S/PV.1248 Security Council

As the African representative in lhe Security Council and in view of the fact that we shall be discussing this question at future meetings. 1 should like to state for the record that we greatly deplore the fact that the two parties are net taking seats at the Council table and taking part in the debate. It is, however, net the first time that this has happened in the Security Council. We shall undoubtedly flnd that, when we discuss the problem of apartheid, South Africa Will, as usual, not be wlth us, although 1 could wlsh that it would be; but its absence bas net prevented the Council in thepastfrom taklnganumber of appropriate decisions. That is why 1 bebeve that in the present case the Council cari usefully continue its deliberations and take decisions which cari be carried out.

Note Will be taken of the stntement of the representative of the Ivory Coast.

My delegation supports everything that has been said by the representative of the Ivory Coast. The absence of one of the parties canot stop the work of the Security Council. It cannot stop the Council from deliberating on the question, taking decisions and finding constructive solutions. Otherwlse it would amount to a veto. if the absence of one of the parties could stop the work of the Council.

The comments of the representative of Jordan are noted and, since no observations bave been made on my proposai, the representative of Pakistan is invited to take a Seat at the Council table. Af the invitation of fhe Presidenf, Mr. 2. A. Bhuffo (Fzlcfsfsn) toolc a place af fhe Cotmcil fable.

The cesse-fire which formally went into effect on 22 September 1965 has net become fully effective, and the steps to carry out the withdrawal of armed personnel bave net yet been taken. Violations of the cesse-fire are becoming more numerous and more serious, and the situation is rapidly deteriorating. SO far, practical wisdom and restraint bave prevailed, but the continuance of the present situation may bave extremely dangerous effects. 10. Cf course, we know that bothpartiesareexpected to honour the cesse-fire, but violations, if continued, may invite other violations, andthese,unless checked, may defeat the very purpose of resolutions 211 (1965) and 214 (1965). We know, of course, that it is difficult to bave the complete picture wlthout complete and 11. We note with appreciation the steps taken by the Secretary-General to implement these resolutions. We know that the Secretary-General will continue his efforts to make the cesse-fire effective and to bring about the witbdrawal of armedpersonnelonbothsides. We endorse ail the steps that bave been taken to implement resolution 211(1965) ; we express appreciation of the value of the Secretary-General% reports on this matter. 12. Resolution 211 (1965) almed at achieving three results: first. an effective cesse-fire and the withdrawal of troops to the old positions; second, the reestablishment of the old cesse-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir; and. third, workingforapoliticalsettlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. 13. We feel that tbose re~uirements should go together as far as possible. Tc concentrate exclusively on one of them. and to leave or postpone the others may result in our facing the real dangerof a resumption of hostlties. the consequences of which no one could predict. 1 say this because 1 know that this is what happened in the past. and 1 am sure we ail agree that this is what we are here to prevent. 14. The elements of the resolution, and here 1 am using the words of the author of the resolution. the representative of the Netherlands. *are closely interwoven”. 1 would say that they constitute one unit, and any discussion of any resolution which is one unit should Covfx ail the resolution; otherwlse. il wouldbe an inadequate and incomplete discussion. We invite both India and Pakistan to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General and the UnitedNations observers in their efforts to implement ail parts of the Co~ncfl~s resolutions. 15. What is going on in the whole area of conflict. and now in Kashmir itself. leaves no room for doubt that an early settlement is essential and that the need for a political solution now is more urgent than ever. We cannot and should not ignore this fact. The dispute camiot go on without more violations and more violence and more bloodshed. and tbis may lead to the danger of war extending to more areas and bringiing in mcre parties, thus threatening international peace and security and perhaps escalating to uncontrollable proportions. 16. With the cesse-fire in effect. our Council is duty bound to formulate a procedure wbich would be workable. equitable and in conformity with standing resolutiWs. Lasting peace cannot be secured by any other means. 18. Why is the situation today more dangerous than even at the time when the problem first arose? For an answer to this. we have to look at the problem in its proper perspective. 19. In his report of 3 Septemher 1965 on the current situation in Kashmir, with particular reference to the cesse-fire agreement, the Secretary-General stated: I, . . . the cesse-fire . . . would afford the most favourable cllmate in which to seek a resolution of political differences. The differences over Kashmir are sharp, great and ominous. They must be resolved if peaoe in that area is ever to be secure.” [8/6651, para. 2.1 20. This continues to be the case today. It is for this reason that we believe tbat we cannot ignore the background which brought about a kind of undeclared war in Asia. The historical beckground of theproblem is essential, and the question must be viewed against that background. This Council should not overlookand it cannot erase the history of the problem, the most important part of which is that bothbidiaand Pakistan agreed that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmlr to Indla or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a frae and impartial plebiscite. Thls stand was given the United Nations blessing. On 21 April 1948. the Security Coumil endorsed this agreement [resolution 47 (194811 and authorized a commission to implement it. 21. It is net open. at this stage, for either India or Pakistan to claim that Jammu and Kasbmir is an integral part of its territory. Thls Will be decided by the people of Kashmir themselves. Theyhave the right to choose their destiny, and untilsuchtlmeas they do. both parties are stopped from making any claims of sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir. On the other hand, it is not open to any of the parties to deny the arrangements reached. We need net remind the members of the Council around this table that human relations are regulated sometlmes by other means than forma1 treaties, which are the substance of international law. Informa1 arrangements, especially when endorsed by the Security Councll, are one of them. 1 submit, what is the use of conference tables and negotiations, agreements and arrangements of thls klnd if they are reached today only to be negated 23. We say tbis because we believe that 5 million people cannot. wltbout their free wlll. be forced to share a singIe stat witb eitber India or Pakistan. Our stand stems from United Nations resolutions on tbis pmblem. None of tbe members CbaIlenged tbe vslidity of tbose resolutions. Some members here may tic issue with tbe meons. tbe methods or tba timing but-and 1 stand to b-e correoted on tbis-we do net differ on the validity of the Security Counoil’s resolutions. Tbey wew bas& on tbe agreement of tbe parties. They were never negateà Tbey still stand. 24. Needless to say. Jordan. wbich bas alwaysmaintained close bonds of friendsbip wlth both of the two sister States of Incha and Pakistan, seeks in this case to express ils stmng deslre and its unalterable wish to keep and to strengthen those bonds. IIowever. its first deslre and duty is to stress as a basic prlnciple the necessity of respecting the decisions of theUnited Nations. Jordan bas tbe greatest admiration for tbe ancient cultural heritage of India. It also stressed the importance of India as a major Power in tbe forces of non-alignment, the aim of which is to maintain world peace and security. With Pakistan. Jordan lias close links of culture and religion, but neither of tbese factors can influence my country’s position vis-b-vis tbe decisions of tbe Security Council, respect for which must be an unquestionable principle to be upheld by @l Member States in the interests of tbe Unlted Nations and of world peace. 25. Soi-ne members calledon tbe twoparties to respect ail 2ecusity Council resolutions of September 1965. I. in turn, would like to call on aIl members of the Council to respect its resolutions in order to prctect the prestige and dignity of the Council and to protect the hope of mankind. Jordan is a small country. Small countries derive their strength from. and depend for their security on. the effective discharge by the United Nations of its own responsibilities to protect its own Charter. By ignoring or disregarding its resolutions. the Security Ccuncil would create an unhealthy precedent. We cannot lnsist on the implementation of OUr resolutions in a given case and overlook it, or let expediency play its part, in another case. 26. Quoting a great leader of our tiie. a former RePubliCan President of tbe United States. Dwight D. Eisenhower: “We cannot, in the world any more thanin our own nation. SUhSCribe to one law for the weak. anotber President Eisenhower also stressed the point that: “There cari be no peace without law. And there cari h-e no lm if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who opposeusandanother for our friends.” My delegation subscribes to these views. It is through the collective will and-wisdom of the members of this Council that we canpu) tkese sound views of tke former Pmsident of the Unlted States into effect. 27. Much has been said recently about the scope of the authority of tke Secretary-General. Some uncertainties bave been expressed in thls connexion. We know tkat wlthout complete clarity and understandlng of thls matter the work entrusted to him may be bsmpered. We deem it fit, therefore, to make a few observations on this important matter. 28. The Secretary-General is appointed by tke General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. The Security Council’s recommendation unanlmous agreement among the five permanent Council members. This is a Charter requirement embodled in Article 97 of tke Charter. And the’question arises: Why is a11 tkls? It is simply because of the importance of this office. It is one of the main organs of the United Nations. TO be able to use tkls office effectively. the Secretary-General, in hls election, needs to bave the unanimous support and acceptance of a11 permanent members of tke Security Council. His functions are not only administrative. but diplomatie and political. at tlmes. as well. 29. Whether the Security Council, in interpreting tke Charter and acting wlthin the scope of its autkority. would give the Secretary-General special mandates and/or more power is up to tkis body. Tke Security Council .xn always do this. But, 1 subrnit, we kave notklng to say about vested rights embodied in our Charter. and interpreted in the past through the practice of thls United Nations organ. When powers are clear. to invoke them the Secretary-General need not corne to the Council for directives. When, for instance, Pakistan requested the Secretary-General to go there. or to send a representative on his behalf, to see and report to the Council on certain charges, we do not believe tbat thls needed the Council’s approval. It is his discretionary right. Ctkerwise, what would be the meaningof Article 99 of the Charter, which gives the Secretary-General, besides other functions. tke right to bring to the attention of the Council any matter whlch, in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security? This authority, wkich involves a task of great responsibility implles tke discretionary right to visit places of conflict and to make inquiries. This is the more SO 30. We do mt want to ses bis activities freeze and beoome ineffective. 1 am sure the Secretary-General w*uM wish to belp us in tbis respect. B is his office. wbich is one of tbe main organs of the iJnited Nations. and bis authority wbich shotid be pratected. 31. W%ere to àraw tbe line bAveen matters whfch me0 %e Comcil”s directives and approval and those wbicb do mt. is somethiag wbich bas beendetermined pasa. psactice. In some cases. the Seore+aryean play a part vbich neither the Sewcity 6omd mm a State or group of States would be abb Hay. het me reiterate that the Secre!ary-General s bis office der tbe unardmous consent of tbe permanent members 0f this Council. the reaommendation of the Seeansity Council and tbe appointment hi tbe General Assembly. We do net believe thaé tbose who draft& our Charter and iucorporsted aB tbese Conf%ions ad Emitatims in tbe Charter intende&, after aU tbis, to coafine tkke role of tbk Siort=.tary- General to “rmegative rmeotsality”. Certainly lx is expected. being an independent body, to play a more eBecbivee. positif 5 and belpful part. 32. P bave one mm geae~ral observation. As fhe Utited Nations gmws dosé to achfeving universality. it becomes imperative for ail ite main organs to fuaotbn p~0perly and effectiveky. eoen if this requires a Bberal interpsetation of the C%arter. The United Nations Charter is our constitution, wbich is bound to respond to the changing needs of our international society. lt is au evolutionary document and it must live in the ewlutionary world in which we live. It mast be interpreted. therefore. in su& a way as to reflect the intention of thosc great statesmen Mo drew it up. And I must say once more, Mr. President, tbat you are one of those statesmen who drew up and signed this great document, the Charter of the United Nations. Thés kind of liberaf approach is the one that has been adopted by tbe U&edNations on the domestic juridiction issue. on the colonial issues, ou the issue of human rights and on many issues involving international conflict. 33. Before concluding. I sbould lie to refer to a letter submitkad by the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Na.tions. dated 22 October 1965 IS/SSZl]. This letter emhoclies charges of a serious and alarming nature. The same is true of the statemeut tbat the representative of Pakistan made on Monday 11247th meeting]. Tbese charges, if established. should arousc our deepest concern. as issues of a humanitartan nature are also involved. We are glad that the Secretary-General has already sent bis represeniative to the area of confit&. Bis representative could also be directed. if this is possible, to look into these charges and ascertain the facts. On the other baud. if the Secretary-General deems otherwise,we thinktbat. by oirtue of his own rigbt and the powers entrusted to 39. I bave. of course, made it my business to stud~ very carefufly tbe record of tbe meeting. and as : did SO. tbere wias me main conc1usi0n mi& formec and devehped in my mind. I wish to speak ver5 He-tly on tbaat one proposition. It is that we ~1111s swely eaotime to concentrate ail our attention a1 éhis aime on tbe timediate target of progress towardr 41. But whlle 1 do not doubt the importance of those constitutional and financial questions, 1 put it to this Council that our immediate task and the taskon which we should concentrate a11 OUI effort at this time is the task of taking every possible action to render effective the cesse-fire between India and Pakistan which this Council demanded. together wlth the withdrawal of ail armed personnel. If we lose sight of those immedlate aims we shall bave failed. We shall fail to maintain the momentum of suocess which oui previous resolutions initiated. We shallfail in OUI duty to all concerned to show that we are seriously determined tocarry out the provisions of the resolutions we passed. Everything Will depend on whether we now take effective action to win and maintain a secure peace. 42. 1 do most earnestly urge upon the Council that. whatever else we do, we must facilitate and accelerate the withdrawal which we demanded. For, as long as the wlthdrawal is delayed, the daily dangers of further violations of the cesse-fire Will continue. The hope of progress towards a peaceful settlement Will recede. The situation might easily deteriorate into renewed confusion and conflict and catastrophe, 43. Moreowr. whlle we bave ample evidence of the intensity of feeling in India and Pakistan arising from the events of the past few months, it bas been enoouraging to realize that on the necessity for a cesse-fire and withdrawal there bas already been a measure of agreement between the Gcvernments of India and Pakistan. On this issue at least there appears to be good reason to hope for agreement and for effective action. 44. We welcomed and endorsed the efforts which the Seoretary-General has sopersistentlymade toachieve this aim. 1 was glad that the spokesman for my delegation immedlately made itplain that in our opinion the Secretary-General has throughout acted in complete accord with the clear mandate glven to him by this Council. Particularly we commend his consistent endeavour to malce the cesse-fire effective and to proceed with the withdrawal. We specially welcomed the proposa1 to appoint an officer to meet the military representatives of eaoh side to seek urgent agreement on a practical plan for withdrawal. 45. Last month we rejoiced when. in a series of four resolutions, thls Council actedwithsuohcommendable ewen k+aad to a resumWon of fuEI-scale kostiPities. t 16 mn. Tke tbxeals. tke verbal violence, tke nizilmq? acmns and tke subversive acts, ed ta tke aheady existingeensim. kave degenerated iota a blooay ma frsaericidal eaact. 4% Tke Gaeemmeat of Bke Ivry Const. which is 01 greaé Asian countries o akistan. kas of &Aence h tkat region akistaan are great. wt merely beeause 0 tkeir tesrit0ries or tkeeir p4@ations. bu. keeoause of their civi-ili 61. ékeir reàigious feeliop, tkeir age-old pr-tsh Pn particn&3.rar, kecause ai tlle metapkysical SQ-e inkerent in tke doctrine of Master, Galldhi. a.nd tke ermt treaswry of talent amassed by the great $43. T%e hwy Coast, wkickconsiders non-ti01enCe tk< essence of moral perfection aml kas adopted it as thé primmy element of its international palicy. could no1 stand by unconcerned and watcb ii fair; tkat is wky wf drafting aadadoptionof theSecwitJ Cowcil resoiutions dlimg foi a cease-fire aad éh6 f aAA rerrned~rson~Ak~ackt~tke~sitionc 1965. Tke parties emkanour, accegtec se resolutions am pra@Aaimerl a cease-fire. In faot, howeves. only th pitcked AaMe km been halted and tkefi~ingcontinues Tk Secsetary-Genesd”s report of 23 October 196! .5] casts a specially disturbing light 01 cke situation. t 51. Psess reports and documents transmitted daii by tke parties give accounts of tke various violation telhmfortanately-of the virtuel disruption 0 Y S If 53. Iiowever, how cari the Security Council carry out its mission of peace if the parties to the disputewhich, moreover. are influential Members of the United Nattons-do net collaborate with it? How oan the Council be asked to find a solution to a conflict when. at the same time. the parties affirm that they are net prepared to make any concessions? Dialogue and negotiation require a certain attitude of mind, a mutual willingness not to impose a11 one’s vlews on one’s neighbour. and an atmosphere of concession. 54. The Security Council is acting onlyinaccordance with Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. Under Chapter VII, the Council may use force to restore peace or to prevent aggression, but never to salve a contentious dispute between two States. In the last case. the only recourse is to Chapter VI, which requires notonly the goodwill of the parties but also their necessary and essential collaboration. That is why the Council must demand an effective cease-fire and reiterate its request for the withdrawal of allarmedpersonnelback to the positions held by them before 5August 1965, as stated in operative paragraph 1 of resolution 211(1965). 55. The Secretary-General has tsken steps to that end and we must encourage him to continue his efforts and to ensure that India and Pakistan co-operate with hlm and with the United Nations observers. But we should perhaps also ask our colleagues in the Seouriij Council to co-operate with the Secretary-General. You cannot give wlth one band and take away wlth the other, as the saying goes. The Council requested the Secretary-General to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cesse-fire and the withdrawal of a11 armed personnel. What is necessary depends on the length of the frontiers and the kind Of warefare the parties are engaged in. We believe that the Secretary-General, in acceding to oui request and in taking steps which, perhaps because of their inadequacy, have net yet been SuoCeSSftd, has net SO far exceeded his mandate. Accordingly. we shall not critiae him prematurely. 56. In any event, the Council had the opportunity knowing the financial implications of the resolution had adopted; a11 it had to do was to ask the SeCremry- 58. Cur intention w3.s merely to encourage the Secretary-General in tke fuIfilment of the difficult ta& we entrusted to mm. 1 am sure tkat the Council as a wimle. faceà tith a groblem, SO delicate because of the extent to wkich the feelings of bath parties are invohed. would not wish to lose its way in this Brebyrinthine taagIe of procedure. 59. My ddegatïon tlaesefore believes tkat thepresent debate skouki Grive to create apropitious atmosphere fcm reneting negotistèons ketween tke parties. By making tke cesse-fire effective, by supporting the measares advocated by tke Secretary-General for the witkdrawal of tke armed forces, by inviting tke parties to co-operate witk tke Secretary-General and tke United Nations observers in order ta acbieve that objective, tke Security Council, witk tke Secretary- General% collaboration, wiD be able to appropriate diplomatie means to seek a political solution wkich, witkout offending tke susceptibilities of either party. wiB enakle tkem to eliminate a latent cause of war betveen two hrother countries. T&e meeting rose at 5.20 pm. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS United Nations publications mcy be obtained distributors throughout the world. write to: United Nations, Sales Section, ENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS Les publications des Nations Unies sont agences dépositaires du monde entier. 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