of amed men on each side, and tske place in the air as weI1 as on tbe gxouk~d~. me Secretary-General added tbat, most serious of ali, %egular army troops fmm bot& countries are now engaging in military actions along and across the Zinc”. 153. The fact that after seventeen years theàashmir question, in which tbe Security Council has been for SO long involved, bas given rise to such an explosive situation is a matter for special conoern to this Counoil. Tbe fact that tvm great nations should be engaged in such a conflict is a matter of anxiety to tbe wbole world. Surely we all now bave one over- 154. We bave always believed that the Kashmir problem must be solved if there is to be peaoe and stability in the sub-continent. That is still our view. But we also believe that the problem oan be solved only by peaceful negotiation and not by force. We earnestly hope that the present situation oan be resolved in a manner which makes resumption of such negotiaticns possible. 155. Whatever the individual views of members of the Council on the substance or the history of the Kashmir dispute, surely a11 of us must now ooncentrate a11 OUI endeavours on that one aim: the aim of convincing bcth countries that continued fighting can bring only disastrous consequences to all directly concerned and to the whole sub-continent and also to the cause of international security. 156. We should in this Council act quiclsly. We should speak wlth one voice. We should make our cal1 for an end to the confiict unanimous and unmistakable. In doing SO we shall be speaking with the true voice of the United Nations. 157. We are sure that our purpose of stopping the fighting is in the interests of both India and Pakistan, and we trust that the two Governments Will respect and heed an appeal which, it is not toc much to say, carries with it the wishes and hopes of people thrcughout the world. We trust too that they will reoognise that we act, and must act, inaccordanoe witb the needs of international peaoe and securiiy, which under the Charter we are al; charged tc maintain. 158. We entirely endorse the actions which bave already been taken by the Secretary-General, and we shall continue to give him every support. In particular, we are grateful to him for marking out the steps required to restore the cesse-fire. That he did in the most earnest and cloquent appeal which he addressed to the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India three days agc. 159. IVly Government immediately supported tbat appeal and made the following statement: “The British Government bave been following with close attention and considerable anxiety ths development of the situation in Kashmir. They wholeheartedly support the appeal made by the United Nations Secretary-General to botb sides in tbe dispute to agree to an immediate ceasefire and to respect the cesse-fire agreement wblch both entered into in 1949.” 160. You, Mr. President, af once publicly expressed your countryls full endorsement of the Secretary- General% appeal. Now is the time for tbe Security Council to take tbe lead in rallying support bshind the Secretary-General% initiative. 16% It is with those considerations in mind, therefore, that my delegatio” appmaohes the draft resolution submitted by Bolivia, the Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Uruguay. It seems to me that the drsft resolutio” contains the essential elements of the action wbich today, in immediate support of the steps take” by the Secretary-General, thls Council is in duty Lxxmd to take. 1 hope that we shalI alI be able rapidly to agree to make the call for a cerise-fim, as is pmposed in the draft resolutlon. 163. Mr. lUFA’ (Jordan): Before 1 speak briefIy, for the tIme being, on the question beforethe Security CounciI today, 1 should like to welcome you, Mr. President. as an outstanding representative of your country. Your first appearance in this Councll as the representative of the United States of America coincides wlth your presidi”g over oui meetings for the carrent month. Tbis dig”ified advent is ù1 keeping with the high office which you bave just left and wlth the distingulshed position whichyou are just assuming. You corne fmm the highest judicial hody in your country, where right and justice reign supreme, to the blghest international body, where right andjustice in the relations among nations must be the basic plIlars of peace. 1 sincerely hope that the success which accompanied you in your past camer will continue to be with you in the tasks ahead. 164. Just as members of the Councll bave followed with deep co”cern the recent armed olashes in Kashmir, the efforts of the Secretary-General to hait .$hose dangernus activities bave also been followed vflth special appreciation. In recognition of his valuable contributions to the cause of peace, it should be sald that oui’ Secretary-General is shouldering with devotion and perseverance much of the heavy tasks in the maintenance of international peace. 165. It is therefore quite appropriate that. in their tum, members of tbe Security Council should feel called upo” to meet and consider a situation as dangerous to international peace and security as the one before us today. It is most unfortunate to sec that force of arms bas become the spoken language behvee” two great nations that belong to the same continent and share the heavy responsibility of protecting peace in the great continent of Asia. With bath those nations my people and country bave most Cordial rdatiOnS and strong tics, and we cherish the same ideals and serve tbe same principles as they do. 166. We therefore regret to see that the cease-firire llne in Kashmlr has been opened to wide and expanding armed con%% Yet we know that this thln barrier can- “ot continue to resist the pressure of the political weight in the underlying factors and interests of bath nations. Nor ca” it last long in provlding hope and 167. In the opinion of my delegation, the present meetings of the Security Council should yield positive results. TO meet the immediate requirement, the Council should cal1 on India and Pakistan to halt forthwith their armed clashes and return, each of them, to the original position on its side of the line. That requirement has indeed been met in the draft resolution just introduced by the representative of Malaysia. Once this purpose of a cessation of armed hostilities has been achieved, it should be followed by a serious attempt on the part of the Security Council to look into the wider and basic aspects of the matter. 168. As regards the present regrettable state of events, we wish to take note of the important report of the Secretary-General on the current situation in Kashmir, and we trust that the Secretary-General Will continue, as he always does, to enable us to be promptly informed of the developments in the situation.

In acknowledging theremarks of the representative of Jordan, 1 wish to indicate my special p ?-titude for the warm and cordial comments he has made concerning myself, comments which 1 reciprocate in full measure to him as one of the most able and distinguished representatives here who has contribued SO much to the effective functioning of the Security Council. 1 thank him very much.

The Security Council has before it the question of the armed conflict which has arisen between two neighbouring Members of the United Nations. In the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir there is the sound of gunfire, blood is being shed, and events are taking place which arouse the serious concern of all peace-1Oving people. 171. In view of our feelings of sympathy and friendship for the peoples of India and Pakistan, we cannot remain indifferent to the sufferings of the peaceful inhabitants of Kashmir and to the worsening of relations between the two States. 173. My delegation, at previous meetings of tbe Council devoted totbisquestion, has repeatedlypointed out that tbe tension between tbese twc important Asian States over Kasbmir is on@ of tbe grim legaciee of colonialism. The imperialists bave always tried to use the Kashmir question to stir up quarrels hetween the p@oples of India and Pakistan, to set them against each otber now tbat tbey bave freed tbemselves from colonial bondage, to undermine their solidarity, to aggravate international relations and exploit tbe situation tbus created for their own selfisb purposes, and to create in Asia yet anotber botbed of tension. 174. It go@* without sayingthat the confIict inKa.shmir cari benefit neither side: neitber India nor Pakistan. Engaged as tbey are in tbe great task of developing tbeir national economies, the peoples of India and Pakistan bave a stake in peace and friendship with a11 countries, in friendship witb each otber. 175. Tbe people of the Soviet Union are sincere friends of the peoples of India and Pakistan. Tbat is wby they are concerned over tbe bloodshed in Kashmir and tbe armed conflict between tbese two neighbcuring States. 176. The Soviet Union has, of course, traditionally been a friend of India. Wehavehigbesteem for India’s adherence to the policy of non-alignment and ta tbe principles of peaceful coexistence betw@enStates. Tbe Soviet Union supports the Indian people’s courageous struggle against colonialism. 177. The strengtbening of the ties uniting the Soviet Union and Pakistan is part of my Government’s general policy directed towards safeguarding peace in Asia and throughout tbe world. 178. In pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union at ail times supports the settlement of rimputes through negotiations and by peaceful means. It should be pointed out that lndia and Pakistan bave already show” willingness to adopt tbat course with a view to establisbing good-neighbourly relation*. In June of tbis year, for example, tbey concluded an agreement for a cesse-fire in the Rann of Kutch.2 In doing SO, bath sides sbowed tbe greatest common sense, restraint and patience. 1’79. We consider it necessary to point out tbat any further exacerbation of the conflict in Kashmir might further aggravate tension on the Asian continent. 160. It is to be hoped that a cessation of the armed conflict will in turn gradually lead to the establishment of mutual understandii and co-operation between India and Pakistan. In the opinion of my delegation, settlement of the conflict in Kashmir would be an linportant contribution to the maintenance of peace.

This is certainly no timeto go into the background to the Kashmirquestionorto pass judgement on the latest violations of the cesse-fire agreement. 1 think the report of the Secretary-General, particularly the passage cited by the representative of the United Kingdom, is cloquent enougb. We are indebted to tbe Secretary-General for his timely report and for his continuing efforts to re-establish the cesse-fire. It now falls to the Council tosupport in no uncertain terms the appeal of the Secretary-General. 182. The representative of Malaysia has made another significant contributionto theworkofourcouncil by promptly presenting a draft resolutionwhich, inthe view of my delegation, Will adequately meet tbe requirements of the present grave situation. My delegation wholeheartedly supports it. 183. Mr. President, if 1 mayaddawordhere, 1 recall that when Mr. Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State of the United States, spoke in the General AssemblyHall at tbe memorial meeting for yourlatepredecessor, he told us that the United States always sends to the United Nations its best, and, if 1 may say SO, in you we flnd the best.

1 appreciate very much the over-generous comments made by the representative of China. 1 shall do my best in small measure to try to meet some of the praise that he has been kind enough to vlsit upon me.

We bave before us the report of the Secretary-General dated 3 September 1965. This document is particularly disturbing because of tbe light ‘it sheds onthe development of certain events in Kashmir whichwehave been following in the past few weeks. Net only Press reports, but statements from officiai sources clearly confirm, as indicated in the Secretary-General% report, the seriousness of the situation in that part of the world, where the intensity of certain military operations on land and in the air are a manlfeStation not only of the threat of force, which is already prohibited by the Charter, but of the undeniable use Of force between two great nations.

As no o+her members of the Security Council wish to speak, 1 shall new speak asM?s;Czpresentative of the UNITED STATES OF 186. 1 speak for my Government in total support of the draft resolution submltted by Bolivia, the Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Uruguay. 1 slmuld like to compliment the spensors for drafting a resolution which represents, as is apparent from the discussion here this afternoon and now tonlght, the overwhelming sentiment of the members of the Security Coumil. 189. We are meeting here, as is apparent, ina spirit of grave concern for peare on the Asian subcontinent. The reverberations of fighting between the forces of India and Pakistan are reaching us in increasing volume. As the Secretary-General has reported so well and SO objectively, the cesse-fire bas been broken and there bave been serious breaches of the cesse-fire Une in Jammu and Kashmlr. Armed personnel as well as military units of the regular forces of bath India and Pakistan bave now crossed the cesse-fire Une established by agreement on 27 July 1949. 1 shall not attempt to recapitulate the facts, which bave been set out in the report of the Secretary-General, but shall only share his concern for future peaoe ùehveen India and Pakistan. 199. The United States, and, as has been made evident here today, all other members oftbis Council, bave viewed these events with the greatest apprehen- SiOn and concern. Since the birtb of India and Pakistan, mY Gwernment bas developed close and friendly relations with their Governments, relations wbich we wish with ail sitmerity to continue. The people of the United States bave many ties based on friendship, C*mmon interest, and shared goals with the peoples of hoth India and Pakistan. These are expressed not or”Y in the broad programmes which my Government bas pursued, and is pursuing, to assist the development and security of these countries, but also in the form of many non-governmental exchanges and Programmes, particularly in the fields of health, eduation and economic development. We know intimately from our close relations with bath countries the intricacies of the underlying problem which is at the mot of today’s conflict, a pmhlem whmh haï 192. It was emphasieed, in tbe comprehensive and carefullv ureuared r&ort of tbe Secretarv-General of 3 September, that there has been a disturbing increase in bath the number and scale of Incidents in the area of the cesse-fire line in Kasbmir since early 1965-violations of the agreement, signed by representatives of hotb Govermnents on 27 July 1949, which established the cesse-fire line. In June, the Secretary-General, persevertig as he does, was able through quiet persuasion to effect a solution of the threatening situation in the Kargil area-a very great contribution in the cause of international peace and security. 193. As noted in the report OftbeSecretary-General, the tempo of Incidents rose again in early Augubt. 1 shall net recount those incidents; they are fully and, 1 tbink, objectively reported in tbis report and in the details submitted to the Secretary-General by General Nimmo, Cbief of the United NationsMiiitaryObserver Group. 194. As indioatedinthereport,theSecretary-General bas, since early August, been endeavouring persistently and thmugh quiet diplomacy to pmmote a restoration of calm and respect of the cesse-fire. In his report to the Council, the Secretary-General sets fortb a number of conditions which be considers prerequisite to a restoration of the cesse-fire. In hi6 telerrrams of 1 Sentember to President Avub Kban andbrime Minister’Shast&, appealing to b&leaders to respect the cesse-fire agreement, the Secretary- General again outlines these conditions. They are, in the view of my Govemment, hotbsoundand reasonable and they are, in effect. e&orsed by the casefire reauest made in the draft resolution. 195. 1 should like to point out tbat co-operation witb the military observers, which is one of the Secretary- General% propos&, must mean fuIl freedom of movement and access for tbe observers in the dlscharge of tbeir functions. These functions are to observe and report any violation of the cesse-fire and tbe cesse-fire line and to supervise the ceasefire order. This clear supervisory function of the military observerS derives from the terms of the “In its discretlon and as the Commission may find practicable. the Commission wlll appoint military observers who, under the authority of tbe Commission and wlth the co-operation of botb Commands. dl supervise the observance of the cesse-fire order.” 196. It is clear that all the conditions enumeratsd by the Secretary-General ln his appeal are prerequlsite to an effective cesse-fire, which the draft resolution before us endorses. 197. \Vhen the Secretary-General% appeal to President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri was made public, 1 immediately ar.nounced, with the autbority of President Johnson, my Government’s complete endorsement of that appeal. 1 bave the authority fmm the President to reiterate that endorsement here today. It is ail too clear that tbe Iatest developments in Kashmlr bear traglc witness to the imperative need for an immediate ceasefire. 1 do net think 1 need point out, after wbat bas been said here today, the devastating consequences a war behveen India and Pakistan would bave on tbe peopleS Of the subcontinent and 1 dare say on tbe entire world. 198. Thf world has been privileged to witness the remarkable economic and social pmgress of these two great countries in hehalf of their peoples, and many of the nations represented in this Council bave been able to contrihute to this process. It ought to continue, under conditions of peace, in the interesis of the inhabitants of bath countries. It would be an unthlnkabie tragedy should these great achievements, past and present-and future-be annulled by a failure to end the currenl fighting pmmptly and firmly. 1 pmfoundly helievl that this Council cari do no less than glve its fullest support to the appeal of the Secretary-General and to the draft resolution just submitted by my colleague from Malaysia speaking on behalf of representatives and nations whlch participated in the drafting of this text. 199. Moreover, my Government believes that it is of the highest importance to the cause of world geace and security, and indeed to the cause of the Charter, which is dedicated to these great principles, that the Security Coîuwil must clearly and unequivocally Place its great authority behind these grave appeals, and we pray chat the parties involved Will hear ow v&es and draw back from the caiastrophe which t~w&ms a11 of them. The cost to them, and to the world, of tbeir failure to do SO wuld be beyond any ~SSSUDZ that any Of us here today could even contemplate. 201. The Cou&l dors not seem to be faclng up to the simple issue of aggression. It is now considering a draft resolutlon sponsored by Bolivla, the Ivorq Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlar.ds and Uruguay. We bave just seen that draft resolution. Naturally. we bave had no time to study it or refer it to OUI Government for instructions. The Councll willappreciatethat 1 am in no position to state my Government’s reactions. However, I should like to offer some general comments. 202. Cease-fire is a very desirable objective, but it oan corne only after Pakistan has been condemned as an aggressor and the Council has instructed the Government of Pakistan to withdraw its troops, whether or net they are in unlform, from the Indian State of Jammu and Kasbmir. It is only along the these lines that a durable cesse-fire wlll be possible. 203. In this context, 1 cari do no better than to read out the texty of the reply sent today, 4 September, by my Prime Minister to the Secretary-General: “1 bave the honour to acknowledge the receipt 01 your message received on 2 September. “1 appreciate the considerations tbat have prompted you to address an appeal to us and to Pakistan. Our Permanent Representative inNewYorkhasbeen in frequent touch with you and has kept you informe0 of tbe situation as it has developed since 5 August. 1 bave no doubt tbat from all the information that you bave received from the Unlted Nations observers in Kashmir and on the basis ofyourownassessment, il is clear that the root cause of the present dangerous situation is the undertaking of massive infiltrations of armed personnel from the Pakistan side, wellorganized and trained in sabotage andsubversivewarfare, the whole operation being çonceived, plannec and executed by Pakistan. The inflltrators are, ir fact, members of Pakistan armed forces. These infiltrators are, in fact, members of Pakistan arme6 forces. These infiltrations are still continuing. Such action by Pakistan is a clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of the cesse-fire agreement, and against a11 canons of international law and code of good neighbourllness. It is to meel this thinly disguised invasion that the Governmenl of India, while showing every forbearance, has been forced to take preventive military action. “In your message you bave appealed in the in. terests of oeace that we sbouldindicateourintentiol to respect! the cesse-fire agreement, that therc should be a cessation of crossin&s xf the ceas@ WI would like to take this opportunity of apprising WI would like to take this opportunity of apprising you of the salient facts of tbe situation. Since you of the salient facts of tbe situation. Since 5 August, several thousands of infiltrators from 5 August, several thousands of infiltrators from Pakistan sud Pakistan-xcunied Kasbmlr bave Pakistan sud Pakistan-xcunied Kasbmlr bave crossed the cesse-fire line. Tlmse men bave corne camouflaged as civ%aus and fully armed with modem weapons, signal equipment, large quantities of ammunition and supplies and explosives. From the interrogation of tfie prisoners captured by us from among tbe infiltrators, many of whom are regular officers of the Pakistan Army, it is now known tbat a military headquarters was set up in Murree in West Pakistan in May 1965under General Akhtar Iiussain Malik, GeneralOfficer Commanding, 12th Division, of the Pakistan Army. This organisation is kuown as Military Headquarters ‘Gibraltar Force’. Tbeir instructions were to destroy bridges and vital roads, attack police stations, supply dumps. army beadquarters and important installations, inflict casualties on Indian forces, and attack VI?S in Jammu and Kashmir. The statements of the captured prisoners and the nature and type of weapons which the infiltrators carried. larae auantities of wbieh bave beencapturedbyus.bearingthemarklngs of Pakistan ordnance factories, prove beyond a sbadow of doubt tbat tbe infiltrators were armedand equipped by the Pakistan Government and bave operated under tbeir instructions. “Pakistan. however, has denied any knowledge of these armed infiltrators and persists in the theory that there is an interna1 revoit in Kashmlr-a rewlt whlcb does net exist and has net been noticed by independent foreign observers. Since your message was sent, the situation has been further aggravated by a massive attack launched by two regiments of tanks and aircraft supported by Pakistan troops in brigade strength, across the cesse-fire line and the international frontiers between the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir and West Pakistan. The attack, wbicb is in great strength, is aimed at OUI key positions controlling our lines of communications. Even on its own admission, as indicated in President Ayub Khan’s broadcast of 1 September, the Pakistani forces bave gone to the assistance of tbeinfiltrators wbom Pakistan chooses to cal1 ‘freedom fighters’. There is no pretence in it of any klnd of defensive “In your message, Mr. Secretary-General, you bave vourself recoaniaed that essential to the restoration of the cesse-fire would be a cessation of the crossings of the cesse-fire line by armed personnel. As 1 bave indicated above, the root cause of the present dangerous situation lies in the massive infiltrations of Pakistani armed personnel. Since the Pakistan Government disown responsibility for the armed infiltrations, your appeal to Pakistan, SO far as armed infiltrators are concerned, cari hardly be productive of results and the roct cause of the trouble Will remain. “India is a peace-loving country. We bave neither the inclination or is it in our interest to be deviated from the path of peace and economic progress to that of a military conflict. Pakistan has, however. by sending armed infiltrators in large numbers across the cesse-fire line brought about a situation in which we bave no choice but to defend ourselves and take such preventive action as may be deemed essential. In taking such preventive action we bave, in certain sectors, had to cross the cesse-fire line for the purpose of effectively preventii further infiltrations. This is a matter of great impOrtanCe to us. “As to the cesse-fire agreement, you are well aware that we bave shown respect for the ceasefire line all these years though Pakistan has shown scant regard for it. Overthepast hvoyesrs. General Nimmo, Chief Military Observer, has made proposais for a meeting betwron the representatives of India and Pakistan with a view to ensuring ths observance of the cesse-fire agreement and to preventing its violation from the Pakistan side by armed civilians. We have always accepted these proposa&, but Pakistan has either refected them or net responded tc them; In July 1964, we offered to corne to a gentleman% agreement with Pakistan to ensure tranquillity along the cesse-fire line. Pakistan at first agreed to a meeting andthe repretentatives of India and Pakistan were to meet in Karacbi on 2 November X464. Nowever, a day before the meeting was to be held, Pakistan postponed the meeting unilaterally ami did net suggest any fresh date thereafter. aPakistan% international behaviour is such as cannot be ignored in considering your appeal. It “xl PS in April 1965. P&ista in our territory in t Qf Ktuch, a clear case of use of force for rtion of its clnims, wbieh is forbidaeu by tic3 cbatier 0f United Nations. fbe Baxkuq Declaration, tbe charter of the Organisation of cm Unity, the Caire Ueclaration and many r international declarations of Our Lime. ln spite of such provocation, we showed forboarance .md reached an agreement witb Pakistan on 30 June 196.5 for tb@ peaceful seftlement of tbe border question. The hope was solemnly expressed by htb sides in tbe sgreement ébat it wouãd result in better reIations between India and Pakistanandin tbe easing of tewicns between the fw countries. It Es na4 dem, however, that even when Pakistan was putting its signature to tbat agreement it was planning and orgmising the massive armed infiltrations across tbe cesse-fire line in Jammu and Ka.shmir, and even before tbe ink was dry on tbat agreet-nent, Pakistan launcbed tbousands of its armed infiltrators across the cesse-fire Une. We cannot be expected to wait for Pakistan to violate fbe cesse-fire Une snd tc attack us at will, and we canuot go from one cesse-fire to another without our being satisfied that Pskistsn Will net repeat its acts of violations and aggression in the future. Vbere is ~CI other name for the massive inftltrations of Pakistani across the cesse-fire line and âcross tbe international frontier between Jammu and Kasbmir and West Pakistan, and the military attack tbat Pakistan has launcbed into our territory, but aggression. Tbat aggression tbrows on us, as a sovereign State, responsibilities for defence whicl are cur rigbt and duty to discharge. *TO sum UP, 1 bave taken tbis opportunity OI aaquainting you with a11 the aspects of the comple> and dangerws situation that has been brought aboui by Pakistam actions. We owe it to you and to tha high office you occupy with such distinction, tc Ieave you in, no doubt as to our position. Or Secretary-General, you bave appealed for peace anc we greafW appreciate your anxiety and the sinceritJ of your efforts. India has always stood firrnly for peace and our position needs no reiteration. ~1x1 is eSSenti& however, today is that Pakistan shouh uodertake forthwith to stop infiltrations across thc 204. The Secretary-General% report [S/6651] ccntains the following in paragraph 9: “1 bave net obtained from the Government of Pakistan any assurance that the cesse-fire and tbe cesse-fire line Will be respected henceforth or tbat efforts would be exerted to restore conditions to normal along that 1ine.n 205. Why has no assurance been forthcoming from Pakistan? It is because that country bas no desire to end its aggression on the Indian State of Jammu and Kasbmir. In faot, Pakistan has disowned any responsibility for sending armed troops in civilian disgnise across the cesse-fire line. As my Prime Minister stated in a broadcast to the nation yesterday, 3 September: “The Pakistani Government has endeavoured to oreate a myth-and this myth has bnen reiterated in Prcsids& Ayub Khan’s broadcast on 1 Septembertbst infiltrators are freedom fighters and that there is pa intsrnal re::olt in Kashmir.” 206. Even today, on 4 September, neither the represomative 3: Pakistan nor the Government of Paktstan bas acimitted responsibility for sending armed troops in civilian disgnise across the cesse-fire Une. 207. Paragraph 15 of the Secretary-General% report gives five conditions which are necessary before “restoration of the cesse-fire and a return to normal conditions âbxng the cesse-fire line cari be achieved”. One of the conditions, given in sub-paragraph (Q). is “A readiness on the part of the Government of Pakistan to take effective steps tcprevent crossings of the cesse-fire line from the Pakistan side by armed men, whether or not in uniform.” A furthsr condition is thc withdrawal of armed personnel, What guarantaes cari this Council give that even if Pakistan agrees to respect the cesse-fire agreement and the cesse-fire line, it will take effective 209. In a bmadoast to the nation yesterday. my Prime Minister said: “what we are up agaiust is a régime which does net idieve in freedom, democracy and peace as we do.* TO quote front the Prime Minister once agaùu “In the agreement between India and Pakistan in connexion with the Gujarat-West Pakistan border, signed an 30 June 1965, Pakistan solemnly affirmed its hope that the agreement would result in better relations and easing of the tensions between ~ndia and Pakistan. “The conscience of the world wiIl be shocked to know that even at the time this agreement was being signed, Pakistan had already drawn up the plan of armed lnfiltration in Kashmir and was training its personnel in Murree for operations to be undertaken just over a month later, even before the ink was dry on the ngreement of 30 June. Such conduct speaks for itself.” 209. It is the congenital hostility of the various régimes in Pakistan against India which dictates their policies. If the rulers of Pakistan were ever willing to live in peace with India, they would find a ready response from the Govermnent ond people of India. 210. The Council today speaks of a cesse-fire. The Secretary-General has appealed for a cesse-fire. Do 1 need to remind the Council that India bas repeatedly offered a %xvar pact” te Pakistan?Oneachoccasion this offer bas been spurned. 211. TO meet the present situation it is essentialthat there be: first, an acceptable guaranteefromPakistan that infiltrations across the cesse-fire line will be stopped forthwith and that infiltrators and the armed forces of Pakistan Will be withdravm from the Indian side of the cesse-fire lime and the international frontier witb the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir and West Pakistan: and, seconclly, an acceptable guarantee that there will be no recurrence of such a situation. 212. These are the starting points for any steps toward the restoration of peace. 213. As 1 understand it, there bas SO far been no reply from Pakistan to the appeal issued by the Secretary-General on 1 September. In the absence of such a response from Pakistan and in the absence of assurances requested earlier by the Secretary- General, it seems premature for the Councll to proceed with the consideration of the draft resolution. As far as my delegation is concerned, the reply of my Prime Minister to the Secretary-general’s appeal-which 1 bave just read out-constitutes our 216. The Indian representative made his statement on his Government’s instructions; 1 made no similar statement myself. The two statements cannot be put on the same footing. It is therefore for the Council to consider whether such a preamble as tbe one I mentioned is appropriate, and, more importantly, whether it will be at a11 helpful forthe Council to adopt a resolution without hearing one of tbe parties. 216. 1 bave not studied the draft resolution, 1 bave merely glanced througb it. 1 note with regret that the draft resolution does not even refer to the basis of the cesse-fire which was established in Kashmir in 1949, the basis of the demilitarisation and the plebiscite. This omission in itself cari be seriously prejudicial to the position of the party which seeks the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations. 217. Subject to instructions from my Government, 1 wonder how, without proof of the Security Council’s intentions to engage in serious efforts toward the settlement of the Kashmir dispute, in accordance with thc wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged to them by the United Nations, any appeal from tbe Security Council Will effectiwly and convlncingly restore the peace which we a11 desire.

No other representatives wlsh to speak. Therefore, if there are no objections, since the sponsors of the draft resolution before us bave asked for a prompt vote, I propose to put to the vote the draft resolution [S/6657]. A vote was teken by show of hmds. The draft resolution was adopted unanimously.~ 219. Mi-. SEYDOUX (France) (translated from French): 1 apologize, Mr. President, for taking the floor at this late heur, but 1 must convey to you the French delegation’s deep satisfaction on seeing you take your Seat today at the head of the United States delegation. There cari be no doubt tbat the Council will benefit enormously by the abilities which you hnve SO amply demonstrated in tbe course of an exceptionally brilliant career. 221. The French d@l@gation is net unawar@ thattbese are only emergency measures and that tbe problemof the root causes of tbe present crisis remains intact. However, in view of the fact tbat blood is belng sbed in Knsbmir and tbat any prolongation of bostilitieswould greatly jeopardiae peace in a whole region of the world, tbese emergenoy measures are an essential prelimlnary to the more basic examlnations wbicb the Council wlll later decide to undertake. 222. Thus, tbe resolucion adopted today does net, in our opinion, prejudge the Council’s future attitude towards tbe contradictoay positions beld by India and Pakistan wltb regard to tbe truc nature of the present conflict.

1 appreciate tbe very kind and generous comments tbe representative of France made concerning me. 1 look forward to a period of collaboration witb hlm. 1 now give tbe floor to tbe representative of Malaysia, who bas contributed SO mucb to the formulation of tbe resolution whicb was unanlmously adopted today. 224. Mr. FtAMANI (Malaysia): It is rather unusual for on@ of tbe sponsors of a draft resolution to want to explain hls vote; but, if you Will permit me, 1 would like to offer a brief comment on tbe statement made by th@ representative of Pakistan ~6th regard to wbat he theught wsre errors of fact tbat had been allowed to oreep into tbis resolution. 225. Tbe second preambular paragraph refers to bavlng beard tbe statements of tbe representatives of India and Pakistan, and he thougbt it was ratber singular chat we sbould bave used tbe plural. But 1 wisb to remind him tbat all that we say bere is tbat we beard tbe statement tbat the representative of Pakistan made. Tbat statement was tbat he reserved the right to make a fuller statement on tbe vital positions in the political content of tbe conflict between India and Pakistan on a later occasion. IIe also said tbat he repudiated everytbing that was said by the representative of India. Without meaning to be derogatory eitber to tbe representative of India or to tbe representative of Pakistan, 1 may say tbat wbat had been said by tbe representative of India was no more relevant t0 this resolution than wbz& bad net been said by the representative of Pakistan. Tbey were botb concerned wilh the situation as it occurred. Until we bave heard eitber tbe representative of India or tbe representative of Pakistan deny tbe facts as tbey bave been portrayed in d&ll in the report of tbe Secretary-General, tbe draft resolution tbat we 227. Mr. RIFA’I (Jordan): 1 also wlsh to rafer to the observation made bytherepresentativeop~stan regardlng the second preambular paragraph. Ris observation is well talcen as far as my delegation ls concerned. Since it will appear in the offlcial records of the present discussion, the matter wlll be selfexplanatory.

We have now completed our work for today. 1 want to take this occasion to thank the membars of the Security CounciI for their cooperation with me, a neworner to this Chai. They bave made my task easier. 1 would also like to express my appreciation to the representative of India and the representative of Pakistan for thelr co-operation. 229. There remains the question of the next meeting of the Cou&l. The resolution we bave just adopted requests the Secretary-General to report to us on its implementation within three days. 1 would therefore suggest, unless there is objection, that we set our next meeting for 3 p.m. on Wednesday, 8 September 1965, it belng understood that the Council could be convened earlier should circumstances SO demand. It was SO decided. The meeting rose et 7.45p.m. liOW TO OBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications moy be obtained distributorr throughout the world. write to: Unit& Notions, Sales COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS Les publications des Notions Unies agences dépositaires du monde entier. ou adresser-vous 8: Notions Unies, COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de 10s Nocioner casas distribuidoras en todos portes dirljase LI: Naciones Unidos, Secci6n