S/PV.1242 Security Council

In accordanrs witbthe Council’s pretious decmion, 1 nov/ invi+~ the representatives of Indla and Pakistan tc participate in our discussion and to tahe seats at the Council table. Af tke imikfioa offke Pres!deaf. Mr. M. C. Ckagfa @dia) and Mr. &kammed Zafar (Pakfsfao), tcolc places af tke CounciI fable.

Before pmceeding tc the consideration of the question on the agenda, 1 wish to apologiee to the members of tbe Cou&l and tc tbose of tbe public wbo bave waited tbese many bours for the cou5cil to couvsue. 3. 1 should first lihe, on bebalf of the Councll, tc welcome to tbe Security Councll tbe Forelgn Minister of Uruguay, Mr. Luis Vidal Zaglio. wlm will sit witb us as the representative of Uruguay in the fortbcoming weeks. Tbe Foreign Minister is no newcorner to tbe United Nxtlonsnortoparliamentaryprccedures. For mmy yexrs he served inbis country$ Parliament as a Ueputy and later as a Senator. 4. Mi-. Mi&ter, as 1 bave discovered in my short stay here, you will findyourparliamentary bachgmund of immense usefulnes~ a5 x LncmbQr of thQ 5. 1 consider it a great honour and privllege to express these sentiments on behalf of ihe Council. 6. The Council will now continue its oonsideration of the question on its agenda. The first speaker on my list is the representative of Pakistan, exercising the right of reply, and 1 now give hlm the Roor. ‘7. Mr. ZAFAR ,(Pakistan): 1 listened very csrefully to the statements that were made the day before yesterday [1241st meeting]. There are many points which demand discussion, but I wish to confine myself at this stage to some brief submissions. These, we feel, are absolutely neoessary if the grave issues confronting us are all to be clarified. 8. 1 must ssy at the very outset that it is net the policy of my Government to join issue with any individua member of the Security Council. As a Men&er of the United Nations, and as a party to a dispute that has tragically persisted for eighteen years and remahs unsolved on the agenda of the Counctl, my Government, 1 believe, ha6 a right to expect at least two things from anyone who participates in the judgemeat-making processes of tbis council. 9. First, he must be objective enough net to cast reflexion upon, far less to question, the basis, the raison d’être, of the statehood of a Member State. Second. he must net in any mariner denlgrate the value of tbose decisions of the Council itself which govern the consideration of an issue and which bave been rep-eatedly affirmed over a xmber of years. 1 tblnk it was evident that, at one point the day before yesterday, these expectattons were net fulfilled. 10. The representative of Malaysia made the observation regarding the Kashmir question tbat: Qnmeaning the Kashmir dispute-abegan simmerlng , . . in August 1947 when one ancient country and one ancient people were tut into two unequal parts.” [1241st meeting, para. 19.1 This is indeed a strange observavation coming from the representative of a country which shares witb Pakistan membership in the Commonwealtb and many other close ties. His observation amouds to an attack on tbe very exlstenceof Pakistan as a sovereign and independent country. What aone ancient country” and whioh aone ancient peoplev is 12. Further, when the representative of Malaysia talked of “ancient resolutions from the musty records of the past”, 1 am sfraid he did net encourage respect for tbe Councïl’s decisions. He seemed to imply that if one disobeys a resolution of the Council long enough, me can Count on the resolution becoming “ancientw and being buried in We musty records.~ of this colmcil. 13. For tbose who shy away from the mention of tbese resolution, let me point out that India itself invokes them when, according to its interpretation, Pakistan. is supposed to bave acted contrary to their provisions. General Nimmo and tbe United Nations Military Observer Group bave been quoted in these discussion. What do they derive their authority from, except tbe two reso!utions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan ywhich were accepted by the partles? In fact, tbe day before yesterday, the representative of India said that Indien tmops are in the State of Jammu and Kashmir wïtb the consent and sanction of the Security Council. 14. In makIng tbis statement, what was he doing except referring to the Commission*s resoluti.ons and putting a glass onthem? The Stateof Jammu and Kashmir is a territory in dispute. lt is certainly net an integral part of India. If Kashmir were an integral part Of India, if the Commission% resolutions were defimct, the question of the Council’s consent and sanction would net arise. 15. Kashmir never was snd never became a part of Indian territory. Eveo If it is admîtted that people from AZ2 Kashmir bave crossed over into occupied Kashmir, it cannot ba said that they bave trespassed on Indian territory. India first usurped Kashmir and, having done SO, now maintains that any move to challenge its usurpation is an aggression against Indian territory. If this pcsition were accepbd, there would be no end to colonialism. Indian leaders bave accepted Kasbmir’s right of self-determination and the problem of Kasbmir cannot be compared to that of tbe fissiparous movements in India. 17. The first is fromtbeSecretary-General’sreport; it is the passage which qualifies General Nimnmfs conclusions about the SO-called infiltration. It reads: n . . . even though in mOst cases the actual identity of those engaging in tbe armed attacks on the Imiian side of tbe Line and their actual crossing of it could net be verified by direct observation or evldence.v [S/6651, para. 6.1 18. The second is from General Nimmo’s letter to the Secretary-General dated 30 August 1965, which is appended to that report: “As you Will note, the investigations, which often bave to be carried out in extremely difficult circumstanoes and et varying lengtbs of time after the particular action has occurred, bave in general not yet been able to verify, either through observation or direct evidence, the identity of those responsible for the action and participating in it, or whether and to wbat extent there had been in fact cmssing of the cesse-fire 1ine.v [Bib] These observations speak for themselves. 19. More important is the consideration-and the records prove it-that the cesse-fire line has beeo violated thousands of times during the sixteen years it bas been in existence. It is not the violations of the cesse-fire line that brought the matter to the Security Council. What gave the gravest turn to the situation was the outright, self-admitted invasion of As& Kashmir by India and its inevitable results. Wbat brought to it the dimension of aggressionwae tbe invasion of Pakistan by India on 6 Septomber 1965. 20. The representative of India charged mewithhaving forgotten that under the Constitution of Pakistan only a Muslim could be elected as President of Pakistan. 1 have not forgotten the Constitution. What 1 do net accept is the assumptionof the representative of India that because only a Muslim cari be President of Pakistan, Pakistan is a theocratic State. Pakistan is no more a theocratic State than the United Kingdom, where only a member of the Anglican Church cari be King or Queen. 21. The representative of India inquired wby we regard the people of Jammu and Kashmir as OUI kith and kin. The answer is obvious. Morethan80 per cent of the people of the State are Muslims. They belong to tbe same racial stock as the people of Pakistan and have the closest cultural, social and human ties with us. We cari never be inùifferent to their fate. 23. The representative of India has further saidthat, on the snalogy of Kashmir, we could also claim-which is bis fear-that since the Muslims of India are our kitb and kin, they too could be %berated”. 1 am using his expression. The representative’s anslogy is ail wrong. Kashmir is disputed territory: India is “ot. The possibilily posed by him, therefore. is manifestly inconceivable. 24. The representative of the USSR was pleased t0 refer to the letters dated 4 September 1965 of the Chairman of the Counoil of Ministers of the USSR to the President of Pakistan and to the Prime Minister of India [S/6665] in wbich the Soviet Government had offered its good offices to help to resolve the Kashmir dispute. 1 understand that Mr. Kosygin. Prime Mini&er of the USSR. bas sent another message to the President of Pakistan snd the Prime Minister of India inviting them to meet on Soviet territory; it has also been reported that he would be prepared to take part in such a meeting if this was desired by Pakistan ami India. 25. The Government of Pakistan regards this move as very important and highly significant. It deeply appreciates the offer of the Soviet Union and is giving urgent consideration to the message received from the Prime Minister of the USSR. 26. Several members of the Security Council bave advocated tbe resumption of biiateral talks with regard to Kasbmir. We are always ready for bilateral talks witb lndia on tbis or any other matter in dispute provided the ground for such meetings has been adequately prepared and tbe talks are likely to be fruitful Members of the Security Council will recallthat there were biiateral ne@iations with regard to Kashmir between the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and Indin in 1950-1951 and 1953-1954. Direct talks also took place between the Heads of the two Governments in 1959 and 1960 and between the hvo Foreign Ministers for as long as six months during 1962-1963. Al1 these talks proved unfruitful, because India refused to honor its international commitments with regardta Kashmir as embodied in the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and endorsed by the Security Council. 27. The counter-pmposals which India put forwarc from time to time were that the present cesse-firc line should become the international boundary, witl some miner border adjustments. This ws no “ho” 29. The central fact in the whole situation is the suffering of tbe people of Kashmir. There is only one way out of thls situation. Let conditions be established under which the people of Kashmir are enabled, wlthout fear of coercion or persecution, to record their free verdict on their own future. That is the clear duty, as 1 sec it, oî thls Council. 30. In what mariner does it propose to discharge mat duty? If India’s position should be that the people of the occupied portion of Kashmir are, if not happy, at least well content with their present situation and they desire no change, why does it not put an end to the whole of thls dispute by offering a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of ‘he Unlted Nations, with due safeguards against any fear of coercion or persecution? India does not do SO because it is convinced that the verdict of the suffering people of Kashmir Will go agalnst India. What is it that the Co~ncil proposes to do in that situation? 31. Pakistan has hltberto discharged its duty fully under the Charter tu strive for afair, just and equltable solution through peaceful methods. It is still eager to seek a solution through such methods provided there are no further prevarications and subterfuges and a self-implementlng plan is adopted to bring about such a determination of the dispute. It is our earnest hope mat the Council wlll bave the determination, strength and wisdom to bring about such a solution. 32. 1 wlsh to say that 1 bave received information that the third Arab summit conference. held in Casablanca from 13 to 17 September, &led anew for giving cp the policy of force ln the settlement of international problems, for solvlng thém by peaceful means, and for respect for the right of self-determination, and, consequently, it expressed grave concern over the armed conflict between India and Pakistan. It appealed to bath States immediately to halt the fighting and to settle the dispute by peaceful means in accordance with the principles and resolutions of the United Nations. This is what an organisation of various Heads of State has stated. 34. Mr. VIDAL ZAGi,IO (Uruguay) (translated from Spanish): Before begimdng this statement on bebalf of my country, 1 should first like to thank the President of the Security Council for the kind words he bas spoken about me. Since, however, : take his words as being addressed to tbe country 1 represent, 1 wish to expr ?ss my deep gratitùde for the sentiments they contained, which reflect the gensrosity and goodwill cf the President and are a source ofpride and satisfaction ta me and to Uruguay, particularly since they corne from such a distinguished jurist as Mr. Goldberg, who has hadanoutstandingcareer in his own courtry as an eminent member of the Supreme Court. IIe has spoken of Uruguay SO kindly and aptly, in terms whicb we cannot forget or ignora. 1 am grateful for tbe graciousandwarmwelcomeaddressed ta me and, as an Uruguayan, 1 havp lisrened to them with the greatest satisfaction. 35. On taking my Seat in the Security Council, 1 wish to express my rountry’s genuine interest in and its opinion oo the item under discussion. Uruguay is occupying a Seat on the Council for the first time and, because it is aware of the resp0nsiblity which this implies, because it knows that its statements-by virtue of its own tradition and of the fact that it is one of the hvo Latin American msmbers of this bodyare inspired by asteadfastly peace-lovingtradition, by tho rejection of ail solutions based on aggression and force and by an unswerving faith in solutions based on international law, it bas studied this case, in which two Member States face each 0ther in battle and which is endangering peace and general security, with all the seriousness which the circurnstances require. 36. Uruguay was one of the sponsors cf Eecurity Cou&l resolutions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965) adopted unanimously on 4 and 6 September 1965, and we are accordingly in general agreement withthe conclusions of the reports made by the Secretary-General on returning from sis mission [S/6683, S/6686]; his devotion to Che cause of peace has once again been demonstrated by the accomplishment of bis difficult mission. 37. The matter is now before the Security Council, under Article 24 of the Charter which confers on it 35. Liltion ~Peimment me àans !Aembres 38 Ggnatoires 80. s%.Srontent mns pxbFcmes ?Dre aaopérationl soudre, tion une 41. caop&ratiOn bres comme ment hommes bon labyrinthe dans 42. cie J’ai les de tante 43. I am pleased at this time to recognize tbe representative of &e Nefhe~%nds, who wishes to submit 3 draft resolution. 43. des Szxdution.

On behalf of the delegdion cd the Netbe-âlands, 1 bave khe pleasure to introduce a draft reno2utiOn [S/6694] on the conûict between India and Pakistan. I should add at once that altbougb the dr2ft resolution is presented in tbe name of the Netherlanùs, it would net bave been possible fOr us to arrtize at the text Of this draft resolution ii 15 had net been for the co-operation of the other mmpermanent members and the unanimous suppOrt Of the permanent members. Therefore, tbe contents of this draft resolution are the outcome of informai consul- 44. Au de pr&enter au peut-&.tre de R~US laboration Conseil nents. 45. Its second main abject is to open up an avenue to tic parties for renewing negotiations ontheir underlying political problem from whichthepresent fightiug originated. 46. For both these purposes-the cerise-fire and the negotiations-the draft resolutionoffers tbe assistance of the United Nations. 47. With regard to the cesse-fire, 1 should furthermore like to point out that the draft resolution Lhls time uses stronger language than before. After having twice “appealed” for a cesse-fire, the Security Council now “demands” it to take effect on a given date and at a given heur. 1 should explain that the heur mentioneh in the draft resolution is this coming Wednesday, 22 SeFtember 1965, at 0700 heurs GMT, which corresponds to 1130 heurs Rawalpindi time, M 12 noon New Delhi time, and tc 3o’clock in the morning New York daylight saving time. which meanS chat it wlll give a little more than forty-eight heurs t0 carry out the orders for the cesse-fire whichwe hope will take place. 48. The draft resolut;&, 1 t;i’nk, speaks for itself. 1 bave little to add to the text. It is a draft resolution which neither condemns nor condones; it deaIs with the past 1e;s thao with the future; it dces net try to look backward but forward; it does net assess fault to the parties, but offers assistance to them: assistance in supervising the carrying out of the cesse-fire, and assistance in subsequent negotiations. 49. The autbors of the draft resolution fully reslizs that there are serious disappointments involved inthis draft resolution for bath parties. One party, we Imow, would bave llked no mention at all of cetim aspects; tbe other parbr would bave preferred far more and stronger meniion of those aspects. The authors, 1 cac assure them, havî had no choice but to adopt the middle course which was achievable. This means that noither Indla nor Prlcistan gets all that it wanted. Al1 1 aan Say is that this is the essence of compromise; 1t is inevitable in any psaceful settlement. In return, we beliere that they do get two invaluable things: the fir& is pcace for their nations, and,the second is an opportunity to start tslks again on the main problem which bas envenomed relations between India and Pakistan ever since their birth. 61. In view of tbe lengthy informai consultations wbich bave preceded the present draft resolutio”, md io viev oi the bIcodsked whieh is going on st this very moment, 1 wadd swst that we vote on this draft resolution as scon as possible. We hcpe tbat it wiU be passed by the Council thïs mcrning, witb as many votes as possible. and abcw ail with the unanimity of tbe permanent members. il. lui st m&me, de qu’il xvec I un vote / , 52. 1 kaw only this tc add. There has been much t.%Ik in th@ past abcut the crisis of the Uuited Nations and sbcut tbe paraIysis of the Securily Cou&l because of a lack of unanimity among the permanent rnembeis. If tbe Security Council’takes this decisive action at this critical houx in this very difficult matter, it will Ixwe prove”, we believe, that the Ucited Nations bas overcon~e its crisis andthat the Securi@ Cou&l ca” indeed exercise its primary respcasibility for international peace and security. 52. oarlé barzysie de de sécurité en délicate, a surmonté peut cipale et de la sécurité // /

1 appreciate the remarks cfthe reDresentative of the Netherlands and I shall. after th< Yote, bave something to say abcut his very constructive contribution to the formulation of the draft resolution. The representatiw of the Netherluads has suggested that we prcceedimmediately tothevote. 53. mercie ration. r61e du projet Bas 54. MI~. RAMANI (Malaysia): 1 should like to ask wbether tbe representative of the Netheerlands abjects to havi”g each part of the draft resolution wted upon separately? d’inconvénient, ties

1 would very much like to comply with the request made by the representative of Malaysia. Hcwever, we bave already considered this question and we bave corne tc the conclusion tbat the elements of the draft resolution are clcsely interwcven. The draft resolution deals mainly witb twc abjects, as 1 bave explained, and if we were to wtec”eachparagraphseparately,wefearthat tbere might be danger that o”e abject might be achisved and the other abject might net. Therefcre, to my great regret. 1 cannot agree to the request of the representative of Malaysia, and 1 hcpe he Will understand my reâscns . 56. The PRBSIDENT: Under rule 32 of the Council% provisional rules of procedure, if the original mover of a draft resolutio” cbjects to a vote in parts-as the representative of the Netherlands has-the draft resolutic” must he voted on as a whole. Consequently, this will be done.

I should like to go on the record before the vote is taken.

Inowrecognizetherepresentative of Pakistan.

1 bave just seen the draft resolution submitted to the Councll and bave listened with cars to the explanation given by its sponsor. The draft resolution, as stated by therepresentative of the Netherlands, is the result of tiormal consultations among members of the Cou&l. My delegation was net involved in those consultations. Permit me, however, to make a few observations of a preliminary nature on this draft resolution. 61. The question that the Security Council has been considering during the past week, and which has been on the awnda of the Counoil since Januarv 1948. is is the question of Jammu and Kashmir. It is”esse&l to concentrate a11 future endeavours on a settlement of the outstanding differences between India and Pakistan on the question of Kashmir. It is in that sense that we understand the reference to Kashmir in the preamble to the draft resolution. 62. We notice that the cesse-fire is regarded by the Council as the first step towards the attainment of a peaceful and enduring solution of the Kashmirproblem. Indeed, as 1 bave recalled in my previous submissions to the Council, the cesse-fire orders were issued on 1 January 1949 and the agreement on the demarcation of a cease-fire line was reached on 7 Julv 1949. in oursuance of the international asreement with regard to Kashmir embodied in the resolutiens of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. The cesse-fire agreement is part and parce1 of the Commission% resol’ttions and does Ilot standby itself. 63. In my statement on Saturday, 18 September 1965 [124Oth meeting], 1 also reviewed briefly the history of Kashmir since the reference of the dispute to the Security Council. 1 showed that, SO far, only the first parts of the two agreed resolutions of the Commission bave been implemented. Implementation of the remaining provisions has been blocked by India’s refussl to proceedwithdemilitarizationandtheholdh~g of a free and impartial plebisoite. 64. 1 regret to note that the draft resolution fails to deal with the basic problem. For a settlement of 65. My Government must once again reiterate that the continuing force and validity of the Commission% resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 do not becorne obsolete simply because the other party chooses to resign from them. Solenm international commitments cannot be SO easily repudiated. The Commission% resolutions still provide the surest sud quickest means of resolving the Kashmir dispute snd achieving a lasting peace and amity between Pakistan and India. 66. On the other hand. should the Security Council adopt tbis draft resolution, WE feel bound to warn and to put on record that unless the ùasic cause of the present couilict is removed, another and wider conflagration is bound to eusue. 67. In my statement of 18 September 1965. 1 put forward a four-point peace plan to endthe war between Pakistan a,rd Incüa and to secure peace with justice. Permit me to recall what 1 said: first, there should be a cesse-fire with immediate effect: second, immediately thereafter the forces of bath India and Pakistan should be withdrawn completely from the disputed area of Jannnu and Kashmir, including the territory called Azay Kasbmir: third, a United Nations force should take over the security functions in the State: and fourth, within three months of the ceasefire a plebiscite should be conduïted in the State, under the auspices of the United Nations, to ascertain the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir on the question of accession of their State to India or Pakistan. These four proposais do not impose on India any disability which Pakistan, for its own part, is net prepared to accept. Therefcre, thcy are faix’, reasonableandconstructiveandpoint tothequickest and surest way to end the bloodshep and to seoure iasting peace. There is no other way than a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir to resolve the differences between the two countries in a just and honourabls manner. This is the reason why Pakistan bas aclhered faithtùlly to the idea of a plebiscite for ail these years and insists that it should be held. 68. 1 would therefore request the members of the Council to consider these aspects again and net to accept and adopt this draft resolution.

1 take it that the members of the Council are now ready to vote on the draft resolution [S/6694]. A vote was faken by show of hands. In famur: Bolivia, China, France, Ivory Coast, Malaysia, Netherlands, Union of Soviet SociaIist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britam and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay. Againsf: None. Absfaining: Jordan. The draft resolufion was adopfedbylovotes to none, with 1 absfenfion.2/

1 now give the floor to the Secretary-General.

Just for the record, 1 bave asked for the floor to clarify two points: one raised by the representative of India, in hls intervention at the Council’s 1239th meeting, and the other by the representative of Malaysia, at the 1241st meeting. 72. In his statement to the Security Council on 17 September, the representative of India referred to a paragraph in a message which 1 addressed to President Ayub Ehan and to Prime Minister Shastri on 15 September, the text of which is containedinparagraph 13 of my preliminary report [S/6683]. The representative of India observed that whereas the President of Pakistan had stated conditions with regard to the cesse-fire, the Government of India had stated no conditions whatsoever. 1 feel that 1 owe the Council a clarification of the circumstances in which my message of 15 September was written and delivered to the Heads of Government. 73. 1 was taklng off from New Delhi airport at 2.30 p.m. on 15 September and had, therefore, to leave for the airport at 1.45 p.m. My third message, dated 15 September, was an identical appeal to the hvo Heads of Government, which had been drafted, typed and signed before the reply of Prime Minister Shastri to my second message was received by me at about I.10 p.m. on 15 September. My third message haS already been sent to Rawalpindi SO that it could be delivered to President Ayub Khan at the same time as it was given to Prime Minister Shastri. It was written, as the text makes clear, in the light of the replies of the two Heads of Government to my message of 12 September. a Sec remlurion 2‘1 (1965). i5. 1 mîy phmps bave made allusion to these matters in my second report [S/6686], but it seemed tome tbat the te.& of the eschanges with the Heads of Government put before the Council in rny prelimInary report [.Y66831 spoke for themselves.

My delegation abstained in today’s voting on the draft resolution before us. In doing so va-2 were not umnindful of the most urgent and vital need to effectuate a cesse-iïre and put an end to armed hostilities between two sister Stdes in the shortest time possible; on the contrary, such a step is most important and cornes tïrst. My delegation has wholeheartedly and vigorously cospnsored such a step in Security Council resolutions 209(1965) md 210(1965) of4 and 6 September 1965 on the grave matter beforeus. Bothresolutions. however, bave failed. Bath bave proved inadequate to bringabout even the most immediate goal of the Security Council. War between IndIa and Pakistan nevertheless went on and Is still going on. What is needed is something basically different. What is hacking is an analysis and a resolution that deal face to faie with the issues involved. My deiegation most emphatically submits that a reaffirmation of Security Council resolution 4’7 (1948) of 21 AprR 1948 and the two resolutions of the United NafIons Commission for India and PakIstan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January1949 is a “nxst”. Today’s resolution makes no reference rvhatsoever to the said basic resolutions, and 1 ask: are we on the threshold rf burying also the relevant and pertinent resolutions? 77. In addition, the reference to the need for peaoefui settlement of outstanding differences betweenindia and Pakistan deserves more attention and emphasis than it is accorded in the resolution. My delegation would like to sec the parties undertake such peaceful discussions within a reasonable time, lest we face another outbreak of hostilities in the future between India and Pakistan. 78. My delegation would also like the Security Council to demand that such peaceful settlement be conducted on the basis of the previous resolutions to which 1 referred earlier. The mere call for dis-

1 should like to offer a comment or two on the draft resolution to which we bave given OUI support, but before 1 do SO permit me to offer a word of comment on the references made by the representstive of Pakistan to certain statements 1 made at the 1241st meeting. It is often unfairly urged that the fair sex like to bave the last Word, but 1 think men too bave a habit of wanting the last Word. Nothing would bave given me greater pleasure than to bave left the representative of Pakistan with the comforting thought that he had had the last word on this controversy of his own creation, but 1 would bave been responsible for the misunderstanding which has been generated in MS mind. 1 think that in fairness to him, and certainly in fairness to myself, 1 should try to explain what precisely 1 said, if he Will permit me. 80. 1 normally try to express myself in as precise a language as possible, but, aven though I read from a written te& I must bave been particularly obsoure in the use of language. The first complaint of the representative of Pakistan related to my reference to that fateful day in August 1947. IIe asked to whom 1 was referring and who the peoples were. 1 was merely referring to the fact that India waspartitioned in August 1947. As Minister of Law, having learned the Constitutions of the countries, he would know that the parliamentary act that divided India and created Pakistan and India refers to YuulividedIndia” many times. Tlierefore 1 referred to what India was before 15 August 1947, which by parliamentary usage is referred to as undivided India, which becazne divided and became Pakistan and India. 1 could net deny the integrity of the State. 81. Undoubtedly the Minister of Lawcame ratherlate to this debate. He was net present on the two earlier occasions on which 1 took the floor when 1 had the good fortune-or whatever else it may be-of introducing those two other resolutions. On tbe first occasion, which was on 4 September, 1 said the following in introducing the resolution: “As 1 said, the draft resolution does no more tlaan just cal1 a hait to this escalation. India and Pakistan, as two great world Powers, bave less a duty to themselves than to the wider cause of world peace and world order. They bave been and should continue to be an example to the Afro- Asian world.” 11237th meeting, para. 137.1 The day before yesterday, when 1 was speakiig on the substance of the debate, 1 said the followinp: “My countly enjoys the most friendly relations with Pakistan as well as India nnd we are anxious that this relationship should continue and mature.” 82. The other matter to which he referred was my reference to the “musty records’ of the Council. AS to that, he was here on Saturday and therefore he must bave heard what 1 said, which was: VI resolutions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965) we called for a hslt to hostïlities-the sole concern, 1 repeat, in the present context of the Security Council. It is sot to recall ancied resolutions fmm the musty reosrds of the past. “or to express pious hopes for a peaceful settlemènt in the future, “or to get side-tracked from the main objective.” [124lst meeting, para. 32.1 SO what 1 did say was that our attention should net be turned backward, it should be tusmed forward. 89. 1 “aderstand, if 1 may be permitted a personal reference, that the Law Minister of Pakistan is a member of the English Bar, and 1 “oderstand also that he and 1 corne from the same Temple. NO~, he knows. and 1 lmow a8 a practising lawyer. that espeoially when you go to court, they must hear your records, they must hear the authority that you cite: the more ancient the doctrine that yo” cari press into service, the more ability yo” demonstrate to Ihe court. And no lawyer. certainly no one who bas been trained as a lawyer, would ever refer in that context to “musty records” as somethig derogatory oi disrespectf”l. 1 do hope he Will accept my expianation. 1 am sorry if 1 did net make myself clearer, as 1 now find f ought to bave. 84. 1 would now like to go on and make a few comme& on this resolution. My friend, the representativeof the Netherlands, undoubtedly deserves the greatest of pi-aise for the tremendous amount of effort he exerted. The inspiration did net corne to him; he had to shed a great deal of perspiration over this matter. we are a11 conscious of this, and we tender to him oui gratitude. 85. To my Government, this resolution is subject to certain reservations. It is, if 1 may say SO, like the curate’s egg-good in parts and not SO good in other parts. The fourth preambular paragraph specifically reads: “&&& the differiog replies by the parties to an apPea1 for a ceasr-fire as set out in the report of the Secretary-General, but notingfurther withcon- Cern that no cesse-fire has yet corne into being”. The words “different replies” bave now beenamendeà to read “differing replies*, which some might regarc as a distinction without a difference. The word “but” therein rather gives the meaning that, whatever might 86. With reference to operative paragraph 4 oi the resolution, in tbe context of my own statemeut made to tbe Council, we should bave liked net to have this resolution cluttered up with areferenoetothe political settlement. 1 bave ail the time understood that ail views expressed in this Council had to bs taken into account: but to the extent to which we bave had the pleasure and the privilege of listening to tbe representative of Pakistan, evsn before we voted, 1 almost ventured to think that the Child had been kllled even before it was born, and tbat we were listening to an inquest of paragraph 4-that it Will net work and it is net intended to work. Therefore, bad my friend from the Netberlands net objected to the resolution’s being put to the vote in separate parts, we would net bave voted in faveur of operative paragraph 4. In any case, we bave a forecast now of what is poing to happen to operative paragraph 4.1 suppose it does net matter if 1 do net venture into further criticism about what it might do or what it might net do. 87. My Government is undoubtedly just as anxious as anyone else at this table that there should be a cesse-fire and that it should arrive as soon as possible; with the reservations 1 bave just stated. andhecause we are SO anxious, we voted in faveur of this resolution.

The Security Council has just adopted a resolution which is important for two reasons: first. it demands a cesse-fire, without which the situation could only grow worse for the two countries concerne& secondly, it confirms the Council’s intcrest in the political problem which is at the root oftheir dispute, ami indicates the ways and means of dealing promptly with the substance of the problem. These two major provisions of the document adopted are. in our opinion, eomplemcutarv and. as 1 have said in earlier stateme&, my delegation attaches equal importance to them. Nobody denies that the cessation of hostilities is a primary objective in thepresent serious situation; nor does anybody dispute that the serious disagreement between the parties concerning the political and legal aspects of the Kashmir affair means that a longterni solution Will not be foundwithoutgreatdifficulty. 89. These are the ressens why the Frenchdelegation voted as it did, 90. &Ir. AKA (hory Coast) (translated from French): Daring the six weeks of tbe conflict between Indla and Pakistan many efforts bave been made at various levels to restore peace behveen these hvoneighbours. these hvo great Members of the United Nations. A special tribrte mnst, bowever. be paid to the efforts made by tbe Secretary-General since the outbreak of hostilities and to the vigilance and the impartial and tireless endeavours of the Council. which, on hvo occasions-on 4 and 6 September 1965-called upon the parties concerned to order an immedlate ceasefire. Unfortunately. the underlying problems and the passions they arouse. togetber witb ail tbe resentment that has accumulated since the hostilities began, bave made it impossible to implement resolutions 209 (1965) and 2IO (1965), adopted by the Cc!mr.il on4 and 6 September 1965. 91. Kevertheless, whatever justification there may be for feelings of vengeance and of injured national honour, experience shows that vengeance engenders vengeance, that hate engenders hate, and that notbing cari be settled in an atmosphere of unbridled passion. 92 It was therefore necessary and urgent to bring the hostilities to an end, unconditionally and without delay, in order to spare those lives whicb could still be sared and in order to work out. by peaceful means, a solution to tbe problem of Kashmir, which is tbe bene of contention between India and Pakistan, because it is certainly not beyond human ingenuity, and particularly the ingenuity of the two parties involved. to compose the differences. 93. ,. TO meet this need, the Council adopted resolufions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965). The Ivory Coasl voted in faveur of them. and has for the same reason just voted for the draft resolution submitteC by the Kethsrlands, because it does not wish ta miss anY opporhmity of co-operation in a humanitarian anc peace-keeping endeavour. 94. \ve therefore wish our vote to be understoodthur and we think that this new resolutionwhich the Counci bas adopted will secure tne co-operotion of the parties concerned, which bave. on many occasions, showt their love for andfaitb in the Cnited Nations and peace ‘Xe alSo bave in mind, however. what the United Natiom ougbt to do, as quickly as possible, to help India an< Pakistan to reach, by peaceful means. a solution tc the Kashmir problem which divides them and whicl bas only too often been a source of world-widt amuiety. 9:. Mr. President, may 1 first compliment you and your colleagues on your strenuous and heroic attempts to produce a resolution which has so mu@h support and which, 1 take Lt, has been adopted in the interest of securing peace and the cessation of the hostilities in the subcontinent of India which are going on at present. 98. The main concern of the Security Councilwastbe cessation of hostilities. You bave sat here from day to day; you bave sat here until almost 2 o’clock this morning because you realise what is happening. Men are being-killed, there are widows and orphans, devastation ragesin a11 directions, and a11 men of peace and goodwill naturally desire thaf this terrible bloodshed sh_ld corne to an end. 99. As far as my Government is concerned, and as 1 bave pointed out before, weacceptedanunconditional cease-fire as far back as 15 September 1965 and, as I again pointed out. Pakistan did not. 1 threw out a challenge to the representative of Pakistan (1241st meeting) as to whether he was prepared to accept an unconditional cease-fire; no answ.zr has as yet been given to that challenge. Not only that, he has rspeated today the conditions for a cease-fire on which President Ayub Khan has been insisting inhiscorrespondence with the Secretary-General. But what is worse, the representative of Pakistan says-and 1 bave taken down his words-that if the Kashmir problem is net solved, “another arid wider conflagration is bound to ensue”. The threat is already there. This aggression is not enough. The representative of Pakistan wants the members of the Secur?ty Council to know-and 1 do ask you to make a note of thisthat if the Kashmir problem is not solved according to his liking and to his country’s liking, another and wider conflagration Will ensue. 100. This is net the attitude or the conduct of a peaceloving country. In the first place, he refuses to accept an unconditional cesse-fire; in the second place, even before these hostilities bave corne to an end, he threatens this great international body with a future conflagration which Will break out if the Kashmir problem is not solved. That is tbe love that Pakistan has for peace and international understanding. 101. As 1 read it, the reeolution just adopted is not direîted against my country. We bave already aocepted an unconditional cesse-fire and we certainly Will carry it out if Pskistan Will carry it out. TO the extent that the resolution deals with a ceasefire, it cari only be directed against Pakistan, which has not accepted an unconditional cesse-fire. 102. With regard to the rest of the resolution, a11 that 1 am going to say now is that I adhere to every- _ 0 Ccwwii bi malring i fewverybrief camments. i S first like to acknovkdge tbe important contri- Tmtian made by tbe representaWe of tbe Netherhmds to the work of the Council today in the preparation. in the drafting and in tbe negotiation of the resolution whicb bas been adopted. His ealleagues on the Council are indebted to him for bis perseverance in drafting a fair and impartial resoluticn wùich has commanded tbe widespread support whieb mis resolution has receimd. 104. Pt MS, as I ean bear witness, net an easy task. TO corne to the broad consensus refieeted by the vote in a situation of ?Ais complexity. of this clifficulty ami of tbis cbaracter is net easy. The representative of tbe Netberhands brougbt to the task the impartiaRty which m assigmment ai this type clearlynecessitates. 0x1 behalf of the members of tbe Comm& 1 express appreciatian to him and to a11 tbose who participated 105. This is net justanotherresolution. Ihavestudied the resolution opted Orgtmbcation, in the history of this great 1 shmlcl Pike to point out that this resaluticm is of a unique character. It is of a unique cbaraoter because tbe situation whicb confronts us is unique, it is grave. it is difficult. Therefore. the resolution is of great signlficance, net only for tbe future of peace on the subcontment but also for the enttie co2nrnunity of the world. I should liieto direct, on behaX of the Council, an appeal to the representatives of Pakistan a& India. Tbis Counoil has spoken in terms of friendship to botb countries. Tbis Couneil bas spoken in terms of complete dediication to tbe principles of thé Charter, wbieh reqtire as a ma%er of treaty obligation that a11 Men&er nations pursue peaceful met.im& in ~resolutio~offtiKtirüùference6. 106. This resolutian demands, in tbe name of the members of the Council and in the name of peaceloving people a11 over the world, an end to the bloodshed mat is poing on. The word “demand” is a word tbat is not used easily or readily in relation to *overnations a.ad it is only to be justified, it seems and it seems to the Council, in the interest of the cause of peace. St is no infringement of the of any nation to ask nations to pursue perm&l ways. ‘Bis is the commitment that we have 108. This is an even-handed resolution. It is an even-handed resolution in that it addresses itself both immediately to the problem at hand, whfch is the restoration of peace and the end to the war that is going on, and to the fact that there are underlying problems which require consideration. It seems to me that neither nation cari deny either aspect of this resolution, which deals with both aspects of the problem at hand. 109. There is net any question that the situation is urgent, and this is why we bave stayed with it these several weeks and bave stayed wlth it SO intensively the last few days. It is only by act of Providence that 1 sit in this Chair, and 1 bave had the unique experience of working with other representatives and. as the representative of my country, with other nations ?.n trying to tope with this problem. Surely it must be a source of encouragement to both India and Pakistan to accept this resolution to know that not an unfriendly word or thought was expressed by any member or any nation towards either country in the discussions which took olace. Surelv it shnuld be a source of thoughtful reflection that th& Council, which represents an Organization to which they both bave been SO loyally devoted. has expressed itself the way it bas. 110. This dispute is going to be over some day, and it is hetter that it be over sooner than later in terms of bloodshed, in terms of suffering, in terms of all the hardship that war cari entail. It should be over, it must be over, within the time that has been fixed by this Council. And then, when the fighting stopsand the fighting must stop, and the fighting wiil ultimately stop at a greater cost of lives and all other things that are dear to people-this Council, as the resolution has said, has said that it will consider. as soon 1s that is done, what steps could be taken to assist toward a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict. 111. What other course of action could the Council be asked to take? What other course of conduct would the representatives of India and Pakistan take if, instead of being parties to the dispute, they were members of the Council? 1 am positive thatthey would bave joined then in the vote that we bave taken here today. 1 PI the best efforts of my Gmeel-nmsnt. actiag spirit of tbess friendly relations, ta assist, through the Security Council, th th@ Unit& Nations, which is the instrument FhaF we aPH qreed qxm shculd act in these matters. to searcb for a peaceful settleraent of the problems Fhat exist between the two eoum%=s. 114. As K repressntative of the Govermnent of Fbe Lb&& States and speaking. 1 know. for the people of the ?Jnitsd States who feel very deeply about this matter md follow it with the greatest possible @xmcem, I CaU upon the peoples of India and P&istan ta nnderstand and support tbe challenge of statesmsmbip which the Security Council has made to tbe hKkFS of these two great countries. 115. This Qrganization, the United Nations, was set up ta cape witb theproblems and disputes of our world, the problems and disputes of the kind and character which is here before us today. Rut it cari sncceed on& ta Fhe extent Fbat we the Members use it. and use it in Fhe interest of peace. The members of the CauncS bave used it tonigbt in tbe interest of peace ad, in my opinion, Rave used it welf. iI6. It is now a solemn obligation of the Governments eoncerned to meet tbe fuIl import of this iesolntion in the same spirit in which the resolution was drafted and in wbicb it bas been adopted. It never husts any country, nor the people of the country, to serve the cause of peace and to use peaceful means ta resolve their differences. Il?‘. The BRESIDENT: 1 bave mentioned that there are no further speakers on the list. Before the meeting is adjourned, I wish to express my thanks éo everybody for co-operating in our work during the past few lengthy days. 118. As the members of the Council are aware. applications for membership in the United Nations have been received from the Government of the Maldive Islands and from the Minister for Fore@ A%irs of Singapore. I intend to convene a meeting today, Monday. 20 September. at 3.30 p.m., ifthere is no objection, to consider the matter. It was SO decided. The meefing rose af 2.20 mn.