S/PV.1247 Security Council

ML Preeident. 1 deeply appreciate your gracious remarks coucerning myself sud 1 tbank youverymuch for them. Ymr statement is but an example of the many kindnesses accorded me by your Minister for Rxtenml Relations, yourself and other members of the delegation of your great country since I came t0 New York to represent the United States. 13. M=. President, your experience as a statesmsn and leader in Your country and In the world and your record of dedication to the United Nations sud its Adoption of the agenda

The provisional agenda for today’s meeting is contained in document S/Agenda /1247. which the members of the Council bave before them. If 1 hear no objectton, 1 shall take it that the agenda for oui work today is adopted. There are, however, certain comments or clarifications that 1 should like to make. 15. Last ‘Thursday the representative of Pakistan requested the President to convene a meeting of the Security Council SO that he might inform it of developments indicating a deteriorating situation with regard to the cesse-fire and the withdrawal of troops from the 5 August line. The President asked the representative of Pakistan to submit his request in writing and assured htm that in the meantime he would notify the members of the Cou&l and the Secretary- General of the request. This was doùe. 16. Late on Friday afternoon the F-esident of the Security Council recsived a letter from tbe representativs of Pakistan to the United Nations [S/6621]. The first two paragraphs of the letter refer to the deteriorating situation which tire Security Cour@1 ha8 already considered and on which it has adoptecI four resolutions. After consultation with all members of the Council and in full agreement with the Secretary-General. the President arrangedfor the Council to hold a meeting at 4 p.m. today and added to the agenda an item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on withdrawals (S/6719/Add.3) and on the observance of the cesse-fire (W’llO/AddS).’ 17. On both those points the Security Council has adopted resolutions and the Pakistan delegation has complaints to niake concerning tbe changing and deterioratins situation. It is not for the President to undertakela full examination of the letter from the representative of Pakistan [5/6821]. for wbich he has no responsibility, but the first two paragraphs complain of situations which affect agreements adopted by the Council and activities carried out by the Secretariat. The agenda was prepared accordingly. The India-Pakistan question Latter doted 22 October 1965 from the represwtative of Pakistan addressed to tCe Prssidcnt of ths Sewrity Cwncil (S/6821); At the invitation of 121s Presidsnt, Mr. CS%?rm SIa@ (Mia) md Mr. Z. A. BbUttO (PekiSté@ t00k PISCeS at tbe Coumil table.

The Minister for Fore@ Affairs of Palcistan, at whose request this meeting has been calIed, wishes to address the Cmncil, and 1 therefore call on him.

The consideration of the IndIa-Pakistan question hy the Seourity Council has now reached a stage which wIl1 be decisive, as much for the issue of war or peace in South Asia as for the effectiveness and authority of the UnIted Nations. 1 hase this statement on the requestwe made for this meeting and on India’s response to it, as indkated in the letter of the Permanent representative of IndIs to the United Nations [5/6823]. 21. 1 am grateful to the President and the other memhers of the Seourity Council for having convened th& meeting, at our request, to consider the rapidly deteriorating situation bec leen IndIa and Pakistan. The reasons which prompted ourrequestwerethevirtuaI collapse of the cesse-fire and the total disregard hy IndIa of the letter and spirit of Council resolution 211 (1965) of 20 Septemher 1965. 22. This resolution pr,sided for various essential measures t0 facilitate an xxiotirsble settlement of the political problem underlying the conflictbetweenindm and Pakistan-namely, the Jammu and Eashmir dispute. It waS stated authoritatively In the Counoil that the resolution stood as a whole and had to be implemented as su&. It represented the CourmIl% commItment to seoure a psaceful settlement of the dispute. That was emphasized by the membsrs of the Ccuncil and also hy numerous Memher States speaking in the general debate durIng the ourrent General Assembly session. 23. chat is IndIa% attitude to thst commitment? As far as the world is concerned. today India has unmashed itself. It ha8 said that it is not prepared to participate in the Council’s deliberations if these go beyond paragraph 1 of resolution 211 (1965). In other words, it shows contempt for the Cmmcil’s reSolution and the Council’s authority. That fact Is SO plain tbat it needs no elaboration. 24. The Counoll is told that Jammu and Eashmir is an imegraI Part of IndIa and that any discussion relating t* it amounts to a gross interference in IndIa% intermal affairs. That is to say, the Council’s deliberations for eighteen years. extendmg overmore than 133 meet@gs. tith alI the statements made by its members. the resolutions adopted, the pledges given. the ComrWments solemniy entered I$o-a11 25. it is for the Counoil to deal with that defiance. Meanwhile, 1 sh~ll proceed witb reportlng the present Situation 8s we se8 it. 26. When the Comm11 met on 27 September [1245th meeting] to consider the situation, it did SO as a resuit of the Sezetary-General’s report tbat the ceasefire agreed to .unconditionally by tbe Governments of India and Pakistan was not holding. The Cour& reaffirmed its previous resolutions anddemandedthat tbe parties urgently honour their commitments to the Caoncil to observe the cease-fire and withdraw their forces as neceasary steps in the full implementatlon of resolution 211 (1965). 27. Nearly a moutb has elapsed since the Counoil adopted its la& res&tion, but the cease-fire continues to be unstable and negotlations have still to begln on wlthdrawal of troops and a settlement of the political problem with regard to Jammu and Kaabmlr. In otur submissi&s before the Council. we bave consistently affirmed that, while a ceasefire and withdrawal of troops must necessarlly form a part of the effort to reach a permanent settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, itwasunrealistic, in political terms, to divorce the probiem of the cVeseation of hostilities from that of settlingthe Jammu sud Kashmir dispute. 26. The reason for this is net far to seek. One of the parties conslders the cesse-fire as Somethlng which merely facilitates its continued hold on the greater part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It is therefore unwilling to allow such Stabilisation of the cesse-fire and withdrawal of tmops as would permit tbe Councll, as xell as both parties ta the dispute, to proceed with the task of finding a peaceful settlement of the dispute. It is for this reason that my delegation ha6 constantly urged that the Ccuncil would b-e defeating even the immediatz purpose which it bad in mind if it allowed IndIa to escape with the impression tbat tbe Council had resigued itself to the continuauce of te status quo in Jammu and Kashmir. 29. It is also on this account tbat my Govemment bas always urged the Council to remind the parties not merely of their duty to refrain from the use of force in contravention of the United Nations Charter, Imt aleo of their responsibllity to hooour and implement in good faith the obligations and commitments undertaken by them under the United Nations resolutiens which lay dovm the accepted and agreed solution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. 30. In its resolution 211 (1965) the Security Council demanded that India and Pakistan should issue orders for a cesse-fire to take effect on 22 September at 7 a.m. GMT. Pal&&an complied-sec the letter dated 22 September 1965 from the Permanent Representative 31. Even after the cesse-fire, there was no le& up in Indla’s aggressive attitudes and activities. India bas been flouting the cesse-fire agreement by following a deliberate and systematic.plan to seize forcibly as much territory as possible. It bas alsc been enàeavouring to improve its position on the actual Une of control by creeplng forward and occupyin& are85 which it failed repeatedly to capture during the war. 32. Since 23 September there hsve been a large number of violations of the cesse-fire by Indian forces in Jamm” and Kas*hmir and agalnst Pakistan territory. These bave been reportsd to the United Nations observer5 by our militar; authorities anr’ to the Secreta~~-General by our Permanent Representative to the United Nations. In spite of their endeavcurs, the United Nations observer5 bave not been able to ensure effective observance of the cesse-fire or vacation of territory seized forcibly by India since 23 Sqfcember. It is no wonder that the Secretary- General is conoerned about the deterioration in the situation and the mounting tension in various sectors of the battle front and that he has corne to the conclusion that “the existence of the cesse-fire must be considered precarious”. 33. At the 1245th meeting of the Securi~ Council, on 27 September. 1 mentioned some of the breaches of the cesse-fire committed by India between 23 and 26 September. 1 also drew the attention of the Council to the first three report5 of the Seoretary- General whlch showed that our complaints were well founded [S/6710 and Add.1 and 21. The Council was naturally concerned over this state of affairs and again called for strict observance of the ceasefire. Let us sec how far India has ccmplied with the Council% directives. 34. Since 27 September there has been no diminution either in the number or in the gravity of breaches of the cesse-fire committed by India. Numerous complaints bave been filed by ourmilitary authorities, of whlch only a small proportion bave been investigated SO far by United Nations observers. Their reports. however, leave no doubt as to India’s responsibllity for proved violations of the cease-fire. I shall net weary the Council with demi15 of alI the cases investigated by the United Nations observer& but 1 should like tc invite the Cxuu?il~s attention to were used ta deshy tbe Jura and Shah%& bri suap~sted by medbam, field aad mwantain artilkry. @SO used fcs ncgiseic support. of operationd orde .w 60~333f~di~g CI+ Bat umxm Reghent. art in tbis operaticn, is being distribcted hor pems%?. by tbe members of tbe Semsity êauncif 828g. Tbis Indian operatioz~ eontiined for more ten a%ys, ia total disiegara of bxlia”s ceasewmmitments ~2nd tbe intervbnticn of hinited Nations obsemers. 3%~ premeditated attack hns created an extremely etangemus sitiaation, the ccnse- CIE~% of wblcb wiU ~&II~ ta be borne by Hndia and by lcM.ia ah%@. 36. IL cbe Kotki-Naosbera sector, on 7 Octcbes. an fmmps. y artiiery, attacked P&istm CkwE. ca side of tbe cesse-fire line iratta-Jbangar area. Again tbis in tbe presence of the United Nations observers. wbo confh-~ed tbat the Pakistan position mentia@ea in car complaist had been att@a?a by the Imlian tmops at 0140 hG!srs ma at 0215 hcars auring Ch2 nigbt of 6 io 7 O~t&er, and tbat hdim C~OQ~S again sbellea lb@ P%kistan Biea between 0626andO925 bQws on a acccber. They also re of Ch@ Pakistan pcsitions had been cccupied by lndian tmcps on tbe nigbt of 7 actcber and rehken by Pakistan fimes later in the same &y. Par%gr%ph 22 of document S/671Q/Add.4 refess to this incident. ch sector, the Zndians are bWding ch tcm witb Yri, thus committiig 38. With regard to the Chhamb sector, as is now well known. on 29 September the Indian local commander issued an ultimatum to Pakistan forces in the Chhamb sector to vacate areas under Pakistan control, failing which Indian forces would launch an offensive action. The Indians launched a well CDordinated attack on 1 October in the area between the Elst and 74th Northings. This area has been in the possession of Pakistan forces since before the time of the cesse-fire. The above facts bave been substantiated by tlie United Nations observers in the area. as cari be seen from paragraphs 11 to 21 of the Secretary-General’s report of 7 October [S/6710/ Add.31. 39. In Pakistan. the Indians bave been reorganizing ed regrouping their forces in front of the Lahore. Sialkot and Kasur sectors, contrary to the spirit of the cesse-fire, and they continue to disregard the interventions made by the United Nations ob= servers, as cari be seen from paragraph 46 of document S/6710/Add.4. Tbis paragraph states: “On the morning of 13 October, between 0920 and 1000 heurs. Indian troops fired with tank and field artillery at Pakistan positions in the Siphon area on both banks of the Canal. The observers saw no reaction fromPakistanartillery. butbelieved that there was an exchange of small-arms fire. At approximately 1005 heurs, the firing stopped and the observers took this opportuntty to place their jeep with the United Nations flag on the west bank of the Canal in full view of bath sides. Nevertheless, firing aas resumed by Indian troops with artillery, anti-tank guns and recoilless rifles and lasted nearly one heur.” 40. In the Ferozepore sector, in violation of the ceasefire agreement, India brought the 23rd Infantry Division, equipped through United States military aid. from the north-eastern frontier of India to Ambala. an Indian militery station close to West Pakistan. A few days ago tl+s division was moved to Ferozepore. Al1 the evidence indicates that India intends ta launch an attack on the Khem Karan sector, which has been in the occupation of Pakistan forces since before the time of the cesse-fire. 41. In the Sulaimanke sector. on 4 October Indian forces engaged OUI’ posts at Sandarke with heavy guns and small-arms fire, which createdanextremely tense situation. 42. The Rajasthan sector.accordingtotheSecretary-= General% report dated 23 October. is considered by the Chief Officer of tbe United NationsIndia-P&istanOb- 44. Oh 12 G%ober. the Ind&us attacked our pasitîon al Ghchm. These attaoks bave been confirmeci by Unit& Na observes in the area, as oa be mm raphs 66 and 67 af document S/6710/ 45. 0n 14 Oetober. tbe Indiaus attackedthe Pakistanbeeld village of Nawatala. This is confirmed by paragraph 71 of the Secretary-General’s report dated r [S/6?1O/Add.4] sud by paragraph 8 of bis ad 23 Gctober [S/671O/Add.5]. whioh reads: Tm 15 October also, an observer in the Cbor- Barmer seclor who had proceeded to the village of Nawabla reporteà that the village had been attacked 0” 14 October by Indian troopsandocoupied by tbem tbe next day. When the 0bserver told the an ma]or tbat the village previously had been dsfinitely occupied by Pakistan troops. the Iudtan Mal oommder replied that he had instructions t0 Clear PahiSts.0 infiltrators from Indian territory. The observer later reoeived the same reply from tbe fudbm battalion and brigade commanders...m Thts slmws India% respect for the cesse-fire. 46. On 15 October. the Indians, after capturtng a Pakistan-held post at Kelnor. crossed tbe Indo- Pakistan international boundary near the village of Rhame Jotar, whicb is well within Pakistan’s territory. Thés COnStituteS not ouly a serious breach of the cease-fire. but also an act of aggression agamst Pakistan. 47. Gur Army authorities informed the Chief Officer of tbe United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission ou 16 October that Indian forces inthe Rajasbn area were being reinforced by one fresh tufantry division. These reports were confirmed by United Nations observer& wbo informed General Macdonald 0” 21-22 G&ober tbat there had been % s,tbstantial build-up . . .m tbe JaisaImer sector” [S/6710/Add.s. para 131. 4% In a futile attempt to justiiy her aggressive action in the Rajasthan sector, Indiahasbeen assert@ that Pakistan held only the border outpost of Munabao in Rajasthan when the cesse-fire came into effect. This Inàian lie has been finally nailed by the Secretary- General in his report dated 18 Cctober [S/6710/ Add.41. 1 invite the Cooncil’s attention toparagraph68 of the report. in which the Secretary-General categorically states that RThe above-mentionsd positions under attack by Indian traop&&Ialesar, Raichandwala and Ghotaru-*are located in the arma held by Pakistan f0rces.A 50. Again. in paragraph 70, of the same report, he refers to Itelnor. whioh was attaoked by Indian forces, as “a Pakistan-held position near the border on the Indian side”. And then. in paragraph 71, when the Secretary-General reports the Indian seizure of Nawatala. it is made clear that this area “had been definitely occhpied by Pakistan troopsw. 51. Apart from the above serious cesse-fire violations in Jammu and Kashmir and along the Indo=- Pakistan borders. the Indianshavecommittedinhuman atrocities on the civilian population in parts of Pakistan which are under their occupation. Acts of barbarity being committed by Indian military authorities against Pakistani prisoners of war have been reported to tbe Secretary-General. Documents captored by the Pakistan forces reveal that the Indians are violating the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Priscners of War.l/ Wounded Pakistani prisoners of war have not been given adequate medical treatment, ad some bave been killed in the Rajastbao and Fazi sectors. AU such cases bave beenbsought totbe sot d the United Nations Observation Mission in tbe hope that it would be able to persuade ths Indians to abide by the Geneva Convention and to accord humane treatment to the prisoners of war. 52. The Security Council, in its resoiution 211(1965) of 20 September, called for tbe witbd~aw~ of armed forces subsequent to the coming into effect of the ceasefire. In identical telegrapbic messages sent to the Governments of India and Pakistan OR the same day, the Se~~et~~Gea~~~ stated inter alla: “a request your plan and e le for the indicatedwithdrawal of your troopsOs !S/66SS, para. 3.1 m . . . it is my duty to inform you that 1 expect to receive from you at a very early date your plan and schedule for the required withdrawal of any of your trocps that are now on the wrong side of these 1ines.n [S/6699/Add.2, sect. II.] 54. Pakistan% response to the Secretary-General’6 r@quest was positive and constructive. The Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, in hls letter to the Sscretary-General of 26 September [S/6715] pointed out thatz ” . . . no withdrawal cari take place until it hss been jointly agreed to by representatives of the two armed forces and a mutually acceptedprogramme of withdrawal bas been prepared.” 55. The Indlan reply and subsequent communications tc the Secretary-General, on the other hand. wer@ contentious and designed to delay the withdrawal as long as possible and to provide India with excuses to resile from any plan of withdrawal that may be formulated whenever it suited India. 56. In his letter of 13 October[S/6719/Add.2, para.41 to the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India. the Secretary-General expressed his concem over the fact that @the wlthdrawals.. .fores@@n in the Council’s resolutions.. . bave not taken place”. In this letter. the Secretary-General put forward two possible courses of action: first, that: *. . . each party might find it possible to formulate its own plan and schedule of withdrawal and that the respective time schedules might be co-ordinated with the assistance of Cnited Nations military observers.” hlternatively. the Secretary-General suggested that: *. . . appropriate military representatives of each side be brcught tcg@ther by and wlth an acceptable representative to be designated by me to meet either in the area or at United Nations Headquarters for the purpose of formulating an agreed withdrawal plan.” 5ï. Pakistan took a practical approach to the problem and accepted the second alternative suggested by the S@cr@tary-General. It was also recommended that tbe meeting-s should be held in the subcontinent rather tban at CnitedSations Headquarters. as a11 tbe rolevanl information would be more easily available in the subcontlnent. and senior military officia16 could take part in these meethgs. 56. Let us now look at the Indian reply to the Secretary-General’s proposais. The Prime Minister of India. in his letter of 18 October 1965 [S/SSlO] stated that: “... since a cease-fire has not yet heen effectively establlshed, the stage for aplammd schedule of wlthdrawals over the entire area of conflict bas oct yet arrived”. This is tantamount to saying that 59. In a letter of 22 October to the Permanent Repreeentative of Pakistan to the United Nations, the Secretary-General welcomed our favourable responee tohis suggestion. He propoeedtc eend Major-GeneralSyeeno Sarmento of Braail. Commander of the UnitedNations Emergency Force in the Middle East, to the area at an early date to vieit both capitale and ta arrange for representatives of India and Pakistan to meet at some mutually agreed place, poeeibly near the front Iinee. and to eeek agreement on a plan and echedule for the wlthdrawale by both parties. We bave accepted the proposal. India’e reply ie still awaited. 60. The record ie open for a11 tc observe. The only logical conclueton ie that India ie flagrantly vlolating the cesse-fire and then ueing the ineffectiveness of the ceaee-fire as a means to frustrate any plan for withdrawal. Pakistan accepted the ceaee-fire in good faith and has taken no offensive action since it came into effect. But eurely we cannot be expected to carry out the ceaee-fire unilaterally and then follow it by a one-eided wlthdrawal. The Security Council must aleo bear in mind India’s past record when it fruetrated a11 the attempts made by the mllitary eub-committee of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan to effect demilitarizatlon in the State of Jammu and Kaehmir. India muet not be permitted to repeat its past tactics with regard to wlthdrawal of troope and once again hold up the implementation of Security Council reeolutions. If the Security Council is determlned to impIement its resolution 211 (1965). it should compel India to show respect for the ceaee-fire and co-operate wlth the Secretary-General in implementingthe withdrawal provisions of the Council’s reeolutions. 61. 1 muet remind the Council that a ceaee-fire and withdrawal of troope are. in the worde of Couccil reeolution 211 (1965). only the firet eeeential stepe towarde a peaceful eettlement of the outstandllg dlfferencee between India and Pakistan wlth regard to Jammu and Kaehmir. The Council must now addreee iteelf to thie baeic problem. 62. As the President of Pakistan hae pointed out in his communication to the Secretary-General of today’e date [S/6825]: 63. Tbe need for prompt action und@r paragraph 4 of Commil r.ssduCion 211 p965) bas becorne more urgent ever m accmmt of the large-scale arrests by India of polltlcal leaders ln Jammu and Kashmir and the expulsion of thousands of people who opposed Indlan rule. II is a fact. wbicb many impartial observers bave atteste3 to. that almost simultmeously with tbe cesse-fire Indla let loose a reign of terrer hi the occupied portion of J-u and Kashmir. 64. In a lett@r nddressed to the President of the SecuFity Coutmil on 18 Ootober 1965 [S/6801]. ths Permanent Representativs of Pakistan to the United Nations drew attention to the situation whichprevalls in tbat mfortunate land. He quoted from the dispatches sent by correspond@nts of a number of reputable and well-known newspapers to show the brutalltywith which the Indian occupation authorities bave set upon the people of Jammu and Kasbmir. As the Council cari visualise, there are stringent restrictions on Press dlspatches from Srlnagar. Yet storles are beginning tc trickle out whlch glve us some ides of the extreme measures employed by India to tweak vengeance on th@ p@ople of Jammu and Kashmir. . . .

With the permission of the representative of Pakistan 1 should like to point out that according to our agenda the subject for discussion today is the implementation of Security Council resolutions 211 (1965) and 214 (1965) of 20 and 27 September 1965 concernlng the C@as@-fire and the withdrawal .of troops. and 1. woold most respectfully and sincerely invite him to confine his comments to the suhject which is the reason for the Council meeting.

1 am sorry to take the floor at this stage, Mr. President, but let me at the very outset take this opportunity to convey to you the warmest congratulations of my Government, together with my own, on your assuming the presidency of the Council. 1 feel certain that vour abilitv and experience Will enrich our deliberations. You are one of the leading figures in Urug.w-a senator, a professer. and one of those leading statesmen whosigned the Charter of the Unlted Nations. We are privileged to bave you with us.

1 am deeply grateful to the representative of Jordan for his kind words to me. 1 now callon the representative of the Ivory Coast.

My delegation associates itself with wbat the representative of Jordan bas said and would like also to congratulate you, Mr. President, onyour accession to the presidency of the Security Councif. 70. 1 should like to add-without in any way prejudging ourposition on the substance-that we consides. as dces the representative of Jordan, that Security Ccuncil resolution 211 (1965). wbich contains several paragraphs, forms a whole. Mcreover, the Pakistan delegation bas requested a meeting of the Security Council in order to bring the Council up to date on the serious deteriqration of the situation that may well jeopardlse the cesse-fire. 71. 1 think the Pakistan delegation should inform us of the events which, as a whole, constitute. in its opinion, a deterioration of the situation. Therefore we consider that it would be difficult to ask tbe representative of Pakistan to confine himself purely and simply to stating a part of what he considers a deterioration of this situation. That is why I think the Council might allow the representativeof Pakistan to speak of what he considers a deterioration of tbe situation as a whole.

1 tbank the representative of the Ivory Coast. Inow cal1 on the representative of France.

1 sbould Iike, Mr. President, to asscciate myself whole-beartedly wlth tbe congratulations just addressed to you by my colleagues from Jordan and the Ivory Ccast. If 1 do net speakanymore on this matter, it is because you know my country’s feelings about your country and abcut you personally. 74. With regard to wbat tbe representativesof Jordan and of tbe Ivory Coast bave said, I should just like to aay, Mr. President, that I bave perhapn net fuIly grasped tbe meaning of your statement. Perhaps you would be kind 11 us tlm seasons WbiCb led you to feel 1 ents made by the representative of Pakistan were in some way gcing beyond the agenda before us. mnwro paklstan): 1 willcontinue my statement mless 1 heu a tiing cootrary to what ha6 been stateosofar. . . . ‘77. Th@ PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The renresentalive of India. bas asked for the Qoor. If h@ vdsbes to speak on a &nt of coder. I sha?’ be happy bim. If, hornver. he wishes to raise a ubstmce, 1 vmuld ask him to wait mtil ewd of the stat@nmnt by tbe representative of SINGE fi : 1 wish to rsiae a @oint of order. 79. Tbe PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): 1 ree se the Minlster for External Affatrs of India. 80. Mr. Swaran SlNGH (India): Mr. President. altbough you hnve b@@n good enough to recognlse me on a point of order, may 1 take this opportunity. beause 1 em addressïng the Council for the first time, to place on recordourappreciationofthe efforts of tbe Council ami also of the very distinguished and able Secretary-General to bring about a ceasefire ami to restore peace in the subcontinent. 81. In th@ letter of the Permanent Representative of India to tbe United Nations dated 24 Ootober 1965 [S/6823] the position of the Government of India was made clear wltb regard to the raising of matters which amount to gross interference in the internal affairs of India. New th@ Foreign Minister of Pakistan is raising those matters which refer to the interna1 situation in the State of Jammu and Kasbmir and is mentioning matters which are exclusively within the internai jurisdiction of India. Therefore. these matters tu-@ net relevant to our discussions here tcday. 82. At the beginning of the meeting, the President made it clear that this meeting of th@ Counoil was being convened ln order to discuss two matters: first. the deterioration in the cesse-fire, and second&. the question of the withdrawal of armed personnel. Even the framework and the scheme of the Security Cou&l resolution clearly indicat~ tbat the first stage is that of effectimg a cesse-firt. i ,q thereafter cornes the question of bringlng about withdrawals. Therefore. th@ only relevant question before the Security Council at thls stag@, and this is also covered in large measure in the report of the Secretary-General, is this question, namely paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 211 (1965). The only point for consideratlon. th@ .efore. is theposition of the cesse-fire at the moment. what steps. if any, are required to strengthen it, ami what m@asures should b@ taken to brlng about a wlthdrawal. The Council is thus faced wlth the problem of stabilizin8 peace and with theproblemof effectingdisengagement. 84. In view of the ruling that the President ha5 already glven that the remarks of the representative of Pakistan were about matters whichwere extraneous tc the twc issues which the President emmoiated at the beglnning of the meeting, 1 wculd request the President tc cal1 upcn the representative of Pakistan net to mention such matters. We are participating in this discussion on the distinct understanding that the cnly twc issues that are being discussed at the moment are. first, the stabi1iaa:ic.r of the cesse-fire and second, what further steps. if any. are tcbe taken for the withdrawal of trocps and the wlthdrawal of a11 armed personnel. 1 shall net go intc any detail, but 1 shoulù like tc make cur position clear on tbls issue.

1 should like tc explain that 1 did net cal1 the representative of Pakistan tc crder but interrupted him merely to point cut. in the interest of ordsrly discussion and of a useful cutccme to this meeting, that the subjects which the Ccuncil was ccnvened tc ccnsider are those item6 which appear on its agenda. For this reascn 1 do net think we shculd go intc the scope of rescluticns 211 (1965) and 214 (1965) whioh. as Security Ccuncil rescluticns. may be freely appraised and interpreted bcth by themembers of the Council and by the representatives of the ccuntries ccncerned. 86. As for points of order, 1 feel that within a strict interpretaticn of the prcvlsicnal rules of prccedure of the Security Council, they may be raised only by the members of the Ccuncil themselves. 87. 1 shculd like tc ccnclude by requesting the representative of Pakistan tc state his vlews on the Ccuncil’s rescluticns and tc refrain frcm commenting on matters wlthin the dcmestic or interna1 jurisclicticn of ancther State.

1 am scrry tc take the flccr again. 1 am trylng tc be helpful. Mr. President, 1 heard ycu menticning the term “dcmestic jurisdicticn”. 1 do net think this question is befcre us. The prcblem is ncthing new befcre the Ccuncil. It las been befcre the Ccuncil for the last seventeen years. The Ccuncil assumed jurisdicticn. The parties accepted the authcrity of the Council. That is why they are befcre us ncw. With a11 due respect, 1 think this term “dcmestic jurisdicticn” dces net wly. 89. That is the first point. The second point is this: We bave before us resclution 211 (1965) adopted by the Ccuncil on 20 September 1965. This continues tc be befcre us. It is one unit; it is interwcven; SQ. The PRESIDENT (translated frcm Spanish): 1 should like to su& chat I WaS Inerely tryinp t0 be ~-tru~ti~e and that 1 WBS rat calling the repre- ~entdivs of Pakistan to orderores~ressinganopinion on any question of substance. 1 hope the representatfve of Pakistan wRl accept my remarks as evidence of a ~nd con~tructivs desire to contribute to the P of the debate. 9 (I.bited States of America): 1 st that we hme a brief recess S of the Couucil cari confer Informally for a few minutes.

If the representative of the United States wlll excuse me. the representative of the Ivory Coast bas asked for the floor.

I had asked to speak before the representative 19 tk ‘United States. but 1 did not press the point bxawe 1 was satisfied with the request you bave just made to the representative of Pakistan to continue his statement. Sin~e you bave already called upon the representative of Pakistan, 1 should merely like to appeal to the Urdted States representative to allow him to continue hls statement and not to insist upon a suspension of the meeting.

As the representative of the United States is notpressing bis motion, 1 call upou the representative of Pakistan.

Pakistan bas always sought to be constructive. has always co-operated with the Security Council and with the United Nations. In the spirit of our belief in the importance of the Charter and what it stands for, we shaal continue to co-operate wlth this august Organisation. 96. What 1 baie to say now goes to the beart of the pmblem in the sens ihat it is in confrrmity wlth Security Coumil resolution 211 (1965) of 20 Septemher. Tbat resolution is not divisible. The ceasefie is connecttY wich witbdrawals. and withdrawals are connected with the underlylng problem that divtdes hiia an.cI Pakistan Over the State of Jannnu and Eashmir. Thls is an indissoluble prcblem. II is a great tragedy that India would net even want th@ Securi& Comcil to hear of the latest developments. to inform the Security Council as to what iB the situation in the subcontlnent. how the cesse-fire is beiug observed, why it is net belng observed. the abject wlth which it is nctbeingobserved. why they are nc& effecting withdrawals, what are their malicioua intentions behind uct wanting to effect withdrawals, ad why they do net want to go to the heart of tha problem that bas caused bloodshed twice ln a generatiOn between India and Pakistan. 99. Tliis is the mind of .India: this is the mentality of India. A dispute whioh has brougbt war and blccdshed and misery to the suboontinent twice years, which has been befcre the Secu for the la& eighteen year&. which bas attention of tbe whole wcrld. is regarded by India. mailaterally-as NIr. Ian Smith regards tbe question of Scutlaern Rhcdesia uuilaterally-tc be its interna1 matter. Theworldmustbeblind,truthmustbe stcpped. reality must be ccndsmned, sc tbst India, by its forensics and by the sbeer weight of ils force. fa able tc defy the Security Ccuncil and deny it the ri@. of resclving an Mernational dispute. 99. 1 [1m thankful tc those members of the Security Council who have not allcwed the rule of law, the rules of procedure, to be subjected tc Indian intimidation. because if the Security Counoil is tc arm India with a super-veto. if the great Pcwers are going tc mcve in step with Indiau obduracy. then there can be no justice in the wcrid. Then we might as well implement what you regarded tc be a threat frcm us. but what we in gccd conscience believe tc be the cnly hcncurable course cpen tc us. 100. 1[ again tbank the members of the Security Ccuncil for having correctly and ccuragecusly interpreted tbe prcvisicnal rules of procedure and rescluticn 211 (1965). 101. As the Ccuucil can visualise, there are stringent restrictions on Press dispatches frcm Sriuagar: yet stories are beginning tc trickle cut which give us scme idea of the extreme measures emplcyed by India tc wreak vengeance upcn the people of Kaslunir. A dispatch by the special correspondent of the Paris daily Le Figaro ccntains the following account of bis meeting wlth scme of thcse whc bave escaped tiie Indian terrcr: “An angry ycuug mari grabbed my arm aad tcld me the stcry of his village, Mandi, scmewhere in the vicinity of Punch. ‘Indiana’ bave tut off the breasts of cur girls and held them up, saying Were is your Pakistan! v Seven members of my ‘family bave been taken by the scldiers and butchered’, he went on with tears in his eye. Ancther man interrupted: ‘They lccked pecpleintheirbouses and set fire tc them. The whcle village has been burnt.’ “This mcrning 1 visited ancther refugee camp further up in tbe ncrth. Nere again 1 bad the same of O%d@F. unaer e Fepresentatwe raire 3 poi;L, of ive of Pakistan. We

I ho te11 tt%s representat of Pakistap1 no meam of PoreteHing t tile repr.e= la ~sks to say. H muet therefore a& Mm at least to Bet m ind ont wbat queseion tbe segresentatiw of Sndia shes to mise. If it eh@ Presid is entikled to refuse to spak. Does the represen ee? The representative of J 3 asked eo spe&. 105. MS, EL-FARRA (Jordan): 1 thfnk a speaker eaa an$ be interrupted by a pooint of order raised elewh members of tbeSeccuri~ Council. ineermpted otherwise. OQly a member tk sepresentative of Pakfstan-andordy on a p3iBt of order. ENT 6.tmnsMe~ fmm Spanish): IS of Pakistan questianing tbe Presito satisfy bis euriosity conceming tke probka vihich the represeneative of Mia wishes Uo aaise? PQS. MF. BRUTTO (Pakiseanp: r cas uuderstmd, WC. Sida&. tbat you curions to fiod out ww Fepres@~tative of a is askbg for the fbor. 108. Tbe PWZSDrnT d from Spanish): Tbe representative of the flwr. unaer the prouPs.ianaP rules of e be is mot entitkd ta rsise @nts of or&r. which is the prerogatàve of membess of tix? sew%i&gr Council. Perbaps gh@ rqwesenkative of Eodia wisbes ta make some statement that ES Rot a paint of ordes? Mr. SWarm Skgb (India) wftkdrew. ., 110. Mr. GGOLDBEFG (United States of Amerioa): 1 would bope that the membecs of the Security Counail could address themselves to the problem be.. fore leaves tlae Council obamber. 1 renew ØY r r a receas SO tbaat we cm confer briefly with each other. Ill, The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanlsh): diuce the representative of the United States bas Submitted a motion under rule 33 of the provisional rules of procedure. which precludes debate, I put the motion for a ban-minute recess to the vote. A vote was n by show of ha&. .6v fsvoor: Bolivia, China, Malaysia, Netherlanda. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. United Ki of Great Britaiu and Northern Ireland. Umted of America, Uruguay. Agiiinst: France, Ivory Coast. Jordan. Tbe motion was carnled QY 8 votes to 3. Tf2.e meethg was suspmded at 6.50 pan.

I should like very seriously to point that only the members of the Couacil bave tbe to raise points of order and to participate. the President’s authority, in decisions on the agenda and on the conduct of debates. 113. On these @NO points tbe Council is soverei and no rule of prooedure, no precedent and no p practice cari be invoked in opposltion to the rule I have just mentioned. 114. We bave just bad a demonstration of tbe consequences incurred wben there is a departure from tbis prlnciple and thls practice. 115. Consequently, I sbould like to bope tbat there wiI6 be 820 repetltlon of the incidents wbicb we bave just tihessecl and wb.loh migbt, if repeated, tmdermbae tbe autbority of tbe Security Council. 116. Mr. Presldent. I shauld like my brief statement to be lnterpreted because. sime net a11 of yonr statements bave been interpreted. y into French, it may vrell be tbat I did not *orne of tbe points you made.

I entirely agree v.dth the xdewe of the representatioe of F na vdsh to state formaUy Ut at ILO time did 1 e autbority to anyme invlted to st at tMs COU~~ be resolved. 0 interfere witk tke but cmny SO tkat I ity to taapk to some e parties concerneà me to km.~ a41 tke parties on every 12L I am ~espectful botk of tke subjeet wkick 1s befwe tbe Coumi8 ati of tke tradition of tlm Coumil. PW my part, bearing tkat In minrd, I am bea ~~~n~ wkiek tke repmaeutative Of s t\ say ad. K migkt add, aaytkkq whick reaentative of hdia kas to say. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet SO&&& Republics) @ranslated from Wussian): Mr. Pmsident. selves witk tke congratulaof Ike Council. abilities of tke %d tke poeitbon of tke ckief r 123. Polemics on procedural matters bave gone ‘co excessive lengths at this meeting. This is liable to create an unfavourable atmosphere for the discussion of the substance of the items on today’s agenda. We are clearly moving towards a situation in which the substance Will be replacedby a polemfcal discussion on procedure and formalities. An unusual and, indeed. strange situation is being created in the Counoil. in whlch we are returning over and over again to discussion of the agenda which we adopted at the very beglnning of today’s meeting. 124. It is ou conviction that our most important task at present is to secure strict observance of the cesse-fire agreement in the area of theIndo-Pakistan oonflict. Unfortunately, we know that violations of the cesse-fire agreement are oontinuing, ami tbis might have very dangerous consequences for peace in the area. Obviously our main attention should be concentrated on matters connected with the direct settlement of the armed conflict and, first of all, on scrupulous observance of the cesse-fire agreement, wbich would create more favourable conditians for seeking a solution to other questions that both sides cari accept. 125. Tbat is in fact the principle bebind Counoil resolution 211 (1965). which clearly provides inparagraph 4 that only after a cesse-fire and the subsequent withdrawal of ail armed Qersonnel Will consideratlon be glven to the question of what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlylng the present conflict. The conclusion is obvious. 126. At the present time. when these decisions oftbe Council calling for a complete cesse-fire and the withdrawal of armed personnel have still net beenfully implemented. it would hardly be in keeplng with tbe spirit and letter of resolution 211 (1966) for it to consider other aspects of the problem. Accordingly, it is our view that at tbis stage the Council’s discussion should be on questions directlyconnectedwlth the settlement of tbe armed conflict between India and Pakistan. That is how we understand the agenda adopted for this meeting of the Council. 127. Tbe Soviet delegation Will net insistonconsecutive interpretation of its statement into the other languages in view of the time factor and subjeot to the usual understanding in the Council on tbis question.

I should like to state that the agenda we adopted this afternoon was that in doaument S/Agenda/1247. 11 bas net been mcdified, it ha5 net been amended, and it stands. Reference was made to a ruling. butItbinkit was an observation, because P know, with all respect, Mr. President. tbat

It is not my intention to speak on tbe subject of the debate tbis afternoon M to oannss the reasons why we recessed and resumed. 1 was just golng to refer to one m&er of great lnterest to me. whicb was esplalned by the representative of France. That relates to thequestion of parties who are in a position to raise points of order. 130. IIe explained, undoubtedly in the light of bis very long experienoe in the Security Council. to which I always defer, that no one who is not a member of the Counoil has ever been in the past or should hei-eafter be permitted to raise points of order. Mr. President. you accepted that and you entirely agreed witb it. 1 do net wish to glve the impression that 1 challenge Wtt ruling. 1. of course. bow to that ruling and 1 accept it-in any event untiI We end of October. because 1 want to put forward the view that the auestion is net concluded in the wav in which the representative of France put it before the Council. I want hlm to acquit me of succumbing merely to the temptation of putting anotber point of view just beoause it is a point of vlew opposed to hls own. 13I. Rule 30 of the provision81 rules of procedure states: “If a representative raises a point of order. the President shalI lmmediately state hls nding.’ The question then arises: who is a representative for the purpose of raising points of order? Rule 14 states: “Any Fdember of the United Nations not a member of the Security Council and any State not a Member of the United Nations. if invited to participate in a meeting or meetings of the Seourity Council. shalI submit credentials for the representative appointed by it for this purpose. The credentials of such a representative shall be communicated to the Secretary-General net less than twenty-four hoursbefore the first meeting which he is invited to attend.” Therefore, once he is invited he puts on the garb of a representative. The Charter, in Articles 31 and 32. repeated in rule 37 of the provisional rules of prooedure. clearly puts limitation on the right of a representative SO invited. Rule 37 states: “Any Member of the United Natlons which is net a member of the Security Council may be invited. as the result of a declsion of the Securlty Council, to participate. without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Courmil...” 132. Pausing there, if the persans who are invlted to participate should be forever regarded as standing outside the door of the Security Council, it would hci unnecessary to say that they shall participate without vote; and therefore their participation in the discussion is permitted. The only thing that is denied 133. Tberefore, we arrive at this result. A State invited to participate bas to provide a representative. and the moment he becomes a representative heparticipates in the discussion before the Conncil. One oau easily imagine dozens of possibillties in which the ability to participate in a discussion may be gravely bampered, if net prevented, if points of order may net be raised at appropriate times. 134. 1 submit that there is another point of view: that any aerson-other than a nerson called under rule 39; vÎho only glves information-who is invited to participate and make bis submissions is entitled to participate in the discussion. There are two things and two thinge only that he Cannet do: first. he cannot vote. and secondly. though he may submit a draft resolution he cannot bave it voted upon uuless a member of the Council SO requests. 135. That is what I wanted to say. Undoubtedly, it might be that in the past the positionwas not clarified in this mariner. 1 had ta pay some attention to it during the time when 1 was President of the Council. Al1 1 want to say at the moment is that there is another point of view.

My delegation would like briefly to explain the position it has taken in this procedural debate. 137. 1 should just like to reiterate that the position my delegation has taken does net in anyway prejudice the nositiou it took earlier on the substance of the problem. However, my delegation notes that a sovereign Member State requested the convening of the Security Council, by means of a letter which is a Security Cou&l document [S/SSZl] and is on the agenda for this meeting and that this State’s delegation was speaking and was explaining the reasons wby it had requested the convening of the Council. The delegation of the Ivory Coast considers that this delegation bas the right to speak. within the context of the letter in question, and that the Security Council also bas the right, when it considers the substance of the question, to decide what is necessary and urgent and what is net. However, what does net seem usual in thls Council is that a representative who is called upon to speak-and you certalnIy caIled upon him, Mr. Presideut-and who bas begun to speak, should be interrupted and that a request for the suspension of the meeting should be decided while the speaker is still onIy haIf way through bis state- SEYDQUX (Fram?) (tranSlatiOn from 1 sbtid like to say to the representatlve of that thbkgs aie SUC~ that the members of the councn. or some of them. like to meet each otber at the same crossroads and. in tbis particular the same rdes. for 1 tbink 1 am rigbt In t during tbe debate on the situation in the Dominicsn Repuhlic 1 bad a very friendly discussion with bim. like the one we are having taday, cm tbe interpretation of rule 14 as well as on several other des of procemUe. 138. I bave listened to bis argument wlth great interest an& once again, his legal dialectic is extremely brtlliant. But I must tel1 bim that it bas net canvirneed me aad that, rather tban returning to each of the points be bas raised. 1 can do no better than to mention two comments we bave jusr heard; they sbould. 1 tbiak. put an end to this aspect of the debate. 140. You yourself, Mr. President. wlth a11 the authority of your blgb office. were good enougb to endorse tbe interpretation tbat 1 advanoed when we resumed tbis meeting. Moreover. the representatlve of the Soviet Union bas, for his part. spoken of the dispropcrtlonate nahwe of tbe incidents that took place. In my opinion. that is precisely what makes them depIorable st a time when such an important discussion is taking place. Therefore we should a11 agree-and this, in any case. ïs tbewlshof the Frenoh delegation-to consider them closed.

1 cal1 on the representative of Pakistan.

IVe bave heard the prccedural debate with great interest and we are happy tbat it has been satisfactorily resolved in the higb interests of the Security Council itself. 143. Many impartial observers bave attested to the fact tbat almost simultaaeously with the cease-fire, India let loose a reign of terrer in the occupied portion of Jammu and Kashmir. ln a letter addressed to the Piesident of the Security Coutil on18 October 1965 [S/6801], the Permanent Reprecentative of Pakistan to the United Nations drew attentionto the situation wbich prevails in that unfortunate land. He quoted from dispatches sent by the correspondents of anumber of reputable and well-known newspapers to show the brutality with which the Indian occupation authorities bave set upon the people of Jammuand Kashmir. 144. AS the Council cari visualize, there are striagent restrictions on Press dispatches frcm Srinagar; yet stories are beginning to trickle out wbich glve US some ides of the extreme measures employed by India-tbe representatives of which are absent this eveniag because they do net want to hear the truth- “An angry young man grabbed my arm and told me the story of his village, Mandi, somewhere in the vicinity of Punch. ‘Indians bave tut off the breasts of oui girls and held themup, saying, “Here is your Pakistan”. Seven merabers of my family bave been tsken by the soldiers and butchered’, he went on with tears in his eyes. Another man interrupted: ‘They locked people in their houses and set fire to them. The whole village has been burnt.’ “This mornlng 1 visited another refugee camp further up in the north. Here again 1 had the same accounts from fleeing villagers. One of them, a bearded man, told me how his village had risen against the Indians five or six months ago. ‘Twenty me* Of our village were participating in action against the Indien Army. What kind of action? Sniping at passing soldiers, blowlng up bridges. Eighteen days aga the Indtans launched an attack against our village, and after a fight they entered it and burned a11 the houses, killing everyone in sight.’ He said he had escaped with his two sons, his daughter and hls wife. Ne did not know where the others were and how many survived.” 145. And that is why the Indian representative is net here this evening to hear this tragtc story. 146. The correspondent of Le Figaro, who lias no direct interest in the subcontinent, continues: “A little girl, aged about twelve, was standing beside a ta11 man wearins a blue shirt. Sbe was firmly gripping the inan*s hand. ‘We found her wandering alone in the jungle’, he told me. ‘She was keeping the cattle when the Indians carne up and burned her village. So she fled alone, without knowin& what happened to her brothers and sisters and fandly.* II 147. And that is why the Indian representative is net here tonight to hear these stories, these tales of woe, to hear what they are perpetrating against the people of Jammu and Kashmir. 148. The same correspondent says that the refugees from Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir keep asking questions, and he quotes tbem: ‘VWhy are we treated like that? Wbat bave we done? Wbo has given you the rigbt to bebave with us in such manner? Wby do you help India? Al1 we want is to be free from India and to go back to our homes snd to our honour.’ R 149. This is wbat was told to the correspondent of Le Figaro, and tbis is wby tbe Indian representative is not here tonight to hear tbe truth. 150. The magazine Newsweek, of New York, in its issue of 11 October 1965. reports a tour of camps of refugees from Indian-Leld Jammu and Kashmir 151. Ami tbat is wby tbe wbole Indlan delegation is net here tonight-because impartial observers are talking of tbe rape, tbe buroing of villages. the genocide sud tbe horrors tbat ar@ being perpetrated. t is why tb@y bave left your cbamber tonlght in an unprecedented fashlon. 152. The Newsweek article continues: “A ten-year-old girl tolù me she saw her parents sht. One woman, sobbing and hysterical, said her small clùkiren were tut into pieces and her husband taken away wben Indian troops attackedhervlllage.~ 153. That is why India is absent tonlght: becnusethey do mt v;ant to hear the truth. they do not want to hear of tbe ghettos and of the horrors that bave been taking place in Jammu and Kashmir. 154. Tbe D@lhi correspondent of the Daily Telearaph, in a dispatch about Indian-cccupied Kashmlr, said this on 12 October 1965. “Resentment and hatred are growing against the Indian army in Kashmir as it is burning the houses of those persans who are charged with helplng and hidlng guerrlllas.n 155. Tbat is why the Indian delegation is absent tonigbt. 156. The facts are SO overwhelming in their detail that it is impossible for me to do them justice in this presentation. What has been reported in the Pnsss is inevitably ooly a fragment of the reality which, were it vlsualised here, would SO stir the Councll’s consbience as ta bring immedlate condemnation on India. And India, fearing that all the truth would b@ tolù, hrooght ahout an unusual and extraordinary procedural debate in whlch it had no right to be a party. For the first time in the hlstory of the Security Council, it brought about a procedural debate to thwart the dlsclosure of the truth, to supprers the facts, to make reality out of the falsehood of its policies. That is why they are net here tonight-net because of procedural tecbnicalities or legal niceties, but because under the bright ligbts of the Security Cou&l they cannot stand the truth, tbey do net want to know what they are doing to the peopl@ of Jammu and Kashmlr. They are not prepared tohearoftheir atmcities; that is why their seats are vacant. They do not bave the courage to hear of the atmcities andthe barbarism they are perpetrating against the people of Jammu and Kashmir. It is not because of the pmcedure, it is rat because of legal nlceties; it is because in their conscience and in their hearts they know that they are following a barbarie, a Nazi-l& policy against 157. The harrowing tales which arerelatedofIndians murdering a11 the young men and abducting tbewomen are corroborated by tbe fact tbat tbe refugees pouring into Azad Kashmir are by and large old men, and women and children below tbe age of ten. Young men and women are conspicuous by their absence in tbe Azad Kashmir refugee camps. The people of Rajaori District, who bad declared for freedom after the cal1 to arms by the Revolutionary Cou&l, are being subjected to unheard-of atrocities. Tbe border6 of this district and Mendbar area bave been almost sealed by the Indians and the entire population is facing the prospect of annihilation at tbe hands of Indian soldiers. 158. It must be recalled here tbat, in tbe month of August. Indian troops burnt down the town of Mandi and hvelve adjolnlng villages. Tbree families of IvIuslims in village Bedar Balnoi were burnt alive in their houses and many Muslims were shot down by Indian soldiers in cold blood in the presence of their families. Several girls were also abducted in the same village. Simllar barbarities were committed in otber villages in Muzaffarabad, Rawalkot and Mirpur sectors. And because the Indians bave no answer, that is why tbey are not here tonight. 159. Tbe entire Batamalun suburb of Srinagrr inhabited by Muslims was set on fire and razed to the ground. Many Muslims were burnt alive in this suburb by the Indian Army. This burning was reported by the correspondent of the Washington Star in the paper’s issue of 1 September 1965: “During tbe past three weeks bundreds of Kashmiri houses bave been burned to the ground-about 440 in Srinagar alone and scores of others in from fifty to seventy villages soattered tbrougbout tbe valley . . . “Indian officia16 claim Pakistani infiltrators started fires. But both extremist and moderate Kashmiris and tbe victims themselves, interview& while digglng in the smoulderlng wreckage, claim the Indian army was responsible.” 160. Tbe Indian army was responsible for tbe destruction and devastation and for setting Kasbmlri towns and villages ablase, for abducting women and cbildren and for tearing tlae breasts off women. 1 do net say that as tbs Foreign Minlster of Paklstam that 2 what tbe Washington Star says, a United States newspaper, the newspaper of a country which is friendly to botb India and Pakistan and wbicb would like ta see a settlement. 161. Wbat is tbe dlfferernce between tbe extermination of the Jews in Europe by Hitlerand tbe extermination of IMuslims by Indian bayonets in Asia? Hs there 162. Tbis explains why there bas becs an excdus of about 75.066 Kaabmiris SO far from Indlan-xcupied Kashmir. Tit@re are extremist fanatical organisations in Mia, called tbe RSS and Jan Sangh. and the ruffians and booligans in tbeir service bave b@@n armed by Iudian authorities to carry out the heinous design of exterminatingthosewhoresisttheIndianoccupation. If tbls is a falsehood. the Indian Foreisn Minister sbould be here to deny that charge. Ï say witb ail solemnity and with all the sovereignty of 100 million p@ople of Pakistan that that is net a false charge. There is not a iota of exaggeration in this charge. If this is incorrect, the IndianFor@ign Minister sbouldbe sitting lmre to deny tbis charge on behalf of his people. But the hdim representatives bave fled. Why bave they fled? 1s tbe Indian delegation not capable of answering tbese charges? The Indians are very gcod at forensics. They are phllosophers. We hnw that they are very capable of using pretty wcrds. Why are they net here? They are not here because they cannot answer the charges of the Government of Pakistan or of tbe peuple of Pakistan, they cannot satisfy the conscience of manhind abcut these atrocities andbarbarous acts, abat the tragedy and the upheaval that tbey bave brought atout on the subcontinent of Asia, about the trouble that they bave created in Asia. They are not here because they bave no conscience, they bave na integrity, they bave no words. They are estcpped frcm answering for what they bave done to the p@ople of Jammu sud Kashmir. 163. As I bave said, more thsn twenty years bave passed stnce the Nazis executed their programme of exterminating the Jews in Germany. We still read the stories of those hcrrors and the world tries to salve its conscience by description and dramatisation of thcse bestial acts. Today, despite tb@ existence of the United Nations, despite the solemn commitment of the Charter, despite the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, despite ail the talh, withits intervals of ten minutes, abcut the sacredness of human life, India is perpetrating similar acts in Jammu and Kashmlr. Will the world remain unmcved? Will it refuse to stir because the people invclved are SO distant from the air-conditioned Headquarters of the United Nations? Are we a11 tc be SO shachled by cur inhibitions, SO bogged down in expediencies and SO crippled by oui calculations of power intereuts tbat the blood that is being shed in Jammu and Kash- 164. Pakistan Will not stand by and allow India to carry on these monstrous acts in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. where 5 million neonle live. If the United Nations remains umnoved’and unconcerned, Pakistan will take up the challenge and will be prepared for the ultimate consequence of life or destruction, of honour or extermination. 165. This attempt by India to take advantage of tbe cesse-fire in order to exterminate the population of certain areas in Jammu and Kashmir is one part of the human reality which is unfolding before us, The other is the resistance movement in the Indian-held area and the barbarous response to it from the Indtan Government. Let me now give the Security Council an idea of the situation in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kasbmir, particularly in the valley of Kasbmir, which has deteriorated rapidly since the cesse-fire. This is why the Indian Foreign Minister has absented himself from the deliberations of the Council meeting, although he has corne a11 the way from Delhi. The Indan representatives do net want to hear the truth. The G”ardian of London stated on 22 October: “Day by day corne reports from Srinagar-many of them attestedby Indian sources-of student demonstrations, riots, police firing, use of tear gas, throwing of grenades, closing of schools and colleges.” Mr. President, you are an academicianconnectedwith a University, and here we see that schools and colleges are being closed in order to perpetuate Indian terrer. The article continues: “The Indian Government, having earlier tbis month arrested more fiery opposition leaders in Kashmir, yesterday turned its attention to Maulana Masoodi and Mr. Karra who want Kashmiris to use nonviolent means of persuading the Indian Government to consult them about who they want to be ruled by. Now a11 leaders, disunited about methods as they bave been, are united in being prisone-s.” 166. The correspondent stated on 22 October: The Times of London “Leaders of a11 political groups opposed to present Indian policies in Kashmir are behind bars: Sheikh 167. Tke dispatcb in The New York Times on the same date commnent& tkat the arrests had vïrtuallv wiped out the leaclersbip of the Kasbmiri people. it autboritative sourcss as saying that “tk? men had infiltrainterview AGnister, .?%hmodi 168. If me eemin@s the reports of fndian statemeats regard& tb? so-calied infiltrators which bave ared in tbe world Press. a patternemergeswhich is reveafing of the truth about tbe resistance movement in Jammu and Kashmir. Since this movement sses tk entire population of Jammu and and invohes bath the Azad and the lndianaceupied territories, it is natural that the hniian Gowram@Bt shulcl get involved in perpetual contradictions when it seeks to establish that all the trouble is the wcmk of agents from Pakistan. At fîrst they said that the guerrillas had no local support. Tlxm they conceded indirectly that they had some Iocal support. because otherwise the battles fought by guerrillas near Srinagar and the alleged existence of ammunition dumps in masques could net bave been explsined. Tben they bgan to assert that some of the leaders of tbe resistance movement were collaborating with tbe guerrillas but a few were not..Then they said that those otber leaders-me few of them-also were in collaborattoa with the guerrillas. 169. NO~, judging from a report in The New York Ta of 23 Cktober, they say that theîe leaders of the people of Keshmir are Pakistani agents themselves. The nez& logical step would be to condemn tire entire Muslim population of Jammu and Kashmir as cocsisting of Pakistani agents, wkich would menn condemning SO per cent of 5 million people. Al1 this would haw been ludicrous if its effects were not SO deadly. The Indian allegations about infiltration are New seen to htnet merely a canard, but the means by wbich India supplies itself with a pretext to crush aB vocal opposition to its hated occupation. Let me quote a report filed from Delhi in the Baltimore Sun Of 11 October. 1 am quoting American newspapers friendly to bath India and Pakistan. The report says: “The repo?ts of demonstrations and arrests were the first officiai confirmation of substantial unrest 1’70. If an impartial outsider reads reports of happenings in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kasbmir which are publisbed in the world Press, the question will naturally arise in his mind: how deep, howwidespread, is tbe opposition of the people to Indian occupation? Ne Will, of course, remember that the Press reports cannot possibly convey the full dimeusions of the revolt because of manifold restrictions, because of censorsbip, barriers of language, and tbe difficulty of fore& reporters obtaining access to humbler fols. AU the same, he will corne across numerous indications which cari be pieced together and from which a coherent picture will emerge. Let me now mention some of these. 171. On 13 October, The New York Times reported that tbxee boys, sixteen years old. were killed by the Indian police in Srinagar. That is why the Indian Foreign Minister is net hure. Heknows tbe repression that his armies and his police are committing against the people of Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian delegation is absent because they cannot face tbe reality of tha trutb of the slaughter of men, women sud children, of rape, of people beiog destroyed, of people’s seuls beine subiected to terrer. That is whv thev bave abseited themselves for the first time -in tbe twenty years of the history of the United Nations. i 172. Because tbere is a parallel between wbat they do in Jammu and Kashmir and what the Portuguese are doing in Angola and Mozambique, or what Mr. Iar Smith does in Smthern Rhodesia. The Soutbern Rhodesians. and the lndians, and the Portuguese, thsy want to destroy the spirit of Asia and Africa. The spirit of Asia and Africa cannot be destroyed. Asb and Africa are vibrant; they are youtbful; they aff full of life. VIe must achieve our objectives. The agc of domination bas corne to an endthrougboutthe worlE and that is wby they cannot face tbe fact tbat tbey are dominating 5 million people. r 173. As 1 bave said, sixteen-year old boys and girlc: wepe killsd by Indian soldiars and Indian bayoneta. Cowaenting on the slaughter of tbs innocents, the Home Minister of tbe Padian-s~~nsoredGovernm%nt ir Srinagar is reported to bave safd tbat the firing COUIC net bave bean avoided because %r a small om of police to move around in tbe narrow lanes tkle old City present atmospbere is juet to invite trouble”. does atement me5o exce@ that the tien of P is totally hostile tc India% army and lx~lice and will net besitate to battlc with Lt wtaerever it cm? 175. It quotes the girl as saying *We must show how we feel. We Rluslims here are tired of Indian rule. We want to be witb Pakistan.” of course they want to be witb Pakistan. They are part of us; they are our flesb and blood. 176. Is it conoeivable that a movement would absorb tbe passion and dedication of boys and girls of tbat age unless it was rooted in tbe heart and seul of an entire people? 177. News dispatcbes about tbe situation in lndianoccupied Jammu and Kashmir report tbat shops are closed in Srinagar andthere is no traffic in the streets. The New Ymk Times of 13 G&ober reported tbat only armed policemen and army patrols are seen moving in the streets of Srinagar. 178. The Financial Times of London of 8 G&ober said: “Only tbe very prejudiced cari deny tbat mass opinion in Kasbmlr is now overwhelmingly anti- Indian.” 179. The Foreign Edlmr of the Frankfurter Allgemeine, an eye-witness in Srinagar, reprted on 10 October: “At least 30,008 policemen and soldiers bave turned Srinagar into a huge army camp.” On 19 Ootober he further reported how street battles developed behveen the people and Indian police when uaarmed demonstrators demanded a plebiscite and an end to Indian brutalities. When he drove through Srinagar be saw cmwds of protestors everywhere asklng for a plebiscite and shouting curses at “Indian barbarians and Indian dogs”. 180. These developments inhidian-oooupiedKashmir reached a climax on 23 October when the Indian puppet régime in Kashmir decided to assume control of hfuslim trusts, masques and shrines, ami to post police guards at tbese places. The same day there were reports of widespread demonstrations in Baramula and Sfiopian against the desecration of a revered shrine in Chrar Sbareef. It cari be imagined bow deep must be the hostlllty of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to tbe régime of the occupying Power when tbe latter finds it necessary to deny them free access to their places of worship where it is natural for them to congregate and worship and pray to Allsh. The extreme nature of this act oan be understwd by anyone in East or West who remembers 181. The situation in Shrinagar and the Valley is brought Out in the dispatch published in The New York B of today. It confirms wbat 1 bave said above and bears out the fact that the news stories are tightly censored. The newspaper’s correspondent, reporting from Srinagar yesterday, had tbis to say: “The Indian Government is seeking to destroy the Kashmir self-determlnation movement witbvlrtually a11 the means at its disposal. “In the last few weeks, the Government’s policy bas shifted from a selective pruning of the movement% most radical elements to ail-out suppression [of the people of Jammu and Kasbmir]. “The largo Indian police and armed forces in tbe state bave been used liberally to break the back of the movement’s organization and to dissuade its momhers and sympathizers from further activity.” “TO break the back of the movement” of tbe people of Jammu and Kashmir. And that is why the Indian Fore@ Minister has absented himoelf in an unprecedented way frein the deliberations of this meeting. 182. The correspondent goes on to say that the goals in Jammu and Kashmir ‘are crammed with those who demand a plobiscite to determine Kashmir’s future”. The goals of Jammu and Kasbmlr are crammed with people who demanded self-determlnation. That is why tbe Indian delegation is absent here because it does net want to hear the truth. The correspondent continues: %ast Friday, policemen and soldiers blocked all roads to the Hazratbal sbrine, turning away thousands of Moslems who tried to go there for their weokly worship. “Srinagar Moslems said it was the first Friday in 350 years.. .” Imagine, the first time in 350 years that a people should be told that they cannot go and worship. They cannot go and pay homage to tbeir God. There must be something very extraordinary tbat the people should be deoied this for tbe first time. Can you imagine Catholics being told for tbe first time in centuries tbat tbey should net go to St. Peters and worship tbeir God? Can you imagine the Jews being told that they cannot go to a synagogue to worship their God? But the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir, for tbe first time in 350 years, were stopped from going to tbeir most holy shrlne because tbe sitart:on was such tbat India could net tolerate tbe 5 million people of that country going to worsbip their ovm God. *Action bas also been taken to prevent Moslem merchants in Sricagar fmm showing support forthe se&determination mmement.* 183. This is the report publisbed in The New York Ta The report confirms the tigbt news censorohip rmposed by the Indian autborities. It says: mTbe Govermnent has olso taken steps to prevent news of the unrest and its counter-measures fmm 7x% the outside world”-that is. from reaching ycu, Mr. President, and fmm reaching members of tbe Security Council. Qaveral correspcndents whc tried to transmit articles on the situation from here last week had the articles retÿtrned by the table office marked ‘Objectionable’. ‘One high-ranking officiai in the state government said. ‘We are net going tc let any news out of here which is not favourable to oui position’.” 184. This is the secularism of India which boasts to the Westernccuntriestbat Indiaistheonly demccracy in Asia. Theonly seculardemocracy whichbutchers its own minorities, which suppresses its own pecple, which destmys the seul of its own scciety, which has untcuchables and which defies the Security Council. This is the secular democracy of lndia which is supposed tc receive support frcm cther democracies in the West. And tbis secular democracy of untouchables, where we. as non-Hfndus. are regarded as subhuman. says today tbat we Will net allow any news to go cut of here which is unfavourable. This is the democracy of India which does not allcw any unfavcurable news concerning India tc get out of Jammu and Kasbmir. And they corne here and sit and talk with great fcrensics and with a great deal of elcquence of their democracy. They pontificate and lecture to us as to what is the meaning of democracy. We know the meaning of democracy; you knowthemeaningof demccracy; we all kmw. But they corne here and tel1 us what is secular lndian demccracy, which bas a caste system, which has people who are suppressed because they are born dffferent, which has people who are killed and destroyed because they are different from them. Then they corne and tel1 you that they are a democracy and that they mUSt be supported. Yet that same democracy refuses to let news cut-leave alcne destruction, chaos, burning of villages, raping of women and chfldren. These people do net want news tc trickle 185. Tbe report in The New York Times is confirmed by a dispatch appearing in The Observer of London of 24 October. It says: “Kiasratbal shrine in Srinagar, from wbere in December 1963 an uprising in Kashmir sparked off, migbt once again see tbe same. For at &.sratbaI on Monday, occurred a clash between police and a mob of Kasbmiri students which Government spokesmen say might bave terrible consequences.” These are Government spokesmen saying that it will bave terrible consequences. 186. The report continues: Wazratbal has become a symbol fer the rigbt of self-determination oampaign and a last desperatr throw by Kashmiris. It is clear tbat tbe plebiscite campaign in Srinagar hasbeentakenovercompletely by students and bas become a kind of children’s revoit terrifying in its innocent determination.” 187. Wben there is an almost general strike in a eity, wben ail popular leaders of a people are tbrown behind bars, when the police dare not move about in small numbers, wben the Government is driven to obstruct the people’s prayer congregations, when schools and colleges are closed, wben the young are in tbe forefront of the opposition rnovement, it Will be but a beartless sou1 who does net conclude that this is an extreme situation wbich cannot possfbly be allowed to continue. The people of Jammu and Kashmir, themselves, are unarmed, they sre figbting their oppressors with only the weapons whichtbeweak bave always used against the strong. 188. The editor of tbeFrankfurter Allgemeineandtbe correspondent of The New York Times whom I bave quoted bave bcth said that people in Srinagar came to them and pleaded, aPlease tel1 our st&y to tbe world. Please tel1 them what you bave seen here. You are now oui only b0pe.a That rneans, Mr. President, please tel1 tbe story toyouandto the rnernbers of your Council because you are now tbeir only bope. 169. As 1 read tbese words, 1 am driven to ask the estion: are we bere so hardened in oui hearts. so deadened in our conscience, 60 morally bankrupt, that we will be deaf to this piteous pleading of a peopfe groaning under tbe oppressor’s heel? 190. Tbe truth of the reports 1 bave quoted cari be verified by a visit to any part of Indian-occupied Jammu anà Kashmir by any impartial observer from any country in the world. 192. 1 repeat with all tbe solemnity at my ccmmand that the 100 million pecple of Pakistan wlll net and sball net allcw Indian tyrancy and oppression tc be perpetrated against tbe pecple of Kashmir. We shall face extinction ratber thon allcw tbese Indian warlords to papetr.& hormrs on the pecple of Jammu and Kashmir. It is a part of cur duty andfaith, cm religion. artd tradition; it is a part cf cur culture tbat we shaU homur our commitments tc the pecple of Jammu and Kashmir. This ycu must know. And tben do net say that we spread trcuble or that we are the cause of your anguish and anger. We bave gcne tbmugh tcrment. Young wcmen and cbildren killed, Pacerated. 1[ speak tbis evening with a bleedicg heart. I corne fromthe battlefields of Pakistan, wbere we bave fcught a mmstmus and a habitua1 aggresscr, and 1 tell ycu tbat we are prepared for the ultimate consequences, but we sball never surrender cur hcncur and self-respect. The Security Ccuncll must lmcw this, tbe Members of the United Nations must kacw tbls-chat Pakistan will face decimation but we sball hcnour cur pledge. 193. 1 wculd like fcrmally tc reiterate the request of my Gcvernment tbat a fact-findii committee, or tbe Secretary-General, shculdwithoutfurtberdelay visit tbe embattked State of Jammu and Kashmir in order tc see wbat is happening there, report tbe faCtS to tbe Council, and suggest prompt and effective measures tc end tbis intolerable situation in Jammu and Kasbmir. 194. The situation in Jammu and Kasbmir tcday, with itS passion and pcignancy, its suffering and tragedy, should serve tc restore scme perspective to tbe Ccuncil’s consideraticn of the JammuandKashmir dispute. It is all very well for pecple tc listen tc arguments cc tbe two sides and say, =Oh, well, it is a very complex question”. It is ail very well fer wcrld Powers tc gc tbrough careful calculaticns Of tbeir interests and opine, “Oh, it is a very delicate 195. 1s the Council aware that Jammu and Kaehmir is larger in sise and population tban several Members of the United Nations? Its 5 million people bave never bsen a part of India. What they seem to resent simply”, B reporter wrote in The Irish Times of 11 Ostober, vis their belonging to India befng taken for granted by New DelhLn For Indla to say tbat there is an issue of national integrity involved here is preposterous because the national integrity of India comprises the territory whlch was included inthe DO: minion of India at the time of its establisbment as an independent 5tate on 15 August 1947 and those territories which acceded to it without dispute. By no stretch of imagination cari Jammu and Kashmir be includsd in either of these categories. 196. How, when and where did Jammu and Kasbmir become an integral part of India? Not wben India came to the Security Council saying tbat-and 1 quote from India’s letter tothe Presidentoftbe Security Council of 1 January 1946: “It was imperative on account of tbe emergency that the responsibllity for the defence of tbe Jammu and Kashmir State should be taken over by a government capable of dlscharglng it.But, inorderto avoid any possible suggestion that India had utilised tbe F%ate% immediate peril for lier own political advantage, the Government of India made it clear that once tbe soi1 of the State had been cleared of tbe invader and normal conditions restored, ita people would be free ta decide their future bythe recogniaed democratic method of a plebiscite or referendum which, in order to cnsure complets impartiallty, migbt be held under international auspices.“2/ These are the words and the commitment of the Government of India. 19’7. Jammu and Kashmir did not become part of India when India accepted ths resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 5 January 1949, which states: nTbe question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan Will be 189. Jammu and Kasbmir became a part of India only by the fiat and by the arrogance and by We cbauvloism of tbe Government of India. 1s tbls a position wbich the Council Will accept? Pakistan Will certainly net accept it, even if the Cou&l were to accept it. 200. Colonialism, in its classical form, is on tbe wane. Gnly a smaII nunaber of Powers continue to hold on to tbeir passessions, justifying their action by the fiction tbat tbe territories in question form part of tbe metropolitao nation. This is tbe position wbicb India bas taken in the case of Jammu and KC4XUiF. 201. It is interestiog to sec how one colonial Power, SP@ of its colonies in Africa, lnterpreted the Govermnent of India’s position vis-à-vis Kasbmir. Speaking in tbe General Assembly on llOctober1965, the Foreign Minister of Portugal said: VIe bave here hvopointsoftbeutmost importance: first, foreign countries or outside organizations cannot request tbat a plebiscite be heldina territory which is part of anotber nation; ancl second, integration of a territory by a constitutional provision or clause is considered to be legitimate aod final, and sbould be so accepted bv all.. . .*Y 202. The Fortuguese Fore@ Minister, who was defending his Goveroment’s policy in Angola and Mozambique, went on to say: %et us see whether the Indian Government frum now on will dare to a6k for tbe implementation of other and different criteria whenotberGovernments are involved.*a 203. India, wbich herself bas only just emergedfrom ten centuries of fore@ domination-for 800 years thel were uuder Muslims and for 200 years under tbe Britieb-bas joined the dwindling racks of colonial Powers and deals witb ocoupied Jammu and Kasbmir 88 if it were a colonial possession. The atrocities that are being perpetrated on the defenceless people 204. The General Assembly adopted, only the other day, a resolution on the situation inSouthernRhodesia [General Assembly resolution 2012 (Xx)]. Tbe Council Will shortly meet in order to consider tbe South African question. It should corne as no surprise to the world tbat, as the Government of South Africa bas done in the case of apartheid, the Government of Iqdia now pleads that discussion of Kashmir in ths Se cil compromises a by raising matte stio jurisdiction. Mr. Ianguage of Mr. Ian Smith when he asserto tbat any concern of the United Nations in the fate of the people and Kashmir constitutes . ternal affaira and infris sovereignty. 205. The minority clique which today ntles Southern Rhodesia, against the Will of its people, on the basis of a constitution speoially made to perpetuate alien rule, would lihe nothing better than to be Ieft alotie in the possession of the land which tbey bave stolen from the real people of the country. Tbe Government of India constantlv comnlains that there is little sympathy and understandkg in the world for its case on Jammu and Kasbmir. The Indian leaders should ponder this fact and try to understand the reason why they cm seek s bt for their policy on J and Kashmir onIy from tbe Ian Smiths of the world. 206. The Security Council gave a pledge tothepeople of Jammu and Kashmir that they would net be plaoed under a sooereignty which was sought to he imposed on them by an imperial army of occupation. On 20 Sentember 1565 the Council committed its urestiee and power to going to the heart of the probIem &d to securing a just and bonourable settlement of the dispute. The question is: should the Council allow either party to veto its efforts? If 60, then oqe must be candid and say that the United Natio Organisation which we look upon as the tus humanity’s conscience, is now destitute of and drained of a11 its powers and its moral r The long history of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute is sufficient proof of how India’s wikïuhiess bas been encouraged by the see~ng~elplessuessof~e~curi~ Council. 207. Shonld this process bave no end? Is the Council pOWW h ta tel1 Pakistan, *The blood you bave shek. in vaina, and 80 powerfess as to tel1 ase. why do you stop us from If yau bave the paver to stop lement, wlthallthe experience of the dispute, tben you should bave the ta Nfil your promise and your a settlement betweenthepeople of Pakistan by settlll the dis- Kasbmir. Why thesa double ne standard applicable to Pakistan and mwement. Is ta ga by the criterion of justice, of one does oat go by the sise of Pakistan or tbe sise of India or by what your vital interests ln India are or wbat your vital interests in Pakistan are. Your vital interests are best served by bringlng about a just and lmnourable settlement. Therefore the Se&rity Councll is committed by its resolution 211 (1265) to bring about an honourable and equitable settlement of tbe Jammu and Kasbmir dispute. This it is committed to brlng about in tbe interests of the Security Council, of the United Nations, of the great Powers, of world peace and of peace in Asia. Do not tel1 us, “Pakistan, stop, because we bave the power to force you to stop’, and tel1 India, “Do not stop, because we do net bave the poser 00 stop you.” Do not tel1 Pakistan, “Accept the solutionvand tell India, Vo net accept tbe solution.” Both countries must be treated in the same way. The two countries bave fought agamst eacb otber. We bave established car equality for all tlme with India, because Indla, a babitual predatory aggressor, commlttedaggression against PahMan, and WI epelled that aggression. We establisbed Pakistan because we were on a basis of equality. There is cosplete equality between the people of Mia and tbe people of PahlstLi. On the basis of equality, determine the issue on tbe morality of the situation and on the basis of international law and international agreements. 209. It is impossible to tbinh of tbis dispute without recalling tbe many instances in history of the small or the weah being pitted against the strong. The betrayal of Etbiopia when it was pitted against Italy brougbt deeth and dlsbonour to the League of Nations. I+N CSu the consequences for the United Nations of the betrayal of Jarnmu and Kasbmlr be much different? The betrayal of Csechoslovahia before Hitler% hordes involved the world in a disaatrous var. The calculations of power interests in the case of Jammu and Kasbmir may point differently today, but, whilst these are bound to be ephemeral, the moral laws are eternal and inexorable. 211. Accordlnp: to a New Delhi dlsoatcb of 3 October published in th< New York Herald- Tribune the next day, the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Shasfri. said that India wanted peace witb Pakistan but that this time it must be on India% terms. Peacewith Pakistan on India% terms! We are not interested in peace on any terms, If it were a question of obtaining any kind of peace, there would be no need for the Security Council, tbere would be no need for tbe United Nations. Why not have a Hitler% peaoe? Why net bave a Genghis Hhan’s peace? You cari bave peace on the terms of the vlctor, you cari have a dishonourable peace at any time. Wby should there bave been a San Francisco Conference, at whlch you, Mr. President, represented Uruguay and put your signature on the Charter? Pou came there with enthusiasm, with the belief tbat we were going into a brave new wcrld based on justice. Was that your concept when you went as representative of Uruguay to tbe San Francisco Conference-that there should be peace on any terms? Peace on any terms is always rasy to achieve. Peace on any terms is something that canbe achieved without war. It cari be achieved on the basis of dlshonour, on the basis of surrender. But the Wnited Nations came into being, with its Charter, to achieve net peace on any terms but a just and lasting peace. 212. Mr. Shastri said: “This time it must be settled on India% terms.” It Will never be settled on Inclia~s terms. That is out of the question. Whois Mr. Shastri to say that peace in the subcominent Will be settled on India’s terms? Have we lest ourselves? Are we completely destroyed? We Carnot allow peace to be settled on India’s trams. We wbo bave ruled India for 800 years, we who bave dominated India for 800 years and who are respcnsible for the civilization of India, for all the Delbis and the Taj Mabals and for all the grandeur and glory of India, are we today in the twentieth century to accept peace on India’s terms? One hundred million people to accept peace on India’s terms? It 1s out of the question. It is for you to know tbat we wiH never accept peace on India% tsrms. It is preposterous, it is scandalous, it is a dishonour to ns, to accept peace on Pndia’s terms wben we bave always established our squality and OUF spirit and bave stcod for an honourable and dignified world. The Muslims of Pakistan cannct accept tbat. It is out of the question. It ie preposterous that this time it must be settled on India% terms. It is out of tbe question. AIf the United Nations wixks for a settlement, net on OUT terms, bat in terras of t.he Charter, in terms Qf the international s ment acepted by hth sb.0 will net stint its co-operation K starmd by tbose words. Tbat is the issue, without verbiage or embmidery. Tbe Councll bore witnesses B ekni confrontation, not between two Fowers, not between tvm nations, but between two attitudes and policies whicb direct$ impinge upon tbe value and effectiveness of the United Nations. Anvone misrht rirefer to be neütral when it cornes to ; clasb behveen two national interests; but wko cari be neutral wben it cornes to a clash between the attitudeof complinnce witb the Charter and tbe attitude of defiance? No one em say, %et us help one party to defy the Charter B Kita ~3~3 tbe otheei psrty to obey it a lUtle.@ 21% It is impossible to comprehend how it oan be withh the kunds of humao reason to remain neutral between these two attitudes. Infact, neutrality between them is sctuaUy an endoranment of tbe negative and defiaat attitude, because it amounts toanacquiescence in it, ao encouragement of it. Need 1 say tbat such ncutraMy is .m abdication of the functions of the S@cczlty Council, tbat it undermines & theprinciples 0:: tbe Charter? 216. Tbe preseot situation brin@ out the stark reality of the issue. Immediately after tbe cesse-fire, wben tbe world was beginning to feel a renewal of hope in tbe effectiveness of tbe Uoited Nations, Indta lost no time in putting us all on notice tbat such hopes were lll founaed. The education Minister of Imita is reported to bave said in tbe Indlan Parliameot chat the Govermnent of India ïs prepared to bave discussions ~4th Fzkistan, but only onthe clear understanding tbat Jammu and Kashmtr is aclosedchapter. Kf Jammu and Kashmir is a closed chapler, then what is Pakistan supposed to discuss? Andwhat is the problem the Security Council is trying to resolve? 217. That is tbe essence of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. If one Iooks at it as a collision of national interests and claims, it would be quiteunderstandable tbat one might not like to take sides. But it is not merely a clash of interests. It is, 1 repeat, an opposition of two philosophies and two attitudes towards the first and forenost purpose of the ‘Jnited Nations, whlch, under Article 1. paragraph 1, of the Charter, is to bring abodt by peacefzl means, S!/&i&. 1339*me séance. par. 162. 218. In regard to India’s commitment to a plebiscite in Jammu and Kasbmir, 1 bave cited at earlier meetings of the Security Council scoresofpronouucements made by the late Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India. These are on the record of the Security Counoil, as well as cf the General Assembly. But the source of that commitment is net only the Government of India and its arcbitect and first Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru. It is also tbefatherof the Indian nation, the lata Mr. Gandhi, for whom I had great respect. We who stood for Pakistan nevertheless respected Mr. Gandhi, who was regarded as tbe great Mahatma, the man of peace. We still bave respect for Mr. Gandhi. Ile was assassinated by the bullet of a bigot-and that bigot was not a Muslim, but a Kindu. 219. 1 bave never quoted MT. Gandhi since I bave been Foreign hiinister of Pakistan. 1 bave quoted Mr. Nehru, wbo was the aoa of Mr. Gandhi, the father of India% democracy and secularism, but 1 bave refrained-in spite of the emotions of the Kashmir dispute-from quoting Mr. Gandhi. However, we bave reached the high tide; wehave reached a crucisl stage; and 1 am compelled to quoteevenMr. Gandhi on Kashmir. 229. And what did Mr. Gandhi-éhe father of Indian nationslism and of tbe renaissance in tire subcontinent, a m whom ail of us respect-bave to say? 1 sfiould like to quote from a biograpby of Mr. Gandhi ;vritten by his private seoretary, Mr. Pyarelal. Gandhi was on his way ‘a Kashmir and had detailed talks sepa,dtely with the l!Jabarajah sud his Prime Mirister on 1 August 1947 in Srioagar. On 3 August, a i.eputs+ion of .,&shmiris asked Gandhi at Jammu: “‘Irdia wffl be free on the 15th of August, wbat of Kasnmir’r’. . . ‘That will depend on the people of Kasmmr’, Gandhiji replied. They all wanted to know whether Kashmir would foin the [Indian] Union or Pakistan, ‘That again’, answeredGandhifi, ‘sbould be decided by the Will of tbe Kashmiris’.“Z/] Those were the words of Mahatma Gandhi. IIe said that it was for the people of Kasbmir to decirle. 221. hi all the eighteen years in which tbis dispUte bas been discussed here we bave never quoted Mr. Gandhi. We did net want to make him a controversial fi et in tMe issue. We Ve qmé what Prime Minister of India said about the Will of the people of Kaehmir. The representative of India is absent from tbis meeting becauso ho does net want to hear what the father of the Indian nation bad to say about the future of Jammu and Kashmir. The wbole delegation of India is absent from this meeting be- 222. It was ta spare the Indian mlers embarrassment that we never before ouoted Mr. Gandhi in tbis content. We do SO now beoause we bave discovered that il is weIl-nigh impossible to subject India to tbe kind of embarrassment to which tbose who are sensitive and bave saine sense of honour are easily susceptible. But the Prime Minister of India, who claims to be a disciple of his. should show some respect for the words of Mahatma Gandhi. 223. Whether Mr. Shastri does SO or net. it is the duty of the Security Council to rise above the interests and demands of the parties to the dispute, to act mdependently and look at the issue in its human and moral reality. Jammu and Kashmir is not a piece of real estate. Its future is not a problem to be viewed only in the context of the rights and wrongs of India and Pakistan. It cannot be condemned to a kind of Ku Khm Klan administration. A leading collaborator of Mahatma Gandhi. a prominent Minister of the late Mr. Nehru% cabinet, a contestant against Mr. Shastri for the Prime Ministership of India, none otber than Mr. Morar Ji Desai, is reported to bave said recently that the South Indlan City of Madras would be raaed to the ground if the people of the South sought secession from India. That may be his conception of how Indian unity cari be strengtheneé But Jammu and Kashmir is not “Madras or Bihar or G”jera%-and those are the words of the late Prime Minister. Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru. Jammu and Kashmir is net a part of Indla and therefore cannot be condemned to be a victim of Indian oppression. 224. TO sum “p, it is apparent that. as in January 1949, the Government of India has once again agreed to cesse hostilities wlth a perverse mental reservation. In the light of the events ef the thirty-two days which bave elapsed since the cease-fire formally went lnto effeet. there cari be little doubt that the grest anxiety msnlfested at the time by the Indian Government for a cessation of hostllities was not prompted by any desire to esohew the path of force and aggression and to return to the methods oi pS%?fUI tlement for reaolvlng its dispute wlti Pakistan. 225. Only four days after the cesse-fire went intc effect. 1 had the occasion to place before the Council a number of facts which indicated that India was using the cesse-fire to re-establish its authority in Indlan- 226. In recent weeks there bave been larqe-scale movements of Indlan troops from other parts of India to Jammu and Kashmir and the border6 of Pakistan. A mountain division equipped by the United States has been moved from the North East Frontler Agency area to Ferozepore. and another suoh division from Ladakh to Tithwal. Augmentation of forces amounts to a grave violation of the cesse-fire and gives the lie to India’s assurances of peaceful future behaviour. 227. Pakistan accepted the Security Council’s call for a cesse-fire in good faith and stands ready to carry out its obligations without reserve. We stopped fighting in order to avert iûrther bloodshed and the danger of a more widespread conflict in the subcontinent, and perhaps beyond. However, Pakistan cannot be expected to exercise endless restraint in the face of India’s patent and proven aggressiveness. Pakistan cannot permit India to continue to nibble away at its positions and to obtain. under the caver of a cesse-fire, what it failed to gain on the battlefield-namely, a position of military advantage from which it cari dictate terms to Pakistan and force us to abandon OUI support for the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to determine their own future in freedorn. 228. Pakistan has complied with the Security Council’s cal1 for a cesse-fire on the basls of the solemn assurances given by the Council and, in particular. by the four great Powers, that the future of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, who bave for eighteen years borne the burden of Indla’s tyrannlcal and hated occupation, would at last be the subject of a final settlement, based on justice and honour. 229. Paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 211 (1965) commits the Council to consider steps which It might take to bring about such a settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. More than a month has gone by since the cesse-fire went into effect, a cesse-fire which the Council regarded as the first step towards a peaceful settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. The withdrawal of armed forces called for in resolution 211 (1965) has not even commenoed and. from wbat 1 stated a short while it is to be feared that the Government of India wll; delay as long as possible the withdrawal of its troops, with the abject of avertlng or delaying consideration by the Council of the political problem underlying the Indo-Pakistan conflict. 230. In the light of experience, there cannot be any doubt that India will not of its own volition do anything to facilitate a peaceful settlement of the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir. The bistory of the las: eighteen years ha6 shown that India will use 231. sa before the Coonoil to&y.-it would be unfair to tbe world community if 1 dld not point oat that Pakistan does not corne ben as a suppliant. In si se the ce fire ZlfOSTCitp the assuring the Couucil of our readioess to co-operate in the searcb for a just and bonourable settlement. Pakistan is adhering tc the self-same path which it has followed aU these eighteen years. It is the only path of honour. We believe in tbe implementation of the resolutions of the Security Ccmm!il, and in SO doing we take the rough wltb tbe smooth. net flinch from sacrificlng a ition Qf adv if ju.stice 80 requires. We are fortlfied by the faith that, despite India% arrogance and obduracy, despite its flouting of ail canons of civlliaed conduct. desnite the armed miaht which it deploys agalnst K&&*s helpless peoile tbis long-drawn-ont tragedy cari end only in the vittory of tbe people of Jammu snd Kashmir and in the vlndlcation of our stand. 232. We are committed to honour our pledges. We shall honour our pledges irrespective of the conseqnences. It is only when a nation is prepared to stand by its word, by its commitments, by its honour and by its pledges tbat it cari serve its people, that it cari serve tbe cause of peace. 233. It is not a question hem of unequalspitted against each otber. wlth the Security Cou&l trylng to brlng about a certain equlllbrium. It is more than that. You bave tc go bath to the very quest of manhind for a just and honourable future. That is what has brought about revolutions in the world. 234. And we tel1 you. Mr. President, we shall face destruction rather than dishonour ourpledge. We shall fight for the people of Jammu and Kashmir. and we shall honour tbat pledge irrespective of what the Security Council does. irrespective of what the great Powers do. Tbis is a part of our faith; it is lngrained and enshrined in our very civilisation. And we hnow itd evwyP lmows, men. wcmen anà cbildren. Tbat is why we are able to face aggression from a country six times our sise. We bave fought it heroically. bravely; and when the history of that is written, it Will he enshrined in the annals of manhlnd. 235. We stand for a righteous cause; we fight for justice. And finally and ultimately, whatever you do, we must triumph; we must succeed because justice is with us. And those who bave left this chamber Will leave us also. They Will run away from Jammu 237. The Soviet Union’s position ontheIndo-Pakistan conflict has been quite clear from the very beginning. We bave been deeply grieved by the outbreak of the conflict and by the bloodshed it has entailed. 238. We should like to stress again that this conflict is net in the interests of the peoples of either India or Pakistan. Its continuation would threaten the peace of the world and would impair the solidarity of the forces which are for peace, national independence and progress. That is why the Soviet Union. from the very first, has urgently appealed, both in its messages to the Governments of India and Pakistan and in the discussion of the matter in the Security Council, for the prompt cessation of fratricidalbloodshed and an immediate peaceful settlement of the dispute between India and Pakistan. 239. We welcomed the agreement between te two sides-India and Pakistan-on a cease-fire witb great satisfaction. In this one must sec. first of all. a demonstration on the part of the statesmen of India and Pakistan of due realism. restraint and awareness of the dire consequences of a further continuation of the armed conflici. 240. The Security Council has playedthe role assigned to it under the Charter of our Organisation in connexion with the armed conflict between India and Pakistan. The positive results that bave been achieved. namely, the agreement of the parties of a ceasefire. are of course important, but only a first step. New the main task is to consolidate the cesse-fire, to ensure strict and sc~pulous observance of the cesse-fire agreement and to take the next step towards strengthening peace between India and Pakistan. The withdrawal by both sides of their troops and a11 their armed personnel from the positions they occupied up to 5 August 1965, as provided for in the Council’s resolutions, must proceed more rapidly. 241. These are the question that must be settled first, these are the questions to which attention must be given in the situation that has now arisen. 242. The Soviet Union, as everyone Will remember, supported the resolutions adopted by the Security Council on the armed conflict between Indla and Pakistan. These resolutions are an essential f&or in tha restoration of normal relations between India lioatbn of these mely,tkeirfunc ancing of tkeir qtivities these questions aie being settled outside tke Seourity Cauncil. wkose members are meiely informed akout measures tkat kave alma@ been taken. Tkls situation is. of course, abnormal ami, as we kave noted. at variante with tke Charter. We cansider it necessary to stress partioularly that tke Couacil skould set a definite time-llmit for tke stay of tke United Nations observers in India ami Pakistan, wkich it is our firm conviction should be strictIy limited to tkree months. 245. Those are tke views we wished to express at this Etage in the Cwncil’s work. 246. In view of tbe late heur and on the usual understanding. 1 shaIl net insist on tke consecutive interpretation of my statement into the other laquages.

My delegation and my Government strongly support aII tke resolutions wkich bave been adopted by the Security Ccamcil. begkmlng wlth resolutions 209 (1965) of 4 September, 210 (1965) of 6 September. 211 (1965) of 20 September and 214 (1965) of 27 Septemker. in dealIng witk thls matter. We bave dose 80 in tks spirit of great friendskip with the great nations of India and Pakistan. and we kave done SO in the interests of world pence and security. 248. It kas keen a source of great strengtb to all peace-loving people tkroughout tke world tkat tke Seowity Council. in ail tkese instances, kas acted wltk virtual unanimity. It was a source of great satisfaction to my Government and to allthemembers of tke Council tkat tke Governments of India and Pakistan responded to the Council’s demandthat tkere ho a cease-fire in this dispute. 249. We also skare tke conviction of. I am sure. ail the memkers of tke Council that the resolutions whioh were adopted are solemn commitments by the memkers of tke Security Council tkat a11 parts of tbe resolutions that we adopted must havs fuIl implementation. 251. That is what we all agreed upcn. in the Ccuncil, and we believe that it is the obligation of both India and Pakistan-faitbful to their commitments under the Charter-t0 respect, to hcncur and to comply with the declarations of the Security Ccuncil. 1 shculd like to emphasize that my Government continues tc support fully these resolutions of the Ccuncil, which were adcpted in September, and we urge most strongly that these resclutions, particularly the key rescluticn of 2.0 September [Zll (1965)]. be fully implemented. We do 80 in the necessary spirit of secing tc it that peace, to which we are aR pledged. is restored in full measure on the subcontinent. As far as we are ccncerned, my Gcvernment is pledged to that resoluticn, to its full terms. to the sequence of steps which the resolution contemplates. and we sball continue thrcugh this Council and thrcugh tbe United Nations to play our part in cc-operating and seeing to it that the resclutions are implemented. 252. My Government bas no question in its mind concerning the actions of the Secretary-General taken to carry out the resoluticns we bave adopted. Nor indeed do we think that any question can be raised apprcpriately under those resclutions in the light of their clear langnage and in tbe light of the very caretùl ateps which the Secretary-General has taken in order to give effect tc them. 253. On 6 September 1965. this Ccuncil, in resolution 210 (1965), after calling upcn the parties tc cesse hostilities and promptly withdraw ail armed personnel to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965. unanimously went on to say that it: “Recuests the Secretary-General to exert every possible effort to give effect to the present resolution and to reeolution 209 (1965). to take ail measures possible to strengthen the United Nations Militarv Observer Groun in India and Pakistan. and to keep-the Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of the resclutions and on the situation in the area”. Our Secretary-General did exactly that. He filed a steady stream cf reports indicating tbe steps that he was taking pursuant to this resolution in ordertc give effect to what the Council had decided. And he frankly shared his thaughts, his views. his recommendations “1 bave taken immediate steps to obtain extra transport andcommunicationsequipmenttofaoilltate UNIVIOGIP in its tas& 1 bave also made provisional ar ements to increase the number of military observe-m in WNMOGIP at short notice, should developments mske tbls lucrease necessary.” [S/ 6686,para. 10.1 254. We were on notice of this when we met on 20 September to consider the deteriorating situation which bad developed in connexion with this dispute. Behg on notice of this, the Coumil again adopte4 a resolution wbich, in tbis respect, was agreed to by aIl parties. Tbe Council in tbis resolution [211 (1965)] requested *, . . tbe Secretary-General to provide tbe necessary assistance to ansure supervision of tbe cesse-fire sud tbe withdrawal of a11 armed personnelR.. In sncther paragraph we requested “the Secretary-General to exert every possible effort to glve effect to tbe present resolutiona. 255. The next day the Secretary-General suppliecl us with auother of bis many reports. In this report be pointecl out wbat bad transpired during this period. The original cesse-fire line was a cesse-fire line of a little less that 500 miles. The Secretarv-General reported tbat there were crossings of the border. thc? international boundary between the two countries, and then he went on to say: “The border between India and West Pahistan. where figbting bas been taking place between Indian and Pakistan armed forces, extends for a distance of over 1,000 miles from the Arabian Sea to tbe footbills of the Himalayas on .tbe southern edge of tbe Rate of Jammu and Kashmir.v [S/6699. para. 10.1 Tben he went on to point out speclfically in detail tbat because of tbis situation: “In the supervision of tbe cesse-fire and of the withdrawsls, it is the intention to deploy, at least initially, a team of approximately 100 military observera witb the necesssry logistical and staff support.’ [x. para. 11.1 IIe was not talldng at tbat point about the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan; he was talhing about recruiting a. team of military observers for the international bouhdary, as we ail necessarily understood. The Secretary-General conthmed: “It is tbe purpose to bave those observera in the area at the earliest possible date sfter the ceasefire becornes effective. According totentativeplans. the locations outside of Kashmir where cbservers might be most usefully stationed would be the following.. .” [n>id.] Then there are specified in detail the headquarters on the Indian side and on the Pakistan side for this “The Security Council. in its resolution 210 (1965) Of 6 September 1965. calls upon the Secretary- General ‘to take all measures possible to strengthen the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pskistanv. To thts end. I bave already made specific approaches to the Governments providing military observers to make available additional observers SO that the over-a11 strength of the Group cari be very substantially increaseù. As stated in my second report to the Council on my mission to India and Pakistan [S/I?~%]. 1 bave also taken urgent steps to provide extra transport and communications equipment for the Observer Gro~p.~ [mIb, para. 16.1 266. The Council met on 27 September and noted reports of the Secretary-General. There was not a voice raised in the Counoil at the time, although we were full apprised of every step that the Secretary- General had taken, that the Secretary-General in any sense was deviating from the mandate that this Council had given him in carrying out the task and heavy responsibrlity we had entrusted to him. 257. And the Secretary-General did not leave us in the dark as to what he was doing; quite the contrary. On 1 October 1965 he told us in specific detail what observers he was recruiting for both these forces: “As of 30 September, a total of ninety observers has been provided for the United Nations India- PakistanObservationMission.“[S/6699/Add.6,para.3.] Then he goes into it in detail. Then: “As of 30 September, a total of fifty-nine additional observers had been provided for the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan.” (IN., para. 8.1 258. New, it seems to my Government and to my dtiegation that the Seoretary-General has proceeded exactly in accord with the resolutions that the Security Council has unanimously adopted and that he has advised the members of the Council. step by step. of every step he has taken in order to execute the Council’s resolutions. There would bave been time at any point during these proceedings to raise the question of whether the Secretary-General wasproceeding improperly, and that was not done. That was net done although the facts were knovm and were laid before us. 259. My Government wishes to commend the Secretary-General for the steps taken by him to carry out what we agreed upon here. And in regard to the statua of the cesse-fire, it is a plain and simple fact of life that we owe much to the patient efforts of the United Nations observer& who bave promptly gone to work thanks to the Secretary-General’seapeditious action in response to the Council’s mandate to him. in paragraph 2 of resolution 211 (X965), “to provide the neoessary assistance to ensure supervision of tbe 260. 1 wish to make it clear that my Government emphatically rejects the suggestion that the Secretary General acted beyond his mandate or that he should have consulted tbe Council in advance on the details of the actions he took under that mandate. In oui view, bis actions were entirely reasonable, and well within tbe limits that could be envisaged in view of the seriousness of the problem. If fortytbree observers were appropriate, as has been long recogniaed by tbis Council, to observe a ceasefire under peaceful conditions and in a cesse-fire line of less tban 550 miles, then 200 observers are obvlously reasonable for supervising a ceasefire line that now extends 1,500 miles under the grave and troubled conditions that now exist between India and Pakistan. 261. I tbink tbat 1 for one uuderstood what the Council was asking for in our discussion. We made it very clear tbat we asked and requested and directed tbe Secretary-General to take steps to strengthen the observer force, and also to take steps to sec to it tbat there was appropriate supervision of what we had demanded that India and Pakistan should do. Therefore it seemed to me that there cari be no question about this. It 1s interesting to see that there is not always consistency in this area. Today we are told by the representative of the Soviet Union that the Secretary-General acted improperly in the face of a resolution we adopted which called upon the Sesretary-General to strengthen the observer force. 1 would like to remicd the representative of the Soviet Union of his actions and his comments when the Domfnican problem was before the Security Council. The Security Council adopted a resolution on 14 May 1965 [resolution 203 (1965)] inviting the Secretary-General ‘to send, as an urgent messure, a representative to the Dominican Repubu+. On 9 Yune, the representative of the Soviet U: _ %d this to say about that resolution: nWe also take a favourable view of the suggestion that the representative of tbe Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic should continue to keep the cesse-fire under observation. The USSR dele- 20 my 1965’ tbe SsmQ tbo 8 Ymre ex- * it 5eQms to me 266. Mr. SEJI?DOUX (France) ftrmslated fmm FrQncb): Because of tIv2 %steness af tbe hem, 1 rd intended taJzen place. take part én tbe debate wbicb bas just wever, in view cf itsunexpectedscope, 268. Naving made tbese comments, tbe French delegation consideïs it necessarybriefly to recallthe princlplee whicb sbould guids our action whenever the Security Cotmcil decides to set up a peace-keeping operation-even if it is m rvation or inspection mission. W emergency meamres which the may be led to take, we consider that it is for the Security 6mncil, taking into account the information tbe Seoretary-General gives it, to decide on the size and tbe command, as well as the principal characteristics, of the mission or force it has established. The Commil should not get lest in dota& wbich would par%lyse it, but it shotid make sure tbat tbe proposed metbods correspond, at a11 stages. tith the political data about tbe problem as assessed by the Council itself. We consider that in that kind of a framework, the Seoretary-GeneraPs action would avoid the difficulties which would sot fail to arise if bis terms of referenoe were defined too vaguely, thus leaving the door open to deep differences of interpretatfon on the part of members of the Council. The Council 3hould also not forget tbe finanoial aspects of an operation it decides lo undertake; its basio task is to set a ceiling for expenditure on tbe basis of the Secretary-General’s proposais and to decide how the operation is to be financed. whetheroaa vohmtary or on a compulsory basis; in the latter case it sbould invite the General Assembly to pro e funds required in the Org%nisation’s regular 26% I do mot want .now to reopen a discussion on tbis wint. wbioh the Snecial Committee on Peacekeeping O&%tions has^ bad to de%1 with and will probbably de%1 witb again, but I do want to stress once again tbat the Security Cou&l cannot be asked lo take simple decisions of principle and then leave ta otber task of c%r them out. Similady. m on ccJw~aer t il is for the 270. Naturally. 1 rsserve the right to speak again at a future meeting, and. if neoessary. on the substance of the problem.

The Soviet delegation has already stated today-and quite unequivocally-its position on the resolutions adopted by the Security Cou&l and the existingpmcedures for sending United Nations military observers to India and Pakistan. We sbould like to reaffirmtitposition. 212. As for the views just expressed by the United States representative. they oannot be regarded as convincing. nor do they in any way justify the actions we referred to previously, despite the fact that he spoke most resoundingly. 273. We did not consider it appropriate to offer an interpretation of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council. However. since this questionhas been raised in the Security Council, we feel obliged to express our views on it. 274. What are in fact the provisions of Seourity Council resolutions 210 (1965) and211(1965)? Resolutlon 210 (1965) refers to measures to strengthen the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan. We are choosing our words witb oare and wish to stress the phrase sstrengthen the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistans. In resolution 211 (1965). the Security Council requests the Secretary-General “toprovidethenecessary assistance to ensure supervision of the oease firs and tbe withdrawal ofallarmedpersonnelw. These are the provisions of the Security Council resolutions and in OUI view thay are sufficiently clear. These resolutions contain nothing else. 275. what in reality is tsking place? It is common knowledge that in fact measures are being taken not to sstrengthen the United Nations Military Observer Group in India sud Pakistan” but to expand it oonsiderably. This is a substsntially new departure. In ad.dltion. we note tbat a oompletely nsw body is being set up-a mission of United Nations militsry observers. But is any mention made of this in the resolutiens we bave adoptedl There is net a single word about it in ths Recurity Council% deoisiohs. If the Council had really intended to set up this new group, then obviously-in faot nsoessarily-it would bave taken a clear decision to that effect. Why, merely to “strengthen the United Nations Military 276. T~US a large number of military obseivers is being set to India and Pakistan-to be precise, four times more than the original number of the exls?lng group. A new military observation mission is being set up, and the posts of command are betng assigned mainly to senior NATO officers. Considerable expenditure is being planned for the maintenance of these mflitary observers, and the representative of France has rightly and wlth a sense of responsibility stressed this fact. And all thls is being done in circumvention of the Security Cou&l. 277. However the representative of the United Su&es may interpret the resolutions of the Security Council, tbis cannot alter the obvious fact that they provlde no justification for ths actions taken wlth a view to carrying out the resolutions. TO thls 1 must add the fact that the United States representative tried to present the matter as though he were hearing the position of the Soviet delegation on the subject for the first time. 27s. May 1 remind the United States representativealtbough we discussed the matter wlth him earlierthat we drew the attention of the United States at the proper time, after the publication of the Secretary-General% first report, to the impropriety of the steps tsken. This was done by the Mlnlster for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union andalsoby the Permanent Representative of the USSR to the Unlted Nations. 279. We should further like to recall that we drew this to the attention of the President of the Security Counoil in September. when that responsible office was held by the United States representative. We Weil remember-and we hope that Mr. Goldberg also remembers this clearly-that, as President of the Seourity Comm& he agreed in the course of oor dlscursion that these matters fell within the competence of the Security Council and should be considered by it. Eevertheless, tbis oral admission was net followedby any practical measures on the part of the Presldent o? the Security Council. 260. We should llke to draw the attention of the United States representative to the fact that. in Security Counbil resolution 214 (1965). to which he referred, the Council did not in any way tske note of the Secretary-General% reports which refer to militaiy observers, but of reports containlng information on the observance of the cesse-fire (S/LVlO snd Add.l and 2). 281. May we also recall tbat our position on this subject was presented in demi1 in the course of consultations-lnformsl consultations-among members of the Security Council. Al1 these are simple tacts-facts which are not new to you, Mr. Goldberg. but which are known to everyone and of which you must have been aware. Therefore your references 283. For this reason we again venture to point out the need to comply strictly with the provisions of the Charter and not to depart from them. snd tüe need also to show respect for the competence of the Security Councll. whose task it is to decide such In&ters. 284. Since ycu bave all understocd what 1 bave said and as it is already late, 1 shall not insist on the consecutive interpretation of my statement.

The heur is late. 1 shall say only a few addlional words. 286. The representative of the Soviet Union is guite correct in saylng that informally. at the Foreign Mlnister level, and in conversations between bitn sud myself. and while 1 was President of the Security Ccuncil, he did express the viewthathehas expressed here today. It is also correct that 1 expressed a view, similar to the view tbat 1 bave expressed tcday-as did my Govsrnrosnt st all levels-and throughout took the position that whatever the Secretary-General had done was in strict conformity witb the resolutions wbich had been adopted. 287. That being the case, it was not my obligation under the provisonal rules of procedure to bring this matter to the attention of the Security Cou&l. Under the rules, any member of the Securiiy Ccuncil may brlng to the attention of the Councll any matter that he desires. My esteemed friend did not elect to do SO unttl today. And when 1 ssid wbat 1 dld, it was in ternis of submitting the matter formslly. as was doue today. bsfore the Security Couucil. 288. MI’. FEDGRENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): We note with satisfaction thecalm toneof theobjsotlveacknowlsdgement the representative of the United States bas just made. Our statement was based solely on facts. These facts lmve been acknowledged as was proper. Nevertheless, the United States representative is attemptlng to make out that they should bave heen presented differently or in soine other way. 289. As for the suggestion that we shculd bave done this at a prevlous meeting of the Securiiy 290. We exhausted a11 possible sud available methods. We considered that ail we had done might bave led to a settlement of the problem, but since that was net te case, the Soviet delegation took the first opportunity to explain its position officially here.. This is a perfectly proper thing to do. and only shows that we sought to hring about a final settlement of the problem. We tried various ways. This should be clearly understood and duly appreciated. 291. Once again 1 should like to ask that no conseoutive interpretation be made of my remarks. l%e meeting rose at 10.10 pm. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications moy be obtoined distributcrs throughcut the world. write to: United Nations, Saler CO ENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS Les publications des Notionr Unies sont agences dépositaires du monde entier. ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, Section COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de tas Naciones Unidas cas05 distribuidoras en todas partes dirijase a: Nacicnes Unidas, Secci6n l.itho in V.N. Price: $U.S. 1.00 (or quivalent in other