S/PV.1239 Security Council

Before proceeding witb our business today. 1 wish to take this opportunity to welwme to the Cou-cil Mr. Aleksei E. Nesterenko, wbo bas recently taken up the position of Under- Secretaxy for Political and Security Council Affairs. Mr. Nesterenko is net unfamiliar to many here since he bas been tbe representative of the Soviet Union at various international conferences, as well as a memhe: of tbe Soviet Mission to tbe United Nations. 3. 1 am sure 1 express tbe unanimous views of tbe Security Council in welcoming Mr. Nesterenko to bis new and important post and in saying to him, on bebalf of tbe members of tbe Council, that we look forvnrd to fruitful collaboration witb him in the work of the Security Council. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted.

In accordance with ourprevious decisions on thIs matter, 1 propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of India and Pakistan to participate, in the discussion of the question. At fhe invitation of fhe Presidenf, Mr. M. C. Chagla (India) aad Mr. Mohammed Zafar (Pakistan) tookplaces at the Couacif tahI.%

May 1, on behalf of the Security Couocil, welcome the Mini&ers and high officiais of both India and Pakistan who bave joined their delegations here today. It Will, 1 nm sure, be my pleasure in tbe course of omdiscussion of the matter before us formally to introduce the Mini&ers to the members of the Council. Gentlemen, you are welcome here today. 6. In my closing statemenl as President of the Security Council at our last meeting, 1 stressed the fearful potential in the curent conflict between India and Pakistan. Since then, substantial military operatiens bave continued, although the Council adoptedtwo forthright and unanimous calls for a cesse-fire. 7. In spite of the hazards intrinsic in this situation, the Secretary-General travelled promptly to the subcontinent to give effect to the mandate given to him by the Security Council in its resolution 210 (1965) of 6 September 1965, and exerted every possible effort to give effect bath to that resolution and resolutien 209 (1965) of 4 September 1965, to take a11 possible measures to strengthen the Unlted Nations Military Observer Group in india and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) and to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of the resolutions and on the situation in the area. 8. You bave all, 1 am sure, read, from the preliminary report of the Secretary-General [S/6683] and from newspaper accounts, of the intensive and arduous efforts of the Secrelary-General in carrying out the mandate of this Council. And 1 understand tbat today the Secïetary-General will give us a further nssessment of his trip. 9. Again 1 know that 1 speak for a11 the members of the Cou&l when 1 welcome the Secretary-General brick from his mission of peace, on which he carried with him not onIy the resolutions of the Council, but also the good Will, the hopes and the prayers of ail people everywvhere. 10. In light of the return of the Secretary-General yesterdny, 1 suggested our meeting today in spite Of the short spnce of time we bave had in which t0 examine the preliminary report of the Secretary- General. 1 believc that the urgency of the situation rcquires us to lose no time in our deliberations on this matter. 1 consulted with members of the Council, who wwe of one minci: thnt we should promptly re- 19. With the above impressions in mind, andbeing convinced-as 1 stated in my second message to the two Heads of Government on 14 September [see 5/6683, para. 101 and in my statement at the airport in New Delhi on my departure for New York-of the fundamental desire of bath parties to end the fighting, 1 am taking the liberty of expressing the following thoughts in the hope that they may be helpful to the Coumil and to the two Governments themselves in facing the immediate necessity of obtaining an effective cesse-fire. 20. First, the Security Council might now do what it has done once before, and successfully, in another dangerous conflict situation: it could order the two Governments concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, to desist from further hostile military action and to this end to issue cesse-fire orders to their military forces. The Council might also declare that failure by the Governments concerned to comply with tbis order would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter. 21. Second, the Security Council may wish to consider what assistance it might provide in ensuring the observance of the cesse-fire. 22. Third, Security CounciI resolution 210 (1965) of 6 September also calls for a prompt withdrawal of all armed personnel to tbe positions held by them before 5 August 1965, and the Council may wishto study means of assisting in the carrying out of tbis requirement. 23. Fourtb, the Council could rsquest the two Heads of Government to meet together at the earliest possible time to discuss the current situation andtheproblems underlying it as a first step in resolving the outstanding dlfferences between their two countries and in reaching an honourable and equitable settlement. Such a meeting might take place in a country friendly and acceptable to bath. In this connexion, Imight draW the attention of the Council to my message of 15 September to Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub Khan, tbe ttxt of which is set forth in my preliminary report [ibid., para. 19. The Council could also consider the possibility of creating and making available a small committee to assist in such talks should ils services seem useful and desirable to the twoparties. 24. Fifth and finally, 1 may again assure the Council of my availability and of my desire to continue to be of assistance in tbis matter in any way which may commend itself to the Council and to the two Governments. 26. ~~~~~~~~a 210 (1965) tbe Securlty cconoil it informed an the situation in +b situation is covered in a sepsrate 26. sécurité situation décrite 27. 1 would net wisb to let this occasior pass without 27. sans exprimer sinchre et gouvernements dant ma mission de soutien moral pratique. WZpR3SS my warm appreclation and gratitude tothe many statesmen and Governments froro wbom 1 bave received, botb before and during my mission to India and Pahisbm, messages of supportandencouragement as wll es practicel measures of assistance. 28. FhlIy, I wish to express my appreciation to the Govemments of In& end Pakistan both fer their hospitality to me and my party and for ess and belpfulness in their talhs withme. believe that these talks Will eventually contrilmte to a peaceful solution of tbe present crisis. 28. Gouvernements bilité qu’h franchise qu’ils ont eues avec moi. Je crois conversations tion pacifique

The preliminary report of tbe Secretary-General on bis visits to the Govemments of India and Pal&&an [S/6683] bad been distributed prior to tbis meeting. Tbe second report of the Secrefarp-General on bis mission to India and Pakistan [S/6686], vnùc~hasbeenreadbytheSecretary-General to the Security Council. bas now also been distxibuted. 29. pr&minaire qu’il Pakistan séance. sa mission donner lecture tribu5 30. I now g-l= the fioor to the Minister of Education Of Inbia, Mr. ChagIa. 30. l’éducation

We are meeting here this morning under very dlstressing and tragic clrcumstances. Fightii ie poing onbetweentwoneighbouing mmtrks. 1 assure you that, as far as we are concerned, vre have tbe friendliest and most cordial relations ~4th the people of Pakistan. AltboughPresident Ayub Kban has said that we are at war, our Prime P&nister more than once has stressed the fact tbat there is no wsr betwen the two countries and chat we do net want to be at war with Pakistan. 31. sommes navrantes entre deux pays voisins. pour amicaux tanais. nous sommes l’Inde de guerre pas &tre en guerre 32. Tbis is a peculiar tragedy for our country. We bave always stood for peace. We are wedded to the cause of peace. Gur great leader, Mahatma Gandhi, gave the message of non-violence and peace to the wbole world, and it is sad tbat we should be lnvolved in thls war. But Mahatma Gandhi also said that a 32. Nous avons toujours voués Gandhi, et de paix, et malheureusement dans Cette 33. As I bave said, war is opposed to our basic philosophy. We realize the horrors and devastation of a war. A war makes no distinction between combatants and non-combatants, between the innocent and the guilty. War means to us a threat to our economic progress. We are fighting a tremendous war against poverty and ignorance. As Minister of Education, 1 know what the war against ignorance means, and we do noi want to be stopped or deterred from carrylng on that war. Therefore, we do not want to divert either oui attention or our resources from our primary purpose, which is to raise tbe level of the standards of living of our people. 34. New 1 hope to satisfy you that even after Pakistan% aggression every step that we bave taken bas been in self-defence. Our reply to Pakistan has not been offensive: it bas been purely defensive. 1 also want to point out to the Council that we bave done OUI‘ best to prevent the escalation of thls war. And may 1 now point out that it was Pakistan which for the first time used field artillery: it was Pakistan that used tanks with air caver; it was Pakistan that started the bombing of cities; it was Pakistan that started the dropping of paratroops; it was Pakistan that used its navy to bomb one of oui seaports, while we bave not used our navy at all. 35. The basic question which this CounciI faces and which it must answer and resolve is: Who is the aggressor? who has committed aggression? 1 ask the Council not to shirk giving a reply to that question. 36. 1 thi+ that on the records of this Council it has been established beyond any doubt that in this particular conflict aggression was committed by Pakistan upon our territory. May 1 first of a11 refer to paragraph 6 of the Secretary-General% report [5/6651] of 3 September 1965: “General Nimmo has indicated to me that the series of violations that began on 5 August were tn a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of armed me”, generally net in uniform, crossing the cesse-fire line from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indiar side. Thés is a conclusion reached by General Nimmo on the basis of investigations by the United Nations observers, in the light of the extensiveness and character of the raiding activities and theiI proximity to the cesse-fire line, even though ir most cases the actual identity of those enga!& in the armed attacks on the Indian side of the line and their actual crossing of it could not be verifiec by direct observation or evidence.” 37. It is important to note that resolution 210 (1965) also mentions the date of 5August. That,to our mlnds, is the crucial date, and the Council has to apply Es miod to that date. What happened on that date? What happened on tbat date was that Pakistan inwdedhxlia. Kashmir is a part of India, sndthe invasion of Kashmir vas an invasion of India and aggression on Kashmir vas aggression on huila. 38. But we bave other evidence of Pakistanan’s complicity and the support that Pakistan bas been glving to these infiltrators. May 1 read out a few quotations. 39. President Ayub Khan in a broadcast on 1 September 1965 said: “How cari she”-India, that is-%lame anyose fmm &&KashmW-they oall it AzadKashmir, we C%~I it the part of Kashmir unlawfully occupiedby Pakistan-wor, for that matter. from any part of Pakistan, for poing to the assistance of these brave people?m 40. 1 ask you to mark %ny part of Pal&ta@. SO that here is a statement from the Head of State asking how India cari expect any part of Pakistan net to help tbese so-called brave people-and 1 shall deal tith these brave people presently-who bave lnradedlndia. 41. Then Mr. Bhutto, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan. said this on 13 July 1965 in the National Assembly: “Circumstances and conditions bave been tbe most cloquent compulsion to action-what wasvalid, pmper nnd realistic yesterday need not be valid, proper and realistic today. ” SO chat the Foreign Minister of Pakistan moulds his policy not according to law, not accordlng to international morality, but according to circumstances and conditions. 42. Then we bave this from the Morning News of Karachi, 20 August: “ML-. Bhutto told reporters that the cesse-fire line, which India describes as an unshakable boundary, is a temporary arrangement, It could very well bave been drawn further down lnside ocoupied KaShmir.” This in his respect for the resolution by whlch the cesse-fire lins was established. According to Mr. Bhutto, it is a temporary arrangement: it could be changed, it could be altered, it could be modified to suit Mr. Bhutto’s pleasure. 43. Then something more. The Morning News of Karachi of 19 August quoteds statement by the Central Home and Kashmir Affairs Mi&ter, Chaudhuri Ali Akbar, under the headline “Kashmiris Free to Cross 44. In this connexion 1 should bave quoted one more passage from paragraph 9 of the Secretary-General% report to which 1 referred earlier, where he gives bis finding with regard to the cesse-fire line: “1 bave net obtained from the Government of Pakistan any assurance thnt the cesse-fire and the cease-fire line Will be respected henceforth or that efforts would be exerted to restore conditions to normal along tbat line. 1 did receive assurance from the Government of Indin, conveyedorally by its representative to the UnltedNations, that Indiawould act with restraint with regard to any retaliatory acts and Will respect the cesse-fire agreement and the cesse-fire line if Pakistan does likewise.” While we were prepared to hocour oui international obligation to respect the cesse-fire line, Pakistan informed the United Nations representative that itwas not prepared to do SO. 45. AS regards the support by Pakistan for what has been happening in this invasion mounted by it on oui territory, 1 do not want to weary this Councll with a great number of facts and detalls. 1 must respect the patience of this Council; 1 know how anxious it is to corne to some conclusion. But there rire certain facts to which 1 must refer. 46. On 8 June 1965 thc Pakistan Government issued an ordinance entitled “The Pakistan Mujnhids Force Ordnance”. The Mujnhlds are supposed to be freedom fighters. In this connexion the Pnkistan Times of 12 Vune wrote: “Pakistan will now bave a regularly constituted Mujnhids force”--these are the people who bave invaded India-“with n rank structure similar to that of the army, according to a Press release of the Inter-Service Public Relations Directorate. It Will bave commanding officers, junior commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers and Ot:;er ranks. The Mujahids, for certain local purposes, will be deemed part of thePakistanarmy and Will be treated on a par with army personnel of the corresponding rank.” Thus there is no ambiguity as to the situation. These 4,000 to 5,000 people who invaded our country on 5 August were really part and parce1 of the regular Pakistan Army. They may bave corne in civilian garb or they may bave corne dressed in any manner they liked, but the fact remains that they vfere part Of the regular Pakistan forces. 48. The Indian Security Forces bave captured vast quantities of arms and ammunition seized from these inHItmtors. Some of the arms and ammunition captured from Un? inflItr.stors bear the markhtg PQF, that is, Pakistan Qrdnance Factories. Two of the captured officers beld emergenoy commissions in the Pakistan army. 49. 1 bave plmtographs here; 1 could also bring arms here to satisfy you chat they were manufactured in Pakistan. Tbese infiltrators carried radio sets SO tbat they were in communication with Pakistan Headquarters. There oannot be the slightest doubt of this. No judge-and 1 appeal to you, Mr. President-cari on tbis evidence fail to corne to the conclusion that on 5 August a regular invasion of India was mounted by Pakistan and that these infiltrators were backed and supported by Pakistan; they were armed by them, tltey were trahmd by them and they were supported by them. 50. What is the utility of tbis Council if it will net condemn aggression on these facts? If you are satisfied-and 1 ask you to say that you are satisfied-to respect the Secretary-General% report and if you are satisfied that aggression was committed by Pakistan on 5 August, 1 say that it is your duty to condemn this aggression. Otherwise, international law bas no meaning and international society cannot exist. Not Orly must this aggression be condemned, but also Pakistan must be askedtovacatethis aggression. An aggressor cannot get away wlth the fruits of his aggression. 1 beg you: do net equate the aggressor and the victim, do net bracket them together. My one objection to resolutions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965) of 4 and 6 September, if 1 may say SO witb respect to the Security Cout~il, is that bath hidia and Pakistan are treated alike, that both 01 them are called upon to do something without dist%‘uishmg in any vfay whatsoever the role played by Pakistan and the role played by Indla. 52. What was the grand des@ of Pakistan? Let me explain it to yo”. When it sent these 4,000 or 5,000 infiltrators or invadors or armed men-cal1 them what you like-Pakistan expected that there would be an uprising in Kashmir. They thought that the large Muslim majority in Kashmir would support them and that Kashmir would fa11 into their mouth like a ripe plum. What happened? The whole of Kashmir stood firmly behind the constituted Government of that State and behind the Government of India. Kashmii is proud of its traditions of a multi-racial society, just as India is. In Kashmir we bave Muslims. Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and Christians. All of them stood firm and resisted this aggression. They handed over the infiltrators to the Government and to the security forces, and this granddesignof Pakistanfailed. Having failed in that, Pakistan started an attack in force with its regular army. That was the attack in tbe Chhamb sector. You are perhaps not familiar with the map Of Kashmir; but may 1 explain that the Chhamb sector is a very crucial one in Kashmir; it contains O”r lifeline, our lines of communication to our Army on the cesse-fire line and also communication to the army that is facing China in Ladakh and trying to meet that menace. Their entry in this partioular sector of Kashmir was for the purpose of destroying our lifeline so that we should be crippled bath with retard to our army on the cesse-fire line and to our defence against China. 53. Pakistan% other objective was to make this a religious war. We are living in the modem age. ail the rights that tbe wder our Constitution. rital ri%&ts. vh? are a ar But tan cbes net iike tbis because a mtà e: it is a religious state. TO Pakistan wPl@on is tbe basis of citizenship. TO us ddle East and cmk?rmt religions live togetber as natiomls. Xe is one gmd thing about MI-. Bhutto: be lea& himseIf to quotations. May I quote him again, tbis question of religious war. This is wbat . Bbutto said in bis broadcast of 3September 1965: *Let India mt be complacent in waging war iu Kaslamir. Let tbem BQE disregard the lessons of bistory. Eet tbem mot forget that if Pakistmùs bave hithesto sbown tbe patience of a Solomon, they axe descendrrnts of tbe heroic soliders of Islam newr sbowed any hesitation inlayingdown ‘R defence of theheù- honour and tic pursuit efs of Islam”? Are they fighting a s an insult to Islam to suggest that t or tbat Islam bekes in wars and 57. Then MI-. Bbutto said the following at anIndependace Day chic reception at Larkanaonl4Augw.t: ‘1 a.lone . . . is known as a country believing in threats 1 waat to tel1 Mr. Shastri and India that after 3.U justice is sure to prevail. We are not alone ia tbis. Our religionis spreadingalloverthe world.” Agaiu the appeal is a religious appenl. The CounciI Will reake the danger of this. There are 50 million Muslims living in India in peace and smity, in friendship and concord, witb other communities. The whole attempt Of Pakistan was to disrupt this unity, to bring abwzt communal distord and then to appenl to this Coumii, or to the world, by saying: YOU sec, Indians 59. Now 1 want to draw the Council’s attention to something which is very interesting. 1 think it was Max Beerbohm who said that history does net repent itself; historians repeat themselves. But in this case history has repeated itself; 1 do not know whether historians are going to repeat themselves or net. 60. There is a close similarity between this invasion by Pakistan of Kashmir and ofIndiaandwhat happened in 1947 and 1948. If one looks at the record, one will find-and it is a matter of record; 1 am net speaking outside the record-mat Pakistan raiders invaded Kashmir and that Pakistan denied any complicity with these raiders. They said: We bave nothing to do with it. Ultimately, Muhammad Zafrulla Khan-no less a person than Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, who is now a member of the International Court of Justice-agreed and admitted that Pakistan had armed the tribesmen to invade Kasbmir. 61. This is exactly what is happening now. But tbe similarity does not end there. We bave a gruesome history of what the tribesmen dld to Kashmlr and the people of Kashmir in 1947 and 1948, and there is a repetition this time. People have been killed; they have been tortured; masques bave been desecrated; masques have been bombed and cruelty has been practised of a sort which it is difficult to believe cari be done in modem times. It almost goes back to the days of Hitler, when such things were possible. But 1 thought we had outlived the days of Hitler. 62. TO show what happened in 1947, may 1 quote s statement by Sheikh Abdullah-as reported in TA Hindustan Times of 18 November 1947-whicn 1 alsc quoted when 1 spoke before this Council on7 Ma7 1964 “These raiders abducted women, massacrsx children, they looted eveiything and everyone, the) even dishonoured the Holy Koran and convertec masques into brothels, and today every Knshmir loathes the invading tribesmen and their orchinspirators who bave been responsible for suc1 horrors in a land which is peopled with an over. whelming majority of Muslims.” [1113th meeting para. 21.1 64. No countrg, under these circumstances, oould bave done more tha” India ha8 done to oometoa friendly settlement with Pakistan. We bave extended the band of friendship; it bas been rejected. We bave made o vertures: we bave been rebuEed. New let me give tIle council a short résumé of what we bave been tlying to do. 65. First and foremost, as far back as 1950, OUI' late Prime Minister asked Pakistan to enter lnto a no-wsr declaration. We said: Look, before 1947 vfe were one country; we are brothers; ethnologlcally, racially and culturally we are one; it would be a horrible thing to contemplate a war behvee” our two countries; let us enter into a no-vfar declaration. 66. Wlmt was the response? It U%S: No. From 1950 onwards we bave repeated thls offer. We bave said: we shall wt go to war witb you, and you must net go to war wltb us: if we bave differences we shall seffle them in a peaceful menner. 67. Why has Pakistan refused to enter into thls “owar declaratio”? 1 shall give you the reason. It is because she had a guilty mind: because she knew that when the proper tinte came, she would net hesitate to attack Indla. New we knmv for a fa& the reaso” for her not entering lnto tbis no-war declaration. 68. But this is net the only thingwe bave done. We agreed to bave talks with Pakistan. We agreedto bave a meeting of the Home Ministers of the two countries in Aprll 1964. That meeting was adjourned. We continued to remind Pakistan of the need to bave another meeting. After continuous pressure fmm India, the Government of Pakistan agreed to hold a conferrnce on 23 November 1964 in Karachi. However, about ten days before the meeting was due to take plax, the Government of Pakistan unilaterally postponed the conference indefinitely. 69. In October 1963, the United Nations Chlef Mllitary Observer decided to glve awards agalnst eve” civilians if they were found to commit breaches of the cesse-fire agreement. The Government of lndia accepted this decision. The Government of Pakistan rejected it. 70. In 1964, the Chief Military Observer proposed a meeting between the military representatives of lndia and Pakistan to consider the problems arising out of the violations of the cesse-fie llneby armed civilians. India accepted the proposai, but Pakistan rejected it. 73. What happened in the Rann of Kutch?Ishould like to say that this is the third invasion by Pakistan of India. The first was 1947-1948 whenpakistanattacked Kashmir, which legally and constitutionally was part Of India; the second was the aggression committed in the Rann of Kutch; and this is tbe third invasion. Witb regard to the Rann of Kutch, tbanks to the intervention of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, we agreed to a trüce and to certaincease-fire terms.g 1 would Iike to draw the a:tention of members to the preamble of tbat agreement: “in the confidence that this will also contribute to a reduction of tbe present tension along the entire Indo-Pakistan border . . .“. While this agreement was being negotiated and before the ink was dry, Pakistan was plotting and planning to invade India. 74. 1 would like to corne now to our response to the mission of the Secretary-General. May I in the first place express my appreciation of the very strenuous and difficult task that he has undertaken. 1 remember that 1 came here on the day the Secretary-General was leavirg. 1 saw him, wished him godspeed and told him that he would be most welcome in my coudy. 1 hope the Secretary-General will not mïsunderstand me, but there is a passage in his preliminary report with which 1 must quarrel; 1 do not tbink it is fair to my country, nor does it correctly represent wbat reslly happened in India and in Pakmtan. I quote from the message of 15 September from tbe Secretary- General: ‘a “The replies from bath Govermnents to my message of 12 September bave shown clearly the desire of bath for a cesse-fire, but bothpose conditions which make the acceptance of a cesse-fire very difficult for tbe other side. For this reason, to my profound regret, it has SO far been impossible to obtain a cesse-fire as required by the Security Council resolutions of 4 and 6 September.” [S/6683, para. 13.1 75. 1 wish to state that whereas President Ayub Ban posed conditions with regard to the cesse-fire, 80. President Ayub Khan is pw&g a precondition tbt there must be machinery in tbe cesse-fire agreement, OP‘ a cesse-fixe itself, which wouldlead to a final settlement of tbe Kashmir dispute. “While we are agreeable in principle to stop fighting 1 should like to point out that despite our most earnest efforts, the Ministerial level talks that followed the 1962 agreement pmved barren and abortive in face of a firm refusa1 by hrdia to arrive at an honourable settlement of the Kashmir dispute. On the other hand, India let loose a reign of terrer repression in the State and pmceeded to adopt messures to ‘integrate’ the State of Jammu and Kashmir in the Indian Union. In adopting these measures India showed once again that it has no regard for its own solemn agreements and treats them merely as scraps of paper whenever it suits India.” [x, para. 14.1 1 am not dealing with that now. Therefore, there is a Clear refusa1 on the part of President Ayub Khan to meet the Prime Minister of my oountry. IIe says that the last effort was “barren” and “abortive”. Agam, 1 am not poing into that history. We had six rounds of ta&, and the meeting was broken up by Pakistan. But this is the response of President Ayub to the Secretary-General%! suggestion that the two leaders sbould meet and bring about a settlement. 82. The date of tbis reply of President Ayub Khan is very significant. Whereas the Prime Minister of India replied immediately, President Ayub Khan took some time-and that w? deliberate. Members of the Security Council are aaare of the news that was released in this coun:ry yesterdaY, 16 September, namely, tbat .China has gix: 1.1s an ultimatum, whichexpireswithin tbree daYs, that tiwe do net carry out China*s demands, serious conscquences xvi11 follow. It was only when President .Iyu’u Khan was assured of this that this reply was sent. This intractabïe and intransigent attitude is due to the fact tlmt he is expected support fxm China. Se wants India to fight on two fronts. While we are facing Pakistan in the direction of the Punjab, he wants China to stab us in the back. If ever a complicity was established between those two countries, it is this. The timing of the ultimatum and the timing of the reply of President Ayub Khan is not merely a coincidence. It has grave and serious implications. We are now threatened by an invasion from China. 83. It is sad that Pakistan should be taking this attitude with the help of the arms suppliedto Pakistan by the United States net for !he purpose of fighting India but for the purposr of meeting the Chinese menace. 1 bave three statanaents here. The first is 04. This ts wbt Mrr. Bunker, who was then the Ambassador to India, said in November 1957: “If Pakistan uses Amerioan arms against India for aggressive purposes, she Will forfeit our assistance snd we will ire. on the side of India.” 85. Seoretary of State John Foster Uulles. who wâs, as you know, net very friendly to us in those days. said in 1956: “1 think there cari be every confidence on the part of India now that there Will be nouse of those armaments hi any aggressive way against India. Certainly pakistan knows that if that shouldhappenthere would be. a quick ond to its good relations with the United States. On the contrary, under the principles of the United Nations Charter, the United States would be supporting India if it became victim of any armed aggression.” 66. 1 ask the United States: 1s the UnitedStates gomg to permit Pakistan to commit a breachoffaith with it, and also make it possible for a breach of faith to be oommitted by the United States with India? These are net ordinary people giving us assurances. These are assurances by the President of the United Statfs, by the Ambassador of the United States and by ‘he Seoretary of State of the United States. Todaywe haoe this extraordinary situation that Pakistan is fightiig us with Patton tanks, witb arms whioh Pakistan received from the United States, and Pakistan is going to figbt us in collaboration with a country whioh the United States considers to be its nmnber one enemy. Therefore, American arms are poing to bs used to destroy a country which is friendly to the Unfted States. 87. Therefore, my short submission is that whereas oui response to the Secretary-General% mission am the resolutions of the Security Council calling for a cesse-fire bas been positive, constructive and unequivocal, the response of Pakistan has beenobstructive and non-co-operative. 88. Let us look at the conditions that Pakistan ha: laid down for the cesse-fire. There are four candi. tions. The first is, a cesse-fire-of course, it want! a cesse-fire. The second is withdrawal of all troop! from Kashmir. This is an extraordinary condition 1 am net going into the Eashmir question. If 1 ma: say SO, the Security Council should confine itsel to the simple question of the cessation of the conflic 89. Paragraph 1 of part II, A, of the resolution reads as follows: “As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Covernment of Pakistan before tbe Security CounciI, the Covernment of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from the State.” 90. That was in 1948. We are in 1965 and the troops still remain. Not only do they remain, but tbey are used to mvade us, to attack us, tc commit inhuman cruelties upon the citizens of Kashmir. 91. Part II, B, of the resolution relates to India and in paragraph 2 it is stated that: “Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Covernment will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cesse-fire the minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist local autborities in the observance of law and order.” Therefore, we are responsible for law. order, security and defence of Kashmir. 92. Kashmir is an integral part of India. It is a member of the Indian Federation, and it is as much our duty, OUI responsibility andourprivilege to defend Kashmir and look after its law and order as it would be if it was Calcutta, or Bombay, or Delhi, or any other part of India. 93. And what is thig demand? When analysed, it means this. Al1 troops should be withdrawn. That means that we have got the legal right, tbe constitutional right to bave troops in Kashmir for its defence and security, but we must withdraw them before the great country of Pakistan will condescend to taIk with us or to accept a cesse-fire. 94. The third condition is induction of an Afro-Asian force. We are entirely opposed to this proposai. We do not want any foreign troops in our country, on our 95. Finally-and thii is the most extraordinary condition of all-a plebiscite witbin tlwee months. 1 bave said that these conditions are impossible and preposterous. But Iet me deal wlth tbis last one: a plebiscite within three months. Again, 1 am net poing Mo tbe political history of Kashmir. 1 said on the last occasion-and 1 stand by that-that under no circumstances will India hold a plebiscite. Kasbmir is an integral part of India and we do not hold plebscites in every part of tbe oountry. You, Nr. President, would net agree to hold a plebiicite in New esico. or Texas; or Alaska; ami this would apply to many otber countries that 1 could mention. But, spart from that, it is for tbe Security Council ultimately to decide whether a plebiscite should be held or not. But Pakistan decides, and it wants a plebiscite at the point of the gun, at the point of the bayonet. The argument is this: we bave invaded Kashmir; now hold a plebscite witbin three months. 96. 1 could understand Pakistan% coming to this Council-after all, Kaslnnir is still on tbe agenda of the Council-and pleading its case. But no, Pahistan does not believe in going to international forums. 1 thinh that Mr. Bhutto said that hehadlost his patience and that he was prepared to fight fora thousand years in order to get Kasbmir. But this shows how impossible a condition bas been laid dovn? by President Ayub Khan before we cari bave a cesse-fiie. 97. NO~ may 1 add that this ;s not merely a conflict between India sud Pakistan; It has a much wider s&pificauce. The first significance is that the threat and menace of China looms large behind tbis war. It is much more than merely looming now; it has almost corne to a concrete shape after yesterday’s ultimatum. And 1 charge Pakistan witb having launched upon tbis fight with India in the hope and expectation that China wiu be behind it and support it. 98. Then, this is a war between two ideologies. Let us face it. On the one hnnd, there is the religious State; and on the other. the secular State. This is the conflict; it is net Kashmir. Kashmii is merely the symptom; it is not the disease. The disease is that Pahistan believes in a religious State: it believes in religion as the nexus behveen citizens. We believe in a secular State, in a multiracial society. And it is also a fight between a free society ami democratic institutions, on the one hand, and dictatorship and regimentation on the other. These are the issues involved in this war. And 1 thinh, if 1 may say SO, that it is in the interests of Asia and the world that oui free society, our mlulti-communal federation should survive. 100. What we are defending today is not merely the territorial integrity of our country-whichis important enough. What we are defending today is the existence of a free, democratic nation. We want to function as a free, democratic nation. It is the threattoour institutions that we are resisting. 101. Finally, 1 charge Pakistan with aggression. Aggression began in .947 against Kashmir and continues today. It is a continuing aggression. The Secretary-General% reports show that Pakistan does net wish to renounce aggression as an instrument of its policy, and Pakistan has been allowed to enjoy the fruits of aggression and even permitted to make common cause with China. 102. And 1 charge Pakistan witb refusing to comply with the resolution of tbe United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. 103. 1 ask that in the resolution which the Council ultimately will be pleased to adopt it will note that whereas we bave unconditionally accepteda cesse-fire, Pakistan has refused to do BO. The action which 1 suggest that the Security Council should take is that it must brand Pakistan as an aggressor, and it i-oust insist on Pakistan% compliance with tbe resolution. 104. May 1 deal now with the report of the Secretary- General which he has read out and which 1 bave had a short time to read. The Secretary-General suggested that the Security Counoil “could ordert.hetwoGovernments concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of tbe Charter of the Uited Nations, to desist from further hostile militai-y action and to this end to issue cesse-fire orders to their military forces” [sec para. 20 above]. 105. Why two Governments? Why again bracket India and Pakistan together? We bave not said no. Why do you say you should call upon India and Pakistan to desist from taking hostile action? 1 bave read out the letter of the Prime Minister of Indla. UFy thls constant attempt at bracketing India and Pakistan together, coupling them together, puttii them on tbe same footing? 106. The Secretary-General went on to say: “. . . the Council migkt also declare that failure by the Governments concerned to comply with this order would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter.” 107. 1 say that the Council must call upon Pakistan to decist from carrying out hostilities, and 1 ask it, under Article 39 of te Charter, to which the Secre- 108. Witb regard to the second suggestion readingas follows: *. . . the .6ecurity Council may wish to oonsider what assistance it mlght provide in ensuringthe observance of the case-fire” (sec para. 21 above], after the cesse-fire has taken place, and if we wish for any assistance fmm the Security Cou&l, w-e will certainly ask for it. 109. The third suggestion reads as foIlows: “. . . the Security Councïl resolution 210 (1965) of 6 September also calIs for a prompt withdrawal of all armed personnel to tbe positions held by them before 5 August 1965. and the Cou?ciI may wish tc study means of assisting in the carrying out of this requirementn [Sec para. 22 above]. 110. This deals with the modslity of the cesse-fire. 1 do not want to deaI with this in detail, but may 1 say this. Al1 the invaders who bave entered Kashmirmust leave. They must be wlthdrawn. They must be called back. Just as they were sent by Pakistan, they must be called back by Pakistan. Secondly, it rnust be made impossible for such infiltration to take place again. Thirdly, Pakistan must own up toits responsibility for these infiltrations. 111. The fourth suggestion is: “. . . the Council could request the two Heads of Government to meet together at the earliest possible time” [see para. 23 above]. i bave already dealt with that. As 1 bave said, it requires two to constitute a meeting. We are always prepared to talk with anyone. Debate and discussion are the life-blood of democracy. We bave never said no to talkswithanybody,buttalksmusthave a purpose. There must be a basis fora talk. Bile this conflict is going on it is impossible to scggest that the two leaders cari meet. Once there is a basis for talks, 1 hope the Head of the Pakistan 5tate willagree to meet witb the Prime Minister of India, and 1 am sure chat the response of our Prime Minister will not be urcooperative. 112. Finally, the Secretary-Geaeral declared: “. . . 1 may again assure the Council of my availability and of my desire to continue to be of assistance in thls matter in any way which ma.y îommend itself to the COumil and to the two Governments” [sec para. 24 above]. 113. The Secretary-General is always welcome in oui country. As 1 bave said before, we bave great respect and great regard for him personally and as the executive of this great Organisation. Today he is the greatest international servant in the world. Iknow bis desire for bringing about peace, and whenever he wants to corne t0 our country he Will be welcome. Whatever assistance we cari give him for restoring peace Will always be available. 115. 1 agree with the Secretary-General that a great responsibility is placed upo” the Security Council., 1 think this is a test of the Security Council. 1s it going to meet the challenge? If international society is to function, the Security Council must answer the challenge. 1 therefore say: corne to a decision, corne to a conclusion, arrive at a judgement, and do not hesitate to deliver the judgement.

1 acknowledge witb appreciation the comments of the Minister of Education of India. 1 am advised that the representative of Pakistan, who is the Minister of Law and a very distinguished One, Mr. Zafar, Will bave something to say. However, he has just arrived in the country and lie has had a long and arduous trip. He has just see” the various documents which bave been circulated and he has asked for a” opportunity, which will be accordedto him, to make his statement at the next meeting of the Security Council. 1 shall give him the floor at that time. 117. Mr. RIFA’I (Jordan): After having listened to the highly important statement of the Secretary- General at today’s meeting and to the weighty ideas which he introduced, 1 wouldyrefer, withyourconsent, to make my statement at the next meeting of the Council, which you may wish, Mr. President, to convene soo”. However, since 1 am taking the floor-and with my apologies to the members of the Council for this short prolongation of this meeting-I feel in duty bound to clarlfy one point which was brought up by the representative of India in the statement he has just made. 1 do SO because the point raised is related to the meaningof Security Council resolution 210 (1965) and because 1 notice that the representative of India has attached special significance to it. 118. 1 understood him to bave interpreted the date of 5 August 1965 contained in Council resolution 210 (1965), as signifying the beginning of what he called aggression by Pakistan against India. Inasmuch as such a” interpretation reflects on the intentions ofthe authors of the said resolution, rny delegation cannot subscribe to it. Having had the privilege of taking part in the consultationsanddiscussions whichbrought about the text of that resolution, 1 feel tbat 1 am in a position to s2.y that the meaning suggested by the representative of India does not represent the understanding of my delegation as one of the authors of the said resolution. The date of 5 August WPS intended merely to be a” indication regarding the lines behind which the armed forces of both India and Pakistan were asked to withdraw. It was not meant to pass judgement on the claim of infiltration or to establish a fact in this regard. occupation of positions on the m [S/6651, para. 8. 121. Prier to se events tbere were aIso SimiIar more serious events. In the same &ry-General statecb “Among the most serious of the violations was one tbst accwred in May of this year when Indian tmops in battalion strength attacked and captured Pakistan positions in the Kargil area of Kashmir and remamed in oocupation of them. In the interest of preserviug the cesse-fire litre. 1 appealed to the Govemment of India tc withdraw its tmops fmmthe Pakistan side of the line.” jlblb, para. 4.1 122. Tbat cbain of events could also b=e traced back to the beginnii of 1965. Regardhig violations committed up to mid-June, the Secretary-General said that some %ok the form of ‘heavy and prolonged firing’ fmm weapons up to the calibre of field artillery” libid.1. 123. 1 shonld add that the date 5 August was introduced aiter a tborough and considerable discussion. as a substitute for an earlier text of the draft resolution which cslled on India and Pakistan to withdraw their srmed personnel behInd the cesse-fire line snd the international boundary. It was for the sake of accommodatIng tbe position of ail members amund ths table-without going into details-that the mentionina; of this date was thougbt to serve the purpose of defining the lines in question. 124. 1 wish further to add that tbe draft resolution [S/6662] was intmduced to the Council without any explanations. 1 recall witb special appreciation the words of my frir-nü and colleague Mr. Ramani, representative of Malaysia, when he introduced the draft resolution. He said: “If tbis draft resolution proceeds on any findings at all, it pmceeds on two undeniable facts: first, the Security Council is stiIl waitingfor some hopeful or helpful response to its appeal for a cesse-fire and, secondly, the contlict is obviously expanding and spreading. This drsft resolution, therefcra, merely decides tbat tbe Secmity council, being naturally comerned with the serious developments, is amious to do something and to do it at once to give effect to its own resolutiou, SO that this bloody conflict is halted and does net spread.” [1238th meeting, para. 65.1 127. The United States enjoys. and hopes to continue to enjoy, friendly relations withbothhuliaandPakistan. 1 should like to emphasize that we bave suspended arms shipments to both countries, since we want, in support of the Security Council% resolution calling for a cesse-fire. to help bring about an end to this confIict and not to escalate it. It is the sense of the Security Council’s resolution that ihere be a prompt end and not an intensificationofhostilities. Wedeplore the use in this conflict, in contravention of solenm agreements, of arms supplied by us. 128. The United States, along with all members of this CounoiI, profoundly believes that the differences between India and Pakistan cari be resolved-must be resolved-under conditions of peace. Thls is the stated objective of the Security Council, and as the Secretary-General has made clear in his report, it is his earnest hope and desire. We bave supported the Security Council and the Secretary-General inthis objective. We shall continue tbis support in pursuit of peace on the subcontinent. 129. This completes oui business today, andlnmy capacity as PRESIDENT, 1 would merely wish to say that members of the Council, and indeed the entire world, Will bave taken note of the momentous statement made by the Secretary-General this morning. It is now incumbent upon this Cou&l again to tske up its responsibilities as the agency of the international community with primary responsibiiity for the maintenance of internationaI peace and security. 130. The Secretary-General has warned us that a real danger to world peace is imminent as a result of the conflict on the subcontinent. New and serious developments which bave broadened the threat to the peace cari only increase tension and complicate the peace-making efforts of the United Nations, the Seourity Council and the Secretary-General. We musl therefore proceed with a sense ofurgencyandresponsibility. My consultations with the members of the Security Council bave indicated that we may best do this by proceeding, for the ï-est of today, through private consultations regardlng the actions we must now take. 131. 1 therefore propose, unless there is objection, that we set our next meeting for 10.30 tomorrow morning, with a view to proceeding to the adoption of our next action as promptly as possible. Should, however, consultation? in the meantime with members of the Security Council make an earlier decision possible, or should conditions in the subcontinent SO reluire, the Council will be called into urgent and emergency session. 1 hope the members will remain If~s sadecided. Tbemeetingmseaf1p.m.