S/PV.1272 Security Council

Several members of the Council still wish to be heard on the question of the adoption of the agenda, I give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Uganda. 2. Je touchée colljgues ticuli@rement que qui mon internationale des suis puissances, appelle tribuer qu’'a 2. Mr, KIRONDE (Uganda): I should first like to express how gratified my delegation is at the warm welcome that my new colleagues and myself received this morning. We are especially gratified at the welcome which the representative of France gave to me and my colleagues who represent, as he termed it, the third world. This I regard as very apt. The international situation has been in a mess literally for decades and centuries. It is my firm conviction that the small and medium Powers, which in the main comprise the so-called third world, would greatly contribute to world peace and security and general economic and social development, if only—and it is a big if—the big Powers would let them. si puissances 3. internationale de opposés vue inconciliables, collégues Il qui l'humanité décidés édifier la paix 3. There is indeed urgent need for a third point of view to be put before the world forum. We have all heard the points of view of the two opposing camps expressed ad nauseam; we all know how irreconcilable those attitudes have become, The Ugandan Government and my colleagues represent the third point of view. It is true indeed that ours is yet but a small voice in the wilderness; but we have a duty to perform, and we intend to perform it, because we owe it to mankind to see that a new and better world emerges and that international peace and security are established. Council. I am not surprised, for the unthinking masses, to which the mass media generally are blind to all other colours than black or Either a nation is pro-Communist or anti-Communist; grays and yellows do not exist. I should like to those who are trying to categorize Uganda that will have to look in new and unfamiliar directions, Uganda intends to be true to its policy of strict alignment, By that I mean positive neutrality, undertake that line which is fair and justand conducive to international peace and well-being. 5. It is the view of my delegation that, for an tive and meaningful treatment of the subject which on the provisional agenda, we must go to the cause of the problem, I do not subscribe to the that the Security Council is not the appropriate forum in which to consider the issue of Viet-~Nam, Security Council is the one organ of this Organization which has been charged with the primary responsi-~ bility for the peace and security of the world. issue of Viet-Nam should have been brought before the Council by the United States—or, in fact, by other member of the Security Council—long before the bombings of North Viet-Nam ever began. United States should have brought this issue before the Security Council before it became so deeply involved in the Viet-Namese mess. 6. My delegation welcomes the United Nations resolution {8/7106], indicating as it does that United States is now trying to repair its past mistake of bypassing the Security Council, of which it is a permanent and highly significant member, that it is now bringing the matter before this Council, which is the right one to treat this matter. 7. T said earlier that we must go to the root of the trouble. The Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of world and security, It cannot achieve this by plastering over a cankerous sore in the body politic requires careful diagnosis and effective prescription, The Security Council can reach the right decision only by hearing direct evidence from the four parties concerned: namely, the People's Republic of China, the National Liberation Front, the South Viet-Namese people and the North Viet-Namese people, Until be assured that an invitation will be extended by Council te all the parties involved, I cannot agree any useful purpose would be served by inscribing item on the agenda. summarizing it as best you can, bringing out the points of agreement and of disagreement, and let it go at that? Then we could of course postpone this meeting and meet at some future date, perhaps elsewhere, in a different venue. Perhaps it would be better for this matter to be referred to the Geneva venue, rather than considering it here, I very much hope that you will take up this suggestion, because I really feel there is no point in trying to win victories here by voting for or against, the most important thing being that we all agree that negotiations are necessary and that a way should be found—and that quickly—to resolve this most difficult impasse. dans L'essentiel faut un moyen cates, 9. République beaucoup rité, dinseription toutes duction rité, intervention 9, Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translated from French); The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, like many delegations on the Security Council, was taken somewhat by surprise by the request for the inclusion of this item in the agenda, in view of all the manceuvring that took place before this question was brought before the Security Council, we have had some difficulty in preparing a statement expressing our views. 10. Before I begin, however, I should like to thank all the delegations which have congratulated the People's Republic of Bulgaria on the occasion of its taking part in the first meeting ofthe Security Council since its election, together with a number of other countries, to membership of that body. 10. remercier des A loccasion du nombre du Conseil 11, de ma de la tout pas mandat le monde question 11. 1 ghould algo like to express my delegation's thanks to the outgoing President, the French representative, for his excellent performance: during the entire month of January there was no need for the Security Council to meet, Now that his term of office has expired, however, someone has dared to disturb the world and to request the Council to take up a difficult question. I nevertheless congratulate the French representative. représentant 12. des et le cette nouveau l'a déjk des longtemps 12. I should Hke also to thank the President for his words of welcome to us and to congratulate him on presiding over our first meeting this year. This is indeed a difficult task for a newcomer but, as one of my colleagues said this morning, this newcomer could give lessons to many of those who have been members of the Security Council for a long time. 13, Bulgarie si nous majorité pays, responsabilité non 13. It is an honour for the People's Republic of Bulgaria to take its seat in the Security Council. While we are gratified by the confidence which the great majority of Member States have shown in our country, we are fully aware of the heavy responsibility that devolves upon us as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. During its ten years of memfunction as guardian of the peace and security of all nations, small or large, more effectively. 14, Lastly, I should like once again te thank all our friends who have supported Bulgaria's candidature, and particularly the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, whom we hope to represent worthily in this principal organ of the United Nations. 15. The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria has been and continues to be seriously concerned about the grave situation that has prevailed in South-East Asia for many years, It has spared no effort in helping, as far as it is able, to create conditions likely to improve the tense situation prevailing in that area of the world and to bring about the restoration of peace, In view, however, of the positions taken by the various parties, the intransigence of some of them and the de facto situation created in that region, the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria has always opposed the inclusion of the question of Viet-Nam in the agenda of the Security Council or of any other United Nations body. It has always strongly supported the position adopted by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, namely, that the question of Viet-Nam should be discussed and settled within the appropriate frame— work of the Geneva Agreements of 1954. L/ 16. The latest developments in Viet-Nam are not such as to alter my Government's position, On the contrary, my Government is more convinced than ever that the consideration of the question of Viet-Nam by the Security Council is even less desirable now than it was in the past, for the reasons which I shall now give, 17. For some time now discussions have been taking place, as we all know, in United States official circles to decide if or when the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam should be resumed—I use the word "if" only because that was the word used by some of these circles, It would seem, however, that in influential military circles there has never been the slightest doubt that the United States would 1/ Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China, signed on 20 july 1954, at the Geneva Conference on the Problem of Restoring Peace in Indo-China; ses Further Documents relating to the discussion of Indo-China at_the Geneva Conference, Cmd 9239 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, August 1954). joug 18. bombardements que étaient poser securité travers reglement que la certains devant devaient bombardements. ment 18. It was really more a question of deciding when the bombing would be resumed, Now thatithas started again, these same circles that had long beenintending to do so are bringing the question of Viet-Nam before the Security Council so that, it is said, the Council, and through it the United Nations, may contribute to the search for a peaceful settlement. It is interesting to note that the United States official circles which decide on the policy of aggression to be followed against certain countries have never yet submitted to the United Nations the question whether or not they should undertake aggression or bombing. They raise this question only when their crime has already been committed, 19. fouler 19, It might be asked why, before trampling underfoot the Geneva Agreements of 1954, the United States did not come before the Security Council to ask if it should do so, Why did it not bring the matter up before starting to bomb the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam? Why did it not come before the Security Council before landing its troops in South Viet-Nam? Why did it not turn to this body before resuming the latest bombings? It brings the question before the Security Council after the crime has been committed, Why? Knowing that neither world public opinion nor the Security Council would give it permission to resume the bombing if it so requested, it has again placed the Security Council before a fait accompli. Etats-Unis de sont~ils ments Pourquoi barquer ne recommencer la le pourraient un mission demandaient, le 20. quoi seil que qui civile né Conseil Nam, responsabilité les lequel draient bilité contre ainsi bation 20. What is the reason for this attitude and why has the United States brought this question before the Security Council only after the fact? The explanation is only too obvious. The United States official circles which have launched these bombings against the civilian population of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam did not try to get the Security Council to take part in the search for peace in Viet-Nam, but they wanted to make it share the responsibility for the crime they have perpetrated, They want to use the debates in the Council as a smoke-screen behind which they can conceal their crime; they wouldlike to make it appear that they had no alternative but to intensify the war of aggression against the people of Viet~Nam as a whole; their idea in so doing has been to assure themselves in one way or another of the approval of some countries and some representatives in the Security Council, au 21, de son Conseil tion miné 1954, 21, The reasons why the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and especially its Government have decided to oppose the convening of the Security Council and the inclusion of this question in its agenda are the same as those which in 1954 led to the convening of the Geneva Conference instead of the Council in order to find a solution to the problem on the question under discussion, namely, whether or not we should place this item on our agenda. 22, May I, in support of my argument, quote what the Secretary-General said in his press conference on 20 January 1966. Replying to a question, Secretary~General stated: ".,., it is true that the United Nations has a primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, It was true in 1954, as it is true 1966, Now, look at the situation in 1954, The parties to the conflict decided to resolve their differences in Geneva, outside the framework of the United Nations. Of course, a lot of thought was given the prospective United Nations involvement even at that time. But the big Powers, plus the parties to the conflict, decided that the discussions should take place outside the framework of the United Nations .., "Tf it was true that the discussions onthe Viet~Nam situation could take place in Geneva in 1954, outside the framework of the United Nations, the same con~ siderations still apply today, because some of parties primarily involved in the conflict are still not Members of the United Nations. This is greatest impediment to any United Nations involve~ ment in finding a peaceful solution to the Viet-Nam conflict. "2/ 23, Whenever it has been possible and timely make an effective contribution to the solution of controversial problem constituting a threat to peace and security, the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria has considered it advisable to act immediately and in the most appropriate way. On the other hand, the People’s Republic of Bulgaria has always opposed any hasty or untimely intervention by Security Council when the conditions in which it could make an effective contribution to the solution of problem at issue were lacking. There is no need involve the Security Council when all the necessary conditions to enable it to make a valid contribution not exist. 24. Suppose that at this time it was proposed certain countries and Governments which are present in this hall should take part inthe discussion. In that case it would not be possible to create conditions in which the Security Council could concern itself with the solution of this problem. Is it realistic to think that the Government of the Democratic public of Viet~Nam and the Saigon authorities could be invited to attend on a footing of equality, when af Quoted in English by the speaker. in any other way with the only party that matters in the present conflict, the National Liberation Front, because the United States knows that it is under the direction of the National Liberation Front that all the Viet-Namese people are fighting to free themselves from a foreign yoke. de pour 25. In the circumstances, when it is not possible for the parties concerned to take part in the debate because they think that the only thing they could do would be to make an already dangerous conflict a permanent danger to peace, it is equally futile and 25. pour car qu’ danger et a dangerous for the Security Council to seek to place such a question on its agenda. 26, cupe introduit l'avaient question Il des Corée, vrai question d‘une duites pays heureux emploie ce d'autres vraiment, yeullle reuse la 26. As you know, the problem with which we are concerned is a permanent danger to peace; it was introduced here by certain Powers, Just as they had introduced the so~called question of Korea, which should serve as an example. It is true that since the United Nations intervened in the Korean question, much water has flowed under the bridge. It is none the less true that nothing important has occurred in connexion with the question of Korea that could encourage us to take up a similar question, Despite the resolutions which the United States and other countries introduce year after year on Korea, the only result is that that unhappy country remains divided by the stratagems employed here. When we cannot discuss this problem effectively and when there are other forums in which the question could be dealt with if that was really desired, it would seem that the aim is to make a situation which is already dangerous for South-East Asia a permanent danger to the peace of the world and to us, 27. que tir Bulgarie du d'Amérique, 27, For all these reasons and many others that we have been unable to bring out here, the delegation of the Peopie's Republic of Bulgaria is resolutely opposed to the question proposed by the United States of America, namely the question of the situation in Viet~Nam, being placed on the agenda, 28, 28, Mr. CORNER (New Zealand): Mr. President, may I start by thanking you and the other members of the Council for your words of welcome and by congratulating you upon your election to the Presidency of this Council for this month, This is a high responsibility, especially when one considers the gravity of the issue now before us, anditis a doubly challeng~ ing task for one to whom the Chair is entrusted at his first meeting of the Council. Yet we know of your qualities from your contribution to the work of other organs of the United Nations, and we are therefore secure in the confidence that you are wholly equal to the heavy burdens which may well be your lot. glais]: vous Conseil, de sécurité surtout nous difficile la connaissons dans donc parfaitement attend. 29. sécurité, 29. As my delegation returns to the Security Council, we are conscious of the dangers inherent in the prethe beginning of a significant transformation. 30. It is an honour to serve in the first meetings of this enlarged Council, now more representative of the contemporary world as it is reflected United Nations and therefore better able, so we expect, to play its assigned role in the preservation of peace. We shall do our utmost to co-operate our fellow members in the pursuit of this goal. cannot contribute great resources either of men money, but we can and do bring a consistent that there is no realistic substitute for the universal collective organization of international security. 31. All the members of the Council who have so far, whatever their points of view on other aspects of the question may be, have demonstrated in various ways that they are at least at one with United States in the awareness expressed in the of the United States representative to the President of the Security Council (5/7105) that it may easy for the Council itself, in view ofall the obstacles, to take constructive action on this question. 32. In the past months, if not longer, many must have weighed the value of action within United Nations, and particularly in the Security Council, On several oceasions during the past months, the attention of the United Nations and Members generally has been specifically drawn this question and appeals have been made for whatever help they can give, Many of us may have had our in the past as to the contribution which the Nations could make to a constructive solution, arising from the nature of the conflict and relationship to the United Nations itself of of the parties involved. 33. But we must consider the point which has been reached. Over the past two months there been perhaps unparalleled diplomatic activity search for peace, not only by the United States many other Governments. This was preceded months before by a whole series of initiatives number of Governments, including that broad section of peoples and policies grouped in the monwealth. The peace offensive was accompanied unilateral cessation of one major aspect of military action. In his press conference yesterday, Secretary of State Rusk said that the authorities in Hanoi been informed, in connexion with the cessation bombing, that if they would reciprocate by making serious contribution towards peace it would obviously 34, que 34, But to what avail have these efforts been expended? In spite of the repeatedly expressed willingness on the part of the United States to enter into unconditional discussions, there has not been the slightest indication of willingness on the part of Hanoi or the National Liberation Front to join ina mutual search for peace, except on their own terms, acceptance of which would amount to prior concession of fundamental points. by the United States. Ho Chi Minh's letter of 24 January is, asI read it, illustrative of this fact. The representative of the Soviet Union, as I understood him, described this letter as a "new initiative". Perhaps he would be willing to indicate wherein specifically this new initiative lies. . qulils condition, n'ont & leurs vaudrait préalables je vier, soviétique, lettre voudra~t-il sa 35, quelle ayant militaire résultat pour ce gations nécessité ments, prise, 35. In this situation one is led to ask what options remain available, The United States, having found that continued self-denial on the military front not only appeared unproductive of results on the diplomatic front but also was resulting in a concession of advantages to its adversaries which it considered incompatible with its military obligations, found itself subject to the regrettable necessity of resuming bombing. We greatly regret that this step had to be taken, but much as we regret the resumption of bombing, the real object of regret must surely be the failure of North Viet-Nam to respond to the peace des surtout pas faites, décision Premier initiatives made to it. It was this failure which gave rise to that decision. As my Prime Minister stated yesterday: ments "It is tragic that the communist Governments are obviously determined to pursue their objectives through military means rather than by the processes of discussion and conciliation. Their callousness has wrecked what appeared to be a more hopeful development in the Viet-Namese situation. In the circumstances, the United States President faced a difficult and unenviable decision and he has the New Zealand Government's full understanding in the decision he has reached." & taires et runié rageante conditions, dans difficile, du quiil 36. clairement solution des la Unis rité, des dans toute doit 36. But at the same time the United States has made clear that its objective remains the achievement of a political solution preceded by areciprocal cessation of hostilities. This determination has been expressed most concretely by its decision to place the question before the Security Council as the appropriate organ of the United Nations, This decision must be seen as a part of a continuing effort in which every avenue that might possibly lead to a conference table must be explored. 37, des pas, gibles, sion 37. Where efforts by individual Governments, statesmen and other men of peace have thus far failed to produce tangible results, the international community, in its organized expression in the United Nations, is now given the opportunity to bring its collective skill Should wish to abdicate. Knowing how committed number of those members who have spoken today are to this institution, I would beg them to reflect on the impression which will be created in world opinion if the United Nations were to back away from consideration of the major political problem of the day. 38. As I have said, my delegation is well aware of the difficulties in the way of this Council as a United Nations forum playing a role virtually equivalent to that of a negotiating body. Here, a number of the objections posed by some of my colleagues this morning are perfectly valid. 39. But the fact remains that in the process of ralsing these objections representatives were drawn to and beyond the point at which a discussion of substance begins, The statements made began to demonstrate an active concern and very definite points of view on the issues involved in this tragic conflict, Is this not in itself of value? Is this not one of the benefits which we may look for fram Security Council discussion of the item once it has been inscribed? Why then should we not take that step in order to continue this process which began this morning and explore the issues involved in greater detail? We do not envisage, nor,asl understand it, do our colleagues, that the Council itself should necessarily be regarded as an appropriate vehicle for negotiation. But are we going to adopt the attitude that we have nothing to say, or that it is improper, whatever political and wellknown difficulties may be in the way, for the Council to discuss the question and to see whether there may be avenues showing promise of assisting in its solution? To deny even this seems to my delegation to be an abnegation of the Council's place in this Organization and indeed in the international community,

Since this is my first intervention, I should like to express first my delegation's particular pride and satisfaction at seeing on this very day the delegations of Japan, New Zealand, Bulgaria, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda and Argentina join forces with the rest of the members of the Security Council and embark with us ona wider road in meeting the challenges of today and tomorrow. I say "particular pride and satisfaction" advisedly, Mr. President, because my country like yours is a non-perma-~ nent member of this great body and therefore is overwhelmed with optimism to witness the team of 41, We look forward very earnestly to a more efficient, constructive and powerful Security Council with the United Nations Members more equitably represented on it. We contend that the Security Council as presently constituted is a positive step forward towards a stronger and healthier United Nations. 41, de plus nisation représentés. rité, progres plus 42, derniers & membres représentant de la délégation 42, And as we welcome whole-heartedly the newcomers in our midst, we also acknowledge and recognize the great services rendered by the departing members. I speak specifically of the representative of Malaysia, Mr. Ramani, the representative of the Ivory Coast, Mr, Usher, and the representative of Bolivia, Mr. Ortiz Sanz, and their respective delegations. My delegation will most certainly miss their wisdom and wit. leur 43, délégation insiste 43, Regarding the matter of the adoption of the agenda, my delegation is compelled to propose that, should it be decided that the matter be pressed to a vote, such a vote he postponed until a future date. ultérieure, 44, Avant constitue je mer de que salué 44, Mr, RUDA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Before I] refer to the adoption of the agenda, which is the first item on our provisional agenda, I should like, on behalf of the Argentine delegation, to express our thanks for the kind words with which the President and other members of the Security Council have welcomed us, together with other States, to the Council. autres, 45, témoignage remplir la dépendra stacquitte veiller nationales, lappui tine, ment tout fique la pays ne au 45, The Argentine Republic feels itself honoured once again by the trust placed in it by this election, We shall try to be faithful to the mandate given to us by the international community and we shall exert our best efforts to ensure that the Security Council fulfils its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. To that end, we pledge the total support of the Government of Argentina, whose foreign policy is based on the purposes and principles of the United Nations, particularly on the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes and the principle of collective security. The authentic traditions of my country have never belied its vocation for peace, which it now places at the disposal of this Organization. 46, sécurité, de nous entrée part, que quest du dernigres 46, We are glad to occupy this seat in a Security Council whose membership has been increased in accordance with the increased membership of the United Nations and in our turn we should like to greet the States which are joining this body with us. I should like to emphasize, moreover, my country's pleasure at the fact that it is replacing our sister country, Bolivia, whose contribution to the work of this Council has been so outstanding for the last two years, 47, argentin cupation 47, For the last few months the Argentine Government has been expressing in various bodies its profound concern about what is going on in South-East plete success, 48. Despite the geographical distance separating from the threatre of war, we considered then, as do now, that it is our duty to do all in our power support any moves to restore peace in South~East Asia, 49. Today no conflict is distant or alien to anyone. On the contrary, we are more than ever convinced that peace is indivisible and that no State can escape the terrible consequences of armed conflict. To fundamental concern for peace must now he added our membership in this Council and the duties entails, The Members of the United Nations have conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace security, which is the principal purpose of Organization, My delegation considers that the Security Council must fulfil that responsibility when, as in case of Viet-Nam, peace not only is threatened has already been breached, 50, In our view, the Security Council cannot evade this responsibility, There is no higher body alternative to the Security Council when peace threatened, No agreement, however important it may be, can establish bodies or machinery to replace when it is a question offulfilling its primary responsibility. Having applied these basic principles of Charter to the case of Viet-Nam, and specifically to the request by one of the parties concerned that we should exercise the powers vested in us, delegation considers that the Council should place the item under discussion on its agenda. We know—and this debate is proving it—that the acceptance of item will necessarily lead us to consider a series complex procedural and substantive problems, we are confident that in the course of the discussion we shall be able to find a peaceful solution to this grave problem, for the happiness and peace of people of Viel-Nam. 51, We have been entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining peace. Let us make every effort, us exhaust all possibilities, let us try every solution, let us explore every avenue, but let us not fail before we begin. 52, Mr. MARQUES SERE (Uruguay) (translated from Spanish): As we begin our meetings this year, delegation would like to express its pleasure at being a member of the Security Council with its new membership of fifteen and in which, after so many years, the African and Asian States are equitably represented. l'Argentine, sommes la Zélande coopérer sauvegarde 54, en représentants Bolivie, de tenons poste succés 54. It is also our pleasant duty to express our appreciation of the efficient and persevering work of the representatives of the countries which have ceased to be members of the Security Council: Mr. Ortiz Sanz of Bolivia, Mr. Usher of the Ivory Coast and Mr. Ramani of Malaysia. Lastly, we should like to offer our warm congratulations to you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the high office of President and our best wishes for success in your difficult task. délicate, 55. quelle A qui jalousement Conseil internationale, sont internationales; droit les ctest c'est dique le 55. My delegation would like briefly to express its support for the adoption of the agenda. In my delegation's opinion, the question transcends the specific point which we are discussing. My country has zealously defended the right of any State to call on the Security Council, as the highest body ofthe United Nations, to deal with questions which really concern international peace and security and it has expressed its legitimate hope that the Council will deal with the matters submitted to it. It is, we repeat, the right of every State, but it is above all the principal, and sometimes the only, defence of small countries under the existing system of international law. 56. contraire aujourd'hui, sécurité, certains renvoyer composition pices formule une le l'avenir tragique faveur sans vraiment question. 56, We do not think that these ideas conflict with some of the views expressed here today. Once the Council has taken cognizance of the matter, there is nothing to prevent anyone who so wishes from propos~ ing formula for referring the study of the question to other bodies which may be considered more appro~ priate and whose terms of reference may be deemed more adequate, The action of the Council in adopting proposals of this kind could thus be internal and, in a certain sense, procedural. Therefore, since the item has been proposed and since there is no sign of any effective solution to the tremendous and painful problem before us, my delegation will support the inclusion of this item in the agenda, although such action should not be taken to imply any judgement on our part as to the expedience or otherwise of dis~ cussing this matter at this time and in this place. 57, Monsieur cler la ainsi d'étre félicite sécurité

First of all, I wish to join previous speakers in welcoming both you, as our new President, and the seven newly elected countries as members of the Security Council. My delegation is particularly happy to see today an enlarged Security Council composed of fifteen members, 58. part la ont 58. Since 1958, the Netherlands has been actively engaged in efforts to amend the Charter so that the great number of newly independent nations would be more fully and more fairly represented inthe delibera- 53. We therefore welcome on the Council today the representatives of Argentina, Bulgaria, Japan, Mali New Aealand, Nigeria and Uganda, I should like extend a special word of good wishes and welcome those who are our antipodes on the globe but with whom we rub elhows at the Security Council table the left, namely New Zealand, since New Zealand has heen elevted to the additional seat of the group ealled "Western Europe and other States", 60, My delegation likewise joins the former speakers in expressing its deepest appreciation for the able way in which the three outgoing countries, Bolivia, the Ivery Coast and Malaysia, performed their task in this Council, We shall miss their experience and wise counsel in the deliberations of the non-permanent members, $1, The question which is before us today is whether the Security Council should decide to discuss the question of Vict-Nam as proposed in the letter of the representative of (he United States, dated 31 January 1966. It seems to my delegation that there is one basic anc determining fact in this connexion which fairly simple, The Members of the United Nations have, in Article 24 of the Charter, conferred upon the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenunce of international peace and security. Therefore, the one and overriding consideration determining whelher to discuss this specific subject is whether international peace and security are stuke—yes or no, Is there anyone who can deny that international peace and security are nowhere more dangerously threatened at the moment than they are in Viet-Nam? 62. In fact, in view of these simple and clear facts, it has long been an anomalous situation that the Security Council has not dealt with the one situation where internutional peace was most endangered, For practigal reasons, no country hadup to now considered it opportune to take the initiative to ask for a debate ou the subject of Viel-Nam, However, now that we have a specific request to discugs the subject for the purpose of trying to take a first step on the road to solution, the Security Council would, in our opinion, sadly fail in the duty entrusted to it by the Charter of the United Nations if it refused even to put the subject on its agenda, My delegation is of the opinion that it would constitute a serious precedent if the Security Council refused to discuss a dangerous situntion which was brought before it, a situation fraught with such serious consequences as is the present one, 63. My delegation has listened carefully to the interventions of a number of other delegations. We found in themi a number of arguments which we can appreciate and, too certain extent, understand, but which, nevertheless, in our opinion, do not constitute Security Council, 64. la cuter en ressent nisation effet, 64, The first objection which has been put forward is that the Security Council cannot discuss the subject because not all the countries involved or closely interested in the war in Viet-Nam are Members of the United Nations, This, indeed, has been one of the main considerations why up to now no one has asked to discuss the matter in the Security Council. Howquelles soit que effet, tuer ceci ever, now that we are faced with a request to discuss the matter, this cannot, in our opinion, be a determining factor against discussion, and this is so for two reasons. 65. paragraphe Unies 65. In the first place there is a legal reason. The Charter of the United Nations, in Article 2, paragraph 6, specifically states that: "The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security." Ainsi, a au méme bres Therefore, from the legal point of view, the Security Council is entitled to deal with a situation touching upon the maintenance of international peace and security even if non-members are involved. 66, a ctest préférence intéressés, Le pays tion Von raison entendu, et aura fois, débat ma n'aurons intéressés, Nam participer 66, Apart from the legal aspect, there is, of course, the very valid practical consideration that a discussion, in order to be fruitful, should by preference take place in the presence of all countries concerned, We realize that, The fact that some of the countries concerned in the case of Viet-Nam are not Members of the United Nations is no reason to object toa discussion, but it is a good reason to invite all the countries concerned, I realize that this is a question which is not before us and which will come up only after a decision has been taken on the provisional agenda, However, this aspect has been brought up in the debate and I should like to state now, on behalf of my delegation, that when the question does come up, we shall have no objection to inviting the countries concerned, notably South Viet-Nam, North Viet-Nam and the People's Republic of China, to participate in our debate on Viet-Nam. 67, de ce l'Organisation la délégation pas au le 67, A second objection which has heen brought forward to the inclusion. of the Viet-Nam question in our agenda is that this problem should not be solved in the context of the United Nations, but in the context of the Geneva Conference of 1954, Basically my delegation can agree with that point of view, but again this does not, in our opinion, constitute a reason to object to the proposed discussion in the Security Council. The purpose of the proposal is not to resolve the Viet-Nam question in the context of the United sation 68. In other words, if I understand the intention the United States proposal correctly, the intention precisely to arrive, by way of an initiative of Security Council, at talks within the context of Geneva Conference of 1954 and 1962, talks such desired by several of the speakers who have preceded me. It seems to me, therefore, that an objection debate in the Security Council on this ground springs from a misunderstanding of the actual purpose of present proposal. 69. There is a third objection which has been raised against the discussion of Viet~Nam in the Security Council, and that is that, in view of the resumption the bombardments of North Viet-Nam and of other circumstances, the situation is hardly propitious a fruitful debate in the Security Council, Undoubtedly, the situation is difficult and serious. One can certainly imagine more favourable circumstances or a more favourable moment for undertaking a debate on Viet~ Nam, But in the opinion of my delegation this again is no reason to desist from a debate now; if anything, to the contrary. The very seriousness of recent developments make it all the more necessary that should at last discuss this subject, If events allowed to run their course, a further escalation the war to ever bigger proportions seems inevitable, It is obvious that we stand at a new turn of the road leading to a growing disaster, It should never be said that at such a critical moment the Security Council even refused to discuss the subject in order to try contribute to a peaceful solution. 70. For these reasons, my delegation, although fully realizing the great difficulties involved in the discus~ sion at this moment, will vote for the inclusion of subject on our agenda,

Mr, President, in deference your wishes, I hesitate even for a moment to impose on the Council by expressions of a formal nature. However, it is more than formality when I express my delegation's sincere welcome to you and to other members who have just come into the Council. It my delegation's belief that the Council, reflecting it now does the enlarged membership of the Organization, will be able to dischrage its duties and functions with an increasing sense of responsibility. 72. We are still on the point of adopting the agenda, In the many years I have served in this Council, seldom have come across an occasion when Council declined to consider an item brought before it by a Member of the United Nations. In the present case the request comes from a member ofthe Council and the matter to be considered is one of the greatest urgency, universally regarded as an explosive situa- 3/ Agreements signed at the International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, held at Geneva from 12 May 1961 23 July 1962; see United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 456 (1963), No. 6564. 73, ne communistes une la raisons chinois de au né réglement attiser chaque guerre a faire ses placer régimes nia Dans munistes A pompiers. 73. There are some representatives who contend that the Council should not consider the item in the absence of the Chinese Communists. I do not propose to enter into any discussion on any aspects of the question of so-called Chinese representation. But I have every reason to believe that the presence of the Chinese Communists will only make any solution of the Viet-Nam situation impossible. Those who have followed the pronouncements of the Chinese Communists closely cannot help being aware that Peiping wants no settlement of conflicts; on the contrary, it thrives on crises and conflicts. It promotes crises and conflicts wherever and whenever it is possible to do so. This is what it calls people's wars. Just the other day Peiping made it abundantly clear that it intends to make Thailand a second Viet-Nam and to export its guerrilla warfare to Malaysia, Its objective is to replace all non-communist régimes by communist régimes, Even Sukarno's Indonesia hag not been exempt from this over-all objective. This being so, it is clear that to invite the Chinese Communists to the Security Council is tantamount to inviting the arsonist to join the fire brigade. The consequence is grave indeed. graves. 74, question sans Conseil 74, For our present purposes I will content myself by saying that this question of inviting the Chinese Communists is irrelevant to our inscription of the item on the agenda. 75, sur la 75, The PRESIDENT (translated from French):- I have no more speakers on my list, May I now speak as the representative of JAPAN. [The speaker continued in English.] 76, rations sion devrait lOrganisation ponsable Il voir du cessation depuis efforts avec autorités des conduisant si 76, I have listened carefully to the previous interventions on this question and I have come to the conclusion that the opportunity to discuss the question should not be denied to the Council, whichis the organ of the United Nations primarily responsible for the maintenance of peace and security. It is well known that the Japanese Government is anxious to see a peaceful settlement of the question of Viet-Nam. Taking advantage of the opportunity provided by the cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam since Christmas 1965, my Government has carried out intensive diplomatic efforts, in close touch with a considerable number of States, in the hope that the North Viet-Namese authorities would agree to enter into negotiations and thus create an opportunity for the peaceful solution of that very grave, complex and difficult problem. 77, dépit dépit A moyens encore aucun 77. We very profoundly regret, therefore, that despite the efforts carried out by many countries, including my own, and also despite the sincere efforts of the United States to seek a peaceful solution by every possible means, no favourable response has been received as yet from Hanoi, While having no doubts whatsoever about the sincerity of the United States, statements made by the representatives of the United States to the effect that the United States is quite determined to continue pursuing a peaceful settlement with the utmost diligence and through every possible channel. 78, For this reason, as my Government sees it, United States, in order to leave no stone unturned, arrived at the conclusion to bring this question, this time, to the Security Council. My Government sincerely hopes that all efforts for peace in Viet-Nam will be continued relentlessly and intensified more than ever before so that those who still seem maintain a very rigid attitude will change their minds, making the achievement of peace possible by taking into account, practically and realistically, the public opinion of the world, which certainly is most anxious to recover peace in South-East Asia, 79, My Government, for its part, intends to continue its own devoted efforts, continuing to explore every possible measure that may lead the parties directly concerned to negotiate for peace, The Japanese Government approves and supports the decisions made by the United States Government to take this question to the Security Council as one of the means available in the search for a peaceful solution of question of Viet-Nam. 80. For these reasons, my Government will vote favour of the adoption of the agenda. [The speaker resumed in French] 81. Speaking as PRESIDENT, I now give the floor the representative of the United States who wishes exercise his right of reply. 82. Mr, GOLDBERG (United States of America): the 1271st meeting I attempted to explain tn some detail the reasons that have impelled my Government to bring the question of Viet-Nam to the Security Council. I shall not repeat that explanation, butI shall endeavour to deal briefly with the doubts that have been raised by other members about the usefulness of Security Council consideration of this problem this time. 83. I have listened very carefully to the discussion that has taken place, both this morning and afternoon; I agree with the wise observation made the representative of New Zealand, that the discussions today—which, of necessity, have extended somewhat beyond the agenda item—have already demonstrated their value. Our discussion in the Security Council, although vigorous, was to be anticipated; although reflective of varying points of view about main problem at hand, as well as being concerned with procedure, it has been temperate—to the surprise probably of some—reasonable, and informative. I appreciative particularly of the interventions of new members of the Security Council, which have been of high quality. 1 have listened to them and to the older 84, qguiont discussion, par apprécier précieuse. que sentant ment; allusion soviétique leur les international bléme Vorgane occuper, Le premier concernant Genéve pour 84, Now I shall turn to some of the questions raised by members in the course of our discussion. I should like to deal with what was first pointed cut by the representative of France, whose wisdom Ihave learned to appreciate very much, and whose friendship I deeply value. The question he raised is a very important one and has been raised by others—the representative of Mali and the representative of Uganda—and it has been adverted to by the representative of Bulgaria, and I think was mentioned also by the representative of the Soviet Union, Their point is this: it has been pointed out by them that the Geneva Conference, at which all parties to the conflict are represented, has been the international body which has in the past dealt with the problem of Viet-Nam; and it has been claimed that it still remains the appropriate body to do so, The United States has no quarrel with this contention, The first of the fourteen points which represent a summary of our policy on Viet-Nam states: "The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962are an adequate basis for peace in South-East Asia," 85, avec rence Royaume-Uni, la coprésidence une pour nouvelle llaccueil L'Union démarche Que demain évidemment soit 85, We have repeatedly stated that we would welcome the reconvening of the Geneva Conference for this purpose, Indeed, the Government of the United Kingdom, one of the Co~Chairmen of this Conference, has specifically addressed a request to the Government of the Soviet Union, the other Co-Chairman, that they issue a joint call for the reconvening of the Conference. But how was that proposal received? The Soviet Union refused to join in any steps to reconvene the Conference. Let the joint chairmen issue the call today, and we will be in Geneva tomorrow at a conference, and then indeed there will he no necessity for the Security Council to deal with this matter, 86. projet n'a convocation pas des tions, Conseil Conseil moins, qu'il aussi 86. It has been correctly pointed out that the purpose of our draft resolution [$/7106] is to assist in what thus far it has not been possible to realize: the reconvening of the Geneva Conference. That has not been possible to realize not because of any opposition on the part of the United States; quite the contrary. Under these circumstances, therefore, the choice before us members of the Security Council is not whether to deal with this problem in the Council, or to deal with it in Geneva, but whether to deal with it at all. The door to Geneva is, at least for the time being, closed, and the question we have to decide is a plain and a simple one: do we wish also to close the door to the United Nations? What will the people of du monde the world say if we do? 87. sieurs pas et 87. It has been pointed out by members here that several of the parties to the conflict in Viet~-Nam are not Members of the United Nations, and therefore are not in a position to present their casehere, But others to the dispute*, 88. It is also to be remembered that there Charter obligation which reaches beyond the Members of the United Nations, Article 2, paragraph 6, says: "The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in cordance with these Principles so far as may necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security." 89, Furthermore, this Organization has, of course, had experience with this matter before, This is new subject for our consideration, We have considered matters in the past, and presumably will do so in future, where Members or non-members of the United Nations have refused to participate. The Government of South Africa has consistently refused to participate in proceedings of this Council dealing with the problem of apartheid, and the Council has—rightly, we believe never permitted itself to be prevented by this refusal from dealing with a problem that it believed to clearly within the scope of its responsibility, 90. It has been said: Why has the United States brought the problem of Viet-Nam to the Council before? I should like to remind the members of Council that in August 1964 we brought an aspect the problem of Viet-Nam to the Security Council—the Gulf of Tonkin incident, It was no fault of the United States that that was not fully explored. I should like to remind the members of the Council that Security Council documents we have repeatedly pealed to the United Nations and all of its organs assistance in the settlement of this dispute. 91. One of my colleagues has suggested that Council should not atternpt to deal with the problem unless it is assured that it can do so successfully. To do so unsuccessfully, he claims, would be a to its prestige, Let me point out that the Council not been inhibited in the pastfrom dealing with threats to the peace of the world because it could not assured of doing so successfully, Indeed, it can hardly expect to have any such assurance in advance. had it in advance, the matter would probably not to come to the Council. My colleagues here remember that only a few months ago a full~scale war broke out between two great Members of United Nations, India and Pakistan. Neither saw to bring this conflict before the Security Council. Nevertheless the Council most rightly decided that must seek to bring an early end to this threat to peace of the world despite how the parties to conflict might feel. Though success was far assured when we began our deliberations, the Council did deal most vigorously and mest unitedly with war, and in a matter of weeks, overcoming serious obstacles it did bring about a cease-fire which still obtains. In other cases, candour compels 92, Mais méme siennes prestige 92, Were the Council, however, to refuse even to attempt to carry out the obligations laid upon it by the Charter, what credit and what prestige could it hope to have in the world? I must say that I completely fail to understand how those States which repeatedly insist that the Security Council, and the Security Council alone, has the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security can now deny its competence. Permit me to say most solemnly to my fellow members of the Council at this critical juncture of its history that what is at stake here is not the United States position; we have brought the matter to the Council, What is at stake here is the matter of how the world will judge the Council if it refuses even to discuss and consider that problem which public opinion almost everywhere considers to be the most serious threat to the peace now confronting mankind, What reliance, what confidence will the peoples of the world henceforth place in the Security Council—in the United Nations itself if we adjourn without having made an attempt to deal Jtavoue prendre que c'est combe la sécurité en question permis collégues histoire, n'est saisi le c'est le stil se probléme universellement grave & Quelle pourront~ils sécurité nous nous la question? with this matter? 98. Enfin, légues clest-A~dire seil, ainsi nous avons Conseil blame des autres mandons le poids entretiens entre vue de assurer et de 1962". 93, Finally, I would remind my colleagues once again of what I said a few minutes earlier, of what the United States seeks from this Council and what is apparent from the draft resolution that we have placed before the Council, We do not expect the Council itself to solve the whole problem of Viet- Nam, either with or without the other parties to the conflict, What we ask is only that the Council lend its tremendous weight and prestige by calling for “immediate discussions without preconditions... among the appropriate interested Governments to arrange a conference looking towards the application of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962", 94, Ce en rien demandé que nous offre son du Sud-Est, médiateurs, soit par peut certainement sous-estimer fait que sabilités dans le nullement de chercher liation facgon dont 94, What we are asking the Council to do is in no way different from what the non-aligned countries did in their appeal on this subject, What we ask is only that this Council offer its assistance in bringing about peace in South-East Asia, perhaps through the provision of arbitrators or mediators as His Holiness the Pope has suggested, or perhaps through some other appropriate means. So much certainly we can do, And let us not underestimate the effect of our doing this. The fact that we are attempting to fulfil our responsibilities for the peace of the world by taking action along these lines would not in any way inhibit or prevent any Government or Governments from seeking to promote negotiation or conciliation through other channels, A recent example of how that could be done has been provided by the welcome intervention of the Soviet Union at Tashkent, which 95. We would welcome any and all efforts to the end of a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam such as we have heen attempting to exert; but in the absence of such efforts at this time showing any prospect of success, and confronted with the refusal of the Government. of North Viet-Nam to take part in unconditional negotiations under the auspices we have tried to arrange, we Continue to believe that the body primarily charged with the maintenance of the peace of the world has every right and, more important, every duty to explore earnestly and without fear of failure what can do at this critical turning-point in world affairs. 98, The PRESIDENT (translated from French); give the floor to the representative of Mali who wishes to exercise his right of reply, 97, Mr, COULIBALY (Mali) (translated from French): I must apologize for speaking again in this procedural debate, but, as I pointed out this morning, the Government of the Republic of Mali is deeply disturbed about what is happening in Viet~-Nam and fervently hopes that an equitable solution can be found, without any demonstrations of passion or statements directed to one or other of the parties concerned in the conflict. In the present circumstances and in view ofthe international situation, a discussion on the question of Viet~Nam in the Security Council would only aggravate a state of affairs which is already critical. 98, My Government has followed the diplomatic activitles of the United States in recent weeks with interest, But the positions of the parties concerned have been hardened for so long and so much distrust has been generated between them after the long years of war that the diplomatic offensive launched by the United States Government instead of ending in resumption of the bombing, should have been more persevering and should have been accompanied by measures calculated to create an atmosphere of confidence conducive to dialogue, Such an attitude would have demonstrated an evident desire to negotiate with the parties concerned in the conflict, 99, We know that there are some States which are imbued with a sincere desire to bring about rapprochement of the views of the parties engaged in the conflict in Viet-Nam, Consequently a premature discussion in the Security Council, which would paralyse or render more difficult the efforts that certain Governments are making or thinking of making, or the good offices they are using, to restore peace in Viet-Nam, would be inadvisable. In our view, substantive discussion of the question in the Security Council cannot at this moment serve the higher interests of the Viet-Namese people. For that reason I should like to support the suggestion made by the representatives of Uganda and Jordan that no vote should be taken now on the adoption of the agenda. 100. -pas 100. What my delegation is seeking isnot accusations or justifications for any specific action; that would do nothing to alleviate the sufferings of the Viet-Namese people, who are the principal victims of the tragedy with which we are concerned today. What we are proposing is not that the Security Council should evade its responsibilities; we want any action by the Council to be undertaken in the conditions most likely to lead to success and at the propertime, for what we are concerned about is the interests of the Viet- Namese people and the search for an effective and appropriate way of satisfying the legitimate aspiratelle frances victime Ce du de optima car peuple efficace légitimes tions of those people. 101. sentant sur suggestion, réel aux de sécurité danie et courtoisie du présence une 101, We might therefore comply with the Jordanian representative's request and not vote today on the adoption of the agenda, In making this suggestion, my delegation is guided by a real desire tohelp as ohjectively as possible in the work of the Security Council because of the importance we attach to the maintenance of international peace and security, The represen~ tative of Jordan has requested that no vote should be taken today and I think that elementary courtesy demands that his request should be granted, particularly since the Security Council has been convened so suddenly on such an important matter, 102, voudrais socier africains la sions rechercher que dénouement nerait 102, Mr. ADEBO (Nigeria): I just want to take this opportunity to associate myself with the appeal made by the representatives of Africa and the represen~ tative of Jordan on the question of a vote, That appeal was the result of discussion which we held in order to discover what would seem to be a way out which would make the discussions that we have already held of value, rather than an impediment tothehappy reso~ lution of the Viet-Nam question, 103, listes soviétique remarques 103, Mr, FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Re~ publics) (translated from Russian): My delegation deems it necessary to make a few remarks in con nexion with the statement of the United States repredes sentative, 104. parole proposition de l'appui longueur Etats-Unis évidemment montée son devoir de Genéve, 104. The United States representative, who was speaking for the second time, made an effort to salvage the United States proposal to convene the Security Council, which clearly lacked the support of quite a number of members, Despite the length of his statement, the United States representative actually said nothing new, and he was, of course, unsuccessful in making any more attractive this latest farce which the United States is now enacting, In addition to everything else, he took the liberty of referring to the position of the Soviet Union, as a Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, 105. observations, sont 105, We must draw the attention of the Security Council to the fact that those comments reflect an extremely free interpretation, to put it very mildly, 107, What is the situation there today? Is it nota _known fact that South Viet-Nam has been taken over by United States interventionist hordes, which by now number in the hundreds of thousands? The situation in Viet-Nam today is the direct result of the perfidious violation by Washington of the Geneva Agreemeuts, and full responsibility for the tragic consequences in Viet-Nam lies squarely and exclusively on the United States, which has unleashed a criminal war of aggression and is continuing to trample on the most elementary principles of international law and on the Charter of the United Nations, 108, In order to make perfectly clear the position of the Soviet Union with regard to the question of Viet~ Nam, we should like to draw the Council's attention to the message sent by Mr, Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in reply to a message from President Ho Chi Minh, In that reply the position of the Soviet Union is again set forth, With the President's permission, I shall read out the text of the reply, Dear Comrade Ho Chi Minh, "We have received your message of 24 January 1966, which we have studied with the most careful attention, The Soviet people fully share the anger of the Viet-Namese people at the aggressive acts of the United States and vigorously condemn the armed intervention by the United States in the southern part of your country and its aggression against the sovereign socialist State of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, The sending of United States troops to South Viet-Nam, their use of napalm bombs and of toxic and poisonous substances against: the South Viet-Namese people, the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the incursions into its air space constitute acts of aggression and violations of the principles of international law and the Geneva Agreements of 1954, The aggression of the United States imperialists against Viet-Nam has seriously complicated the whole international situation, In extending military action to parts of Laos and multiplying its provocations against Cambodia, the United States is expanding the limits of its aggression and still further jeopardizing the peace and security of the peoples, "The Soviet people are filled with admiration for the courage and steadfastness of the Viet-Namese people in their struggle against imperialist aggres= sion and for the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of their country, and "The Soviet people are deeply in sympathy with the efforts of the Viet-Namese people to restore peace in their country, We support the position of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the programme of the National Liberation Front with regard to a settlement in Viet-Nam, deeming them to be in conformity with the provisions of the Geneva Agreements and with the interests of a lasting peace in Indo-China and South-East Asia, "We agree with you, Comrade President, that if the Government of the United States really desires a peaceful settlement it should recagnize the justice of the four points made by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and confirm that position by deeds, unconditionally discontinuing once and for all its bombings and allother acts of aggres~ sion against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, That would create an atmosphere conducive to a political settlement of the Viet-Namese problem, "The United States, while resorting to various political manceuvres, refuses to accept the legiti~ mate demands of the Viet-Namese people, What is more, it is contininuing to increase the number of its armed forces in South Viet-Nam and is ex~ panding the scope of the war against the South Viet-Namese people. Recently, as is known, the United States Government submitted to Congress a request for almost $13,000 million to expand mili~ tary operations in South Viet-Nam, It does not wish to recognize the National Liberation Front as the true representative of the people of South Viet-Nam and negotiate with it. Instead of putting an uncondi~ tional end, once and for all, to its piratical air raids on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the United States has ceased such raids temporarily and presented ultimata to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, The resumption by the United States Air Force of the barbarous bombing of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has revealed to the whole world the falsity of the so-called United States peace offensive. It still further complicates the international situation, "All this shows that the actual deeds of the United States are clearly at variance with its declared desire for a political settlement in Viet- Nam, be on their side," 109. My delegation again deems it necessary emphasize that it objects to the convening of Security Council for the purpose of discussing Viet-Namese question and protests against the inclusion of this question in the Council's agenda. Soviet Union, as everyone knows, supports the position of the Government of the Democratic public of Viet-Nam that the Viet-Namese question should be settled in the context of the Geneva Agreements. It is clear that the United States proposal the question of Viet-Nam should be considered in Security Council is not aimed at a genuine settlement of that question but is simply a diversionary manoeuvre designed to conceal, behind talk of a settlement Viet-Nam, the steps which the United States is taking to expand its war of aggression, 110, The PRESIDENT (translated from French): have no more speakers on my list, During his remarks, the representative of Jordan mentioned the possibility of deferring the decision on the question of the adoption of the agenda, That proposal was supported the representatives of Mali and Nigeria, Moreover, a similar proposal, or at least one along the same lines, was made by the representative of Uganda. the circumstances, I should like to ask the representative of Jordan if he wishes to submit a formal motion for adjournment and, if so, whether he could indicate until what date he proposes that the meeting should be adjourned.

| regret that I did not make myself specific when I referred to my proposal postpone the voting on the adoption of the agenda, Since I have this opportunity, I should like to supplement my first statement by saying again that formally propose that the voting on the adoption the agenda be postponed at least until tomorrow afternoon. I have no formal objection to a later for the postponement, 112, The PRESIDENT (translated from French): representative of Jordan has just made a formal proposal that the decision on placing the itemin question on the agenda should be adjourned until 3 p.m, tomorrow, If I hear no objections, I shall take that the Council adopts this motion, Jt was so decided. The meeting rose at 6 p.m.