S/PV.1266 Security Council

In accordance with decisions previously taken. Ipropose to invite the representatives of Portugal, Liberia, Tnni818, Madagascar and Sierra Leone to take places at the Conncil table, in order to participate wlthout vote in the Conncil’s deliberations of the item on our agenda. At the invitation of fhe Presideat, Mr. B. de Miraada (Portugal), Mr. J. Rodolph Grimes (Liberia). Mr. Mongi Slim (Tunisia). Mr. R. Ratsimamao (Madagascar) and Mr. C. B. Rogers-Wright (Sierra L@oue) fook places at tbe Couacil table. 1. le la parole 3. The Council will now continue its consideration of the item on the agenda. 1 give the floor to the representative of Tunlsia. 4. P savoir explosive suspendu tories pour désie de ef&ieurs en surtout peuple des suspension, au coeur une intimement Btait le ticiper 4. Ir. Ikfongi SLIM (Tunlsia) (translated from Frencb): Last weeh-cn 11 November 1965. to be precise-following the explosive developmeni of tbe Rhodesian situation, tbe Council postponed its ccnsideratïon of the situation in tbe territories under Portuguese administration [125Sth meeting] in order to devote its attention to the situation in Southern Rhodesfa, wbere a minority of racist settlers recently assumed all tbe internal and external attributes of r;overeig&y. heedless of the warnings of the adminlstering Power, and heedless. above ail, of the wishes and tbe inalienable rights of the African people who coustitute ihe overwhelming majority of the country’s inhabitants. We agreed to that postponement. bath realizing that the situation thus created in the heart of Africs. was one of extreme urgency and unprecedented gravity. and being convinced that it was closely related to tbe matter which the Council was thon examiaing. At its oery first meeting on the Rbadesian situation 11257th meeting], the Council decided to invite the Gcvernments ofPortugal and of the Rewhlic of Soutb Africa-bcth immediate ueigbboufs of Southern Rbodesia-to tahe part in its debates. 5. In ita note verbale of 15 November [S/6938]. Portugal refused the invitation, which had been tendered in accordance wlth rule 37 of theprovisional rules of procedure. May 1 say tbat we deeply regret tbat the Portuguese Governrcent should bave refused once more to co-cperate wlth the Council in finding a way of dealicg witb a situation wbich is botb very grave and liable to affect its responsibilities in Afrioa. As we all hnow. tbat situation has arisen in a territory hordering on Mozambique, which fs under Portuguese administration. It is not unrelated. therefore, tc tbe situation in that colonial territory, and it cannot fail to bave repercussions on the pclicy carried out hy the Portuguese Government. 5. le Portugal ment Qu’il profondément refuse Conseil situation sabllit6s situation Mozambique, tugaise. avec ne politique 6. The Portuguese GovernmenVs attitude to the Security Council, combined titb the fact that, togetber witb South Africa, it voted in the General Assembly against resolution 2024 (XX) of 11 November 1965, which the representatives of Pretoria and Lisbon were alone in oppcsing without explaining their votes, is such tbat it confirms collusion wlth Mr. Ian Smith in bis rebdlion against the London Gcvernment. Such collusion is becoming diffioult to deny, as is the unboly aDiance referred to by a numher of newspapers betwesn the Lisbon and Pretoria Gcvernments and Ian Smith. which is allegedly designed tc defend European civilisation in southern Africa. Followlng tbe indisputable evidence of collusion provided by Mr. Nogueira himself in bis note of 15 November, it would seem to me more useful to tahe up the challenge issued in this very cbamber by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The facts, unfortunately. are there. However reluctant one may be to admit them, they bave to be faced. 8. As we bave pointed out in this debate. the colonial war which began in 1961 in Angola has slnce spread to Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea, forcing tens of thousands of naticnals of thcse Territories to take refuge in neighbouring countries. TheCouncilhad already examined that situation and taken the view that it was a sericus threat to peace and security even before the war began in Mozambique in 1964, and before the Senegalese complaints to which 1 referred in my earlier statements had been submitted to the Council. Hence we are now forced to nots that this situation constitutes an increasingly obvious threat to international peace and security, even if. for the time bclng, we try to consider it independently of the new situation which has arisen in Rhcdesia. 9. We bave also pointed out. during this debate. that the embargo on tbe sale and supply of arms and munitions to Portugal, decided upon by the Security Council in paragraph 6 of its resolution 180 (1963) of 31 July 1963, does notseemtohavebeen implemented. Yet the purpose of that embargo was clearly defined in that paragraph. 1 quots: “Recuests that a11 States should refrain forthwith from offering the Portuguese Government any assistance”-and here 1 emphasiae the words “any assistance”-vwhich would enable it to continue its repression of the peoples of the Territories under its administration, and take a11 measures toprevent the sale and supply of arms and military equlpment for tbis purpose to the Portuguese Governmentv. An embargo on arms and military equipment would seem to be the first consequence of tbe first part of paragraph 6. But since the repressive and colonial war ha8 continued. we bave pointed out during the oresent debate. on the basis of the reaort of the Special Committee,ythat it is the armsan;lmunltions supplied by Portugal’s allies which havs enabled that Government to continue its repression in the Territories concerned. During tbls debate, the Portuguese representative and bis allies bave denied that fact. The representative of Portugal asserted that his Government was capable of manufacturlng in its owI1 factories the arms and munitions used in the African Territories. He said, for instance in hls statement of 8 November: It , , . we manufacture sud supply 93 per cent of our own military requirements and needs. ami Il. 1 should like to draw tbe Council’s attention to the fact tbat tbe arms and munitions are sent to Afrfca from Portugal. Their manufacture seems, therefore. to take placè principally in Portugal itself. Hence, if tbe embargo onequipment and supplies forthe purposes of such manufacture is to bave any effect. it must apply to Portugal. Such a step is only the loglcal and necessary corollary to the embargo on arms and munitions referred to in resolution 180 119631. an . ~,, embargo decided upon by the Council as an elementary measure arising out of its request to States to cesse rendering Portugal the assistance which eoabled it to pursue its repressive war in Africa. 12. At the same time, the report of the Special Committee, to wbich we bave referred in the course of this debate, points out that one of the consequences of the activities of foreiga interests in the Portuguese Territories has actually been to encourage Portugal’s policies and-indirectly bat substantially-to support its military efforts and. consequently. the continuation of its colonial and repressive war against the African populations under its administration. It is perfectly obvious that that is an argument wbich Portugal uses to continue its repression in the Territories under its administration. 13. Therefore, to ensure the effective implementation of the first part of paragraph 6 of resolution 180 (1963) and to prevent any assistance to the Portuguese Government in its coloria1 war, the most elementary logic demaads tbat ail imports from or experts to Portugal should stop. Such an embargo is but one way of implementing resolution 180 (1963). strengtbened. incidentally. by resolution 183 (1963) of 11 December 1963. 14. Fortunately, an economic boycott is no longer regapded as anuntbinkable or even impossible means of strengthening or restoring international peace and security. A Permanent Member of the Security Couacil, tbe United Kingdom, decided quite recently to apply it against the racist authorities in Salisbury and requested the Council’s confirmation. The Council, being seriously concerned about the explosive situation whioh developed only some ten days ago in Southern Rhodesia, had no bestitation in instituting and even strengthening such a boycott. We do not think, therefore, that the Councii cari hesitate to decide upon a boycott today as an effective means of implementinga measure .previously decided upon in resolution 180 (1963), particularly since it is clear that the situation in the Territories under Portoguese rule bas aince deteriorated. If it does net want to be reduced to a skate of iaertia and to disappoint the hopes wbich the 15. That is why we helieve that the draft resolution submitted to the Council [5/6953] embodies a series of realistic measures, adapted to thepresent situation in the Territories under Portuguese rule. where a colonial war of repression has been developing and spreading since 1961, constituting an increasingly serious threat to international peace and security. The measures advocated in the draft resolution are more likely to be effective if they are carried out at this stage of the development of the situation in the Portuguese Territories. They are indeed more likely to prevent a deterioration of the situation to the point where they would be ineffective. The situation in Rhodesia serves us as a tragic example of the fact that vigorous action, if taken too late, may become ineffective. 1 may add that, at a11 the debates in the Security Council and the General Assembly on the question of Southern Rhodesia. we bave net failed to point out the potential dangers inherent in any pro; crastination. in any postponement of decisive action by the admfnistering Power or the United Nations. Despite oui appeals to the administering Power in Sauthern Rhodes& despite our appeals to the Security Council, no decisive action was taken intime either by the British or at the international level. Today, in Africa, we are payinga heavy price for others’ errors, and the very people who wwe counselling patience, restraint and caution in th= then prevailing circumstances bave been the first to recognise the effioacy of rneasures which we ourselves proposed at a time when their effectiveness was certain. 16. Once again, we feel that, inthe criticalRhodesian situation, only an effective and immediate decision of the Council cari arrest the disease. Procrastination and half-measures will only postpone the day of reckoning, never prevent it. For this reason, too, having learnt the lessons of experience, we ask the Council today for a logical and realistic implementatien of paragraph 6 of resolution 180 (1963). We ask it, therefore, to supplement its decisiononanembargo on arrns and munitions by an embargo on the supplies and equipment used for their manufacture and maintenance, and by the boycott of imports from and experts to Portugal. What we are asking should not be regarded as a hostile act towards Portugal as such: ou= grievance against Portugal is simply its regrettable obstinacy in refusing to allow the peoples under its administration to exercise their right of self-determination in accordance withthe relevant interpretation of the United Nations. 1’7. In upholding this right of self-determination, we bave never claimed to prejudge the final choice of 18. V&it we ask of Portugal is net tbat it should recognize the right of tbe peoples under its administration to make a choice determined beforehand. but rather tbat it should honestly and sincerely recognize their rigbt of self-determination, that it should reccgnke that they sball be able to exercise that and determine their politloal future. and we are prepared to accept any solution upon wbic; they might decids. even if tbat final choice does net appear to us the most natural one. 19. That is oup position on the prlnciple of self- ~~r~~Kon. We accent anv choice nrovided tbat it is the result of a freê co&ltation of the peoples cowerned. OUT position is 110~ clsar. fhal and unamkdguous. We pG these questions explioitly to Portugal: is it or is it net now prepared to accept the consequences of tbe priaciple of self-determlnation as they bave been defined in the resolutlon of the Security Council? 1s it or isitnotprepared to endorse tbat deflnitioa of self-determination? Apparently it is net prepared to accept it; tberefore we havs alI the more reason to ask tbe Council to approve snd adopt the draft resolutlon which we bave the honour to submit to it on behalf of the thlrty-two African States aad the Afro-Asian membsrs of the Security Council.

Inow give the floor to tic repressntatlve of Portugal. 20. la parole 21. MI-. DE MIRANDA (Potigal): 1 should llke to begin by saying a few words to explain my presence at tbs Councll table. In the earlier part of tlds debate. the Portuguese delegatios was headed by my Foreim inister who came to New York expressly for that purpose. He bas since had to return to Lisbon, where bis dutles and prevlous engagements demanded bis presewe md personal attention. Ile dld SO zotwlthout regret that he was net able to attend the Counoil until the end of thls dehate. In these circumstances. the task of representation now devolves on me. As 1 take it up. 1 wish to tban!x you for admitting me to participate in this debate on behalf of the delegation of Portugal. 22. Before 1 prooeed with the mattel for wldch 1 bave asked for the floor. may 1 be permitted to say a few words ooucernbg certain remarke made just now by the representative of Tunlsia? At the outset of hls 23. Allow me now to offer the comments of my delegation on the draft resolution now hefore the Coumil [S/6953]. 1 Will be very objective and as brief a8 possible. The draft resolution begius with a reference to the examinationundertakenby the Coucil ol “the question of the situation in the Territories under Portug.?ene administr&ion”. My delegation participated in ail the stages of tbis examination. My Fore@ Minister replied in detail to the allegations made against us; in addition, he made certain coustructive suggestions. From the contents of this draft resolutlon, it appears that my delegation bas made no suggestions and has bad nothing to say at aIl, wbile tbvee of the four delegatlons wbich oonstitumd the pane1 of accuser8 of ?ortugal bave found themselves in a position to co-sponsor thedraft resolution. ShonId tbis draft be adopted. our accuser8 will bave achieved what tbey proposed, while we, for ail the su StlOilS ami comment8 that we made, Will bave achieved nothing. The contrast should not escape attention: it Will become clearer w we proceed wlth our amlysis of the draft resolution. 24. The draft resolution continues, in its second and tbird preambular paragraphs. to refer to certainprevious resolutions of the Council-resolutiona on wbich we re6erved our position for reasons that we stated ou each occasion-and says tbat we bave net implemented them. In tbe fourth preambular paragraph, an accusation is made against us that is SO grossly unjust and contrary to reality that mydelegatien protests and rejects itwlththeutmostiudignation. The allegation bas not been supported by any evidence which cari stand against the strong evideme to tbe contrary which my delegation has placed before the Council. Taken, as it is, from respectable, independent and trustworthy foreigners who bave visited our Territories recently and reported on the situation there, the evldence we bave produced should net be dismissed lightly. The least that cari be said about it is that it points to the need for further examination ‘before any decision is taken by this Council. 25. IL is a matter of opinion, but my delegation does net aaree tbat the resolutions auoted in the flfth oreamb&r paragraph are tbe *ohy means” that <ouId be adopted. It bappens tbat certain partie6 outsideour Territories do net feel inclined to leave us in peace ualees we implement those resolutions. Dut this is preciaely howthey fail ta act in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Therefore. it is thev who should be held accountahIe for such Violations~ As for my delegation, we submit that notb in our 26. Befcre prwceeding to comment on the operative uart of tbe draft resolution. I sbouId like to recall the “But since tbe same sceusstions are stiU ding reFprsted, my delegation would b@ prepared to con- Sida. ptew ways 33d meails to 113ve them investigated. If khe Council wer? Po find il useful and timely to appoint a sub-commitke, including one nepresentative of PorbugaP and one for the African eountries, to sssess wbetber there is a threat to international peace 8.~~3 secwity either on oui‘ part. SS is alieg@d, or on tbe part of otbers, and to investigate the bases ~3rd the camps in foreign terrltnries snd tbe infiltrstions across borders,wewotid lx2 prepared to extezxl our fu91 ca-aperatim to that ad, after dh mandate of snch a sub-committee is 3gwed U~OR.* fa253rîi meet*, para. 5o.l After this stdement. it sbould be held very uafair for nnyune to tske Îor granted the accusations Ievelled q@M, us and to proceed without tbe investigation thst w bave suggested. It sbould ix beld g~ossly u.t&ir to accuse us. on tbe basis of suchunproven nnd groundiess nccus~tions, of endaxxgering interuatàonal peace snd aecurily. This is a wry serious matter and one to be weigbed witb the utmast CPI‘B ad impartklity. AprBs d’accepter contre que juste non mettre C’est être impartialité. 27. Gm resds in qxratire parag~aph 1 that adager SO intesnstionai pace and secwity resuits from our i~ternal poliey aw.3 ow pa!icy tocards ow neigkbows. Port~@s internnl poliey is sot uew. II bas resulted in the multiracial scciety which hcs ewked appreciative commrnts from those who haw objectively assessed its results. But whether or net our policy is appreciated on its merits. on@ tbing is undeniable: it is net direct-d against any outsider. If outsiders choose net to lik ow internal poiicy, a& are see’king to force a change. it does not follow tbat it is Portugal that adagers intern&ional peace and secu~ity. On tbe confrary; the responsibility must be laid 9t Pbo door of the outsiders. 27. danger rkulte populations B l’égard Portugal cr&tion éloges rBsultats soit chose dirigk pas modifier Portcgal internationales. incombe 23. Xnd what about our po?icy towards our neighbours? 1 submit that Portugal is second to none in its desire to maintain gocd relations with a11 its neighbours. Time and again we bave offered to sxamine with ail our neigbbows a~ tbe prohlems arising from g@ograpbical contiguity in a spirit of sincerecollaboration for mutual benefit. It is unfortuuate that our offer has net met with a positive response from the African 28. voisins? personne relations a maintes tous graphique pour 8 29. For a11 these reasons. my delegation strongly protests against the allegation contained in operative paragraph 1 and iasists tbat the aggressive activities directed against us from some neighbouring States be investigated. 30. 1 shall net take the time of the Council to deal at length with operative paragraphs 2. 3 and 4. I wotid only like to recall that, as detailed in the Secretary- General% report of 31 October 1963, during the talks wbich took place between Portugal and representatives of African States in the autumn of 1963, my Foreiga Minister presented a fui1 clarification of our concept of self-dtermination. Referring to this fa&, the Secretary-General himself stated: “From the above-mentioned Portuguese explaaatien of their position it may I-e inferred tbat the Portuguess Government has net denied theprinoiple of self-determination for the peoples of its overseas Territories.” [S/5448, para. 16.1 31. But the draft resolution goesfurtberandconfuses the principle of self-determination witbthemodalities of its implementation and in a clear attempt ti interfere with oui interna1 administration seeks to prescribe for us a series of steps of which we should be the sole judges. 1 shall izot dwell at length on these steps, but it does seem to us illogical to claim-as we hear it said-tbat self-determination is a free choice and. at the same ‘cime, to prescribe its goal in advance. Yet tbis predetermination is exactly what one finds in the series of demaads contained in operative paragraph 5. despite what we heard a lit&? while ago from the representative of Tunis& 32. 1 Will tus-n now to the remaining operative paragraphs of the draft resolution. It amazes my delegation to see such measures proposed, particularly tb@ one mentioned in opsrative paragraph 8, which must be viewed a% utterlv irresaonsible. It is oertinent ta reoall that this Couacil did not envisage-su& measures even in the ca%e of the full-scale war be’Weea two States Members recently brought to its attention and discussed by it at length. I submit that, even if the allegations made against us had beeu provedwhich they were net-tbe iniquitous measures SC aI inhi a spirit I : i ; t , L I , 39. I bslieve we bave offered convlncing proof of tbe fact that the war in the African Territories under Portugaese administration is being stepped up. The troops dispatched to those Territories by PortugaI and the reinforcement of its military installations prove that the war is growing daily in intensity. The open allfanoe between Portugal, Soutb Africa and Scuthern Rhodesfa is one aspect of thls dangerous situation. 1 think that there is clear evldence of these alliances even at the United Rations and inthe General Assembly, particularly in the last fewdays. Nordo we need to offer proof of the attacks on neighbouring States and the violation of their territories, because on several occasions the Councll has had to deal with violations of Senegalese territory and has already taken decisious thereon. 40. With regard to the mislnterpretation of the principle of self-determination, Portugal itselfmakes no secret of the matter, and it is incombent on the Counoil to remind Portugal of the interpretation of the principle of self-determination accepted by allthe United Nations and ask that country to apply it immediately in the African Territories under its administration. 41. Beveral proposa16 bave been made here to enter into negotiations wlth Portugal. 1 feel that once Portugal has accepted the principle of self-determina- Lion, as set forth in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), it Will merely bave to contact the nationalists engaged in the fight and negotiate with them ways and means of applying the principle of self-determination. 1 see no reason why the other African States sbould be invited to negotiate with Portugal. The action provlded for in this draft resolution is intended to compel Portugal to take notfce of what. in my speech on the substance of tbe matter, 1 termed the sign of the Urnes, and to make Portugal realiee that we are no longer living in the slxteenth or seventeenth but in the twentieth centnry. In my opinion the tragedy of the situation liesintbe-fact th& Portugal bas not understood that fact and refuses to do SO. This is a11 the more regrettable since Portugal apparently refuses even to understand the change that bas taken place in the meaning of the word noolonizatien” o* ~colonialism”. 42. 1 bave carefully reread the reply of the Minister for Fore@ Affairs of Portugal 11255th meeting] to the Malaysian representative and the more I read hi8 speech tbe more I reallze that our words are falling on deaf e,ars, for the Minister has said that “colonisations or ncolonlalismn is an economic concept in Portugal. Eiymologically, that is, in fa&. the original idea behind the term. but Portugal seems to be unaware of the fact that its meanlng bas changed and that Limes toc bave changed, 80 much 80 that when we were talking of Acolonlalismn or %olonization’, Portugal understood this to mean oagriculture’. You will appreciate what a dangerous situation that c~fl 43. 1 *herefore hope that the Council will adopt the draft resolulion. Since it was introduced by the Tunisian representative. 1 8111 requeating that yo”. Mr. President. under rule 38 of the provisional rules of procedure. if need be. put the resolution to the vote as soon as my cofIeagues bave expressed their vlews on it and are ready to vote.

1 bave no furtber speakers on my Ii& The Counoil members bave before tbem a lenathv draft resolution which requires some thought. SO I‘would suggest to the Couacil tbat it might be helpful if this meeting were adjourned SO as to allow time for consultations and an exchange of views among the members. 45. With regard to the date and time of the next meeting, 1 bave held informai consultations with Our colleagues ami, although one of them has said that he would like us to meet tomorrow morning. 1 pointed out to him that some of tbe Mini&ers for Fore@ Aflairs atteadbg the debate intend to leave New York in the next few heurs. and therefore, if tbe Council agrees, 1 tbink it might be wiser for us to meet this afternoon at 3.30 p.m. in order to continue our discussion of tbis matter.

With regard to the next meeting. 1 should like to point out that the draft resolution, which is dated 18 Novembar-that is, last Thursday-did not corne to the notice of my delegation uutil Friday afternoon. 1 cabled the text of the draft reSOl”tiOn to my Government on Friday evening, but 1 could not px.sibly receive instructions on it by today. Therefore. SO far as my delegation is concerned. it would be impossible to discuss it Or to vote on it today. Wowever, I uaderstand thedifficulties of the Foreign Ministers present. and my delegation regrets chat they bave already been kept waitIng SO long, due to the unfortunate coincidence wlth a debate on anotber matter. 47. 1 do not know whether there are still some Foreign Ministers who wish to speak. but of course in that case a meeting this afternoon would be very useful, since it would allow us to hear what they bave to say. 1 must repeat. however. that my delegation is not prepared either ta discuss or to vote on the draft resolution this afternoon. since it is impossible for us to receive instructions from our Government this afternoon on a document which we did not see until Friday.

Witf ail due respe& to thestandtakenbythe representative Of the Netherlands, and while 1 appreciate his problem, we are still faced with the same situation. Some Ministers for Foreign Affairs bave to leave NewYork 4% Sir Roger JACKLING (United Kingdom): I am bound to say that my delegation finds itself in a not dissimilar difficulty to that of the representative of the Netherlands. It may well be tbat we shall receive instructions during the course of the day. which would permit us to discuss the draft resolution uow before us. However. for the serious reasons well lmown to us all. 1 suspect that my colleague from the Netherlands and I are not the only ones who might find themselves in some difficulty in trying to reach a conclusion to this debate today. Tbis is not to say that I would in any way suggest that this afternoon’s meeting should be postponed, but 1 felt it only right to say that we may also find ourselves in this diffi- CUl@.

One of the duties of the President is to set the date and time of Couucil meetings and 1 shalltherefore adjourn the meeting now and hold the necessary consultations in order to set the date and time of the next meeting, which Will be announoed to the Cou&l members in due course.

When my colleagues brought up the question which led us to resume discussion on the time of the next meeting, we had already agreed to meet this afternoon. Aotually. Mr. President, you were about to adjourn the meeting when the question cameup.Sinoe. however, some of OUI colleagues may be in a difficult situation, would it not be better to try and schedule the meeting for this evening, for example. ratherthan leave the date and time of the next meeting pending. A night meeting would be preferable, for it would enable us to vote on the draft resolution and the Ministers would be free to leave early tomorrow mormng. 1 therefore suggest, if you bavenoobjection. that we should hold a niaht meetins: the reoresentatives would thus have alï day in v%ich to obtain instructions from their Governments regarding the draft resolutlon and we would be able to vote on it tonight.

We aotually bave tbree proposais before us: my own proposa1 to reconvene at 3.30 p.m., the suggestion of the Ivory Coast representative to hold the meeting tonight, and the suggestion of some members that we reconvene tomorrow. When 1 announced that we would adjourn the meeting and set the date and time of the next meeting later, 1 did SO precisely to avoid discussing in the Counoil a matter which should really be decided by the President. 1 wish to show all tbs members of the Cou&l every due courtesy and, after consultiug them. and as soon as the matter is decided, I shall iuform them of the time at which the meeting Will be held. 53. MI’. EL-FARRA (Jordan): This will net be a new suggestion: 1 am not going to propose anything 54. r. FEUORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translate-d from Russlan): Mr. Presldent. before yw made the pmposal to convene a meeting of tbe Secm%y Cauneilat3.jOthisafternoon.preliminary consultations bad been beld wltb tbe delegatlons. We, expressed agreement to tbe idea of tbe mxt meeting of tbe Security Cou&l at 3.30 this afïernm After your proposai regarding tbe tinte of the net meeeting of the Security Cooncil. we understccd tlmt a deoision bad been taken on your proposai. Tbus. tbe question bas in fact been decided. Ka this ssme sease, we share the view fust expressed by tbe +epresentatives of tbe Ivory Coast and Jordan. The Security Coumil could meet at 3.30 p.m., heur tbe Mlnisters for Forelgn Affalrs who are taking part in the pmceediBgs of the Security Councll and tben deeide on the question of voting. In s.ny case, the Soviet delegation NIy understands and respects the cansideratlons advanced by OUT colleaguesconcernlng the need for tbe Ministers for Fore@ Affairs to return to tbelr capitals in order to asal wltb important mstters awaiting thelr attention. Tels being SO, it seems to us lll-advlsed for us to leave tbe question in s state of uncertalnty and thus embark on a course of proorastinatlon in tbe consideration of such an impurtant a& urpnt question. 55. Tbe PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): It would seem. wltb due respect to the problems of some members, that the majority of tbe Councll is stlll in faveur of my original proposai to meet agaia tbis a~bm~~~n at 3.30 p.m.

1 shouldllke to make it clear that what 1 sald originally was. 1 tblnk, no dlfferent from wbat tbe representative of Jordan bas said. K bave no objection to a meetingthls afternoon if there are otber speakers who wish to take the floor. I&y only objection-whlch 1 wisb to point out again now-was tbat my delegation would net be in a position either to dlscuss the draft resolution or to décide upon it becanse my Government dld net se8 it unM1 Satorday morning. and it is now only Monday. This is a very important resolutlon and 1 do net tblnk om? Ciill expect of any Governmert which takes its responsibilities seriously to decide on Monday aftermon oa a draft reSoktion wbich was seen for the first time on Saturday mornlog. SO, 1 wish to make it clear once more: 1 bave no objection at all to a meeting tbls afternoon. as agreed on by the majority, but my delegation Will net be able to express any views or vote on tbe draft resolution tbis afternoon.

1 simply wish to say that. in my opinion. a

We are finally back where we stsrted: we shsll meet tbis afternoon at 3.30 p.m. The meeting rose at 12.35p.m.