S/PV.1263 Security Council

If 1 uaderstood the rrectly. 1 believehe iniater of the roblem is net one t0 be by military interventionw - md tlds is the %nless, of course. OUI trcaps are asked for to prmmve law and order and to avert a tragic ~ctlon. subversion, murder and 80 OS”.~ Does the ent we heard tlde afternoon, that Ve mle out lar measwe+. exclude the possibility of meamre as contained in the Prime 23. MI. STEWART (United Kigdom): 1 am obliged to the representative of Jordan and 1 sball meke the point clear. 18211 in full agreement with the statement made by our Prime Minister in Parliament. which he quoted. The representative of Jordan may bave noticed that when 1 was speaking 1 said that one must rule out’ force as a way of solving the constitutional problem in Southern Rhodesia. It is truc that circumstances might arise in which force would nead to be used for the purposes referred to in the Prime Minister’s maternent. What wodd not be appropriate would he to use force as a way of imposing a constitutional settlement in Southern Rhodesia.

1 must inform the Couccil that. when 1 recognised the repressntative of Jordan. 1 thought that he wished to speak On a point of order. Hi8 statement prompted a reply from the United Kingdom representative. Without prejudice to the right of the members of the Council to mske stcv;ments at a later stage, 1 thlnk we should keep to Ouf list of speakers in accordance with the provisional rules of procedure. 1 therefore give the floor t0 the represontative of Sudan.

Mr. President. 1 wish to thank the Council for the oppormnity afforded me to address it on a subject that has been the cause of great concern to my Government. 26. It is “ow nearly a week since the white racialist minority in Southern Rhodesia declared its bogus independenoe in flagrant defiance of the authority of the Government of the United Kingdom. The Government of the United Kingdom promptly declared the act illegal and the perpetrators rebellious usurpers. We all kuow that the Governor General infoimed Mr. Smith and his Government that, in law, they no longer held office, and the UnitedKingdomParliament two days ago passed leglslation to impose sanctions on the Smith régime. 27. This is all very well, but one cannothelp wondering at the discrepancy between the enormity of the act and the measures that are supposed toprovlde the remedy. The representative of the United Kingdom. in outlining these measures to the Council On 12 November. stated: “Taken together and fully supported by the United Nations these measures will ensure that the pur= ported Government of Southern Rbodesia is unlversally understood to be a” illegal r6gime without friends or recognition in the worlclv (1257th meeting, para. 33.1 26. It is fimther assumed that the realization of .he gravity of their isolated and untenable position will bring Mr. Smith and bis supporters to their senses. What ha8 bappened, in fact, 1s the exact opposite; for, c-?%xleral [S/69S8], m3vise decllmed in no terms to accept tbe t5vitatim. castingdoobt ety aa? its motivatia Tims it regime Will 1east i-m Ilot umikely tbat tbere is some 8 tbaE Soatb African armed men Iished tbemeelves in great numbers in i%dkms Bhdesia. ready and dstermincd to corne to tbe aïd of the Southern Rbodesians if tbe ueed arises. eeem* dcabtm even to came of tbe Govermnmt of Great Britain eed sancticms are adequate to meet support of tbis contention may 1 refeer to a statement made by tbe Attorney-General of Great Britain, Sir Elwyn Jones. He was quoted by Tbe New York Times of 16 November as bavbrg said. in expfauation of tbe sanctions Bill, that it scught tc give tbe Govermnent jurisdiction over Rhodesia ami pcwers to deal with a situatkm. the future of wbicb it is net possible now to forecast, We bave felt this sime tbe sanctions arme first annouuced to tbfa Coimcil. Deprived of the beaeflts of Commanvealth 34. In anticipation of the hard ttmes to corne, Mr. Smith has been calling upon bis supporters to t5gbtetea their belts and exborting his armeà forces net to waver in their loyalty, but to remain steadfast a& uxdted. According to The New York Timea of 16 November, Mr. Smith is quoted as baving said: “corne what may, tbe services Will play a powerful part if supporting the efforts of ail aihodesians to weather the stormn. These are the words of a determined man wbo should be met with a determiaation tbat is fmppotied by the füll force and the most resolute action of the United Nations. not by measures whose effeotiveness is doubted even by tbose who advocate thcm. 35. There are grounds for optimism in some of tbe latter pronouncements of tbe Prime Minister 0fGreat Britain and in wbat the United Kingdom representatlve bas just s@d. Tbe Prime Minister himselfdeelaredin the House of Gommons a few days ago tbat this issue is too cx’ucial for Rhodesia. for the Commonwealtb and for tbe nile of law to thiak in terms of a meaningfess slap on tbe wrist. Tbis strengthens the hope tbat Great Britain, wbich bas always taken pride in tbe BritonV *ense of justice and fair play, Will net abandon 4 million Africans of Southern Rbodesia to tbeir fate. 36. The United Nations, which is now calPed upon to stren n the baud of the Britisb Govemment cari, even tbis late heur. tip tbe balance agafnst tbe racists of Southern Rhode& if tbe Govepnment of Great Britain Will lend its fol1 support and COoperation to the Organisation. The Government of Great Britain sbould net be unmiodful of the fact that tbe Nations had repeatedly warned against the inberent in the Soutbern Rbodesian situation est Britain maintained an unco-operative and obstructionist attitude. 37. NO~, if the Government of the United Kingdom is serious in its desire to render Mr. Smith% act of defiance truly unprofitable, let it deny the Sontbern Rhedlesian Government not merely tbe advao es of Commonwealth preference but te possibility of any trade or communication with its CommonweaRb. In order to crippks. or at least aeriowly bamper tbe Mthern Rhodesim armed Lrees. let the ?Jnited dom impose a total embwgo oh oil imp~rts into Soathem Rhodesia. ii is heartening to note tbat tbe repsesentative of tbe United Kingdom bas juat stated tbat his Govemment wdd be prepared to oonsider sach an embargo. 38. TO deter the raciets and their friendsinS&bern Rbodesia from imposiag tbeir immoral r6gime by tbe use of armed force, Jet armed force be used agaioet tbem. Tbis is tbe ay. R is tbus, and only thus. tbat tbe United Mi ~1111 prove beyond doubt that it is serions in its e, and intent upon honouring its pledges to the Africans of So&hern Rhodesia. Tbe Sdenm wo* show tbe exterat of ow co: ceru r det tlm. But we still bave faith in tke amie of tbe united N&ions. 4l. SpeciÎically. we urge tbe Securie Ccuncll totake action mder C%apter VII or’ the Charter. Ifthe Cou&l chooses thus ta a&. itwillreceiveourfull support and ctMqYsration.

Iglve the Îloor ta tbe representative of Somalis. 45. The sitcation whicb has developed in Soutbcrn Rbodesia is a direct result of tbe United Kïngdom’s neglect net only of the social and political rigbts of the majority of tbe people of tbat Territory but a.Pso of the principles and expressed Will of tbis Crga&atien. The rights of tbe 4 million indigencus pec@e of Swtbern Rbodeaia were negkcted under COVBF of tbe of%repeated formula thal the Terrftcry had been granted interna1 self-government since 1923 and tbat for tbat Feason tbe British Gcvernment could trot intemSne in the cause of justice. The expressed wiI1 of tbe United Nations Special Committee.z/ of tbe General Assembly and of tbe Security Cou&l bas been steadily ignored since 1862. 46. The representative of the United Kicgdom has expressed a desire to concernhimselfwiththepresent situation and present action rather than with past events. This is understandable in view of the United Kingdom’s record of failure in Southern Rhodesia. But my delegation is of the opinion tbat the mistakes of tbe pasé bave a direct bearing OR any action whiob we might take n or in the fctcre. 47. Successive British Governments bave claimed that they had no power to intervene in the affairs of the SouthernRhodesianGovernment. Tothem,Southern Rhodesia seemed to lie in some constitutions1 DO ma& land since it was described by the United Kingdom representative in the General Assembly debate on Rhodesia in October 1962 as being neither sovereign zor independent but out of the sphere of tbe non-self-governing territories. 46. 1 leave aside for the moment the fact that tbe United Nations Speoial Committee, after due consideration of tbe relevant facts, came to the conolusion, which was later affirmed by the Genesal Assembly, that Southern Rbcdesia was a Non-Self- Governing Territory within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter. P asI& instead, why it bas been impossible over thhe past years tn contrd in any way tbe power of Swthern Rhqdesiaqs white population and why it 18 now QossibIe for the BPitisk Government to assume tbe attitude of a ruling power. If the United Kingdom Goveïmnent cari now apply tbe rod to its recalcitrant Child, why oould tt net bave done so 53.. Scutb Africa andRo~ga~havenowmad~~a~~es of support for Soutbern Rhode&% illegal assumption of independence. There is Little doubt that the racial and pdilical policies in Mozambique. in Scuth Africa and in Soutbern Rhodesia wiI1 cause tbose countries to draw together in cher economic and political alliance. Under these ctrcumstances, effective ecmomic sanctions against Scuthern Rbodesia will prcwe impossible. 53. We already bave indications of tbis from tbe position which the Governments of Portugal and Scutb Africa bave adopted towards all resolutions passedon the problem and by thetr refusai, this week to accept tbe C!ounci1% invitation to them to participate in the present debate. We have had sufficient evidence of tbeir intransigence whenever questions involving the rights of African pecples to self-determinatfon are concerned. In this particular issue, the proposala for any economic sanctions or a blookade of Southern Rhcdesia Will bave very little chance of success SO long as the frontiers of South Africa ami Mozambique remain open to that Territory. In the opinion of my Government, any blockade might also bave to be extended to tbe frontiers of Mozambique and Soutb Africa if those Govennnents refuse to co-operate in tbe kind of international action necessary for this particular situation. 54. My Govermnent, along with other African Governments, has b: Iported the demand of the African leaders in Southern Rhcdesia that the 1961 Constitution be revoked and a new one. based andemccratic rights and universal suffrage, be instituted in its place. This demcnd bas been repeatedly endorsed by the General Assembly. Wbtle the Britisb Government haa dismissed Ian Smith, it still retains the1561 Constitution in the face of world condemnation and of the present unfortunate event in the Territory. The London Daily Telegraph has remarked that, for ordinary Sou~ Rhodestans. the conflict of loyalties has not yet corne tc thepoint of persona1 decision. Surelythat point would be reached If the British Government or the @teen-inis for th@ paTfommm of their duties tbe revocatioo or suspension of the 55. Tbese matters of detail. and ones wbich tbe united may be considering at Uùs time. But they bave an ti>wrtant as it bas been presented to th beeostatedbytberep~~entativeofthe Uoited in this Ccamcil. it is clear tint tbe United is net sure of its positicm in the Territory. fact tbat itbasbeenobligedto bring tbe matter Security Ccuncll for international action makes it evident tbat the situation bas goae beyond its control and now coosühdes a tbreat to international peace and security. 56. In the v y Govemment. and considering tbe potenttal inherent in tbis situation. hvo alternatives to tbe United Kingdom Government. The Uni om sbould bave a physical preseace ia Rlmlesia sufficient in strength to support tbe Gaveraor in effecting a direct administration ofthe Territory witb tbe abject of pmviding justice and security to tbe peopple and introdocing immediate measures - I sbould like to empbasize tbak immediate measures - which would ensure majority rule forthe inhabitants. 57. If the United Kingdom is still in doubt about its ability to alter the morse of events in Southern Rhadesia, or if it fmds it distastefol to ils way of thhking to use force agaiost tbe wbite rebellious gmup in that Territory. tbea it must havethe courage ta admit tbat its emotional involvement prevents it fmm providing tbe people of Sootbern Rbodesia with those essential conditions contained in Article 73 of Chapter Xl of tbe United Nations Charter. Interc national action is defmitely required in dealing with tbis problem. and wbatbetterandmoreefficient means coold be devised for dealing witb tbis dangerws and complex problem tban by the Uaited Kingdom’s vobmtarily placiog the Territory under a United Nations trusteeship? The authorily. tbe objectives and the conditions onder which su& a transfer cari be effeCted are covered by Articles 75. 76 and 77 of Chap+sr W of tbe Uaited Nations Charter. Such a trusteeship should be of short duration - sufficient to provide for the transition from the present chaos to stability and independeace. During this period. political life could be normalized. a new constitution cwld be drawn UP based on the principle of equal political aad social rights for ail regardless of colour. and free deCtionS could be held under the auspices of an impartial authority. Anobvi~us merit of the trusteeship ProPosti is chat it would dispense with tbe argument offered by some countries here that any action taken by the United Nations witb regard to Southern Rhodesia wOtid amour& to interference in tbe interna1 affairs of a country.

1 apologize for speaking again, but 1 confess that the more we tall the less 1 am convinced of what 1 hear. A little while ago, at the opentng of the meeting, 1 tnformed the Council of the tragic situation in wbich 4.900 Africans in Southernllhodesiafoundthemselves. In reply 1 was told that it was because that situation was tragic that it was “ecessary to adopt a resolutio” immediately in order to bring it quickly to an end. 1 confess that 1 am net convinced by that reply. 1 know that these 4,000 Africans are “ow listening lntently to their wireless sets, awaiting the reply of the United Kingdom Government. for the question that they put to it was a very precise one, namely: in view of the fact that Ian Smith’s Government ha6 been declared illegal and has been dismissed, when he tries to force them to sign a pledge of allegiance, should they or should they net sign it? 1 think that those 4,000 Africans deserve an answer and 1 trust - indeed 1 count upo” it - that the United Kingdom Will give them one. 60. 1 do not believe that the immediate adoption of a resolution here would bring a rapid settlement of the tragic situation which 1 bave just described. If lt is desired to end that situation, or to crush the rebellion swiftly, we bave said - and we are merely echoing the almost identical comments of a11 the experts, who bave reached this same conclusionthat only a” embargo on oil would be capable of causing, within a month or two, the collapse of the Ian Smith Government, or in other words the end of the rebellion. That would be a rapid solution and that is the solution for which we ask - not the adoption of a resolution. 61. When we speak of using force, the point must he clearly defined. We are not saying that it is “ecessary to use force to salve a constitutional problem. We are saying that an action has been taken which has been declared a” act of rebellion and we recommend that the possibility of using force should net be ruled out - not, 1 repeat, to salve a constitutional problem, but to put down the rebellion. In similar circumstances elscwhere, recourse has been had to force. What we refuse to accept is that a” attempt shouldbe made, as it were, to decide upo” oui action according to where the rebellion takes place and who its authors are. That is what we refuse to accept. 62. We bave genuinely made the “ecessary effort to arrive at a resolution. a rapiddecision by the Security Council. for we bave the firm impression that the tInooropi”iwthat itive actlw. if it cari be 50 cplifIed, asked to talc@. t is a mîtter for tbe Commomvealtb. Let , we are told tbat the r@soUtian shouldend esttoSt5teswttosupplySouthem Rbodesia witb arms and military ecpupment. Tbere agaln 1 do wt tbink tbat we ne& tbe Mxrity Couacil for that. It tbe Afrlcsns who are poing to sq-?ly Southern sia wlth arms and militaq equipment. Nor is it the A&ns. Nor is it tbe socialist groop. Tbat ding SO. it se@ms to os that tbe Unlted Kingdom and its friends cddhave talcen tbose decisions without comiog before tlxe Couoeil. 65. We think tbat tbe Council. since this matter has been brwgbt b@for=e it. should not be content merely to eadorse the deeisloos taken by tbe United Klngdom bot sbould skoulder its resoonsibilities and iudae the pmhdem in the light of its seriousness. To d:so. it bas &e Charter at its disposai and for whatever declsims it may bave to take. for whateverenforcement may be calIed q? 3 to adopt. it must Charter. It is somewbat like penal law. wbich muet always be Wterpreted restrictively. The Ccspcil bas available a body of laws. namely the Charter. It is wlthin the frameworkofthe Charter that it must formulate its decisions and whateverenforcement sanctiws it may choose to adopt. and it has no right ta go beyond the framework of the Charter. In thes@ cimumstances, we shoold like to recommend tbat the Council sbould continue its search fo? a solution and its consideration of the resolutions. keeplng always witbin the limits frxed for it by the Charter. 66. The PRRSIDENT (translatedfromSpanish): Ihave no more speakers on my list. Nevertheless, several lneoabers of th@ Council bave expresse4 their desire ta bave some more tlme to continue the consnltations which bave been in progress for some days now on this problem. 1 intend therefore. wlth the consent of the members of the Couacil. to suspend thls meeting for an hour In ordez to glw tlme for consultations and. after the resomptlon. we shall consider whether

The point of view just expressed by the representative of Jordan is exactly the same as the one 1 put forward. After an hour’s suspension the Council will meet again and take its decisions, i.e., after the resumpticn we shall decide whether to act along the lines prcposed by ths representative ofJordanorinaccordance with the suggestions of some other member of the Council. 1 trust that he Will find this explanation satisfactory. and, if the members of the Council agree, we shall suspend this meeting for one heur. The meeting VA?S suspended af 5.15 p.m. and resumed af 6.25p.m.

1 bave to inform you that the consultations among members of the Council with a view to drafting a text acceptable to everycne continued net only for one heur, as arranged. but for somewhat longer. There is. however, a feeling thatfurtherconsultations are essential in view of the gravity of this matter. 1 bave been authorised by some members to proceed accordingly, and 1 hope that everyone wlll agree to the adjournment of this afternoon’s meeting until tomorrow at 3.15 p.m., when the Council Will meet again to consider this item. The meeffng rose af 6.30 p.m. United Nations puklicationr may ce obtcvined distrhutors thrcugkout tke world. write fo: United i+tions, Sales CO ENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS Les publications des Notions Unies sont agences dépasitoires du monde entier. au adressez-vous 6: Nations Unies, Section COMQ CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES Las publicaciones de las Nociones Unidas casas distribuidoras en todos partes dirijare a: Nociones Unidas, Seccibn Litho in U.N. Pri~e: $US. 0.50 (or quivalent