S/PV.1265 Security Council

In acCoTdanCe witb the earlier decisions tahen by tbe Council, 1 propose to invite the representatives of A@ria, India, Pakistan.Ghana, Zambia,SierraLeone. t%%x3gRal. MaIi, the United Republic of Tansania, Nigeria, Guinea. Ethiopia. Yauritania, the Gambia, Jamaica, Somalis sud the Sudan to participate, without vote, in the Council’s discussions. At fbe invifafim of fhe Presidenf, Mr. T. Bcwftouta (A&ria), Mr. G. Paxfhasamthi @dia). Mr. A. Bbuiyan (Pakisfm)~ Mi-. F. S. Arkbursl (Ghana), ltfr. F. M. MuliMfa (Zambia). Mr. G. B. 0. Collier (Skm-a Leone), Mr. S. CcmIBmly (1MallJ. Mr. E. P. Mw&ko (United RepbBc~ d Tamania), Mr. 0. M’Baye (ouine@, MS-. T. B. Gebre-E&v (~fhiopia), Mr. R B. Mi&e (i%%uriFania), Mr. A. B. N’aie (Gmbia). Mr. A. M. Adm (Smnrdia) and Mr. Fakhreddiae (Sudan) fookfbeplaoes reserved for Ihem in front cfthhe Couacil fable.

Asthe members of the Council Will recall, at the 1264th meeting the Uruguayan representative subnutted a dssft resolution [S/6955] sponsored by tbedefegations of Bolivia and Uruguay. 1 should Lihe to suggest to the membre of the Caunoil tbat we shOuld vote immediately on this draft resolution and that those who tish to speah should do 80 after the vote. Jf tbere is no objection, .l shall prooeed accordiug to this suggestion. It was SO decided.

Before proceeding to the vote. 1 sbould lihe to inform the &uncil that, as B result of observations sud la&- minute consultations. operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution aubmitted by Uruguay and Bolivia adU be amended to read as follows: Tletermines that the situation resulting from the proclamation of independence by the illegal authorities in Southern %hOdesia is extremely grave, that tbe United Kingdom Government should put en end to it and that its continuance in time constitutes a tbhreat to international peace and securit~.” 4. I &a11 now put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by BoPivia and Uru@ay [S/6955]. la fav0u.r: Bolivia, China, Ivory Coast, Jordau, Malaysia, Netherlands, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kidom of: GreatB andNotiher0 Ireland, Wntted Skates of America, *Y. 12. It is also obvious that the Southern Rhodesian racists would net bave decided to carry out their criminal plans if they had not also had the blessing of the Governments of other NATO oountries, and above ail of the Unftsd States of America. The results of oonnioing with and encouraging the raoists of the Smith camp are now in evidence. Soutbern Rhodesia bas now openly opted to become a police State and a prison camp for the 4 million persans of Zimbabwe. Such a situation cannot be tolerated: theUnitedNations and the Security Council muet make their voice heard in decisive fashion. 13. The General Assembly, in its resolution 2022 (XX) of 5 November 1965, called upon the United Kingdom to employ immediately ail necessary measures, including military force, in order to put an end to the arbttrary rule of racism in Southenr Rhodesia and in order to secure the independence of the Zimbabwe people. ln its resolution 2024 (XX) of 11 November 1965. the General Assembly condemnedths latest action of the raoists in declaring the independence of Southern Bhodesia and recommended tbe Security Council to consider this situation as a matter of urgency. The Seourity Council, in its resolution 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965, called upon all States net to recogntse the illegal racist régime in Southern Bhodesta and to refrain from rendering Lt auy assistance. 14. The Soviet Union fully supports the resolutions adopted by tbe Security Council and the General Assembly on the situation in Soutbern Rhodesia and Will strictly apply them. The Soviet Govermnent bas declared that it Will net recognize the ractst r6gime which bas usurped power in Southern Bhodesia. The Soviet Union firmly condemns this new crime against tbe peoples of Africa. 15. The Seourity Counctl bas just adopted a compromise draft resolution that ~8s submitted by Uruguay and BoBvia. The Soviet delegationwonldbave preferred the Seeurity Council to take more-effective the situation in Scnrthern Rhodesfa remains on the Counctl% agenda. the Soviet delegation bas been abis to support tbe dr& resolution andvoke for its adoption. 16. The main éask before the Securlty Cofmoil atthis time 1s to furtber in every possible way tbe triumph of tbe Just cau&e of tbe Zimbabwe people in their long and Persistent stru e for tbe freedom and Ind& pendenoe of their ccuntry.

Dwiag this long weelt of difficolt debates aticms. XVe were cdl , tbat tbe situation is ext grave and that it creates a definite tbreat to peace aw3 security in Africa and in the world. Wlmtever expressions we bave severally used, we are ail in ent on the gravity of tbe situation botb for and for the worki. The Unit& IGngdom was avare of this when it brot.qht the qnestion hefore the Security Cotmcil at the ssme time as the African States did. In considering the question, the Security Cou&l has listened to statements by the Unit4 King$om. wbich considers that inthisextremelygrave situation the matter has gone heyond its control, since it has no power in Southern Rhodesia sud conse*ently it is trying to act from a continent far distant from Afrlca. 19. TAe African States, fortheirpart.haveexpressed tbeir contera clearly andhave descrihedtheir situation as one of seIf-defence, for the action of that racist minority of Swth Africa. of Southern Rhodesia-mg coldesgue tells me that it is the same thing. whether it is South Afrïca or Southern Rbodesia. and 1 think he is rigbt-is net aa isclated oue. Ian Smith’s action is of a general plan concocteci by States that are weE lmown to you, South Africa and Portugal, to create a consortium of racist States in the heart of Africa. It is clear that in these circumstances tbe Africa SWes feel that they are in a state of selfdefence sud their position is all the more justified in chat. as we often say in my country, anyone who has been bitten by a snake is afrald of sn earthworm. 20. Kt is a fact that it was the United Kingdom that ceded South Africa to a white minority. Admittedly. no one protested at the time. but it is clearly felt that today tbe situation, even in South Africa, constitutes a vi 1 hotbed of war. Nor do we forget tbat, al.hough tboae men in South Africa had shown themselvesto be monsters. the United Ringdom cededSoutb West Afrioa to Sadh Africa too. whereas the Africans of Soath West Africa couId bave become independent today, lihe their brothers in Camercon and Togo, whichwere also Gemm colonies. Inatead of that, they are etrnggling under the iMn rule of a wblte minorlty who. blinded by their selfiah materiallstic lnterests. know neither faith nor Gcd. United Nations the Afrmaas are still sm, against those Afrikanders and Boers. Convinced, after several years of attempts. tbat it ia absolutely impossible to reach those men 22. The roason those sanctions bave not SO Par heen adopted is that some States-and they are net the smaller ones-are opposed to their adoption and the argument they invake 1s that tbey are net workable. One of those States is the United Kiagdom. which today cornes to ask us to apply sanctions. weak economic sanctions, against Southern Rhodesia. 2% Mat is certain is that in the events which are taking platie in Southern Rhodesia we are witnessing the aame process which enabled poser to be tractferred to tbe white minority in SoUeh Africa. T3e Security Council should realize that the numerous statements which are made outside the Council show that it must be extremely vigilant, because peace is really threatened. The army of the white rebels, tbe outlaws of Southern Rhodes& has taken up combat positions facing Zambia, in tbe region of Kariha, threatening that country with repris&+, that very country which the United Kingdom has Iinked économically witb Southern Rhode&. Zambia bas appealed to the United Kingdom to deend itsfrontiers and to place forces around the power station wbich it sbares with Southern Rhode& aad whicb is vital to its economy. We were very disappointed to hear oa the radio tbat the United -dom% reolv to tbat Y a ” appeal wa8 as follows: “If Zambia is attacked, tbe Unlted Nations wilI corne”. Zambia hasnotappealedto the Wnited Nations; it has appealed to the United JSingdom. within the framework of the Commonwealth. 1 suppose. 1 am sure that this is net the reply that Zambia expected to receive. On tbe other baud. the United Kingdom ha6 declared that it wouldnot toIerate an attack against Southern Rhodesfa. We shotid bave preferred that language ta be used in connexion with Zambia. 24. One thing is certain, and that is tbat tbe Afrtcans are net prepaxd to tolerate the oreation of this consortium of racist cmmtries. Uou bave heard a number of statements on tbis Po;nt and you lmow that, wbatever the situation may be, the African caunlries too csn find support. 25. In view of all this. t&e least that cari be said is tbat there is a definite threat to peace, that a war may break out. a war with incalculable consequences. In MS fine book on Southern Rhodesla, Sir Wugb Foot. now Lord Caradon, sounded the alarm and warned tbe world wbat su& racial war would mean. 26. what does Me Unlted Kmgdom propose as a remedy for tbis situation? We find it in the draft resohdtion wbicb it bas submitted [S/SSZSl. IL asks u* to refuse to rec ize the unilateral declaration of independence, to r born of tbls matera1 declaration of independence. to refrain from an could give afd and comfort to that refrain also from sw~ybxg arms. waamaterla FinallyD it invite tbe Uaited Kin in making effective tbe measures whioh its Government bas tien. 31. On the other hand we bave shows that this matter could only bave been brought before the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. We bave demonstrated that Chapter XI. entitled *Declaration regarding Non-Self-Governing TerritoriesA, was not applicable, for the Wnited Kingdom denies that Soutbern Rhodesia is aNon-Self- Governing Territory, although we Africans and the United Nations agree that this Territory is non-selfgoverning. But even if we bave agreed upon this and. we are sure, SO has the Security Council, in that case it would uot be the Security Cou&l wbich is competent to deal with the matter, but rather the General Assemhly and. consequently, the Fourth Committee. That is why we consider that the United Kingdom did not b-ring the matter before the Counoil under Chapter XI. Nor has the matter heen brougbt before the Council under Chapter VI, for in that case there would be oiily oue solution, that provided in Article 33: to invite Ian Smith and the United Kingdom to seek a solution by negotiatiou, inquiry. mediation, conciliation. arbitration. judicial settlement, or, as is aIsoprovidedforinArticle 33, to resort to the regional agency, that is to say tbe Organisation of African Uniiy, wbich, youmaybesure. would welcome them and show them the path of wisdom. Or there is Article 36. which recommends appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. 32. Thus, a glance at the Charter Will convince ycru that it is only under Chapter VII that the IJnited Kingdom could bring this matter before the Security Couucil, for we bave shown that it is only in Chapter VII that economio sanctions are mentioned. Indeed. lt is diffioult for the Couacil to do otberwise witbout contravening the Charter. 33. Moreover, the difference between the United KinmJom and African oositions is tbat the United Kinidom has chosen sanctions decreed by itsGovernment, wbich it prasents to us and asks the Council to apply, whereas we say tbat in such circumstances, in view of tbe fact that tbese are coercive sanctions. tbe Seourity CourmIl cannot adopta wide interpretatien and that it should therefore be guided only bythe sanctions provided for in ArticIes 41 and 42 of the Charter. That is why we submitted a draft resolution whioh the bory Coast had tbe honour of introducing on behalf of tbe African group [S/6323]. 34. AE you know. bowever, wbich we bave tered representative 0 ay we negotiations wbi led ta* to reacb a cotnpromiffl resolution. I declare on babalf of tbe Afrioans tbai tbis reaolution is sot entirely satisfactory to uB; we realize, however, t if it were otberwlse it wdd net be a compromise ami Vve hâve therefore accepted it. 40. 1 wish, first of all, to make it clear that my Govermnent stands firmly behînd the ptmTose which this rcàolution aims at, namely, to put an end to the illegal situation in Southern Rhodesis, and that my Govermnent Will do everythtng within its power to co-operate witb the measures being taken to that end by the British Govermnent and by the Members of the United Nations, under this resolution. 41. Nowever, we did not wish to undertake commitments that we are not certain we shall he able really to carry out, and this put us in some difficulty with regard to the words which 1 bave just read out. We should like to ask understandtng for the practical difficulties facing those countries which Will, we should net forget, in practice bave ta bear the brunt of the implementation of those measures. It is one thing to declare oneself in faveur of strong measures and to vote for them, but it is quite another thing to bave to carry those measures into effect, with a11 the legal, economic and practical problems which that tnvolves. These may not be ultimately decisive conaiderations, but tbey do pose real problems whkh bave to be looked into. 42. As the text now reads, as has just been said, in Prenoh, by the representative of the Ivory Coast.cela laisse fi chacun la latitude de faire cet effort, c%s% dtrelaltberté d'apDrbCl&tiOn - thalis, itleavestoeacb one the freedom to make the effort. todo the autmosta. and it leaves a certain liberty of judgement. 43. What measures will he feasible for us to take depends on the legal and tbe practtcal problems involved. Those cannot immediately be judged in ail their implications. We bave to examine this. My Government has already initiated this examination, and it Will proceed with the utmost speed and vigour in doing 60. 1 wish to make it clear, therefore. so there be no misunderstanding, tbat my Government does net reject application of this paragraph, but it oannot at this moment undertake as yet the obligation to carry it into practice, becausewe cannotyet 899856 all its implications. 44. For this reason, my delegation seriously considered asking for a separate vote on operative paragraph 3 andabs~~n~onthatpa~agraph.~oweve~, we refrained from doing so in order net to endanger or uoset tbe resolution. whioh bad been acbieved throÜgh snch lengthy oons&ations and 80 many diffmult concessions on botb sides. My delegation therefore 49. The news trichling through from Salisbury helps to underline the fact that even as we in this ornate hall battle vehemently with words and in sheer weariness gave way, the real battle in Salisbury between the illegal r8gime sud the trapped people there is gathering momentum and vioIence to which we here appeared to affect tke pose of Nelson on his battleshlp putting his telescope to his blind eye. 50. 1 bave one last Word. Our principal, final appeal is to the United Klngdom. 1 lmow and we a11 lmow tbat it is doing its best; but we here bave felt it our duty to tel1 it tbat its best, at least SO far, has not been good enough. New that it has secured from the Council the strength it sought, and indeed something significautly more than would satisfy it, we expect of Great Britaln to go about its skare of the task with firmness, with vigour and witk a11 speed. Speed is of the essence. Walter Bagekot, tkat famous father historian of the English Constitution, kas said of his ieh people do net easily ckan their rooted opinions: but they bave a great mauy unrooted opinions.v 51. Eoen if we kave not been able in this Council to uproot its rooted opinions, may we a9peal and cal1 to its mind tke unrooted opinions wkick bave actuatad and accomplished 80 much in the past, for it and for tke world, in its colourful kistory of long centuries. England has by tke enample of its e rieme a history provided tke modem world witk the essential tore and precise substance of liberal traditions in tke art and science of government. May we express Be fervent kope tkat tke appeal of tke 4 million African people in Suutkern Rhodesia, eupported by aJ.I the world, will net kave only tke ecko of tke question for ite answer. 58. We bave noted the statement made at the 1264th meeting by the representative of Uruguay, when he was introducing the resolution just adopted by the Council. that its text does not mention whether Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the Charter is brougbt to bear. My Government agreeswith tbis interpretation of the text. 59.. We bave taken an important action today. It is not a11 tbat everybody would wish us to take, but its importance should not be denigrated. It is an important statement by this Council of its unanimous desire to condemn this rehellion in Southern Rhodesia and to take measures to bring an end to it. The misguided rebels in Southern Flhodesia would do well to heed the voice of the Council, to heed also the voice of the vast majority of nations as earlier expressed In the General Assembly. The writing is on the wall. The time is late, but not too late; reason cari still prevail if the minority will but reconsider their shocking and untenable decision. 60. The actions of this Council-the one taken on 12 November [resolution 216 (1965)) and the one taken today-and the fact that we will keep thismatter under continuing review, as the representative of tbe Ivory Coast has pointed out, demonstrate that the nations of the world oannot and Will net stand idly by while Re minority violates principles which the world community holds most saored. This is the message of this resolution. Let us a11 hope that it Will Indeed be heeded, for heeded it must be If the problem of Southern Rhodesia is to be snlved as it should be solved, by peaceiül means and not by violence with its menace to international peace and securiiy. 61. Lord CARABON (United Kingdom): As 1 listened to the proceedings here tbis morning. 1 bave once or twice been very much tempted to reply to statementa made. But 1 doubt whether it is right touse the opportunity for explanation of vote to reply to previous speeches; and in any event, as 1 said yesterday, we bave already had ample opporiunity for debats and for consultation--for very fulI consultation-and at this stage, therefore, wbat I wiah to say Will be limited strictly to tho explanation of the vote whioh 1 cast today. 62. 1 think I might perhaps be permitted, however, tc turn aside for one moment to refer to the speech: made by the repreaentatfve of Nlalaysia just nmv BM the appeal wbich he addressed to my country. Certainly we shall pay respect to that appeal. It cornes well 68. We are in aims agreed. What are theseaims? An early nnd to the rebellion leading to a settlement based on justice and equality. We welcome the support of all tbose who share these aims and joinus in a united endeavour. They are aims in which tbe international oommunity has repeatedly expressed its determination, a determination not to rest until the agreed aims aie achieved. 69. 1 end as we began, by empbasiaing that the practical measures my country has taken and is taking will be much the more effective, and much the more speedily effective, if they are supported and matched, and seem to be supported and matehed. by the similar action of other nations. That was cur request. We trust tbat the response given by this Council Will encourage all nations with diplomatie and trading relations with Southern Rhodesia to act as we bave done, without delay. ‘70. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Witb the Council’s permission, 1 shculd now like to speak in my capacity as the representative of BOLIVIA. The technical and political difficulties wbich we bave encountered bave 60 far prevented me from stating my Government’s opinion and I should like to do 80 now. 71. 1 should like to express the most categorical protest of the people and the Government of Bolivia against the oppressive action of a racist minority which is trying to snppress the rigbt to freedom of 4 million Africans in Southern Rhodesia. 130th world opinion and a11 tbe members of the Security Ccuncil bave deolared themselves againstthefanaticalattitude of I&n Smith. and tbe people of Soutbern Rhcdesfa cari ke sure that there is a universal consensus of opinion in their faveur to protect them against any discriminatory threat and to cc-operate with them in their aspirations for freedom. 72. After the unanimous condemnationof theminorfty action to wbich 1 hwe just referred, tbe Councfl embarked upon a consideration of the measures which should be adopted to eliminate that act of discrimination, to provide safegcards for the people of Southern Rhcdesia and to leave tbe way open for tbe complete achievement of democratic freedom in that territory. Although similar in tbeir objectives, the measures which were suggested were of different degrees of 73. In the opinion of my Gcvernment, it was net a question of chcosing between these measures; rather was it the Cocncil’s duty tc analyse them tcgether as integral parts of a ccmmon purpose, to cc-ordinate them as far as possible SO that they wculd be satisfactcry tc everycne, and, fmally. to adcpt them, tmanimcusly if possible, as one single document whlch would bave the authority of a Security Ccuncilresolutien designed to cffer an effective solution to the pmblem. 74. In order to achleve that goal, which we consider to be an objective one and which we feel is essential if we are to prevent the cutbreak of violence whioh might overtake the pecple of Rhcdesia andwhichmight, with the passage of time. constitute an even greater threat to international peace and seourity. mydelegatien participated in a spirit of responsibility in the long oonsultaticns and is now in a position to express the fcllcwing point of view. 75. IVe bave been tcld. both by the representa:ive of the United IGnadcm and bv those who bave sncken for Afrfca. that & Unit& &gdom ocntlnues ‘to be the cnly legltimate Government in Rhcdesia. If the most authcrized spckesman of this the cnly legitimate Gcvemment reports to the Sourity Ccuncll on the polltical and eccnomioal meaaures which bave been adcpted to brlng the rebels under ccntrcl, at the same time requesting. through the Council, world-wide support for the effective implementaticn of those measures, it seems to us only loglcal to gtve the cnly legitlmate authcrity in Southern Rhcdesia the cpportunity of ccntimùng to act, wlth world support, according tc the plans and intentions which. at least for the moment,-we must accept as being.the best solution which the United Kingdcm is in a position to propose. 76. And here 1 bave an important comment to make which may perhaps help not cnly to prosent more clearly the point of view of the Bclivian delegation but to elucidate the essence of cur debate. Those who spoke for Africa said that the measures adopted by the Unlted Kiugdom would net by themselves ahe be effective encugh to quell the raeist rebels, tc guarantee security and to cpen the way to demooracy for the Rhcdesian pecple. That statement anticipates events and we cannot altogether believe it, especially when we consider that the United Ringdom representative spcke of tlie determinaticn of the United Kingdcm tc establish in Scuthern Rhodesla conditions which would enable the lnhabitanta of that territory tc determine their cwn future in confcrmity with the wishes of the prople an? of its intention tc take the neoessary steps to put sd end to the rebellion. 78. The Bolivian delegation is, at least for the moment, agalnst the use of force being advised or recommended by the Security Council. It wishee, however, to emphasize in the presence of the United Kingdom representative that his Government has an obvious moral obligation which should lead it, as the only legitimate authority, not to hesitate to use force if that should become indispensable in order bath to put an end to the rebellion and gnarantee the rule of law and order in Rhodesia, and to answer to tbe world for the special responsibility which from this moment rests upon the United Kingdom. 19. In a desire to be even clearer about this matter, which 1s the very crux of the problem that we bave debated, 1 Will say that my delegation wishes to accept the measures adopted by the United Kingdom Government against the Ian Smith regime and that. without requesting anything else for the moment, tc feels lt is its duty to reflect the outcry of the African States and to point out to the United Klngdom and a11 States Members that it is urgently necessary to broaden the scope of the sanctions at the same time as trylng to make them more effective. 80. We consider that, in vlew of the danger lnherent in the situation. the United Kingdom should net hesitate to use force, applylng lts judgement as a sovereign nation in a territory under its sovereignty, if and when the circumstances render such action imperative. 81. Concerning the collapse of the 1981 Constitution and the possibility of a stricter and more extensive economic blockade, my delegation considers that those qtestlons cal1 for new measures. The Government of the United Kingdom must corne to a decislon about their adoption in the near future, according to the developments of the situation, a17 ays bearing in mind its speclal responsibility. 82. The Bolivian delegation. in accordance with tts firm position on reglonal organisations, considers that the Organisation of African Unity should COoperate in the implementation of a11 the measures adopted by the Courtcil. 83. For a11 the reasons 1 bave mentioned and in its profound desire to give an immediate response to so grave a problem, a realistic response whlch ~111 be acceptable to all, my delegation has net hesitated to vote in faveur of the draft resolution which the Cou&l has just adopted and whlch, though lt may not be fnlly satisfactory to all. is in oui opinion the most sound and realistic document which could for tbe moment corne from the United Nations in connexion wlth this problem. 85. Second&, I wish to express publicly mygratitude to ail the members cf the Council for their untirlng efforts and tbeir spirit of compromise In tbIsdifficult te cm the very diffidt resclution which we ~d@ed. 86. Mi. USHER (Ivory Coast) (translated from French): 1 should Iike to say briefly that 1 do not tbink that tbe representative of the Netherlands has ti m.e correctly. more especially as he quoted out of oontext. 1 think tbat we should abide by our tradition, that is that each should interpret the paragraphs as he understands them. as the representative of the United Kingdom did, for example, when he interpreted the word %mnedIaten. In my opinion, that isthe only way in whichwe cari understand each 0th~ and reach a unanimous agreement. 1 do net think that th quotation which my colleague from s made from my statement was quite ragrapb 5, we findtbe words *s’efforcer de rompre”. The French term “s’efforcer* cari mean vto make the effort ton or % apply oneself ton. That is gite dIfferent from what the representative of the Netherlands thought. namely. to allow each one the freedom to do something or net to do it. On the contrary, it means that they must do something. It does not say just how far tbey should go, but that they must do somethIng. Everyone knows that. even in law, it is considered that the obligation to do is the most difficult thing to indlcate. That is why law always recommends the obligation not to do. shme it is casier to enforce an obligationnot todothan to impose an obligation to do. But when we are faced with thIs Qpe of obligation, the level of the debate rises to the nmm.l plane. It is then a question of the moral obligation U&s something. That is exactly what we tbis passage to mean and 1 wlshedto mske thés cormction SO that it could appear in the record.

Altbough a few other speakers bave signified their Intention of spesklng on this suhject, in view of the late heur and of the fact that we bave reached a decision 1 propose to adjourn this meeting, with the consent of the Counoil. We shall be able to decide later on the desirability and date of a future meeting tc deal witb this matter. 88. 1 should like to inform members of the Council chat 1 bave received suggestions from some Ministers for Foreign Affairs who bave been in New York for =%ml days in order to disccss the item on the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration, which ha6 already been placed on OUI agenda. SS. They are high government offioials who are anxious to return to their countries. Consequently. If there is no objection from the members of the It wm SO decided. Themeetingmseat1p.m. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED Unitad Nations publications may be obtained distributors throughout the world. write to: United Nations, Sales ENT SE PROCURER LES pUBLICATlONS Les publications des Nations Unies sont egences d&positaires du manda entier. ou adress~~our à: Notions Unies, Section COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES tas publicaciones de las Naciones casas distribuidoros en todar portes diriiase a: Nw5ones Unidsr, Seccibn Lit40 in U.N. Price: $US. aso (OC equivaleslt in ather