S/PV.1245 Security Council

In accordmce withtheCouncil’s preticus declsion. 1 aow invite the represenbatives of Fakistan to participate wltbout vote, in the die‘cussioa. Af fbe ievifefian & tac Presidenf, Mr. Parfhasarafhi (PaIdstanJ tco.k places af the 2. The PRESIGENT: Before proceeding wlth the busiaen5 at band. 1 ahould like. on behalf of tbe members of tbe Couacil, to welcome to our midst H. El-Farra, the very disof Jordan. The Ambassador career in his own country, aad broad outlook Will, I know, urdeliberations greatqualities to the work of the Council md to the great work of the Uaited Nations. 3. It 1s witb great pleasure. Ambassador El-Farra, that. Qn bbdf of the Council, 1 welcome you here. 4. Mr. El-FARRA (Jordan): 1 am lndebted to you, Mr. president. for your kind words. I know that my able predecessor a& dear colleague, Ambassador

In addition to the report of the Secretary-General wbich is inclucled in the agenda [S/6710 and Add.l-21 and to the other relevant documents which were circulated this morning, an addItiona report by the Secretnry-General bas just been submitted in document 5/6719, to which 1 should like to draw the attention of members of the Council. 6. We now bave a draft resolution wbich reflects the consensus of the members of the Council on the basis of my consultations with them. The text is as follows: “The Security Council, the reports of the Secretary-General (S “Reaffirming its resolutions 209 (1965) of 4 September, 210 (1965) of 6 September and 211 (1965) of 20 September 1965, “Enpressing its grave ooncern tbat the ceasefire agreed to unconditionally by the Governments of India and Pakistan is not holding. “Recalling that the cesse-fire demand in the Council’s resolutions was unardmouslv endorsed by the Council and agreed to by the &vernments of bath India and Pakistan, “Demands tbat the parties urgently honour their commitments to the Council to observe the ceasefire. and further calls upon the parties promptly to withdraw all armed personnel as necessary steps in the full implementation of resolutlon 211 (ISSS).” 7. We note that the representative of Jordan made a reservation to resolution 211 (1965) of 20September at the time of its adoption, which reserration ia still maintained. 8. 1 bave had no request from any member of the Council to speak. Since tbis draft resolution has been fully discussed in the informa1 consultations which bave taken place throughout the day, if 1 hear no objection and if there are no other requests to speak, 1 shall consider the draft resolution adopted. The draft resolution was adoptad. Y

1 recognize the representative of India.

Presumably the resolution just adopted by the Security Council Will 1/ S?e re.wlut‘on 214 (1565). 11. In contrast wfth Pakistan% attitude, India bas at every stage expressed its wîllingness tc accept an uuccnditicnal cease-fire. This is also clear frcm the records of tbe Cou&l. from the communications sent by tbe Prime Minister of India tc tbe Secretary- GenePal. and frcm tbe statements made by the leader of the Indian delegation. Mr. M. C. Chagla. Education Minister. in tbe Cou5cil. 12. As far baok as the second week of August. as stated by the Secretary-General in his report of 3 September. tbe Gcvermnent of Pakistan had refused to give any assurance abcut cbserving a cesse-fire and Me cesse-fire line. TO quote the Secretary- Gell@Nk “1 bave net obtained frcm the Gcvernment of Pakistan any assurance that the cesse-fire and the cesse-fïre Une Will be respected henceforth or chat efforts wculd bs exerted tc restcre conditions to normal along that lii. 1 did receive assurance frcm the Gcvernment af fndia, conveyed orally by its representative at the United Nations, tbat India would act with restraînt with regard tc any retaliatory acts and Will respect the cesse-fire agreement and the cesse-ffre line if Pakistan does likewise.” (S/6651, para. 9.1 13. The President of Pakistan. in hi8 telegram dated 5 September 1965. addresssd to the Sscretary- General [S/6666]. stated categcrically tbat he wculd net accept an unconditional crase-fire. He stated, in tbe penultimate paragraphoftbattelegram: “Therefore, insistence on a cesse-fim cari cnly be meaningfti if there fs a self-implmentfngagreementtofollow IL” 14. Pakistan% attempt tc force a settlement of what Pakistan calls “the Kashmfr dispute” on its own texas by threatening tc continue its aggressicn was made even clearer by President Ayub Khan in his l&er of 13 September addressedtcthesecretary- General. in which he said: V&ile ycu propose a ‘cesse-fire wfthcut ccndition’ you go on to add that the Securi@ Council would, soon after the cesse-fire. prcceed to implement its resolution of 6 September. The provisions of the Security Cauncil resolutions of 4 September and 6 September that the oease-fire be followed fmmediately by withdrawal of all armed Pakistan personnel to the Pakistan side of the cesse-fire line and the consolidation of the cesse-fire Une through ths strengtheufng of the United Naticns Military Observer Group wculd result in restoring India’s military grip over Kashmir. We would thns 16. On tbe other hand, the Prime Minister of India. in hi6 response to the Secretary-General’s appeti for a cesse-fire, as expressed in his letter to the Secrebuy-General dated 14 September, said: “In deference to the wishes of the Security Conncil and to the appeals which we bave received from many friendly countries, we accept your proposa1 for an immediate cesse-fire. We would. therefore, be prepared to order a cesse-fire effective from 6.30 a.m., Indian standard time, on Thursday, 16 September 1965, provlded you confirm to me by 9 8.m. tomorrow that Pakistanis also agreeable to do SO.” [S/6683, para. 8.1 17. In reply to the Secretary-General’s message of 14 September, the Prime Minister of India said: to “1 reaffirm my willingness, as communicated, order a simple cesse-fire and cessation of hostilities as proposed by you, as soon as you are able to confirm to me that the Government of Pakistan ha6 agreed to do so as well.” [Ib&., para. 11.1 18. On 18 September, the representative cf Mia -the Education Minister, Mr. Chagla-challenged the representative of Pakistan to accept an unconditional cesse-fire and to make a declaration to that effect in the Council [124lst meeting, para. 1541. The only response from the Law Minister of Pakistan was to ask the Council not to adopt the draft resolution and to warn the Council that if it was adopted “another and wider conflagration is bound to ensue” (1242nd meeting, para. 661. 19. Sndia accepted a simplecease-fireunderSecurity Cou&l resolution 211 (1965) of 20 September 1965. Pakistan did not give aqy indication of its acceptance untll the last minute of the time-limit allowed under the resolution of 20 Septemher, that is to say at 3 a.m. New York time on 22 September 1965. Obvlously there was a reason for delaylng the communication of its acceptance until the last minute. Ita Foreign Minister’s statement in the Security Conncil that the President of Pakis+aa had already iesued orders for acease-firebeglnningat12.05hours West Pakistan time was made for propaganda purposes, because three heurs after hls statement the Pakistan Air Force bombed Amritsar. causing heavy civilian casualties. 1 refer to document S/6?09. 20. Kn a letter dated 25 September 1965 addressed to the Secretary-General [S/6711]. 1 brought to the notice of the Secretary-General a number of serious violations of the cesse-fire by Pakistan troops. The Secretary-General% first report on the cesse-.fire dated 25 September [S/6710] also proves that Pakistan entratingalmostexclusively s for withdrawal of troops and re-estab old cesse-fire in Jammu and Kasbmir. In our judgement, however. militery dise gement shmld proceed conourrently witb owable political settlement.. . . Moreover, ~immediate steps are net taken to bring about an honourable settlement of the JammuandKasbmir dispute. we would be faced with the real danger of resumption of hostilities which msy well lead to a conflict of much greater dimensions.” 22. These facts prove conclusively tbat Pakistan started tbis trouble on 5 August 1965 wilh the intention of creatlng and maintaining an armed conflict with India to force a settlement of wbat it calls “tbe Kasbmir question” oa its own terms. It is therefore clear that Pakistan bas net accepted an unoonditional cesse-fire and bas no intention of observing it. 23. The issue before the Counoil is tberefore quite clear, and that issue is to get Pakistan flrst ta abjure the ways of force ami violence and to honour the cesse-fire witbout aqy mental or otber reservat.ions, as we bave from the start agreed to do anal as Pakistan bas clearly failed to do. UntD Pakistan is made to comply with the CounoWs call for a cesse-fire. until the cesse-fire becomes reaDy effective, no useful purpose cari possibly be serve& by any kind of discussion. in tbe Council or elsewhere, as to any possible subsequent steps. 24. Mat is the situatton today? All alongthe westerr border between India and Pakistan, Pakif$an continues to indu@ in bigbly provooative attacks on ou] troops and positions. The Counoil cannot possibly expeot OUT forces to stand idly by. They bave cleaa instructions to me& every attack witb determination in defenoe of tbeir positions and themselves. 25 f Jammu and Kasbmir, hun. dr raiders continue to commi ac tlds day. Pakistan ha6 no owned toresponsibilityfortbem.Instead, theP&dstan controlled radio continues to blare forth ca& tothen to continue their nefarfous activities and to say tba these will continue, n~~~~i~ a cesse-fire. 26. In SUC~ circumstsnces. it would bs utterb fuule for the Connoil to waste is valuable time 0;

It was not my intention to take part in this debate. In response to the President’s statement that he had bad prolonged discussions with his colleagues, leading up to the resolution asklng the parties to co-operate and to implement in full resolution 211 (1X5), 1 had expected to refrain froc making any statement. However, in view of the charges made by the representative of Indfa, it becomes necessary for mc to take the time of the Council. 28. 1 am deeply gratefbl to you, Mr. President, for the concern that you have shown in calling for an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the grave and serious situation that has arisen as a result of the flagrant violations of the cesse-fire by India. 29. It Will be recalled that the Council. in its resolution 211 (lSC5) of 20 September, called upon Mia and Pakistan to issue orders for a cesse-fire to take effect on 22 September at 0700 heurs GMT. In his letter of 21 September [see S/6699, para. 6.1, the Secretary-General informed the Indian representative that each party should lnstruot its forces to cesse fire as of 0700 hours GMT on 22 September, vflthout condition. In spite of this unambiguous clarification given by the Secretary-General, the Indian representative sought an extension of the dead-line by eighteen heurs on the pretext of a reasonable notice to the local commanders, althougb the President of Pakistan had, in compliance with the Security Council resolution, issued orders to the Pakistan armed forces to stop fighting as from 1205 heurs West Pakistan time (equivalent to 0700 hours GMT) on 22 September. There was no justification for India’s delaying the cesse-fireorders,buttheSecurity Council acceded to the Indian request and granted an extension of fifteen hours. We had a sense of foreboding that India was seeklng an extension of the dead-line in order to alter the military situation to its advantage during the interva1. 30. We regret to say tbat our fears have proved to be well founded. Even while the representative of Indla was asking for an extension of the ceasefire dead-line, the Indian forces were massing fer a major offensive against Pakistan. Since then, there have been daily violaticns of the cesse-fire agreement by India. The following serious incidents may be mentioned by way of illustration. 31. On 23 September, Indian forces crossed the cesse-fire line and occupied a feature in the Lipa valley in Aaad Kasbmir. When our forces in that area told them to vacate this position, the Indians opened fire. This restarted the fightiy between the two forces, Also on 23 September, Indian forces occupied the village of Alhar in Sialkot sector, and seized the villages of Bhakini Dbilwae andDogijai in Lahore Sector. 32. On 24 September, in the Uri-Punch sector, Indlans started building a road linking Punch town witb Uri. On the same day, Indian troops moved 33. On 25 September, Indlan forces, hi more than batallion. strength, supported by a squadron of tanks, atlacked Pakistan positions aftersendingwuitimahrm to the Pakistan local commander, demanding tbat he should wlthdraw from positions held by him since before the cesse-fire came into effect. Also on 25 September. Indian troops attacked Pakistan positions in Chananwala in Fazilka dector at 1700 heurs West Pakistan time. supported by armour and artlbry. 34. On 26 September, Indlan forces were assembling in the Rajasthan sector to launch fresh attacks on Pakistan positions; if an attack is uuùsrtaken, it wlll be necessary to “se the Pakistan Air Force in self-defence. On the sanie day. Indian troops committed more cesse-fire violations and occupied some places in Akhnur scctor whichwere notoccupied by them before the cesse-Gre. They also put in attacks supported by artillery and mortars, to seize two posts in the same sector. Similar reports were received from the Tithwal sector. 35. On 2’7 September, Indian troops made a number of attempts to occupy a feature nsar Shabkot. They bave been shelling thls area throughout the day and the shelling was still golng on when last reports were received. 36. The Permanent Representative of Pakistan reportad to the Secretarg-Gsneral about these violations, through his Mters of 24. 25 and 26 September. which bave since been circulated as Security Council documents [9/6709. S/6712, S/6713, S/6714]. These violations of the cesse-fire by India were also of tbe cesse-fire irrefutably pmved Itiian 6owrrment in 40. I am bringlng these inhuman acts of victimisation and terrorization of the people of Kashmir to the attention of the Security Council in the hope that the Councll Will take effective measures to alleviate the misery of these innocent people who have suffered at the hands of the Indian colonialists for no other reason than their struggle to aohieve their freedom. 41. The catalogue of deliberate. wanton and blatant violations of the ceasc-fire line by India and the acts of repression against the innocent, helpless people of the Indian-oocupied zone of Kashmir underline the gravity of the present situation. It is of the utmost importance that the Security Councll should take inunediate and effective measures to stop violations of the cesse-fire by India. The Council should also ensurc that India does not commit these violations again. Unless these Indian incursions into Pakistan positions are halted immediately, the situation Will deteriorate rrpidly and go out of control. We believe that India is deliberately creating these incidents and violations in order to frustrate the efforts of the Cotincil for an honourable and enduring solution of the Kashmir problem. 42. It is imperative that a self-executing procedure for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute should be evolved as soon as possible. Time is running out. Events bave shown that the implementation of paragraph 1 of Council resolution 211 (1965) is not enough. It in of the utmost importance and urgency that the Security Council should initiate immediate action for the implementation of paragraph 4 of that resolution and bring lasting peace to a war-torn subcontinent. S am elated to note that in the resolution which it has adopted this evening the Security Council has taken into account the importance of the underlying problem by reaffirming resolution 211 (19ô5), which, in paragraphs 4 and 5, makes it incumbent upon the Council to work rapidly towarde a self-executing agreement which wlll bring to an end the dispute between India and Pakistan and achieve lasting peace between the peoples of those countries. 44. 1 must once again point out that Pakistanl troops in civilian disguise who orossed the cesse-fire Hne beglnning 5 August bave net ceased fire. In fact they are being told that the cesse-fire demanded by the Security Council does net apply to them. 45. Does the Security Council or Pakistan expect India to cesse fire unllaterally?

We also bave received subsequent allegations of violations of the oeasefire; 1 do not want to go into them. The main tbing is that the United Nations observers bave reached the subcontinent. You bave observers in my country, and, 1 believe, you bave observers on the other side. 47. The charges and couiner-charges bave been made to the observers, and they have investigated them. Al1 three reports submitted by your observers bave clearly stated that Indians bave been responsible for the violations of the cesse-fire. There is document S/6710, dated 25 September 1965. wbich clearly establishes from your observers’ reprt that India bas vlolated the cesse-fire. 48. Then there is another dooument=-S/6710/Add.2. dated 26 September 1965-m which the United Nations observers have again clearly placed the blame on India for the violations of the cesse-fire. 49. A third document, whlch has recently been circulated-that is, document S/6710/Add.l. dated 26 September 1965-again states that India is responsible for the cesse-fire violations. 50. 1 would like to repeat the more recent lnformation that has been given me of violations by India of the cesse-fire. Your observers are there, and they Will report to you impartially on who is vlolating the cesse-fire. 51. We bave agreed to abide by the cesse-re: we intend to abide by the cease-fire. But we also believe sinoerely and ganuinely that permanent peace cari be achleved only if the Jammu and Kashmir dispute is tackled and settled behveen the two countries. 52. As 1 told you the other night, there had been cesse-fire before. There is a cesse-fire now; We wlll try to implement it. We Will do our very best. But its effective, proper, and final implementatlon oan corne oniy when the Jammu and Kashmir dispute is honourably settled.

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