S/PV.125 Security Council

I invite the representative of Albania to take his place at the table. 2 Ibid., Annex 9. oIbid., Supplement No. 10, Annex 22. CENT-V;NGT-CINQUIEME SEANCE Tenu6 a Lake Success, New-York, le jeudi 3 avril1947, a10 h. 30. President: M. Quo Tai-chi· (Chine) . . Presents: Les representants des pays smvants: Australie, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, Etats-Unis d'Amerique, France, Pologne, Royaume-Uni, Syrie, Union des R~publiques socialistes sovietiques. 117. Ordre du iour provisoire (document 5/3171 1. Adoption de I'ordre du jour. 2. Inddents survenus dans le detroit de Corfou: a) Lettre, en date du 10 janvier 1947, adressee au Secretaire general par le representant du Royaume-Uni au Conseil de securite, et pieces jointes(document S/247)1. b) Communications du Gouvernement albanais relatives aux incidents survellus dans le detroit de Corfou (document S/250) 2. c) Rapport de la, Sous-Commission du Conseil de securite chargee d'enqueter sur les incidents survenus dans le detroit de COrfOll (document S/300) 8. 118. Adoption de I'ordre du iour. 119. Suite de la discussion de la plainte du Royaume-Uni contre I'Albanie. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): J'invite le representant de l'Albanie a- prendre place a- la table du Conseil. 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officieEs cu Conseil de s~cu. Tit~, Deuxieme Annee, Supplement No 3, Annexe 8. 2 Ibid., Annexe 9. • Ibid., Supplement No 10, Annexe 22. I may say that from one point of view I was extremely gratified by the result of the vote, taken on 25 March, on the resolution which I had the honour to submit to this Council, as amended by the United States and French dele- gations. I had been told Jy the Soviet and Polish dele- gations that this .;ase ought never to have been brought before the Security Council at all, and that in any event I had failed to prove &11Y guilt on the part of the .Albanian Government. But seven out of the nine voting'representatives voted for that reEolution, thereby showing not only that it was, in th!"i!' view, a suitable case to bring before the Council, but that in the opinion of the majority I had established _our case against Albania. Though it had the requisite numerical ma- jority, that resolution is inoperative becaus~ it failed to obtain the support of one permanent member of the Council, the Soviet Union. I cannot pretend to be surprised at this, be- cause in the very early stages of our proceedings, before all the evidence h;ld been produced, and before any c.I it had o,;en sifted, Mr. Gromyko announced that our charges against Albania were, as he put it, "absolutely groundless"2. And he was followed by the Polish representative, who told us that there was no case; who said there was no need for a sub-committee; and who yet chose to serve on that Sub-Committee and to complicate its deliberations.s . ce~e resolution est inoptSrante parce qU'el1e n'a pas obtenu l'appui d'un membre permanent du .Conseil, rUmon sovietique. Je ne puis Fl·et~.l1dre en eprouver de la. sure prise, parce que, des le debut de nos delibera- tions, avant que toutes les preuves eussent ete produites, et avant qu'aucune de celles-ci eut ete meme partiellement examinee, M. Gromyko avait annonce que nos accusations contre l'AI- banie etaient, pour employer ses propres termes, "absolument sans fondement:". E'i: il avait ete suivi par le representant de la Pologrte qui, apres avoir dcklare que notre accusation n'etait pas fondee et qu'il n'y avait pas lieu de constituer une sous-commission, avait cependant voulu faire partie de cette Sous-Commission et en com~ pliquer lesdeliberations B • C'est la un exemple - un exempletres im- portant et tres grave - de l'exercice du veto. Le representant de l'Union sovietique n'aime pas parler du veto; il prefere insister sur ce qU'il ap~ This is a case-and a very notable and seri- ous case---of the exercise of the veto. The Soviet Union representative does not like to talk about the veto; he prefers to insist on what he calls the doctrine of the "unanimity of the permanent members", by which he apparently means that the other permanent membern should conform to the view of the Soviet Government when the latter is in a minority of one. Those of my col- leagueS who are permanent members do not seem to have accepted this version of the doc- trine, and I may say that I do not accept it either. However, it would doubtless be a wast~ or time to attempt to discuss that question now. But we might remember this example of the exercise of the veto next time we are told that the principle of unanimity must apply to en~. pell~ la doctrine de "l'unanimite des membres permanents", voulant apparemment dire que les autres membres permanents devrai- _\t se confor- mer a l'opinion du Gouvernem....l1t sovietique, lorsque ce dernier est seul de son avis. Ceux de lnee collegues qui sont membres permanents ne semblent pas avoir adopte cette interpretation de la doctrine, et je puis dire que je ne l'adopte pas non plus; Tout.efois, ce serait certainement une perte de temps que d'essayer de discuter cette question en ce moment. Mais nous pour~ rons nollS souvenir de cet exemple de l'exercice du veto la prochaine fois qu'an nous dira que le On 5 March, in the course of his remarks in the Council on the Atomic Energy Commis- sion's report, Mr. Gromyko gave what he claimed to be a historical, but what was in fact an inaccurate, account of the origin of the "Great Power veto" in the Security Cou~cil. He said that the principle of the veto, while acquiesced to by the Soviet Government,. ~as originated by the United States and the United Kingdom; and he added that, so far from there hawllg been. any difference of opinion on this question, nobody at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference "even dared to think that there might be some other solution of the question".1 Mr. Gromyko does not explain how his ac- count of the matter is to be reconciled with the fat;t, which he must remember as well as I, that th~ Dumbarton Oaks Coriference was held up for several weeks of a Washington summer in a deadlock over this very question. I should like to refresh his memory by recalling briefly the points of view of ou!' respective delegations, as . expressed in the working papers circulated on the official level before Dumbarton Oaks. The Soviet paper said simply that "decisions_of th.e Council on questions pertaining to the preven- tion or suppression of aggression shall be taken by a majority of votes, including those of all permanent representatives on the Council". TJ1e United Kingdom proposal, however, while ad- mitting that unanimity of the permanent mem- bers should normally be required for decisions on matters of substance, added that s'in any event the votes of parties to a dispute should not be taken into account". It was this last pr lPOSal which, at Dumbarton Oaks, was unacceptable to the Soviet delegation, which insisted throughout that the principledf unanimity should be applied even when a great Power was party toa dispute, and should be en- forced to the extent of barring even the very discussion of such a dispute by the Council. What else were we arguing about at Dumbarton Oaks? Why was it that we had to leave the voting chapter blank? This gap in the proposals was not filled until at Yalta the United States Government proposed the rule that a great Power, party to a dispute; should abstain from voting on decisions for· the peaceful settlement of that dispute. The Soviet Government then finally found itimpossibl~ to resist any longer this rule, which now forms part of the Charter. But it is dear tha~, so far 'from the United States and United Kingdom having been the cham- pions of the unanimity rule, the United Statef! proposal, which we accepted, although. it did M. Gromyko n'explique pas comment son ex- pose de la question peut etre concilie avec le fait, dont il doit se souvenir aussi bien que moi,' que les travaux de la Conference de Dumbarton Oaks n'avaient fait aucun progres pendant plu- sieurs semaines'd'un plein ete de Washington, en raison de l'impasse ou cette meme question nous a\'ait conduits. J'aimerais lui rafraichir la me- moire, en rappe1ant brievement les points de vue de nos delegations respectives, tels qu'ils etaient exprimes dfu.1S les documents de travail officielle-- ment communiques avant Dumbartol1 Oaks. Le ~ocument sovietique disait simplement que "les decisions du Conseil sur des questions concemant la prevention ou la suppression de l'agression sont prises a la majorite des voix, c,elle-ci com,. prenant les voix de tous les membres permanents du Conseil". Neanmoins, la proposition du Royaume-Uni, tout en admettant que l'unani- mite des membres permanents devrait normale- ment etre exigee pour les decisions portant sur des questions de fond, ajoutait "qu'en aucun cas, les voix' des parties a un difi'=rend ne de- vraiem etre prises en consideration". C'est cette demiere proposition qui, a Dum- barton Oaks, semblait inacceptable a la deIega- ' tion sovietique, qui ne cessait d'insister pour que le principe de l'unaninUte s'appliquat meme dans le cas ou une grande Puissance est partie a un differend, et pour qu'on allat meme jusqu'a don- ner a ce prlncipe le 'pouvoir d'empecher la dis- cussion d'un tel.differend devant le Conseil..De quoi d'autre discutions-nous a Dumbarton Oaks? Pourquoi avons-nous dft laisser en blanc le cha. pitre relatifau vote? Cette lacune dans les pro- positions Ii'a ete combIee que lorsque le Gouver- nement des Etats-Unis d'Ambique suggera, a Yalta,qu'une grande Puissance, partie ~ un differend, devait s'abstenir de voter sur les deci- sions concernant le r~glement pacifique' dece differend. Le Gouvemement sovietique se tr'..uva alors, finalement, dans l'impossibilit~ de s'oppO- ser plus longtemps acettc regIe qui fait,main.te- nant partie de la Charte. Mais, loin quo 1e5 Etats-Unis et le Royaume-Uni ~ !Oient faib la; Having sufficiently eStablished my point about the suitability of. this 'case against Albania for the attention of the Council, and having re- cei':ed the requisite numerical majority in favour of my resolution, I cannot refrain from making some reflections on the situation in which tile Council finds itself at the moment. The will of the majority of the Council has been obstructed. I must ask the Council to con- sider the inferences to be drawn from what has happened. The outrage in question occurred on 22 October last. Some delay was caused by our having tried to reach a direct settlement with Albania in accordance with Article 33 of the 'Charter. Tha.t proved hopeless. But that did not prevent the Soviet representative from accusing us of ignonng Article 33 and of not attempting to reach a settlement directly.l I thh"lk, in fact, that our conduct in this case, and our attempts to reach a direct settlement, stand out in con- trast to the' manner in which many other cases have bef'.D brought to the Council without prior notification or attempts at settlement. Anyone who read the correspondence2 will have seen that the Albanian attitude excluded all hopes .of direct settlement. On instructions from my . Qovernment, therefore, I put in a formal request on 10 J;muary that the Council should examine . the matter.s Mter every possible obstruction and delay from various quarters had been inter- posed, the Council held its first hearing on 18 February.'" And here we are, on 3 April, with the Council completely obstructed, sterile and impotent. ' I admit that this case may involve no prob- ability· of an immediate breach of the peace. (That, incidentally, is due to the steadiness and forbearance of our ships, which, even in May of last year, might justifiably have returned, with good effect, the fire which they sustained from the Albania~shore batteries.) But other mOl'e urgent. and more menacing cases may arise, and, if the Security Council is now strangled by a smgle veto, should we have any confidence that it, would he able Of willing to deal effectively with such cases? Here is a.case presented to the Council based on factual e"idence, such as is not often ·sub- mitted to it. We were reluctant to bring the case; we.tried to settle it directly, but met with failure. We could derive some comfort only I Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de secu- rit:, ~euxieme Annee, No 6, page 115. Ibld., Supplement No 3, Annexe 8, pages 41 & 46, et Supplement No 6, Annexe 15, piece IV. I feel that the Council cannot leave the case where it is:, a majority findin",' defeated by a single veto. The Council can do better than that. Under Article 35 of the Charter, the Council may rec- ommend that both parties should submit this dispute to the International Court of JWltice. k I have said, we tried direct negotiations with the Albanian Government but witho~Jtsuc- cess. We then hoped that settlement mig. ~ be possible with the assistance of the Council, which could, we thought, make a finding of fact, so that further direct negotiations might have some prospect of success. But that has proved imI10ssible because of the attitude of the Soviet representative. I therefore suggest that the Council should now recommend that both parties .should immediately refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice. If the Council were to make such a recom- mendation,. I may say that my Government would do its part to fulfil it, promptly and com- pletely. In view of the fact that the Albanian Government agreed to the conditions of the Council's invitation to participate in the discus- sion of this dispute, namely, the acceptance of all .the obligations which a Member of the United Nations would have to assume in a similar case, the Council would, in view of Arti- cle 25 of the Charter, no doubt expect Albania to act with similar promptness. I therefore have the honour to move the fol- lowing resolution: €CThe Security Council, €CHaving considered statements of repre- sentatives of the United Kingdom and of Al- bania concerning a dispute between the United Kingdom and Albania, arising out of an incident on 22 October 1946, in the Strait of Corfu iri which two British ships were dam- aged by mines with resulting loss of life and injury to their crews, ~~Recommends that the United Kingdom and Albanian Governnients should immedi- ately refer the dispute to the International "Le Conseil de securite, "Ayant examine les declarations des repre- sentants du Royaume-Uni et de l'Albanie au sujet d'un differend existant en~re le Royau- me-Uui etl'Albanie a'la suite d'un incident survenu le 22 octobre 1946 dans le detroit de Corfou, au cours duquel deux naviresbritan- . niques ont ete endommages- par des mines, faisant ainsi des morts et· des blesses parmi leurs equipages, "Recommande aux Gouvernements du Royaume-Uni et de l'Albanie de sOlimettre immediatement ce aifferend a la Courinter- Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): The United States delegation wholeheartedly supports' this resolution. At the same time, I should like to expr~ the regret of the United States delegation that the Security Council was unable to take action towards the furthering of a peaceful solution of the case which has been brought before, it. I hope the Council will,find no difficulty in supporting and passing so equi- table a proposition as that made by the repre- sentative of the United Kingdom. expriml~r en meme temps le regret qu'eprouve la delegation des Etats-Unis de voir le Conseil de securite incapable de prendre des mesures pour encourager le reglement pacifique de l'affaire qui lui a ete soumise. J'espere que le Conseil ne verra aucune difficulte a appuyer et a adopter une proposition aussi equitable que celle que vient de suggerer le representant du Royaume~ Uni. Le moins que le Conseil puisse faire est, sem- ble-t-il, de. donner au tribunal impartial que represente la Cour internationale de Justice roe.. casion de reparer, si possible, une partie du dommage cause par l'action du Conseil de se- curite. Ce n'est pas le fait de renvoyer l'affaire a la Cour qui constituerait une reparation,du dommage, mais DOUS avons' tous confiance en l'impartialite de la Cour. M. ARANHA (Bresit) (traduit de l~anglais): Apres avoir' procede aun examen approfondi de l'affaire qui nous a ete soumise, il me semble evident qu'il y a d'abord une question de prin- cipe qu'il importe d'ec1aircir. J'estime done de mon devoir de la signaler' a l'attention du Conseil. I Les declarations faites au cours de nos discus- sior.s prolongees et repetees,les points exposesdans le rapport prOvisoire de la Sous-Commission et les conclusions auxquelles a abouti notre examen des faits et des divers aspects de cette afIaire, ont ,donnt! l'impression que le Conseil fonctionne que1quefois comme une cour d'ar..."trage, et quelquefois comme une cour de justice. Le Conseil de securite n'est pas et ne peut etre une cour de justice. C'est, par excellence, I'or;. gane politique et.executif de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Nos fonctions ne sOnt pas d'ordre judiciaire, et nous ne ndus reunissons pas id en qualite de juges internationaux. SinoD, il serait difficile d'expliquer pourquoi la Cour intematio- nale de Justice a ete maintenue, et ses fonctions elargies aSan-Francisco. Nos fonctions ont ete hien definies dans la Charte, et nous ne pouvons ni les elargir ni les reduire. Si, par suite d'une interpretation erro- nee, ou d'un mauvais exercice de ces fonctions, on tentait de faire Pun ou l'autre, 'onaboutirait pratiquement adesarticuler notre Organisation. Tout en conferant au Conseil des.fonctions eten- dues, je dirai meme elastiques, laOharte les a limitees enstipulant qu'elles doiventetre exercees confonnement aux principes et aux' buts des Nations Unies. QueUe que soitsa nature, un dif- ferend n~ peut faire l'objet de la consideration du Conseil que si la prolongation de ce diffe~nd est susceptible de, menacer le maintien de la pm et de la securit~ internationales. Article 33 of the Charter imposes upon the V Article 33 de la Charte impose aux parties parties to any dispute the obligation to seek first a un diff~rend l'obligation d'en urecllercher la of all CIa solution by negotiation,arbitration,. solution, avant ~out, par voie de negociation . .. .' • I "JlIIiJ l.lI1Ulb1iJllI,!AH '.illilill_I,W:~!'iW;l!:illllfiljlillli"'I!lIlBll(._"I;lj_"'!iii!""""""""-'."" '" " ' 'F It' woula seem that the least the Council can do now is to give the impartial forum, which the International Court of Justice constitutes, .."1 opportunIty to repair, if possible, some of the damage which has been done by the action of the 'Security C01mcij. It is not our action in sending the case which repairs the damage, but we an,have confidence in the impartiality of the Court. Mr. ARANHA (Brazil): After a careful exam- ination of the case before us~ it has become ap- parent to me that there is a prior question of' principle which requires clarification, and con- sequently I feel it ~ my duty to bring this ques- tion to the c~nsilierationof the Council. In the course of our extensive and repeated discussions, as well as in the interim report, of the Sub-Committee and in the consideration of the facts and aspects of this CaseI the feeling gathered frOm what was said, what was set forth, and the .conclusion .reached, was that the Council·was functioning at times as a court of arbitration and at others as a tribunal of justice. The Security Council is not and cannot be a ' tribunal. It is par ~xceU.ence the political and executive organ of the United Nations. Ours is ' not a judiCial function, nor do we meet here as international judges. It would 'be bard other- wise to explain why the International Court of Justice has been maintained and why its func;. nom have been amplified at San Francisco. Our functions have been wen defined· in the Charter, and we can neither brOaden them nor reduce them. Should misconception or misappli- cation bring about an attempt to do so, the re- swt will be' practical disarticulation of our Organization. While vesting the Council with 31,l1ple and even elastic functions, the Charter circumscribed t.lem within the ,provision that they must be discharged in accordance with the prinCiples and purposes of the United Nations. Whatever the nature of a dispute, it can become the object of the Council's consideration only if its continuance is. likely to endanger the main- tena.nce of international peace and 8CCurity. ~;:Jcing into consideration a dilSpute or a situation le cas d'un differend ou d'une situation suscep- likely to endanger peace and security, the. Goun- tible de menacer la paix et la securite, le. Conseil cil has no power to judge but only to investigate n'a nullemt:nt le pouvoir de juger, mais seule" and to recommend appropriate procedures or ment de rechercher et de recommauder les pro- methods of adjustment. In the exammation of cedures ou methodes d'ajustement appropriees. disputes and situations, the Council is not re- Qmmd il proced~ a l'examen di:S differends et stricted, as a court or tribunal would be, to the situations qui lui sont soumis, le Conseil ne doit consideration of proofs, facts, cir~umstances, and pas se borner, comme le ferait u:ae COUl' ou un laws. Our function is political, not judicial. Our tribunal, a etudier les preuves, les faits, lea cir- consideration of a dispute or situation should conc;tances et les lois. Notre fonction a un carac·· limit itself to that part oi the one or the other tere pclitique et non judiciaire. L'examen d'un which may endanger the maintenance of inter- differend ou d't~ne situation· devrait porter national peace and security. Our attributions, uniquement sur ceux des aspects de _cel1e-ci. ou therefore, preclude the consideration of any de celui-la qu~ risquent de menacer le maintien other disputes or situations, under penalty of the de la paix et de-la securite intemationales. Nos enlargement of our competence beyond the lim- attributions excluent done I'~xamen de tout autre its fixed by the Charter. differend ou situation, sous peme d'elargir les limites de notre competence,' telles que la ·Charte les a fixees. This is ·a fundamental question. -If we do not C'est 13. une question fondamentale. Si nous define it accurately now, and if we do not set ne definissons pas, des maintenant,·n.otre compe- the limits for our attributions, this Council will tence de .maniere precise et si nous ne fixonspas become a lower court for all disputes between de limites·anos attributions, le Conseil deviendra natic.ns. un tribunal interleur' pour tous les differends entre les Nations. If the Council considers, however, that the Si le Conseil estime, toutefois; que le differend dispute between. the United Kingdom and Al- survenu entre le Royaume-Uni et l'Albanie re- bania b within its province, because the con- leve de sa competence parce que sa prolongation, tinuance of the dispute, after all peaceful une fois epuires tous les moyens de reglement resources have been exhausted, is likely to en- pacifique, semble devoir menacer la paix et la danger international peace and security, then securite internationales, notre devoir est alo1'S de our function is to pronounce one of the decisions prendre rune des decisions qu'il appartient ex- which are expressly attributed to the Council pressement au Conseil d'adopter en pareils cas. insuch cases. Again, it is not our function to conciliate par- ties, to harmonize differences, to negotiate un- derstandings, to arbitrate disputes, to pronounce sentence. We act principally to protect and en- sure international peace and security, ~phene :'er these are threatened. We have no powers to condemn or to absolve. Our decisions are based exclusively on the interests of international peace and security, and not on other considerations. It is not our prerogative either to punish or fail to punish, to listen to prosecution and defence, or finally, like a body of international jurymen, to deliver a verdiCt. The hope of the Brazilian delegation is, there- fore, that in the future the Council will admit for consideration, after the peaceful resources recommended in Article 33 are exhausted, only those dispute~ whose continuance is likely to endanger international peace and security, pro- vided such menace is ascertained by previous investigation. . For these reasons, we give our full support to the resolution now before us, and we .hope that in the future, when dealing with similar cases, the Council will bear in mind the provisions of Article 36, and refer such disputes, from the beginning, to the International Court of Justice. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): The Syrian dele- gation expressed its opinion on this subject at the last meeting and suggested that the parties might refer this case or try one of the other means outlined in the first paragraph of Article 33 of the Charter. One of them, as I mentioned at that time, was mediation or judicial settle- ment. As the United Kingdom draft resolution which is now presented complies with that sug- gestion, the Syrian delegation has no objection to it and is ready to support it. Mr. LANGE (Poland): I have listened with great interest to the remarks made by the rep- resentative of Brazil, and I have listened to them also with a certain regret that they were not made at an earlier stage of our discussion. I wish to remind this Counf~l that the representative of Poland was the first to take the view that the case was of such a nature that it really did not belong to the Security Council, and that it should be recommended for settlement by other means, accor.cling to Article 33.1 I think that if M. EL-KHOURI (Syrie) (traduit de l'anglais): La delegation de la Syrie a exprime son opinion a ce sujet au cours de la derniere seance, et a propose que les parties aient recours a l'un des autres moyens mentionnes au premier para- graphe de l'Article 33 de la Charte. L'un de ces moyens, comme je l'ai alors declare, est la media- tion ou le reglement judiciaire. Le projet de resolution presente maintenant par le Royaume- Uni etant conforme a cette proposition, la dele- gation de la Syrie n'a rien a y objecter et est prete a rappuyer. M. LANGE (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais): J'ai ecoute les remarques du representant du Bresil avec un vif interet et aussi un certain regret qu'elles n'aient pas ete presentees plus tot. Je desire rappe1er a ce Conseil que le represen- tant de la Pologne a ete le premier a soutenir que, par sa nature, cette affaire n'etait pas de la competence du Conseil de securite et qu'on devrait en recommander le reglement par d'autres moyens, conformement a l'Article 331 • Si le Conseil avait adopte des l'abord cette {agon However, there is a new element in the situa- tion. I heard with great interest the speech of the representative of the United Kingdom; be- fore I make any more fundamental comment on it, I want to mention two minor points which refer to the position taken by the Polish repre- sentative. The representative of the United Kingdom said: "And he (Mr. Gromyko) was followed by the Polish representative, who told us that there was no case; who said there was no need for a sub-committee; and who yet chose to serve on that Sub-Committee and to complicate its de~ liberations." First, I want to introduce a slight correction. I remember well that the representative of Poland at the time did not say in advance that there was no case, bu~ stated that it was not a case which belonged to this Council and that it should be settled by other means, a view in which the representative of Syria concurred, and now belatedly the representative of Brazil, and I believe this probably also applies to many. other members of this Council. The representative of the United Kingdom also said that the Polish representative chose to complicate the deliberations of the Sub-Com- mittee. Did he choose to complicate them by asking for relevant facts? If an attempt to ascer- tain facts means complication of deliberations, then we fully plead guilty to the charge. In reading and listening to the speech of the representative of the Uplted Kingdom, I find that one half of the speech really refers to quite a different subject, which bears :qo relation to the matter before us, namely, to the question of the veto. To be frank, I really think this point was somewhat out of order, because the question of the veto is not on our agenda for these delibera- tions. But since it has been raised, some of the representatives may probably want to discuss it in replying to the arguments of the United Kingdom repr~entative. My whole feeling about the statement which was made by the representative of the United Kingdom is one of great regret that he chose to use the dispute between the United Kingdom and Albania to put over on the Council a small piece of political propaganda about the veto, and other things which might well be discussed However, since certain arguments about the veto have been put forward, and since certain delegations, including my own, wish to answer them, we shall require some time for study and for the formulation of our views. I think it might be advisable, in view of the new situation cre- ated, to postpone the discussion of the whole problem to a later meeting and, in order to have time to take a stand on the new situation, to adjourn this meeting now.. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (trans- lated from French): As I have already had occasion to point out, the fact that mines have been secretly laid in waters used for maritime navigation is incontestably serious. Its-repetition would certainly be liable to affect peace and security. It would therefore be disastrous~ in my opin- ion, if the Council, being seized of this matter, which falls within its competence, proved in- capable of taking a decision. It would be a seri- ous admission of impotence, and public opinion would draw its own conclusions regarding the value of the security which, because of the vot- ing rules, States could expect from the United Nations. The United Kingdom representative has pro- posed that the Council should recommend to the parties to submit their dispute to the Interna- tional Court of Justice. Such a recommendation complies with the terms of the Charter. It is in conformity with a' method of settlement to which the Belgian Government has always been faithful. In our opinion, the Security Council should be unanimous in its approval.

I did not understand the Polish representative to have formally moved for an adjournment. That is why I did not put his suggeStion to a vote. Does the Polish representative wish to put it forward formally? . Je voudrais demander au Conseil de dissocier le differend dont nous nous occupons de toute tentative visant a utiliser ce differend a des :fins de propagande politique, soit contre le Gouvernement de l'Albanie, soit contre tout autre Gouvernement, qu'il soit ou qu'il ne sait pas Membre des Nations Unies. Cependant, comme certains arguments relatifs au veto ont ete avances, et comme certaines deIe~ gations, y compris la mienne, d6lirent y repondre, il nous faudra quelque temps pour 1<'8 etudier et formuler nos vues. Je pense qu'il serait opportun, etant dOllne qu'une nouvelle situation a ete creee, de remettre la discussion de rensemble du probleme a une seance ulterieure et, pour pouvoir nous former une opinion ace sujet, ~'ajourner maintenant la seance. M. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgique): Ainsi que j'ai eu l"occasion de le signaler precedemment, le fait que des mines aient ete secretement . mouillees dans des eaux utilisees pour la navigation maritime est d'une incontestable gravite. Sa repetition serait certainement de nature a affecter la paix et la securite. Il serait desastreux, amon avis, que le Conseil, dftment saisi de ce fait qui est de sa competence, demeurat incapable de prendre une decision. Ce serait un grave aveu d'impuissance, et l'opinion publique yverrait la mesure des garanties de securite que, en raison des regles de votation, les Etats peuvent attendre de I'Organisation des Nations Unies. Le representant du Royaume-Uni propose que le Conseil recommande aux parties de saisir la Cour internationale de Justice de leur differend. Semblable recommandaticn repond aux }>Tescriptions de la Charte. Elle est conforme a un mode de reglement auquel le Gouvernement belge a ete constamment fidele. A notre avis, le Conseil de securite devrait etre unanime a I'approuver. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de I'anglais): J'ai cm que le representant de la Pologne n'avait pas presente officiellement une motion d'ajournement. C'est pourquoi je n'avais pas mis sa proposition aux voix. Le representant de la Pologne desire-t-il presenter une motion officielle dan.:; ce sens? ' D'autre part, je ne pense pas qu'il nous faille entamer un debat en regIe sur cette question, ni maintenant, ni dans un avenir rapproche, a - moins que le Conseil n'en decide autrement. On the other hand, I do not think we need go into a full-fledged debate upon that question either now or in the near future, unless the Council decides otherwise. Since the Polish representative has formally moved for adjournment, I shall take the view of the Council by asking it to vote on the motion. Before the vote, however, I shall call upon the Soviet Union representative who has asked for recognition. Sir Ale'1Cander CAnOOAN (United Kingdom): A point of order, Mr. President: do the rules of procedure not say that a motion for adjournment has to be voted on without discussion?l

Yes. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): May I be permitted to speak?

Are you going to speak on the point of order? Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)· (translated from Russian): In so far ..• (The speech was interrupted by the representative of the United Kingdom). May I speak or not? I wish to deal with this proposal and I want the Council to listen to what I am going to say. I wish to touch upon the question raised by the representative of Poland. That does not altogether please Sir Alexander Cadogan. I fully agree that the greater part of the speech by the representative of the United Kingdom has nothing to do with the question. If I have properly understood the speech by the representative of the United Kingdom, the point he wished to make was that the United Kingdom was not one of those who took the initiative in proposing that the veto clause should be included in the Charter of the United Nations in this particular form. I am prepared to admit that of the two parties which took the initiative in that matter, the United Kingdom was party No. 2 and the United States party No. 1. l: am prepared to agree within those limits. Sir ~Jex­ ander Cadogan's statement, in so far as it is in accordance with the facts, merely confirms my statement of 5 March to the effect that the clause contained in the Charter concerning the Puisque le representant de la Pologne a presente officiellement une motion d'ajournement, je demanderai l'opinion du Conseil en mettant cette proposition aux voix. Cependant, avant de passer au vote, je vais donner la parole au representant de l'Union sovietique qui l'a demandee. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Une motion d'ordre, Monsieur le President. Le reglement interieur ne stipule-t-il pas qu'1.U1e motion d'ajournem~t doit Stre votee sans debat1? Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Oui. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques sodalistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Puis-je prendre la parole? . Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Est-ce sur la motion d'ordre? M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Etant. donne que ... (Le discours de M. Gromyko est interrompu par une intervention du representant du Royaume-Uni). Ai-je ou non la parole? Je veux parler de cette proposition, et je tiens a ce qu'on ecoute ce que je vais dire. Je veux parlei de la question soulevee par le repre,sentant de la Pologne; cela ne plait pas beaucoupaSir Alexander Cadogan. Je suis pleinement d'accord sur le fait que la plus gral\de partiede l'intervention du representant du Royaume-Unin'a aucun rapport avec la question. Si je l'ai bien compris) le representant du Royaume-Uni s'est efforce de montrer que le Royaume-Uni n'etait pas parmi les pays qui ont pris l'initiative de proposer d'inserer dans la Charte des Nations Unies les dispositions relatives au veto qui yfurent incIuses. Je sui."lpret a admettre que, des deux pays qui ont pris cettc initiative, le RoyaUJ.ile-Uni y avait la seconde part et les Etats-Unm la premiere. Je suis pret alui accorder cela) mais cela seulement. Dans la mesure ou la declaration de Sir Alexander Cadogan correspond a la realite, elIe ne fait que confirmer ma declaration du 5 mars, OU fai dit que c'etaient les Etats-Unis et le Royaume-Uni qui avaient propose les dispositions de la Charte Mr. LOPEZ (Colombia): I am not quite sure that this is a point of order, but since the representative of the Soviet Union was given the floor to discuss the motion for adjournment, I take it that, whether it is a point of order or not, I can say a few words on the motion of the Polish representative. I know that, according to our 'rules of procedure, a motion for adjournment should be decided upon without debate. I do not propose to debate Mr. Lange's proposal but simply to call for some clarification either from the Chair or from the Polish representative. The Polish representative has moved for adjournment, on the ground that the statement made by Sir Alexander Cadogan brings the veto into this debate and that the question is not relevant to the Albanian dispute. If we follow Mr. Lange's suggestion that,the veto question should not be discussed because it is not relevant, I find it rather contradictory to propose adjournment. If we are not going to discuss the veto question, there is no reason why we should adjourn. It seems to me that :we should go on with the Albanian question. Of course, should we plan to discuss the veto question and if' that has-in fact been proposed by Sir Alexander Cadogan, the position is entirely different. In that case, I shall vote for the adjournment, because I really believe it woiIld be very useful, at the present stage of our deliberations, to-discuss how the veto operates in our work. I think it is highly relevant to the whole position of the United Nations to see whether we should adhere to the initial contention that the veto should stand without modification and that the Charter should not be amended, as has been heId.very consistently by the major Powers, the permanent members _of the Council, or whether it would be advisable'to consider the possibility of amending the Charter, in order to amend or regulate the exercise of the veto as it has been practised; I believe it would be highly useful'to do '-so. I, for one~ believe that most of a~sez paradoxal de proposer l'ajournement. Si nous ne devons pas discuter la question du veto, il n'y a aucune raison d'ajourner la seance. J'estime que nous devrions poursuivre la discussion de-l'affaire albanaise. Bien entendu, la situation est tout a fait differente si nous envisageons de discuter la question du veto, a supposeI' que Sir Alexander Cadogan ait reeIIement propose de le faire. Dans ce cas, je voterai en faveur de l'ajournement, car je suis fermement persuade qu'ilserait tres utile, dans la phase actueIIe de nos deliberations, de discuter de la maniere dont le veto intervient dans nos travaux. II est, je crois, parfaitement conforme a.l'esprit general de l'Organisation des Nations Unies d'examiner si nous devons nous en tenir a.. la these ihitiale, seIon laquelle le veto doit subsister sans modification et aucun amendement ne doit etre apporte ala Charte, comme les grandes Puissances, membres permanents du Conseil, l'ont soutenuavec tant d'opiniatrete; ou s'il serait opportun d'envisager un amendement de la Charte tendant amodifier ou areglementer I'exercice du veto, vu la .rnaniere dont Therefore, I would request the Chair to call on the Polish representative to clarify this point. I should like to know, particularly, whether we shall adjourn for the purpose of discussing at our next meeting the whole problem, including the possibility of making some remarks on the veto, or, if not, whether we shall simply discuss the Albanian question and take a little more time to discuss the proposal sublnitted by the United Kingdom representative. The PRESIDENT: I am afraid that the Chair, in a momentary departure from the rule of procedure that a motion for adjournment should be voted upon without debate, has led us further afield in our discussions. In reply to the remarks of the Colombian representative, I think that, since we have the Corfu Channel incidents on our ageDlila, we should continue to discuss them. As regards any discussion on the veto, any member who wishes to have it placed on the agenda can do so by making a request in accordance with our rules of procedure. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): I only wanted to contribute a little, if I could, to clearing up what appears to be a misunderstandin/5' I made no suggestion for discussion of the veto. I consider that I was perfectly entitled to make certain reflections on what happened at our last meeting on this subject, as any representative is entitled to do. I made no proposal for such discussion. Of course, if anybody wishes to place the question on the agenda of the Council, he is entitled to do so, and I should be happy to join in a debate, which I should not expect, however, to result in any valuable conclusion.

Thank you. That is the understanding of the Chair. Mr. Parodi, do you wish to speak on a point of order? Mr. PAROD! (France) (translated from French): What I had to say constituted a point of order only in so far as it was connected with previous statements. I prefer not to consider it as a point of order and to abstain from speaking at the moment. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): When I suggested that it was difficult for me to discuss this draft resolution as I had not previously studied it, I was not linking up this matter with the question of the veto or with any other question. My sole reason is that I am unable to discuss the substance of this new prop.osal now. A number of questions arise in connexion therewith whiCh must be thought over and studied. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): Mr. President, does that motion mean adjournment until this afternoon to give time for study, or adjournm~t until another day?

I think it means until another day, not until this afternoon. I understand that several members of the Council are very much averse to meeting again this afternoon. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): A point of order, Mr. President. I think there are two motions for adjournment: one by the Polish representative, and one by the Soviet Union representative. The first one, as I understood it, meant simply to dismiss discussion of the resolution which is before us. The Soviet representative~s mooon gave reasons for an adjoununent for which we are ready to vote. Tile PRESIDENT: I understood that the Soviet representative merely supported the Polish motion for adjournment; I shall ask the Polish representative to re-state his motion. Mr. ~GE (Poland): I have to clear up a misunderstanding. My motion for adjournment did not mean a motion to dismiss the discussion of the resolution. Since the representative of the Unite4 Kingdom has introduced problems into the debate which were not introduced before, I thought it desirable that the representatives should be given some time -to make up their minds and to separate the different problems, in particular~ to separate the relevant from the irrelevant ones. The represeIitative of the Soviet Union has brought in an additional, personal request, which is simply that he wishes time to study the resolution. Of course, the adoption of my resolution would give him the time he requires.

Wc shall now votc on adjbuming..the meeting, probably until next Wednesday, because our time is taken on Monday and Tuesday. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Monsieur le President, cette motion signifie-t-elle que la seance sera ajournee a cet apres-midi pour nous donner le temps d'etudier la question, ou qu'elle sera renvoyee a un autre jour? Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais): Je pense que cette motion tend aajoumer la seance aun autre jour, et non a cet apres-midi. Je crois que plusieurs membr~ du Conseil sont fortement opposes ace que nous nous reunissions de nouveau cet apres-midi. M. EL-KHOURI (Syrie) (traduit de l'ang1ais) : Une motion d'ordre, Monsieur le President. Je pense qu'il y a deux motions d'ajournement: l'Une soUlnise par le representant de la Pologne, l'autre par le representant de I'Union sovietique. La premiere, si je comprends bien~ tend tout simplement afaire abandonner la discussion de lapre~nte resolution. Celle du representant de rUnion sovietique donne, en faveur d'un ajoumement, des raisons auxquelles nous nous rallions. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais): Si j'ai bien compris, le representant sovietique a simplement appuye la motion d'ajournement du representant de la Pologne. Je demande au representant de la Pologne de bien vouloir presenter de nouveau sa motion. M. LANGE (Pologne) (traduit de l'ang1ais): Je voudrais dissiper un malentendu. La motion d~ajournement ne visait nullement afaire abandonner la discussion de la resolution. Le representant du Royaume-Uni ayant introduit dans le debat des elements qui ne s~y trouvaient pas auparavant, j'ai pense qu'il etait opportun de donner aux representants le temps de reflechir et de distinguer clairement les difi'erentsproblemes, notamment, ceux qui ont trait ala question et ceux qui s'en.ecartent. Le representant de l'Union sovietique a introduit en outre une requete personnelle: il de- ~ande simplement qu'on lui accorde un delai pour etudier la resolution. n va de soi que si ma resolution est adopt~, il obtiendra ce dBai. Le PRtSIDENT (traduit de l'anglzzis) : Je mea maintenant aux voix l'ajournement de la seance, probablement a mercredi prochain, car nous ne sommes libres ni lunm, ni mardi. Votes against: Australia Belgium Colombia Abstentions: China France United Kingdom

The result of the vote is: five in favour of adjourning, three against, and three abstentions. The motion is not carried. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): It seems to me that the Polish and Soviet proposals have been mixed up and I would therefore ask that the Soviet proposal, raised by me, might be put to the vote as it stands: to postpone the consideration of this question because, as the Soviet representative, I desire to study the resolution submitted. I am not linking it up with the question of the veto or with any other question. I simply want to study this resolution further and I .ask you not to confuse .this with the Polish proposal, at any rate as it was understood at the beginning, and not to link it up with the question of the veto. I simply wish to study this resolution further. That is my only reason. I request that my proposal should be voted on, taking into consideration the reasons I have given.

I am glad that the Soviet representative has made a simple motion for adjournment. I should support his motion for adjournment for the simple reason that he has given. I have not seen this text before, and I think that, when any member of the Council asks for more time to study a resolution, he is entided to it. I did not support the Polish motion, because the Polish representative gave extraneous reasons for the adjournment. I shall now put the Soviet motion to the vote without further debate. Does the representative of Australia wish to speak on a point of order? Colonel HODGSON (Australia): It is hardly a point of order, but everybody seems to be using a point of order to get in a word this morning. As I was one of those who voted against the adjournment, I should like to make it clear that I voted against the Polish motion. In my opinion, the Polish representative made statements Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le vote a donne les resultats suivants: cinq voix en faveur de l'ajoumement, trois contre, et trois abstentions. La motion n'est pas adoptee. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): n me semble qu'on a confondu ies propositions polonaise et sovietique. Je demande done que la proposition sovietique soit mise aux voix telle que je I'ai presentee. J'ai demande d'ajoumer la discussion de cette question parce que, en ma qualite de representant sovietique, je veux etudier la resolution qui nous a ete presentee. Je ne rattache cette question ni au probleme du veto, ni a aucun autre probleme. Je veux simplement etudier cette resolution de plus pres, et je vous demande de ne pas confondre ma proposition avec la proposition polonaise, tout au mains telle qu'on l'a comprise au debut. Je vous demande done de ne pas la rattacher a la question du veto; je veux simplement etudier cette resolution de plus pres. C'est ma seule consideration. Je vous demande de tenir compte de mes raisons et demettre ma proposition aux voiX. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je suis heureux de constater que le representant de rUnion sovietique presente une simple motion d'ajournement. J'appuierai cette motion pour la raison toute simple qu'il a lui-meme donnee. Je n'ai pas vu ce texte ~uparavant, et j'estime que tout membre du Conseil qui desire un delai pour etudier une resolution est en droit de l'obtenir. Je n'ai pas appuye la motion de la Pologne, parce que le representant de ce pays a donne en faveur de l'ajournement des raisons etrangeres a la question. Je vais mettre maintenant la motion. de l'Union so~ietique aux voix sans debat prealable. Le representant de l'Australie desire-t-il parler sur une motion d'ordre? Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): 11 ne s'agit pas exactement d'une motion d'ordre, mais, ce matin, chacun semble se servir de cc moyen pour obtenir la parole. Etant I'un de ceux qui ont vot~ contre l'ajoumement, je desire souligner que man opposition etait dirigee contre la motion de la Pologne. A mon avis, le representant de la

All those who are in-favour of the Soviet motion to adjourn the discussion of this item until next Wednesday afternoon will please raise their hands. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Que tous ceux qui sont en faveur de la motion presentee par l'Union sovietique en vue d'ajourner la discussion a mercredi apres-mid~ levent la .main.

The motion for adjournment is unanul10usly adopted. The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): La mo- tion d'ajournement est adoptee al'unanimite. La seance est levee a12 h. 55. UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES Security Council PublicatiollS Publications du Conseil de securite Journal of the Security Council (18 January - 11 July 1946), bilingual: English-French. 42 tssues, 86~ pages, the set , $4.20 Supplements to the Security Council Official R.ecords, First Year, Second Series, bilingual: English-French. Supplements Nos. 1 to 10, 190 pages, the set $1.95 Special Supplement: Report of the Sub-Committee on the , Spanish Question, 104 pages, English edition $ .90 ProvIsional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, English edition $ .20 Journal du Conseil de seturite (18 ianvier-11 iuillet 1946),bilingue:anglais-franr;ais, 42 numeros,. 868 pages, la serie $4,20 Les numeros 1 a 42 du Journal du Conseil de se- curite contiennent sous forme· provisoire, les procC~s­ verbaux des 49 premieres seances du Conseil de secu- rite. Ces proces-verbau.x sont actuellement reedites et paraitront ulterieurement sous le titre: Proces- verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, P"emiere Annee, Premiere Serie. La publication du Journal du Conseil de securite a ete interrompue le 11 juilkt IM~ .' . Proces -verbaux officiels du Conseil de secl..rite" Premiere Annee, Seconde Stfrie, bilingue: anglais- fran'Sais. froces-verbaux officiels Nos 1 a29, cinquantieme seance a quatre-vingt-huitieme seance, 702 pages, la serie $4,90 Supplements aux proces-verbaux officiels du Con- seil de securite, Premiere Annee, Seconde Serie, bilingue: anglais-franr;ais. Supplements Nos 1 a 10, 190 pages, la serie $1,95 Supplement special: Rapport du Sous-Comite charge de . la question espagnnle, 104 pages, edition franc;aise ,$0,90 Les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, Deuxieme Annee, ainsi que les Supplements, sont en cours de publication. Une liste de ceux qui sont deja livrables peut 'etreobtenue sur demande adressee aux agent~ de vente. • Reglement interieur provisoire du C~nseil de securite, edition fran'Saise ~ 'O.20 \. ARGENTINA-ARGENTINE, Editorial Sudamericma S.A. Calle .Alsina 500 Buenos Aires DOMINICAN REPUBLIC REPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE Librerfa Dominicana Cane Mercedes No. 49 Apartado 656 Ciudad Trujillo ECUADOR-EQUATEUR Muiioz Hermanos yeia. Nueve de Octubre 703 Casilla 10·24 Guayaqull" AUSTRA.LIA-AUSTRALIB H. A. Goddard'Pty. Ltd. ' 255a George Street Sydney , BELGIUM-BELGIQUE Agence et Me~sageriesde la Presse 14.22 rue du Persil . ,Bruxelles F~FINLANDE Akateeminen Kirjakauppa " 2, Keskauskatu Helsinki FRANCE---FRANCE Editiom A. Pedone '13, lrue Souftlot ParisV- GREEC~kCE BOLIVlA-BOLWIB Lihreria Cientifica y . Literaria Avenida16 de Julio, 216 Casilla 972 - LaPaz "E1efthero~daki8" Lihrairie intemationale Place de la Constitution Athenes I GUATEMALA GUATEMALA Jose Goubaud Goubaud & Cia. Ltda. Sucesor 5a Av. Sur No. 6 y 9a C. P. Guatemala HAITI-'HAITI Mu Bouchereau Librairie "A la Caravelle" Boite postale 111·B Port·au·Prince . CANADA~ANADA TheRyerson Pres9 299 Queen StreetWest Toronto CHlLE-CHILI Edmundo'Pizarro Merced846 . Santiago CHINA-CHINE The Commercial Press Ltd. 211 Honan Road Shanghai COSTARICA COSTA.RICA.' Trejos Hermanol Apartado 1313 San Jose INDIA-1NDE OxfordBook & Stationery Co. CUBA-CUBA La Casa Belga Rene de Smedt O'Reilly 455 La Hab&na I Scindia House New Delhi mAN-IRAN, \ Bangahe Piaderow ·731 Shah Avenue Teheran " IRAQ-lRAK Mackenzie"& Mackenzie The Bookshop Baghdad 'CZECHOSLOVAKIA TCHECOSLt;JVAQUIE F. Topic Narodni Trlda 9 Prahal . DENMARK-",DANEMARK Einar lWunskgaard Norregade6 J:lobeuhau LEBANON-LIBAN . Lihrairie umverselle Beirut NETHERLANDS PA.YS·BAS~ N. V. Martinus Nijho:l Lange Voorhout 9 e'Gravenhege NEW ZEALAND NOUVELLE.ZELANDB Gordon & Gotch .Warmg ~aylor Street Wellington NORWAY-NORYEGE Norsk BokimportA/S Ed:v. StttrJD8 Gate 1 Oslo SWEDEN-5UEDB "AB C. E. Fritzes Kungl Hofbokhandel Fredsgaian 2 Stockholm SWITZE~UISSB Librame Payot S. A. Lausanne .... • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••• •••••• '- Hans Raunhardt Kirchgasse 17 , Zurichl SYRIA-::'-SERlB Librairie universeUe Damascus UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA UNION ~UD.AFRlCAINE CentralNewsAgencyLtd. Commissioner &: Rissik She Johannesburg UNITED KINGDOM ROYAUME·UNI H.M. Stationery Office P.O. Box 569 London, S.E. 1 . UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ETATS·UNIS D'AMERIQUE , Intemational Documents Service / Columbia University Prus 2960 Broadway New York 27, N. Y. \ YUGOSLAVIA YOUGOSLAVIE Drzavno Preduzece lugoslovenskaKnjiga _ . Moskovska Ul.a6 Belgrade