S/PV.1259 Security Council

Thursday, Nov. 11, 1965 — Session None, Meeting 1259 — UN Document ↗ OCR ✓ 5 unattributed speechs
This meeting at a glance
9
Speeches
3
Countries
0
Resolutions
Topics
General statements and positions Security Council deliberations Southern Africa and apartheid War and military aggression General debate rhetoric Arab political groupings

The President unattributed #121819
In accordance with the decisions taken earlier by tbe Council. 1 propose to invite the representatives of Algeria. India. Pakistan, Ghana, Zambia, Sierra Leone, Senegal. Mali, the UnitedRepublic of Tansauia. Nigeria and Guinea to participate. without vote, in the Council’s discussions. At tl>e invitation of the Presidenf, Mr. T. Bouaffcura (Algeria). Mr. G. Partbasamtbi (Iadia), Mr. Amjad Ali (Pakistan), Mr. F. S. Arkhurst (Ghaaa), Mr. F. M. Mulikila (Zambia). Mr. G. B. 0. Collier (Sierra Leone), Mr. 0. S. Diop (Sanegal). Mr. S. Coulibaly (Mali), Mr. J. W. S. Ma&?ela (United Republic of Tamao.ia), Mr. D. 0. lbekwe (Nigeria) asdMr. Achkar Ma-of (Gutiea) took the places reserved for them in froat of the Couacil fable.
The President unattributed #121822
I wish to inform the Council that I have received a communication from the representatlve of Etbiopia [S/6922], reqnesting permission to participate in the discussion of the question before us. If there are no objections, 1 shall invite the representative of Ethiopia to take part, without vote, in the Council’s ciiscussions. At tbe imitation of tbe President, Mr. T. Gebre- Egzy (Ethiopia) took a place reserved for bim in front of &e C0wcïl fable.
The President unattributed #121823
1 give the floor to the representative of Pakistan. 4. Mr. Amjad AL1 (Pakistan): The delegation of Pakistan is grateful to the members of tbe Security Council for according us the opporhmitytoparticipate in the debate on the question of Southern Rhodesia. for this problem ha& occupied the attention of the Government and the people of Pakistan for a number of years. The people of Pakistan came to share Gloser association witb Africa in the second half of the nineteenth Century when the colonial rulers exported en masse Asian labour to the African continent. Generation alter generation, our people have suffered, along with our African brothers. from the legalized injustices and oppression at the hands of the racist minority in southern and eastern parts of Africa. As the Council is aware, my country was among the first to bring the question of racial discrimination and hatred perpetrated iu the southern part of Africa to the United Nations. 5. Hile the classic form of colonialism is disappearing, the subtle forms of domination of the racist colonial minorities trying to dominate and perpetuate the inhuman rule over the indigenous inhabitants sriIl thrives and stands as the remnant and ultimate citadel of injustice and wrong-doing that is asso- 6. Today. we are facedwitb the spectre of having mother régime lfke tbat of South Africa installed in Soutiers Rhodesia and of seeing the same exploitation. suffering, persecution, denial of human the deplorable political system operattng Unfortunate non-Whites as in SouthAfrica. 7. As 1 raid before, tbe stand of the Government and tbe people of Pakfstan has been unequivooal in tbe matter. My Government had declared time and tbat any declaration of unilateral independence wwld be a direct challenge to the world community and a blatant denial of humas rights and justice. We bad further warned that in oase of such an illegal mttlateral decharation of independence as was made the day before yesterday. Pakistan would immediately enter into consultattons with other Governments to consider meaeures necessary to defeat this scheme. This poltcy is the logtcal outcome of our ovfn long and pair&0 esperience of colonial domination. We feel at one with other peoples in our re@on and in other reglons of the world wbo aspire to tbe right of self-detenninaticn, the inherent rigbt of every people to dectde and determine their ow” future. 8. Yecently in Afrioa we bave witnessed tbe snap@ng of the shrckles of colonfalism. But in the aoutbern part of thés potentially rich and pwerful continent there lisger the very strcmg and determined remriants of tbe forces tien. lands of Soutbern We aee tbe unforhmate sia. Angola. EAozamhique, Swth West Africa and South Afrioa in tbe clutcbes of memiless raoist minorities. We have mentioned ail these lands togetber for we believe that tbey are tbe victims of tbe same forces. As a consequence. Tokay thés Territory bas been brought to tbe brtnk of dîsaster. 9. Tbis Organfzatton, in its Special Commtttee.l/ in the General Assembly and in this Council, bas been seised of the question of Scuthern Rhodesta for a considerable time. But General Assembly resolutiens 1747 (XVI), 1760 (XVII) and 1889 (XVIII) were dbxcded as scraps of paper. Ltkewise. no attention was paid to Security Council resolution 202 (1966) of 6 May 1965. The rightful leaders of the people of this Territory, Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole. along with many others. languish in the Southern Rhodesian vrestricted areasv. The problem oonttnued to acquire serious proportions in the past few nmths as Mr. Smith continued to threaten to Proolaim unilateral declaration of independence, 10. It is our view tbat the present situation involves basically four parties, namely, the usurpers of power of Salisbury, the majority of tbe psople of Southern Rhodesia, tbe Government of the United Kingdom and the world communlty as represented at the United Nations. At this late hour we cannot but express our pessimism as regards the hope of any rational response from the usnrpers of power in Salisbury. As for the African majority of Southern Rhodesia, though its voice has been stifled. we have no doubt that it cannot and Will not remain inactive in the face of this grave injustice whlch is being perpetrated against it. The Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union is reportedly in the process of forming a *Government of the Peopl@ and has termed this unilateral declaration a “declaration of warA on the Soutbern Rhodesian majority. Though the efforts of the leaders of the indlgenous population are bound to multiply. we believe that they alone may net be in a position to defeat the sinister designs of this small but powerful band of usurpers. On the other hand, if these forces of freedom do not get support from outside, the Smith r6gime might use it as an excuse to unleash a new series of repressive measures which might cause greater suffering and bloodshed of tbe African population. As for the Government of the Unlted Kingdom, my delegatlon bas listened witb interest to the statement of the representative of the Unltsd Ifingdom in tbe Seowity Coumil yesterday (1257th meeting] to the effect tbat the Britisb Government is tahing a number of legal and economic measures to defeat the designs of Mr. Smith. But we doubt very much if those measures Will be adequate. 11. In addition. we wish to empbasize the role of this Organisation. It is this forum which has tahen the cause of the oppressed majority of Southern Rhodesia to its heart. and it is here that justice should be obtained for them. Resolutions on this subject have been passed in the General Assembly and in this Ccuncil. Actions bave been snggested. Recommendations have been made. The attention of the world has been invited t0 the threat to international peace and security which the present situation poses. Yet the situation, instead of improving, bas worsened and has indeed become grave. 13. The day before yesterday we heard tbe vaices of 107 cauntries candemning tlte uniletersl declaratian of independence by the rncist mlnority af Santbern Rhodesia [sec General Assembly resolutian 2024 (XI)]. Tbat condemnatian was vaiced by the repuesentstives af slmast sll the nations represented bere. It was the msnifeststian of tbc determinatian of the people af tbe warld not ta tolerate the racial discrimination snd segregation snd minority rule In Sauthern Rhadesia which constitute a crime sgeinst humanity. hi thls cil many voices are beard snd wlll be hesrd this Coud1 to tahe decisive action. The dele Qf Pakistan, on behau of the Govermnent of Pakistan anri its 110 mlllian people. appesls ta snd urges this Council ta respand ta tbe call of 101 nations. We feel tbet these appesls fmm the warld community sbauld nat remsin unanswered. Let tbe United Nations prave once tbat it wss capable af decisive action in e ing the vestiges af colaniallsm. racial injustice, decial of bumen rigbts snd denial af tbe supreme right of self-determination to the 4 million peaple in Southem Rhodesla. Only such en action Will strecgthen the fsith of tbe peaples of the v this Orgsnization. and it may well be tbe beg of a revitslised, dynemic snd living warld Organisation as the framers of the Charter wsnted it to be. 14. On behalf of my Gavernment I wlsb ta stnte that we Will fully ca-operate in accardsnce with resalutian 216 (1965) adapted by the Security Cauncil lsst night as a preliminary end urgent measure tawards the solution of this grave prablem.
When I spahe Yeae*y [1257th meeting] I described tbe view which the Unlted Klngdam Government tahes af thh i~e&Pl a-3 in Sauthem Rhodesia and the meaeures which we are already tshing ta deal with the 16. First of ail, it is, 1 think, generally agreed, as we have maintained, that this situation in Southern Rhodesia is a British responsibility. Secondly, we are indebted to the representative of Jordan for the resolution which he put forward and which we adopted yesterday, one which gives the agreement of tbis Council to certain views and measures already adopted by the United Klngdom Government: that is to say, a condemnation of the illegal r@lme, a cal1 for non-recognition of it and a cal1 to all nations to refrain from dolng anythlng whlch may help the rebels. Al1 this is naturally very gratlfylng to us in the United Kingdom. 17. Next 1 would mention that the United Kingdom, of course, has gone further than the condemnation and the non-recognition. We have taken measures the purpose of which is to briug home to Mr. Smith and his associates the gravity of what they have done and to cause Southern Rhodesia to return to its alleglance to the British Crown SO that Britaln cari then carry out its task of ensuring for alI the peoples of Southern Rhodesia an independence and a freedom that Will be genuine. 1 was pleased tc notice how many representatives expressed their approval of the measures we have taken. The representative of the United States spoke of our “effective measuresv and mentioned, further, certain measures which the United States Government is already taking along the same lines. The representative of Senegal said that the United Nations must support the United Kingdom measures. The representative of Nigeria, in a reference to our measures, said that now a11 of us are called upon to act. The representative of Ghana expressed his support for the measures we have taken. The representative of lndla said that our maih concern must be to end this act of piracy and to help the United Kingdom Government. 18. New 1 ought to refer to certaii critioisms that were made whlch, as 1 said, partly were concerned with past events and partly came from those *rho, while for the most part approving the measures we have tahen, made a call for fnrther measures and expressed some doubts about the efficacy of the steps we have already taken. 19. 1 should net want to spend a great deal of time In replylng to those criticisms whlch were concerned with past events, for it seems to me that the vital concern of the Council ncw is to consider the present situation and present action. 1 must. however. mahe some reference to those criticisms lest it should be thought. if 1 were completely silent about them, that 1 accept the validity Of 21. Another matter 1 sbonld refer to in tbls connexion is the Constiiutlon ;I 1961. 1 would fully accept that criticisms cari be made of tbat Constitution. but it was never intended by the Unit& Kingdom Government as a Constitution on wbich Scuthem Rbodesia coul< proceed to independence. However. it is worth noting=-and thls was net bronght out yesterday-Unît wben tbat Constitution was fi& forxned it was accepted as an lnterlm messure by all tbe political parties of allraces in Sontbern Rhodesia except tbe party of Mr. Ian Smith. 1 should perhaps explain to the representative of the Soviet Union, wbo made special reference to tbis hlstory of past events. tbat tbere are in many countries dlfferent political parties, SO that when people bave elections they cari bave a choice. We bave often hard references to tbe phrase aone msn, one vote”. Tbat is an admirable prlnciple. but of course sotie mm. one vote, one party, one candidate snd no choices is not an equally satisfactory prlnciple. But that is by the way. New why dld Mr abject to that constitution? It was because fully acoeptlng many criticisms that msny of it-it bad bnilt into it a ofity rule. One of the reasons Mr. Smith made this illegal declarstlon of independence was 80 that he could tamper wltb tbat Constitution Iiowever. when OUI mea produced the wsult they are intended namely restoring Southsrn Rbodesia to its om-and it wss of constitution which would be suitable for independence. 22. The other matter relating to past events to whicll it would be rlght for me to refer was the su made by a few representatives yesterday thst the British Government had in some way connlved at thls illegal declaration of lndependence ami that there was some hlnd of conspiracy with 27. With respect to the measures that we bave taken, tbere was some criticism of the measure related to tobaoco. It was said that the tobacoo trop has been sold and that this will not worry them until March 1966. If 1 were a farmer and 1 New that 1 was going to be ruined next Maroh. tbat knowledge would considerably affect my behaviour now. And if 1 thought that 1 was being put in that situation beoause of the reckless behaviour of a group of people purporting to be tny government, 1 should be extremely anxious that they would change that behaviour as soon as possible. 26. May 1 repeat a point that 1 made. Tobacco and sugar together amount to one third of Southern Rhodesia’s experts. If the action that we bave taken -and the appropriate orders bave already been issued by the British Government-is paralleled throughout the world, Southern Shodesia Will be faced by ‘Ws measure alone with the loss of one tllird of its experts. It is not possible, in a serious view of the situation, to say that that is net a very grave measure indeed, Moreover, it must be tsken together with the financial measures that we bave tahen and which alert the whole world-Governments, business communities everywhere-to the desperate situation in which the whole Southern Rhodesian economy is placed. 29. Southern Shodesia, by its nature, has been a country whose future and progress bave depended on confidence, on a belief that there was a thriving future for tbat country. The recldess act tahen in Salisbury has completely undermined that confidence. That is the situation with which Southern Rhodesia is now faced. 30. 1 listened with interest, with patience and witb a measure of sympathy to tbose who asked for wider economic embargoes, but 1 do ask them to contage. first, tbat we sbould recrimination over the past, or di6ctassion of in+ possibilities, tbis Counoil at tbe end wene left in disassay witbout a clear message au tbe world. If tbat were to happen. tbe only tbe rebellions wdd urge. in view of the need for for definiteness amd for urgency, tbat rably consid%r the &a& reaolutfon whfoh I
The President unattributed #121831
1 glve tbq fhr to tbe representative of A
The Security Couacil is once again oalled upon to examine the question of So&bern Rhodesia. Is tbere any need Ibis time to draw ious nature of tief3e er a question of a~ Ian Smith% tbreats b.rt of ret whioh. in fact constitute8 a for the Mure of Rhode&. to eacb an SmbWs threats bas been one of besitatio5 sometàmes cdh~ion. Once tb r had tadcen place, tbe Wnited utmost to foscer an international a apparently intenaea to restore tbe 1 lmw cm we be convinced of tbe 5i an attempt when ail the earlier decisi<Ens bave contributed to the disintegration of tbat country’s power in Rbodeeia? 35. Alfgeria, like all tbe independent c trie6 of Africa, did not fail to draw the CouneiR3 attention. on tbe one hand, to tbe increasi activities of the Salisbury authorities ~~~e~~c~~rn~a~ detesmination to de* tbe entire international community and, on tbe other hand. to the ~paE~aab~% inaction of tbe administering Power. AU OUI Wmmlong s.go as 39 April 1965, tke Minister for Affairs of Algeria proposed to tke Cowcil meeting] urgent saps to d tk@ slpremaoy ttler minority over 4 rmity witk tke aspirations of tke people of Zibabwe and of tke A%fi&n continent, the meass recommended to tke Cnited Kingdo incklded re!eease of ait politieal prismers and leaders nationalfst movements and tbe res ation of tkeir rigkts. tke suspension of tke 1961 @onstimtion and the convening of a ~~sti~ti~aal conference witk a view to f tke African peoples. 37. On 6 May 1965 tke Coumil adapted resolution 202 @$55f. wkick recommended that tbe United Kin d “enter into eonsumtations witb ail comerneu tith a view to cmve of ail political parties in order stitutional provisions the peopie of Rh ssible date may b ite of the timiùity of tkat deeision. wkiek we remarkeed on at the time, tke Africans nursed tbe hope that tbe United Ringdom wuld respect the Security Council’s decision and carry out its oftproclaimed intentions in tbe face of Ian Smith% intransigence. 39. But wbat action bas the United Kiigdom taken since May 1965? First of a& tbere was a secret correspondeme ketween Mn-. Narold Wilson and fan Smith, tke results of wkick we see today. In addition to tbe exchange of correspondeme, negotiations were opend in London. where Ian Smith tlouted United m and world opinion by rejecting every pro- Tke discussion between Mr. Wilson and Ian vas resumed at Salisbury. What was tbe basis of the discussion? Wbat was the aim of the negatiations? TO make Ian Smith agree to majority de, we are told. Uet tbe 1961 Constitution was me of the bases of the discussion. Fwthermore. in conformity with the spirit and letter of that Gonstimtion. tbe majority representattves were left d the discussions. The results themselvesely, tke establisbment of a Royal Commission cw~posed of two minority representatives and one United Kingdom representative-were in keeping witb the principles of that Constitution in that the Africans V+exe left out. By failmg to take into account either the recommendations of the African States or the decisions of tke Council, the Wnited Kingdom pro-. bnged the period of procrastination. 3% MoreQver, bu repeatsdly announcing its deter. mination net to use force, the United Kingdom Govern. ment opened the way for a unilateral deolaratior 40. ‘The United Kingdom now adroits that this new situation has created a threat for theworld. Mr. Rarold Wilson has not concealed this fact In his recent statements. Today the situation does In fact constitute an even more direct threat to the African continent; but it is not a new threat for the Africans, for last spring we drew the attention of the Security Council, and in particular of the United Kingdom, to the seriousness of the threat. Unfortunately the Wnited Kingdom paid no attention to our warnings. It did net see fit to heed the appeal of the African oountries, which stressed the dangers of the situation and the threat it entailed. The United Kingdom rejected those warnings. And yet, in the light of its great experience, the United Kingdom could bave put a stop to a sequence of events which in other times and places has led to a tragic situation. For indeed the events in Southern Rhodesia are simply a repetition of certain serious problems with which the United Nations bas been concerned for nearly twenty years. Whether it is in connexion with the settler minority, the total disregard of the aspirations of the people of this Territory or the consolidation of a fait accompli, the sfmilarity to othér questions is SO complete as to be deeply disturbing. 41. In a11 these cases, the United Kingdom has deliberately refused to shoulder its responsibilities. In a11 these cases, its attitude has helped to weaken the authority of this Organisation. Not content with terming the African recommendations and the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council interference in its affairs, the United Kingdom denied the very competence of the UnitedNations in regard to the Rhodesian problem. In contrast to the stand it took only a few days ago, the United Kingdom has just placed the same problem before tbe Security Council. By appealing to the Security Council taday, is it not recognizing Lhe competence of the United Nations? Or is it a capitulation on the part of the United Kingdom in view of the gravity of the situation? It is clear that in SO doing, the United Kingdom is trying to ask the United Nations to remedy a situation whloh its inaction alone has created. 42. If this is the dialectic position of the United Kingdom and if such are its intentions, we feel it Kingdorn would be bre ide33dionâl morality. Tbere are precedents in this matter, creat@d by other colonial PoWers, Wbiob tbe e‘nited Nations to interverre. The result the after-effeets of the crisis wbkb tbe ation; v.ndenvent are still being felt. racist paver installed at Salisbury. The administering Power% total responsibility th regard to Hmdesia bas just been coofimed Prime Minister Wilson. It now behoves tbe Unfted m to assume that responsibility to tbe fuU. withut delay. 45. Afriea. wbicb bas experienced centuries of domitien, cannnot today, any more than it could yestery. tohrate tbe installation of a rdgime whicb, being in the image of tbe Soutb African rQime. cannot fail to do furtber damage to the basic prines of tbe Charter. without respect for whicb i~t~~~tion~ comrnunity c+n neitber dewbp even survive. Our continent, suffering under tbe South AMean scourge. camot agree to its expmsion on any pretext whatever. Chr existence is a: st&e and we are firmly determined ta do everytbing m our pawer to ersdicate tbe evil by ail ssibie means. That is tbe uaderlying signnificaace the decisions adopted by tbe Qrganization oftirican Unity. 46. Algeria. for its part, is henceforth determined to assume aU its responsibilities. Faitbftd to tbe ch it bas fought for 80 long, it mbabwe people witb ail tbe necestbe crucial ordeal tbrough wbicb 43. It is certainly not under the ternis of Article ‘23 of C%apter XI of tbe Charter, regarding Non-Self- Governing Territories tbat the United Kiigdcm has corne here. since it has always disputed our ccmpotence in the matter by rejecting alI the resclutions in wbich Southern Rhcdesia was ccnsidered as a Non-Self-Governing Territory by the General Assembly. According to its own statement. tbe situation is of serious ccncern to the world. For su& cases, the words used by the Charter are: a threat to international peace and security. These are the words used by the thirty-five African conntries wlaich signed the letter requeeting an emergency meeting of the Security Council [s/6202]. 43. Neither cari it be a question of Chapter VI. since that Chapter refers to disputes between parties whiÏe the case bsfore us is a di te between tbe administering Power a titi s 0f a colony; moreover, the United om is contesting the competence of the Security Council to deal witb su& prohlems since it considers tbem domestic problems. Rowever tbat may be, tbe United Kingdom bas corne bere to ask us to endorse tbe eccnomic sanctions wldch it is preparing to apply and we have granted its appeal and convened the Council. 50. Conseqnently, Cbapters VI and XI having bsen excluded, the Council must discuss the problem in terms of the only Chapter of the Charterproviding for economic sanctions, namely, Chapter VII. The Council must conduct its discussions in tbe light of that Chapter and apply Articles 39 to 51 of that Chapter. 51. I consider that the United Kingdom is tbe autbority responsible, the sole authority responsible, s.n~ tbat it must face the situation, however complicated it may have become. Indeed, the United Kingdom should bave settled its problems before they assumed snch proportions as to make it necessary for the United Nations to take up the matter. 52. Only a few years ago we witnessed the problem of another difficult prccess of decolonization, that of A@ria. a colony inbabited by nsarly a million Frenchmen who had beenthere for more than 132 years and formed a ratio of ons Frencbmantoten Algerians. France consistently denied the competence of tbe United Nations to deal with tbis problem: it proclaimed that it alone was responsible and it did discharge in fact lts responsibility; it solved tbe problem. at the cost of great sacrifice, admittedly, but it did SO justly and in conformity wlth its great . we bave net heen emn ue a sbrt time an aTamd@sia. Relatians bc! to deteriorate s to achim-e tbe t5emers.l Assembly havs mpetence oftbe Uhited Nations probkms of Rbod@sia, a NQn*af~v@ 7, says that in suoh prejudice tbe application of enforcement measuvss. 55. RQW Bave we reacbed su& a situatfa bave akeady bad occasion in e to a& bow it was that tbe Unit cari majmity frcm assummeans, 5t a time when se& in tbe Assembly to a a, and %%y seats to a wbite ie diffiouak to unders~nd bclw the Africam se two Territaries are capable of rnnutng tbeir coudries puhile Uose of Rbadesia bave to wait for a years to bri achal pxess wbich wi11 take fii hem to pQwep. 56. The best constitution. tbe best form oftbestate, fs tbe me wbich wiiill naturally ensure that the best elemexbts of tbe community wdl bave the impr(ance of Peaders and tbe influence of masters.* PS tbis was intended in Rhodesia? The words which Ve SUSL qnoted corne from Mein Rampf sud no commentary. 57. In tbe face of :‘. se deviations fram moral Unit& Nations vainly asked the Unfted net t0 grant this constitution and, Mer. d it and to com~ne a constitutiona confereaoe to draft a new constitution wbich would tzk amxmt of the actnal situation. Tbe United K cm Of bas also been requested, on tbe initiative my Cotmtry in the Special Committee, net tc tramfer to any so-called constituttonal commtssior tbat it possessed to annul any le the rights of Africans or any le st nature. Similarly, after tbe dissolutior of the Federaéion, appeals to tbe Wnited Kingdom 58. Similarly, the way in which the negotiations with the Government of the white minority were conducted, filled us with consternation. Never, witbin the memory of any crdonised people, had anyone seen a metropolitan Government begging its subjects not to proclaim independence, the subjects refusing to meet tbe head of the metropolitanGovernment and asking him to go to them, forbidding him to speak on television and confining the Queen’s repre>entative. the Governor. to his residence. A mere swish of a fly-whlsk was enougb to cause the occupation of Algeria for 132years. Itis astonishing to see tbe colonizer become the lamb and inconceivable tbat he really has. Al1 this was only possible because the United Kingdom made the mistake, both before and during the negotiations, of showing its hand by telling the subjects whose rebellion it claimed it wished to prevent: If you rebel, inno circumstances shall we use military force againstyou. 59. I assure you, Mr. President. that ifthe colonizers had said that to us when we were colonial subjects, we sbould bave been with you when the Charter was sigued at San Prancisco. 1 suggest to Portugal that it should say the same thing to the Territories under its administration and then 1 shall request you to adjourn sine die the Security Council debate on tbe question of the Portuguese colonies. 60. What we find even more pair&& however. is the fact that while the settlers wer? becomingincreasingly întransigent and threatening to proolaimindepeudence by Christmas, the Africans were told not to expect any kind of protection, and above a11 no military force, from the United Kingdom and that they had no alternative but to accept the 1961 Constitution which they had already rejeoted and because of which they had already spent many years in prison. 61. In regard to his dramatic telephone cal1 to Ian Smith at 6 a.m. on 11 November. the United Kingdom Prime Mirister said: “... in that conversation, 1 weut througb every single item of dispute between the two Governments concerning the establishment of the Royal Commission.. . 1 proved beyond any possible reasonable doubt that every point they had made was fully dealt with on terms tbat must be satisfactory to them.” Y Certainly we know the objections raised by Ian Smith, namely, that the 1961 Constitution should not be submitted to a referendum oftheentirepopulation. During a debate in the Security Council itself, however, 1 2/ Parliamenrary Debares (Hansardh House of Gommons. Cfficial Repart. Fiflh Series. vol., 720 (Landan. l-fer Ma@s&% Smtimery office). COI. 351. 67. Instead of prompt and effective action, what is beîng proposed? Bconomic sanctions, while the very people wbo are propnsing them today’ have said to us Africans here that ail economic sanctions are unworkable and are refusing to accept them in tbe case of South Africa. chat is more, care bas been taken to avoid any sanctions wbich might bave a rapid effect. For example, an embargo on imports, experts, capital goods, spare parts and petroleum. a11 that bas been put aside, SO muoh SO that Ian Smith was able to say of tbe few measmes enacted by the United Kingdom tbat they were designed to appease the Africans, the United Kations and some members of the Commonwealth. AR tbe newspaper comment6 show that tbe effect of the sanctions, if they were to have any effect wbatever, would not be felt until two years had elap5ed-in otber words. until Southern Rhodesia had gone far e to do without aid from the Wnited Kingdom. 5 in the meantime it would bave been able to fosge other economic and commercial links and find other partners. We should be curious to how many weeks or montbs tbe United Kin thinlcs it will take before the sanctions bear fruit and brfng the rebellion to an end. 66. In addition, sanctions are always based on military logistice: either the United Kingdom sends troops to bar tbe frontîers of Sotzthern Rhodesia witb South Africa and Portugal or else the same sanctions should be applied to South Africa and Portugal, since those two countries are the allies of Southern Rhodesia and say they Will continue to maintain relations witb it. C 2trary to what migbt have been thought just now, we do not say that force should be used to establish a constitution. We say: ff it provss necessary. 1.9 *ue use force to quel1 a rebellion. 66. The United Kingdom should be invited to take more adequate measures. whicb would net exclude ‘che use of force and wbich would bring the rebellion to an end as soon as possible. It should be invited to suspend tbe 1361 Constitution. TheSecurityCouncil sbotid not be content merely to take note of the datement; wbile endorsing the measures already proposed by tbe Wnited Kingdom, it shonld add to them certain other measures witbin tbe scope of Cbapter VII of the Charter, should not besitate in its deliberations +o recommend the application of Articles 41, 42 and 43 and sbould tbus enact measnre5 wbich Will be regarded as declsions of the Secnrtty Connoii and Will consequently be binding on aR Member States-in otber words, measure5 wbich Membsr States Will ail be obliged to respect. 31 cTc&obr 1962, 63. PI December 5 Nwember 1965. tbe situation resuRin2 from eme c~nst~~t~s athreat e mitea Mlngdam Govmeasm-es il bas proped to take titb regard to tbe situation in SO rn Rbodesia. to suspend the 1961 Constih&ion; “5. 6aRs UJXXI s.E S&es net to rwo tlle ~iW2isU rni~r~~ settkr s6gime and to xaw ree tiion d any State ree@o zing tbat régime; of “me man, me voée”; “9. Decides to take a11 the enforcement measmes provided for under Articles 42 ami 43 of the Charter agamst the racist minority settler régime; “10. Authorizes the Secretary-General to ensure the immediate implementation of this resolution and to report as soon as possible.” 71. 1 hope that, in the deliberations of the Security Council, due aocount Will be taken of what this situation may lead to in Africa, in the centre of Africa and in Southern Rhodesia and what it may lead to in the world; above ail. I hope that account Will be taken of the intensity of tbe Africans’ feelinge of frustration. On this occasion, 1 ûhould like to read you the final communique of 12 November of the Summit Conference of the four Heads of State of the countries bordertng on the Senegal River, held at Nouakchott-the first conference attended by Heads of State since the situation which we are considering arose. The final communiqué states: WL That no State should grant the Rhodesian Government de jure or de facto recognition; “2. That a11 States should boycott it economically. “3. That a11 African States and other States lovlng peace and justice should recognise, immediately it is established. any government of the Zimbabwe people which may be formed ioside or outside Southern Rhodesia and give it any assistance it may need; “4. That a11 the African States should immediately consider themselves to be in a state of armed conflict with the illegitimate racist Government of Southern Rhodesia and should send contingents to Rhodesia to help the Zimbabwe people to liberate themselves and protect their ovin independence; v 5. That the African Liberation Committee should meet without delay to propose the necessary measmes for the implementation of paragraph 4.” At the end of tbe Conference, President Ould Daddah. summing UP the work, stated that the four Heads of State thus recommended action by the Organisation of African Unity as a rejoinder to the Rhodesian declaration of independence. 72. 1ix PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): 1 give the rloor to the representative of Sierra Leone.
1 should like to beQ;in by thanking the Council for giving my delega- Moved by concern ovesthe vas m explosive sàtaation. IL saàd twt t refuge in their familiar a em Rbodesàa baad yeârs and that 78. Now we find the representative of the United Kfnf&om here today aSkbg the United Nations to co-operate in making effective the sanctions they now propose to impose upon Mr. Smitb’s régime. One would have thought that. with equal respect for the United Nations and its capacities, the Unïted Kingdom Government. instead of waiting until today. When Mr. Smith is at large in open and defiant rebellion against the British Government, this same United Kingdom Government could have sought the support and co-operation of the United Nations in containing the racialist exhibitions of the white minority in Southern Rhodesia to bring about majority rule-a principle in which the United Kingdom Government has declared itself to believe by suspending long ago a Constitution whose operation clearly constituted a denial of the legal and human rights of the vast majority of the population. This the United Kingdom could have done instead of persistently ignoring United Nations resolutions and deliberately refusing to co-operate with thfs Organiration in the matter of Southern Rhodesia. There is a rather apt maxim in English law which says: *IIe who cornes to equity must corne witb clean bands.v The hands of the British in this matter are far from clean. ‘79. In two successive Commonwealth Prime Blinister@ Conferenoes, in July 1964 and in Jone 1965, in bath of which my country had the honour of participating, my Prime linister. Sir Albert Margai. warned the British in no uncertain terme of the foBy of their intransigence and the dangers to which they were exposing the 4 million Africans by net exercising the authority which we knew them to possess in this matter. In June of this year, Sir Albert Margai in London rejected the suggestion that, if Afrfcans in Southern Rhodesia had co-operated, the Constitution would bave eventually produced majority rule. On that occasion Sir Albert Margai .called for an embargo on arms and a trade boycott similar to tbose which tbe United Kingdom Government hasnowatlast wnfitto impose. Indeed. on 11 Octobsr 1965. only a ..th ago, in the face of the growing cockiness of Mr. Smith over current negotiations, Sir Albert Margai sent a cablegram to the United Kingdom Prime Minister, in whicb he strongly recommended that this mari Smith be detained in London. tbat the Southern Rhodesfan Constitution be suspended immediately and that the Uniéed Kingdom assume direct responsibility for the Territory. The British, of course, did net comply with those requests, nor did they hearken to the resolution whfch was just passed by the Summit Conference 84. Again, it is a lamentable exhibition of cynicism to find tbe Unitecl Kingdom Government EOW talking with enthusiasm about sanctions in a situation Iiké Southern Rhodesia when in tbe case of Soutb Afrfca, contrary to African opinion, it has éhe use of sanctions, one reason be elled against kas moaned, that the Africans in South Afrioa would suffer most. Would the situation be any differant now in Southern Rbodssia’? The British have a clear and simple responsibility to discharge in this matter. The Britisb Government sbotid use force to restore law and order. and law and order in Soutkern Rhodesia cari only mean the restoration of the human and legal rigbts of the majority of the people of Soutbern Rhodesia. The pages of Britisb colonial history are fuI1 of instances when they bave reaorted to force to expref35 thefr Will. It is not particUr~ly belpful to go into tbese details here since the facts are well known to aR of us-what witb the recent experiences of British Guiana and Aden fresh in our memories to remind us, even if we had forgotten, that the British bave never hesitated in tbe past whsn they felt their vital interests were involved. But maybe in this case the British do not consider tbeir tital interests itavolved. 85. One is left with the regrettable conclusion that mayb the British. who bave never hesitated to quell rebellions and to use force as an instrument of polfoy in a situation like this, value wbite blood more than black blood. They bave nover been SO reluctant when the blood of black and brown men ail over the world have been involved. Indeed, tbere are many in Britain who have stated publicly that to quel1 this rebellion with force would be untbinkable and intolerable sinoe it would mean a confrotation of wbîte men against whEe men Mao a11 happa to be Britisb. Maybe berein Iles the explanation for Brltish reluctanoe in this matter. 86. But on tke otker hand, tbe rea~ns~bi~i~ of tke British for tke lives an& destities of tke 4 llt0ll vpurther, the resoiution on tbe Rhodesian question passed unanimously at the last OAU Keads of State meeting in Accra must be adhered to by ail concerned. In this connexion it should be recalled that the British Government itself, notably Wilson and Bottomley as well as the Chief Justice of Rbodesia, had said time and again that any unilateral declaration of independence would net only be illegal but treasonable. Indeed that was why 1 urged in Accra la& month that Ian Smith and hi5 colleagues ‘should be apprehended and brought to tria1 immediately’ for actions and utterances which even then were tantamount to treasonable conduct. “1 am now convinced that inhandlingtheRhodesian situation, Wilson% Government has yielded topressures from certain financial and other interests in Britain, who have extensive vested interests in Rhodesia in the forms of mines and plantations which have depended for their prosperity on the exploitation of cheap African labour. 1 note with interest that it is intended to introduce a Bill in the British Parliament on Monday to deal with this situation. Whilst 1 do net wish to anticipate the Bill 1 feel bound to state that it is a measure of the complicity of British people in this monstrous outrage tbat Conservative Opposition spokesmsn bave already started questioning any measures which as they put it ‘saveur of punitiveness’. mmy delegations in tbei~ OLmCil bad supportea tk? m po.çitiBQ witb regarra to a@ crimina clique ia Sauthem Rlnodesia. remarks abat the Wnltted se a mater fm bis own itioon Qf tbe United states by the specid cbaracter relations betwe its cour@ ancà the United he socSaI and political nature and essence an rdâtions with respect to tbe us were mmmdceeel if partàcular, ativs of the Ivory Coast in bis statement today. As far as 0th~ delegations are concemed. t padiculasly tkose of t5e African countries, rsppresentative of tbe United KPngdom was clearly htkmmxI, if we may say so, by an excessively subjective viewpoint. Me was apparently ind@$ng, as sometimes happens, in wishful tbiaking, and, as we sec, tbat sense of restraint which is SO oharacteristic of Loadon% attitude towwds Salisbury failed here. In culp Wew, there was little g~ound, if any, for an optimistic evaluation in tbis instance. 92. Toelay% statemnts by a numbes of African delegatians bave giwn the Council new proof tbat tbe wlmle pdicy of the UMted Ki~@.~rn in regard 93. As far as the position of the Soviet Union is concerned, it was set forth clearly and exhaustively in the Council yesterday 11258th meeting], and a11 we wish to do now is in confirm that position, which is based wholly On fa& and documentary evidence. Actually, the United Kingdom representative did not refute a single material fact. It is obviously impossible to refute facts which are indisputable and well lfflown to everyone. 94. Yet as soon as the United Kingdom representative referred to material facts in his statement today, the baselessness of his reasoning inevitably became apparent. He referred, for instance, to the question of the transfer of armed forces to the Salisbury régime and maintained that those forces consisted of Rhodesians. but he apparently for@ to mention what was most important-that the armaments in Southern Rhodesia were British armaments. There were modern aircraft there, after ail, and other types of militaiy equipment. It is amasing to hear it argued that the United Kingdom was unable to prevent the transi& of that equipment. After all, the Territory concerned was a British colony. We bave already had occasion to note that in many other cases the United Kingdom Government has acted far more vigorously and decisively. 95. The representative of the United Kingdom acknowledged that the critical comment6 concerning Southern Rhodesia’s racist Constitution of 1961 were well founded. But may 1 point out that absurdity of his attempt to justify it by saying that tbat Constitution SO generously granted by the metropolitan country was intended as a temporary measure. The implication is that a shameful and arch-reactionary instrument, permeated vith racist hatred of human beings, is justified if it is a temporary measure. 96. The United Kingdom representative spoke again today about the sufferings which would result if extreme measures and drastic enforcement action were applied against the racist clique in Southern Rhodesia. However, he was again silent-and not accidentally so-concerning the extreme measures and cruelties directed against the long-suffering Zimbabwe people. the sufferings endured by chat people as the result of racist oppression. The reprela bP@nvellP%x 98. rie coma&mns aussi liste l’lmmme nations. pmblem. we feeP it oui‘ jusqu’a lui-mC%ne cas de la Rhodésie dence. catégories vateur, en réalité parti and mt of tbe whole people. e interests of all. which km-s aad tbe aspirations aw the attention of tbe Unnited to tbe fact that tbe Soviet 102. Su& were the remarks which we wished to make at this stage of the Council’s wozk. 103. Tbe PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): 1 give the floor to the United Kingdom representative, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.
The representative of the Soviet Union said tbat he would make a brief statement in clarification. Ris statement was not brief and was not a clarification: it was a continuation of the argument. 1 shall indeed be brief and say only this. 105. It is quite true that I did refer in my speech to those expressions of agreement with wbat the British Government had doue that had been made. 1 think that 1 was justified in doing 60. 1 take it that we are here to try to reach agreement rather than to make propaganda speeches. But 1 did not burke either the fact that there had been many criticlsms of us as well. I referred to those criticisms though, as 1 said, not in full because 1 did not feel that to go over the whole of the past would serve any useful purpose. 106. 1 stick to my point that our pmpose is t0 consider what appropriate and useful action this Council should take now, and 1 feel that speeches that say more about that and engage less in recrimination will be more useful to all of us.
The President unattributed #121848
I propose now to adjourn tbe meeting. Since half an hour bas elapsed since 1 announced my intention of adjourning the meeting, it migbt be better to meet again at 3.30 p.m. instead of 3 p.m., unless there are any objections. ut was SO decided. The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.
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UN Project. “S/PV.1259.” UN Project, https://un-project.org/meeting/S-PV-1259/. Accessed .