S/PV.1257 Security Council

Members of tbe Council Will bave notedthat the provisional agenda referS to a series of letters received on II November 1965 on the question concerning the situation in Soutbern Rhodesia. 2. The f+.rst to be received was the letter from the represenmtive of the United KIngdom [S/6896), requesting an urgent meeting on this subject; next came the letter dated 10 Novembsr from the President of the General Assembly [S/6897]. in which he transmitted to the Security Council resolutions 2012 (XX) and 2022 (XX) recently adopted by the General Assembly on this matter. 4. Lastly, a letter was received from the President of the General Assembly [S/6908] transmitting to the SeCtirity Council General Assembly resolution 2024 (Xx) of 11 November 1965, in which the General Assembly recommends that the Council should consider the situation in Southern Rhodesia as a matter of urgency. 5. After receiving these letters-one from thirty-five African States and the other from twenty-two African and Asian States-and in the light of the decision taken by the Security Counoil at its 1256th meeting to cal1 a meeting to consider the question of Southern Rhodesia, 1 carried out urgent consultations with allmembers of the Security Council. In accordance with the views expressed by the majority of them, 1 decided to convene this meeting this morning. The agenda was adopted. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhode&: letters dated 2 and 30 August 1963 oddressed to the President of the Securitv Council on behalf of thc representotives of thirty&voMembar States (S/5382 and S/5409): (0) Letter doted 11 November 1965 from the Permanent Represantotive of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Irelond to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Counci I (S/6896); (b) Letter dated 10 November 1965from the President of the General Assembly to the President of the Security Council (S/6897); (c) Letter dated 11 November 1965 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of thirty-five Member Stotea (S/6902); (g) Letter dated 11 Novembcr 1965 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of twenty-two Member Siates (S/6903); (9) Letter doted 11 Novembes 1965 from the President of the General Assembly to the President of the Security Council (S/6908)

I wisb to lnform members of the Council that 1 bave received requests to participate in the discussion of this question from the representatives of Algeria [S/6904]. India [S/6905]. Pakistan [S/6906]. Ghana [S/SSO?], Zambia ]S/SSOO], Sierra Leone [S/S910], Senegal [S/6911]. and Mali, the United Republic of Tanzania and Nigeria [S/6912]. 7. If there are no objections, 1 shall take it that the members of the Council agree that the representatives just mentioned should be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question. In view of the number of representatives who bave asked to take part in the discussion, and of the limited space at the Council table, seats bave been reserved in front of the Council table for the representatives 1 bave 8. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanishj: The Council will now take up the item on its agenda. 9. I should like to welcome tbe Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, who is honouring us with his presence at the Council table and who is the first speaker on my list.

Mr. President, 1 thank you most cordially for your words of WelCOme. 11. The United Kingdom has askedforthis immediate meeting of the Security Council to face a situation of great importance and great urgency. 1 know full well the wisdom and ski11 of the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, Lord Caradon. and 1 know how highly he is regarded among you. Yet 1 thought it right to corne myself to this meeting of the Council SO as to establishbeyond doubt the seriousness with which the British Gcnernment regatis this situation and the resolution with which we are determined to treat it. 12. The Southern Rhodesian question bas been discussed already more I’XUI once in this Council and in other organs of the United Nations and i need not now recount a11 the history nor a11 the arguments. I Will set the matter out in the simplest terms. 13. A group of persans who were until recently the Government of Southern Rhodesia bave purported to make a declaration that Southern Rhodesia is inde pendent of Britain. The British Government regards this as illegal and invalid since only tbe British Parliament has the right and authority to accord indepence to Southern Rhodesia. This illegal act bas been performed in tbe hope and with the intention of establishing a form of Government which would ensure chat the power to control the future of Southern RhodesIa remains in the hands of a white minority comprising On$ one-twentieth of the population. But the Parliament of Britain, to whom alone the right to grant Independence to Southern Rhodesia belongs, would grant it only on tenns acceptable to the pople of Southern Rhodesia as a whole. 14. To this principle Britain bas firmly adhered thronghout the whole argument-which now stretches over years-between British Governments and the former Government of Southern Rhodesia. Nevertbeles% we wre determined to take every step-short of abandoning this principle-which would help tc avert disaster, every step ahich would make it easy 15. Everyone agrees-even Mr. Smith, the former Prime Minister of Southern Rhodes& admits-that we were patient and forbearing. There are some. 1 know, who Will say that we were too patient, and to those 1 Will say this. Tbis illegal declaration of independence and the measures which Britain has taken in consequence mean inevitably distress and suffering to Rhodesians, including many Rhodesians of all races who detest this illegal act and who are wholly innocent of it. 16. With that in mind, 1 am certain that we were right to follow what Lord Caradon described as a policy of assurance, of warning and of negotiation. The assxrance was that independence would not be granted until and unless it was acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole. The warning was that an illegal declaration of independence would bave disastroua consequences. The negotiation wascarried on in the light of that assurance and of that warning. 17. In the course of the negotiation Mr. Smithvisited London and was there able to express bis views with a freedom which he Will noi grant to any in Rhodesia who might disagree with him. Gur Prime Minister. Commonwealth Secretary. Lord Chancellor and Attorney-General bave ail visited Salisbury. Every possible constitutional arrangement bas been examined. For example, the British Prime Minister made two propositions to Mr. Smith. The first was that Mr. Smith% claim that the Rhodesian people, includingthe majority of Africans, wanted independence on the terms of the 1961 Constitution should be put to tbe test by a referendum of the whole Rhodesian people. The second proposition was that a Royal Commission should be set up to “recommend the amendments to the 1961 Rhodesian Constitution which could provide the basis on which Rhodesia may proceed to independence as rapidly as possible in a mariner givingeffect to the principles enunciated by the British Government in oui‘ statement of 9 October 1965u and which at the same time Will he acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole”. Those were the two propositions: a referendum to test the claim that Rhodesians wanted independence on the basis of thc 1961 Constitution, or a Royal Commission to consider what amendments were needed to that Constitution to bring it HI line with the principles which the British Government had laid down. 19. New that this illegal declaration has been made. tbe only lawful Government of Soutbern Rhodesia is tbe Government of tbe United Kingdom. That Government, however. bas no physical presence in Soutbern Rhodesia and in Soutbern Rhodesia there is therefore now no rnle of law. It is, clearly and unmistskably, a British responsibility to re-establish the rule of law in Southern Rhodesia so that in due time that country may enjoy net the mere name of independence but the full substance of freedom for ail its peoples. 20. Southern Rhodesia is a British possession and tbe responsibility lies on Britain. Nevertheless, we bave thought it right. for two main reasons. to bring this matter now before this Council. 21. The first reason is this. An attempt to establish in Africa an illegal régime based on minority rule is a matter of world concern. As oui Prime Minister said in Parliament yesterdny. 11 November 1965: “But the extent to which what bas haPpeO ;n Rhodesia Will create a diiicult situation in Afyica and &e Commonwealth makes it a matter of world concern, aid those who deny this are burying their heads in the Sand.” ?/ 22. The second reason why we now bring the matter before tbis Council is a severely practical reason. 1 am about to describe the measures which the United Kingdom Government has taken to deal with tbis illegal declaration and to restore the rule of law in Southern Rhodesia. If these measures are to be fully effective we must ask for the goodwill, the co-operation and the active Support of ail tbose who accept the principles set out in resolution 2012 (XX) adopted by the General Assembly on 12 October 1965 by a vote of 107 to 2. We believe that we bave a right to ask for this support. 23. Before describing the measures we bave taken. I ought to make clear, as has beenmade clear before. that we do not believe the use of military force cari salve tbis problem. 1 know that there are those who ask for this step. 1 understand their feelings but 1 cannot aocept their judgement. Wben 1 say that 1 understand their feelings 1 mean this: Next year, 1966, it Will be a full 900 years since any conqueror set foot in 24. The British GQVernment, therefore. afterthe most sober consideration, is resolved that an attempt to impose a constitutional solution by military force ir Southern Rhodesia not cilly would involve misery for millions of innocent people but would thrust into a still more distant future the right and just solution to this problem. Therefore, the Br’tish Governmenc has already taken the following measures. Some of them are measures which cari be taken solely by administrative action; but in addition a Bill Will be presented to Parliament and carried throhgh Parliament without delay to ensure that the Government is equipped with the full legislative powers required to carry these measures into effect. 25. First, the Governor, who is the Qceen’s representative and remains the only constitutional authority in Southern Rhodes& has, in pursuance of the authority vested in him by the Queen, informed the former Prime Minister and other Ministers of Southern Rhodesia that they no longer hold office. The claim of these persans to be the Government of Southern Rhodesia has, therefore, no foundation. We ask with confidence that every State Member of the United Nations Will refuse to recognize this illegal regime, Will ignore any passports issued by it and Will refuse to give credence to any persans claiming to be its representatives. 26. Second, we prohibit a11 expert of arms to Southern Rhodesia. Nor bave we any doubt that a11 States Members of the United Nations will impose a like prohibition. 27. Third, we impose exchange control restrictions and prohibit a11 experts of United Kingdom capital to 29. Fifth, we deny Southern Rhodesia ail the advantages in trade. through the Ottawa Agreement, through Commonwealth preference. through expert credits which it could bave enjoyed if the members of its former ùovernment had remained loyal to the Crown. 30. Si, we propose ta ban the import into the United Ktngdom of Southern Rhodestaa tobacco and sugar. The effet: of this action by the Uni%ed Eingdom alone wiU be formidable; we invite our G?Gow Members of the United Nations to take such action as is appr‘+ ytaie under thetr “wn laws to ensure thst these measures of ours Will bave their full effect. 31. Let me stress inpartioularwhat that last measure cass mean if we bave fui1 support here. In lxuming imports of tohacco and sugar, the United Kfngdom is cutting off purchases amonnting to over $50 million and constituting more than 70 per cent of “UP total purchases from Southern Rhode&. 1 would invite the Cou&l to consider for a moment the situation of Southern Rhodesia if everywhere it found adiminution of its experts by 70 per cent. Let me put it another way. Tobacoo and sugar together represent rather more than orsthird of SoJthern Rhodesiv.‘s total exports. If all Members of the United Nations support us sincerely in applying these measures: the effect on the Southern Rhodesian economy Will be severe indeed. 32. We confidently believe that these are the right steps to take. We belfeve that they cen succeed. We believe that we are justified in asking for the support of our fellow Members of the United Nations in carrying o?lt WI task. For it is our task, we bave an obligation to the people of Southern Rhodesia and we are determined to fulfil that obligation. 33. Taken together and fully supported by the United Nations, these measures willensure thatthepurported Government of SouthernRhodesiaisuniversallyunderstood to be sn illegal régime without friends or recognition inthe world. These messures willfurther compel those whohave committed this illegal act to realize that 1 they bave thereby inflicted grave damage onthe trade, economy and currency of their country, and that, for hard-headed business reaeons as well as for moral reasons, there Will be few indeed throughout the world who wish to have dealings with them. 1 hope that this realization Will corne to these men in Southern Rhodesta Sooss, for we in Britain are stfll ready, when illegality ts abandoned, to salve this problem Justly vmd by reasonable mezns. 35. Al1 of us who corne bere to tbe United Nations do SO with s. desire to serve the commtpn interest of maakind. Yet each one of us cornes afso with a deep affection for md understanding of his own eountry, an Wld&Tst of Bb& its d-tues md ils limitations. T0day tbere su-e critics oî Britain vibo say we are too pragmatic, tao cauticas, too esger to seek compromise. 1 would claim that. even if this be truc. tbese sre gocd faults in a wozld where intaIera2e ami reckless violence cause so mueb misery. Rut Iet me retnind you of one quality of tbel3ritish. Oncewe bave decided an a came of action we do net faIl short in courage or resolution in carry@ it tbrough. Furtbermore, intbe years sinee tbe Second World War we bave steadily carried tbrougb the transformation ofa subject Empire into a free Conunonwealth. and millions of people througbout Fbe world are witnesses to this. In tbis Soutliern R esian question we bave assessed with sober caution the right course of action; we shall pursue tbat course witb determination, and. witb tbe help of the UnitedNations.we sbaR seeurefor Soutbern Rhodesia net tbat false independence whicb some now s@ek to impose an it but that genuine freedom for the peuples of dl races of whxh the Commonwealth prw vides SO many e.-amples. 36. Finally, tnay 1 emphasize the need for speed If n-62 cm ah once by general agreement here at the Wnited Nations show to tbe people of Southern Rhodes&. and to the world, that these immediate xneasures, which the Wnlted Kingdom bas SO far taken of its own motion snd irrespective of what others may do, attract overwhelming support, then we shall bave made a major contribution to tbe results which we wish to achieve. If tihere he any who feel that up to now we bave been too patient, it is surely for them now to assure us of their fullest and enthusiastic support forthe measures we bave taken to deal with this situation. 1 am convinced tbat there must be no delay and I trust there wili be no dlsagreement. 1 greatly hope tbat this Couneil, speaking for the United Nations, Will give us tbe support which we need to make fully effective tbe measures we shall take. 1 am sure that the impact of chat we do here Will bave the maximum effect if it is done at once.

1 give tbe floor to the representative of Ghana. 39. The racist white settler r&gime of Southern Rhodesia has seized poser from the United Kingdom Govsrnment. The Ian F %th clique bas unashamedly committed an act of treason and rebellion against the United Kingdom Government in broad daylight. Because of this seizure of power. the 4 million Africans in Southern Rhodesia bave been renderedimpotentand powerless, without any protection whatsoever, and bave been dangerously exposedto the whim and caprice of a shameless racist &gime, which is bent on subjugating Africans in perpetuity in the name of Western civilization. 40. Ian Smith has defied the United KingdomGovernment. By his unilateral ‘declaration of independence, Ian Smith and his racist accomplices haveprecipitated a serious crisis which poses a threat of immense proportions to peace and security in the world. The grave consequences of this illegal seizure of power Will be felt not only in Southern Rhodesia itself. but throughout the continent of Africa and the world. In fact, in the words of the representative of the United Kingdom. who has just spoken. what has happened “is a matter of world concern”. 41. Ian Smith’s rebellious act has not corne as a surprise to those of us who foresaw this development as far back as 1963, at the time of the dissolution of the Central African Federation. Then the African States warned the United Kingdom of the dangerous consequences of transferring powerful armed forces to the racist minority Government of Southern Rhodesia. 42. With full knowledge of the unfolding of events in Africa, the African States requested the Security Council two years ago to cal1 upon the Government of the United Kingdom not to transfer to its colony of Southern Rhodesia any powers or attributes of sovereignty until the establishment of a Government fully representative of a11 the inhabitants of that colony, and net to transfer to the colony of Southern Rhodesia the armed forces and aircraft, as envisaged by the Central African Conference of 1963.3 43. But the Government of the United Kingdom showed disregard and utter contempt for our apprehension and warnings by vetoing in this very Council, the draft resolution which 1 had the honour to present to the Council on behalf of Morocco. the Philippines and Ghana, 4/ then members of the Security Council. 1 said on that momentous occasion, that is on 13 September 1963. speaking as the representative of Ghana on the 46. T the Foreign Secretary of the United cion3 has came here to invoke tbe Semritv Council m a& if it ha mtaitary units ana nnority Government wwld net bave displayed su& defiance of tbe B~lttisb Crovm by this iUega1 seizure of paies. Today the racist régime in Soutbera Rhodesia feeh sufücientay powerfd to defy tbe Utited Kingdom Govemment. especially sfnce the at it is net prepared to use force to y. We submit that had the United ent taken firm action from the very tbis grave crisis whïch is now before the Secwity CouneiP would bave %xen averted. 46. The ~orn~onwe~~ Frime Ministers’ Conferences of 1964 and 1965 gave sericrus and eareful Southem Rhodesian problem, a& the Heads of Government affirmed their irrevocable opposition ~~y~~ate~a~dec~aration ofindependence by tbe tben Gavermuent of Sauthem Rhodesia. The EIeads of Govemment fiartber reaffirmed their inaideme ofa tbe principle of majority rule. In tirtlmxme of tbat objective. they insisted on eertair reeonditions tbat wouldpave the way towarcàs major& mie. The communiq~1’6 of the Prime Ministars’ conference of June 1965 contained this significanl statement: “The Baitish Prime Minister was urged by other Brime Ministers to couvene a constitutional conference at an early date, say. within three montbs, wbich apP tbe eolitical leaders in Rhodesia sbouh This communiqué was issued barely five mcnths agc. But, tc cur disappcintment, instead of the British Gcvernment insisting on the implementaticn of this undertaking, it develcped ccld feet and became systematically apclcgetic. while Ian Smith and his henchmen grew more and more truculent and defiant. 47. Instead of the immediate release of Nkcmc and Sithcle and cther pclitical detainees, more African nation& were arrested, and even an ex-Premier was placed under restriction. 48. Instead of a ccnstimticnal ccnference, theBritish Prime Minister went tc Scuthern Rhcdesia and prcpcsed a Royal Commission, of which my cwn President, Mr. Kwame Nkrumah, had this tc say tc Mr. Harold Wilson on 31 Octcber 1965: “1 cannct ccnsider that the prcpcsed Royal Ccmmission which is tcbe ccmpcsedcf three indlviduals, twc of whcm corne frcm the settler r6gime and cne of whcm is ncminated by the British Gcvernment. is in any way an adequate substitute for the ccnstituticnal c0nference.a 49. Again, in a statement on 4 Ncvember 1905, my President vividly expcsed the inccngruity and illcgicality of the British Gcvernment’s apprcach tc the Scuthern Rhcdesian question: *The British Gcvernment has a duty tc prote& the African inhabitants of Southern Rhcdesia. The United Klngdcm~Gcvernment has nevertheless agreed tc a proposa1 that mcst important questions of principle shall be decided by a bcdy on which Britaln has net even a majcrity and frcm which a11 Africans are excluded. It was for this reascn that my Gcvernment described this scheme”-of settlng up a Royal Ccmmissicn-nas a betrayal of the 4 million Africans of the colony.” 50. If 1 keep on referring tc British actions. it is because we think that it was Britain’s responsibility tc see that there was crderly an6 ccnstituticnal prcgress in Scuthern Rhcdesia. Frcm the very day when Ghana first raised the question of Scuthern Rhodesia in the United Nations, we bave deliberately and ccnsistently pclnted out that the British Gcvernment has cver-a11 respcnsibility in Scuthern Rhcdesia and that, because that Territory is a cclcny, it was futile and ridiculcus for the United Kingdom delegatien tc hide behind Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United us in Africa itwas office, tbe British dispkty of f0me. a11 Afriea shares tbe view of the Archbisbop of Canterbury which be expressed reeeatly at. Oxfmd aad which was repmted in The Times 0f Landna of 8 Movember 1965: *In cm mdem world, I think that theuse of force is y legitimate to thàe ~2nd ofiustice anci ordes and there are few occasions of mat kind whicb arme. Upbolding Paw and order did ancl d0es invalve tic use of force, tbough tbat force must never be used at a State or a group of States cari use holdi~g law and order where there is a tb2.t tlne FesuIt of force Will ensure law and order. w 53. The Britisb Primate made this datement in &arification of an earlier pronouncement wbich he bas maae at Aberdeen on 26 October, that if the British Government tbought it practicable touseforce for tbe protection of the righhts of the majority of the Satbern Rbcdesian peopb, tben vas Christians, we bave to say that it will be right to use force to that essIR. Then the Arcbbisbop contmued: VJVX+ comtry lad ils obligations to Poland. We mlfilled our obligations. Pt was necessary to use force inNffRing tbem. Our country bas its obligations to Rhodesia, net a rp 55. Cari there be any surprise, then, that Smith became tmboldened by that shocking display of weskness and indecision? 56, The African States bave never doubted the efficacy of the tbreat to use force. A threat to use force does not mean that force isbeingused. A threat to use force to prevent a unilateral declaration of independence would have served as a deterrent. 57. As my President, Mr. Kwame Nkx-umah, pointed out in his statement on 4 November 1965: “In my view it is only necessary for the British Government to show that it isprepared. ifnecessary, to use force in order to secure a peaceful solution. If the British Government rules out theuse of force, it should be made quite clear to the settlers that they, too, Will receive no assistance from Britain in the event of a revoit by the African population.” 58. This extraordinary abdication of responsibility by the United Kiigdom Government constitutes, in the view of the African States, the first instance in history when any conntry. great or small, has declared in advance that it is not prepared to support those who are ready to risk their lives in defending legality and order against rebellion and revoit. 59. Al1 of us who bave been trained in British institutioim know very well the justice in British law and in the British Constitution. That is why we are surprised that, in spite of the fact that British colonial history is replete with examples of Constitutions being suspended and troops being despatched to recalcitrant colonies to maintain law and orderthe latest examples, in fa&, are British Guiana and Aden-nothing of that sort has been done in the case of Southern Rhodesia. 60. From the lack of courage displayed by the Wnited Kingdom Government on the Southern Rhodestan issue, we in Africa are forced to conclude that the United Kingdom Government is always ready to order its troops to shoot down colonial subjects when their ski.n is black or brown, but that the blood of white Rhodesian rebels is too sacred to be shed in the interests of African majority rule. 61. 1 have alreadywarnedtbat thisunilateraldeclaratien of independence will bave serioui; repercussions ermnent in Scdhem tioo, tbe African States 62. We are net herto endorse ha&-heartedmeasures therefore demaad tbat and more effective measures be taken to cash the r~bellioa. 63. We base noted the staéem~nt just made by the representative of the United that in fa& t&sre is no Govemment w m Rimdesia; tbat in fact Southern Rhode& bas beeome a nonself-governing colw~y; tbat the Wnited Kingdom Government now has contrd over Southern Rhodesia. d, however. to hear bim say that Govemment “bas no pbysical Rhodesiaw. If that is SO* what is poing to happen to the 4 mUcm Africans? He also said that tbere is ano ruk of la@ in Southera Rhode-. sia. F&at is the United Kingdom Gavernment doing to r-e-establish tbe rule of law in Soutbem Rbcdesia? New does it intend to go about re-establishing the rule ol Paw in Soutbern Rbcdesia, when Ian Smith bas at bis commaad an air force and troops wbich the United dom Govsrnment handed over to bim? 64. Tbe evil has been done. 1 wish to state here with ail tbe empbasis at my command tbat the Afrtcan States til take steps to implement the pertinent provisions of operative paragraph 6 of the resolution s.dopt& at Acora on 22 October 1965. Tbere, the African Neads of State and Government resolved, inter alia; “Ta use aD possible means, including force, to oppose a unilateral declaratioa of independence; “To give immediate assistance to the people o Zimbabwe with a view to establishing a major@ Government in the country.a “It is my duty to issue a serious warning as to the grave consequences which would flow from any attempt by the British Government to set up a racialist State in the heart of Africa. The test tbat we should apply is whether or not the State is based on racial prlnciples. If it is based on racial principles. then OUI attitude to it would be the same whether it was declared unilaterally or whether it was set up by an Act of the British Parliament. 1 am certain that it is the view of a11 African States that under no circumstances could they permit a second South Africa to be established in the African continent. Therefore. irrespective of whether sucha State was established by unilateral action or by an Act of the British Parliament. the African States would be forced to oppose it in one form or tbe other. if necessary. In view of the trend of negotiations in Southern Rhodesia. 1 consider that it is necessary for the African States now to start making practical plans as to how they cari cleal militarily. if necessary. with the situation. 1 hope that you will appreciate that 1 speak with a full sense of responsibility and realising the grave issues involved. “In any event, 1 would like to make it absolutely clear that Ghana would not recognize any independent State set up in Southern Rhodesia unless that State was based on the principle of majority rule. Irrespective of whether it was created by an Act of the British Parliament orunilaterallybythe settlers, Ghana would oppose its entry into the Commonwealth, the United Nations and a11 other international bodies. If the British Parliament were to provide that the British Crown should be the titular sovereign of a racial independent Southern Rhodesia, then Ghana would no longer be able to recognize the British Crown as head of the Commonwealth.~ 66. ‘Ibis view, 1 am confident, is shared by all the African States-especially thosewhichwereatAccra-- to which this ill-considered and reckless action of Ian Smith constitutes a serious challenge whicb they are determined to meet with firmness. We shall not allow the British betrayal of the 4 million Africans of Southern Rhodesia to deflect us from our determination to fight relentlessly for the establishment of a majority rule in Southern Rhodesia. even if that necessitates the use of force. We appeal to a11 Mates Members of the United Nations to lend us their unqualified support in removing this blight of anotber white minority r6gime from Africa. 67. The situation now facing us is fraught witb dangerous consequences for the peace and progress of Africa. We cannot sit idly by while 4 million The fa& is that an iPle Britisb, again i 3x3 ofthe existence of Afaicas, bandea OVt)F some Sand d selft lQ a white minority. We are determiaedthat ity sbalI net continue in 1965. baw Pistened wlth 8 by the repFM@mtative 0 use every meams at its order in Soutbem Rbcdesia, 1 upcn the Cacil to tmge the Britisb c2cmxTment, ama au other GoveFmmemts. to act now tQ ves of thhe 4 million Africans and the Qtb tl¶@ s of tbe Territory who are now under mith and bis racisthenchmen. We cal1 CO tbe Ccmcil to order fuR sanctions against the Ian Smith rêgime in accordame with C%apter VII of the Charte~, inchrding the banuiug of the lamding of aircraft and even transport by rail. We urge the British Government, and we cal1 upon the Council to urge the British G~ventnnent, in consonance witb the statement duet made, to swpend the 1.961 Constitution wbich, in say case, is ROT operative since the colony is .j . a ~~~S~-EoQ~~irn~ colony, if I understand correcuy tlle ment Kin of the Foreigo Secretary of the Uniteà I I 72. In conclvsiom, I wish to stbe the following. Whai bas happened in Southern Rhode& is serious anc ConstiMes a crisis and a threat to the peace auc s%urity of tbe African continent and, in fact. of thc wodd. We therefore ask tbe Council take fts respon- 74. A Bmall, stubborn and sadly mistaken minority has seized sole power in an effort to dominate te lives of the va& and unwilling majority of the population of Southern Rhodesia. Defying the Stern warnings of the sovereign authority-the United Kingdom-this white minority &gime, in a desperate and what Will certainly prove to be a futile gesture, basuuillterally declared the independence of Southern Rh-tiesia, net in the interests of a majority of the people upon whom a genuine declaration of independence might depend, but in the interests of a privileged minority, making this a spurions declaration of independence. 75. It would be a pointless waste of the time of this Council to recount at length the strenuous and prodigious efforts made by the Government of the United Kingdom, backed by my own Government and bY the almost unanimous vote of the General Assembly to forestall this tragic act. 76. Al1 of us know of the firm statement made by Prime Minister Wilson on 27 October 1964. when he declared that a unilateral declaration of independence would be an act of rebsllion and warmed of the disastrous consequences which would ensue. We know of the prodigious efforts of Mr. Wilson, who travelled to Salisbury in a B;allant but futile endeavour to bring reason to the minority leaders of that country. We bave now heard the ringing words which, with what mnst bave been a heavy heart indeed but also a clear conscience, the Prime Minister spoke yesterday, II November, in Parliament. He left not the slightest doubt about where the United Kingdom stands on this rebellious act. and no room for conjecture as to its determination honourably to bring this rebellion to an end. 7’7. My Government has repeatedly made clear it! position on this issue, and today 1 wish to reaffirn it. That position is, briefly. as follows. 78. First, we are firmly and irrevocably dedicatec to the principle of self-determination and independencc for the people of Southern Rhodesia: self-determinatiol by and for a11 the people, independenoe on a bash acceptable to the people of the country as a whole. 79. Second, we hope and believe that the means o achieving this goal will be throughpeaceful negotiatio] and re-establishment of the broken lines of contac among the various factions in Southern Rhodesia. 85. IX@ representattve of tbe United nringdom has bcia~~ in tbis Council, described the stoonn andeffective measures wbich bis Government ig even now taking in an effort to make SO unprofitable the action of tbe Southern Rhodesian leaders that they Will, in due course, be forced to abandon the posture which they have illegally taken. It is now for all of us to stand bebind the United Kingdom and to lend to it all &eeessary assistance and support in making effective the measures which it bas taken. We must do this with a single purpose: to bring an end to the 87. As a first step, the United States yesterday recallad its Consul General from Salisbury. We bave a&30 informed the British Government that the Minister for Southern Rhodesian Affairs in the United Kingdom Embassy in Washington, and his four staff members, no longer bave any diplomatie status in the Wnited states. 88. We are immediately instituting a comprehensive embargo on the shipment of ail arms and military equipment to Southern Rhodesia. We will withhoid the establishment of any quota for the importation of sugar from Southern Rhodesia in 1966. The United States Government Will suspend action on a11 applications for United States Government loans and credit guarantees to Southern Rhodesia, and Will make it clear to any potential American investors in SouthernRhodesia the grave risk which we perceive in the further investment of American capital. 89. Finally, we here and now discourage a11 United States private travel to Southern Rhodesia in the Iight of the grave situation which exists there. In addition, we are now actively considering what further steps mi& he taken. 90. Such are the determined actions by the United States in support of the Uni+ed Kingdom and in opposition to the imprudent andunacceptable steptakenby the minority in Southern Rhodesia. 91. But we are now here to considerall steps that cari usefully be taken by the Security Council. In speech after speech in the Fourth Committee and in plenary meeting of the General Assembly, and here today, Member States bave acknowledged the authority of the United Kingom in Southern Rhodesia. They bave said the United Kingdom must act to put a stop to the illegnl action of the white minority Government. The moment has now corne when we in the Security Council bave the grave responsibility of adding the voice and the declaration of this Council to this virtually unanimous chorus of demands. We cari best do SO by supporting the Unitsd Kingdom in its sincere efforts in good faith. In OUI view, a11 States should be requested to refuse to recognize tht minority r@gime in Southern Rhodesia and asked to refrain from any action-and I emphasize %ny action”-which could aid it; and in particular, as a matterofurgentandimmedtate necessity, to refrain from supplying it with armaments. We must, in OUI view, cal1 upon States to lend assistance to the United Kingdom in making effective the steps it is taking, including financial and economic ones, to end this rebellion. And it is the view of my Government that we should cal1 upon the Wnited Kingdom to implement such steps with urgency andvigour, aswell as to do everything feasible to restore conditions which Will enable the inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia as a whole to determine their own future, Finally, the ‘du Sud. colmie 99. In a statement to the General Assembly on 5 Ncvember. 1 said-and in this respect 1 agree witb the statement made a few minutes agc by the representative of the United Kingdcm-that the United Kingdom is inccntestably the colonial Power which has emancipated the greatest number of pecple in Asia and Africa. And 1 added that wbat is surprising is that, in this great task of human emancipaticn, we find that in the Southern Rhcdesian question everything seems suddenly tc take the course dear tc Shakespearean tragedy: the herc kncws his duty; he defines it clearly; he has agreed tc do it and has begun to do it; but, suddenly, he is heset by hesitaticns, retreats and irraticnal scruples when it cornes tc the final step. 130. We are accustcmed tc read on the British emblem: Dieu et mon droit. The British lion still believes verv fervent& in Gcd: but now he seems tc bave dcubts abcut his iights in the Scuthern Rhcdesian question. ln any case, what is clear is that the United Kingdcm shculd bave no doubts regarding its international respcnsibility tcwards 4 million Africans, whcm the ccntemptible racist &gime of Mr. Smith wishes tc cast intc slavery in their cwn homeland. withcut any guarantee of pclitical rights. 101. Wbat in substance is the United Kingdom prcpcsing? Sanctions, econcmic sanctions. It is truc that they shculd net be underestimated, but mcdern pclitical history cver the last 150 years leaves us scmewhat sceptical about the effectiveness of econcmic sanctions and the effectiveness of that type of coercicn tc force a State tc submit to international law. Frcm the continental blcckade of Napcleon 1 against Great Britain tc the present day-including the eccnomic sanctions prcclaimed against Mussolini by the League of Nations in 1936 when tbat dictatcr attacked and invaded Ethicpia-econcmic sanctions bave never in the end crcduced the results excectedcf them. They are applied in the beginning with &nness andvigcur. but nraduallv cbinks accear in the armour, tlne sanction; are applied with’ less conviction and finally degenerate intc a kind of platcnic, unworkable and ineffective action. .Z&OIB of Africm Uni&~ at Fbe Accra meeting. 105. Firsl of a& the CcmstiFuFian and its racist machiraery must be SuspendeO. by force if necessary. Elections musé thon ke beeld an the basis of universal suffrage snd political eqiuality for tbe purpose of esF&lishing a national constituent Assembly. This national AssembIy sboold prepare a constitutionbased on politiea8 erpaltty. te be submitted to Fbe Wnited Kingdom. The United Kingdom should then grant independenee on the basis of that Constitution. Tbat is tbe only dem and vigoraus solution that cari put an end to the sebellin and ta tbe international piracy of Mr. SlniFh’s Government. 106. FurFbem~ore, Flds internatimal crime is a sign of the times: it is a symbolof tbe grave crisis of con- Femporary history. Tbe development of the great scientific movement and its practical applications. from P85Q to the present day, has enabled man to acbieve fantastic tecbnical progress, which today makes it possible for him to destroy the plaaet with a few atomic bombs sud Will soon enable him to take a walk round the moon. In tbe development of the moral conscience, however, there has not been SO much progress. Man has not hecome SO much better; an Fhe contrary. there is reason to fear that, if he bas net remained at a standstill. he may even bave regressed. At the beginning of this century, a great French philosopher, Bergson, foreseeing the coming crisis, said: “The body. grown out of a11 proportion. is in need of more sou1 and the mechanism is in need of a mystique*. This mystique is the mystique of the United Nations; it is the mystique which requires that relations among men should no longer follow the law Of mture or of tbe jungle, the law of the wiid heasts, but should he based on fraternity, justice and equity in opposition to individua or national egotism.

We are consideri8ng a question of a very immediate and urgent nature. 1 am sure that world public opinion, wbich condemns the illegal action of the minority group. is waiting for the reaction of this Council. We believe that this Council should, in its wisdom, consider tsking a decision, which would be a preliminary decision, declaring the illegality of the action of the minority group. condemning the action and calling on ail Members to stop any possible assistance to that illegal r&gime. This course embodies also non-recognition. 110. What is also important-and it is important to be decided now-is that this Council should in its wisdom decide, right here and now, to invite the two Member S&es which voted against resolution 2024 (XX) of the General Assembly yesterday. namely Portugal and South Africa, to corne and participate with us in these deliberations. They are neighbouring States. They bave their own responsibilities, and their presence Will help us in our deliberations here. 1 hope that this Will be discussed and decided at this meeting and now.

The Security Council is master of its own decisions. The representative of Jordan has made two proposais: first, that the Council should adopt what he calls a preliminary decision and that this should be done in a11 urgency; secondly, that the Security Council shonld decide to invite Portugal and South Africa to take part in this debate. 1 should like to hear the views of members of the Council on these proposals.

1 should like to say only that the second part of my proposai is based on rule 37 of our provisiona rules of procedure: “Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited. as the result of a decision of the Seourity Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question.. .v. It is based on that rule. and 1 have already stated the reasons.

With regard to thetwo parts of the suggestion made by the representative of Jordan, 1 should like to address myself first to tbe first part. It is undoubtedly a very urgent situation on which we should not disperse until we bave heard a11 the statements of a11 the representatives who are going to take places at this table and also of such Qf tbe I%&d Nations wbicich tbe Secwity Comcilmaybe invit as tbe result of a decision of tbe Security Council. FQ partie@&, witbout vote, in tbe discussion of But Article 32. whicb is Fbe provisional mkes d Member of the United r of tbe Security Cou&l w any Stste wbicb is net a member of tbe United Nations, if it is a party to 8 dispute under considemtion by tbe Security Council, sbalI be invited to participate. Tberefme, tbere is the. abligatorg provisien of Article 32 whicb 1s I~rn~t~tQa~~y to tbe diswte. Unàer mle 37 of tbe provisions1 rules of Proc&ure, wbicb ccmtaims permissive provision and whicb reres a decision of tbe Secnrity Coucil, a State may be invite& ovicled. and mly provlded, that tbe inof e iuember to be invited are especitiy . 116. 1 quite gmnt tbat tbe position of tbe two States mentioned by tbe representative of Jordan might sigtilcantly affect tbe problem that we are considering. but it wouId be very difficult to say tbat their position is affected as a result of any debate on the question of Soutbern Whdesia.

Witb regard to the double proposai wbich bas been made by the representative of Jordan. I should like to say the foIIowing. 118. With respe& to his proposaI, whicb is that the %mcil sbould deckire ilegal tbe self-declared Govenunent of Southern Rhodesla, I fally and whokheah?dly endorse the motive which is behind it. Howtiver. 1 think that this should be done in the form of a draft resolution, which would need some careful consideratlon, and in a draft resolution wbich should Include many more ekments tban tbis one statement. Tberefore, I would support the motive which isbehind the proposa& but 1 wouId suggest tbat we aim for a draft resolution. which should be adopted as soon as

There are two parts to the proposa1 just made by the representative of Jordan. In the first P~I$ he asks us to declare the unilateral deolaration of independence which has just been made in Southern Rhodesia illegal and, as a consequence, to invite a11 States Members of the United Nation5 to refrain from recognizing that illegal government. In the second part, he asks us to invite South Africa and Portugal-two States that are neighbours of Southern Rhodesia-to participate in the debate. 121. Despite what the Netherlands representative had just said concerning the first part of the proposaI, 1 do net think that in emergencies theSecurity Council has ever hesimted to adopt a preliminary motion. Tsking into account the time that has elapsed and the difference in time, it is nearly two days since the unilateral declaration of independence was made. We know that some States are in the habit of giving immediate recognition to a new government, and that is why 1 consider that we should adopta motion on the lines of the one proposed, pending the conclusion of our àebate. Experience has shown that, when a preliminary motion is adopted in this way. it is possible to include it in the subsequent final resolution adopted by the Council. I therefore think that’we shall not really be going counter lo the argument put fovzard by the Netherlands representative if we adopt forthwith a preliminary motion which could be included in a final resolution when we reach the conclusion of the debate. 122. As for the second part of the Jordanian representative’s proposai, 1 think-if my memory is correct-that 1 cari cite a precedent on the same question of Southern Rhodesia. lf 1 remember rightly. the Council did in fa& invite South Africa to participate in the debate. Subject to verification of that by the Secretariat, 1 think that we could do the same today. 123. To sum up, 1 repeat that, in response to the first Part of the Jordanian orooosal. we could adonta preliminary motion and tbai, as far as the second part is concerned, we could follow tbe precedent that 1 invoked. 124. Mr. ,EL-FARRA (Jordan): With respect to the question of inviting two Member States of the United Nations to participate in the debate, 1 wish to state that rule 37 is a rule of the CounciPs provisional rules of procedure and that tbe Conncil is the master of its own procedure, It,can give its rule the interpretation that it,deems fit. It cari freeze its effectivene88 or decide otherwise. Article 39 of the Charter gives the Council the full right to adopt its own rules of procedure. Since the Council is master of its own rules, I hope that, in its wisdom. the Council Will decide to invite the two Members. This action would be verf important for the problem itself. bis idem for a @piminq decisiwn-to biSOWnW0rdSseecnay. I wwuld again sugowm tbis meetig to enable tw exwbange views. $ memld iofQrnal c~~l~tiQ=s in 2 pm.. VE41 in advmce of e WU&l time of wur meetis. 1 sbwuld Rhe tw submit stiwns tw the Cwuncfl. (union of Soviet Swcialist m Russian): Welistenedwith made by the representa~ive n under cwnsideration. The ipre to empbasize that it is n mv by tbe tw tbe remarks made just mpresmtative d JOF&O. Security Cwuncfl is twday examining a far matter, ad is meeting as a matter of aBais. evay bous and every reactiwn Cwuncil undoubtedly bwlds especial t place, with regard to a prelimïnary deeision of tbe Security Cwunoil, as prwpwsed by tbe rqmsentative of Yordm, the WSSR delegatiwn favwurs SUC~ an apprmeh and considers that the circumstames and tbe development of the situation warrant the immediate adoption of a resolutiwn strongly condeming raoist s@@me in Souehem Bxdesia md calling aIl States to deny seeognition tw tbese usurpers of power. That is ful1y consonant with reswfutiwn 2024 (XX) adopted by the General Assembly, paragmpb 1 of which prwvides for condemnation of the unilakeral declaratiwn of independence by the racist minority in Soutbem Rhodesia. %?A Momver, we also view with sympathy the second consideration put fwrward by tbe representative Of Jordan. We believe that tbis is demanded by the S~cia1 position taken by Portugal andtbe Republic CoUrSe we must-but alsofrom apoliticalpoint of view. The Security Council cannot overlook such conduct and a position such as that taken by the representatives Of Portugal and the Republic of South Africa in OUI‘ Organisation. 132. That is why we support the Jordanian representative’s suggestion that the Security Council should decide to request the representatives of Portugal and the Republic of South Africa t-, take part in the debate on the question under review and to hear their explanations on the substance of the question andon their position in that regard.

The President has suggested that the Council should adjourn until3.30 p.m. We are ready to support that suggestion, but on the understanding that the time is to be used for work and not for rest. A continent is on the rasor’s edge and in such circumstances no one oan allow himself any respite. The President specified, very pertinently and constructively. that during the interval the Council could engage in a useful exchange of views. We naturally share the view expressed by the representative of Jordan concerning the urgency of a declaration repudiatingandwithdrawing recognition from a regime which claims togovern Southern Rhode&% 134. 1 do not spesk of the Government of Southern Rhode&, for at the present time there is only one authority in Rhodesia. namely the Governor. who, as the representative of the United Kingd0m has informed us, has dismissed the previous Government from office. We are confronted with a rebtllion on the part of a minority. 135. The concern that we share with the representative of Jordan is to ensure that no one in the world should hold out a hand to this rehel racist minority. We need a written text, however, and for this reason 1 support the President’s suggestion for the adjournment of the meeting. 136. Before the Council decides on a resolution, it would wish to, and indeed it should, hear the representatives of the ten nations that bave requested the right to take part in our debate. 1 do not think it would be correct on our part to adopt, or even prepare, a final resolution before hearing the representatives of the countries that are involved or concerned in this problem. 1 am therefore ready to support the suggestion that we adjourn immediately, in order to work, not to bave lunch, SO that Council members may draft this urgent prelimmary declaration, as suggested by the representative of Jordan. 1 also agree that we should reconvene at 3 p.m. to hear the statements 137. WiLh m d tc. the second proposalofthe represenwive of an, a91 1 say is: let us invite those ccmtries. An invitation may be acceptecI or refus&. It does net imply any legal or funetional competence 011 the part of the Coumil. Sin~e the presence and of the two Governments t sa3 msy bring anote @d situation we 5re exarnine) (translated from stened with great inby the representative representathes of the ion snd Umgmy on the by the repeseniative of then rnade 5 take acocmt to a lars tfve of Jorclm cabk us, after informai ~n~~~tions, to take a decision on 5 specific text whioh the Jordanian representative would p sble to submit before this afternoon% meet ably be 139. Thst is wby my deleg5tian will support this estion, md if tbese timès are convenientforthose Uri& to bave Iuach as weU as for those who do net, we cauM perhaps consider holding consultations at 3 p.m.. for example, so as to be ready to resume ow meeting at 3.30 pm., as you suggesled. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): My aion is sympathetic towards ho& aspects of the proposai made by the représentative of Jordan. 141. We do not wish to inconvenience any delegation’s serious consideration of the problem. In listening: to tbe discussion tbis morning, it seemed to me that, in the lighht of tke action taken by the General Assembly, it would notbe dif%xdt forthemembers of the Security Council to support a simple resolution callingupon all States to refuse to recognize the illegal and unconstitutional r&gime in Southern Rhodesia. As the representative of Jordan has said, khere are elements of urgency in this question. 142. In my own vlew that cauld have been done here tbis morning after hearing expressions which deal witb other aspects of the problem by a consensus statement of the President if it reflected the con- 144. 1 also believe. with due deference to the views of the representative of Malaysia, that the Sec%& Council has the right under the rules to invite any Member State to be present. We are considering a grave problem, with profound implications for the. entire world. and certsinly for the States neighbouring Southern Rhodesia. My delegationwouldnot oppose an invitation to the two Governments in question. As has already been stated, this is an invitation and may be accepted or not accepted; it is not a demand. It is an invitation. 145. Thus, my delegation is not adverse to having a statement here and now either in the form of a consensus statement or in the form, if it could be done, of an appropriate resolution with appropriate language on what has been correctly described to be an interim measure. 146. We, of course, recognize that your ruling as President was the only one a President could make in the light of the lack of consultationamong members on the proposa1 which has heen submitted. We bave been consulting here in the open, and as part of that consultation 1 would say, as regards my delegation, that we would be prepared to join in a declaration here and now or in a consensus statement by the President if the President could make such a statement based on the discussion we bave held here. However, if any member of the Cou&l desires time for consultation on this proposai-and we bave always followed this practice-then a short period for consultations would be in order. 147. As regards the invitation, that perhaps is something that has to be dealt with now if we are to issue an invitation. We support that proposal. As a matter of fact, we support both proposais.

References wasmade to the idea of having a final resolution before hearing OUI other colleagues. That is the last thing that 1 would want to do. We are. of course, going to hear a11 of our colleagues around this table and also those who bave asked to make statements. 149. What 1 was referring to was a preliminary resolution. This question is most urgent. Public opinionis awaiting the reaction of this Council, the highest body of the United Nations, regarding thecompletedefiance of its values. What 1 wanted was a preliminary or fnterim resolution reflecting certain agreed ideas. con- . _ F. &J$OROZOV (unmn OI Soviet SccialisF Re- ~trgnslated fmm Russian): Tbe USSi delealready bad occasion to state tts position pmposals wbicb Fhe Jcrdmim representain MS statement. We support action along . 154. As regards Fhe present position of our work. it. seems tbat we are now at tbe stage of waittng for Fbe draft resobrFiou -wbicb the Jordanian representative is to prepsre. as he has just stated. If he needs more than five minutes or so to draft it, we couuld examine it at the beginniig of our next meeting. 155. TO avoid any misunderstandùtg, 1 should like to make it elear that. in tbe view of tbe USSR deLegation, SUC~ a draft cari be examtned at the meeting of the Council itself. Tbis wuld not rule out tbe passibility of consultations wldch individual members of the Council might wisb to conduct concerning the draft. The one thing uvbich we should like to stress is tbat we do not regard it advisable to hold consuRations which wauld, as it were. be a substitute for meetings of the Security Ccmcil. 156. Tbe President remarked that ail the members of tbe Security Couneil might meet in his office. We do not tbink that sucb a procedure would be warrmted in general, and especially not at the present juncFwe. It would be preferable to examine all pro.. posais which mightbe submitted to tbe Security Council in mmexion wiFh tbe action taken by tbe Jordautan representative at a meeting of the Councilitself. Furtbermore. if we understand the position rightly. we should like to make the following point: we’object to baving meetings of the Security Council replaced by 8.a unofficial gatbering of members of the Council in tbe President’s office. Such a procedure is unwarrantad. incomprehensible and unacceptable.

1 think that 1 correctly interpreted the views of the representalive of Jordan, which 1 support. Per baps the difference in Ianguages is responsible for the misunderstanding. 366. 7 understood what tbe representative of Jordan prowsed and what he is rightly conceAned aboui: 159. 1 should like to make it clear that 1 dId not misinterpret the statement by the representative of Jordan and that 1 supported it. 1 agree, however, with the constxctive suggestion by the President that we suspend the meeting for a brief working interval.

1 think that the Jordanian representative has accepted the idea of the meeting heing adjourned now SO that we-and we who bave supported him-cari submit a preliminary text at the beginning of this afterncon’s meeting. The proposa1 of the Jordanian representative bas. however. two parts, the second of which consists in inviting two Member States to participate in oui discussion on this problem. 161. 1 think that usually there is no need for a text or a resolution in order to invite two Mrmber States and that in view of the proposa1 which has been made the President could consult the Council to see whether there is any objection. If there is no objection, the President could conclude that the Council has decided to invite them and an invitation could then be addressed to the two States. 1 do not think that for the second part of the Jordanian proposa1 we really need any text or resolution. 162. MI’. STEWART (United Kingdom): 1 would like to say that Britain would support-indeed. would welcome-&he idea of an early declaration on the lines proposed by the representative of Jordan. 1 would bave thought that perhaps the most convenient way of doing that would be for this immediate sitting to corne to an end and for us to proceed without delay, when we resume. to act on the suggestion of the representative of Jordan. 1 would like to say that we also support his other proposai, that these two countries should be invited to address the Security Council.

If there are no more speakers on this item, 1 think that 1 may now proceed to divide the prohlem Into two parts. 164. With regard to the first proposa1 for the adoption of a preliminary resolution, 1 am happy to note that we bave finally reached the point at wbicb 1 wished to begin, namely that we should adjourn the meeting for an exchange of views and that we should bave a document before us on which we cari work. 165. With regard to the second part of the problem, namely the question of inviting the representatives of Portugal and South Africa to take part in this debate, we bave a new and constructive suggestion from the representative of the Ivory Coast to the effect that, as this is a question falling within the competence of tbe Security Council and one for which there are precedents. 1 should ask the members