S/PV.1260 Security Council

In accotiauce with decisions tien earller by the Ccuncil, X propose to invite tbe representatives of Algeria. India, Pakistan, Ghana, Zambia. Sierra Leone. Senegal. Mali. the United Republlc of Tanzania, Nigeria, Guinea and Etbiopia to participate, without vote. in the ~councfl’s dLsonsslcns. At the%wifation of the President. .IMr. T. Eouatim (Algerie), Mr. Pez-thasarathi (India), ICL-. S. K. Deblad (PaFdsti), Mr. F. S. Aikburet (Gban4, MI-. F. M. Malikita (Zmbia). Mr. 0. B. 0. Collier (Sien-e L%OB~), Mr. 0. S. Diop (Sene@& Mr. S. Cotdibaly @fa@, Mr. J. W. S. Maleoela (Koited Republic of Tmzda), lb. D. 0. lbekwe (Nigeria)). 1Mr A. L Diallo (Guhea) and Mr. T. Gebn!?-Egzy (Btbic@a) Cook tbe places reserped for them in front of the Coumil lahle.

1 glve the floor to the representative of Ethiopia.

Permit me at tbe outsèt of my intervention to express theappreciatien of the Ethlopiau delegation, and iudesd of the Ethicpian Government, to the Council for allowing us to participate lu tbis debate. 4. k/dY intervention MI b kif. First I eball speak of some histoncal facts in ordër to placé the debate in its historical perspective. Secoudly, 1 shalldemonstrate to the Council the inadequacy of the measuree prcposed by the Govermnent of the Uuited Kingdom aod the fact tbat. far from restoring law and order and eneuring the downfall of the setier Government in SsuLhern Rhcdesia, these meaaures Will strsngthen tbe obdnracy of the rggime in Soutberu Rhodesia in pursuing its course and thus make the ta& of tbe Counnfl and of the international c about an African Government in Z -et Tbixdly. 1 shall speak briefly to show tbat tbe Cotmcll must make a fludlng uuder Cbapter VII of the Uuited Nations Charter tbat tbe ailuati llug lu Southeru Rbodesia ie a oituation ing the peace sud securlty of tbe world. ahould like to comment on tbe draft resoluticn eubmitted by tbe Unlted om [S/69281. aituatlon prevailing in Soutbern Rhodesla me aboot preciaely becauee tbe Unlted Kingever allowed the participation of tbe Afrlcan iu tbe administration of that Territory. The majority wae at 9111 times excluded frcm the tnistration of the Territory and the activities of daily Iife. That is the root of the evil and tbe problem ta whicb the Cout~il must find a solution. 6. The Gckemment of the United grsnted the CcnstItuticn of .1923 to ite owll exclud- 7. TO refer only tc the ernment of tbe United Rhmlesia from the list tories on the prstext that tbat colony was self- (XVl)]. These relateci actions bad. therefore. deprived tba pecple of 9outbern Rhodesfa of the only pmatection given them by tbe Charter of tbe United Naticns. 8. Witbin the last ten years. the Gwernment of the unitea Kingd entrai Africa Federatios without wîshes of the ~frfcan people. Tus olidated tbe interests of tbe settlers in Central Africa and created a strong St any successful freedom mwement ca118 of this territory dukfrg the shortlived bistory of tbe Federation. Upon the dissolution 8 Federatiw, the Government of tbe United om allowed the tramfer of armed forces and 9. T~US. the develcpment of tbe last forty years. outlinea s 8llOWS beyona tlleacbnin is responsible exclusiw m the sffairs of tbeir land. Tire Ccuncil must tahe note tbat ail these acts bave been committed in tbe name of tbe 8acred misaion of civilisation. But the hard facts before us taday demonstrate beyond any dcubt tbat the mission ~88 neither saoied nor civilized. 10. In the ht three years tbe spec bas spent more time on Scutbern R anY cher territory o¶ its liet of terr muade the Gwernment of tbe Uni e tbe means tc implement the 11. In order to complete the outliie, may we recall that the Government of the United Kingdom attempted in the last year, and particularly witbin the la& few weeks. ta negotiate a compromise within the Constitution of 1961. a compromise which would bave sealed the fate of 4 million Africans to perpetual slavery. The details of the negotiations are not known to us, but what has been reported in the Press indlcates amply tbat the original wrong of 1923 would bave been made good by an agreement between the metropolitan Power and its people in an Overseas territory. 12. In the conte:3 of this development, one point emerges clearly: the Government of the United Kingdom lias consistently declined. on various pretexts, to take a clear and decisive stand against the settler r6gime in Southern Rhodesia. Let me explain this point. Up to 1964, the Government of the United Kingdom had refused to carry out certain measures recommended by the Special Committee and the General Assembly on the gronnd that it was either physically unable to interfere, or constitutionally barred from interferlng. in the interna1 affairs of the settlers. It is thus perfectly clear that this policy is responsible for the development of the preseni criais, for had the United Kingdom Government accepted the recommendation of the General Assembly and imposed its Will on itspeopleinûouthern Rhodesia there would at present be an African Government in Zimbabwe. 13. There exist in tbe annals of British colonial administration many precedents to prove oui point, but we shall net take the time of the Councll to go into them. In terms of the development of the last few weeks. we find, much to oui chagrin, the saine attitude of the United Kingdom which has glven strength tc the recalcitrance of the settlers. Thus the British Prime Minister himself declared to the Africans in Southern Rhode& on bis recent visit there-that the use of force to bring about majority rule is out of the question. That was bis flat statement. The position of the United Kingdom Govemment that it will not use force against its people in Southern Rhodesia has thus enoouraged the settler government of tbat Territory to make a unilateral declaration of independence. In these circamstances, and given the philosophy of the white settlers, we cannot but conclude that the attitude of the British Government bas served to encourage the unilateral declarationof independence with which the Council is faced today. i4. On the verge of disaster, tbe Government of the Unitsd Kingdom condemned the rebellion as treasonable, and bas since announced that it wlll impose diplomatie and economic sanctions against the rebellion of the white settlers ‘in Southern Rhodesia. The ,question is. would these measures be enougb to accomplish the task? The answer is clearly no. 16. Inthts connexion tire Cou&l must tahe notethat, in fact, the diplomatie and ewnomic measures proposed by the United Kingdom Government are net total because it still hesitates to apply any measure agfdnst the sefflers. and indeed dislihes the very ides of X For xny part, 1 neednofurther prooftbat diplomatie and economic sanctions are doomed tofailure. strate 1 represent the St& which was the first victim of collective security by a similar Council only three decades ago. 17. Diplomatie and economic sanctions have their own means of defeating their end. ln thïs particular case they would simply lull the African States. the world ~ommunity, and in particular the Africans of Zimbabwe, into helieving that a solution was near. while in faot the enemy would grow stronger and entrench himself through bis infernal allies. Thus. time would pass and the worid would forget, while the people would continue in slavery. just as their bmthers across the border bave contiiued in slavery. We cannot condemn these people to the same fate. We therefore urge the Council not to undertske suob a a’esponsibility. The lesson of htstory against su& a course is clear and we must reject this hind of solution at the cutset. 16. ln oui view. the measures proposed bytheUnited Eingdom Government will. if 1 may paraphrase the memorable words of my own Sovereign on a net dissimilar occasion some thirty years ago. give us neither peace nor justice. We must therefore reject them. 19. What. then, do we ask of the Council? We ask of thts Council first. tbat. it sbould mahe a findis that the situation prevailfng today in Soutbern Ehode& endangers international peace under Chapter VU of the Charter and. secondly. that, it should decide accordingly on enforcernent measures. The sttuatiom prevailing in Soutbern Bbodesia as a result of the mad act of the settlers en ers international peace and seourity because the peace of the continent if affected by the action that bas beenundertahenagatnsl the people of Zimbabwe. The total and complete sup pression of the rights of the 4 million Africans affects the peace and security of the continent becauae it Will set in motion racial wars of grave magnitude, [ , , 20. In ccnclusicn, 1 must state that the explosive situation in Scuthern Rhcdesia has corne tc pass, fifst and fcremost because the administerlng Pcwer refueed ccnstantly and ccnsistently to standnpagainst tbe settlers in tbat country. It bas corne about la+ cause the adminlsterlng Pcwer, hy the Constitutions of 1923 and 1961, ccmpletely excluded the Afrlcans from the sffairs of their cwn ccuntry. Tbe recent crisis is the nahml result of the pclicy of keeping Africans InScutherna; desiaunderperpemaldcminatien. 2i. The measures prcposad by the Wnited Khgdcm Covernment for dealing with the present crlsis are inadequate and will result cnly in entrenching the setter Covernment in Southern Rhcdesia. We therefore ask the Ccuncil tcdeolare the situation in Scutbern Rhodesia as en ering international peace and tc take enfcrcemunt action under Chapter VII cf the Charter in orde? tc crush the rebelIion and tc prevent racial war in the heart of Africa. 22. With ycur permission. 1 shculd llke tcmake scme brlef observations on the draft rescluticns submitted hy the representative of the United Kingdom [S/6923], for that affects the interests of my ccuntrg dlrectly, 23. In the first place, we note with sadness that. in tbe preamble, the United Kingdcm Covernment ccntinues tc refuse tc accept the prinoiple of on8 mari, cne vote. This is made clear hy the tbird pawgrapb of the preamble, which reads as fcllcws: the expressed determlnaticn of the Unlted tc establish in Scuthern Rhodesia ccnblch wilI enable the, inhabitants of that ‘lerrftcry ta dater future fn acccrdance I think that there is an attempt here to bave twc peoples: on the one band the Africans, and on the ctber. tbe settlers. We cannct accept thls. 24. In tbe second place, the principle of a one ma& gcvemment bas been cmittednely-aad therefcre tbe operative Pa~~~a~bs of tbe draft rescluticn am net acceptabIe tc us. With aIl respect to the United Kingdom, 1 do not bslieve that we cari accept tbst sort of drat%ng. We must state further tbat these meaeures are not sufficient because if we simply stop there, it me;ins tbat w* are net goicg to do anytbing else; and thie gIves furtber encouragement to the settlers to persist in tbeir rebelUon. 26. 1 turn now .to the operative part or the draft firet place, economic sanctions are in the second place, even If they wording in this draft rtsolutioo leaves many loopboles. 1 sball give one example. There is no reference to United Nations machinery for carryIng cut tbose economic sanctions. It is therefore wholly inadequate. 27. 1 sbaB not tahe up the CounciPs time in criticizing the draft resolution ‘%I detail. 1 would only say that it is evident to us at once tbat tbe draft reeolutfon will wt do tbe job. We tberefore cannot accspt it. 28. 1 should now lihe tc comment briefly on the draft resolutlon aubmitted by the Ivory Coast [S/6929]. That text is in line with the considerations 1 bave set for& and we therefore appeal to the Security Ccuncil to adopt it. It will deal witb tbe matter radically and dispose of tbe problem once and for all.

1 give the floor to representative of the United Republic of Tansauta.

My delegation would lihe to express tc the Council the appreciation of the Goverament of the United Republic of Tansania for allowing us tc participate in tbis debate. 31. The intentions of Afrlca have often been underestimated. We hope tbat tbis time tbe United gingdom Government Will make no miscalculation abcut Africa% intention to decolonise Southern Rhodesla. 32. It 1s with a deep feelbig of eorrow tbat my deleicipates in tlds debate. I say witb a deep orrow. beoauee the is before the Counoil not only a terrible t of Zimbabwe, but also a flagrant edy for the people mpt to humiliate the whole continent of Africa. 1 eay to humiliate Africa because history will never be able tc forgive us-indeed, the future generatione of Africawillnever be able to forgive us-if we oo e thie tragedy. My delegation is certainly aware as we participate in this debate, we are bound to commit the érrcr of repetition. After the eloqent interventions of the African representatlvee whohave precededus, it might bave been felt that the African case had been amply presenteè But the gravity of tbe situation now facing 39. 1 turn to the fourth reason. We must recall that it was the Unlted Kingdom Government which handed over the arms and the military might to Southern Rhodesia. It did that despite the draft resolution presented to the Cuuncil in Septemher 1963 which the United Klngdom setoed (S/5425/Rev.l]. Although this morning the United Kingdom representative tried to malntain that the forces in Southern Rbodesia were net British forces, he forgot to tel1 the Council that they are still referred to as “Her Majesty’s forces”. It is lndeed absurd that. after facilitatlng the transfer of arms and military might to the then minortiy Governmed of Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom Government should now plead its inability to disarm the racist clique that has risen in defiance of and open rebellion agalnst the lawful authority of the British Crown. 39. We are not particularly concernedaboutwhatthis rebellious act will mean for the prestige of the British Crown. But we feel that. by ruling out the use of force and advocating economic andfinancial sanctions which, after all, are inadequate, the United KingdomGovernment is refuslng to respond to the gravity of the situation. 40. Why has the United Kingdom Fore@ Secretary corne to this Council? Has he corne to tell us that bis Government is now the only sovereign Government in Salisbury9 If 80, where is the evidence of the existence of British power in Salisbury? The BrXsh Governor has no power whatsoever. Ian Smith has ordered the removal of the Governor front the Gcvernor’s residence to demonstrate that he bas no officia? standing in Salisbury and that the so-called majesty of the British Crown, which he purports to rcpresent, has been ignomlniously thrown lnto the dust. 41. Deflnitely, the Fore@ Secretary of tbe Unlted Kingdom has corne to this Council to deceive the world, to give the impression to the world that the British Govennnent is concerned, to give the impression to the world that the British Government wants action from this Couucil. 42. Has the Fore@ Secretary corne to this Cwncil to plead for Smith’s safety and immunity from armed intervention by the United Nations? Thls must he the case because the ineffectiveness of the economic measures he bas outlined are not suffictent reason to corne before this Council. slnce the British Government has always maintained that it has tbe sole rieht to deal witb the Southern Rhodesian problem. But, as if to add insult to injury, tbe Brltish Government argues that the Smith rebelllon must be crnshed. The British bave no physical presence ln Salisbury. It does not accept tbe judgement of tbe African States that milltary force is the only solution. and African leaders are net yet capable of mling tbemselves, Iet aIane tbe Europatts, in 5mthem Ilhodesia. In doing mis, tbe Britisb Prime Mintster gave th tbe assurance he ae&& Ian Smith knew as long as the Britisb Government did not inter- Ben@ mil%arily eu0d if it would use its infiuence in tbe Security Cmcil to prevent the use of force. tben witb tbe expressed assistance of the Britisb Gva?mm~nt. be vas Safe in declaring iadepeldence. 44. me Britisb Governrnent stands guilty on this math-. Tbe Britisb Government is clearly guiltyin tbis instance of ractal prejudice and discrimination ti it refuses to use foroin Scathern Rl~cdesia. inst tbe rebellious gang ritish Wemeng was net slow to use force in India and to imprison the leaders tbere. Tbe British Govemment was not low to use force in the then Gold Coaet and in Nigeria, imprisoning Dr. Nkmmah, Dr. Asikiwe sud the other leaders of Nigeria. The Britisb were not slow to use force imprisaning Mr. d Britlsh Government s of Africans and imprisoning In fact. the British Government was net relu use force in Zambia, ktlling a number ofdefenceless Africans. TheBritishGovernment 1~89 not reluctant to use force in Kenya, im- Jomo Kenyatta and killing a number of 6 Africans. Indeed. tbe Britisb Governnet been kesitant to use force in Aden to kill defeneeless people there. Britaii has used force aU over its colonial Empire, slaughtering dozens of peuple with blaok or brown skias. But, in the Case of Swtthern Bhodesia, where 220.000 whites bave already begun to murder Africans in Bulawayo and WtsburY, as we heard today, the BritishGovernment bas refused to use military force for ordtnary POtiCe pu-poses. There is only one anmer: the British Governrnent Will never use force against tts white oolomal subjecta to prote& thom against blaok aubjeots. In this case. the British Government is mescapably guilty of racial discrimination. 45. Wbat dfd tbe Umted Hingdom representative mean by.bis statement tbat he could understaud our 46. Tbe British Government must stop tbe Rbodesian railway from passing through ita protectorate of Bechuanaland on its way to South Africa. Oil supplies to Southern Rhodesia must also be stopped immediately. 47. Let me comment now generally on tbe question of sanctions, and here 1 should like to qote my own Preeident, President Nyereere, who stated in Dar es- Salaam yesterday: Y%notions by Bdain against Rbodesia will not work becauae theywouldbs immedlately sabotaged by South Afri~a.~ 48. There were two types of pressure to be appaed to Soutbern Rhodes& ane wa$ pressure by economic ectives aad to ass&tits 8, there alpe several Western c blc1uding the United Kiagaom, wbicb bave economic sanctions will not work. m positbn in WbiCb ecammic sanctkms mist say tbmt ecam We now find ourselves Britisb Government says work in Soutkern Rhodes omis sanctions a 51. NO~. wbat bas the rebellion meant in fact? Th-3 r&eUion bas meant in fact that there is a bresk- ~OWC of law and order in Sonthem Rhodesia and the disappearame of tbe rule of law. Thts situation bas been perpetrated by the Smith reheBion, afactalready admitted by the United Kingdom Government. We are t0ld &hat at the moment, the 0myconsntuti0naI authority, a000 to the assertion of the United Kfngdom 6ovemm s the Br+h Governor representii the Britisb Crown, The rebellion bas challenged tAe lee;al existence of the Governor. and therefore chaithe autbority of the British Government over m Rhodesia. it is indirectly admitted by the Britbh tbat their physical absencehasmade it dSficult for tbem to contain tbe situation. 52. The rebellion ako means chat the lives of many people of Southern Rhodesia who do not agree with tbe rebels are defiitely in jeopardy. inoluding tlrat d tbe Govemor himself. 53. The rebeBion bas also meant that the fate of tbe poRttcal prisoners-people like Joshua Nhomo. the Reverend Mr. Sitbole. and many others-Cwot now l?e properPy foU from the outside, in which case tbey are in r of being execnted secretly at any moment fmm now on. 54. Tbe rebellion bas muant a threat. certaii. to international peace and seourity as we see the massing of Southern Rhodesian troops on the Zambianborder, something wbich is normably done when a conntry is preparing for war against another. 55. We agree that the Dnited IOngdom Oovernment is the only legally constituted authority at tbe moment in the Non-Sslf-Goveming colony of Southern Rhodesia. Tbe .United Kingdom representative conceded to this Council that bis Government does not bave a physical presence in Southern Rbodesia. We contend that the British .6overnment can assert its autbority as the oonstitutlonal authority in Southern Rhodesia only by betng phystcally present in Soutbern Rhodesia. TAis pbysical presence would no doubt consolidate the autbority of the Governor. Therefore, when we. the African St-des, in the Fourth Committee and also in tbe General Assembly, consistently requested a military presence in Southern Rhodesia, we were noadvooating that snch a military force shotdd go there to hill for the S&e of kilRng, but rather that it should go to sot as a police force to ensure the maintenance of law snd order. to uphold the ruleof law, and to give a sense of seourity to those who do not support and sympathise witb tbis open rebellicln. 56. Acc~rdkg t0 British laws, a leader of a rebe%nf fs a traitor and. as such, must be brought to a Court of justice and tried for high treason. But the irony of tt ail is that tAe rebellions traitor. fan Smith. i@ SU~I at large and could even refuse the GrW@mor the use of the Southern Rhodesian broad.. easting fadlities. And yet we are told by the British c+0wmmnt that they are going to quell the rebellton 57. My delegatlon respectfnlly invites this august Connoil to invoke the application of the provisions of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter; and in particular, my delegation invites the Council to brlng into immediate effect Article 42 of the Charter. We do so because we feel that the situation in Southtrn Rhodesia is such a dangerous threat to international peace and secnrity that the provisions of Article 41 cannot snffice. We bave already stated why we feel that the Urne is too late to test the efficacy of economic sanctions. Members must, consistent with Article 41, immediately and collectively effect a complete interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal and other means of commnnicatien. But this is not enough. The situation admittedly demsnds military actions as advocated by Article 42 of the C%arter. 56. For the British Government is the legal authority of a colony where according to its cwn admission, it has no power to exercise that sovereignauthority. The Conncil must therefore decide that, npon the evidence before us, the measures proposed by the British Government are inadequate. A threat to international peace and security and an act of aggressionhave been committed by the rebels and traitors in Scnthern Rhodes&. They bave marshalled their troops on the borders of the peace-loving State of Zambia. Zambia is seriously threatened by the rebels. This massing of military forces, as 1 said before, is resorted to only when a conntry is about to declare war against another. Therefore, a clear case has been made for the application of Article 42 of Chapter VII of the Charter. Article 42 entitles the Conncil to consider the taking of snch action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to restore international peace and secnrity. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade. and other operations by air, sea or land forces of Members of the United Nations. 59. It will be definitely a tragedy for the United Nations if action is not taken nnder Article 42 of the Charter. Africa has appealed to the Secnrity Conncil. and especially to the permanent members of tbe Conncil. We want to warn the Conncil of the tragic racial animosities that this rebellion will generate on the whole continent of Africa. We are strongly convinced that this racial animosity and conflict cari be avoided, and avoided only, lf military force is sent to Southern Rhodesia. We feel it mcst be sent now before Smith starts using his arms against onr fellow Africans. We must remember too tbat a fascist police srate now exlsts in Southern Rhodesla. None of us hem cari say precisely what is now being 60. We bave corne to this Council to put the case of ou* dear brothers in Zimbabwe. We bave corne to thts Cauncil to assure the world tbat altbongh Smith wants to impose racial war on us. we want the Council to avert it. We bave corne to this Council ta advocate military action that will help the Britisb Government .aSSert its position in Southern Rhodesis. and thereby be in a position to transfer power to thé majority of the people of Zimbabwe. Indeed, we bave corne to this Council to ask for military action agatnst the rebel srnith. que, pouvoir nous 61. If-and only if-this Council lets ns down, or if tbis Courmil does not insist that the Untted IUngdom Gaverament should take mtlitary measures to avert thts tbreat to peace and secnrity then Africa must act. In the words of my own President: ‘African countries must be prepared to take action on their own. This ts again a responsibtlity Africa cannot av0id.v 62. The time for long speeches in this Council is over. Let me end by remtndtng the members of tbe Council of tbe tragedy of btstory repeating itself. In 1910, the United Eingdom handed over 10 million of our African brothers to the racists in South Africa and now, in 1965 it again wants to hand over our 4 million African brothers to racist Smith. 1s il: not at Munich where the world sought to appease fascism? B%at were the results then? Fascists are by nature insatiable brutes. The only peace they hnow is war. The Latin proverb Pax in hello is the only way to deal with the rising tide offascism in Southern Rhodesia. Conseil Avec hello 63. The represem!ative of France raised a purely legal point 11256th meeting]. But we, here. bave to face the real problems confronttng the people of Zimbabwe. The British bave said they bave no pbysical presence in Southern Rhodesia and that the explosive situation is a matter for the World Organization. Therefore. the issue bas become an international issue threatentng peace snd security in Southern Africa. France shonld therefore trot only refuse assistance to Ian Smith bnt also refuse South AfriCa the aircraft and ammunition sold by it. which might be nsed by Ian Smith. The United Stades shonld do likewise and pledge actnal question disent Rhodésie question qui l’Afrique. mais 64. The Britfsh sbould not brag.of tbeirgoodcolonial record. They must ponder the Shahespearian tragedy: Therefore. whatever good records the British may daim elsewhere. it Will mean notbing-4 repeat, it will mean nothing-to the people of Zimbabwe t;bQ peopb3 of Afdca tiess tbey. too. accaaQ to penden& under maioritv role.

Igtve the floor to tbe representative of Zamhia.

First of aB I wisb lo tbank yoo for respondtng favourably to my request to invite me to participate in tbe debate on tbe treasonable rebellion in Soutbern Bhodesia. As a representative of Zambia, a country wbicb is closest to tbis rebellion, I wiab to mahe our poositionvery clear. 67. The question of Southern Bbodesia bas been debated in the Security Council and tbe otber relevant organs of the Wnited Nations. The United resolutions bave repeaéeàly called npon Britatn about a democratic form of government in S Rhodesla. But the Unit& Eingdom has pretended tbat the United Natione bas no competenoe in the matter Cou&l to propose economic and diplomatie sanctions agaiust tbe rebels after passively watbbiugtbemcommit treason. Tbe United Nations haas alwady paseed rèsobnions oondemning thé unilateral decParation of independence and bas Proposed tbe memarres now advocated by the Britisb Covernment. Indeed. tbe Unit& Nations hasgonebeyondpropoaalsforeconomic and diplomatie sanctions; only last week tbe General A~~embly, in tts reaolution 2022 (XX) of 5 November 16 called for mflitary action againet tbe rebellious ré e in Soutbern Bhudesia. 68. Zambia bas since 1963 ur the Un OM to use military force when de g witb ion in Soutbarn Rhodesia, ancl that atill remainns 068~ pokdtion. The President of Zambia, Mr. Eennetb D. to tbe 3tited inst rebellion done aespite ités economic links witb Soutbern Bbodesia. 62. TO us economic meamres amt Soutbem Rhodesia ~$11 not be e ctive. C~ase~ently* cdy force OF a combination~f~~oPce~aeco~~~ic sanctions 70. les adoptées envisage que qu’il TO. The representative of the United Kingdom bas referred to the steps bis Government hs.s tirea&’ initiated to punish the rebellion and further meast~re~ contemplated in tbïs direction. We are told tbat the Governor has dismissed Smith and hisMinistersfrom office. Of course, the Governor showed 8 remarkable degree of courage in actingashedid. But, poor fellow, he bas been abandoned bytbe BritishGovernment to be governed by the illegal autboritiestbeBritishGovernment had encouraged bim to believe be bad dismissed from office. ‘71. We are told that the United Kingdom is now the Government of Southern Rbodesia, altbough it has no physical preseuce in that territory. This is government by remote control. Rere is a perfect picture of King Lear who, after giving away bis Kingdom, imagines in his insanity that he is still the sovereign ruler of Britain. The Governor now has been dismissed by tbe rebels. and in spite of this Britain has net taken immediate action to punish Smith and bis henchmen. How long shall we resist the feeling tbat there is collusion between the rebels and the Britisb Government? Zambia refuses to be taken in by British wisbful thinkiig that thc British Government is ruling Southern Rhodesia. when in actual fact tbe control of affairs and ail the institutions is in the bands of the rebel forces. Whether the rebels are recognized or not. the fact of the matter is that they are still in effective control of the affairs of Southern Rhodesia and no amount of condemnation Will change that fact. One would bave thought, therefore, thût tbe United Kingdom would take energetic measures to reverse the situation in Southern Rhodesia and assume direct control over the affairs in that Territory, SO that it cari give a fair and just administration and prompt majority rule to the people of Zimbabwe. 72. The United Kingdom representative stated that when tAe illegality committed in Southern Rhodesia is abandoned, his Government will be willing to salve the problem justly and by reasonable means. And yet he knows full well thatthemeasures proposed by bis Government to deal with the rebellion cari never make the rebels abandon the course they bave taken. It would bave been more realistic to bave stated that when this illegality is crushed tbe British will salve the problem justly-as indeed this seems tobe the only effective way of handling the matter. 73. The United Kingdom representative further told tbis Council that he understands the feelings of those wha advocate the use of force, but cannot accept their judgement. Since Zambia is one of those countries tbat advocate the use of force, let me remind him tbat our demand for the use of force is based on the . precedents created bythe United Kingdom when dealing witb rebellions in its other colonies, and moreover oui demand for the use of force stemsfrom our sense of justice and our genuine desire to bring to an im- 74. Permit me to refer to an extractfrom the speech made by the President of Zambia two days ago about the situation in Southern Rhodesia whiohaffects international peace and security: Wuring the past forty-eight heurs there has been au increase in troop movements on tbe Rhe desian-Zambian border, It is now clear that there is an equivalent of two battalions of European troops along the border. These troops consist of Rhodesian light infantry which number approximately 700 officers and menv.-1 may add at this point that we bave just heard the news that the number is now 1,200.- “Then there is a detachment of special air service signal corps and other personml required to maintain a large hody of troops in operational conditions. BTroops are presently deployed at the following locations: Kariba on the Southern Bank of the Zambssi River opposite Lusitu, Chirundu& thevicinity of Nyakasanga River on the Peninsula formed bythe Zambesi and Ngombe River8 at Feira. RThe Rhodesian army is presently operating at least four launcbes on the Zambesi. These launches are capable of carrying eight to ten armed men; they carry out patrols from army camps situated between tbe Kariba Dan and Mosambiqae border at Zumbo. During tbe past week reconnaissance flights by Rhodesian aircraft along Zambian border8 bave greatly increosed. On 10 November flights were carried over the border by jet, pistonengined and hellcopter aircrsft. The British South Africa PoUcea-tbc police in Southern Rhodesia- Ahave been greatly increased over tbe past few days. This applfes to stations at Kariba. Chirundu anà Feira. At tbese border stations European members of the British South Africa Police bave 76. B la merci peuvent priété l%m PMtus a menacés vers Le d&ourner passait du d(B reveuir Les aa p&xipad trouve été prises Malgré Uni ~wouie primer position e have B3w m? sia i5 a mattes 77. question ou de mort affaire nationales. qui ont demandé diaéement pitre 78. ma

The unlawful deolaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia undoubtedly constitutes one of the most serious situations the Security Council has ever faced. A smalP group of men has defied the United Kingdom and world opinion by usurping power in order to establish the dictatorship of a small minority over the vast majority of the African population. Mr. Smith and his colleagues bear the sole and terrible responsibility fer thus creating a situation which is an outrage to Africa and to the world and which, unless remedied, is likely to endanger international peace andsecurity. 81. My delegation has listened with grave attention to the statement made before this Councïl by the representative of the United Kingdom. In the opinion of my delegation, his Government, in full awareness of its responsibilities for the fate of Southern Rhcdesia and its people, has in the whcle question of Souther% Rhodesia shown what we believe tobe both remarkable patience and determination. Now that the act of rebellion has taken place. it has announced a number of Stern measures, and there is no doubtin our minds of ‘che serioua effect of thase measures on the régime of Mr. Smith and of the serious consequences tbey Will have for the whole of bis country. These xneasures cari bs fully effective, we believe, provided tbey receive general support and provided a11 Member nations refrain from anything which might impair their results. Yesterday the Security Council, already aoting ombehalf of the whole memhersbip of the United Nations, as well as the General Assembly befoz it. condemned the unilateral declaration of independence [resolution 216 (1965)], thus making it known to Mr. Smith and his followere that they stand aloue in tbe world. chat is now needed is that tbe full pressure of this Organisation and its membersbip be brought to bear upon them without delay. 62. My Govermnent cannot condone ira any way the illegal acts of Mr. Smith. The Netherlands Cabinet, at a meeting yesterday, has already decided not to recoguize Mr. Smith% illegal r&gime in Southern Rhodesia and has also decided to examine as a matter of urgency what measures might possibly he taken in the framework of our national legislation. 63. We believe that it should not be difficult for this Council to give the FJnited Kingdom fulJ endossement of lts aotion, since the atm of that action is common to abnost .aIl the Members of the United Nations. The only difference of opinion which may exist concerns what kind of counter-action to take. 84. My delegation is of cwrse aware tbat the Organisation of African Unity. in October 1965.a de- 87. Mr. RAMANI ~~a~ys~a): This is on@ of tbese nt Power maments in buman history wben an imperial with an ancient heritage stands at the crossroada of its m-o freely fashhmed destiny. AB the world armd sees it erious predicament, tbere is 583 mucb eo conlmena t equauy ehere 1s 60 mucb ta candenm. But this, hwever, is net the tira@ to kmk 88. The question of Southern Rhodes& having corne before the Security Council and the General Assembly on several previous cccasions, the temptation to indulge in the 1-told-you-so attitude is understandabIy irresistible. If only the British Government had taken the good advice it was proferred; if only it had acted in time; if only it had done something else. The vif onlysv are legion. 1 do not wish to sucoumb to that temptation, but 1 must confess that one indeed frequently felt that the attitude of the United Kingdom with regard to Southern Rhodesia when trouble was brewing was cold, austere, legalistic, almost academie. Even when the devil’s cauldron was boiIIng over. no attempt was made to assuage the feelingê of those who felt deeply over this matter. The nearest the United Kingdom came to recognizlng those deepfelt emotions was a rather tardy acknowledgement of the existence of such feelings In those who felt passionately about them-that it was a11 entirely understandable but that the purist constitutional conscience of the United Klngdom could not do much, if anything, about it. 89. Even yesterday, the representative of the United Klngdom said in effect: 1 understand your feelings, but 1 cannot accept your judgements, a kind of *the spirit is willing but the fIesh is iKeak* attitude. 1 recall characterising this posture durlng an earlier debate on Southern Rhodesia in the Seourity Council as a hypnosis which Britain’s rational soulhad created for itself: an illusion of powerlessness, right in tbe storm centre of a situation created by a power-mad politician, to des1 witb tbe situation as it was develop ing before its very eyes. 98. New that the event bas corne to pass-tven if the United Klngdom has closed its eyes to tbe blindlng vision that we a11 claimed had beenvouohsa.fed to many of us-1 cannot but feel. with the utmost deference to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affalrs, that even the pi-es& attitude is one of wllllng to strlke but unwilling to wound. Even the fondest of parents would raise his hand against a rebellious offspring. But Britain. the mother of democracy, tbe grandmother if you will. ha8 nothing to show but an ineffable sadness at a rebellion that hasbeenperpetratedwithin its own unchallenged domain, the basic motivation of whicb was to tear every ideal of democracy lnto shreds for all tbe world to sec. 91. In süch a situation the Vnited Kingdom, at its own initiative, brought the matter to the Councll. 92. The United Kingdom chose to call it a rebellion, as no other word will fit the facts and, of course, one is forever conscious of the genius of the British peuple for understatement. A rebellion must be put dovm. Tbere is no otber remedy for it. One does not deal with a rebelfion by suffering its continuance in the confident expectation that the rebels Will lose henrt and wiP1 corne down on tbeir knees when they are driven to the extremity of hunger and starvation. Even individuaIs who rebel for a cause prefer to die Tan to give in. Moreover. what bas happened in Rbodesia is not a seeretly planned coup d’état. What has bappened there is a carefully planned and meticulously calculated ami cunningly carried out seiaure of ‘@aver. wbich has been maturing for a period of yeers in the Fidel gaze of all the world. 93. Tbfs Cari hatiy be describedas a situation&ch, even assttming it is Bkely toendangerthemaintenance of intemationad peace, cari be solved by recourse to megotiation. conciliation and SO forth. Negotiationwith wbom? Conciliation witb whom? Rot with a group of ?&ofJfe wbom you bave branded as rebels and beyond the @e of the law, except perhaps when they ask for mercy. MOreOVer. SUC~ steps as the United Kfngdom bas already taken and the langnage it bas employed to describe the events are. by very definition, neither negotmtion nor conciliation. They are the application of force ao that. it may be, the rehel r&ime may want to conciliate or negotiate. My delegation feels convinced that the situation in Southern Rhadesia. as it is today. is entirely outside the scope of a common senso view Of tbe provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter. 94. what hz% taken place, therefore, is indeed a threat peace. One could even daim rhat this is clear Sion within the meaning of Article 39 of the Chwter. A Govenunent which. through the COUSC~OUS. COnS~tutiOWd prOCeS8eS to the United Kingrlom, bad been stiared to exist and control the destinies of 4 million oeor>le in a territory which 1 was happy bu note yesmrday the United Kingdom representative aad a Ba?t&h possession, a Government which had 95. This is patently aggression. and the United Kingdom has brought the situation arising aut of it to the attention of the Security Council. On this question the Security Council, if 1 may say SO with a11 deference, must form its own judgement. The complainant provides the occasion; the judgement is that of the Council. By bringing this matter on its own primary initiative to the Security Council in such a conte& the United Kingdom can only be regarded as asking for a determination by the Council that a threat to peace exists as the result of an act of aggression that has taken place. The situation that has developed in the last two days bears on its very face the oharacteristic form and lineaments of what indeed it is, and not much effort is needed to sec which way our determination of the situation must lie. 96. By the terms of Article 39 of the Charter the Security Council thereupon becomes obligated to decide what measures under Article 41 or Article 42 shall he taken. 97. It was my understanding-1 use the past tense deliberately since it was SO yesterday-of the attitude of the United Kingdom Government. until 1 heard the United Kingdom representative again this morning and read the terms of the draft resolution submitted by his Government, that it asked for measures to be taken not involving the use of armed force in the first instance. This is precisely what the several resolutions of tht General Assembly invite the United Kingdom to take: a11 necessary measures. including military force. Economb sud political sanctions inas full a measure as will achieve the objective must be applied; and 1 do not think that there are any of us at this table who would wish something less to be done. SS. It is just at this point that 1 bave corne up against aome difficulty in clearlyunderstanding the draft of the present situation in Southern Rhodesiabothinpolitfcal and in economic ternis. SS. In political terms, the consitutional stand taken by the United Kingdom in Southern Rhodesia is not SO muoh one of isolating the colony into the stahts o? an international outlaw as it is an effort to disaociate itself from the events that are taking place ir Ozthern Rhodesia. In theoretical terms. a barrl- 100. Twenty-three years ago. during the Second World War when the subcontiuent of htdiawas seething witb a political revolution. the then Secretary of State for India. Mr. Amery, with a crack of the wbip to the Governor General of India, took into custody in one fell swoop ail the leaders of tbe Indian National Congres&. including Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, and kept them detained. He then claimed in Parliament. with gusto. tbat he had removed the fuse between the plotters of rebellion and the population of the country. Hany such thing had been attempted ry it would bave effectively kept the political cmtrol in Britain’s hands. even if in the process the Smith clique should bave been handed the crown of white martyrdom. But to bave done what the present Government in London has done is only to perpetuate. for how long one does not know. the rebel r&gime and help towards an exchange of name-calling between London and Salisbury. Hard words break no bones; and the fate of the 4 million African subjects of Her Majesty remains preciselywhere itwasprecarious. in the hands of predatory politicians. hideed their position has been rendered immeasurably inSWUl% 101. In economic ternis, as 1 listened to the representative of the United Ringdom yesterday. 1 got the distinct impression that he was underlining how mucb Britain WBS hurting itself-a gusture of selfsacrifice, net a demonstration of the degree to which it was hurting the economy of Southern Rhodesia. This is the relevant information which we need, information vital to the Security Council SO that it may consider. in the language of Article 42 of the Charter. whether the measures provided for in Article 41 cari be adequate. 1 understand that the Secretariat has in hand a study examining the economy of Southem Rhodesia and, for my part, I should suspend judgement unless the British Government is able to satisfy the Security Council that they are mdeed adequate. net in the sense that it will hurt that economy in the long run, but that it Will hurt significantly at this time those facets of it that are directly rmlnerable to the process of sanctions. 102. Sanctions as SUC~. to bs of any significance for the purpose of Article 41, ca11 only be those that Shah do well for ever to remember that the Smith administration has carefmy assembled its facts. It bas plotted its plans for tbe future because it was never in douht of wbat the world inside and outside Africa was thinking aboui its activities, a& the initiative WaS altiys, and continueS to remaia, in i& hands. 103. Aaother fact wbich, 1 thiak, we sbould sot loae sight of is the inescapable fact of geography. SQUthern Rhodesia now shares a long border witb Soutb Afrioa aad, with otber like-miaded contigaous States on either side of the soutbero portion of Africa, appears to bave been carved out Mo a solid geopapbical unit entering common objectives and creatiag common objectives. Any trade embargo or application of economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesfacannet but tale accouat of this vitalfact. What guarantees cari one hope to get from South Africa-wbatever polite noises tbat Mate may be making now-tbat it ~101 net aid and abet Soutbern Rbodesia tibreakl through aay economic cordon sanitaire? It is entirely withtn tbe boundsofpossibility tbatSoutbernRhcdeslan goods would leave the country, pickupanothercountry of origia label aloag the way, and retain the world market by suoh meana. Wbat steps is the British Goverameat coate~plating to prevent this happening for bath outfiow and inflow? Snob an embargo cari therefore be rendered nugatory. 104. Moreover, and this is net a mere stretcb of fancy, sbould some form of poMica1 union corne Mo being between Southern Rhodesia and Soutb Africa, for instance, how would Britain then respond to its responsibilities to the 4 million African people, short of going to war with South Africa? After all, Prime Minister Clmrobill at a Mgb moment, or should I say at a low ebb, in tbe fortunes of war. offered a political union witb France, and Southern Rhodesfa if net now in a less parlous state and a drowning mau Will leap to cling to a straw. 105. Those are tbe possibilities that assail my delegataeion% and I believe tbat we are entitled to gome . la any event. ev dismlsses such possibilities from one% faanciful aad uarealistic, bow does the Utited propose now to keep open the dcor to nnegotoéia the rebels to which it 80 passionately r wbere Will i chink In the wall en- 1 ti5h to brlng ‘CO th% notice a statement by th.e Prime laysia. A~t~c~pa~ cking tbey deslre. Some d tbem, fait accompli. time. They were to indu@ in excessive r the event has proved tbem 120. For US Africaas. tbe present situation in Rbodesia 18 a matter of life md death. We sball face it with vigour, courage and determimtioa. The leaders of tbe four States bordering on the S@e@ Riverthe President of Senegal, Mr. Leopold SBdar Sa the President of Mali, Mr..Modibo Keita, tbe Presfl dent of Mauritania. Mr. PAoktar Cndd Daddab and tbe President of Càuinsa, Mr. Abmed S&ou T~U&- bave, on 12 November 1965, alreaciy stats vkws and asked their African colleagaes <I African States ahould irmnediately comider tbemselvee fn a state of armed confliCt agaimt tbe illegal up in Rhodesis and eend r (0 help tiw Zimbabwe Kasavubu and 0 e.imiKarKy expre the problem vfi memurst~~ w-ith t 121. Tbe guest fs whetber the S deslm settIers* c ~roms~ons would be meaniagless. In these circmnstances. it is the dnty of tbe Wnitid Namons to @ve its effective support and assmanca to tbe ~PIC~ St?&S. 122. The President of tbe Republic of Guima bas just atated: “Tbe m.?w sitn b a matter of 135. oae o&?r pooint before concluding. we wol.aa Hke t# say tk& we kelieve tkat tke big Powers, %@ pamanent membess of ths Security Couac& bave tk@ pater req&biliQ for tke waint@nance af interwa&wl pêce md security. Tkey bave a p~imany rde to pday. Wtk firmness and d@terminatiOn, tke Secnrity CowiB cm eertlairdy arrest the situation. Ht kas eucceeaed PIE tke past. PL km skoppd states mn the miaority group OP rt kas Sbpped ma.ny S%ut totk@peac@, wh@tk@r In America. Tke Security mission md avert tkis if its merde VE& it to succeed. And in t say ûnce again tkat tke 136. Tk@ blg Powers cannot simply say “we are ’ st a unniPates&I de&aatPon of independ@nceA do aaothing effectfve agauast it. This amounts ko diwmt mnco~geme2t ta minority dominatmn. We wotid be faihg in OU~ duties if we did net take ali tke steps needed to prote& rke authority of tb&J body, to protect the law of th@ United Nations. 137. TO quote tke late Professor EdwinD.Dickinson: V we kave anly tke will .and the persistem2 40 impkment the Ckaarter effectively and make it serve, we imaay Iaave tke firm beginning of tsue law En QUP time.” 138. Tke PRESIDENT (trasslated from Spanish): Tkere me no more speakers on my Est and it is ention, with tke CounciP’s cousent. to zdjoum 139. Witk regard to setline; a date for the next meeting 8.t wkkk the Council will resume its dis-. eussoi~n of tbis important subjeot, I should Iike to inform you, follawing the usual informa1 consult~tioaa, tkat tke majority of tke Council memb@rs me eitker awaitinn instruction.9 from their Governmeste or desire to ccmsider more carefully thé, twc resolutions which hav@ beer subew of these two consideratl:ous, it witk tka Council’s agrsement, we next Monchy a& 10.30 a.m. to oonlieatians des Nations Unies sont LICACIONES mes de la0 Nacicnes U idcras en to&s parler acicnes Uni&s, Secci6n