S/PV.1251 Security Council

In accordance with previous decisions. 1 propose to invite the representatives of India and Pakistan to take part in our discussions. 2. 1 invite the representative of India to take a seat at the Council table. 3. 1 invite the representative of Pakistan to take a Seat at the Council table. At fhe invitation of the President, Mr. 2. A. Rhutto fpakistaa) fook a place af the Coumil fable.

Before continuing the debate, may1drs.w the attention of xnembers of the Council to the draft resolution sponsored by Bolivia. the Ivory Coast, Malaysia, the Netberlands and Uruguay [S/6876]. 5. The Council Will “ow continue its consideration of the item on its agenda. The first speaker on my list is the representative of Uruguay. First, however, Ishall cal1 upon the rspresentative of France who has asked tQ speak. “Reaffirms its resolution 211 (1965) in $1 its parts”. The translater. probably in a desire for elegance, translated that paragraph: “Réaffirme l’ensemble de sa résolution 211 (1965).“, ‘- - which is. 1 repeat, perhaps a more elegant, but a less correct version of a paragrapb to which manydelegations attach great importance. 7. Therefore 1 should like TO ask you. Mr. President, for permission to translate operative paragraph 1 of that draft resolution as follows: “Reaffirme sa résolution 211 (1965) dans toutes ses parties”. -

Ithank the reprenentative of France for his comments on the French translation of the document we are going to discuss and 1 request the appropriate section of the Secretariat to take note of this correction.

The dispute between lndia and Pakistanover the State of Jammu and Kashmir directly involves peoples who make up almost one-quarter of the population of the earth. Since that is the case, it might be said that this question imperils the fateofall Asia. As Mr. Shastri, the Prime Minister of India, said in his letter of 14 September 1965: “. . . the world may’find itself embroiled in conflict which may well annihilate mankind.” [Sec S/6683. para. 8.1 In turn, President Ayub Khan of Pakistan on 13 September 1965 said tbat we must “save the subcontinent from being engulfed in what would clearly be an appalling catastrophe” [ibid., para. 91. 10. Such facts lead us to inescapable conclusions. First, no amount of attention, tact, tare and prudence given to the consideration of thls problem Will be excessive. Secondly, the responsibility of the great Powers in the consideration and application of solutions is enormous. Lastly. those of us in this Couucil who bave lesser obligations are in duty bound to remain silent at times about the trutbs In which we believe in order to be constructive and useful. But we cannot avoid the responsibility of stating where we stand. 11. Given tbese conclusions, 1 must. as the representative of the Government of Uruguay, say a few words. 12. First, we endorse the unanimous concernstressed. in this most recent episode through which we are living, by the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Malaysia-about the 14. Thirdly. Uruguay votedforresolutions 209 (1965). 210 (1965). 211 (1965) and 214 (1965). of 4. 6. 20 and 27 September. In doing SO, my delegation stated that it understood that the Security Council was considering the problem of Kashmir as a whole: that is, hoth the present crisis and the need to make some effective contribution to removing the cause of the crisis. This rireans. in our view. that resolution 211 119651 imnlies . - I - - . ---~ that the protagonists should make a triple commitment: a cesse-fire, withdrawal of troops and armed personnel, a decision or a desire to consider what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the hasic problem which has heen under the jurisdiction of the Security Council since 1948. TO think otherwise would be to close one’s eyes to the facts. If we are given a bleeding foct with a raw wound, it is logical to cure it. anaesthetize it and calm the pain. But it would be neither wise nor adequate to do ail that and then to put back the saine shoe SO that the same puncturing nail, becoming sharper each day, would immediately reopen the wound. What would bave been gained? How ca” we not but think it logical to oppose a retnrn to facing the cause of the crisis without any guarantee that it would receive. at the very least. immediate attention from the Council? 15. With this thought in mind. 1 personally triedduring the period when 1 had the honour to he President of the Council-to see If it was possible to hring the parties concerned together SO that. if there was a feeling that the spirit of operative paragraph 4 of resolution 211 (1965) wûs being respected, it mightbe possible to insist on an immediate cesse-fire and the complete withdrawal of armed personnel. 1 found the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan quite willing to undertake direct conversations. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of India also gave me sure gnarantees that his Government was willing to achieve a complete and immediate cesse-fire and to respect the line of 5 August. This was a11 an initial step before nny conversations of a political nature. 1 agree with the Secretary-General’s desire to obtain at this stage from tbe Governments of India and Pakistan a statement analogous or similar to that made by them on 29 Eovember 1962. That would be a basis for the 16. Fourthly. in his statement of 25 October to the Security Council 11247th meeting], the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan-while speaking about the concrete problem of the cesse-fire and withdrawal of troops-made in dramatic manne= a series of grave charges about the whole problem of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and invited the Council to substantiate the truth of his charges. We recognize that that statement creates a profound impression, but it should not be a condition for the cesse-fire and withdrawal of troops. At the same time, we should like to point out that the Council’s reply should net merely be a debate on the forma1 aspects of the application of the resolutions in question, although that may be of vital importance. 17. As long ago as 1948, the Council appointed first a commission [resolution 39 (1948)]. and later in 1957 its President [resolution 123 (1957)], to collect direct information on the spot. The experience was fruitful. My deiegation, if there seemed to be a favourable atmosphere for it. would support the ides that our President or a special three-mari committee should be entrusted with the task of gathering impressions on the situation in Jammu and Kashmir without the power to investigate. 18. Fifthly. the Security Council is on the eve of facing other problems concerning the self-determination of peoples. lts legal. moral andpoliticalauthority depends on its subsoquent acts and conduct. What the Council says and does now regarding this lamentable situation will constitute a precedent for the situations with which the Council may bave to deal tomorrow. We certainly realize that a complete and effective cesse-fire and the withdrawal of troops and armed personnel must be achieved immediately, but we are quite convinced that this will only check the effects; it Will leave the cause untouched. Since this is the case, any breeze might fan the flames again unless we do something specific to prevent it. 19. Sixthly, the time factor-the mere passage of years-has an overwhelming influence. This dispute has already been before the Council for eighteen years. No one could contend that the present-day realities are identical with tiiose of 1947 and no one cari deny that the present-day realities bave legal and political consequences which affect the rights clalmed by the parties. Often time, the passage of time, is a wise arhitrator of troublesorne situations. In the present case we are concerned lest time may be giving rise to complications: instead of working as a sedatlve. it may become a cause of aggravation. For this reason, the Council cannot renounce its obligation to work towards a solution of a dispute which might be termed a threat to universal peace. 21. Lastly. it merely remains for me to regret the absence of any representatives of the Government of 1ndIa from this debate and the withdrawal of the representative of India from this chamber. As Pmsident of the Council. 1 considered it my duty to do ail 1 could to ensure the presence of the representative of India and 1 must pay a tribute to the very kind attention he paid to my request. For that reason, since I was aware of bis state of mind. 1 did allow myself to speak as President in order to prevent something wbich 1 considered was hardly conducive to direct understanding between the parties. Without impairing the President’s position of complete impartiality. 1 acted in accordance with my judgementwithout giving any views on any substantive matters and without attempting to restrict the right of freedom of speech. Now 1 urge the representative of India, and 1 think 1 am expressing the feelings of ail of us. to honour us with his presence and to co-operate with us in oui heartfelt desire to relax the tension which exists between two noble and friendly peoples.

In OUI present debate on the conflict between India and Pakistan various questions bave corne up which. although they are a11 in some way related to the implementation of the Council’s resolutions. nevertheless belong to two different categories. On the one hand, some members bave discussed the oteps taken by the Secretary- General for the execution of these resolutions and the fiiancing of the operation. Those are questions which, as the representative of the Soviet Union put it, bave some significance In terms of prhmiple, questions which reflect old differences of approach. On the other hand, the reports of the Secretary-General oblige us to pay attention to a number of unsatisfactory aspects of the implementation of our resolutionsnotably, at the present stage, the cesse-fire and the withdrawal of armed personnel. For the sake oi clenrness, 1 intend to deal first with the more general, principal aspect-that is. the Secretary-General? mandate and the financing-and thereafter with thv cesse-fire and the withdrawal of armed forces. 23. In dealing with the conflict between India an< Pakistan. the Security Cou&l has up to now beer able to a& with unanimity or near unanimity. Tht greatest significance of that lies in the fact that thc Co~ncil In a11 its four resolutions has been able tc achieve the unanimity of the permanent members That is a new and hopeful departure. because that ir how the Seourity Council was originally intended h OPerate. For many years it had heen virtually im. possible to ohtain the unanimity of the permanen memhers on almost any important subject. hiy dele. gation was therefore highly gratified at this return b 24. It would, however, bave been unrealistic to assume that the basic differences of opinion with regard tc the organisation and fïnancing of peace-keeping operations-differences with which we are allfamiliar and which played such a large and almost disastrous part during the nineteenth session of the General Assembly-would suddenly disappear. Therefore, it is certainly net surprising that at this moment, when the Security Council has initiated a new peacekeeping operation in the India-Pakistan conflict, the old differences of approach should corne out again in our debate-as they did, inparticular. on 25 October 1965 [1247th meeting]. Now that the question has been brought up. 1 should like to make clear my delegation’s attitude on the subject. 25. In doing SO, 1 should like above a11 to emphasise that my delegation cari find no fault with the mariner in which the Secretary-General has acquitted himself of the heavy and very difficult task imposed upon him by the Council. As has been proved here in the statements, supported by quotations, made by several speakers in the debate, the resolutions of the Council gave him a clear mandate to carry those resolutions into effect. and he did SO exoeditiouslv. Furthermore, in doin& SO he reported r&larly a& elaborately to the Council, in no less thar ten reports, on a11 the steps he had taken. If the Council had been of t!l@ opinion that in some way the Secretary-General had gone too far, it could bave expressed that view in connexion with any on@ of his reports-but it did not do SO. 26. That being said, however, 1 should add that the matter does net rest there. Our debate has shovm that there are basic orincioles involved. on which the permanent membersdo n& entirely airie. This &y delegation highly regrets and 1 should like to make an attempt to find a practical way out, which we hop@ mould enable the members of the Council to maintain their unanimity in a case SUC~ as this. 27. There is no urgent need at the present moment for the Security Council to lay down once and for a11 rcles or precedents for future peace-keeping operations. The Security Council is confronted today only with the practical oroblem of how to bave its resolutiens cariied out in the most effective way, without prejudice to future decisions on principle by the General Assembly, and in a mariner which cari command the unanimous support of its members. It is highly desirable, both for the restoration of peace between India and Pakistan and for future operatlons, that we should find such a method. The Security Council has raised great hopes and restored confidence in the United Nations by its unanimous and determined action in this conflict. It would be traeic if we were to squander part of that gain by differences of opinion, no matter how fandamenlJ, over the margin of authority between thr different organs of the United Nations. My delegation believes that it 29. Tbe second school of thougbt bolds that the Seïuritv Council should be entitled. if not cbliwd. to prono&ce itself upon tbe main characteristi:: of a particular operation initiated in tbe execution of its resolutions. Those directives should, according to the coutries bolding tbat view, deal with sucb aspects as tbe strengtb. tbe composition. the command, the duration and the financing of p?ace-keeping forces. 30, With regard to tbe financing, tbe Çvfi!cil b;.ould. in tbat view, indicate a ceiling for the expenditores on the basis of tbe Secretary-General’s proposa& and indicate a metbod of financing. Within the content of the directives of tbe Seourity Council, tbe Secretary- General sbould then bave freedom of acticn to take ths neeessary steps for the implementation of Sectirity Couccil resolutions. 31. Different variations of flexibility of this point of view are possible. Tbe reasoning behind tbis attitude is tbat under tbe present system extensive commitments are being made on behalf of the United Nations before tbe Security Commit knows it, commitments which could afterwards not be rejected even if tbe Council sbould wisb to do SO. So much for tbe second school of thought. 32. Tbere is a third school of thought, which goes even furtber and bolds tbat decisions concerning a11 aspects of peace-keeping forrps should emanate exclusively from the Security Council. 33. My delegation believes tbat if the aim is to guarantee a certain degree of control by the Security Cou&l over the execution of its own resolutions, it is possible to arbieve ,that by steering a niiddle course, based on a few general considerations. A first, and in our view self-evident, consideration is that the Security Council should always be entitled M interpret its own resolutions. Consequently, and in addition, it would be helpfol if the Council would from time to time, whenever it deemed tbat desirable, give broad directives-I emphasize the word “broad”-for tl!e execution of those resolutions. A second principle is that tbe ultimate approval of tbe financial aspects and the apportioning of tbe expenses rests with the General Assembly, in accordasce with the provisions of Article 17 of the United Nations Charter. A third 35. Witb regard io finaneing, ii meanstha.ttheSecretarv-Genessl should. as soon as uossible after the ado”pt~on of a Secukty Council ;@Solution of this n&re, make an estimate of the expenses SO that the Security Council could give û directive on the general lewel of expenses, but that tbe finaI approval and the apportioning of these expenses sbotid b@ left to the General Assembly. 36. Thece are on1y the rougb outlines for a procedure which we could try to apply in cases snch as the hdia-Pakistan conflici. We believe that such a proçedure would go a long way in meeting the desire. which we understand. of those members who Rold that the Security Cwncil should exercise greater control over tbe execution of its own decisious; at the same timr this procedure would, we ùelieve, be fIexible enougb to leave the Secretnry-General the necessary leewny in order not to be homstrung in thr exercise of his important nnd hewy executive fuuetions. Si. It may be an adventage that the Council need nez take decisions on these matters as a genersl rule for ali cases and for a11 iime, but thnt it cari feel its way through hy practical experience. What we wisb to aehieve above a11 for the moment is a practical solution which maintains tic unanimity of a11 permanent members in order thôt we may, through experience, gradually arrive at a permanent system. 38. SO much for the questions of principle raised by the implemeutation of the Council’s resolutions. Tht attention given to those aspects. important as the) aïe, should, however, in no way take precedence ~V@I tbe more immediate and urgent aspects of the impiementatiou of the Council’s resolutions, which constitutes today the real problem before us. Unfortunately. these aspects give rise to serious concern. 39. Tbe appeals which the Council sddressed on four subsequent occasions to bath parties to effect a ceasefire nnd a withdrawal of their armed personnel bava received Orly partial response. Althoughbothlndiaant 40. It is clear, at least in the mind of my delegation, that the cause for these many violations of the ceasefire does not lie with the military observers of the United Nations, who are performing a” admirable and dlfficult task. It is thanks to their activities that the exlsting explosive situation has net reverted again to ope” hostilities. 41. My country is also deeply disturbed by the stream of Press reports coming out of Kashmir about the total suppression of the liberty of political expression as well as about excesses reportedly taking place in the fighting area. Therepresentativeof Pakistsnhasasked the Council: “Will the world remain unmoved?” 42. My answer would he, “No, tbe world is certainly not; “or is the Council. ” But the remedy lies not in condemning or investigating specific examples of such acts. but in putting B” end to the circumstances which gave rise to such excesses. The Council, therefore, has to concentrate on the three elements of its resolution, just as they bave been enumerated by the representative of Uruguay: the cesse-fire, the withdrawalof the forces, and tacklinq the underlying political problem. These elements are closely interwoven, as 1 said in the Council [ 1242nd meeting] when introducing resolution 211 (1965). and my delegation stands by that declaration. It is not because we bave departed from this view that 1 did not re-emphasize it when it was quoted in the Council meeting last week. 1 did not do SO because, in our view. it was not the interconnexion between the different parts of the resolution which was then at stake, but the old tradition that representatives on the Security Council should be entitled to speak their mind on ail questions connected with the subjectunder discussion, as long as they do not use insulting mnguage. 43. But eve” if it is truc that the three elements of the resolution are closely interconnected, and that “one should be overlooked, it is nevertneless obvious that they cannüt a11 be achieved at once and at the same time, and therefore we bave to proceedinphases. The first phase was the cesse-fire. It has been achieved. but is still precarious: it will remain precnrious as long as huge armed forces remain in close contact facing each other. Therefore. ‘ve must “ow concentrate on the second phase, the withdrawal of forces. Almost six weeks bave elapsed since we adopted our key resolution of 20 September Iresolution 211(1965)] and since the Secretary-General first asked the parties to draw up withdrawal plans. but precious littla 44. For this reason. my delegation bas, inveryclose cc-operation with a11 the other members, bothpermanent and non-permanent, worked out a draft resolution [S/6876]. which 1 should now like to submit in the name of Bolivia. the Ivcry Coast, Malaysia. the Netherlands and Uruguay. The draft is submitted in the name of these five non-permanent members of the Council. but it has been drafted in constant consultation with the permanent members. 1 think we cari say that it contains no language which could give rise to objection. It indicates, we believe, in clear andunmistakable language what concrete steps could and should now be taken to achieve a withdrawal of forces. 45. The text of the draft resolution needs, 1 believe, Iittle comment. Paragraph 1 reaffirms the key resolution of the Council of 20 September 1965 on this subject “in all its parts”, and should dispel any possible doubt about the fact that the Council stands by its prev;ous resolution in its entirety andintends to sec it carried out in a11 itsparts. This reaffirmation is put first in the text because the next two paragraphs concentrate on those phases which are at the moment the most urgent. namely the cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed personnel. 46. Paragraph 2 requests the parties to co-operate torvards a full implementation of paragraph 1 of resolution 211 (1965). calls upon them to instruct their armed personnel to co-cperate with the United Nations and to cesse a11 military activity. and insists that there be an end to violations of the cesse-fire. lt will be noted that this language is stronger than that of previous resolutions, for the reason 1 mentioned earlier. namely that this insistence may be needed to overcome the present deadlock. 47. Paragraph 3 demands the prompt and unconditicnal executicn of the proposa1 which has alreadybeen agreed to in principle by the Governments of India and Pakistan, for a meeting of theirrepresentativeswitha suitable representative of the Secretary-General, to be appointed after consultation with both parties bu’ c without delay, for the formulation of an agreed plar 1 48. Finally, paragraph 4 requests the Secretary- General to submit to the Council as soon as nossible a report on compliance with the resolution. In SO far as is necessary, 1 should point out that this applies to the resolution as a whole, while the request in paragraph 3 applies particularly to the content of that paragraph. 49. This draft resolution. as we hope is apparent from the text, is not directed asainst anv of the narties. It is, on the contrary, intendzd to help them to break the present deadlock in order that we may thereafter proceed further with tbe implementation of resolution 211 (1965). 50. The draft resolution concentrates. as 1 said, on those points which are at the moment tnosturgent; the cesse-fire and the withdrawal of armedpersonnel. We realize, of course, that some members of the Conncil would bave liked to see some other aspects dealt with as well in the draft resolution. The cc-sponsors bave tried very hard, their utmost, to achieve this. but they bave in the end corne to the conclusion that the best way is, consciously and deliberately, to leave out of the draft any matter which does net deal directly witb the most urgent points, anything which might be controversial and might, therefore, endanger it. 51. As the text now stands, every word of it has been the suhject of extensive consultations. Al1 members of the Council bave had their say on it and the co-sponsors believe that a11 their wishes bave been accommodated. I am sure, therefore. that 1 speak on behalf of a11 the co-sponsors if 1 appeal fervently to a11 the members of the Security Council that no one should. because of any subject that might net be rnentioned, break the unanimity of the Council. If it should be possible to adopt this draft resolution with unanimity. or near unanimity, this would be sn important step towards solving the confiict between India and Pakistan and also towards the firm establishment ofa new basis for action by the Security Council such as we bave inaugurated.

Before addressing myself to the draft resolution before us, 1 should like to congratulate you, Mi-. President, on again assuming the presidency of the Council. Although 1 was not present at the United Nations during your previous oocupancy of the presidency, your distinguished career is well known and your reputation for judicious and efficient conduct of the business of this Council are well established among your colleagues. new as well as old, and has again been con- 53. We bave before us today, thanks to the diligent efforts of our colleagues in the Council, a new draft resolution on the India-Pakiti**n ouestion. I wish to express my appreciation partibw..&y to the sponsors and (0 au of tbe non-permanent members, as well as tbe permanent members, of tbeir patient consideratien of tbis difficult question in an attempt again to aobieve tbe unanimity whieh bas characterized our actions on this subject throughout the pnst month as well as the present month. 54. I share tbe opinion of the representatiue of the Netherlands that tbis matter has b@en thoroughly explored in the private consultations which bave tak@n place and I believe that tbose consultations, as this draft resolution demonstrates, bave been most constructive. 55. In the opinion of my Governmeht. the draft resolution folly reflects the intent of the resolutions which this Cou&l adopted in September and represents a neeessary effort ta add urgency to the aspect of those resolutions whicb, as the Secretary-General’s impartial reports demonstrate, is the most pertinent at tbis timr, namely. the problem of withdrawal. My delegation will vote in faveur of this draft resolution and we trust that it wiIl be supported with the same unanimity which has cbaracterized the actions which tbe Council took in adopting its resolutions 209 (1965). 210 (1965). 211 (1965) and 214 (1965). 56. Resolution 211 (1965) made a demand of the parties. This demand, as I said at that time [1242nd meeting) in supporting the resolution, was net lightly made: no demand npon Governments, Member States, is Iigbtly made. or should be lightly made, by the Security Council. It was a demand that voiced the sentiments of virtually a11 Member States, as reflected in tbe plenary meetings of the General Assembly, and it surely reflected world opinion. It was a demand for the acceptance of a cesse-fire, and that demand was, happily, accepted by both India and Pakistan. 57. Today, in the draft resolution before us, the Council makes a renewed demand, a new demand, ir order to assure the permanence of the cease-fire. II is a demand for unconditianal acceptance of the proposa1 on witbdrawal made by the Secremry-General. 1 tbink that 1 cari repeat what I bave just said, an< what 1 said then. that 1 am sure that this demand ia supported by virtually a11 States Me&@rs of thr Wnited Nations and supported as well by work opinion, which is Iooking for the restoration ofpeaceful conditions on the subcontlnent. 1 may say furthei that, as was the case with the cesse-fire, this demain is Iikewlse in the interests of both parties concerned, The sponsors bave chosen the Word “demand” withtht utmost seriousness. and we trust-and the world ha: the right to expect-that there Will be full recognitior “Decides to consider as soon as paragraph 1 of Council resoiution 210 (1965) hasbeenimplemented, what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying thepresent conflict, and in the meantime calls on the two Governments to utilize a11 peacefulmeans, includlng those listed in Article 33 of the Charter, to tbis end”. 59. In this draft resolution. we reaffirm thedeclaration in a11 its parts, and thisisonly appropriate under the CircumstanCes. On 20 September. when we had just passed the basic resolution which the draft before us today reaffirms, 1 emphasized, as President of the Council and speaking on behalf of a11 the members, that the Council had spoken in terms of friendship to both parties. This morning, speaking for my Government. 1 should like again to stress this spirit of friendship. and again to cal1 upon thepartiesto accept and implement today’s draft resolution and to cooperate with the Secretary-General and his representatives and with all organs of the United Nations in implementing the resolution. 60. This is the obligation of both parties under their commitment to the Charter, to which we are a11 pledged, and the world hopefully looks for this necessary step of withdrawal as a further step towards the restoration of an honourable and permanent peace on the subcontinent.

My first pleasant duty is to entend to you, Mr. President, on behalf of my Government and on my own behalf our warmest congratulations on your assuming again thePresidencyoi the Council for this month. Your past experieiice as Professor of law, culture and history, your well known record as a diplomat and a statesman, your tact and wisdom, a11 these high qualities Will, 1 am sure, contribute to the success of our work. 62. We bave before us a draft resolution submitted by five non-permanent memhers of the Security Couucil. This draft resolution is the result of much consultation and hard work, and my delegation paya tribute to the CO-sponsors for their patience and constructive efforts. We wish to state. however. that ii 64. There was a cesse-fire for more than seventeen years behveen India and Pakistan. The prcblem came again and again before this Ccuncil, but no adequate steps were taken to bring abcut a solution; as a resuit, what do we find ourselves facing tcday but cpen and full-scale. nndeclared war behveen the twc friendly States of India and Pakistan. Time dld not and cannot crase -the problem. We cannot, therefcre. give cur endcrsement to any measure that, instead c! taking us fcrwarcl, may freeze the prcblem snd keep it where it was. 65. 1 wonder whether this draft resclution in its present form would bring permanent peaoe to the area. We submit that. if there is a Will, both the cease-fire and the withdrawal can be completedtithin a very short time. Twenty miles on one side and perhaps flfteen miles on the other side certainly do not require weeks and months. And. lf there is a genuine desire. a solution is also certainly attainable. That is why 1 submit that withdrawal and solution are twc sides of the same coin. They go together, and it is net realistic to insist on cne and net to put the same emphasis on the other. This has been the mistake made in the past. and the Ccuncil in its wisdom may want to benefit from its own experience. 66. In this connexion. J must state that the leader of the Uruguayan delegation, Mr. Pays& Reyes, who was cur President in October. made in his brilliant intervention this morning a constructive approach to the problem. His statement shculd be given adequate attention by the Security Conncil. for he raised many points which deserve study and consideration. We shculd ponder them, since they corne from a man of rich experience. TO my delegation, this was a sincere effort to avoid further difficulties and more blccdshed. and it is for this reason that we insisted on cur same stand vis-à-vis this draft resolution. 67. The situation is becoming more sericus every day and calls for further consideration. We are unhappy to find ourselves in a position in which we bave

The French deleeation Will vote in faveur of the draft resolution before us on the conflict between India and Pakistan. It considers that it was essential for the Security Council, after having confirmed the need for strict compliance with the cesse-fire, to provide for measures to ensure the formulation of a plan for tlle withdrawal of armed personnel which would really be applicable in the field. 69. My Government is sure that, once this condition is fulfilled, India and Pakistan will decide, as required by the Council’s resolutions, to withdraw their armed personnel back to the positions held by them at the begbming of August. We think that it was also useful that the Council. in the houe of a lastin@ settlemezt of the problem of .KashmirLwhich is at ihe root of this conflict-should have reaffirmed its resolution 211 (1965) “in a11 its parts”. thus marking its decision to consider, as soon as operative paragraph 1 of resolution 210 (1965) has been implemented, what steps could be taken to assist towards that settlement, and also that the Council renewed its appeal to the two Governments to utilize a11 peaceful means. including those listed in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, to this end. 70. It is, infact, both the responsibility of the Security Council and the wish of a11 countries friendly to India and Pakistan-and thus of France-that anatmosphere of peace and understanding should be restored in this deeply disturbed area of the world. 71. While this is the desire of my Government, 1 should like to state that our approval of this draft resolution is subject to the reservations which Imade at the 1247th meeting on the principles which. in our opinion, should guide the Security Council in the application of its decisions.

If no other member of the Council wishes to speak. 1 shall take the liberty of speaking briefly as the representative of BOLIVIA. 73. An armed conflict of va& proportions, involving two States Members of the United Nations. with a 74. Fully avare of its primary responsibility to maintai” international peace and security, which is expressly conferred on it by Article 24 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council met immediately to discuss the problem. Resolutions 209 (1965). 210 (1965). 211 (1965) and 214 (1965). unanimously adopted by the members of the Council. bear cloquent testimony to the great sense of responsibility of ail members here and to the laudable spirit of negotiation and compromise which endowed those resolutions with the paverful force of unanimity. 75. The Secretary-General, actingwithcommendable zeti and with the speed which the circumstances required. soo” managed. in spite of the size and complexity of the problem. to see to it that the resolutions which we are discussing began to be effective and obtained a cesse-fire which was. and still is, the essential first step towards the total implementation of our decisions. The Secretary-General’s reports [S/6699 and S/6710], together with their addenda, are proof of the impartiality and dedication with which he has acted in this delicate matter and my Government would like to record its express approval of a11 the measures adopted. 76. Additional information was subsequently provided which showed the precarious nature of the case-fire and other factors intervened which impeded progress towards the withdrawal of troops. Thus, ihe Security Council, acceding to the request from Pakistan mentioned in our agenda, has decided to discuss the problem once more, in order to continue to fulfil its duty. For it is our duty, as it is that of a11 the servants and organs of the United Nations, “ot only to draft resolutions but to ensure. with a11 the means within our power, that those resolutions are effective. 77. History is not nourished by isolated documents, however important they may be. But when documents are objective, adequate and practical, they do point the way to coherent 3nd permanent action. i8. In the case before us it ca” be stated that the Council’s resolutions, which were unanimously adopted. do point, in each and every one of their paragraphs, a clez ‘iay towards a solution of this grave dispute, “ame., cesse-fire. withdrawal of armed personnel, a” appeal to a11 States to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation in the area and. at the proper time. a consideration of the steps which could be taken for co-operation towards a settlement of the basic political problem. 79. For this reaso”. the Bolivien delegation has decided to co-sponsor the draft resolution before us since it considers it a “ew, clear and strong instrument to promote the restoration of peace between India and Pakistan through application of ourprevious resolutions in a.11 their parts. A vote wss faken by show ofhsnds. In faveur: Bolivia, China, France, Ivory Coast, Malaysia, Netherlands. United Kingdom of Great Britain andNorthernIreland, UnitedStatesofAmerica, ur”g”ay. Againsf: None. Absfaining: Jordan. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The draft resolufion was adopfed hy 9 votes fa none, wffh 2 rbs ‘entions. 3

In connexion with the vote just taken, the USSR delegation would like to make the following statement. 82. The main task now before us is. as we bave pointed out in various statements in the Council, to ensure the observance of the provisions relating to the cesse-fire and the speedy withdrawal of the troops and military personnel of both sides to the positions which they occupied before 5 August 1965. We continue to maintain that position, in the belief that it is in conformity with the interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan and with the interests of peace. 83. My delegation also drew the Council’s attention to certain matters of principle regarding the prao tical implementation of the resolutions which the Council adopted earlier. In its statement at the 1247th meeting of the Council on 25 October 1965. my delegation stated that the action taken by the Secretaiy- General with regard to the United Nations observers in India and Pakistan following the adoption by the Security Couucil of its resolulions 210 (1965) and 211 (1965). was at variante with the basic provisions of the Charter. We emphasised that under these basic provisions of the Charter only the Security Council was competent io take the necessary decisions ou a11 specific matters connected with the United Nations military observers. 84. It is the Comnil that must decide such questions as the functions of military observer& their number, their command, their terms of reference, thefinancing of their activities, and 60 on. We bave dravm particular attention to the fact that the Security Council set a definite time-limit for the stay of the United Nations observers in India and Pakistan, which should in no case exceed three months. 85. We must. unfortunately. point out that, although the Soviet Union raised this question of principle both during the prolonged consultations among members of the Security Council and at the first meeting 86. This shows that the questions of principle and constitutionality raised by the Soviet delegation were not given due consideration or taken into account. In the draft resolution that was adopted because of the negative position taken by various members of the Security Council, particularly the Unlted States, tbe above-mentioned question of principle was passed over. It was as a direct result ofthe negative position taken by tbese Skates that the unanimity prevailing in the Security Council during the discussion of the India-Pakistan conflict was destroyed. 36. iéllégation :omprf+hension lu membres par compte r8solution L’attitude avait du conflit 87. In the light of the foregoing, and considering such a position to he intolerable, we wep unable to endorse the draft resolution and therefore abstained in tbe vote. 37. tion notre sommes 89. In conclusion, the USSR delegation wlshes to state that, if specific questions relating to tbe United Nations observers in India and Pakistan are in future decided outside the Security Council andinviolationof the Charter. the Soviet Union reserves the right to draw the appropriate conclusions and reconsider its position accordlngly. 38. si, h l’avenir, observateurs doivent in violation Le droit de reconsidérer

1 am only going to say a very few words. The position of the United States in reference to the matter of principle to which the representative of the Soviet Union has referred was stated at lenath when we met last to consider thls problem and it-needs no reiteration. It is perfectly apparent that it is broadly supported in the Security Council. 1 should like merely to point out that the United States bas been very anxious and has attempted by every means at its disposai, without sacrificing Charter principles important to the integrity of this Organisation, to arrive at an accommodation of all points of viewinthediscussions chat bave been going on. It bas not demonstrated any attempt to be intransigent, but, on the contrary, has tried to cooperatc, in a spirit of friendship, conciliation and oompromise, to arrive at a solution of all the problems which bave been raised. Unhappily, this bas not corne about, and if it bas not corne about, it is not the responsibility of the United States for this outcome on this phase of the situation. 99. de mots. question L’Union exposée probRune parfaitement sein signaler moyens cipes organisation, ont sommes avoos conciliation solution Malheureusement, responsabilité nements, 90. 1 should like, finally, to point out that it was not the United States which injected this problem into the debate: rather it was the representative of the Soviet Union who did SO. We would bave been more content had we continued to deal with the substance of the problem, which we bave dealt with today, wlthout prejudice to principles that anybody holds and without prejudice to a resolution of those principles at an appropriate time by the Security Council. This has net, unfortunately, been possible. Therefore. what the sponsors of the draft resolution did today is, in my view, the only thing that could bave been done under the circumstances. SO. pas plutôt aurions probl’&ne préjuger sans question n’a les d’hui, de faire 92. First, that part of the statement in wbich that repsesentative tried to depict the United States delegation as having been constructive and co-operative in regard to the question under consideration does net correspond to reality. It is at variante with the truth, and, in OUI statement at the 1247th meeting of the Council, we were obliged to remind the Council of what had really happened during the discussions, in partizular during the very lengthy. highly complex, tense and so-called informa1 consultations. The United States delegation failed to show the slightest desire to co-operate with regard to the questions of principle to which 1 referred a moment ago, either with the USSR delegation or with other delegations. With the permission of the French representative, 1 should like to draw the Council’s attention to the fact that our position on this subject coincided wlth his. 93. Thus, the United States delegation did net wish to co-operate with any one of the permanent members of the Security Council. 94. Secondly, it is regrettable that although the Securfty Coun?il has just adopted a resolution, the United Stctes representative continues to maintain his position and argues that it is consistent with the United Nations Charter and with the rights and competence vested in the highest organ of the United Nations, the Security Council. We differ in ourunderstanding of the provisions of the Charter and the basic responsibilities of the Security Council and we reject the interpretation given by the United States representative. 95. 1 thought it necessary to draw attention to these two points in connexion with the United States representative’s statement.

1 remet the necessitv to take the floor aaain. 1 underst&d that the representative of the SoGet Union has a difference in principle-net only with the United States but very broadly witll other members of the Security Council as well, as is evident from the statemems made here today-about the role of the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations, including specifically thesecretary-General. That difference in principle has been stated here, and 1 shall not repeat OUI opposing views. 97. What 1 do regret is the statement that 1 did net truthfully report the position of the United States. 1 believe 1 stste the position of the United States-with due respect to my esteemed colleague-snd 1 believe 1 state it correctly, truthfully and honestly. 98. It has always been my view-perhaps 1 bave to change it-that discussions in private consultations should be private and that. if we arrive at agreement, the agreement should reported. 1 am goingto adhere t0 In private consultations, various positions are en. It is comect that I did net accept the position of the Soviet Union any more than the Soviet representative accepted my position in principle. But varlous proposais were nia& to try to bringus togetber in this area. Iamnotgoingto go into the details of tùose proposais, because 1 hope we cari continue the constructive course of trying to resolve our differences privately. I muid only say that proposols were made-net by the representative of the Soviet Union and net by tbe representative of France, who in bis statements reilected a view not identieal with that of the Soviet Ucdon but similar in some respects, but by otber representatives-which attempted to bridge the dlfference hetween us. The United States delegation was willing to accept those proposais; apparently, tbe representative of the Soviet Union and bis Government were not willing to accept them. Tbat is what 1 was referriog to, and 1 think 1 referred to it accurately and honestly. as other rnembers of this Council are well aware. 190. We did not arrive at agreement on this point. That is to be regretted. 1 repeat what 1 said earlier: tbe responsibility for failure to agree is net the responsibility of the United States, and 1 regret very mucb that we were unable to find common ground, as 1 would bave hoped we could.

1 am most grateful to you, Mr. President, for giving me an opportunity to clarify the situation. 102. I bave che impression that the representative of the UnitefL States has based his whole concept on a misunderstandiag or inaccuracy. The question is not whetkr tbe Unitel Skates representative correctly or incorrectly expressed the position of his Govenlment. My statement had nothing whatsoever to do with that. That is exclusively the business of tbe United States representative. How he chooses to express his position is a matter for his own conscience and sense of dut-y. We hope that he is correctly interpreting the position of his Government. But 1 was talking about something else. When 1 said that his interpretation, or the clarification which he gave, did net COrr@spond to reality or to the truth. 1 meant the Position taken by the United States delegation during tbe informai consultations and confirmed by it at the Veïy firSt meeting of this series of the Council. 1 repeat that the truc course of the consultations wss net as he descrihed it. The USSR delegations made every effort to be understanding and co-operative. 104. Unfortuuately, 1 must again stress that the United States representative’s remark to the effect that his delegation has shown a spirit of co-operation is at variauce with the faots. Such a spirit Was net shows, and that was. in fact, the reason for the collapse of the unanimity which had existed in the Security Council. The United States delegation must bear the onus for this state of affairs. 105. MI’. GOLDBERG (United States of America): 1 shall be quite content to rely upon the judgement of my colleagues, who participated in our private discussions, whether 1 correctly reported the seuse of what took place in oui’ private consultations as representing net only the views of the United States, but what actually transpired at those consultations lu terms of the attitudes of the United States, the Soviet Union sud a11 the other members.

1 deemed it necessary to reaffirm our position and a11 the considerations I bave just put forward.

As President, 1 am glad that the members of the Couucil bave concluded the debate on this item of oui agenda this morning. However, at the same time, 1 regret that I must inform them that hardly bave we finished one part of our efforts that we bave to begin another. Consequently, before adjourning this meeting 1 shouldlike to annouuce that, after informa1 consultations, it has been agreed that the Council Will meet again this afternoon at 3.30 u.m. At that meeting. the Council 1. Will concern itselfwith the request. submittedyesterday, 4 November, by the representative of Turkey [S/68’77] that the Security Couucil should give urgent consideration to the present situation in Cyprus. It is expected that the Secretery-General will be able, when we meet this afternoon, to present a more recent and complete report on events in Cyprus to the members of the Council. The meefing rose af 12.4Eip.m. l-lOW TO OBTAIN UNITED United Nations publications may be obtained distributors throughout ihe world. write ta: United Nations, Sales ENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS Les publications des Nations Unies sont agences dépositaires du monde entier. ou adressez-vous a: Nations Unies, Section COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicociones de las Naciones Unidos casas distribuidorar en todas partes dirijase CT: Naciones Unidos, Seccibn Litho in U.N. Pri~e: $V.S. 0.50 (or epivalent in orher