S/PV.1240 Security Council

In accordaxe WithtbeCouncil’s previous decision, 1 propose now, with the consent of the Cou&l, to invite tbe representatives of India and Pakistan to participate in the discussion of the question. Af fhe invifafion of fhe President, Mr. M. C. ChagZa (Inad) andMr. Moh-ed.&far (pakistas) tookplaces at the Couacil table.

The first speaker on my list is the Minlster of Law of the Government of Pakistan, Mr. M. Zafar and 1 nov4 give him the floor. 3. Ir. ZAFAR (Pal6stan): Pakistan is concerned over the seriousness of the situation in tbe subcontinent and shares with the oiher nations theapprehension tbat, if war continues, it may engulf millions living in India and Pakistan. In view of the gravlty of the present conflict, my Government suggested to the SecretarpGeneral, when he came to Pakistan, tbat the followlng actions need to be tsken: first, there should be a cesse-fire with immediate effect; second, immediately thereafter the forces of bath India and Pakistan should withdraw completely from tbe disputed area of J-u andKashmir, includingthe territory called && Kashmir: third, a United Nations force should take over the seourity functions in the 4. As 1 shall be disagreeing with somc of the observations and suggestions made by tire Secretary- General, I wish to say at once that, any disagreement apart, the Government and tbe people ofPakistanhave the warmest regard for the Secretary-General and high appreciation for his dedication to tbe cause of peace. As for myself, 1 bave particular regard for him because in the shortperiodoftimethat 1 travelled with him from BeiNt to Rawalpindi-and tbis was my first meeting witb tbe Secretary-General-1 foundhim to be a man of bigh ideals andof sincerily of purpose. 5. May 1 now proceed to discuss the proposals made by Pakistan. 1 shall take them one by one to explain why we are urging the Security Cou&l to take a decision in accord with those suggestions. First, Pakistan stands for an immediate cesse-fire. This is what the Security Council has proposed. 6. Pakistan stands for a cesse-fire because it believes in peaceful coexistence witb India. We expected the two countries to coexist in peace like Canada and the United States, or like Sweden and Norway. We do net want any war with India. We are a smaller country bath in area and population. India has nearly a million men under arms, four times as many as Pakistan. India has inherited from the United Kingdom, and has recently acquired from the United States, the USSR and other foreign Powers, a large defence production capacity of its OWn. Pakistan has in the main to rely for its defence supplies on foreign Powers. 7. Cur main efforts bave been devoted towards economic development. With hardandsustainedeffort, we have made substantial progress, but we needmany more years to reach our economic goals. And for tbat we need peace. How Oan we afford a war? We neither started tbe war nor do we want it to continue. Therefore, we suggested, as the first proposai. chat there should be a cease-fire. 9. The Kashmir dispute arose when the Maharajah of Kashmir, in spite of a standstlll agreement wlth Pakistan, under coercion by the Indian Government and during tbe tiie when hls people had revolted against blm and muted bis forces, tried to give away the State of Jammu and Kashmlr to Indla. But the rights of citizens are not a question of title or property which cari be passed on by one owner to the other. The people of Kashmir continued their struggle against overwhelming odds. When India failedto crush them, it brought the issue before the8ecurity Cou&l, in January 1948. After extensive discussion of the problem and after listening to bath parties, the Security Council adopted resolution 47 (1948) on 21 April 1948 pmviding for the cessation of hostilities in Jammu and Kasbmir, the withdrawal of the combatants, and the holdlng of a free and impartial plebiscite. Subsequently, the Security Council est.&- lished the United Nations Commission for huila and Pakistan. The Commission visited India and Pakistan, as well as Jammu and Kaslnnir. After strenuous efforts extending over nearly six momhs, it brought about an agreement between the two countries witb regard to Jammu and Kashmir. This international agreement is embodied in the Commission’s resolutions dated 13 August 19481/ and 5 January 1949.9 10. Taken together, tbese resolutions provlde for, first, a cesse-fire and demarcation of a cesse-flre lin% second, the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir; and tbird, a ffee and impartial plebiscite conducted by the United Nations to determine the question of tbe accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan. 11. The Commission*s resolutions were endorsed by the Security Council and accepted bath by India and by Pakistan. These resolutions constitute the basic international agreement with regard to Kashmii. In consequence of tbis agreement, fighting stopped on 1 January 1949. An agreement on tbe demarcation of the cesse-fire Une was reached on 27 July 1949.3/ Implementation of the demilitarization provisions of the Commission’s resolutions was, however obstructed by India. The Plebiscite Admlnistrator) designate was prevented from assuming office and holding the plebiscite. India refused to synchronize the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian army with that 12. There is slonghistoryof hnlia’s reiüsslto implement tbis a.greement. 1 could cite chapter and verse, but 1 am afraid it would take up too much of the time of the Council. 1 shall therefore onIy recount a few points as briefly as 1 cari. 13. First, India refused to submit its plan for the withdrawal of fndtan forces whe” the Commission convened a meeting in March 1949 asking for withdrawal plans, and thus blocked pmgress in demilitarination. When eventually some sort of programme was presented to the Commission, India insisted that it should net be disclosed to Pakistanor to the Security Council. The Commission, however, placed on record its opinion that the Indian withdrawal plan was vfar from a fulfilment of India% undertaking under the terms of the 13 August resolution”.4/ 14. Second, to meet one of the objections raised by India, General A. G. L. Mc Naughton, as President of the Security Council for the month of December 1949, proposed to combine the two stages of demilitarizatio” and produced a comprehensive programme provtding for tbe withdrawal of the forces of Pakistan and hulia, and the reduction of the e Kasbmir forces. His proposai of 22 December 19499 was accepted by Pakistan anci rejected by India. 15. Third, by its resolution 80 (1950) of 14 March 1950, the Security Council replaced theUnitedNations Commission for India and Pakistan by a single mediator, and at its 471st meeting on 12 April 1950 appointed Sir Owen Dixon as United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan. In his report dated 15 September 1950 to the Security Counoil, Sir Owen Dixon set out his conclusion witb regard to the Kashmir impasse: “In the end, 1 became convinced tbat India% agreement would never be obtained to demilitarization in any such form, or to provisims govern&q the period of the plebiscite of any ouch character as would, in my opinion, permit of the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse by which the frsedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperilled.n6/ 16. Fourth, at its 543rd meeting on 30 April 1951, the Council appointed Mr. Frank P. Graham as United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan. He put forward several proposa& to bring about the demili- 6/ Ibid., Supplemenr for Sepremkr dwough Lkember 1950. document sj1791. ~EU’& 52. 18. That briefly Is the record of India and Pakistan witb regard to the implemen+ion of the adopted resolutions by tbe Commission oonoerning demi& tarisation. 19. The third pmposal made by Pakistan is designed to create an atmosphere in which a free and impsrtIal plebiscite oould be held in Kashtnir. TO this end, Pakistan bas suggested that the forces of India sud Pakistan be completely withdrawn from the State and, hi their place, a United Nations force oomposed of contingents fmm Afro-Asisn countries should be inducted. This should eliminate ail possibility of coercion by either side at the time of the plebiscite. 20. The last pmposal made by Pakistan is that the plebiscite should be held withhi a period of three months. The reason for this proposai is stated In the letter dated 13 September 1965 fromthePresident of Pakistan to the Secretary-General: * . . . Pakistan is not against a cesse-fire as su&. In fa&, in order to save the subcontinentfrom being engulfed in what would clearly be an appalling catastmphe, we would welcome a cesse-fire. But il must be a purposeful cease-fire: one that effectively precludes that catastrophe and net merely postpones it. In other words, it should provide for a selfexecuting arrangement for the final settlement of the KashmFr dispute which Is the mot cause of the India-Pskistau conflict.* [Sec S/6663, para. 9.1 21. It is imperative tbat a plebiscite should be held as quickly as possible and that the people of Kashmir be enabled to execute tbeir right of self-determination as envisaged in the United Nations resolutions. Uniil this is done and a highly explosive source of conflict removed, the two countries cannot live together in harmony . 22. 1 bave so far given the Council the reasons for each of the proposais which Pakistan bas made. 1 should now like to explain why Pakistan insists thai ail these StepS must be ordered and taken together and net separately. The stand of Pakistan is tbat ths cesse-fire should be a part of a comprehensiw agreement. It is no use reverting to the same ceasefire conditions of 1949 which, instead of bringinf peace to the peuple of Kashmir, bave brought misery suffering and war. Indeed, Pakistan is net imposim new conditions of its own. What it is suggesting h 23. A clear issue like this should not bave been confused. The representative of India must bave noticed during his term of office as a judge that when a lawyer is unable to convhice a judge, he tries to confuse him. 1s the Minister for Education attempting to confuse the Seourity Council? IIe has raised the question of the so-called infiltrators in order to cloud the issue of the Indian aggression. The case put forward by the Indian representative is that members of the Pakistan Army crossed the cesse-fire Une and entered Indian-occupied Kashmir on 5 August 1965. 1 wish tc contradict thls allegationcategorically and to place certain facts before the Council. 24. First, no troops of AzdKashmir or Pakistan crossed the cesse-fire Une until after India had made repeated thrusts and had launched a major offensive against &Kashmir. 26. Secondly, the area of Kashmir under the occupation of huila is about 50,000 square miles, roughly equal to the total area of the United Kingdom. By lndia’s own account, within less thacforty-eighthours after the alleged crossings, action against Indian forces were taking place from one end ofthe occupied territory to the other. In and around Srinagar itself, pitched battles had occurred. lndid maintains approximately six divisions of regular troops in the territory. TO this must be added some two divisions of police and militia of various kinds, bringing the total forces at India’s disposa1 to well over 150,000 men. 26. India would bave the world believe that a few thousand outsiders-the figures are between 1,000 and 7,000-penetrated the barriers set up by the occupation troops and, operating amidst a hostilepopulation, set the torch of resistance against India ablase throughout the lengtb and breadth of captive Kashmir. These are two basic facts which, ifproperly appreciated, would suffice to explode the lndian fiction. 27. However, 1 feeI that we ceed to examine the myth in some greater detail and see how far it cari stand scrutiny. It must be recalled that the original myth was that thousands-there was always a confusion about the Indian estimates of the number involved-of armed personnel entered Indian-occupied Kashmir in early August. However, later the representative of India began to talk of “armedandunarmedpersonnel’. 1 refer to the message read by the representative of India in which it was stipulated that: “. _. ‘armed personnel . . .’ must include a11 infiltrators from the Pakistan side of the cesse-fire Une, whether armed or unarmed” and furthermore that “the present hostilities originated with large-scale infiltrations of armed and unarmed personnel from Pakistan . . .” [sec 1238th meeting, para. 371. 29. This truth bas been testified to by the wellknown Indian humanitarian, a disciple of the late Mr. Gandhi, Miss Mridula Sarabhai, who bas stated that in the guise of taking action against so-called infiltrators. the Indian Army turned 0;. tbe entire population cf India-held Kaslnnir and committed atrocities upon them. The Council needs to be informed that, days before the start of hostilities, the Indian Army set fire to the entire residential district of Batamaloo in Srlnagar, simply because many freedom fighters lived in that district. The world Press reported this outrage, and published pictures of innocent women and children sitting outside their homes, now reduced to ashes and rubble, but little was known for a time about who had perpetrated it. 30. The truth cari now be judged from the dispatch from Srinagar by Richard Critchfield, publishedinthe Washington Star of 1 September: VA question that hangs over this fabled vale like tbe stmwy Nimalayan peaks is why Indian troops are being used to silence political unrest among Kashmir’s 2.5 million Muslims? . . . ‘Kashmiri Muslims contend that local Indian authorities bave been burning homes without the full knowledge of either Prime Minister La1 Bahadur Shastri or the Indian public . . . 1’. . . during the past three weeks hundreds of Kashmiri bouses bave been burned to the groundabout 440 in the summer capital of Srinagar alone and scores of others in from fifty to seventy villages scattered throughout the valley. “There also are isolated eye-witness accounts of pillage. looting and rape. “Indian officiais claim Pakistani infiltrators started the fires. But bath extremist and moderate Kashmiris and the victims themselves, interviewed 36. Following the reverses suffered by the Indian Army in the Rami of Kutch, lndian leaders let it be known publicly that they would hit Pakistan at a time and place of their own choosing. The following is the direct outcome of that threat. 37. On 15 May-long before the so-called Pakistani infiltrators took to arms in Indian-occupied territory -1ndia violated Lhe cesse-fire line and occupied three Pakistani posts in Kargil. That was India’s first act of calculated aggression. Under pressure of the United Nations, India vacated those posts, but again on 15 August, before Pakist?ni forces could occupy them, India reoccupied those posts. That was done within hours of a Iublic thrert by the Indian Prime Minister that India would carry the fight to A& Kashmir. The Defence Minister boasted in the lndian Legislature that “India had crossed the ceasefire line in the past and would do SO again”. 38. On 23 August the village of Awan Sharif, wbich lies clearly inside Pakistan territory, was shelled by Indian forces. Twenty-five of the inhahitants-none of whom were army personnel-were killed. On 24 August Indian forces again crossed the cesse-fire line and seized two other Kashmirposts inthe Titlnval sector. A few days later Indian forces again struck across the cesse-firs line in the Uri-Punch sector. By the end of August they had seized a number of Pakistan posts there. 39. The Indian propaganda Une was th& they had seized the foregoing Pakistan posts with the limited objective of stopping “Pakistani infiitrators” from entering Indian-held Kashmir. This was only a trick to put Pakistan off guard and to delude the world. We had reliable information at that time that India was preparing to mount a big offensive with a view to capturing & Kashmir. This was the position 40. It vas then that, in order to forestall further aggressive mows by Indian forces, the ~Kashmir forces, backed by the Pakistan Army, cmssed the cesse-fire line for the firsttime since July 1949. They moved into the Bhlmbar sector and seized Chhamb and Dewa. The same afternoon the Indian Air Force went into action agalnst our forces in that area, thereby forci ig the Pakistan Air Force to intervene. The conflict was thus further escaIated by the Indlan action. 41. Pakistan couId bave saved the isolated posts that ~ndia had seised in the Uri-Punch sector if only it had given air support to thOse small outposts which were clsmouring for it. We denied them air support, preferring to lose those posts rather than be tbe fiist to add a new dimension t0 this conflict. 42. On 6 September, after the Security Council had appealed to bath India and Pakistan to cease-fire, India launched a three-pronged attack against Lahore. Lahore, which is one of the most important cities of Pakistan-and 1 cari say SO with fiimness because 1 myself am from Lahore-is situated only eighteen miles fmm the India-Pakistan border. The Indisn leaders’ threat to hit Pakistan nt a place and time of their own choosing hnd thus been carried out. The nggression against Azûd Knshmir was only a device for creating this opportunity, lmowing as India did that we would be bound to react to its nggressive nttacks on SKashmir territory. 43. lndia thus carried the war to Pakistan, treacherously launching an armed attnck against Pakistan territory without even a declaration of ww. This attsck bas been contained and Indian forces bave been repulsed. However, heavy fighting continues. <4. The sheer escalation of attnck by India provldes clenr evidence of Indian nggression against Pakistan. India tore up the cesse-fire Une; and the Indian Government radio described the Indianmilitary action to annex Azay Kashmir as “the war of liberation”. TB magasine of 10 September 1965 reported as follows: “India became delirious with victory. New of the Indian advances was wildly cheered in [Indian] Parliament. The Governmrnt radio announced the ‘liberation’ of 5,000 people and the establishment Of Indian civil administration in the ‘liberated’ arens. n And this is what the representatiw of India described yesterday as measures taken in self-defence. 45. I shall net take the Council’s timewithan account of th@ events and happenings of subsaquent days. The fighting spread with a rapidity which is clearly indicative of the premeditation and planning that must bave gone into the Indian attack on Pakistan. From WeaPon to weapon, and from area to aies, India 46. On the very day when tbe Secretary-General prepared to leave for the subcontintent, in pursuance of the mandate wlth which he was charged by the Security Council, Indian forces opened two new fronts against Pakistan, one in the south from Rajasthan, and the other from occupied Kashmir into the Sialkot area. 4’7. It is not possible for me, in the time at my disposai, to give the Council a full pictare of the scope and nature of the struggle in which Pakistan is today engaged. This is what a foreignobserveronthe scene, J. Anthony Lukas, cabled in a dlspatch from New Delhi which appeared in The New-York Times of 9 September: “It is also felt that, wlth U Thant, the Secretary- General of the United Nations, due in Pakistan, Indian strategy may be designedto confront Pakistan with a military situation that Will makethemsue for peace on terms suitable to India.” 48. Hnving been artacked along its entire frontier, Pakistan is fighting to defend itself against unlimited aggression from India, which claims to be imbued with the Gandhian philosophy of non-violence. And yet the representative of India asserts that his Government has clone its best to limit the war. By invading Pakistan% territory along a 600-mile front, India has spread flames of war over the subcontinent and condemned its 550 million men and women to misery and fear, has given a setback to their hopes of social and economic progress, and has revived the historic animosities and rancours which one has hoped now belonged to the past. 49. If the people of the subcontinent are today on the brink of a cataclysm, the responsibility, ultimate and immediate, must be placed at the door of tbat country which for eighteen years has rejected every suggestion, thwarted every move, frustrated every effort and barred every avenue for a just and peaceful settlement of the dispute which divides India and Pakistan. 50. 1 should like now to refer to the visit of the Secretary-General to Pakistan and India and to the reports which he has submitted to tbe Council. The Secretary-General’s reports show that, while both Governments bave agreed in principle to a ceasefire, conditions bave been attarhed or implied with regard to which the Secretary-General did not feel competent to give an undertaking. He undertook, however, to bring these aspects of the replies of the two Governments to the notice of the Security Council for its urgent consideration. 51. We share the Secretary-General’s disappoi.ntment that his valiant efforts in the cause of peace bave not met with complete success. A careful perusal of his last report [S/6686] shows that this was due partly tc his restricted terms of reference, and partly to the 53. The Prime Mlnister of Indla made it clear in his letter dated 14 September w., para. S] that hls acceptance of the Secretary-GeneraI’s pmposal for a cesse-fire was subject to the following conditions. First, chat the cease-fire orders would “be effective only in respect of the armed forces lnuniform engaged in the present combat” and that the Indlan Security Forces would remain free to deal wlth the so-called ‘armed infiltratorsW in Jammu and Kashmlr. Seoondly, the Indlan Prime Mlnister also made it perfectly clear “wihen cmsquent upon cesse-file becoming effective, further details are considered, we shall net agree to any disposition which will leave the door open for further infiltrations or prevent us from dealing wlth the infiltrations that bave taken place”. Thirdly, the IndIan Prime Minister stated categorically “no pressures or attacks will deflect us from our firm resolve to malntaln the solidarity andterritorial integrity Of our countiy, of whlch the State of Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part”. In other words, he bas clearly imposed a condition that the cesse-file should net be linked to the settlement of the Kashmlr dispute, which is the only cause of the present war. 54. It 1s no wonder tbat the Secretary-General found it impossible tc accept these conditions. In fact, the Indian Prime Minister’s letter of 14 September amounts to a rejection of the Secretary-General% proposa1 for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire. Hile ostensibly agreelng to a stoppage of flghting with the Pakistan Army and the~Kashmir Forces, India wishes fn retain a free hand to deal with the oppressed people of Jammu and Kashmlr, who bave rlsen in revoit against their Indian oppressors and the quisling administration which has been operating in Srinagar under the protection of Indian bayonets. 55. Tke second condition sought to be imposed by the Prime Mlnister of India is in line with India% persistent refusai to withdraw its forces from Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which were 56. The most preposterous condition, however, mentioned by the Indian Prime Minister is his determination to make the State of Jammu and Kashmir an integral part of India. Since 1947, the State of Jammu and Kashmir has been regarded as a disputed territory. As far back as 21 April 1948, the Security Council, in its resolution 47 (1948) noted that: “bath India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of’Jammu and Kashmir . . . shouldbe decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite”. That declaration was reaffirmed in paragraph 1 of the resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 5 January 1949, which, as 1 submitted earlier, was endorsed by the Security Council and accepted by bath India ami Pakistan. 57. When, in total disregard of those undertakings, the Government of India convened a constituent assembly in Kashmir and that assembly sought to determine the future constitutional position of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan launched a strong protest. The Security Council sought and obtained from the representative of India a categorical assurance that, while the assembly could express an opinion, it could “take no decision on the question of accession” andthat this opinion ‘Would not bind the Government of India or prejudice the position of the Security Council”. 58. In its resolution 91 (1951) of 30 March 1951 the Securiiy Council reminded bath India and Pakistan of the earlier United Nations resolutions with regard to Kashmir and reaffirmed the stand of the Security Council: “that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the Will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations “. 59. That position was reaffirmed by the Security Council in its resolution 122 (1957) of 24 January 1957. 60. The Indian Government’s attempt to treat the State of Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of India is, therefore, a violation of its international undertakings with regard to Kashmir and is manifestly contrary to the repeated declarations of the Security Council. It is also a fact that the recent troubles in Jammu and Kashmir are due in no small measurf to the steps taken in December 1964 to undermina the disputed status of Jammu and Kashmir and tc complete the annexation of the State through a varie@ of legislative, administrative and juridlcal measures. Incidentally, these steps were taken in flagrant disregard of the assurances glven by the Indian Prima Minister to the President of Pakistan on 12 October 1964 that, pending a settlement oftheKashmir.dispute, nothing would be done by the Government of Indla tC 61. I gave close attention to the report of the Seorema-y-General [S/6686] on his mission to Indla and Pakistan. That report Contahts a numher Of prOpOS& which, to the best of my -knowledge, the Secretsry- Generai dld net dlscuss wlth the Government of pakmtan durlng his vlsit to Rawalpindi. 1 bave transmitted these proposais to my Government and 1 shall place our considered reactlons before the Security Council as soon as 1 reoeive instructions from my Government. In the meantime 1 should like to submlt a few prellminary observations. 62. 1 mn wbolebeartedly in agreement with the Secretary-General’s remark that the Security Council sbould continue to make further strenuous efforts for a cease-fire, as well as for a long-term solution of the Kashmlr problem. This ls a duty and an lmperative responsibility of the Security Council. The Secretary-General has made a number of speciflo recommendations with regard to the cesse-fire, but 1 regret to bave to observe that his proposais for a long-term solution of the Kashmirproblem are neither precise nor effective. Al1 that the Secretary-General has proposed in this regard is that the Council should request the two Reads of Government to meet together “to dlscuss the current situation and the problems underlying it as a first step in resolvlng the outstanding dlfferences between thelr two countries and in reaching an honourable and equitable settlement” [ibid., para. 9 (b)]. There ls no reference here to Jammu and Kashmlr or to the implementation of the international agreement with regard to the State embodled in the Commlssion’s resolutions which were endorsed by the Security Councll and accepted by lndla and Pakistan. 63. The Secretary-General?+ suggestion that the Councll might consider the possibllity of creating a small committee to asslst in tbe talks between the hvo Heads of Government, “should its services seem usefuI and desirable to the two parties” [i&] is likely to be of limited value unless and untll the Security Cou&l clearly sets out the obligations assmned by India and Pakistan wlth regard to Kashmir and directs the committee to oversee their implementation. 64. Pakistan certainly welcomes the Secretary- General% offer of his own good offices in the search for a permanent solution of the Kashmlr problem. 65. The Secretary-General has said that theijecurity CO”~~R cari order a cesse-fire under the provisions of Article 40 of the Unlted Nations Charter and “that faflux W the Govermnents ooncerned to comply with this order would demonstrate the existence of a breach of lhe peace within the meanlng of Article 39 of the Charter” (ibid., para. 9 (a)]. 1 venture to doubt the neceSSity for such action. It would be the flrst time in fhe history of the Kashmir dispute that the SeWrlty Co”ncil would be contemplating action under 66. 1 would like now to make a few brief comments on some of the points in the statement of the representative of India at the Council’s prevlous meeting. 67. The representative of India claimed that India’s policies were based on the message of non-violence and peace. We bave seen Indian non-violence inaction in Kashmir, Junagadh, Hyderabad and Goa. We bave also seen this non-violence in the Rann of Kutch. We are witnessing it now on the borders of Pakistan. It is a matter of history that whenever India has had any dispute witb its neighbours it has sought to settle it by the force of ârms but to cal1 it non-violence. 68. The representative of India also referred to Mr. Nehru% offer of a no-war declaration in 1950. This offer was welcomed by Pakistan, which put forward concrete proposais to achieve the desired aim. The Government of India was invited to agree that the settlement of every dispute would be sought through negotiations, and ifnecessary, throughmediatien; but if these methods were to fail, the dispute would be referred to arbitration. It was only thus that a no-war declaration could carry conviction. Pakistan also pointed out that by joining the United Nations, Pakistan had already renounced the use of force. A bare announcement that we would net declare war unless attacked added nothing to these commitments; if anything, it detracted from them. An announcement that failed to substitute arbitraticn for compulsion would fail to carry conviction that there would be no resort to force. Thehypocritical character of India’s offer of a no-war declaration is well illustrated by the fact chat Pakistan was invaded by India on 6 September 1965 without a declaration of war. 69. The representative of India claimed that India is a modem, secular State, while Pakistan is a medieval. theocratic State. These claims and accusations bave been made by India ad nauseum in the past. Nothinn could be further from the truth. The urovisions With regard to citisenship, fundamentalrights and social justice in the Constitution of Pakistan are as liberal as those of the constitution of any other modem State. They are in no way inferior to the provisions in the Constitution of India. Pakistan% treatment of its minorities compares favourably in every way with the treatment which India is meting out to its own minorities. This is borne out by the hundreds of attacks on the helpless Muslim minorities and the large-scale expulsion of Indian Muslim nationals from Assam and Tripura whicb has beengoing sentatim of India. 1 will net go into the substance of the dispute, but 1 vmuld like to point out that the existence of the dispute was explicitly reoognised by bath India and Pakistan. They also agreed in the Border Ground Rules of 1960 that, penchug the finaI disposition of the territory, neitber side wouldattempt to ohangeinanywayths!statusquointhedisputed terrltory. Earlier tbis year. the Govermnent of India, for no apparent reason, deoided to make an issue of patrolling by Pakistsni border polio0 along a track whicb mis some 1.800 yards htto the Rami of Kutoh. India clainzed the entire territory. TO mslne guod thia cialm, India marohed tvm full brigades of its reguIar troops and armour into the area, brought upa bomber squadron to the nearby airfleld of Jamnagar, and the aircraft-carrier to within twenty miles of Karachl. Wnen, as was inevitable, a olash occured in the territory, Indla moved up its entire army against the borders of Pakistan and threatened to wreak war and destruction upoa our oountry. At that point the Prime Yinlster of the United Kingdom iutervened, and through bis good offices the Government of India were brought amund to accept the arbitration of a thr@%mn tribunal for settling the dispute. The most significant aspect of this incident is that. while presentir@ the agreement on the Rann of Kutch to the Indii Parliament, Prime Minister 8hastri conceded in the most clear and explicit language that the Pakistani patrol track, whioh the Government of India had ohosen to make into a casus belli, did in fact lie within the territory in the de facto control of Pakistan, and that Pakistani police had always moved along it. What 1 hme stated is in the records of the Indian Parliament itself. Any impartial observer cari draw his own conclusions from a stuc@ of this case. I venturc to subit chat no clearer case oan be found of the SySteInEtiC belliCOSity WhiCh bas Characterised the G0vernment of Imlia’s attitude to Pakistan. The examPle Of the dispute of the Rann of Kutch shows how, behind its peaceable posturings, the hnhan Government goes about seeking occasions to pick gratuitous quarrels wlth Pakistan. 71. The representative of India stated that the Government of India has only love and affection for the PeoPle of Pakistan and that even today India does net consider itself at wsr wlth Pakistan. Gn the morninp of 6 September when, without a declaration of wilr, India tmleashed an attack on Pakistan, its first a& m thiS war was the strafingby Indian aircraft of a stationary passenger train at Wazirabad station kfilinp a mat many innocent civilians. ~his is thai love and affection. 71. gouvernement le peuple core, kistan. sans contre de faire geurs la mort ce que l’on ‘7% As long QJ as 23 August, the Indian army shelled Awan Sharif inside Pakistan territory, killing twentyfive w-s and wounding fi. In flagrant violation 72. bombard8 35 personnes 73. Commenting on tbis, Roy Meloni, correspondent of the American Bmadcasting Corporation, said in a recorded despatch on 14 September: “If the Indians ever try to tel1 you that they have net bombed civilian targets inside Pakistan, youhave my permission to tel1 them to go quietly to hell. ” . . . “Some nights ago, Indians bombed Sialkot about five miles from the Indo-Pakistan border and at least three miles from any military target, andthey killed about twenty people. A further seventy were injured. The bombs fell in the heart of the City, ripped a masque into ribbons; and 1 wept-yes, 1 cried-with the survlvors, because this is not war, it is deliberate terrer.” SO the less said of thls “love”, the better it is. 74. During the night between 13 and 14 September the Indian Air Force once agaln bombed the civilian populations in Pakistan in the cities of Peshawar and Kohat, killing sixty persons and injurlng a large number as a result of indiscriminate bomblmg. In Pesbawar alone thirty persans were killed. When the Indian Air Force Canberras bombed the civilian areas in Kohat, twenty-seven bodies had been recovered by the afternoon and digging for the rest was in progress when la& reports came in. Forty-three persons were seriously injured. The casualties in bath Peshawar and Kohat included a large number of women and children. 75. The main targtit of Indian bombers in Peshawar was two adjoining villages where many houses and two masques were destroyed by Indian bombs. In Landi Arbab village a bomb directly hit a mosque and another bomb landed near a church and the residence of the American Consul in Peshawar. In Kohat, an Indian Air Force bomber hit the Liaquat Memorial .esquelles Utited States. This inationm. If tbere was een a B cberc&2 Le &ute tlle matter cal3 be deaucecl ntai~ divisbns raised and tbe last two years, wi assi tbe Uaited Xates for the express se of defence against Cbina, are 1x3~ deployed in tbe plains of the Pwajab and engage-d in attacking Pakistan. Toward the middle of August, an entire bFigade was moved fmm tbe Laadakb region to tbe Kasb~~ir cesse-fire dernieses expressément Chine, Pendjab kistan. transféF&e cessez-le-feu a franchi réalit& stationtiges de l’Inde elles et menacer sentant avec la Chine accusation tentative certains Unis. line ancl it is tbis unitwbicbwas respmsibPe a?oorthe breach of the cesse-fire Une near Titbwal. In fact, tbe ody Indian divisions which may appear to be st@ioned alo~g India’s morthem îmntiers are those in ‘tbe east. Tbese divisions cari wbeel around at a moment’s notice ta tbreaten and attack East Pakistan. The allegation made by the representative of India that Pakistan was conspiring with China for tbe destructkm of India is net only baseless, but is also a hl5tant attempt ta impress certain sections ofopinion, particularly in the United States. 79. Pakistan% dispute witb India armes from India% 79. origine Jammu cacbemirien, comme ac-eptation l’association attempt to annex tbe State of Jammu and Kashmir against the wishes of tbe people of KaShmiF, wbom vis in Pakistan consider as our kith and kin. The problen of Kasbmir, as well as tbe agreement to bold a plebiscite, predates Pakistan% azsoeiation with the Western Powers and its more recent efforts tc L ! I , 80. Having dealt with a11 the issues, 1 now remind this august body that in a similar situation in 1948 the Security Council insisted on deciding the entire dispute. 1 would like to recall to the Security Council some of the statements made by the members of the Council as they are relevant to the issue now under consideration, 81. At the 236th meeting of the Security Council, the representative of the United Kingdom said: “We are, then, confronted with the question of how is stop the fighting. What Will stop it. and in what way should it be stopped? ‘1. . . vWhat these two Governments want, and what we aI1 want, is that the moral power and authorily of the Security Councü be brought to bear on the situation SO that there cari be a conviction on all sides that justice is to prevail, and that violence need not go on. Moreover, our abject is not only to stop the fighting, but to keep it stopped. We have to arrive at a settlement which Will prevent a new outbreak. “1/ 82. At the 237th meeting of the Security Council, the representative of Canada said: “The President has rightly pointed out that the ending of the fighting andthe holdingof the plebiscite under conditions wbich Will be recognized as fair and impartial are two aspects of the samematter. YY 83. At that same meeting of the Security Council, the representative of China said: “It is obvious that the key to the problem lies in the plebiscite. If the principle of afree and impartial plebiscite for deciding the ail-important iquestion of the accession of Kashmir to lialia or Pakistan should be accepted, much of the incentive to violence and the use of force would be removed.“9/ 1/ See Officia1 Records oftheSecuriryCouncil.ThirdYear, NOS. 1-13. 236th meeting, pp. 281-282. 8/ 237th meeting, lb&, p. 207. o/Kd. p. 288. “We must bear in mind that it was C!es? tbe terms of this agreement, inca rated in tb~ two resolutions of tbe United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan which I have just mentioned, tbat cesse-fire orders were issued by parties on 1 January 1949. Tbe cesse ment of 27 JuIy 1949, completely demarcated on the ground, is also based upon and integrated into the same structure. Any attempt to bypass or whittle away its basic prmciples would jeopardise the cesse-fire wbich bas so painstakingly been establisbed by the Commission. r( . . . n . . . It is for the plebiscite to determine the ultimate fate of tbe Sale. AI would Iike to add that this principle, keystone of tbe wbole structure, bas an impar which transcends the obligaory force it de from tbe consent of the parties. The principl its intrinsic value because it embodiees Eh on& criterion for determining Mashmir’s fate wbich is compatible with madern democratic ideals.*-/ 87. 1 bope tbat the statements of members of the Security Cou&l wlaich I have quotell will suffice to establish tbat a simple, unconditional, cesse-fire would not by itself suffice to bring about either peace or a durable solution of the Kashmir problem. It mnst also be recalled tbat tbe agreement witb regard to the demarcation of the cesse-fire lino of JuIy 1949 is only tbe first part of tbe Commission’s resolution of 13 August 194% The rest of tbe resolution, providing for withdrawal of tbe armed forces of India and Pakistan and the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite, havj still to be implemented. India cannot insist on respect for the cesse-fire agreement and yet continue to oppose implementation of the remaining provisions of the international agreement witb regard to Kasbmir. 88. I have set forth tbe proposals of my Government for tbe termination of tbe present conflict between India and Pakistan. Tbey are based on principles which are self-evident. I put it to the Cotmcil: could be mcre fair to the interests of India, of Pakistan and of the people of Jammu and KaS tban the proposition tbat we finally settle s dispute on tbe basis of ‘che wisbes of tbe people, freely asccrtained? W’hat could better secure a just and genuine peace for OUI entire region? Are we asking too mnch wben we ask chat tbe United Nations base iii/ Ibid.. Fifth Year, NO. 9,467th meeting. pp, 3 PRRSIDENT: 1 acknowledge and appreciate As of tbe Minister of Law of Pakistan. ‘93. If tere fs no objection, and since there are several 5tbep speakers on our Ii&, tbe Council wiU meet again at 3.30 tis afternoon. dt was SO &cHded. Ths meeting rose af 1.10 pm. Laho in UN. P~IC&: $US 0.50 (or epivalent