S/PV.1241 Security Council

In accordan~e with our previous procedure I shall invite the representatives of India and Pakistan to ta& seats SO that tbey may participate in the discussion of the question. (Jordan): We bave corne to an important stage in tbe debates of the Security Cou&l on the question before us-more substantive in nature and. I hope. more productive. 3, At the 1237th and 1238th meet Council. held respecti the dtscuesims we held were of an emerguncy bers tried to confine tkmselves to the question of ~ta~inio~ a cesse-fire on the demarcation lines in Kasbmir and between Indla and P stan. Tberefore, the debate did not go, as it normally should, into tbe fundamental political question of Kasbmir; nor did it deal wlth any olaims or coontercIaims by tbe two parties to the dispute. Since then.armed aotivities between the two nations bave -eached wider’ dimensions and rendered Seourity fxuncil 4. We were disturbed at the fact that tbese activities were tahlng place at a time when tbe Secretary- General was undertahing hls peace mission to tbe area and lndeed during bis vlsits to tbe ~WO COURtries? The conclusion we draw fmm that reality is tbat efforts towards the eoforcement of a ceaseflre cari in no way be practical. nor cari tbey yleld pOsitiW results, if tbe basic issue 1s oot squarely faced. Tbat is why in a11 past resolutlons and agreementS related to a cesse-fire between Iudia and Pal+ istan the political issue. namely the rigbt of selfdetermination of the people of Kashmlr. was always empbasized side by side wlth a cesse-flre. Special references could be made to Securlty Couooil resolution 47 (1946) of 21 April 1946 and the resolutions of the United Nations Commission forIndlaaudPahlstan of 13 August 1946 g and 5 January 1949,2/whlch resolutions were repeatedly reaffirmed in all subsequent decisions of the Council. 5. It follows that an enforcement of a ceaee-fire basic issue would amount to one party and a 108s was easy for us to underone obtaining at present between India and Pakistan. hls blgh’ office and from tbe faltbful son of the Asiau soilwe felt that the political problem Kashmir weigbed heavlly on tbe ation of a cesse-fire. Tbe Secreon 7 September 1965 from ‘Kennedy International Airport on hls mission: bave no illusions about tbls mission: tbe issues are iofinitely compllcatedanddiffmult and tbe situation out tbere is extremely grave. The replies from bath Govermnents to my message of 12 September kave shown clearly the deslre of botk for a cease-fire. but bath pose conditions wkich make tke acceptance of a cesse-fire very dffficult for the other ~ide.~ [Bd., para. 13.1 7. In analysing the positions of the two Governments as stated in tkeir officia1 messages to the Secretary-General. one cari conclude tkat India’s conditions for a cesse-fire could be surmnarized as follows: first. tkere must be no possibility of a recurrence of armed attack on India. open or disguised; second, a cesse-fire should have no bearing on tke political issue of Kaskmir; and tkird. Kaskmir is an integral part of India and falls under its sovereingty. These are the bases wktch constitute lndia’s acceptance of a cesse-fire and which India invites Pakistan to accept. 8. In direct opposition to tkis Indian stand is P&i5 tan% acceptance of a cesse-tire wkich is qualified as follows: flrst. tkat the cesse-fire must be purposeful: second, that arrangements must ba made for tke final settlement of the Kashmir dispute. which is the root-cause of the India-Pakistan conflict: and third, tkat the pledges to tke people of Kashmir that tkey may ckoose their own destiny must be honoured and fulfilled. 9. Comparing tkese two sets of contradictory vlews. one fails to find any common ground on wkich the two parties could meet or even ba called to negotiate. My delegation wishes to stress in tkis regard, and as a general rule. tke point that no direct discussions or negotiations between two parties cari serve any positive purpose if tkere is no agrsement on eitker tke basis of suck discussions or the objectives tkersof. It is to our deep regret tkat thls element of common understanding on tke fundamental issue in tke conflict is lacklng behveen Inda and Pakistan. Thls regrettable fact dosa not enabLe tke members of the Security Council to ckerlsk tke kope tkat a settlemeat of the basic problem cari he reacked througk direct talks between tke hvo Governments. Tke Security Council skould tkerefore itself turn itS attention to tke problem. 12. The question of Kasbmir is knocking heavlly at the door of this Council. We are a11 called upon to propose practical means for its settlement: and in order to be practical, steady and correct in our proposais , we must uphold the principle of selfdetermination as it is embedded and reaffirmed in a11 past pronouncements of the Council on thts problem. My delegation Will not fail to join in any efforts in thls Council aimed at servlng this end. We have therefore noted withsatisfaction thefollowlngremark of the Secretary-General in his report: “1 am sure also that the Council Will wtsh to explore, as a matter of urgeucy. methods for achleving enduring peace betwden India and Pakistan.” Qb&. para. 6.1 13. The Secretary-General, in hlsunrelentingefforts to surmount the present acute crisis, has introduced to the Council in his report [5/6686] some ideas and has stated his own views. The general and deep concern at the situation between India and Pakistan, together wlth the fear that further serious developments might be underway. has preoccupied the minds of the members of the Security Council with what should be done to face the immediate necessities. 1 wish on behalf of my delegation to emphasize, in this regard, some essential points whtchdetermine our position in evaluating the appropriateness and effectiveness of any suggestions or proposals for meeting the situation. 14. First. the continuance of fighting must in no way be allowed and a cessation of hostilities must be enforced at once. Second; the immedtate necessity for dealing with the crisis is part and parce1 of the per- 15. We want, therefore, to prooeed on the main road that leads to a claar destination. not on the sidsways which lead to dead-ends.

Exactly fcurteen long days have passed since the Security Councii was called to meet on the initiative of our President and adopted resolution 209 (1965) of 4 September-an occasion of urgency reflected in the urgent and anxious language in which it was expressed. We had then asked for and hoped for a response wfthin three days: but even before half that short period had gone by we beoame grippsd with the fear that the course of tbe war was accelsrating in its insane speed and gave no Promise of haltbrg or abating. We there.. fors met again-again in circumstances of grave urgency-and within two days adopted resolution 210 (1965) and sent the Secretary-Gsneral on tbis most difficult of all the tasks to which he had in four long years lent the strsngth of his hand and the persuasive talent with which he is immeasurable endowsd. 1 then praised his courage for the readiness wtth which he undertook the accomplishment of this exhausting task. which 1 then felt could be matched only by bis persona1 characteristics and the exalted position tc which he SO significantly adds lustre. He bas rehxned wfth emply hands but with courage undiminishsd and his hopes for a successful outcome by no means leasened. He deserves our gratitude to the ful!est measure. Vertain great questions are put to mankind.w said Tolstoy. %ot that men should answer them but that they should keep on tryfng.” We should therefore continue to hope till, as the poet puts it, hope creates from its own wreck the thing it contemplates. 17. In a very real sense without mincing words, we cannot help but regard the situation at which the Security Council has arrivsd as a test of its ability to stand up to the exacting burdens of international lffe and justify the hopes that mankind bave entrusted to ft. If the Security Council cari be balked. bent or beaten. there is no longer any hope for man in this pitiful world of ours. It is tiierefore our duty to give it the strength to face up to its present peril. But we must have a clear understanding of what we are about before we cari decide our course of action. The representative of Pakistan cautioned us only this morning, at our previous meeting, agatnst advocates who, if they cannot convfnce. at least endeavour to confuse the judges; 1 entirely agree with him. We should not either confuse ourselves or. what is even botter, allow ourselves to be confused. 18. The conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmfr has bad a very long and chequered hïstory. 19. On 3 Yeptember the Secretary-Oeneralpresented a report [5/6651]. It painted a picture of athe murent situation in Kashmira which joltsd us into activity. Neither Indla nor Pakistan-we should bear this in mind-had asked for a meeting with a complaint in hand with regard to any political dispute which was gnawing at its mind. There was a sudden flare-up along the cesse-fire line and you. Mr. Presidentrightly. if 1 may say SO with respect-urgently called us into meeting. We wero net concerned then with the simmering situation between IndIa and Pakistan. It began simmering on that fateful day in August 194’7 when one ancient country and one ancient people were tut idto twounequalparts. It continues simmering to this day. It is most times quiescent: sometimes it bursts into flames as it did in August and September. Something suddenly went wrong on 5Augus.t 1965. 20. May 1 digress here for a moment. My esteemed friend, the representative of Jordan. in a short intervention at the 1239th meeting, offered what he called a clarification to the significance which in the statement he made to us. the representative of Indla sought to attach to the date. IIe quoted me in support of his contention, and 1 wisii to assure bim and also to assure the Council that 1 stand by every Word 1 said then. It is truc indesd thatwe made no judgement on that occasion. We had tsken no position on who committed aggression on whom norindeeddidlunderstand the representative of Indla to say that wehad. by incorporating that date, judged one party as guilty of any misconduct. But-and this is a vital faotthe date 1s indeed of the greatest significance. 1 do not wlsh to mar by sny words of mine this afternwn the very close and friendly persona1 relationship tbat the representative of Jordan. Mr. Rifa’i and myself have enjoyed over the years and the even more close and more affectional feelings that we bave developed toward each otber since we came to be seated at thés Council. It was my good fortune that the arrangement of the English alphabet has made it possible for us to sit side by side. More than ever, speaking on this significant day-the last day IVIr. Rifa’i Will grace this table and add distinction to our company and the last day of my nine-month-long privilege to havebeen SO olosely associated with him. since he is leavlng us tomorrow-more tban ever, as 1 said, do 1 hesitate to enter into a controversy at aA1 with him. P;u: I am perfectly sure that he Will agree wiib me that the 21. The flfth of August as the vital date to this debate if referred to at least seven times in that report, and 1 crave the Cc?mcil’s indulgence to enumerate it. First. tbe su@-kadlng abovc paragraph 5 is entitled sEvents since 5 August 1965n. Second&. tbe opening sentence of paragrapb 5 reads: @Tbe ourrent serious trouble affecting the ceasefire aod tbe cesse-fire line in Kasbmir dated from 5 Augast 1965.. . .u Thlrdly. tbe coacludingsentenoe of the sameparagraph reads: ‘The adequacy of tbe present number of observers and of their functioo may welI be reapqraised in the ligbt of experiences since 5 August.. Fourthly, tbe opening sentence of paragrapb 6 beglns: Weneral Nimmo bas indlcated to me that tbe series of violations that began on 5 August were tc a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of armed men. generally not in uniform. crossing the cesse-fire line from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side.- Fifthly. part II of the same report is entitled: “List of those incidents since 5 August 1965 which bave lkn investigated by United Nations observers prior to 3 September 1965’. Sixthly. General Nimmo, on hls letter transmitting that list sald: “This list comprises only incidents on wbich complaints have been submltted asserting violations of the cesse-fire and the cesse-fire llne between 5 and 30 Augast 1965.. .u Seventhly. and lastly, the list itself sets out the first and second incidents as those of 5 and 6 August. 22. 1 do not tbink 1 need say more, Nor Will it be proper for me to lift the Veil over the va=;ed and vartous consultations that indeeddid takeplace relating t0 the incorporating of it. the formulation of words in it. the omission of some and the inclusion of others. the dotting of the 1% and the crossing of the T’s. ths inspiration and perspiration behind the final form. That would provide good copy. but it would hardly be good diplomacy. 23. 1 now return to where 1 left off. In the remarks that 1 propose to make, 1 do not wish it to be thought to give one’s a11 to save one’s country. 28. Military pundits have calculated the defensive human costs of such operations in the ratioof at least ten to one. The art and science of this wearing, wearying, wasteful war bave now been perfected in Asia. The peril of our times is the expansion, exgort and propagation of this kind of war into regions farther beyond, reglons which are judged to be ripe for revolution. Today, however, Asia is its testingground. 29. When the truth with regard to these infiltrations hecame knovm. Pakistan answered with vague denials and claims that these are but the symptoms of an ancient malignancy and the Security Council should direct its mind and employ its energles in exterminating the root cause of all: the denial by India of a plebiscite in Kashmir. agreed to sjr India as long ago as 1948. This was repeated thls morning at our previous meeting by the representative of Pakistan. Thls has been a time-honoured refrain. 30. 1 bave rcferred to the chequered history of this ancient conflict, and were it relevant to the matter in debate 1 should have felt compelled to address myself to it. But for the moment let me say only that it is claimed by India that it is capable of an answer as effective as it is complete. But 1 suggest that 1s net our task in this debate. 31. Pakistan has claimed that a cesse-flre should be purposeful and should provide for a self-executing arrangement for the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute. The only wpurposen tbat 1 see in this argument is that the purpose of this infiltration was to provide Pakistan with a lever whlch at one stroke releases it from the obligation of November 1962 to engage in direct talks wlth India to settle a11 outstanding differences and enables it, at the sanie time, to return to the pre-1962 claim of nothing but a plebiscite in Kashmir. 1 must venture this thought: If a plebiscite or an undertaking to bave one is to be regarded as an essential prerequisite for a cesse-fire, the loglc of that argument would commit the Security Council to bave secured for a State the happy position of provoking a conflict SO as to be able to secure a political profit from it. 32. 1 suggest that we take good tare that the Securiiy Council does not walk into any position of that kind. Our duty was and is plain. In resolutions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965) we called for a halt to hostilities-the sole concern, 1 repeat, in the present context of the Security Council. It is not to recall ancient resolutions in Prime Minister Sbsstri’s reply of 14 r, we fin43 Ibis staFement: n cleference to tbe wisbes of the Security n imme&ate cease-fire. We wonkl, 9 a.m. tomorrow F&at Pakistan is ah agreeable Fo do SO.” m.. para. 8.1 35. ?Ais btter concludes with tbese Fwo sentences: tbat tbe forces of peace wil: t bummity wilI go EomaPd towardz progress and prosperity. Ht is ir ws are agreeing Fa y5nr proposa 37. It i8 tberefore entimPy ~a~rs~n~b~e that in 6 in tbe politest terms a note of increduUt~ ister Sbastri’s secon< etary-General sets oti from Prime Ministel “I reaffirm my willingness, as communicated, to order a simple cesse-fire and cessation of hostilities as proposed by you.. .“. [Ibid., para. 11.1 38. 1 regret, wlth the utmost deference, that 1 cannot agree wlth or accept the analysis of this correspondence made at the previous meeting by the representative of Pakistan, when he gallantly tried to graft on to,an unconditional acceptance a series ci conditions that are not there. 39. 1 pass on to another aspect of the reports. Thls readiness and willingness-as 1 read it in the correspondence-of India, to xny judgement. contrasts strangely with the consistently unhelpful attitude of Pakistan. 1 now go back to the first report that was circulated to the Council [5/6651]. In that reportthere is a chapter entitled “Efforts of the Secretary- General”. With the indulgence of the Council, 1 should like to read out paragraphs 9 and 10 of the report by the Secretary-General: “9. On the morning of 9 August 1965, a table was received from General Nimmo warning that the situation was deteriorating along the cesse-fire line. On the basis of this report, 1 saw the representative of Pakistan at 1230 hours on that day, and asked him to convey to his Government tny very serious concern about the situation that was developing in Kashmir, involving the crossing of theceasefire llne from the Pakistan side by numbers of armed men and their attacks on Indianmilitarypositions on the Indian side of the line, andalsomy strong appeal that thecease-fire line be ohserved. That sameafternoon 1 saw the representatlve of India, told him of the information 1 had received from General Nimmo and of the démarche 1 had made to the Government of Pakistan, and asked hlm to convey tohis Government my urgent appeal for restraint as regards any retaliatory action from their side. In substiquent days, 1 repeated these appeals orally for trmsmission to the two Governments, asking also that ail personnel of either party still remalning on the wrong side of the line be withdrawn to its ovm side. 1 bave not obtained from the Government of Pakistan any assurance that the cesse-fire and the ceasefire line Will be respected henceforth or that efforts would be exerted to restore conditions to normal along that line. 1 did receive assurance from the Government of India. conveyed orally hy its representative at the United Nations, that India would act wlth restraint wlth regard to any retaliatory acts and Will respect the cesse-fire agreement and the cesse-fire line if Pakistan does likewise. In the meantime, reports from UNMGGIP as of 2 SepaIO. In view of the continuing deterioration in tbe situation as of 16 August, F gave consideration to a furtber step in tbe form of a draft statement about cesse-ftre violations wbicb was designedfor pubrelese. The draft was ba&ecF to tbe two repretives to be traosmitted for the information of r Goveroments. Botb Governments reacted Gavermnent of Iradia hsd e-fise, F wish to draw tbe to two extracts from tbat reply from tbe President of Pakistan General% first letter: fire. But it must ba a purposeful cesse-fire: one that effectively prechtdes tbat eatastropba and not m@reIy postpones it. En otber words. it sbould provide for a seIf-executing arrangement for tbe final settlement of tbe Kasbmir dispute which is tire root cause of tbe Fndia-Pakistan confbct. you propose a ‘cesse-fire witbout condition’ YO n to add tbat tbe Security Couacil would. scmn after the sd to implement its iesolution he provisions of tbe Security CO 4 September and 6 September tbat tbe cesse-fire be followed immeb~~t~~w~of aFFarmedPahtstaapersonne1 Pakistan side of the cesse-fore Fine aod tbe consoIidatio0 of tbe cesse-fire lise througb the ntng of tbe United Nations ilitary Ob- Group would result in restoring Indiak grip over Kasbmir. We would thus merely the same explosive positionwhich tri nt confFict.” [S/6683. para. 9.1 41. Lastly, 1 quote final Setter from tbe President of Pakistan: tbe second settbment 0 42. Mr. President. I bave done. 43. essential parts: first. acknowk3d particular time. onclude 1 wish to eat somow to the c representative of ng. 1 bave not the 9 the representative of India does to tel1 of unspeakable tra at our hearts and stir our seuls with mm& h Swift de&?. 46. 1 trust that that mental picture alone will give tbis debate a aense of urgency as nothing else cm. 47. Lord CARADON (United Ki propose now to endeavour to CO very able speeches to which we afternoon. We shail wish to sttdy would make no excuse at ail tbis aftermon for speaki 49. NO~ as we me& to take action on that report I am confident tbat we do SO with an overriding sense of urgency. ID tbls Council we acted with urgency and unity V&i?n we t3.mdmou~ly passed resolutions 209 (xm) ad 210 (1965) of 4 and 6 September. The Secretary-General followed np those resolutionswithout delay and witbout any besitation. The Unlted Nations did not fail to move qulckly to meet the danger. New tbe need for further urgent action is greater tban éwr. 56. From tbe first, the Secretary-General bas had tbe full support of my Government. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom at once appealed in the most urgent terms to President Ayub Khan and to Prtme Mini&er Sbastri to respond to Council rcsolutlon 209 (1965) and to bring the fighting to an irntnedlate end. And the British Foreign Secretary confirmed personally to the Secretary-General. when he passed through London on hls way ta Pakistan and India. the whole-hearted support of Her Majesty’s Government. 51. We wished the Secretary-General good fortune when he set out on bis brave endeavour. Throughout, he bas carried with Mm the firllest confidence of rny Government. and we pay our tribute to hls energy and bis patience and his persistence and his courage. We are more than ever grateful to him for his readiness to continue to carry such a heavy burden of responsibility. 52. We most sincerely endorse the Secretary- General% statement on leaving Delhi that even though an end of the fighting had net yet been achieved. there was no reason for slackening our efforts to achieve it. 00 the contrary. as the Secretary-General emphasiaed in the report he made to us yesterday, the need for a sustalned and accelerated effort is now greater than ever. There is and cari be no question of failure. It is a continuing and reinforced initiative on which he and we are engaged. an initiative whlch must succeed. As the Secretary-General said to us yesterday-and ws closely marked bis words: qf succws bas not yet been achieved in securing compliance with the Council’s resolutions, that is aR tbe more reason for making further strenuous efforts for a cesse-fire as well as for long-terni solutions.’ [S/6686,para. 8.1 53. We are encouragcd and inspired by the Secretary- General% example and bis call ato show that peace cari be restored and international harmony promoted by the concerted efforts of the international cornmuoity” tibid.t. We, wltb him, are ~t&nking not only of the well-being and future of the Governments and peoples of India and Pakistan, but also of the hopes “The British Government bave made it clear that they gave the fullest support to the recent mission undertaken by the United Nations Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council in an attempt to reach a peaceful settlement of the tragic conflict between India and Pakistan. They believe that the courses of action set out in thesecretary-General% report, which in his judgement might be helpful in considering how to achieve an effective cesse-fire, provide a useful basis forfurtherurgentdiscussions in the Security Council. The BritishGovernment wish to express their profound gratitude and great admiration of the Seoretary-General% untiringefforts for peace.” 55. NO~, looking to the future, we trust that both of the great countries invoived in this conflict Will respond to the appeal which we SO earnestly and urgently shall now make to them. They Will do SO. 1 confidently believe, not only in the interests of their own peoples SO that they may be saved from the scourge of much wider conflicts, but in the interests of establishing and maintaining international order and international peace and achieving the honourable and equitable settlement which has long been thedeclaredobjective. 56. Mr. DE BEUS (Netherlandsl: First of ail. 1 wish to express the deep concern of my delegationa concern undouhtedly shared by a11 members of the Seourity Council-that a cesse-fire as called for by the Security Council almost two weeks êgo. in its resolutions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965) of 4 and 6 September has still not corne into being. At the same time it seems to us that some progress towards a cesse-fire has been made, thanks to the invaluable and unrelenting efforts of the Secretary-General. It is on the result of those efforts that 1 should like to speak first. 57. My delegation has studied carefully the Secretary-General% two reports which are before us (S/6683 and S/6686]. 1 am sure that we are a11 deeply grateful for the tactful, yet determined, way in which the Secretary-General carried out his most difficult mission. IIe has not yet been able to achieve a ceasefire, but from a oareful reading of his reports one gains the impression that it has been brought somewhat closer. 58. Let us examine for a moment the position of the parties to the confliot with regard to responsi-. bility for the outbreak of fighting, as this position emerges from the Secretary-General% reports as well as from the statements of the two parties to whioh we bave listened wlth great attention. 59. The contention of India, to begin with, is-and here 1 quote from the reply of Prime Minister Shastri of 14 September-that: ” . , . Pakistan launched a massive attack on India on 5 August 1965 by sending thousands of armed ?a . ..tbat tbe series of violations tbat began on 5 August were to a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of armed men, generally net in uniform. cmssingtbe cesse-ftre line from the Paklstan side for the purpose of armed action on the IzaIian side.” [S/6651. para. 6.1 61. We must thersfore assume that extensive infiltrations across tbe cesse-fire line did indeed take place from tbe Psklstan side from 5 August on. even though we must add that my delegation would net necessarily subscribs to the qualification of these infiltrations as “a massive attack on India”. 62. From this contention follows India’s demand.repeated here yesterday. that Pakistan be identified as tbe aggressor. and furthermore Indla’s request-and 1 qnote agaln from prime Minister Shastrl’s flrst reply: We must urge that Pakistan should be asked fortbwitb to withdraw these armed infiltrators.. . we Will bave to insist that there mus: be no possibility of a recurrence of armed attacks on 1nti.a. open OF disguised.w [See S/6683. para. 8.1 63. Thls constitutes, 1 believe. the essence of the Indlan position with regard to the outbrssk of the present bostilities and of what India expects of the Securlty Council in connexion wlth a possible ceasefiie. 64. Pakistan% contention, on the other hand, is that it is India which committed aggression. 1 quote from President Ayub Khan’s reply.of 13 September: fl . . .India attacked Pakistan on 6 September. Tins was an act of nakcd aggression. It is astonishing that the cesse-fire resolution of the Security Conncil of 6 September. which you are urging us to implement. completely ignores tbis basic fact.” [Ibid., para. 9.1 65. It is an une--+rted fact, 1 believe, that I&i&i armed forces cFtit- -1 the international border between Pakistan and Indla on 6 September-which WBS ahout one day after the Security Council’s first aPpea1 for a cesse-fire. On the basis of this fact, Pakistan wishes Imita to bs branded the aggressor. The Pakistani President, furthermore. declares himself prepared to accept a cesse-fire on the following c nditions: ” . . . the cesse-fire must bs accompanied by action which would resolve the real cause of this conflict. This would be possible if the cesse-firs 1s followed tmmediately by complete withdrawal of the Indian and Pakistan foFces.from the State of Jammu and 66. The Secretary-General thereupon made a second appeal to both Heads of Government. Prime Mini&er Shastri, in hls reply to this second appeal, declared his country’s preparedness to accept a simple ceasefire without attaohing conditions. President Ayub Khan. in hls reply, declared hlmself hgreeable in principle to stop fightlng” [x. para. 141. He went on to say, however, that a meetingwlth Prime Mi&ter Shastri seemed toofferlittlehopeof success. Presldent Ayub Kban furthermore stated: ‘However. a cesse-fire cari be meaningful only if it is followed by .ntch steps as would lead to a durable and honourable settlement in order to preclude the recurrence of a catastrophe such as now threatens the subcontinent. TO brlng about such a settlement. it would be necessary to evolve an effective machinery and procedure that would lead to a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute.” [E.] 67. A comparison of the first and the second replies of both Governments shows that, althoughunfortunately they bave net yet corne together on a cesse-fire, the gap which separates them has been narrowed. India no longer poses any conditions, although it is clearly worried about a possible repetition of armed infiltrations. Pakistan stlll makes it a condition that a oease-fire should be followed by effective steps leading to a final settlement of the Kasbmtr dispute. 68. SO muoh for the position of both parties to the confllot. The question for us now is: what cari the Security Counoil do to achieve a cesse-fire and a settlement of the underlying polltical questions? 69. 1 bave noted that each of the two parties accuses the otber of aggression, that each of the parties adduces established facts to prove thatcontention.and that each of the parties wlshes the Council to brand the other side as the aggressor and draw the conclusions from such a condemnation. 70. It seems to my delegation that it would become a very complicated and rather fruitless process for the Council toweigb all the actions by one party against those of the other. It is obvlous tbat actions have tsken place on both sides by which hostiltties escalated, and we believe that it would be almost impossible to single out one specific act or date at whlch aggression started. The task Of the Seourity Council is to maintain peace and security. not to sit in judgement ltke a tribunal and award damages after weighing the seriousness of the mutual claims and counterclaims. CJur duty today is to stop the fighting and, beyond that, to promote a settlement Of the problem from which the fightingoriginated. We should. therefore, concentrate on steps leading to that double goal. Rather than trylng tn pronounce ludgement on recriminations about the origln of tbe fightlng. We should now try to stop the fighting and open a road to eliminate the underlyfng causes of confllct from f 72. Indla, 1 repeat. fears a repetitio” of armed infiltration. The Seourity Council Can”ot. of course, guarantee tbat no infiltrations or other violatio”s of the cesse-flre llae will ever tske place again. It cari. hmever, greatly contribute to that effect by increasing tbe present obviously insufficient strength of its militaxy observer corps in Kashmir to the degree necessary. This should go a long way to give India a reasonable guarantee against a repetition of massive infiltrations. 73, Pakistan. on the other band, fears that if it agmes unconditlonally to a cesse fire this Will in fact simply mean a return to the status quo. without anything else being done to go to the mal” root of a11 tbe troubles between India and Pakistan during the Iast eigbteen years: “amely. theKashmirquestlo”. Tbat fear, too. oertainly seems justified on the basis of tbe history of the last eighteen years. since the many decisioas of the Security Council on this subject bave never been carried out. 74. As is well known. the attitude of my country ha6 always been tbat the Kashmir question should be solved on the bas: _ of the free self-determination of the peopb of Kashmir and Jannnu and that the decisions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and the Security Council on that subject offered a just means to achieve that aim. Therefore we ca” sympathise witb Pakistan% apprehension on tbis aspect, namely that the basic political conflict might be left unsolved. If that were done, the Council would be only dealbig with the symptoms of the disease and net with the disease itself, the underlying cause of all the confllcts behveen India and Pakistan. 75. Here again. the Security Council can make its contribution to alleviating tbat fear of Pakistan by making it clear beyond doubt that a cesse-fire and a withdrawal of troops Will bave to be followed by talks between the parties and effective measures to SolVe on a just and durable basis aproblem which bas for “early one score years “ow envenomed the relations behnreen these two grear nations of the subcontinent. wbich are so dependent on co-operation behveen them. As the Secretary-General said in bis appeal of 12 September to President Ayub Kha” and Prime Blinister Shastri, a cease-fire is sa necessary prelude to further measures towards the restoration Of bWti”g peace” [sec S/6683, para. 61. 76. If. then, the difference which separates the two PartieS on acease-fire bas been narrowed. the milltary Sitwtion too seems at the moment to be more pro- Piticus for a cessation of hostilities. After several 77. I should like to point to another aspect of the matter and express the great regret wkich is felt in countries such as mine that these two neighbooring countries, whichwerededicatingthemselves withgreat energy and obvious results to theireconomic andsooial development, are now engaged in a fratricidaI conflict which threatens to undo a11 the valuable work that bas been performed in tke past. My country is among those which are happy to participate actiVe@ in the important assistancewhichbothcountries receive on a large scale from many industrial.ized countries. and we are distressed to sec tbat tb.fs development effort which we are soactively supporting is thus in danger of being undone by tke waste of warfare. 78. TO this political and military situation andto tkis economic aspect there has in tke last few days been added another and more ominous reason for ending tke fighting witkout delay. New and serious deveaopments in Asia during tke past few days, wkick bave been referred to by the representative of India, kave rendered more acute the danger of an extension of the conflict to otker areas and to a large-scaIe conflagration. Tbis mahes it absolutely essential tkat the fighting should be stopped before such a furtker extension cari take place. My delegation, tkerefore, believes that the Security Council skould doitsutmost to ackieve a cesse-fire before this weekend is over. It sincerely hopes that the circumstances wkick 1 kave mentioned Will lead the parties to the same oonclusion. At any rate the Security Council shoufd brook no longer delay and skould act now. Wben F say ‘now’ I mean not later than today or tomorrow. Tke situation is fraught with danger, and time is of the essence. 79. My delegation considers that many of the suggestions made by the Secrotary-C meral in his second report [S/SSSS] point the way and are most likely to lead to the desired result. The Security Council should. we believe, as he proposes. on the basis of Article 40. now decide on a specific moment in tbe nearest future a1 which hostilities should cesse. It oan offer its assistance for ensuring the observance of the cesse-tire. In taking these steps for a shortrange solution, we should, kowever, net lose sight of OUI long-range objective. wkich is to eliminate tbe underlying political conflict. The Council cannot impose a specifio solution of tbat conflict, which in the end depends on the parties. However. it oan set in motion a prooess to tbat end. It cari set tbe parties on the road to negotiations and assist them tkere if desired. 80. My delegatfon is prepared to support or to cosponsor any resolution containing those basic elefnents. 90. The Secretary-General ha8 also expressed the view to the two parties th$ the Council wouldwish to explore, “as a matter of nrgency. methods for achieving enduring peace between India and Pakistan” [S/SSSS, para. 61, and has noted that as Iate as November 1962 tire President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India had agreed on the need for renewed efforts to resolve theiroutstandingdifferences. We egree with the Secretary-General that renewed efforts to resolve these differences should be made aad that they cari only be effective under conditions of peace. 91. The position of the United States in this matter is simple and fortbright. We are in full support of the United Nations activity in this area. We are in full support of resolutions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965) adopted by the Security Council and the efforts of the Secretary-General to give effeat to these resolutlons. And our full support of these resolutions fs but a continuation of our consistent attitude on the fndia- Pakistan question, which ha8 always been to support a peaceful solution of a11 aspects of the differences between them. 92. Since the birth of India and Pakistan as independent countries. my Government ha8 developed relations. close and friendly. with bath countries. relations which we sincerely want and hopeandexpect to continue. We bave many tics of friendship and common interest with the peoples of bath India and Pakistan. And these are expressed not only in our broad governmental programmes. but also in the form of many non-governmentalprogrammesandactivities, particularly in the fields of health, education and economic development. And as I said in the Security Council a week ago, a Saturday. 4September 1965, and 1 would lie to repeat that statement. “We know intfmately from our close relations with bath conntries the Fntrîcacies of the underlying problem which is at the root of today’s conflict . . .u [1237th meeting, para: 190.1 93. Our attitude in the United Nations on the India- Pakistan question today, as in the past, continues t0 derive from the existence of this spirit of friendship with bath countries and a deep interest in world peace. That is why we bave shared the deep con- Cern expressed by us, together with all members of the Councll, in resolution 210 (1965). about extension of the fighting whtch sdds immessurably to tbe seriousness of the situation. The world commuatty hss a right to expect, in the wake of the Sscurity Conncil resolutions twice adopted nnanimously, that both parties cesse hostflities and respeot the Council’s resolutions. wbich are even-handed resolutions between the parties. 94. These resolutions are based on a common convlction that a peacefnl resolution of the differences mes co&Gxxateurs paix du monde. tics to listen to kh ngemus path of -.var. 8 srtuation is dta and P&is aad for t&e peace of tine VmrM. on wishes to dans l*intér& que prennent auxquelles y delegation considers tbat tbe urgmt nature emergency action reqoired does net relie- Security Cou&l from the duty of giving tba ClOSBSt attention ta tbe causes underlying the crisis ~&MI bas been coming on over the last fewwaeks. 101. But, 1 repeat, nothing reasonable can be obtained by prolonglng a fratricidal struggle. It is high time that the two camps-whose eminent speakers we have heard yesterday and this morning. with interest but also with sadness-should be made aware of this. 102. 1 shall llmit myself now to these few general comments, reserving our right to spesk again when a draft resolution is before the Council.

1 wish to associate my delegation wlth the expressions of appreciation entended to the Secretary-General for bis mission of peace to India and Pakistan. While hls efforts to glve effect to the Council’s resolutions bave not received positive responses in all cases from the parties con- CeIWd. my delegation is gratified that the mission has not been altogether fruitless. 104. His two reports have thrown a flood of light on the critical situation. The impressions he has formed and the recommendations he has made should receive the Council’s most serious consideration. The Secretary-General bas found that both India and Pakistan are desirous of a cessation of hostilities in the entire area of the current conflict. But in an atmosphere of suspicion, fear and highly charged emotionslism. it is not surprislng that both parties have found it necessary to make charges andcountercharges against the other, rather than to accede in a clear-cut mariner to the cesse-fire appeals of the Security Council and to the persona1 appeals of the Secretary-General. Thls has made the missionundertalcen by the Secretary-General even more dlfficult and complicated. 105. In thls respect, it is only fair to note. as was ably pointed out a while ago by the representzive of Malaysia, that Indla did indicate to the Secretary- General its readiness to accept a simple cesse-flre. On the other hand, Pakistan made its acceptance condltional upon certain measures that wereunacceptable to India. As a result, the fighting continues unabated and the situation remalns grave. 106. As the organ responsible for the maintenance of peace and security. theSeourity Councilclearlycannoi evade its responsibllty. It must act immedlately in such a way as to enable the leaders of both India and Pakistan to find it possible to get out of a bllnd alley. 107. In hls report [S/6666] to the Council at the 1239th meeting, the Secretary-General suggested the advlsabillty of applying Articles 39 and 40 of the United Nations Charter to enforce the cesse-fire. Thls may very well turn out to be quite unnecessary. But it appears to be a loglcal step to tahe in order not only to uphold the authority of the Conncil, but, 114. The hostilities between these two States. whicb began in Kashmir, are spreading day by day, engulfing more and more regions andinvolving increasing numbers of armed forces on bothsides. Serious losses are befng sustained, and net only by the armed forces: the peaceful population is being sorely Med. Not only military zones but cities far inside the territory of India and Pakistan. iaclucling tbe capitals. are the targets of air raids. 115. The spread of the armed conflict is aggravating the already tense situation in South and South-East Asia. created by the ahvession of United States imperialism in Viet-Nam, and is stillfurtherincreasing the threat to world peace. 116. It isquiteobvious thatsuchaturnof events is net at a11 in the interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan or the peoples of Asia as a whole. It is fraught with an ominous threat to international security and is doing great harm to the cause of worid peace. It is a11 too evident that the armed conflict between India and Pakistan merely serves the purposes of tbe forces which are trying to disunite and set against each other the States that bave liberated themselves from the colonial yoke. It is equally clear that the continuation of this confllct benefits only the forces which are pmsuing the criminal policy of dividing peoples SO as to achieve their imperialist and expansionist aims. 117. It is natural therefore that all who cherish the cause of peace should show legitimate ooncern about the tragic turn taken by relations hetween the two biggest Asian States, India and Pakistan, which were the initiators of the Bandung Conference. Concern about the armed cobfliot between India and Pakistan bas been clearly expressed by the G numerous countries. As we know, a n meu bave appealed for an immediate end to hostilities and a settlement of the Indo-Pakistan armed conflict by peaceful means. 118. The Security Council, fulfilling its great task as the United Nations organ with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, in ita turn adopted resolutions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965) calling upon the warring factions to cesse hostilities in the entire area of conflict immediately and promptly withdraw a11 armed personnel back to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965. 119. With this same end in view. as we know. the Secretary-General made efforts in pursuance of the decfeions of the Security Council. Tbe results of these efforts are refIected in bis reports [S/6683 and S/6686]. They testify to the extremely disturbing turn of events and the vital need for the Council to adopt immediate measures. -+Je kaow, the reports indicate that the -General. fulfilling the mandate entrusted tbe Semrity Council. requested theGovernments of India and Pakistan to order an UnCOnditiOnd cesse-fire and cessation of ail hostilities in the entire ama of tbe conffct. Thepositions of the paarring factions are presented in the respective messages of the Governments of India and Pakistan. They speak for tbemselves. The reply to thls appeal recsivsdfrom the Prime ister of India. Mr. Shastri. on 15 Septemher 1965 quoted in the report of the Secretary-General. states inter alla- - T reaffirm my mli”g”ess. as commu”icated. to order a simple cesse-fire and cessation of hostilities as proposed by you. as soon as you are able to confirm to me that the Government of stan bas agreed to do SO as well.m [Sec S/6683. para. 1l.J 123. The report of the Secrstary-Gsneralalso quotes tbe reply from the President of Pakistan. Mr. Ayub Kban. receivsd on 16 September 1965. The reply states as folloas: While ws are agrseable in principle to stop fightimg . . . a oease-fire cari be meaningml only if it is followed by such steps as wonld lead to a durable and honourable settlement in order to preclude the rer.mrence of a catastrophe such as now threatens the suocontinent. TO bring about su& a settlement. it would be necessary to evolve an effective machinery and procedure that would lead to a final settlement of the Kashmir dlspute.n Igg.. para. 14.1 124. It should be particularly emphasizsd that the recognition of the need for an immediate end to the current armed conflict between Indla and Pakistan. the recognition of the extreme importance of this for the cause of peace. bas been reflected in a WhOle series of international moves. The Security Council too made this point qnite unequivccally in its decisions. which are extremely serious and must k. implemented. 125. T~E Soviet Union, which bas nnwaveringly attached primary importance to the maintenance of world peace. bas likewise expressed grave concern ahout the armed conflict between Indla and Pakistan. The leaders of the Soviet Union bave repeatedly made it clsar that we are far from indlfferent to what is happsnfng now bstween Indis and Pakistan. 126.. It is a well-hnown fact that we aw botmd to hdia by a frisndship which by now has bscome traditioaal. The Soviet Union appreciates Indiak 127. At the sume time, we are in faveur of the development of good-neighhourly relations with Pakistan too, since such relations are in the mutual interests of both our countries. The Soviet Union has therefore on many occasions noted wtth satisfaction that these endeavours of ours nieet wlth understanding on the part of the Government of Pakistan. 128. Al1 this explains why our concern about the current armed conflict between India and Pakistan represents above a11 the sincere and disinterested feelings of friends of the peoples of Indla and Pakistan and desire for peace to be restored between the two countries. At the same time, we cannot but note that the conflict arouses our ooncern also kcause the hostilities are taking place in a region immediately adjacent to the frontiers of the Soviet Union. 129. The attitude of the Soviet Unlon towards the question being considered by the Council is determined by the general lines of the peace-lovlng foreign policy of our country and by oui profound conviction that when disputes arise between Stateswhatever their origln-they shouldbesettledbypeacefui means, by negotiatlons. There is no other posa’- bility for the settlement of conflicts. 130. As was indicated in the messages sent by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the Prime Minister of India and thé President of Pakistan on 4 September 1965, [S/6685], the Soviet Government has expressed willingness to lend its good offices in this matter-provided of course that the parties SO desire. 131. We venture to recall again that the Soviet Union is most anxious 10 see peace strengthened in that reglon. As you know, the Soviet Government has called upon India and Pakistan to cesse hostillties immedlately and wlthdraw their respective troops to the positions held by them before the beginnlng of the conflict. And with that in mind. the Soviet Union supported the decislons of the Security Council designed to achieve this aim. 132. In present circumstances, attention muSt be focused on the need to implement the resolutions of the Security Council and on strict compllance with its decisions. It has become more Clear than ever that the main task now is to achieve an immediate cessation of hostilities hetween Indta and Pakistan and to put an end to the bloodshed. The deafening roar of guns and thunder of bombs are obstructing negotiations. Elelllgerent moods and heated passions are very dangerous counsellors of reason. In an atmosphere of armed conflict it 1s hardly possible to salve the problems whlch exist between the two States, and their solution is most desirahle in the interests of good-neighbourly relations between them. entail. ion feels it necessary to t circnmstmces tbe efforts be abk in t tioos 33 g principles. to enter iatïons on éhe t d a peacpfutul settlee cwrené dis0 136. Tbe PRESIDENT: I calP on tbe representative of’tndin. I Sùall etless of ing tbis meetinng of tbe Seeurity Comcil to a close by coming to a CoaolUSi~ Whi& Will help tbe cause of peaee. tbis war bas now taken dimension. Tbe latest reports vie bave had disturbbng. Cbinese éroops are massingon our At four points they bave already indulged ing actions aad they are. poised for an invasion or a serious attack as soon as the ukimatum to wbicb P refemd at the 1239th meeting, expires. And the ultimatum expires tomorrow. Dut the Council Will 0e making a serious mistake. if I migbt say SO witb the greatest respect to the members of the Couacil. if it loohs upoo this new trouble on our fran- 6 as sometbing bavbxg to do merely witb India Cbisa. 1 want to satisfy tbe Cou&l that wbat is aing mvf is an extension of tii India-P&&an C@dlkt. 139. Tiae represe~tati~ of Pakistan blandly rejected vi 1 said yesterday t the complioity between China ami Pakistan; but unfortunateiy the record is muoh too clear for such bland dismissal of the ay 1 refer to two or three quotattons fram respoasible officiais of tbe Govenment of Pakistan. 141. In a statement to the Associated Press of Pakistan made on 10 April 1963, Premier Chou En-lai disclosed that the leaders of Pakistan bad assured him in 1954~mark the year 1954-that Pakistan had foined the Western military alliances only to gain political and military ascendancy over India and that “Pakistan had no other motivation in joining the pacts”. 142. Initiating a foreign policy debate in the Pakistan National Assembly in 1963. the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Bhutto, sald that in the event of a wawith India. Pakistan would not be alone: Pakistan v?ould ba helped by the most powerful nation in Asia. 143. In December 1963 the Chinese Vice-Minister for Foreign Trade. Mr. Nan Nan-ch+ tben on a visit to Pakistan, said: %‘e have to build ourselves militarily, economically and financially to beat the aggressors.” And he added: ‘“rf ever there is war between India and Pakistan, China Will surely support Pakistan and not Indla.’ 144. Apart from tbls, we bave been reading in tbe Press about the vlsit of Mr. Chou En-lai and the Vice-President of the Chlnese Republic to Pakistan in recent tiraes-and you Will have notlced tbat the one country in the world which is opposed to the cessation of these hostilities between India and Pakistan is China. It bas condemned the action of the Security Council: it has called it an imperialist body. It bas condemned the peace mission of the Secretary- General, calling hlm a stoop of the imperialists. And tbls is for obvlous reasons. China is figbtlng India through Pakistan. The whole policy of China is to. disrupt the economy of India, to break up th@ country. because China realizes that Indla is tbe only country in Asia wblch cari withstand the menace of Chinese expansionism. Therefore, there is no point in saylng, as the representative of Pakistan ha6 said: ““we bave notblng to do with China: tbere is no compliclty betwen ourselves and China: We are fighting this war with India singlebanded”. this Co~acil to be under any missppreheato the attitude of my Government wlth o Ksshmir: nor do I want the representative tan to be under any mlsapprehcnsion. Kashmir is a0 integral part of Indla. Kashmir is a unit of the Indis Federation: and we Will net permit oui Federation to be broken up. The separation of Kashs tbe break-up of our Federatioo much a break-up as if separated from Indla. Tberefore. as far as the position of Kashmir is concerne& it bas been stated by the representatives of tbs Govenment of Indla on more thanoue occasion, snd. as 1 sald, 1 myself stated it clearly and categorically at our last meeting. 146. The representative of Pakistau. surprisingly enough. referred to the people of Kashmir as the %lth and klnv of Paklstanis. St is a surprising statement. Why are they kith and kin of Pakistanis? 1s it merely because the majority of the people in Kashmlr happen to he IVIusllms? There are 5.0 million Muslims in Indla: 1 suppose that the next suggestion of Pakistan vdll be that they bave got 50 million people in India who are their klth and kin and, therefore. they bave a rigbt to invade India to liberate these people who are gmaning under the tyranny of India-as he bas suggested that the people of Kasbmir are groaning under the tyranny of India. 146. a qualifié des fibres que la majorité 8tr-e Inde: va frères libérer comme que joug 147. May 1 quote from a very significant broadcast wblch was made by Mr. Bhutto ou 15 September ‘Pakistan cari never he complete without self-determation in Kashmir. This is the demand of the uslims of tbe subcontllentv. 147. tion M. jamais mire. sous-continent.n 148. Let me make two comments on this statement. Evea before a plebiscite. whlch the representative of Pakistan demands. bas taken place, and even before the people of Kashmir bave espressed their determination, as he wants them to do, Mr. Bhutto bas made up hls mind tbat Kashmlr shall belong to Pakistan because, according to him. Pakistan Will never be complete without the self-determination of Kasbmir. Therefore, according to him, the selfdetermination of Kashmir means Kashmir belonging to Pakistan. ce que même naître celui-ci 149. The second extraordinary statement 1s that this ts tha demand of the bhtslims of the subcontinent. KoW. with all respect to Mr. Bhutto, who made blm the representative of the Musllms of the subcontinent? According to him, this is net merely tb demand of the people of Pakistan. but also the demand of the Musllms of India. If 1 had the time, I would satisfy the Council that hundreds and thousands of meetings of Muslims bave been held lu Indla, in all parts of the country, entirely supportlng the Government of India on thls issue. India is one in fighting thls aggression by Pakistan and in taking UP the attitude that Kashmir is an integral faite 150. The representative of Pakistan bas also talksd about dlsputed territory and he bas tried somehow to exonerate hlmself from the chargs of aggression which has been levelled against bim by suggesting that the Pakistani troops entered into dispuled territory of Kashmir. 1 do not understand thls expression. How is Kashmir disputed territory? If one looks at the resoiutions of the Security Council, it 1s absolutely clear that India was made responsible for the defence and security of Kashmir. that our troops are there wlth the consent and sanctionof the Security Council. If there is a dispute at ail it is as to the question of a plebiscite. But as far as tbe territory is concerned today. the sovereiguty is legally and constitutionaliy vested in India. If 1 had tbe time K would satisfy the Cout%il. from tbe records of tbia august body, that tbat is the position: but 1 do not want to go into it. However, 1 want to make it clear tbat Kashmir is net a disputed territory. It is an integral part of India, net only berause we say 80: it is an integral part in law and in constitution, in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council. 151. The representative of Pakistan has cbarged us with violation of international agreement wlth regard to a plebiscite. 1 think that the shoe is on the other foot. It seems to be forgotten that it was we who came to the Security Council as complainants against tbe aggression of Pakistan against Kasbmir. We were the complainants. The Pskistanis were the accused. And this Seourity Council called uponJ?akistan to vacate its aggression, to withdraw its troops. Until today. that bas not been done. If there has been a violation of international agreements, it bas heen by Pakistan, and that violation started in 1948 and bas continued until today. 152. I do net want to go into the question of aggression by Pakistan. It is borne out by the report of the Secretsry-General and the very able statement whlch has been made by the representative of Malaysia. But there is somethlng more. Pakistan admittedly has violated the cesse-fire line. Accordlng to tbe report of the Secretary-General. Pakistan bas admitted that it does net respect the cesse-fire line. According to Pakistan, the cesse-fire lins bas ceased to exist. If you look at the resolutioos to whlch reference has been made, resolutions passed as far back as 1948 or 1949, it Will be seen that all the arrangements that were arrived at wlth Pakistan through the instrumentality of the Security Council were based on the integrity and inviolability of tbe cesse-fire line. If Pakistan says the cesse-fire Ilne does not exist, then the resolutions of the Security Couacil which 1 termed as obsolete in my statetpent Iast year [1088th meeting. para. 331 net only bave b-ecome obsolete but are dead. rcmresentatiw of Pakistan said that we had g tbem to set fire to ail mmt offices-tbe sate I “Government buildings in Srinagar on ffre. bfujabids*-these are the people Pakistan sent amoas tire cesse-fire line-“active in heart of City. ReId State capital out off from outside. Bundreds of Indians killed in sktrmisbes.w 159. Tbat same paper specifically mentions the arson committed in tbis particuiar case: “Tbe freedom-fightersset manygowrnmentbuiLdings on fire at Batamaho about three miles from Srinagar yesterday and entrenched themselves fn the heart of the City. The blase continued for seven boum. according to the AD-Indfa Radio.” 160. The representative of Pakistan. sittlng before a responsible body Pike this. has charged us wfth setting fire ta that place. What 1 bave read is from Takistan’s own newspaper, their own radio, their own responsible officers. 161; New. there is one tbing more 1 should Bke to say. Every time we corne here, Pakistan talks about the “revoit’ in Kashmir. In tbis morning’s Guardian a bading newspaper in England. thts is wh-am in an article by the correspondent Donald Cbesworth: =An offer to stay in a Srinagar house-boat teck me on a recent holiday to Kashmir. 1 was in the Kasbmir Valfey during much of the present trouble, arriving baok in New Delhi on Sunday. “Pakistan bas alleged a popular uprising, notbiug wbatever to do with Pakistan, was tbe basis of the present armed eonflfct. At no time did 1 came across any evidence that there was a Kashmiri revoit, spontaneous or otherwise.” 162. But that fs not all. The Times of Londoa. ose of the most responsible newspapers of the world. stated on 11 August 1965. in a dispatch froc its correspondent in India: @TIrere is no indication of any armed revoit by peopfe on the Kndian side’-of Kashmir-“as annouaced by Pakistan Radio.” 163. And the Baltimore Sun, a very responsible newspaper in tbe United States-as the President would know-on 12 August 1965, in a report from its correspondent describing atouraroundSrinagar, said: T%.ere is no evidence visible in or near thfs city to support reports from Pakistan of a popular nprfsing agafnst India, nor of rspressive measures against the population. w s of the twa (trandated from Frenoh): couacil is demerating, 170. As the Secretary-Ceneral points out in his report [S/6651], the causes underlying the problem that has brought us together are complex ami of long standing. We believe that the arguments adduced by both sides are equally worthy of respect in prlnciple and deserve the Counoil’s attention. It is, however. undenlable that, whatever arguments are adduced, the Council cannot help to solve the dispute between India and Pakistan by peaceful means wbile unrestrained passions, resentments and violence prevail in these two friendly countries. 171. Consequently, my delegation strongly believes that the Security Council must renew its appeal to the parties for an immediate cesse-fire, and we are ready to join in any initiative by the members calculated to achieve thls result, which must. in the minds of all, be the first step required to meet the present situation. 172. In making these fewpreliminaryremarks, Iwlsh to reserve my delegation’s right to refer to the substance of the question at the appropriate tlme. Farewell to Mr. Rifa’i. reeresentative of Jordan

1 bave no other speakers inscribed on my Ii& end before concluding this meeting 1 would like to add to the remarks already made here today with reprd to our colleagee Ambassador Rifa’i of Jordan. He is leavlng, 1 heard regrstfully, tomorrow for Jordan. having terminated bis assignment as Permanent Repreeentative of Jordan to the United Nations. While he is still with us 1 want to say a word about bim. although 1 know that whatever 1 bave to say 1 could not hope to be suffioient to convey all the friendship and respect that Ambassador Rifa’i has earned during bis years at the Unlted Nations. As the newest member of thesecuriiy Council. 1 perhaps should not presume to make this statement, but 1 am. under the rules of the Council, its President, and 1 therefore presume to speak on behalf of the Council. 1 presume to speak not only as President of the Council. but also from persona1 knowledge and acquaintanceship. From the moment of my arriva1 here in New York people spoke to me of Ambassador RifaX They spoke of hls wisdom and bis judgement; they spoke of his abllity as a dlplomat and as an international politician-which is not an unfavourable Word; perhaps in olroles here the word is %tatesmanR. in the highest sense of the word. They spoke of the confidence and trust which he engendered among a11 wlth whom he dealt. They spoke of him as a poet. Finally. and in some ways most important, they epoke of his humanity and they spoke of hlm as a friend. 174. My limited experience here, which has been intensified by the important developments of ths s seat is a c for tiaose V&O 182. If thls procedure is acceptable, we Will SO proceed. If there is no objection, 1 would thenprcpose that we follow that procedure: convene here informally at 10.30 a.m., and then convene the Council formally at such time as our consultations disclose it would be fruitful and advisable to do SO. It was SO decided. The meeting rase at 6.4.5p.m. l=fOW TO OBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications may be obtained distributors throughout the world. write ter: United Nations, Sales Section, ENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS Les publications des Notions Unies sont agences dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous ou adressez-vous à: Notions Unies, Section COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Los publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas casas distribuidoras en todos portes del dirijase o: Nacianes Unidas, Secci6n de Litho in U.N. Price: $US. 1.00 (or eqtivalenc in other cwencies)